

the surface, very little is happening—but beneath the surface, nothing is happening.”

I think we are in a situation where the U.N. may be incapable of acting. This Nation must act if we are to maintain the integrity of the resolution of the U.N.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Alabama. I welcome the opportunity now to listen, and perhaps engage in colloquy with my two good friends, the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Massachusetts. We have been at this debate 2 hours 10 minutes. We are delighted to have them join us.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

WAR WITH IRAQ

Mr. DODD. Madam President, first, I say to my friend from Virginia, this is an opportunity for us to spend a few minutes talking about the issue of war with Iraq. We all listened last evening to the comments of the President during his press conference. We all have great respect, obviously, for the Presidency of the United States. I would not call the President's press conference a Churchillian moment, but certainly the President expressed his views on what he believes ought to be done.

On October 11, 2002, I voted for H.J. Res. 114, a resolution providing the President with the authority to use force against Iraq if proved necessary. The vote on that resolution was 77 to 23. I voted for the entire resolution including language which requires the President to first determine that “reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or is not likely to lead to the enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Resolutions.” The particular requirement seems to have gotten lost in recent discussions about Iraq and deserves repeating in the context of our debate this morning.

My concern is that the Bush administration, at this juncture, has not made the case that we have reached the point that we can say that diplomacy has failed.

I do not know of anyone who disagrees with the notion that we would be far better off with Iraq disarmed. Every person I know supports that conclusion. The debate, if you will, is not over whether Iraq should be disarmed but whether there are means short of military conflict for doing so. Knowing all the hazards and dangers that will arise when we send American service men and women into combat to achieve that result, we must not take that decision precipitously, without first exhausting other options, particularly diplomatic options.

As I stated earlier, I voted for H.J. Res 114 last fall, and I would vote for it again because I believe force, coupled with with diplomacy, are needed in this

circumstance. Threats of force alone without diplomacy can too often lead us to unnecessary armed conflict and costly destruction and loss of life.

We fail sometimes to recognize and understand the value of diplomacy and how well it has worked for us in times past. We saw diplomacy at work during the Kennedy administration when President Kennedy diffused the Cuban missile crisis. We saw it at work as well in the Carter administration when Sadat and Begin came together at Camp David to end conflict between Israel and Egypt. We saw it at work in 1993 when, through the efforts of former-President Carter in North Korea, we were able to diffuse a situation that was getting very serious. Diplomacy has successfully resolved many disputes large and small. On each occasion it requires our President to put his credibility on the line and work diligently day in and day out to bring those warring parties together to avoid the conflict that would have ensued.

I think too often we fail to appreciate the value of what can be done through diplomacy. There are countless examples throughout our history.

My plea this morning, is not that we renounce the use of force multilateral or unilateral—in the case of Iraq or any other circumstance where US national security interests are at stake. I would never support a resolution that would deprive our Nation of the opportunity to protect and defend its security and its sovereignty, including by the unilateral use of force. My only concern is that we ought not rush unnecessarily to that conclusion when other options still remain. Do we really want to unnecessarily put at risk the lives of innocent Iraqi people or more importantly the lives of our own young men and women in uniform who have been deployed to the Middle East and await the orders of the Commander in Chief?

My plea today is that the President seriously consider giving the U.N. effort the diplomatic track a bit more time. Obviously, there is a threat in Iraq. We all know that. But it is a threat at this moment that is being effectively contained by the presence of international inspectors and the threat of force. Yes, Iraq is a threat, but there are graver and more immediate threats confronting the United States. I believe that North Korea poses a far greater and far more immediate danger to the United States and the region. U.S./Korean experts across the political spectrum share that view.

I am concerned that our impatience over Iraq is doing great harm to our relationships with our long standing friends and allies. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 did not contain an end date by which the inspectors were to conclude their mission. However, from the very beginning, the administration showed very little patience for the inspections process. Almost before it began, members of the Bush Administration were ridiculing the process,

suggesting it would never work anyway; why are we bothering with it?

One might ask the basic question: If we never thought it was going to work, why did we support U.N. Security Resolution 1441 in the first place?

The problem of Iraq and Saddam Hussein is not weeks old, it is years old. We all know that. Nonetheless, we drafted, worked, suggested, and supported the resolution that called for an inspections process. There is no certainty that an inspections process will necessarily succeed, given the size of the country and the difficulties involved, but we voted to send inspectors to Iraq and we supported the terms of their mission as spelled out in the text of the resolution.

Yet as the inspection mission was getting underway, the administration seemed to already have lost patience with it. Perhaps that is why other members of the Security Council began to question whether the United States was ever genuinely committed to an inspections regime.

U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix spoke before the United Nations this morning. Let me share with my colleagues some of his conclusions—very significant conclusions in my view. Mr. Blix said that the inspectors were in a better position to carry out their work than they had been in the 1990s because of the existence of international pressure. The President should claim victory that his policy is succeeding—the combination of diplomacy and the threat of force is bearing fruit.

We ought to be celebrating the fact that the inspectors have made progress in disarming Iraq. I do not think that a call for inspections without a threat of force would have produced positive results. The combination of the threat of force and the inspections process is, according to those we have asked to perform these duties, producing far better results than we ever could have imagined.

Mr. Blix went on to say that there is no air surveillance over the entire country, and that inspectors can move freely anywhere in Iraq. Even with enhanced Iraqi cooperation, Mr. Blix stated that the mission would need some additional months not years to complete its work.

I am not interested in seeing the inspections process prolonged indefinitely. I do not think that is in anyone's interest. We have men and women in uniform deployed abroad, waiting for orders. We cannot keep them there indefinitely without having the necessary rotations. That poses some problems. I hope we never reach the conclusion that simply because we have deployed our forces to the Middle East, we see that action as putting our credibility on the line if we don't then take military action, even though diplomacy may be working.

American service men and women certainly understand that when they are called to duty, there may be times

they are asked to put their lives on the line. They also know there may be times when they are going to be asked to wait. Certainly, we need to understand the conduct of this particular delicate situation. Asking our men and women in uniform to be patient as we try to see if we cannot resolve this problem without putting them in harm's way is not an irresponsible way to proceed at all, given the fact we may get exactly what we are seeking as a result of the combined efforts of diplomacy and threat of force.

I believe this process is working and the President ought to claim victory, in a sense, because as a result of his efforts, we are getting the job done better than we might have imagined we could.

In a sense, I almost get the feeling we are trying to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory by moving away from a process that appears to be working despite all the difficulty surrounding it.

Obviously, if we want the multilateral support of our allies then we need to allow the U.N. effort some time. I can make a strong case that we probably do not need multilateral forces to win the military contest here. I am quite confident the United States military can more than adequately perform the challenges posed in Iraq militarily. But the problem becomes greater when you think of the aftermath, of how we manage that, how this event will affect other relationships we have where international cooperation is important.

I say this with a great deal of lament. Diplomacy has been suffering terribly here over the last few years. This is not just my conclusion. This is the conclusion of the responsible people who have watched, tragically over the last 24 months, where diplomacy has not been working as well as it could. I don't want to digress very much. I will keep focused on the discussion in front of us, but from the outset there was a notion that international cooperation was somehow a sign of weakness; that, in fact, the comments of our friend from Alabama suggesting a moment ago that international organizations and the United Nations could not perform duties when asked to act and asked to get a job done, I disagree with.

I have my difficulties with the performance of the U.N. from time to time, but I ask anyone to suggest what the world might look like if we did not have a U.N. system to respond all over the globe to every imaginable crisis that emerges. The idea of deriding and ridiculing and diminishing the role of the U.N. system is not in our interest, and I don't think it is in our interest to ridicule our allies in Europe and elsewhere. These are good friends. They have been and will continue to be. But we need to work at those relationships to keep them strong. Unfortunately, we have not been doing that. And, we are paying a price for that. That is why the American public and so many around the world are worried about un-

necessarily taking unilateral action. Particularly a preemptive unilateral action.

Having said that, I applaud the President's decision last night to go to the U.N. and to put a resolution on the table. I feared he might abandon the U.N. effort without doing so because some of his advisors have recommended this course of action. I commend the President for still being willing to try and get that international support. I hope a resolution can be crafted which our allies and others will feel comfortable supporting, one that gives the inspections more time to see if they can succeed. If I didn't feel time might work for us here, or that there was an imminent threat to our nations, then I would stand with those who would say we have to go forward now and unilaterally respond to the threat. I don't believe that moment has arrived.

Last night the President said that the world has changed since September 11th. I agree with him. The administration's eyes obviously were opened to the fact we needed help and support from the nations in coping with the amorphous nature of the stateless and faceless terrorist organizations. We heard the great news in the last few days of the capture of some al-Qaida operatives. I would respectfully say that this would not have happened without international cooperation. So in this particular set of circumstances, we have seen the value of international cooperation.

While Bush administration officials have seen the wisdom of cooperating with our allies in combating terrorist organizations, key administration policymakers still hold—too many of them—the fundamental belief that as the world's only remaining superpower, the United States does not need to consult or build the support from other nations in the conduct of foreign policy. They believe that we can singlehandedly decide who are good guys and bad guys, the members of the axis of evil, in the Bush administration's lexicon. It is this tension that brings us where we are in Iraq and North Korea.

Now we have, of course, the paradox that the administration is in no particular hurry, it would appear, to resolve the North Korean problem which was precipitated in part, I argue, by our handling and engagement with Iraq. It has no patience in the case of Iraq to allow the inspections process to play out. I appreciate that the administration is trying to maintain the readiness of more than 200,000 American troops that are or will soon be in the region and that this cannot go on indefinitely without troop rotation. However, I strongly believe the American forces are carrying out an incredibly important mission, even if the order is never given to attack. Just being there has a tremendous value in terms of what we are trying to achieve in the Middle East.

Their presence signals a seriousness and resolve on the part of the United

States that Iraq must disarm. Iraq is, in fact, beginning, as we see here, to respond—not as quickly as I would like, not in the ways some might prefer—but Hans Blix has reported progress. We should not yet draw the conclusion that in U.N. effort has failed.

I want to see Iraq disarm. Every American does. I believe as a way of doing this, at least a way worth trying to get this accomplished without resorting to force. The bellicose and public efforts by the administration to end the inspections process is going to have severe diplomatic costs in the months and years ahead. My hope is that we will be able to repair these relationships. The quick way we might do that is to allow this process to work a bit longer. If we do that, I think we can build the kind of support that is necessary to achieve not only the desired results in Iraq, but also to allow us to continue to build the relationships that are going to be critically important to deal with other pressing foreign policy concerns.

We live in a world that absolutely requires international cooperation, and the United States must be a leader in this effort. The great leaders in the post-World-War-II period understood this. The great people we revere and talk about often, people like Omar Bradley and George Marshall, the Dulles brothers and others, who understood the value and the importance of international organizations. They were the architects of these institutions. They were the ones who argued so vociferously to create a U.N. system, international courts of justice, to build a NATO system. They understood the importance of international cooperation. They understood that even a great power such as ours could not solve all the world's problems singlehandedly.

Too often, as we engage in this debate, many Americans and many people across the globe have the impression that the United States no longer believes that international cooperation is important in the conduct of our foreign policy. I disagree with that profoundly.

That worries this Senator very deeply. I will not take a backseat to anybody in my concern about Saddam Hussein. I would support the resolution which I voted for in October again today if it were the pending business of this body. I don't believe that the resolution calls upon the President to abandon diplomacy.

For those reasons I would urge and encourage the President to continue his efforts with the framework of the U.N. Again, I want to compliment him for indicating he is going to go back to the U.N. in the coming days to see if we can get a resolution that will build the kind of international cooperation that is necessary. But I have this nagging fear that there are some in the President's inner circle who believe this is all a waste of time and effort, that it is not in our interests to do it,

and the sooner we move away from seeking international cooperation the better off we are going to be.

That mentality seems to be gaining currency in the minds of far too many. That is a dangerous road to follow. It is one I hope and pray that the President does not take.

Mr. President, let me associate myself with what others have said in the course of this debate. If or when the President orders U.S. Service Members into combat, I and every other member of this body will support these brave men and women one hundred percent and we will pray that they return home to their families unharmed.

With those thoughts in mind, I thank my colleagues for the opportunity to express some views on this critical issue. I am certainly anxious to hear the thoughts of my colleagues as they express those during the remaining time of this debate.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator allow me to have one or two questions, by way of a colloquy?

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I would like to do it. I understand the agreement goes to 12:30. I have not had an opportunity, and I have been here almost an hour. We extended the time shortly over on the other side.

I will be glad to yield if we can work that out, but I would like an opportunity.

Mr. WARNER. Why do we not just agree now to extend the time by 30 minutes, equally divided between the two of us? That will take us to the hour of 1 o'clock.

Mr. KENNEDY. That will be fine with me. I am glad if we agree the colloquy go maybe 5 or 6 minutes.

EXTENSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. WARNER. Certainly. The Senator from Massachusetts has been most patient.

I ask unanimous consent that morning business be extended to the hour of 1 o'clock, the time equally divided between myself and my colleagues on the other side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CORNYN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WARNER. With reference to two points that you make, Senator, first—I copied in my notes—you questioned was the United States ever genuinely engaged in the inspection process, some words to that effect.

Mr. DODD. Before you put words in my mouth, my concern has been that the administration has not been terribly supportive of the inspections process. Numerous Administration officials have been very dismissive of the inspections effort. My colleague from Virginia may have a different one. But my impression is that the administration has never embraced the inspections process, endorsed it, or supported it with the kind of rhetoric that I would have assumed would have been

the case since we certainly supported the resolution that established the inspections initiative.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we are entitled to an honest difference of opinion. My colleague and I debated last night in a public forum on this very issue. But I believe our Government has been very thoroughly engaged in the inspection process, trying to support it.

I provide today some tangible evidence in the sense that I have a letter from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, addressed to me with a copy to my distinguished colleagues, Senator LEVIN and Senator ROBERTS, in which they set out for the record exactly what we have done by way of giving the U.S. intelligence regarding likely sites where weapons of mass destruction could be in the process of being manufactured, stored, or otherwise. We have cooperated mightily in this effort.

I think that corroborates the assertion of the Senator from Virginia that our Government is engaged. I just read one paragraph here, Tenet stating we, the United States:

... have now provided detailed information on all of the high value and moderate value sites to UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

That is in rebuttal to your comment about genuine engagement. I think that shows good faith.

Second, this rush headlong?

As the Senator well knows, 1441 was adopted on November 8. Immediately thereafter the United Nations began to put in place and formalize work that Blix had been doing for some period of time.

As you well know, the United Nations contemplated that there could be a second inspection regime, and Blix was put in office and began his work some months before. Had he undertaken to go into Iraq as quickly as I think feasible from a logistics standpoint, and having with him trained individuals, and he has been there basically since the latter part of November, early December—am I not correct in that?

The reason there has not been greater productivity by Blix—I think he has tried diligently—is the absolute lack of cooperation of Iraq, to which my colleague from Connecticut has agreed.

Here we are now. Our President and the Prime Minister and other nations of the coalition of the willing, having called up their reserves, called up their guard, transported the forces and put them in place. I was visiting there with Senator LEVIN, Senator ROBERTS, and Senator ROCKEFELLER 10 days ago. We have placed them there. As the Senator from Connecticut I think quite properly said, in fairness, their presence has, indeed, supported the diplomatic efforts undertaken by the President and others in the United Nations, which is still going on.

Our President said last night that we will wait and see what the Blix report comes forth with. He has come forth

again today. With due respect to Blix, he tends to be somewhat contradictory.

In previous reports he quite actively deplored the fact that Iraq has not been more cooperative and that lack of cooperation has hindered his efforts. As the Senator well knows, the concept of this inspection was not that Blix and his team had to find the weapons; it was that Iraq was to cooperate and show where the weapons are so Blix could supervise their destruction.

This thing got totally, as we say as sailors, off course because of the need for Blix to do both the destruction, which he is now supervising, of a modest cache of missiles, and at the same time trying to search, using U.S. intelligence and intelligence from other nations, for the sites.

I say to the Senator, I see no basis for saying that this President, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, or others are rushing, as you said, headlong to try to utilize force as the final solution. We have been at this thing 12 years. Blix has been in business since November.

Mr. DODD. Let me respond to your rather long question.

Mr. WARNER. Yes.

Mr. DODD. I presume there is a question there.

Mr. WARNER. Yes.

Mr. DODD. My response is the inspection teams were not at full strength until about the end of January.

Obviously, we didn't think Saddam Hussein was a wonderfully truthful, reliable head of state last fall when the U.S. voted for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. We have known Saddam Hussein for a long time, and it therefore comes as no great surprise that it has taken international pressure to get results.

It has only been about a month since the inspections team has been fully operational in Iraq. That is a fact. To expect somehow that within a month's period of time, or a little more than a month, an inspections team was going to be able to complete the job was naive.

This morning U.N. Weapons Inspections chief, Mr. Blix—whom I think most people respect as being an honorable person and certainly one who has dedicated much of his career to eliminating weapons of mass destruction—reported that the inspections are making progress, that today inspectors are getting a lot more done than they did in the 1990s. We should listen to Mr. Blix and give his remarks serious consideration as we decide the next steps.

My only point in taking the floor today is not to suggest, as some may, that we ought to under no circumstances in dealing with Iraq ever contemplate the use of force. I would disagree with that. I think having a threat of force is absolutely critical to achieving a desired result. The only point is that we ought not do this alone. I don't think it is necessary, and I think we ought to at least give this process time to work. I think the cost