

then went on to found and run her own company called Dunhill of Harrisburg. In these positions, she cultivated her skills as a great leader and a great motivator.

In 1977, she became the executive director of the Alcoholism and Addiction Association of Pennsylvania. In this position, she established the first successful statewide collaboration in Pennsylvania between alcoholism treatment efforts and drug abuse treatment efforts. She brought the treatment groups together with the recognition that both alcoholism and drug abuse are addictions. Today, that connection between alcoholism and drug addiction seem so logical. It has become an accepted notion. But it was Luceille who was at the forefront of bringing these two groups together.

From there, Luceille was appointed deputy secretary of Health for Drug and Alcohol Programs in Pennsylvania. She supervised the policy and implementation of the State's drug and alcohol treatment effort. This experience at the State government level gave Luceille insights into how an effective statewide alcohol and drug addiction services agency should be run.

Fortunately, Luceille was willing to bring these insights to our State of Ohio. In 1989, Luceille was hired after an exhaustive search to develop a cabinet-level agency to manage a statewide substance-abuse treatment network. She was hired by then-Governor Dick Celeste. Prior to her arrival, Ohio had two different agencies overseeing drug and alcohol treatment programs. A panel recommended combining the two agencies. Luceille was tasked with the creation of that single agency. It was a huge job but one for which she was more than qualified. While she excelled in her previous positions, as director of the Ohio Department of Alcohol and Drug Addiction Services, Luceille truly thrived. Under Director Fleming's leadership, the agency developed innovative programs, reaching out to many different communities. Director Fleming fostered programs for juveniles and children, including youth mentoring, Head Start, and underage drinking prevention. She also established and supervised programs that served women recovering from substance abuse, helping them to reunite with their children. What could be more important than that?

During her 14-year tenure under three Ohio Governors, including the current occupant of the chair, one of Director Fleming's top priorities was the expansion of the drug courts program which helped reduce recidivism, encouraging the proper treatment of offenders with substance abuse programs. When Director Fleming started, there was only one drug court in the State of Ohio. Today, there are 55. That is thanks, certainly, to the current occupant of the chair, and it is also thanks to Director Luceille Fleming.

I have had the pleasure of working with Luceille directly, both when I was

serving as lieutenant governor and now as Senator. Her experience, her judgment have proven invaluable to me. I have sought her advice many times, both as lieutenant governor and now for the last 9 years as Senator. I can tell Members of the Senate, many days I have picked up the phone and called Luceille to get her advice on a bill or program. She has always been very candid, very open, very helpful, and had very good insight.

I am grateful for her advice and her expertise as we collaborated on the safe and drug-free schools bill and other bills. Luceille's insights and contributions added tremendously to that law and helped make it a truly effective piece of legislation.

After Luceille's retirement was announced, I read several news stories about her career and her contributions to the State of Ohio. While reading, I was struck in particular by one quote from Paul Coleman, president of Maryhaven, a substance abuse treatment center in Ohio. He said Director Fleming has "a passion that burns to help people." Paul Coleman's statement says it all. If I had to come up with one statement that sums up Luceille Fleming, it would be she truly has a passion that burns to help people and she has channeled this passion into a life of service and dedication to others.

Luceille Fleming retired last week at the age of 79—yes, 79—to take a breather and enjoy some time off. Those who know Luceille know she probably won't take a lot of time off and she will plunge back into something. She has been working at the Department of Alcohol and Drug Addiction Services since she was 65 years old. Most people at that point in their life would have decided to take it easy, kick back, and maybe relax. But not Luceille. She instead decided to take a position in government to build a State agency from the ground up. Her energy and her drive are truly remarkable.

I conclude my remarks with a quote from Luceille herself. Upon taking her position with the agency, somebody asked at her first press conference about her age. To this question she simply said: "Well, you know, I think the hair thins, the hips thicken, but the mind sharpens."

I cannot speak to the first two parts of that statement, but I can tell you for certain that the last part is true in regard to Luceille. Luceille is sharp, she is bright, she is focused—more today than ever. She has helped so many people during her career, and the people of Ohio and the Nation are, indeed, grateful.

Luceille, you will be missed at the agency. You will be missed in the State of Ohio. We are grateful for what you have done.

The Presiding Officer and I had the opportunity to work with Luceille. It was my job as lieutenant governor to work with the current occupant of the chair, my colleague from the State of

Ohio, in the drug addiction area, substance abuse area, when I was lieutenant governor and the current occupant of the chair was Governor. Dick Celeste, former Governor, picked Luceille to head up this new agency, to create this new agency. She had run it for a number of years and built it up. Then-Governor-elect VOINOVICH had taken over, and it was our job to decide whether Luceille was going to continue in that position. We looked all over the State of Ohio and across the country to determine who should occupy that position. After a long search, we decided—then-Governor-elect VOINOVICH decided that Luceille Fleming, the person who was in that position, was the best person to continue.

We were not disappointed. We had the opportunity to work with Luceille, to sit in Cabinet meetings with her. I had the chance to work with her many times on a detailed basis to talk about substance abuse problems, alcohol and addiction problems, wrestled with these problems, problems in the prisons, problems in our communities. She is just an amazing person, someone who truly understands the gravity of the problem, how it infests our communities, the damage it does to our young people. She was always optimistic, always believed we could do more, always said: MIKE, if we could just move in this direction, if we could just move forward a little bit more, we could save some lives. We could turn some young people's lives around. We can make a difference. Let's try this. Let's try that. We can do better. To see someone now 79 who still has that optimism, who still has that belief—we can do better, we can do more—is a wonderful thing to see.

I salute Luceille Fleming for her 14 years of service to the State of Ohio, for her optimism, for her vision.

Luceille, thank you for the work you have done. Those in Ohio who have worked with you are truly grateful for your service to the people of the State. We appreciate it very much. You are a true visionary. You are a dear person, someone who has contributed a great deal to our State and to the people we always serve.

I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH). Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### BUILDUP TO WAR ON IRAQ

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, last week, CIA Director George Tenet accepted responsibility for having gone along with the African uranium statement in the President's State of the Union address. His acknowledgment that it should not

have been included in the address and his acceptance of responsibility was appropriate. But his explanation of the CIA's acquiescence in allowing the use of a clearly misleading statement raises more questions than it answers, and statements by other administration officials, particularly National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, compound the problem.

Even more troubling, however, is the fact that the uranium statement appears to be but one of a number of several questionable statements and exaggerations by the intelligence community and administration officials that were issued in the buildup to the war. The importance of objective and credible intelligence cannot be overstated. It is therefore essential that we have a thorough, open and bipartisan inquiry into the objectivity, credibility and use of U.S. intelligence before the Iraq war.

First, relative to the uranium issue:

The President in his State of the Union Message said that the British Government had learned that Iraq recently sought to purchase significant quantities of uranium from Africa. The sole purpose of that statement was to make the American people believe that the American Government believed the statement to be true and that it was strong evidence of Iraq's attempt to obtain nuclear weapons. But the truth was that, at the very time the words were spoken, our Government did not believe it was true. Condoleezza Rice's effort to justify the statement on the grounds that it was "technically accurate" doesn't address the heart of the matter, which is that the statement was calculated to create a false impression. It is simply wrong to make a statement whose purpose is to make people believe something when you do not believe it yourself.

It is all well and good that the CIA has acknowledged its role in caving in to pressure from the National Security Council to concur in something which it did not believe. But Director Tenet's acknowledgment raises further questions of who was pushing the false impression at the National Security Council. The NSC should not misuse intelligence that way.

The President's statement that Iraq was attempting to acquire African uranium was not a "mistake." It was not inadvertent. It was not a slip. It was negotiated between the CIA and the NSC. It was calculated, and it was misleading. And what compounds its misleading nature is that the CIA not only "differed with the British dossier on the reliability of the uranium reporting," to use Director Tenet's words, but the CIA had also "expressed [its] reservations" to the British in September 2002, nearly 5 months before the State of the Union Address. Furthermore, the CIA pressed the White House to remove a similar reference from the President's speech on October 7, 2002, and the White House did so—nearly 4 months before the State of the Union Address.

The uranium issue is not just about sixteen words. It is about the conscious decisions that were made, apparently by the NSC and concurred in by the CIA, to create a false impression. And

it is not an isolated example. There is troubling evidence of other dubious statements and exaggerations by the intelligence community and administration officials.

Relative to aluminum tubes, in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly on September 12, 2002, President Bush said, "Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon." In fact, an unclassified intelligence assessment in October acknowledged that some intelligence specialists "believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs," and on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the U.N. Security Council that "we all know there are differences of opinion," and that "there is controversy about what these tubes are for." The International Atomic Energy Agency, after conducting an inquiry into the aluminum tubes issue, concluded they were not for uranium enrichment.

On the Iraq-al-Qaida connection: On September 27 of last year, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the administration's search for hard evidence for a connection between Iraq and al-Qaida. He said, "We ended up with five or six sentences that were bullet-proof. We could say them, they are factual, they are exactly accurate. They demonstrate that there are in fact al-Qaida in Iraq." While Secretary Rumsfeld later went on to say, "They are not beyond a reasonable doubt," he did not say there was considerable uncertainty in the intelligence community about the nature and extent of ties between Iraq and al-Qaida. It was certainly never a "bullet-proof" case.

On nuclear reconstitution, last Sunday, Ms. Rice said, "We have never said that we thought he [Saddam] had nuclear weapons." But Vice President CHENEY said on March 16, "We believe he [Saddam] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons."

On the question of certainty that Iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons, on August 26, 2002, Vice President CHENEY said: "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us." On September 26, 2002, President Bush said, "The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons." On March 17, 2003, President Bush told the Nation that "intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised." And on March 30, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, "We know where they [weapons of mass destruction] are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat." The fruitless search to date for Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction dur-

ing and after our entry into Iraq suggests that our intelligence was either way off the mark or seriously stretched.

As to mobile biological warfare labs, on May 28, 2003, the CIA posted on its Web site a document it prepared with the Defense Intelligence Agency entitled, "Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants." This report, which is still on the CIA Web site, concluded that the two trailers found in Iraq were for biological warfare agent production, even though other experts and intelligence community members do not agree with that conclusion, or believe there is not enough evidence to reach such a conclusion. None of these alternative views have been posted on the CIA's Web page.

On White House Web site photos, on October 8, 2002, the White House placed three sets of satellite photos on its Web site, with the headline, "Construction at three Iraqi nuclear weapons-related facilities." Although one of the facilities was not nuclear-related, the captions of the photos gave the impression that Iraq was proceeding with work on weapons of mass destruction at these facilities, although UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections at these facilities found no prohibited activities or weapons. For instances, related to the Al Furat manufacturing facility, the caption notes that "the building was originally intended to house a centrifuge enrichment cascade operation supporting Iraq's uranium enrichment efforts" and that after construction resumed in 2001, "the building appears operational."

So the misleading statement about African uranium is not an isolated issue. There is a significant amount of troubling evidence that it was part of a pattern of exaggeration and misleading statements. That is what a thorough, open and bipartisan investigation should examine.

Finally, again relative to the uranium statement, I am deeply troubled by Ms. Rice's continuing justification of the use of the statement in the President's State of the Union Address. She repeatedly says it was "accurate," despite the fact that its clear aim was to create a false impression. Her statement and Director Tenet's statement raise more questions than they answer. Here are some of those questions:

One, who in the administration was pressing the CIA to concur in a statement that the CIA did not believe was true, and why did they do so even after the CIA objected to the text?

Two, who at the CIA was involved in pressing the White House to remove the similar reference from the October 7 speech, and what reasons did they give for removing it?

Three, who in the White House was involved in removing a similar reference from the President's speech on October 7, nearly 4 months before the State of the Union speech?

Four, who at the CIA knew about the decision to tell the British intelligence

service in September, 2002 of CIA's "reservations" about the inclusion of references to Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium from Africa in the British intelligence service's September 24 dossier?

Five, given the doubts of the U.S. Intelligence Community, why didn't the President say in his State of the Union speech not only that "The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa" but that "our U.S. intelligence community has serious doubts about such reporting"?

Six, how and when did the U.S. Government receive the forged documents on Niger, and when did it become aware that they might be bogus?

And, seven, what role did the Office of the Vice President have in bringing about an inquiry into Iraq's purported efforts to obtain uranium from Niger? Was the Vice President's staff briefed on the results of Ambassador Wilson's trip to Niger?

These and many other questions underscore the critical importance of a bipartisan, open, and thorough inquiry into the objectivity and credibility of intelligence concerning the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq immediately before the war and the alleged Iraq al-Qaida connection, and the use of such intelligence by the Department of Defense in policy decisions, military planning and the conduct of operations in Iraq.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate the Defense appropriations bill.

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#### CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, morning business is closed.

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#### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2004

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 10:30 having arrived, the Senate will resume consideration of H.R. 2658, which the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 2658) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I compliment the distinguished Senator from Michigan for his thorough and thoughtful statement involving many of the questions that need to be asked and need to be answered. His recommendation to the Senate and to our country that there be a thorough investigation, a bipartisan investigation, where these questions can be answered

and the information provided, in my view, is essential.

We have become more and more confused over the course of the last several days with regard to the conflicting information provided by the administration on these and other key questions. We must find a way with which each of these questions can be clarified and for the administration to come forth with a clear acknowledgement of the need for this clarification is essential.

The American people deserve a thorough, complete, open review of each and every one of these questions. The Intelligence Committee has begun its work, and I commend the distinguished ranking member for his efforts and his persistence in bringing it to this point. I think this has now gone beyond the matter of just intelligence, as the Senator from Michigan has pointed out with questions and the concerns he raised in his speech this morning.

We will address these questions both legislatively and rhetorically over the course of the next several days. But I have very fundamental questions with regard to the bill itself. Others have raised them.

Why is it that there is not one dime requested for the Iraqi operation in the Defense appropriations bill? Why is it that there is not one dime requested for the Defense Department's efforts in the war on terror? Not one dime. I am just baffled. It is sort of legislative never-never land for us to be involved in a war that we are already told by the Secretary of Defense—at least with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan—is costing this country \$5 billion a month, and there is not \$1 requested in this bill for that operation.

How in the world can we be on the Senate floor talking about something as consequential as this—not only to us but to the world—and not have a better appreciation of what the costs and implications and fiscal consequences are? So that, too, will be a matter that I hope will be the subject of great debate in the Senate Chamber.

We admire the work done by our military. We are grateful for the extraordinary effort and sacrifice made by the Armed Forces. Many of our National Guard and Reserve personnel have been in that country now for over 6 months. The sacrifice and the extraordinary effort they have made on behalf of their country ought to be commended. But another question comes to mind as we consider that sacrifice: Why are we doing it alone? And why is it the administration continues to refuse to request additional resources, officially, from NATO? Why is it they are unwilling to ask the United Nations to urge its members to provide military force and civilian police? Why is that not a part of the administration position?

We find ourselves in a very unusual set of circumstances. We are debating the single largest Defense appropriations bill in history but a bill that does not in any way reflect the cost of our

presence and the effort being made at this very moment in Iraq or in Afghanistan or the war on terror.

We know it is going to continue to cost this country billions of dollars each and every month, but we do not know why the administration refuses to ask others officially for help, especially NATO, and we certainly do not know the answers to the questions raised by the distinguished Senator from Michigan just moments ago.

We must have those answers, and I hope during the course of this debate we can find mechanisms and subscribe to procedures that will ensure that the American people have all the facts.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I do not mean to be disrespectful and interrupt the distinguished leader, but I wonder if the Democratic leader knows that I am responsible for not having more money for Iraq in this bill. We met with the President and the Secretary of Defense and pointed out the enormous amount of money we had provided in the supplemental passed earlier this year for that action in Iraq. We had to have money to meet some of the problems caused by my interpretation of the budget resolution in not having enough money for some of the other subcommittees.

We worked out the arrangement whereby we took \$3.1 billion out of this bill and allocated it to other subcommittees with the understanding that if additional moneys are needed in Iraq because of our actions there, beyond what we have already provided, that we will have a supplemental in the spring.

We anticipate the moneys we provided in the massive supplemental, \$62.6 billion, is sufficient to carry them forward. As a matter of fact, there are not only sufficient funds, but in this bill we actually rescinded about \$3 billion of the supplemental to make it available to other areas of defense, not having it totally earmarked to Iraq.

We are trying to manage this money. The distinguished Democratic leader is exactly right. The costs are running somewhere around \$4 billion to \$5 billion a month. We expect that to start tapering down as this involvement in Iraq continues. It is certainly not the same as when we were building up forces and transmitting personnel and material to Iraq. We have tried to manage this situation and keep a firm hand on the expenditures in Iraq. In doing so, we made more money available to other subcommittees because they have problems related to homeland security and other matters.

While I am honest in the fact that I do not think we have enough money yet for some of those subcommittees, I do think we have more money available for nondefense matters, for homeland security matters, than we would have had had we continued with the approach that was in the budget to start.