

At last year's NATO summit in Prague, President Bush pressed for "the most significant reforms in NATO since 1949." He was mainly referring to the creation of a rapid reaction force to deal swiftly and effectively with new and emerging threats.

Last month, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman reiterated this idea during his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He rightly pointed out that NATO needs to be "equipped with new capabilities and organized into highly ready land, air and sea forces able to carry out missions anywhere in the world."

Mr. Grossman was referring to the need for the creation of a "NATO Response Force" to handle serious global challenges, such as proliferation and terrorism. I agree with him that such a force would be beneficial. But I also believe that is only half of the story. It seems to be stating the obvious that each addition to NATO will logically affect in some way the organization, mission, and effectiveness of this proposed rapid response force.

Just as I agree that NATO needs to tailor itself to future global challenges by standing up a NATO Response Force, I can foresee scenarios in which quick and decisive action will be needed in a very short amount of time—perhaps days.

I think it is reasonable to ask whether it will always be necessary or desirable for all 26, or 29, members of NATO to be involved in every aspect of the deployment of this force?

If the answer to that question is no, then shouldn't we at least ask the U.S. administration to study the question of whether NATO should consider a more streamlined decisionmaking structure for NATO to take into account both NATO's new missions, and the alliance's ever-expanding membership. The Levin-Warner amendment should allow a serious review and discussion of that issue.

As I have stated earlier, I am a strong supporter of the pending Protocol approving the new members to NATO. We all want a strong and vibrant NATO. I believe that the resolution of ratification, with the declarations and conditions that have been appended by the Senate will help to make that possible.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

AMENDMENT NO. 535

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: It is my understanding that it is appropriate at this time to proceed to the Warner-Levin-Roberts-Sessions amendment. I send the amendment to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Virginia [Mr. WARNER], for himself, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. ROBERTS, and Mr. SESSIONS, proposes an amendment numbered 535.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To propose an additional declaration)

At the end of section 2, add the following new declaration:

(10) CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO NATO DECISION-MAKING AND MEMBERSHIP.—

(A) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate that, not later than the date that is eighteen months after the date of the adoption of this resolution, the President should place on the agenda for discussion at the North Atlantic Council—

(i) the NATO "consensus rule"; and

(ii) the merits of establishing a process for suspending the membership in NATO of a member country that no longer complies with the NATO principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law set forth in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(B) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the discussion at the North Atlantic Council of each of the issues described in clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes—

(i) the steps the United States has taken to place these issues on the agenda for discussion at the North Atlantic Council;

(ii) the views of the United States on these issues as communicated to the North Atlantic Council by the representatives of the United States to the Council;

(iii) the discussions of these issues at the North Atlantic Council, including any decision that has been reached with respect to the issues;

(iv) methods to provide more flexibility to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to plan potential contingency operations before the formal approval of such planning by the North Atlantic Council; and

(v) methods to streamline the process by which NATO makes decisions with respect to conducting military campaigns.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I, first, wish to thank the distinguished managers, my two colleagues and friends, with whom my friend and partner for 25 years, Senator LEVIN, and I have had the privilege of working these many years, over a quarter of a century in the Senate. We have, I think, reached a common understanding that I will proceed for several minutes, followed by my colleague from Michigan, and in such time the two managers will address their perspective on this particular amendment. I think they are generally in support; however, I shall let the managers speak for themselves.

Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The Protocols that we are considering today would allow those seven nations to become full members of the NATO alliance.

My colleagues may recall that, in 1998, I did not vote in favor of the expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. My opposition at that time was not di-

rected at those three countries. Rather, I was concerned with the broader question of how the expansion of NATO to include newly democratizing countries of Central and Eastern Europe would affect NATO's future missions and its effectiveness as a military alliance.

NATO's success in integrating the new members admitted in 1999, and NATO's commitment to enhancing its defense capabilities and those of its prospective new members, have helped persuade me to support the enlargement of NATO today. But I remain concerned that NATO's enlargement by seven additional nations—the largest enlargement in Alliance history—could have dramatic implications for NATO's ability to function as an effective military organization.

Today, the threats to NATO member nations come from within and without NATO's periphery. Because of NATO's success, there is no Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact. The threats—such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—are transnational in nature, and they emanate from regions outside of Europe. This was recognized in the Strategic Concept NATO adopted 1999, which envisioned NATO "out of area" operations to address new threats. To remain a viable military alliance, NATO must have both the military capability and the political will to respond to the new threats. NATO's recent decision to assume the lead of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and its willingness to consider supporting a stabilization force in Iraq, are welcome examples of new NATO missions appropriate to today's threats.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has a long tradition of strong support for the NATO alliance, and has played an important role in the Senate's consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty and its subsequent amendments. In March and April 2003, the committee conducted two hearings on the future of NATO and on NATO enlargement. The Administration witnesses at these hearings unanimously supported ratification of the NATO enlargement Protocols.

One of the issues the committee examined in its NATO hearings was whether the prospective new members would enhance the military effectiveness of the alliance, and how their membership would affect the capabilities gap that currently exists between the United States and many other members of NATO.

The witnesses who appeared before our committee testified that NATO was taking concerted efforts to address the ongoing problem of a capabilities and technology gap. They noted the decisions taken by NATO's leaders at the Prague Summit in November, 2002, to launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment and to create a NATO Response Force. Through the Prague Capabilities Commitment, NATO members agreed to spend smarter, pool

their resources and pursue “niche” specializations such as lift capability, or precision-guided munitions. The NATO response force is envisioned to be a highly ready, rapid reaction force of approximately 25,000 troops with land, sea and air capability, deployable on short notice and able to carry out missions anywhere in the world. The response force will reinforce the need for individual alliance members to develop and contribute unique capabilities to this new force.

Regarding the military capabilities of the prospective new members, I was impressed that each of them is similarly being encouraged to focus on specific “niche” capabilities where they can achieve a high level of expertise and procure high quality equipment to make a substantial contribution to NATO’s military capabilities overall. Some of the invitees already possess specialized capabilities that have served the alliance in the Balkan operations and in the global war on terrorism, including: special forces, nuclear, biological, and chemical defense, mountain fighting, and demining.

Equally persuasive was the testimony of our witnesses regarding the contributions of the nations admitted to NATO in 1989. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have proved to be steadfast allies and active force contributors to NATO operations in the Balkans, and in the war against terrorism.

Mr. President, historically, I was among those who objected to the last enlargement of NATO. At this time, I very carefully considered the proposal by our distinguished President, President Bush, and other world leaders, that the time has come for new members to be brought in. I commend the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense for the careful procedures that led up to the nominations of these new countries to come into the membership of NATO.

I am privileged to be on the floor now and to cast my vote in favor of these protocols which will enable the seven countries to become members of NATO in due course.

I have to say, I still have some of the concerns I had last time because NATO is such a magnificent organization. Over half a century it has proven its worth time and time again. The Warsaw Pact does not exist, the threats from the Soviet Union do not exist, largely because of the wisdom incorporated in this treaty, and the combination of the military commitments and the political will of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance members over the years to have that alliance stand there as a deterrent. It has worked, and it has worked well.

We cannot foresee the future and, therefore, we must be flexible because worldwide threats have gone through such a major transformation, from major nation-state-sponsored threats to worldwide terrorism, so much of it non-state sponsored. For that reason I

want to support the admission of these new nations.

Further, while so many of these newly democratic nations do not bring a large army, large navy, or a large air force, in due course their “niche” military capabilities will add a very valuable dimension to NATO’s ever expanding responsibilities.

NATO is participating actively in Afghanistan, and contemplating participating actively in Iraq in peacekeeping and support roles. I shall not discuss this in detail. Nevertheless, that is a tribute to Lord Robertson and others who have recognized that the threat to NATO nations comes from beyond their periphery now, but could be brought within their periphery at any time by the threat of worldwide terrorism. Those are the reasons I support NATO’s participation in “out of area” operations in Afghanistan and post-conflict Iraq.

I remember the words of Ben Franklin as he emerged from the Constitutional Convention and a reporter stopped and asked him: Mr. FRANKLIN: What have you wrought? And his reply was very simple: A republic, if you can keep it.

There is a challenge to these NATO nations, soon to be 26 in number. You have the heritage of this great treaty of over half a century, and the challenge is, can we keep it?

I think we can. I think we will. Within the current thinking on NATO, Senator LEVIN, I, and others have identified two issues that dominated our committee’s hearings on NATO: the so-called “consensus rule” by which NATO operates and the question of whether NATO should have a process for suspending the membership of a nation that is no longer committed to upholding NATO’s basic democratic principles.

With respect to the consensus rule, the recent divisive debate over planning for the defense of Turkey in the event of war with Iraq demonstrated that achieving consensus in NATO has become more difficult. How difficult will it be with 26 nations? A different manifestation of this problem occurred with respect to NATO operations in Kosovo when “command by committee” hampered NATO’s leaders’ ability to wage the most effective, rapidly responsive military campaign. Such difficulties in reaching consensus are occurring in part because respective NATO members have different views, as they should, about today’s threats and how best to respond to them. Achieving consensus is likely to become even more complex as NATO enlarges its membership. That is why I believe—and my colleagues join me on this—the consensus rule, and NATO’s operating procedures more generally, should be periodically reexamined to ensure that NATO has procedures that allow it to plan, reach decisions, and act in a timely fashion.

Regarding the issue of a suspension mechanism, some of our committee

members have expressed concern about the lack of a mechanism for suspending a NATO member if that nation no longer complies with the fundamental tenets of NATO—democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

While it may well be true that NATO has ways other than suspension to deal with such a situation, it is prudent for NATO to consider the matter now, as a conceptual problem, and have some options in mind, rather than be confronted with a problem in the future, and be somewhat unprepared should it arise.

Given the tremendous interest of the Armed Services Committee in these two subjects, I, along with Senators LEVIN, ROBERTS, and SESSIONS, am offering an amendment to the resolution of ratification for these protocols that would urge the President—I repeat, urge the President—of the United States to raise these subjects for discussion in the North Atlantic Council at NATO, and request that a report on these subjects be provided to the relevant committees of the Congress.

I have consulted closely with administration officials, and negotiated the language in this amendment with administration officials way into last night, in order to receive their support, and they have no objections today. I hope we can achieve that because we have—Senator LEVIN and I, speaking for our group—have made some concessions in order to have this matter treated in such a way that the whole Senate can be supportive.

I conclude by saying, based on the hearings conducted by the Armed Services Committee and subsequent analysis, I am persuaded that the NATO enlargement protocols we are considering today will advance the national security interests of the United States and deserve the Senate’s support.

Lastly, on the assumption that NATO, I think very wisely, will take a role in Afghanistan, on the assumption again that NATO, again very wisely, will take a role in Iraq, which is a positive thing, I say this with respect to the coalition of forces: We will achieve the end result that is now unfolding in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is yet to be completed, but basically the desired result will have been achieved in Afghanistan and Iraq at some cost—with the bloodshed of Americans and other coalition partners, with enormous tax dollars. These are very significant contributions by the coalition of forces and this great United States of America.

I think it is a minimal suggestion that NATO consider changing its procedures for deciding to undertake such operations in the future to avoid the problems we have recently witnessed.

I urge my colleagues to support the amendment to the resolution of ratification I am proposing today, and to join me in giving our advice and consent to ratification of the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first let me thank my good friend from Virginia for his great work on this resolution. We have worked together not just in the Senate for all of these years but on this particular issue we have worked together for a long time. I also thank the managers of this bill, not just for working with us on this matter but also for their work generally on a host of issues which they struggle with to try to make our Nation a lot more secure. They work together magnificently. They are both essential for this country's security and strength and wisdom, which we surely need in these complicated days.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I thank him for the reference to our long-term working relationship. The Senator has really taken the lead for over 5 or 6 years. We have worked on this issue for a very long time. It is not something that has just suddenly come to mind.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Virginia.

First, I very much support the expansion of NATO to include these seven additional countries, just as I supported the expansion for the three that we approved a few years ago. I believe this expansion, like the last one, could lead to a safer, more united, more cohesive Europe and reduce the possibility that Europe would ever again be divided by war. I very much support the expansion.

I have been troubled by one issue for many years—actually a number of issues relative to NATO—that as we expand NATO, there is a greater likelihood, just statistically, that someday, some country is going to no longer live up to NATO's requirements that it be a democratic country with a free market. We hope that will never happen. We do not expect it to happen. But what happens, after these nations are added hopefully, if one day, one of the now 26 nations departs from the alliance's fundamental principles?

As it now stands, there is no mechanism in the charter to suspend a country that no longer complies with NATO's fundamental principles. It is an unusual alliance in that regard that does not have a suspension mechanism, but it does not. We could actually, theoretically, see a country become a dictatorship and stop 25 democracies from acting in their own self-defense or in defense of a secure world. That is an unusual provision. It is one that was consciously adopted, but it is one that as we add more countries to NATO we have to think about, it seems to me.

Our amendment is aimed at raising this issue. We do not direct that there be a solution to the problem. We simply believe that NATO countries, as NATO expands, should address the issue of a country in the future pos-

sibly departing from the fundamental principles that guide NATO.

What happens, for instance, if one country becomes a dictatorship? That dictatorship could veto a decision that all the other NATO member nations wanted to take, perhaps to come to the aid of a people who were being ethnically cleansed on a scale perhaps approaching what happened in the genocide that occurred in Kosovo, or worse. That issue, as well as the consensus issue Chairman WARNER has raised, should be raised at NATO. They should discuss it. They should decide whether or not they want to proceed on the current course.

Again, I emphasize that our amendment, while expressing the sense of the Senate that the administration raised this issue at the North Atlantic Council, does not in any way indicate what the outcome of that discussion would be, nor, indeed, does it in any way suggest what the position of the United States should be during those deliberations. We simply want the issue of suspension and consensus and the other issues referred to in our resolution discussed at the highest level at NATO—just discussed.

There is a question raised: Is this aimed at any particular country? It is not. It is explicitly not aimed at any one of the 26 countries. We made it clear we amended our language to make it clear this would take effect 18 months after the resolution is adopted. We expect by then all the new countries will have been in long enough so there will be no sensitivity about that issue.

We also make it clear this is not a condition in any way on the ratification of the NATO documents. It is drafted as a declaration of the intent of the Senate rather than as a condition of any type. That is, in essence, what we do.

A final discussion item that is listed in the resolution would be methods to streamline the process by which NATO makes decisions with respect to conducting military campaigns. We believe this is essential because this refers to the actual conduct of military operations—not to the approval to conduct it but it seeks to address the problems that were experienced in the conduct of NATO operations in Kosovo where it was reported that General Wesley Clark, the then NATO commander, was restricted in his actions by a number of NATO countries that wanted to review each day's bombing targets. The planning should be allowed to proceed in advance in the event that the North Atlantic Council approves the operation. This simply would expedite and streamline the planning of military operations.

Our amendment is not intended to interfere with the passage of our resolution of ratification. It would not cause any delay in the ascension of the seven new members into the NATO alliance. Again, it merely seeks to cause the alliance to consider some issues

that could pose problems in the future, if not addressed in a calm, careful, and measured way before a crisis occurs.

Discussion and report is what we are asking the administration to participate in and to initiate—again, not declaring what the position of this administration or any future administration will be and not in any way suggesting the outcome of those deliberations and discussions. It is a matter of prudence that this issue, which would have such huge ramifications down the road as to whether or not NATO can act, should be discussed in advance, whatever the outcome of that discussion.

I thank Senators LUGAR and BIDEN for working with us in a way so we now believe this matter can be resolved and adopted.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. DOLE). The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. I will respond briefly. Anyone who is a C-SPAN watcher will be a bit confused. We have Senator WARNER talking about his 25-year relationship with Senator LEVIN and I am about to talk about my 28-year relationship with my friend, Senator LUGAR. This is proof there is bipartisanship in this operation. We have a Democrat and a Republican opposing a Democrat and Republican on the principle here but not on whether or not this should be included and considered.

This is basically a procedural judgment we are making. I have a few points notwithstanding the very well intended effort on the part of Senator LEVIN who has, for a number of years, been concerned about this issue and is concerned that, as he said, who knows, maybe some day we will end up with one of these member states no longer being a democracy. It is possible.

What do we do? Let me suggest what Secretary Powell said before our committee when there was consideration, not by Senator LEVIN or Senator WARNER, but there was discussion about having a condition attached to this treaty—which is not the case now. He said:

NATO is not a committee; it's not a council; it is not a group. It is an alliance. When you call something an alliance, I think it means that everybody has to be together for the alliance to take action.

I am skipping ahead to make this short. Secretary-General Lord Robertson told the members of the Foreign Relations Committee:

Even when times have been difficult, NATO has never failed to get consensus or to find a way to work around the problem. No country has ever used its national veto.

As Secretary General Lord Robertson also said, "NATO is an infinitely adaptable organization" and has proven itself equal to all organizational challenges.

Let me be more precise. When France pulled out of NATO's integrated command in 1967, the alliance decided it had a problem. Ordinarily, that would be enough to cripple NATO because it

would effectively veto everything. What did we do? Then NATO came up with a Defense Planning Committee, the so-called DPC, which for years has done the bulk of NATO's work. When France refused to go along on the Turkey article 4 request last winter, saying the decision in the NAC would be counterproductive to diplomatic discussions of the United Nations, what did we do? We went over to the DPC effortlessly. We did not have a great crisis in NATO.

If that had not worked, Lord Robertson could have ordered the SACEUR to make the Patriots and AWACs available to Turkey, or he could have done what former Secretary General Luns once did. He could have simply declared his own decision was final unless there was unanimous opposition.

I will not take more time, although there is much more to say. The reason I bring these things up, we have, in fact, dealt with very difficult crises in NATO, including member states not meeting the criteria of a democratic free market, respecting human rights, et cetera. We have had different countries who have been the odd man out on different occasions. Every time, instead of having to go through the process of a period of expulsion, we were able to weather the storm by dealing with it through other mechanisms.

Here is the larger point I wish to make. I do not want to take too much time, but it is a very important point to make, in my view.

Especially troubling is the opinion of Lord Robertson that alternatives to the consensus principle would create more problems than they are intended to solve.

Majority rule or a UN Security Council-type system would send members scurrying for votes in support of their positions, merely delaying action and reinforcing divisions among allies.

The consensus rule is a fundamental part of NATO, an essential second element in the article 5 defense clause of NATO, requiring that any NATO action taken as a result of an attack on a NATO member be decided by consensus.

My colleagues should note that this Article was crafted back in 1949, on American insistence, to prevent the U.S. from being pulled into wars by European countries.

As Lord Robertson asked us, "does the U.S. now really want to open the door to the possibility of being dragged into a war it does not want to participate in?"

I might quote from a thoughtful letter to Senator LUGAR and myself written by Bruce Jackson, president of the U.S. Committee on NATO:

At present, the United States is the only country that can consistently produce unanimous outcomes at the level of the North Atlantic Council or, failing in that, at the Defense Planning Committee. The process of achieving unanimity is uniquely and, perhaps intentionally, to the advantage of the United States.

The countries whose ratification is before the Senate are aghast that the Senate might consider weakening U.S. leadership in NATO, which is the aspect of NATO they most ad-

mire, just as their democracies reach the threshold of membership. We share their concern.

Five years ago when this was brought up in the last expansion, I said, "Why would we indulge in unilateral disarmament and give up our veto over a NATO decision?"

People wondered later, and asked me: What are you talking about? How is this giving up any veto?

With regard to the mechanism to suspend a member that strays from NATO's principles, that too is unnecessary. Here are two examples: During the authoritarian rule of the Greek colonels from 1967 to 1973, Greece was frozen out of the key NATO decisions. When it appeared Portugal might go Communist in the summer of 1975, it, too, was frozen out.

There would also be the temptation to play domestic politics with a suspension mechanism.

We would not want NATO to be torn apart the way the European Union was three years ago when other countries isolated Austria because Mr. Haider's distasteful party had joined the governing coalition after a free election.

For example one might envision a future scenario in which Turkey were threatened with military attack and some members would argue that Ankara's imperfect human rights record obviated the obligation of the NATO allies to honor their Article 5 commitments.

This isn't far-fetched. In January 1991, Mr. Lambsdorff, then the leader of the Free Democrats in Germany's Bundestag, voiced similar sentiments.

The reality is that once a suspension clause was introduced into the North Atlantic Treaty no country could fully rely upon Article 5.

Lord Robertson's summary judgment on creating a suspension mechanism speaks volumes:

The worst possible thing would be to legislate in advance for all possible occasions and then be locked in.

Our debate will be watched closely in the seven invited countries and throughout the rest of Europe. Attaching this declaration to the Senate's ratification would send an unsettling message through the Alliance.

Lord Robertson gave us his bottom-line on Monday:

Putting these issues on the agenda of the NAC would be "deeply unhelpful" to him and would "open a can of worms."

The bottom line here, Madam President, is that I really think we should understand what is intended. The objective here to get NATO itself to adopt such a rule would be the single most serious thing we could do to U.S. leadership and U.S. de facto control of NATO.

I urge my colleagues to vote down this amendment, which is both unnecessary and potentially disruptive to NATO as it is about to welcome seven new members.

I thank my friend from Michigan and my friend from Virginia for being willing not to go with the original resolution they had, and seek this report from NATO within 18 months after the

request being submitted by the Secretary of State. I think that is a more prudent way to proceed. But I hope when that is done, the NATO membership will uniformly reject any change in the process. But again I thank my colleagues and yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I agree with the analysis of history given by my colleague, the distinguished Senator from Delaware, with regard to the basic exclusion—or rather consensus and exclusion argument we are having today. He states correctly this arose the last time we discussed NATO accession. It is an important argument that has been propounded by the distinguished Senator from Michigan, the distinguished Senator from Virginia, and others. I simply rise to say the substance of the issue is different from the procedure. In this amendment offered by the distinguished Senators, we are discussing an amendment that says:

It is the sense of the Senate that, not later than the date that is eighteen months after the date of the adoption of this resolution, the President should place on the agenda for discussion at the North Atlantic Council—

(i) the NATO "consensus rule"; and

(ii) the merits of establishing a process for suspending the membership in NATO of a member country that no longer complies with NATO's principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law set forth in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty.

The amendment also calls for reports on the points of view raised by our Government and, likewise, its fulfillment, with the gist of this amendment.

At the time we had Secretary Powell before the Foreign Relations Committee in one of the five hearings the committee has conducted on NATO, we requested his view on the subject of consensus and expulsion. In fact, I requested a letter from Secretary Powell, which he sent to me, and made clear as a matter of principle NATO's decision-making process in his judgment works well and serves the United States interests.

The Secretary affirmed that for 50 years, from the cold war to Kosovo and now Afghanistan, NATO has been able to reach consensus on critical decisions. NATO is an alliance, and no NATO member, including the United States, would agree to allow alliance decisions to be made on defense commitments without its agreement.

Regarding the suspension mechanism, the Secretary said NATO has been able to deal successfully with the rare cases in the past of problem countries, and NATO has dealt effectively with Allies that have experienced regimes that did not support NATO's democratic principles by isolating them or excluding them from sensitive discussions—just as the Senator from Delaware has illustrated.

I would add that when, at Senator LEVIN's request, these issues were raised by Ambassador Burns in an informal discussion within the alliance, there was no support from other members for creating a suspension mechanism or for changing the consensus rule.

Essentially, the administration preference, when we asked them with regard to this idea, is that these issues not be addressed in the resolution of ratification and certainly that they not be termed as a condition. The authors of the amendment today have not done so. This is not a condition. Therefore, there is not an argument with the administration.

The Secretary believes the questions are worthy of further study, and so do I. My own view, having listened to the testimony by Secretary Powell and then as Senator BIDEN suggested more recently, a visit in the Foreign Relations Committee with Secretary General Robertson of NATO and with our Ambassador, Nick Burns, is that essentially, as the Secretary's letter has pointed out, the decisionmaking process has worked well, has served the United States interests. As Senator BIDEN pointed out, as you look into the fine print, it might not serve our interests so well if in fact our effective veto was terminated.

Having said all of that, none of us has wisdom that is all encompassing on these issues. Times change. Senator LEVIN in his comments has cited some reasons and these are important to consider.

Therefore, I come out in this discussion on the side of thought that within 18 months the United States ought to think through these arguments, ought to put them on the agenda of the North Atlantic Treaty Council for discussion. In 18 months the world may have changed a lot. Even if a discussion of them in recent months led to apparently universally negative views of our NATO allies, plus apparently a negative viewpoint of our own Secretary of State, it is conceivable that on further study, intensive study in this area, there may be some other constructive results.

I say this because I respect very deeply the distinguished chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee. They, too, held hearings, as I cited in my opening statement, on the NATO accession issue. They are intensely interested, as we are in the Foreign Relations Committee, and as all Members of this body are, in what is in the best interests of our country, in our military alliances, in the prosecution of peace, in those horrible instances, and in the prosecution of war.

These are serious issues, and this is perhaps an appropriate time as the body is focused on NATO to, once again, say these are discussions that have to take place from time to time. We in the United States ought to suggest that our Secretary of State take that initiative.

For these reasons, I am going to support the amendment. I hope that, as a matter of fact, it will receive a unanimous verdict of support today on the procedural issues and issues that are out there, even if all of us have fairly strong views on the substance—and that would include the administration as well as colleagues.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I rise in support of the Warner/Levin/Roberts amendment to the resolution of ratification on NATO Enlargement.

Before I talk about our amendment, I want to take a few moments to express my strong support for the enlargement of the NATO Alliance to include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

A significant aspect of any enlargement of the Alliance to the United States, of course, is that it would represent a commitment by the United States to treat an armed attack on any of these seven nations as an armed attack on the United States. In 1998, when the Senate was considering the enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the attitude of Russia to the inclusion of former members of the Warsaw Pact was a factor which was part of the debate. Such enlargement was not intended to be threatening and, appropriately, it was not perceived as a threat by Russia, which wanted to establish a constructive relationship with the United States and the other members of NATO. As a matter of fact, Russia's decision on that matter was so clear that its position relative to NATO membership for former Soviet Republics Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia is not even an issue today.

One issue that I have wrestled with in 1998 and before was my belief that NATO should have a mechanism to suspend the membership of a NATO member, if that member no longer complies with the Alliance's fundamental principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. In the Armed Services Committee hearings that preceded the 1998 Senate floor action, I put the issue to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who said in part that "I think in situations in which a government emerges incompatible with the common purpose of the Alliance, there ought to be some method, maybe along the lines you put forward." I also raised the issue with former Secretary of Defense William Perry who said in part that "What you are describing is a problem—in fact, I would call it a flaw—in the original NATO structure, the NATO agreements. And, in my judgment, this is a problem which should be addressed."

I had a colloquy with the then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator BIDEN, who said in part that "I agree with the Senator from Michigan that this is an important matter that raises fundamental issues for the United States and our allies. I

believe that this is a matter that merits careful consideration within NATO councils. It would certainly be preferable for NATO to discuss this in a careful and measured way now, rather than be faced with the issue at some future time when an emergency situation exists."

That careful and measured consideration, however, has not been undertaken within NATO councils in the intervening years.

Just as I supported enlargement of the Alliance to a total of nineteen nations in 1998, so I support enlargement of the Alliance today to a total of 26. But I am mindful that the sheer number of nations that will soon make up the alliance increases the chance that one of them may some day depart from the alliance's fundamental principles. Having said that, I want to be perfectly clear—our amendment is not aimed at any of the seven nations whose accession is before us today—it is not aimed at the three most recent NATO member nations—it is not aimed at any of the long-term NATO member nations—and it is not aimed at any potential future NATO member nation—it is not aimed at any nation.

It is aimed at the possibility that a NATO member nation that, for example, was no longer democratic and was ruled by a dictator, would be in a position to veto a decision that all of the other NATO member nations wanted to take—perhaps to come to the aid of a people who were being "ethnically cleansed" on a scale that was approaching genocide such as happened in Kosovo. I believe that the United States should put the issue of whether a process should be established to suspend—suspend, not expel—such a member nation so that it would not endanger NATO's decision making when all but an undemocratic member nation wants to act.

The growth in the number of NATO member nations to 26 also increases, under the laws of mathematics, the potential that one NATO member nation, even a nation that conforms to the alliance's fundamental principles, could prevent the alliance from making a decision where all other countries want to act. The recent experience, wherein France prevented the North Atlantic Council from authorizing planning for the defense of Turkey to proceed and the Alliance had to go to the Defense Planning Council for that authorization, is a real-world example that demonstrates the need for the alliance to reconsider whether the consensus rule for NATO decisions should be changed.

I want to emphasize very strongly at this point that our amendment doesn't mandate a particular outcome to the discussion of these issues by the North Atlantic Council. It doesn't prejudice the result of the discussion and it doesn't require the U.S. representative

to take a particular position in the discussion. It merely seeks to have the issues placed on the North Atlantic Council's agenda, discussed in the council, and the results of that discussion be reported back to the U.S. Senate.

Our amendment would require the President's report to discuss two other matters. The first would be methods to provide more flexibility to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, who is presently U.S. General Jim Jones, to plan potential contingency operations before the formal approval of such operations by the North Atlantic Council. In the instance that I mentioned, wherein France blocked the planning for Turkey's defense, it would have been very useful if NATO's military planning staff could have been preparing contingency plans so that they would have been immediately available once the civilian decision-makers had approved the defense of Turkey.

A final discussion item would be methods to streamline the process by which NATO makes decisions with respect to conducting military campaigns. This refers to the actual conduct of the operation—not to the approval to conduct it—and seeks to address the problems that were experienced in the conduct of the NATO operations in Kosovo where it is reported that General Wes Clark, the then-NATO Commander, was restricted in his actions as a number of NATO capitals insisted on reviewing and approving each day's bombing targets.

This amendment does not interfere with the passage of the resolution of ratification. It does not cause any delay in the accession of the seven new members into the NATO Alliance. It merely seeks to cause the Alliance to consider some issues that could pose serious problems in the future if not addressed in a calm, careful and measured way before a crisis occurs.

I ask unanimous consent that the discussion between myself and former Secretary of Defense Perry be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, U.S. SENATE
HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON ISSUES RELATED TO NATO ENLARGEMENT—THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 1998, WASHINGTON, DC

We went into Bosnia, I understand, for legitimate reasons, I think. But, still, it is not what NATO was invented for, which was to reassure the Western Europeans that they would not be attacked by the Russians. And if they were attacked by the Russians, the United States would come to their defense.

And I do not think the operation in Bosnia qualifies to that standard. Which does not mean I am against it, but, still, I do not think you can square it with the original Treaty.

Chairman THURMOND. My time is up.

Senator LEVIN.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Eisenhower, your sensitivity to the impact of this on our relationship with Russia, it seems to me, is correct, in terms of being aware of it. We should worry about it. We should consider it.

I reach a different conclusion than you do, but it is not politically incorrect to factor into the deliberation what the impact on that relationship is. I reach a different conclusion than you do for a number of reasons. And, by the way, I, too, have talked to dozens of parliamentarians in Russia, both here and in Moscow, as well as their leadership, their minister of Defense, their Foreign Minister, and so forth.

And I have heard their words. I have also seen their actions, including the following actions: They entered into a Founding Act with NATO after the decision to expand NATO was made. And they have remained a member of that relationship. And that Founding Act says—and this is between NATO, after the announced expansion, and Russia—that Founding Act reaffirms the determination of the parties, NATO and Russia, to give concrete substance to our shared commitment to a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe.

So one of the actions which they have taken is to both join a Founding Act with NATO after the announced expansion, and to remain a member of that Founding Act. Secondly, recently the Partnership for Peace was expanded. A more active participation was recently agreed to by Russia with NATO. So we have a more active participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace recently, after the actual decision to have three additional countries join NATO.

Next, recently, their Prime Minister, Mr. Chernomyrdin, publicly pledged, after meeting with our Vice President, that the Russian Government will push hard for the Duma's ratification of START II. This came within the last few weeks.

We have heard—and I have heard from parliamentarians—that the expansion of NATO will hurt the chances for ratification. We understand that. But, nonetheless, the action taken by the Prime Minister is that he is going to push hard for that ratification. And that is despite his clear awareness that NATO is, with great likelihood, going to be expanded and that this Senate will ratify that expansion. So we have that action taken on the part of Mr. Chernomyrdin.

We also have a recent—interestingly enough, we talked about public opinion polls in here—we have a recent public opinion poll by the Gallup people in Moscow, released last Saturday, revealing that 57 percent of the people in Moscow support the Czech Republic's bid to join NATO; 54 percent support Hungary's admission; 53 percent said Poland should be allowed to join NATO. And a quarter of those polled had no views on the subject.

Now, I do not know what their sample was and so forth, but, nonetheless, I am not so sure public opinion in Russia is so wholly as one-sided as you indicate. And, again, I have also had similar meetings, as you have had, with their parliamentarians.

On the other hand, it is a very important factor to consider. And I think we should all weigh that. We should not give Russia a veto. That would be a very bad mistake, but we surely should consider the impact of any expansion on our relationship with Russia, and on the effort to bring Russia into the democratic world and to keep them there, and to keep them into the free market world. It is a very important issue.

You have raised another issue, however, which I find—and I join with you in finding troubling. And that is the inability of NATO to suspend a member, to remove a member who no longer comports with NATO's principles of democracy and free market orientation, and a dedication to freedom. This could happen in the future. It could happen. And there is no mechanism inside of NATO to suspend a member. Every member has a

veto. And that could create a problem with your strategic vision. I think all of us hopefully view the world somewhat strategically. That could create a problem down the road.

And so I want to ask, Secretary Perry, about this issue. It is something which has troubled me. I do not want to try to condition the accession of these three new members on a suspension agreement, because that would raise a false implication that it has something to do with them—which it does not. It is a general issue that I think we have to face in NATO at some point, not related to these three particular countries, or any other particular country.

But what happens in the future if a member of NATO no longer comports to the principles of NATO in terms of commitment to democracy, freedom and free markets, and then has a veto on NATO operations? And my question, Mr. Perry, is this: Should we at some point raise within NATO, and satisfy ourselves, on the question of the suspension of a member at some point in the future and a mechanism to accomplish that end? That is my question.

Dr. PERRY. That is a very good question, Senator LEVIN. What you are describing is a problem—in fact, I would call it a few—in the original NATO structure, the NATO agreements. And, in my judgment, that is a problem which should be addressed. It has been a problem for many, many years. And therefore it is important, in addressing that problem, to separate it from the issue of NATO accession. I would not in any way want to tie that issue to the NATO accession issue.

We could have predicted several decades ago that that would cause a problem, that there would be some major issue come up on which we could not reach consensus, and that would bring NATO to a halt, or that some member would depart from the NATO values. Happily, that has not happened. But it is a potential problem, and I think we ought to address it.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. I would appreciate, however, for the record, if you or any other member here—my time is up and the chairman here, I think, has got to stick to his 5-minute rule—but if you or any other panelist here would submit for the record your ideas on that subject, it would be very helpful to us.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friends, the managers of this resolution, for their tremendous work on NATO expansion and other issues.

Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, since the original North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington in April 1949, the organization has expanded far beyond its original 12 members. The amendment to this treaty that I was proud to co-sponsor with my distinguished colleagues Senators WARNER, LEVIN, and ROBERTS acknowledges that we have had recent difficulty with the consensus decision making methodology currently in force within NATO.

Four more European nations later acceded to the Treaty between 1952 and 1982. In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were welcomed and possibly tomorrow we will add Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia bringing the number to 26 members.

The following description of this consensus requirement is taken from the NATO web site, and it says:

In making their joint decision-making process dependent on consensus and common

consent, the members of the Alliance safeguard the role of each country's individual experience and outlook while at the same time availing themselves of the machinery and procedures which allow them jointly to act rapidly and decisively if circumstances require them to do so.

It stands to reason that with the addition of more members, that consensus will be increasingly difficult to achieve.

Our amendment simply asks that the President do two things: to examine the consensus requirement so that we ensure that we preserve our sovereign right to act in our own national interest; and, examine a procedure by which we can take action against a member who fails to comply with the shared values upon which NATO was founded.

Not everyone agrees with this request to have NATO address these two issues. I disagree.

The strength of the NATO Alliance is based upon adaptiveness. Our recent experience with the UN, NATO and other formations clearly shows we must address the changes we perceive in alliances.

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I know I speak for all members of the Foreign Relations Committee in commending the Armed Services Committee for this discussion of these issues, and, most importantly, the comity between the committee members and leadership. I think that is demonstrated in our debate today on a serious issue but to one which we have come to a good conclusion.

I know of no further debate. It would be a privilege if the Chair would put the issue to us.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is all time yielded?

Mr. LUGAR. All on the amendment.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield our time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 535) was agreed to.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LUGAR. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. LUGAR. I yield as much time to the Senator from Texas as she may require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, I was interested in the previous discussion because I think they were talking about going back to NATO to discuss some contingencies that might occur and how they would be addressed. That is the subject of my view on this issue.

I support the entrance of these new countries, but I think we need to take a step back and make sure NATO is going to remain the greatest defense alliance that the world has ever known.

In 1999, when the Senate voted to ratify the addition of Poland, the Czech

Republic, and Hungary, I said at the time that we needed to reassess the mutual threat to NATO nations to assure the strength of our alliance in that agreement.

Four years later, as we prepared for what became Operation Iraqi Freedom, we were disappointed, to say the least, to watch three NATO countries refuse to support the defense of our ally, Turkey. That was an initial signal that we have reached the point of stretching the alliance.

That Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are candidates for NATO is both a miracle and a testament to the effectiveness of NATO itself. They survived brutal totalitarian regimes during the cold war. Now they are free to fully join the world community as valued members of NATO.

But what is the state of the alliance they seek to join? The world has seen three NATO members refuse to support disarming Iraq. In the view of the United States, this was the same as the failure to come to the aid of a member country that has been attacked, a renunciation of our mutual agreement.

Now is the time to ask: What is the mission of NATO today? Is NATO going to protect the future or defend the past?

For NATO to remain relevant, we must agree on its fundamental mission. Our alliance should recognize that the concern threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have replaced the common threat of Soviet imperialism. After the most recent break in our bonds, it is essential to establish a new mission to counter a new threat. NATO has always been unified around a common purpose, but if it becomes nothing more than a patchwork quilt, we will be wasting our money and endangering our own national security by continuing to pay its bills and diverting our attention.

Fifty-four years ago this month, the United States pledged to protect Europe from the Warsaw Pact. We were steadfast in our commitment. We based 300,000 troops in Europe continuously throughout the cold war and keep 119,000 troops there now. We have paid a quarter of NATO's costs, even though we are only one of 19 nations belonging to the alliance. Clearly, our commitment played a vital role in NATO's victory in the cold war.

After the cold war ended, we turned our attention to areas of the world that cried out for stability. We went to Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans, with varying degrees of success. We became central to peace negotiations in the Middle East. We focused more on our commitments abroad and less on our own national defense closer to home. All that changed on September 11, 2001, when terrorists and the countries supporting them tried to destroy the icons of democracy, capitalism and American power. Those attacks on our homeland marked the end of our policy of containment.

The global war we are fighting against terrorism and our forceful disarming of Iraq has forged new alliances unthinkable before September 11. Our relationship with Pakistan in the war on terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan is one example of this dynamic shift. But the war on terrorism has strained other longstanding, traditional alliances.

Many of our friends in Europe do not comprehend the impact September 11 had on America. They viewed what happened within our borders from arm's length, not acknowledging it as an attack on our country that required a firm response. This disconnect has caused a rift among NATO allies that would have been unthinkable before September 11. That split was manifested in the refusal to help disarm Iraq.

As we prepared for Operation Iraqi Freedom, our long-time allies, France, Germany and Belgium, countries we have been committed to defend from attack for over half a century, opposed us at every turn. Even today, they are thwarting the rebuilding of Iraq by refusing to lift the U.N.-imposed sanctions that would allow oil to be sold to pay for new infrastructure in that country.

A strong alliance cannot maintain its strength under such strain. It is imperative that NATO establishes a new, common mission or risk withering into irrelevance. If our purpose is a common defense, then we must form a consensus in defining our common threats. And those who agree should reconstitute a strong NATO.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, we created a valuable template for how the world community can bond in this era of reckoning. We now should lead the effort to reconfirm a coalition of the willing to stand together against the common threat of terrorism to our democracies.

The seven invited countries have all demonstrated they are prepared to contribute if they join NATO. Every one of them supported the U.S.-led coalition to disarm Iraq. As the United States develops plans for the reconstruction and administration of postwar Iraq, we are consulting with all seven of these nations to determine how best to proceed in this process and how they can contribute. All have indicated a willingness to consider the requests of the United States or other international organizations to help restore Iraq.

Just this week, Bulgaria pledged to provide combat troops under international command. By doing so, Bulgaria has stepped forward—among the first of the world's nations—to internationalize the U.S.-led occupation. These seven countries are showing they are ready to do what it takes within their means to make the world more secure.

Madam President, I am certainly going to vote to support this round of NATO expansion because I do believe all of these prospective members have

a clear understanding that NATO has new threats and new missions, and they will make a positive contribution to this alliance.

But I do hope we will take the lead in bringing to NATO a clear focus, a clear focus on the common threats that we all face, and the methods for defending against those threats. That is what it will take to assure that this great alliance will be a great alliance in the future and not just something we talk about in the past with great regard.

Madam President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Virginia as much time as he might require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Madam President. I thank the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator LUGAR, for his outstanding leadership on this issue. I also very much agree with the remarks made by Senator HUTCHISON of Texas.

As far as an enlarged NATO, we have had hearings on the mending of fences and the moving forward that we will need to have as a country with our Allies with a new sense of realism insofar as NATO and certain alliances—who we can always count on and who we sometimes may not be able to count on in the future.

I rise today to specifically address the issue of the enlargement of NATO. I offer my very strong support for the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance. The NATO alliance, over the decades, has had a positive impact on the world.

Since the days I was Governor of Virginia, I have been a long-time advocate of enlarging NATO, with new countries to contribute to security and also to advance individual liberty.

I was an advocate of admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and they have been good participatory members. You can see how the advancement of liberty has allowed the people of those countries to have greater freedoms and greater prosperity.

I believe that enlarging the alliance will bring even greater peace and security to the world, as well as confirm the value of economic reforms that will offer all people greater individual freedoms and protection of their rights.

The reforms and progress that have been made by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania have transformed once communist, oppressive states into vibrant democracies that appreciate the newly reborn freedom to control their own destinies.

These nations are ascending into NATO at a serious time for the NATO alliance. As these countries have made a positive transformation, so must NATO transform from the cold war deterrent it has so successfully been over the last 50 years into an alliance that

is able to adapt to meet the new challenges facing the world and the partner nations of NATO.

NATO and its members must now develop the ability to meet the threat of global terrorism wherever it may arise. This will no doubt be challenging, as the structure and strategy of the NATO alliance for decades has been to prepare for traditional conflict against the Soviet Union.

To meet the defense needs of today, all NATO nations will need to make a commitment to the forces and the resources that are necessary to root out and defeat state-sponsored and itinerant terrorism beyond the shores of the United States and Europe.

The seven nations that are poised to join NATO will be asked to take an immediate role in implementing this new mission. While it is unrealistic to ask these countries to meet the defense spending levels of the United States, the alliance should urge these new members to establish an expertise and an unmatched capability in a particular area of combating terrorism. NATO does not particularly need large, traditional forces or armaments. The alliance, rather, needs skilled units that can neutralize the devastating impacts of chemical or biological weapons, as well as seasoned intelligence organizations to ensure that NATO and its members are always able to thwart terrorist conspiracies or attacks before they are executed.

The seven aspirant countries have had to overcome significant political and economic difficulties to reach the precipice of NATO membership. Transforming a socialist-focused economy to one that is market based requires tremendous perseverance and visionary leadership and also an appreciation of liberty on the part of the people of these countries.

Indeed, the people of these nations have made their decisions and their choices. And now the economies of the aspirant countries are growing markets with potential for prosperous growth. These experiences will help these nations as they adjust to the burden of collective defense and make the responsible decisions that come with NATO membership.

I am confident that these countries—whether they are in the Baltics or Central Europe or Southeastern Europe—will continue to meet their responsibilities. You may ask, why are you so confident? Look at what these aspirant countries are already doing, and have been doing, in the current year and recent years. One must look only at the peacekeeping missions currently, and those that have been going on for several years in the Balkans.

You can look at the war in Afghanistan, and also the conflict in Iraq to conclude that not only will these nations be prepared to take the mantle of NATO membership—but are already contributing to the safety and security of all members. Their contributions and support have been substantive and

significant in these current times of need.

NATO will certainly become a stronger alliance, with the capabilities and the vitality these prospective new members bring to the partnership.

I see these seven new members actually revitalizing NATO. There are concerns that have been expressed about the adherence and the unity of NATO. These seven countries will bring a revitalization, an appreciation for the importance of NATO and the freedoms and values we stand for.

When you discuss the expansion of NATO, the benefits of membership are often the focus. However, it is important to understand the tremendous value the alliance, and especially the United States, gains when these seven countries are offered membership.

We have seen the impact of these nations in the positions and actions taken during the recent military conflict in disarming Iraq. When the alliance first addressed the Iraq issue, it was these countries that immediately voiced their support for offering protection to an ally. Once the conflict began, these countries offered staging support as well as troops and chemical weapons teams which ensured Allied Forces were prepared to confront all possible battlefield scenarios. In particular, Bulgaria and Romania were helpful with their bases.

The alliance experienced a disconcerting event earlier this year when a member nation, Turkey, requested defense assistance. Critics again questioned the value and importance of NATO. However, those trying days highlighted the importance of this alliance to the United States. And while there was a small number of members who disagreed with the United States, the vast majority were in agreement with our policy and were extremely helpful in moving the alliance to assist Turkey in their defense needs.

Beyond the military conflict in Iraq, expanding the membership in NATO continues to be in the interest of this country. As the United States continues to confront terrorism on all fronts, we will need the continued support and intelligence assistance to make our efforts successful. Again, I feel confident these nations will take the lead in developing specialized programs that are needed within NATO.

Again, the aspirant countries are being asked to put together quick response forces to deal with chemical or biological attacks, should one occur. These are the invaluable programs that NATO will need as it changes its focus to fighting terrorism.

The United States will always need allies with which to partner to promote democratic values and our principles. By offering NATO membership to these seven countries, our country is gaining valuable allies that are intimately familiar with the value of individual freedom and also the concept of representative government. They appreciate what a blessing that is for the people.

The tremendous reforms and the progress that have been made by these aspirant nations is a testament to their commitment to the core values that have made NATO the strongest military alliance in history.

I strongly urge my colleagues to vote favorably on this resolution of ratification and welcome Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to our alliance of shared security but, more importantly, to our alliance of shared values, principles, and aspirations for free people.

I yield the floor.

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the time be charged equally to both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SUNUNU). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, it is a privilege to yield as much time as he requires to the distinguished Senator from Arizona.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum for 1 minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield for that purpose?

Mr. LUGAR. Yes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Indiana, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, for his work on this very important legislation, for his leadership and continued voice of maturity and reason that is often needed in our discussions and debates over issues of national security.

The Senate's ratification of the NATO enlargement protocol before us represents the ultimate victory of freedom over the fear and terror that ruled Central and Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1989. The Berlin Wall came down in 1989. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. NATO expanded eastwards in 1999 and will do so again with the Senate's consent in 2003. History will judge NATO's historic move eastwards as a final chapter in a long struggle not simply to roll back oppression but to consolidate a Europe whole and free.

The democracies of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia add a moral and

strategic dimension to the alliance. The Baltics were captive nations during the cold war. Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia were subsumed into the Soviet empire, and Slovenia was a constituent part of Tito's Yugoslavia.

These nations suffered over four decades of effective foreign control and occupation. In 1989 and 1991, we celebrated their independence. Today we celebrate their secure freedom, enshrined in our great Western alliance in defense of our common values.

The Vilnius seven nations, as NATO's newest members are known, lent their moral voice to our campaign to liberate Iraq and end Saddam Hussein's tyranny. A February 5 letter from the V-7 nations, plus Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia, stated:

The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are a part, must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction. . . . The clear and present danger posed by Saddam Hussein's regime requires a united response from the community of democracies.

These nations share our values because they understand oppression all too well. Their voices carry special weight.

We received significant political and logistical support from the V-7 nations during the war in Iraq. NATO's new democracies provided their airspace, airfields, ports, and military personnel in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Several of these nations deployed troops to the Iraq theater. Many of NATO's newest members more resolutely and more concretely supported the military campaign in Iraq than did some of NATO's founding members. These seven democracies have also served as de facto Allies in NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

NATO's enlargement serves American leadership in Europe, anchoring our commitment to security and freedom there. It welcomes into the alliance a large group of nations that resolutely support American leadership and the principles that guide it in Europe and across the world.

As we saw during the Iraq debate, a majority of Europe's leaders, including NATO's new members, supported America's determination to disarm Iraq. NATO's new members will be solid allies that will expand NATO's reach, amplify its voice, and enhance its moral authority to defend freedom, including against the threat of global terrorism.

I have had the pleasure of traveling to each of the seven new member states to review their preparations to join NATO. Like my colleagues, I have been struck by these democracies' determination to rank among our closest allies, and to see NATO membership not only as a way to guarantee their security, but to contribute to the larger struggle for freedom the West once waged on their behalf.

The success of the Prague Summit demonstrated the new NATO's shared

history, shared values, shared sense of threat, and an agreed way forward in meeting those threats. This new NATO will provide a firmer foundation for peace and a more resolute defense of our values. Prague lent considerable momentum to the construction of an integrated and peaceful Europe and taught us much about our alliance.

The decisions at Prague to invite seven new members to join the alliance, create a NATO rapid reaction force, enhance military modernization and interoperability, and streamline NATO's infrastructure were tangible accomplishments that should make the alliance more capable and flexible. Rather than debating out-of-area operations, NATO forces and assets are supporting the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. The NATO-Russia Council provides a forum for security cooperation with Moscow. NATO's peacekeeping missions in the Balkans have been a success. The United States is considering a new military basing concept on the territory of new NATO Allies in southeastern Europe. NATO remains central to American interests in Europe and beyond.

This is not to suggest in any way that everything is going swimmingly within the alliance. NATO has been put at grave risk by hostile French obstructionism that is as dangerous as it is cynical.

Let me be clear: I believe the French government is pursuing a systematic campaign to undermine American leadership in Europe and the world. I believe France would ultimately like to see America's withdrawal from Europe and the replacement of an American-led NATO with an all-European army. France's active opposition to the United States within the North Atlantic Council over a period of many years, and in the daily workings of the NATO bureaucracy, make clear the French agenda to weaken NATO's foundations and make the alliance less capable of effectively meeting challenges to international security.

Officials at many levels of the French government, including President Chirac, boldly assert France's ambition to serve as a "counterweight" to the United States. By definition, a country can be either a counterweight or an ally, but it cannot be both. Official pronouncements by the French government, and the daily actions of France within NATO and at the Security Council, make clear that France is not an ally of the United States.

France's decision in February to block a routine request for Turkey's defense—I emphasize "defense"—in the event of war with Iraq created the most serious internal crisis the alliance has known in a generation. France's open rejection of its commitment to a fellow NATO ally required the decision on Turkey's reinforcement to be taken in the Defense Planning Committee, which excludes France.

The Defense Planning Committee is the logical and appropriate venue for

decisions relating to the defense of NATO members to be made. France does not contribute militarily to an alliance premised on the military defense of member democracies. France has a political voice but not a military stake in NATO decision-making. Decisions relating to the military interests and defense of member states—the core of NATO's mission, and the bulk of its agenda—fall under the authority of the Defense Planning Committee. The French dilute their own influence in NATO by not participating in its military arm, and the alliance should recognize that condition of French membership by making defense decisions in a forum that reflects France's absence from NATO's military mission.

NATO did ultimately achieve a consensus in the DPC that met Turkey's defense requirements. Achieving consensus in an institutionalized forum that excludes France seems to me to have produced a better result than a divisive majority vote in the North Atlantic Council, had we shelved the consensus principle in favor of some other weighted voting mechanism, as some in the Senate have proposed.

While I did not oppose the agreement reached today in the Senate creating a reporting requirement on the issues of consensus and suspension within NATO, I do not support overturning the consensus principle and creating a suspension clause because I believe it could weaken American leadership and interests in NATO while actually improving the position of France within the alliance. Replacing the consensus rule with a majority voting scheme would lead to factionalism and could result in scenarios in which the United States was outvoted, ceding our traditional leadership to others. Adopting a suspension clause would gut the heart of the alliance, the commitment to mutual defense, by introducing a reservation into the Alliance's commitment to defend an embattled democracy.

Putting the issue of the consensus rule on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council would be seen by some of our best allies as divisive. It would create a debate within the Council not about the French fifth column, but about an American proposal that would dilute the influence of other NATO partners by weakening or negating their influence in a majority voting scheme. Replacing the consensus rule with some form of majority vote could threaten the supreme national interests of any NATO member, including the United States, that might at some point find itself dissenting from a majority of NATO members on a matter vital to that country's national security. The United States would never give up its effective veto over NATO military operations, and no country that contributes militarily to the alliance could be expected to do the same by endorsing a majority voting process.

Under consensus, no vote counts more than any other, which is not true

in a weighted majority voting system like that of the Security Council. Consensus helps pull allies together and gives each an equal stake in their outcomes. It prevents factionalism and the development of voting blocs that would only divide allies, not draw us together. Consensus prevents France from leading its own voting bloc in opposition to the United States. Historically, the United States has been the only NATO member whose initiatives regularly achieve consensus. Why throw away such an effective tool for U.S. leadership?

Nor would I support conditioning NATO enlargement on developing a mechanism to suspend any NATO member that fails to uphold alliance principles. Advocating a kick-out clause suggests a lack of confidence in the democratic character and commitment of our new allies. It sends exactly the wrong message to these new members: that we fear they may regress from the democratic values we have certified that they share by inviting them to join NATO, values which NATO itself protects and strengthens. Conditioning their membership with the suggestion that we do not have confidence in the longevity of their democracies seems a strange way to welcome them into our alliance.

A clause threatening any individual NATO member with expulsion would weaken the heart of the Washington Treaty by casting doubt on the commitment of the NATO Allies to come to the defense of any threatened member state. A suspension clause would effectively condition the mutual defense commitment that is at the heart of the alliance in a way that would breed insecurity and mistrust, not security and confidence, among member states. In the words of Bruce Jackson of the Project on Transitional Democracies:

A provision to expel [NATO members] would introduce a corrosive mental reservation into the commitment to defend an embattled democracy and would, therefore, debilitate the most powerful military alliance ever assembled.

NATO works so well for many of the reasons the U.N. Security Council does not: it is a true community of values in which all members are democracies; consensus requires unanimity that gives all members a stake in decision-making and outcomes; the absence of majority voting or weighted voting like the Security Council does not create different classes of membership or hostile factions; and unlike the Security Council, NATO has proven time and again that it is able to effectively resist aggression and use its military and political power to expand freedom. The reason the seven new members of NATO are so keen to join the alliance underscores their clear belief it will protect their security and advance their interests. Can anyone hold the Security Council to the same standard?

NATO's value to American interests and the progress of freedom endures. NATO enlargement serves American

interests by delivering seven committed treaty allies who share our perspective on the world. Enlargement serves our common values by adding to our community of allied democracies the voices and the people of countries that were long denied their free destiny. NATO's expansion moves us decisively in the direction of a Europe whole and free, one that has exorcized the ghosts of a violent past and stands with us in its commitment to human freedom.

As the leaders of Britain, Spain, Italy, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and Portugal have written, "The real bond between the United States and Europe is the values we share. . . . These values crossed the Atlantic with those who sailed from Europe to help create the United States of America. Today they are under greater threat than ever. . . . Today more than ever, the transatlantic bond is a guarantee of our freedom." Let that continue to be our creed in the uncertain years ahead, confident that we are stronger together than apart, that our values ennoble our common defense of them, and that we can, together, make this a safer, freer, better world. It's worth fighting for.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I know of no Senators who wish to debate. I have consulted with the distinguished ranking member, Senator BIDEN. He knows of no Members on the Democratic side seeking time to debate and I know of no Republicans who seek further time in debate. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent all time be yielded back on both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, my understanding, and I ask for guidance from the Chair, is that a vote on final passage of the NATO treaty will occur at 9:30 a.m. tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LUGAR. I advise all Senators that the next action on the treaty will, in fact, be the final vote at 9:30 tomorrow. I also add as an announcement that the foreign ministers of the countries seeking ascension will be brought to the floor following the vote for presentation to Senators. That will be a prelude for a number of recognition ceremonies involving the President, the White House, and others.

Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LUGAR. I am happy to yield.

Mr. SARBANES. I simply commend chairman LUGAR and Senator BIDEN, ranking minority member, for their very effective leadership with respect to this NATO enlargement issue. I am pleased to join with them in supporting this very important step forward.

I underscore how quickly the chairman moved with respect to this matter and how carefully it was done in the

committee. Very extended consideration was given to this issue, which of course, comports with its importance. This is a major step we all need to recognize and the fact that it will happen without controversy, at least of any consequence, ought not to make us lose sight of the fact of the historic nature of what is being accomplished here—tomorrow, presumably.

I thank the Senator for his skilled leadership on this issue.

Mr. LUGAR. I thank the distinguished Senator from Maryland for his leadership in our committee throughout the years and, likewise, specifically, on the issue of NATO that has been before the Senate.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. LUGAR. I ask unanimous consent the Senate now begin a period of morning business with Senators permitted to speak up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LUGAR. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FAIRNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY IN POLITICAL LIFE

Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I rise today to speak to an issue of fairness and responsibility in our political life that demands our attention.

Let me premise my remarks by saying it is an honor to be a Senator and serve the people of New Jersey. I love my job. I love politics and the debate of ideas it makes possible. But I must say that I am downright disgusted when that debate of ideas degenerates into the politics of personal destruction and moves toward character assassination, especially when it may run afoul of the laws passed by this body, and more especially when the target of a campaign of personal destruction is a good and decent man—TOM DASCHLE, who has spent his entire adult life in service to our Nation.

A little over 1 year ago, the Congress passed—and the President signed—the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.

Even as the courts ponder a challenge and an appeal to this landmark legislation, there are those involved in the political process that have demonstrated their intent to disregard it no matter what the court decides for the sole purpose of destroying a political opponent.

In that regard, there are very disturbing reports in the media this week about an amorphous front group being formed in South Dakota for the pur-

pose, in the words of its organizers, of ending TOM DASCHLE's public career in 2004.

I don't question anyone's right to free speech nor their right to mount a campaign against any candidate for Federal Office, but this effort would apparently violate both Federal tax and election laws.

According to press reports, associates of the presumptive Republican nominee for Senate in South Dakota have begun raising special interest money in Washington for an advertising campaign in South Dakota against Senator DASCHLE, a campaign only marginally distanced from Senator DASCHLE's potential competitor or the opposing political party.

The problem with this effort, leaving aside the elements of personal destruction, is that the organization leading it—the Rushmore Policy Council—is organized as a tax-exempt 501(c)(4) non-profit organization.

According to the IRS, 501(c)(4) organizations "must be operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare." The IRS also stipulates that, "the promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office."

One might say a lot of things about TOM DASCHLE, but his election or defeat is hardly social welfare. It is clear from their own statements that the purpose of the Rushmore Policy Council is to defeat Senator DASCHLE. In short, this is likely a violation of the letter of the law and clearly a violation of its spirit.

The Congress attempted to address these types of advertisements in the campaign finance reform law passed last year. But one of the organizers of the effort against Senator DASCHLE stated simply that, "We're going to operate as if it's not" on the books.

In addition to the personal attacks and legal questions are the implications of a smear campaign that constructs front groups to infiltrate a Senator's home State with reckless disregard for the spirit of the campaign finance laws that this body passed just last year with bipartisan support.

At the very least, this is a mockery of Congress's efforts to clean up electoral politics.

Let me quote from the memo distributed around Washington by the organizers of the Rushmore Council's so-called Daschle Accountability Project: "We propose to destroy Daschle's credibility" and "ultimately end his political career . . ."

Unbelievably, the group funding this covert operation intends to employ South Dakotans who have almost nothing to do with the campaign, but who help to convey the false impression that the campaign is, and I quote, "putatively based in South Dakota—to avoid the dismissive 'outsider' label routinely attached to such efforts in the past."

In other words, the group exists to put a phony local veneer on the GOP's efforts to ruin its number one target—TOM DASCHLE. Or as this particular group puts it, ". . . maybe be rid of [Tom Daschle] once and for all."

This is the work of the Rushmore Policy Council, an organization so small it has no website or local telephone listing. Its offshoot "The Daschle Accountability Project" is a proudly self-described coalition of right wing organizations whose stated purpose, according to its own mission statement, is not to engage in policy debate, but rather to end Daschle's career by running an \$800,000 advertising campaign in South Dakota designed to "destroy DASCHLE's credibility within his home state through humor"—as if a laugh track makes them any less unseemly.

The Rapid City Journal recently cited leaders of campaign finance watchdog groups who have already pointed out that the Rushmore Policy Council is endangering its tax-exempt status by targeting DASCHLE for defeat in 2004. "It's not clear to me how they will remain a 501c4—an organization that must operate exclusively for the promotion of social welfare—as they are going to do what is being reported.

And, Fred Wertheimer, president of the campaign finance reform group Democracy 21 agrees with this assessment. He tells the Journal "The group's activities need to be carefully watched in the coming months to see if, in fact, they are breaking tax laws and campaign-finance laws. It is clear they want to defeat Senator DASCHLE . . . there doesn't seem to be any question they want to use this for this goal and that purpose . . . and that—is not what this group—is supposed to engage in."

Most disturbingly is that this type of attack is hardly new. About a year and a half ago, the White House asked its political allies to turn up the heat on Senator DASCHLE. Most of us know the routine—the orchestrated campaign to tar TOM with the label "obstructionist." Even while under his leadership the Senate approved 100 judicial appointments and rejected only two—some obstructionist.

Where I come from, 100 is hardly obstructionist.

After the White House's directive, the outrageous attacks began. Since then, political opponents have compared Senator DASCHLE to everyone from Saddam Hussein to the devil himself on talk radio.

The problem this "Burn Down Daschle" effort faces is two fold: No. 1, lack of credibility; and, No. 2, lack of legal authority.

On the former, the Sioux Falls Argus Leader accurately points out that the Daschle Accountability project and its efforts to destroy DASCHLE's character through an ad campaign with a ridiculing tone embedded in humor have the potential to backfire in a small State where retail politics holds great sway.