

they are afraid to fess up to the Congress and to the American people what this war is going to cost.

Mr. LEVIN. Just to add one further thought, it seems to me it would be absolutely irresponsible not to have a range or an estimate of what the cost of a war would be in the best and worst case scenarios.

Mr. REID. Or middle case.

Mr. LEVIN. Yes, or at least a range on what is the worst case scenario and what is the best case scenario. I cannot believe the planners at the Pentagon and the OMB do not have a range. If they don't have a range, it would be irresponsible because how in heaven's name can the administration then say that we can afford a tax cut of the size they are proposing, when we have an impending demand for resources in a war that could be lengthy, costly, and then the aftermath could be lengthy and costly? It borders on the reckless, in terms of an economy, to say we don't have an estimate, we don't know whether or not it is going to be \$20 billion, \$40 billion, \$100 billion—we don't have a range; yet they are trying to persuade a majority of the Congress that we ought to shrink the resources coming into the Government at the same time we are on the verge of war and the aftermath of a war, which doesn't have any estimated length, any estimated cost, and no troop estimate. We were given about a 200,000 estimate. Well, that is too high. OK, what is the ceiling that is more realistic to the people who say 200,000 is too high? We are completely devoid of that.

What we are not devoid of, though, is the effort to shrink resources to this Government through a tax cut, which has a number of problems to it. One of them is that when we are facing what we are in terms of expenditures, it is not the responsible thing to do.

Mr. REID. I would like to respond, not in a very direct way, but to point out problems the Senator has outlined in his statement to me. Is the Senator aware that yesterday I talked about a Pew Research Center poll? It is a non-partisan organization. They are not for Democrats or Republicans. This was a real big poll, where 1,254 adults were contacted between February 12 and 18. For the first time in this administration, the American people do not approve of the way George W. Bush is handling the economy; 48 percent of the people disapprove. Is the Senator aware of that?

Mr. LEVIN. I wasn't aware of the Senator's remarks, but I was aware of the poll.

Mr. REID. And the Senator talked about tax policy. This same poll says that 44 percent of the American people disagree of George W. Bush's handling of tax policy. So the Senator said it all. I appreciate his asking me a question.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am going to speak about the very budget document that the Senator from Nevada and I have been discussing, perhaps in an indirect way. I wish to share

some thoughts with the Senate about the proposed budget for 2004, which the President has now sent to Congress.

As always, I wanted to see where the President's priorities were—not in sound bites, but the actual nitty-gritty numbers in the budget document. While every budget request is important, with the economy sputtering the way it is and with huge Federal deficits looming and critical domestic and international issues unresolved, particularly when we are facing the potential of a war and a very lengthy and complicated, expensive aftermath to that war, this budget requires special attention.

I have been keenly disappointed by what this attention revealed. The President's budget would do exactly what he recently said he did not want to do, which was to pass our problems along to the next generation. The President made a very eloquent statement in the State of the Union Address, saying that we are not going to pass our problems along to the next generation. But when you look at the details of the budget, that is precisely what this budget request does.

By the administration's own calculations, this budget would have us run a deficit of over a trillion dollars for the next 5 years, including record-setting deficits of over \$300 billion for this year and next.

Now, the contrast here between this projection of deficit and the \$5.5 trillion 10-year surplus that was projected in January of 2001 is simply stunning. That contrast between just what 2 years ago was projected for our economy—a \$5.5 trillion surplus—now there are projections of deficits upon deficits upon deficits—a projected deficit of over a trillion dollars over the next 5 years.

The administration's plan estimates a non-Social Security deficit totaling over \$2.5 trillion to the year 2008, which would leave us with an additional debt of \$5 trillion in 2008, which is 150 times greater than what was projected just in the year 2001.

Why such dire fiscal predictions? First, while the tax cut in the year 2001 played a huge part in putting us into the current deficit ditch, the President's call for an additional \$1.5 trillion in new tax cuts—most of which disproportionately benefits upper income folks—will help ensure that we not only stay in the deficit ditch, which we are back into, but that it will be a deep deficit ditch.

Even Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan recognized the danger of such cuts when he spoke of the importance of curbing the deficit, not increasing it.

That perhaps came as a surprise to some people in the administration who were looking to Alan Greenspan to give support to the tax cut proposal and minimize, they hoped, the impact of deficits on future economies. That is not what Chairman Greenspan did. He straightforwardly recognized the dan-

ger of the tax cuts when he spoke of the importance of reducing deficits and not increasing deficits.

Mr. President, I see the Democratic leader is in the Chamber. I withhold the remainder of my comments at this time because he has a very important message relative to North Korea, and I wish to participate with him in a colloquy and presentation. So I withhold the remainder of my comments relative to the President's budget at this time.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader.

NORTH KOREA

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Michigan for his courtesy and appreciate very much his comments with regard to the budget and his extraordinary leadership with regard to many issues involving our military challenges and priorities abroad.

Three weeks ago, I came to the Senate floor to address the intensifying crisis in North Korea, a country and a situation that I believe poses a risk to our Nation every bit as serious as that posed by Saddam Hussein. At the time, I urged President Bush immediately and directly to engage the North Korean Government in discussions to bring about a verifiable end to that country's nuclear weapons program.

Unfortunately, the administration so far has failed to act, and, in the meantime, the crisis in North Korea continues to escalate. In recent days, we have seen reports that North Korea test-fired a new missile, evidently that regime's idea of an inauguration present for South Korea's incoming President. Just today, the newspapers contain reports that North Korea has restarted one of the reactors at its primary nuclear complex, a reactor that produces spent plutonium which can then be converted into weapons grade material.

Let's be clear about what this latest provocation means. It means North Korea could have a nuclear production line up and running and producing weapons grade nuclear material in a matter of months. It means the world's worst proliferator could have enough nuclear material to produce six to eight nuclear weapons by summer.

According to Brent Scowcroft, President George Bush's National Security Adviser, if we fail to act, it means "We will soon face a rampant plutonium production program that could spark a nuclear arms race in Asia and provide deadly exports to America's most implacable enemies."

Unfortunately, the administration continues to insist on downplaying this threat. These latest developments should confirm for anyone watching that this is a crisis that only grows with each day the administration fails to act. I come to the floor today to join with my colleague, the ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, to urge the administration to act now.

The first step toward action is to acknowledge there is a problem. Based on a series of administration statements that play down the threat posed by North Korea's actions, it appears many in the administration are not even willing to take this step. For example, for quite some time now, the administration refused to call this situation even a crisis.

Last month, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the world's non-proliferation efforts, and the response from Under Secretary of State John Bolton, "Not at all expected," and on Monday after the missile test, the administration is quoted as saying that this was "just a periodic event." Secretary Powell called the test "not surprising and fairly innocuous."

So what do we do? I believe we must begin by making certain we are on the same page as our allies. Failure to do so will only produce a failed policy. Unfortunately, while the administration says the right things about the importance of coalitions, it is unwilling or unable to do the right things to build a coalition.

The administration continues to insist on multilateral discussions with the North Koreans while our friends and others have consistently and repeatedly urged President Bush to engage in bilateral talks. Therefore, the administration must redouble its efforts with our allies in South Korea, Japan, with the Chinese, and the Russians.

Second, we must make it clear to the North Koreans that separating plutonium from the spent fuel rods at Yongbyon represents an unacceptable threat to our collective security. We should tell North Korea what we expect of them directly: That if it verifiably freezes all nuclear activities, we and our allies are prepared to discuss the full range of security issues affecting the peninsula, as well as other steps North Korea can take to reenter the international community.

This is not news to the administration. In fact, the President himself has suggested he is prepared to have just these kinds of talks.

Yet, I must say, regrettably, the administration still delays. It allows the crisis to deepen and relations with our friends who are most directly threatened by North Korea to suffer. In fact, what would reward North Korea is to continue to stand by while it builds a nuclear arsenal. The danger within North Korea is too urgent for the President to delay this any further.

Finally, let me also take advantage of having my colleague, Senator LEVIN, in the Chamber to discuss a recent exchange of letters with the administration on this issue. Senators LEVIN, BIDEN, and I laid out our concerns to the administration about its North Korean policies and provided recommendations in a series of letters. I recently received a response from Dr.

Rice, and I ask unanimous consent to print our January 31 letter and Dr. Rice's February 10 response in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, DC, January 31, 2003.

Dr. CONDOLEEZZA RICE,  
National Security Adviser, The White House,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR DR. RICE: We wrote to you earlier this month about our increased concern regarding the crises on the Korean peninsula. Our concern has deepened significantly as a result of a report in today's New York Times, which was confirmed by the Administration, that the U.S. government has evidence that North Korea is removing spent nuclear fuel rods from storage. These rods, which had been securely stored under IAEA monitoring from 1994 until recently, reportedly contain enough plutonium to produce roughly a half dozen nuclear weapons.

As alarming as this report is, we are just as troubled by the Administration's reported reaction to these developments. Prior to this disclosure, the Administration said nothing publicly or privately to Congress about these activities. According to comments attributed to senior Administration officials, the Administration has consciously decided to hold this information in an effort to avoid creating a crisis atmosphere and distracting international attention from Iraq.

This muted response to the world's worst proliferator taking concrete steps that could permit it to build a nuclear arsenal stands in stark contrast to the President's statement on Tuesday evening that "the gravest danger in the war on terror . . . is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons." It is also increasingly difficult to square the Administration's rhetoric on Iraq and decades of U.S. policy aimed at discouraging the emergence of declared nuclear powers with its continued downplaying of the threat posed by North Korea's blatant disregard for international rules on proliferation.

As the crisis with North Korea continues to escalate, the Administration's policy has not gotten any clearer. The Administration's lack of a clear, consistent policy and our failure to take concrete steps to address this growing crisis has produced consternation and confusion. One result is that our allies in the region appear to be taking a course directly at odds with the Administration's latest pronouncements.

Given the stakes of the situation and the ongoing confusion about the Administration's policy, we request that you come brief the Senate as early as is practical to discuss that we know about North Korea's latest actions and what the United States is doing in response.

We look forward to hearing from you as soon as possible

Sincerely,

TOM DASCHLE,  
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.  
CARL LEVIN.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

Washington, DC, February 10, 2003.

Hon. THOMAS A. DASCHLE,  
Democratic Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington,  
DC.

DEAR MR. LEADER: Thank you for your letter regarding U.S. policy on North Korea.

I agree with you about the need to take effective action in light of North Korea's recent actions to restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. The United States is working closely with friends and allies toward our ob-

jective of the elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

However, I disagree with the assertion contained in your letter that, prior to the New York Times article on January 31 on recent North Korean activities, "the Administration said nothing publicly or privately to Congress about these activities." I also reject any suggestion that the Administration consciously withheld information from Congress to avoid distracting attention from Iraq.

The Administration has regularly briefed and consulted Members of Congress regarding policy toward North Korea and Iraq. For example, Deputy Secretary Armitage briefed Senators on January 16 on recent intelligence on activities at North Korean nuclear facilities and steps taken by the Administration in response to these actions. He also testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 4.

In addition, the CIA has routinely provided briefings and written reports to Members and its oversight Committees. CIA briefed Senate Foreign Relations staff on three occasions in December on North Korea WMD issues, and on January 29, published an article on North Korean nuclear-related activities in the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) that addressed the issues discussed in the New York Times on January 31. The January 29 article was one of nine such articles published in the SEIB on North Korea in January alone. The SEIB is delivered daily to the CIA's oversight Committees and to the Office of Senate Security where it is available to Senators and appropriately-cleared staff.

In the days and weeks ahead, it is my hope that we can work together to address the challenges we face on a range of critical national security issues, including North Korea and Iraq.

Sincerely,

CONDOLEEZZA RICE,  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs.

Mr. DASCHLE. Unfortunately, little in Dr. Rice's letter addresses our policy concerns. Rather, the bulk of her comments are dedicated to rebutting a claim in our letter that Congress has not been adequately consulted about some explosive findings revealed in a January 31 New York Times article.

The article stated that the U.S. Government has evidence North Korea had begun moving spent fuel rods out of a secure storage area, a development that was subsequently confirmed by the administration. Movement of spent fuel rods would either suggest that North Korea was getting ready to reprocess that fuel to build new weapons or was trying to hide the spent fuel from the international community. In either case, this is a very significant finding that we believed then and still believe deserves to be brought to the Congress's attention.

While Dr. Rice rightly points out that Congress has been briefed on North Korea issues generally, including a briefing by Deputy Secretary Armitage on January 16, we are not aware of any administration briefing that provided us with information on this specific development prior to the New York Times story. And in recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Secretary Armitage implicitly acknowledged that fact.

The reason to bring this up is because we are facing a crisis on the Korean peninsula, a crisis with extremely high stakes, a crisis that demands robust American response, a crisis that demands we be clear with each other and with the American people. Given the stakes of the situation and the ongoing confusion about the administration's policy, we should expect no less.

I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Democratic leader yield just for some questions?

Mr. DASCHLE. Before I yield the floor, I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Is the Senator aware of a statement which was made before us—I do not know how he would be, but let me brief him on it. We had the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency in front of the Armed Services Committee a couple of days ago, and we asked him whether or not in his judgment there was a crisis on the Korean peninsula because of the actions of North Korea in removing these seals from the spent fuel, eliminating the cameras and kicking out the inspectors. Even though the administration is unwilling to put the label "crisis" on what is going on on the Korean peninsula, Admiral Jacoby was more than willing to say, yes, this is a crisis.

I am wondering if the Democratic leader would agree that part of the problem that we have in dealing with the North Korean situation is the unwillingness to see it for what it is, which is a major proliferation threat when there is a country that has been the world's greatest proliferator, including Libya and Iran, missiles and missile technology, when there is a country with a nuclear program that they acknowledge removes the inspectors from its country, whether or not that would represent progress if we could just at least get the administration to acknowledge what the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency says, which is that we have a crisis on the Korean peninsula?

Mr. DASCHLE. I think the Senator asks a very good question. This is more than just a semantical issue. Whether one calls it a crisis, an emergency, whatever volatile term one wishes to apply, clearly this deserves more of a response than this administration has provided.

I wonder what would have happened if Iraq had been the country with the evidence now to suggest that weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons, would be produced with the degree of certainty that we now see them in North Korea, what would the administration have said to that? If Iraq had fired a test missile within the last 2 weeks, what would the administration have said of that? My hunch, is that they would have used the word "crisis" and then some.

They have already claimed, of course, that North Korea is a member of the so-called axis of evil, an unfortunate

term in my opinion. But to avoid using the word "crisis," I believe, lends a real serious credibility question to the administration's foreign policy with regard to the region. This is a crisis. Every expert has acknowledged that it is a crisis. Unless we are willing to recognize the reality of the implications of this crisis, I believe the crisis will only worsen.

The Senator from Michigan has made a very important point with his question.

Mr. LEVIN. In addition to looking a problem square in the eye and not sugarcoating it, if we are going to solve it, another part of the administration's platform relative to Korea, or approach to the Korean problem, is to say that the multilateral approach is the right approach. I am always glad to hear when the administration is willing to work multilaterally. I have been a critic of the administration because their unilateral rhetoric activities, it seems to me, have been counterproductive in many parts of the world. So whenever the administration talks about a multilateral approach or consulting with allies and friends, that is good news. But when they do the consultation, when they talk to South Korea, both its former President and its new President, as well as when they talk to China, as well as when they talk to Japan, as well as when they talk to other allies in the area, they are told the same thing. When they do use the multilateral approach, they are told: Engage in direct discussions with North Korea. As a matter of fact, the representative of the new President of South Korea, the special envoy of new President Roh, visited us. His name is Dr. Chyung, and he visited with us on February 3.

That was, again, the open advice, he said, of the South Korean Government, is to have the United States talk directly with North Korea so that they can hear from us what our concerns are; so that both sides can avoid any kind of miscalculations; so that we do not fuel the paranoia this isolated regime has. They are paranoid. They are isolated. They actually believe we might strike them with one of our preemptive strikes. They actually believe it.

So the advice we are getting when we talk to our allies and follow this multilateral approach is engage with North Korea, and yet we refuse to do so.

I am wondering whether the Senator would agree that it is not only important that we consult with allies, not necessarily follow the advice but at least give serious consideration to the advice they give us when they talk to us about a direct engagement with North Korea to avoid miscalculation, so that the North can hear directly from us what our major concerns are?

Mr. DASCHLE. I appreciate the question posed by the Senator from Michigan. This whole experience has turned logic on its head. We have 220,000 troops in the gulf. We are told that

there is almost an inevitability of war. We are told that the reason for this near inevitability is because of weapons of mass destruction that we have yet to find in Iraq and because of an unstable leader in Iraq.

These assertions have required the administration to go to great lengths to try to prove that their findings are ones that could be recognized by the world community. With all of their best effort, they have yet to demonstrate to the satisfaction of some of our allies that the threat exists to the extent the administration perceives it, and yet there is a clear set of circumstances that are undeniable in North Korea. There is a very questionable leader spurring development of nuclear weapons in the most rapid way, which we know could be sold quickly to terrorist organizations and used against us and the world community. Yet this administration chooses to ignore it.

The Senator asks the question, why would we not engage the community and recognize the importance of confronting North Korea? The administration says the answer to that is they do not want to reward bad behavior.

I argue that we are rewarding bad behavior by ignoring the circumstances as this administration has chosen to do. What could be worse behavior than what is going on right now?

As I understand it, we began to reship food assistance to the North Korean people within the last few days. We have no real guarantee that aid is going to get to the people, but it is a very unusual message they are sending to both Iraq and North Korea. Of all those who would be most confused it would be our allies. How do they explain all of this? What credibility do we have with them as we attempt to rationalize this odd position we find ourselves in today?

I appreciate the question, and I would simply say to my colleague that it begs further explanation by the administration which, again, because they refuse to call this a crisis, they have yet to provide.

Mr. LEVIN. This administration has blown hot and cold when it comes to policy relative to North Korea.

I just have one final question.

The Democratic leader points out just how confusing a policy it is, not just for North Korea but for our own allies. Our ally with the most at stake on the Korean peninsula is South Korea. They could be destroyed if there is a miscalculation. Their capital is within range of tens of thousands of artillery of North Korea.

On March 6, 2001, on the eve of a summit between then South Korean President Kim Jong-Il and President Bush, Secretary of State Powell said we plan to engage with North Korea and to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off.

Within 24 hours was the Secretary of State's statement that we were going to engage with North Korea and pick

up where the Clinton administration left off because the Clinton administration obtained the framework agreement that resulted in the canning of that very material which is so dangerous which contains plutonium. Within 24 hours, at the summit the next day, President Bush basically said: We are not going to have any discussions with North Korea. We are not picking up where the Clinton administration left off. We do not trust North Korea.

No kidding. That is a mild statement, that we do not trust North Korea. If we did not talk to people we did not trust, we would not be talking to half of the world, including some of the most dangerous people in the world.

Talking to people does not mean we are going to reward anything. It simply means they will hear directly, eyeball to eyeball, from us as to what our concerns are, and also why we do not threaten them, and why, if they will terminate their nuclear program, they can rest assured they will get an agreement from us that there is not going to be any active aggression against them.

The blowing hot and cold, the erratic policy, the undermining not just of our own Secretary of State 24 hours after he said we would continue a policy, but undermining our South Korean allies with so much at stake, it seems to me has contributed to a very uncertain policy on the Korean peninsula, has sowed the seeds of confusion, and fueled and contributed to the paranoia that already existed in spades in North Korea.

I have been to Yongbyon, the place in North Korea where they were canning those fuel rods, where they had sealed them. I don't know that any other Member of the Congress got there, but I got there a couple years ago. I watched the International Atomic Energy Agency as they were sealing those fuel rods. That was a very positive thing to watch, to actually see, under IAEA inspection and supervision, those incredibly dangerous nuclear materials being canned instead of threatening to the rest of the world as potential proliferated material, to actually see it put under the supervision of the IAEA.

That is now out the window. We are starting from scratch. I understate my feelings on the matter when I say the Senator, the Democratic leader here, has so accurately stated the fact that we have a problem. Step 1 is to recognize we indeed have a crisis. Step 2 is not just to consult with allies but to seriously consider what they recommend when they talk about having direct engagement with the North Koreans.

I thank the Democratic leader for his constant determination to keep this Korean peninsula crisis in front of us. We cannot lose sight of it. It is a greater threat than Iraq because in North Korea you have a known proliferator who has removed the inspectors and who has nuclear material which could

be so easily distributed, shipped, or sold to people who could do great harm with it.

I thank my friend from South Dakota.

Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Michigan.

We can learn a lot from history. History, for most of my lifetime, involved a cold war, a cold war with an arch-enemy—the Soviet Union—which had thousands of nuclear warheads pointed toward the United States. They posed an imminent threat that could at any moment destroy all of civilization.

We made the choice, for good reason, Republican and Democratic administrations made the choice, that rather than engage in conflict, we would contain, negotiate, disarm, and ultimately wear down those leaders of the Soviet Union. That is ultimately what happened. The Soviet Union collapsed, negotiations for disarmament continued, and I recognize the contribution of many Presidents, from Harry Truman on.

But it was Ronald Reagan who said: Trust but verify. He did not say: I don't trust the Soviet Union, so I'm not going to enter into dialog with them. He was criticized at times, but he said: I'm going to engage in dialog. I'm going to continue the effort of my predecessors. I'm going to trust. But then I'm going to verify.

What the Senator from Michigan noted is that a couple of years ago that verification process was underway. We trusted. And we verified. His site visit was an indication of that verification.

I can only hope that those responsible for the day-to-day decisions made with regard to U.S. foreign policy will recognize the importance of past precedent, that we engage our enemies, we engage those whom there is ample reason to distrust, but we recognize that without some communication, without some engagement, the only other option is conflict.

The only other option is to see what is happening today. Nuclear weapons are being constructed. Nuclear weapons are being stockpiled. Nuclear weapons could be shipped. Nuclear weapons could be used not only in the region but against this country, as well. Every day we delay, every day we lack the will to confront and communicate, every day we lack the desire to verify, every day we create a problem more complex for future leaders and for future American policy.

I hope this administration will very carefully reconsider their position. I hope they will listen to our allies. I hope they will engage the North Koreans. I hope they can give us greater appreciation with greater clarity of their intentions with regard to that part of the world.

I yield the floor.

## LEGISLATIVE SESSION

## MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now return to legislative session and go into a period of morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHAMBLISS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

## IRAQ

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, this morning's Washington Post has an especially long editorial. Indeed, it takes up the entire length of the editorial page. It is entitled "Drumbeat on Iraq, a Response to Readers."

I have a dear friend in Utah who wrote me. She was distraught—is distraught, I am sure—about the prospect of going to war and expressed a great many concerns. I have been in the process of constructing what I hope is a responsible and thoughtful response to her concerns. As I read the editorial in this morning's Washington Post, I found that it does a better job than I could do of summarizing many, if not most, of the issues about which she is concerned. I want to read from sections of the editorial and then ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. BENNETT. In the editorial they say:

The right question, though, is not, "Is war risky?" but "Is inaction less so?" No one can provide more than a judgment in reply. But the world is already a dangerous place. Anthrax has been wielded in Florida, New York and Washington. Terrorists have struck repeatedly and with increased strength over the past decade. Are the United States and its allies ultimately safer if they back down again and leave Saddam Hussein secure? Or does safety lie in making clear that his kind of outlaw behavior will not be tolerated and in helping Iraq become a peaceable nation that offers no haven to terrorists? We would say the latter. . . .

As I say, I could not have put it better, which is why I have quoted it. I have raised the question on the floor before: What are the consequences if we do not follow through in Iraq? Some have said let's just leave the troops in place. And that means Iraq remains contained.

Leaving the troops in place is not an option. We must understand that the troops are where they are, poised to move into Iraq, because of the agreement of the governments in Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, among others. Those governments will not allow our troops to remain on their soil indefinitely. They will not allow those troops to remain there while we contain Saddam Hussein for 6 months or 12 months or 12 years, which has been the period of "containment" that we have seen up until now. We must either withdraw those troops and say we are