

are subject to approval from the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and reasonable public access for interpretive and educational purposes.

These historically women's colleges and universities have contributed significantly to the effort to attain equal opportunity through postsecondary education for women, many of whom would not have had the opportunity otherwise. I believe it is our duty to do all we can to preserve these historic institutions, and I ask my colleagues for their support.

#### SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS

SENATE RESOLUTION 256—OBSERVING THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AFFIRMING THE DEEP COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND THANKING THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR ITS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM AND TO THE STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Mr. BIDEN (for himself, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. KERRY, Mr. BROWNBACK, Mr. DODD, and Mr. HAGEL) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 256

Whereas October 1, 2003, marked the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington October 1, 1953, and entered into force November 17, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the "Mutual Defense Treaty");

Whereas the United States and the Republic of Korea have formed a bond through the common struggle against communist aggression;

Whereas more than 34,000 Americans lost their lives fighting in the Korean War, and approximately 37,000 men and women of the United States Armed Forces are still deployed on the Korean peninsula, enduring separation from their families and other hardships in the defense of freedom;

Whereas the Mutual Defense Treaty has been instrumental in securing peace on the Korean peninsula and providing an environment in which the Republic of Korea has become an economically vibrant, free, democratic society;

Whereas the foundation of the Mutual Defense Treaty rests not only on a common adversary, but more importantly on a shared interest in, and commitment to, peace, democracy, and freedom on the Korean peninsula, in Asia, and throughout the world;

Whereas the United States and the Republic of Korea are working closely together to find a diplomatic solution to the threat posed by North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and the export by North Korea of ballistic missiles;

Whereas the Republic of Korea is making valuable contributions to the global war on terrorism, including the contribution of logistics support for international forces operating in Afghanistan;

Whereas the Republic of Korea has pledged \$260,000,000 and has already sent 700 military engineers and medical personnel to assist in the United States-led effort to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq; and

Whereas South Korea President Roh Moo-hyun pledged on October 18, 2003, to dispatch additional troops to work alongside United States and coalition forces in Iraq; Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That the Senate—

(1) observes the 50th anniversary of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington October 1, 1953, and entered into force November 17, 1954;

(2) reaffirms the deep cooperation and friendship between the people of the United States and the people of the Republic of Korea; and

(3) thanks the Republic of Korea for its contributions to the global war on terrorism and to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this resolution is cosponsored by my distinguished colleague, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator LUGAR, as well as Senators KERRY, BROWNBACK, DODD, and HAGEL. It recognizes the 50th anniversary of the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty and is thanking the Republic of Korea for its contributions to the global war on terrorism.

The United States has no better friend in Asia than the Republic of Korea. South Koreans have been there for us time and again, just as we have been for them.

Our alliance has paid dividends on and off the Korean Peninsula. Most recently, South Korea has aided the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and Iraq. South Korea has already sent 700 military engineers and medical personal to Iraq, and President Roh pledged on October 18 to dispatch additional troops to work alongside U.S. forces there. South Korea has also pledged \$260 million in grants to help reconstruct Iraq.

The resolution I offer today observes the 50th anniversary of our alliance, thanks South Korea for its contributions to the global war on terrorism, and reaffirms the deep cooperation and friendship that exists between our two countries.

That cooperation and friendship are sorely needed now, given the challenges posed by North Korea. North Korea today is on the verge of becoming a nuclear bomb factory. The United States needs to redouble its diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to change its course.

President Bush, I note, has repeatedly called for a "peaceful, diplomatic" solution to this crisis, and has worked with our friends and allies in that region toward that goal. I believe President Bush's instincts are correct on this issue.

Last week President Bush told the leaders of Asia that the United States is prepared to provide security assurances to North Korea if North Korea takes tangible steps to dismantle its nuclear program. I find that very encouraging. But in my view we need to

do more. That is essentially where we left off at the end of the last administration, when we were working within the Agreed Framework.

What we need to do is have more contact with North Korea. There were only 40 minutes of one-on-one dialog with North Korea last August in Beijing. That, with the translation requirements in such an exchange, is barely enough time to clear one's throat.

Second, we should use the combination of carrots and sticks to convince North Korea to change its course. The sticks are in play, including the proliferation security initiative and a coordinated crackdown on the North's illicit activities, including narcotics trafficking and counterfeiting, among others.

We need to identify as well some incentives for the good behavior that would come if, in fact, there is a verifiable North Korean effort along the path toward nuclear disarmament. This is not giving in to blackmail. It is a positive reinforcement, and there is a huge difference between the two.

Third, we need to sustain and consider increasing humanitarian food and medical aid to North Korea. Nothing about this crisis will be improved by having more hungry or sick North Korean children. This year, the United States provided only 40,000 tons of food aid to the North a generous donation, to be sure, but a pittance against the world program appeal of more than 600,000 tons is needed, and far below the food aid levels the United States has provided in previous years.

I note there is some dispute about the access of this food aid to the people of North Korea, people we need to help. The fact is the World Food Program and the director have reported significant progress towards monitoring delivery of food and ensuring that the aid reaches those most in need. Further, the food aid we have provided we seem fairly well assured is in fact getting where it is intended.

Finally, we need to speak with one voice. The administration has yet to fully resolve the deep internal divisions over the direction of the President's policy. Some senior officials in the administration continue to argue against this policy of engagement. As a matter of fact, they seem to occasionally look forward to tweaking the North Koreans. I might add there is very little social redeeming value in the policies of Kim Jong Il in North Korea. I am not arguing he is a particularly reasonable man, but it seems to me there should be one voice and one policy coming out of the administration. Prospects for diplomatic solutions are in direct proportion to one voice.

To state the obvious, as I know the Presiding Officer knows, time is not our ally in this crisis. The United States needs to communicate both the risks of North Korea's current path and the benefits North Korea could enjoy if it chooses to verifiably abandon its

pursuit of nuclear weapons and its export of ballistic missiles. Since the United States first confronted North Korea with allegations about its illegal program to produce highly enriched uranium last October, the North has ended its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, taken its plutonium reprocessing plant out of mothballs, begun to reprocess at least some of its 8,000 spent-fuel rods, and has activated its Yongbyon nuclear reactor to produce still more spent fuel.

I am not suggesting we should not have pointed out their violation. I am not suggesting their response is remotely approaching anything rational. What I am suggesting is a sense of urgency and a requirement for us to be on the same page with our South Korean and Japanese friends as well as continuing to engage the Chinese and the Russians in attempting to come to a resolution here.

The North's pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a great threat to the interests not only of the United States but to the entire region. As the North's stockpile of fissile material grows, the likelihood the North will test a nuclear weapon and prove the viability of its design increases, as does the difficulty of securing the North's fissile material in any crisis. Moreover, we have no guarantee North Korea will not export fissile material. All we know for certain is if the North puts a nuke on the auction block, the bidders are not likely to be our friends.

Finally, the North's nuclear ambitions could prompt other countries in the region—notably Japan and South Korea—to rethink their own opposition to nuclear arms. I don't only think that is probable but I think that is likely. As we all know, once Japan made that decision, it would be a matter of months before Japan would be a nuclear armed power. We think that would be a very bad idea. That, in my view, is why the Chinese have become so engaged now in helping us put some pressure on these multilateral talks with South Korea to get them to change their behavior. I believe China understands that if North Korea continues down this path, there is almost a certainty Japan will. Japan becoming a nuclear power would change the dynamic and the equation for the Chinese, and the race will be on.

The President has the right goal—to complete verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the North's nuclear weapons program. The only debate is how do we get there. I think the way we get there is the President should either endow Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly with more authority to drive North Korean policy or, alternatively, appoint a special envoy with access to the President to represent the United States in future negotiations. Second, we should strive for a noncoercive negotiating environment.

This means that North Korea should freeze its reactor, cease all reprocess-

ing and uranium enrichment activities, and place under safeguards any fissile material that it has acquired since the Agreed Framework of 1994 was signed. For our part, the United States should reiterate that it has no hostile intent toward North Korea and pledge not to launch any military strikes or seek new sanctions so long as the freeze remains in place and talks to resolve the crisis continue.

Finally, we should pursue a phased, reciprocal, verifiable agreement to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons program, terminate its export of ballistic missiles, and more closely integrate the North into the community of nations.

Some say North Korea cannot be trusted. They are right. Modifying President Reagan's maxim, we should mistrust, and verify.

But the alternatives to negotiating are grim. Our current approach leads to one of two undesirable outcomes: Either the United States will essentially acquiesce to the North's serial production of nuclear weapons or we may find ourselves in a military confrontation with a desperate, nuclear-armed regime. Any preemptive military strike option would place millions of South Koreans and tens of thousands of Americans at risk.

How do we go to war with the North if the South does not support it, if that were the second option?

Negotiations with North Korea are not easy, but they offer us the best chance—I believe the only chance—to avoid a nuclear nightmare on the Korean peninsula.

I would like to submit a bipartisan staff report by the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who traveled to North Korea immediately following the six-party talks in Beijing in August. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD following my marks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me conclude by saying today's paper carries the news that the quixotic and unreliable and often inscrutable actions of the North Koreans have brought the Supreme Leader of North Korea to the position where he is now saying he will engage in multilateral talks again and resume those talks, and that he is ready to consider what has been rejected before.

That is the sense of the article.

I have no inherent faith that we can rely upon the President of North Korea. But it seems to me we have everything to gain and nothing to lose by continuing to pursue these talks. We give nothing, and at a minimum what we do is put ourselves in the position where the most isolated remaining country in the world at least is exposed to the notions of other major nations in the world, including China, Russia, South Korea, Japan, and the United States as to what we consider to be ap-

propriate behavior. Hopefully, that will have a salutary impact on the willingness to negotiate an end to these programs.

The alternative of not pursuing that is bleak. Therefore, I encourage the President of the United States to continue down this path and to continue down the path more quickly than we have thus far.

#### EXHIBIT 1

#### SIX PARTY TALKS AND THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

OCTOBER 14, 2003.

Hon. RICHARD LUGAR,  
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.*  
Hon. JOSEPH R. BIDEN,  
*Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations.*

DEAR SENATORS LUGAR AND BIDEN: In late August, Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi traveled to China and North Korea, and Mr. Jannuzi traveled to South Korea, to examine the prospects for a peaceful negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear issue and to follow-up on an earlier set of visits to North Korea in an effort to gain greater transparency on food aid issues. Throughout the course of the visit, the staff delegation received commendable support from U.S. Diplomatic personnel. The delegation enjoyed high level access to Chinese, North Korean, and South Korean government officials, and also met with numerous academics, think tank specialists, and employees of non-governmental organizations concerned with developments on the Korean Peninsula. Our key findings, including some recommendations for next steps on the Korean Peninsula, are reported below.

Sincerely,

KEITH LUSE,  
*Professional Staff  
Member, Majority  
Staff, East Asian  
and Pacific Affairs,  
Senate Foreign Relations  
Committee.*

FRANK JANNUZI,  
*Professional Staff  
Member, Minority  
Staff, East Asian  
and Pacific Affairs,  
Senate Foreign Relations  
Committee.*

#### SUMMARY

Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff members Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi traveled to Northeast Asia August 21–September 2 to examine the prospects for a peaceful negotiated solution to the North Korean nuclear issue and to follow-up on their earlier set of visits to North Korea designed to push for greater North Korean transparency and accountability on food aid and humanitarian relief. The delegation expresses its appreciation to U.S. diplomatic personnel at Embassies Beijing and Seoul who helped set up productive meetings and coped with the vagaries of arranging travel to and from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Over the course of three days in Pyongyang, the delegation held a variety of meetings with officials representing the DPRK, the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations (see list of interlocutors, attached). The delegation told senior DPRK officials that the United States views North Korea's nuclear ambitions as a grave threat to international peace and stability and urged the DPRK to seek a peaceful, negotiated solution to the crisis through multilateral dialogue. The delegation visited select humanitarian relief operations, making

the point that such efforts are tangible proof that the United States has no hostile intent toward North Korea. SFRC staff strongly advised DPRK officials that they should permit greater transparency for food aid deliveries under the auspices of the World Food Program and various non-governmental organizations. The delegation pressed DPRK officials to adhere to international standards of human rights, including respect for religious freedom, and emphasized that the United States' concern for the human rights situation in North Korea reflects the deeply held convictions of the American people.

#### KEY FINDINGS

Six party talks in Beijing helped improve coordination among the five nations trying to reign in North Korea's nuclear ambitions, but DPRK officials left the talks unconvinced that the United States genuinely seeks a peaceful, negotiated solution to the crisis. DPRK officials told the staff delegation that they believe the true aim of the United States is "regime change," and that de-nuclearization is just the first step toward that objective.

Under pressure from China, the DPRK probably will come to another round of multilateral talks. However, China's encouragement for DPRK's participation will be contingent on the United States outlining specific steps it will take once the DPRK pledges to dismantle/eliminate its nuclear program. Talks could easily be derailed should North Korea decide to launch a ballistic missile or even test a nuclear weapon. Moreover, North Korea might scuttle the talks in response to the appropriate and necessary U.S. efforts to enforce the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Illicit Activities Initiative, both of which the North interprets as attempts to "strangle" the regime.

Some North Korean officials believe that the United States continues to station nuclear weapons in South Korea.

Decision-making in the DPRK is centralized and ultimate authority rests with Kim Jong-il.

Top officials in North Korea are carefully monitoring polling data reflecting opinion on domestic politics in the United States, Japan and South Korea.

The World Food Program has taken some small, but significant steps in recent months to enhance its operations in the DPRK and reduce the likelihood of diversion of food aid. The significant reduction in U.S. food aid to North Korea (from a high of more than 300,000 tons/year to this year's 40,000 tons) may have undercut United States leverage in pressing for greater transparency on food aid. North Korean officials are convinced the United States is using food as a weapon.

Humanitarian operations run by non-governmental organizations—such as the Nautilus Institute's Village Wind Power Pilot Project and the Eugene Bell Foundation's tuberculosis treatment programs—are making important contributions to the welfare of the North Korean people and help allay DPRK suspicions about the intentions of the United States, thereby contributing to an overall political environment conducive to resolution of sensitive security issues.

After extensive discussion with the delegation, Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan advised the DPRK would allow NGO access to some prison camps on a "case by case" basis.

There were two key differences to our earlier trips. While we were not allowed to make purchases, street vendors were present throughout Pyongyang and in Nampo, selling food and other small items. Additionally, the DPRK military appeared to be at a higher state of alert. More soldiers were armed than during our previous visits.

#### DISCUSSION

##### *North Korea isolated . . .*

Over the course of three days in North Korea, the staff delegation found DPRK officials to be disappointed by the six party Beijing talks, which they described as "five against one." In both formal meetings and informal settings, DPRK officials described the Beijing talks as "pointless" and cast doubt upon whether the North would be willing to engage in future rounds of multiparty dialogue. DPRK officials were critical of the fact that they had only 40 minutes of "direct" dialogue with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly over the course of three days of talks in Beijing, and said they had been misled into believing the multilateral talks would provide a venue for substantive one-one-one discussions with the U.S. envoy.

In one particularly blunt exchange, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan told the staff delegation that the Beijing talks had "confirmed" the North's assessment that the United States has no intention of changing its "hostile policy." Kim said the DPRK, "had no choice but to maintain and reinforce its nuclear deterrent."

The SFRC delegation conveyed their personal views that a North Korean decision to enhance its nuclear weapons capabilities would be viewed by the United States as a grave threat to international peace and security and would be interpreted by Americans as a hostile act. The delegation urged the DPRK to proceed with multiparty dialogue and to refrain from any provocative actions.

DPRK officials were non-committal with respect to any future dialogue, but after the staff delegation's departure, the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement claiming that the North remains "equally prepared for dialogue and for a war." This statement represented a slight softening of the stance articulated immediately after the Beijing talks, and certainly leaves the door open to another round of multi-party talks in Beijing or some other venue.

With strong encouragement from China (a senior delegation from China visited the DPRK in late September), the DPRK may agree to another round of six-party talks, if only to avoid being held directly responsible for a breakdown of the diplomatic process. It remains unclear what stance the DPRK will take at any future talks, and at what level they will be represented. Decision-making in the DPRK is highly centralized, with Kim Jong-il wielding the ultimate authority. Junior level DPRK officials such as Kim Yong-il, who represented the DPRK in Beijing in August, often are unable to engage in substantive dialogue, a fact which argues for the United States to try to elevate the talks to engage officials with real authority and the ear of Kim Jong-il.

##### *. . . and wary of U.S. intentions*

The difficult of communicating with the North Koreans was evident throughout the staff delegation's visit to Pyongyang, highlighting the risk that conflict could arise from miscalculation or mis-communication. North Korean officials with whom we met had an imperfect understanding of United States security policy, especially the recently issued National Security Strategy and Nuclear Force Posture Review. They repeatedly expressed their belief that both documents called for pre-emptive nuclear strikes against North Korea, and said the North's own nuclear program was necessary to counter this United States "nuclear threat."

Sometimes, confusion arose out of the imprecision of different English terms. DPRK officials asked the staff delegation to clarify the different meanings "simultaneous," "synchronous," "phased," and "reciprocal."

Attention to such detail suggests the DPRK is actively studying how the nuclear issue might be resolved given what they characterized as the "zero trust" which exists between the two parties.

DPRK officials took note of recent U.S. efforts to curtail North Korean involvement in narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, and other illicit activities. DPRK officials flatly denied North Korean involvement in such illicit activities, and alleged that the United States had trumped up the charges as part of a more general campaign to "stifle" the DPRK.

##### *Food aid: slow progress on transparency and accountability*

The staff delegation met with the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC) director Jong Yun-hyong, who oversees agricultural reconstruction as well as foreign food aid programs. The delegation explained to Yum that it is essential for the DPRK to enhance transparency for food aid, to open up counties currently off-limits, and to provide random access to WFP monitors seeking to verify food aid deliveries. The delegation told Yum that the level of monitoring requested by WFP was consistent with international norms, and that the DPRK could not expect donors and potential donors to contribute food aid if they did not have high confidence that the aid was reaching its intended recipients.

Yun said that security issues are paramount for the DPRK, and that the military would not permit international access to certain sensitive regions of the country. He also said that monitoring had greatly improved since food aid began to flow during the North Korean famine of the mid-1990's. Yun specifically cited the recent U.N. nutritional survey, and reported that "security officials" had initially objected to the survey, but that FDRC officials had prevailed in an inter-agency battle in order to permit the survey to be conducted. Yun argued that recent significant reductions in WFP food aid—just 300,000 metric tons in 2002, down from 811,000 tons in 2001—had made it more difficult for him to push for greater numbers of monitors and greater access for international observers. Nonetheless, Yun promised progress on monitoring in the future, and invited the international community to shift its humanitarian aid strategy away from food donations and toward "sustainable development," including agricultural reforms, new seed varieties and planting techniques, and "food for work."

The delegation met with World Food Program country director Rick Corsino, who reported slow, but significant progress toward enhanced monitoring of food aid and ensuring that aid reaches those most in need. These are the highlights:

First, WFP has terminated food aid to 17 of 21 districts of the capital city of Pyongyang after concluding that residents of the capital are on average better fed than those of outlying areas. This is an important step, both symbolically, and substantively.

Second, with the full knowledge and support of DPRK authorities, WFP is conducting Korean language training for food aid personnel stationed inside the DPRK. The DPRK continues to object to WFP bringing in Korean-speaking experts from overseas, but the growing language facility of WFP's foreign staff allows for smoother interaction with DPRK officials and higher quality monitoring in the field.

Third, WFP has increased the number of monthly inspection visits and now has approximately 50 international staff in residence in Pyongyang and at five sub-offices located in Sinuiju, Wonsong, Hamhung, Chongjin, and Hyesan. WFP is the only

international agency working in the country with international staff permanently placed outside the capital.

Fourth, WFP has sustained its access to 162 of 206 total counties in North Korea. WFP does not deliver food aid to those counties that remain off limits, most of which are concentrated along the sparsely populated mountainous "spine" of the country and along the DMZ (see attached map).

Finally, through its inspection visits, WFP is gradually building a detailed database of schools, hospitals, orphanages, and other institutions receiving WFP assistance. Although the DPRK still has not provided a comprehensive list of aid recipients—a list long requested by WFP officials—the WFP is essentially building its own list with each inspection visit.

*NGO's making contribution to welfare of average North Koreans*

Although WFP is the largest humanitarian organization working in North Korea, they are not the only international organization operating in North Korea. The staff delegation made a point of visiting two humanitarian operations supported by U.S. non-governmental organizations; the Village Wind Power Pilot Project run by the Nautilus Institute (with significant financial support provided by the W. Alton Jones Foundation) and a tuberculosis treatment hospital and mobile van sponsored by the Eugene Bell Foundation. These initiatives have fostered good will on a "people-to-people" basis, and have measurably improved the quality of life for the North Korean beneficiaries.

*Wind power*

The US-DPRK Village Wind Power Pilot Project was the first attempt by a United States NGO to work side-by-side with North Koreans in cooperative development. Previously, non-governmental organizations had been limited by both Washington and Pyongyang to delivering food aid to North Korea. The project installed seven technologically advanced wind turbine towers in a rural village on the west coast of North Korea near the port of Nampo. This region is known as a bread basket for North Korea, rich in arable land and other natural resources, including steady breezes off of the Korea Bay. The turbines provide clean, renewable energy to the village's medical clinic, kindergarten, and 67 households. In addition, a wind-powered water pump irrigates the village's fields, and has significantly boosted yields, according to villagers. The combined generating capacity of the turbines is 11.5kW.

Since the wind power project was completed in 1999, it has had its share of ups and downs. At present, the delegation found that the facility was not operating at full capacity due to maintenance problems with two inverters and damaged batteries. North Korea lacks adequately trained technicians to service the equipment, and the nuclear stand-off has disrupted visits by foreign experts needed to assess the maintenance requirements and make needed repairs.

Despite these difficulties, the DPRK participants in the project remain enthusiastic about it as a model for rural electrification, and hope to press ahead with a major wind-power survey project along the west coast in coming months. DPRK authorities told the visiting Senate staff delegation that deciding to proceed with the wind power survey requires approval from military officials worried about the collection of militarily sensitive meteorological information. Notwithstanding the sensitive nature of the data to be collected, DPRK officials believe the project will move ahead. Wind power projects could alleviate severe shortages of power in rural areas, and have the advantage

of not requiring major upgrades in North Korea's electric power grid—a grid that experts have found to be in need of major overhaul before it could accommodate the introduction of large new power plants such as the light water nuclear reactors contemplated under the Agreed Framework.

*Tuberculosis treatment*

Since 1995, the Eugene Bell Foundation has been working inside North Korea to fight deadly diseases like tuberculosis (TP). Eugene Bell foundation currently coordinates the delivery of TB medication, diagnostic equipment, and supplies to 1/3 of the North Korean population and approximately 50 North Korean treatment facilities (hospitals and care centers). The staff delegation visited one such hospital in Pyongyang, and also inspected one of the 17 mobile x-ray vehicles designed to navigate the North's antiquated road network.

The delegation found the Eugene Bell project to be characterized by high standards of transparency and efficiency. The foundation conducts regular site visits (more than 60 since 1995) and is able to donate goods directly to recipients rather than through third parties or government intermediaries. Staff at the hospital we visited appeared well trained and highly motivated. They were deeply appreciative of the support they receive from the United States and recognized that this humanitarian outreach occurs even at a time when the two nations do not maintain normal diplomatic relations. The Eugene Bell foundation supports 16 TB hospitals and 64 TB care centers in the DPRK. More than 200,000 patients have been treated. Moreover, serving as a conduit, the Eugene Bell foundation is currently responsible for sending tuberculosis medicine, medical aid, and equipment for approximately 1/3 of the North Korean population.

*Joint recovery operations*

The staff delegation met with Sr. Col. Kwak Chol-hui of the Korean People's Army, the director of the Joint Recovery Operation searching for the remains of U.S. servicemen left behind after the Korean War. The United States estimates that as many as 8,000 remains of U.S. servicemen are on DPRK soil. So far, only 378 of these remains have been recovered. More than 200 remains were found as the result of unilateral DPRK searches and returned to the United States. Just over 170 sets of remains have been recovered through the joint recovery operation.

The recovery operations are laborious. Historical records can indicate likely search areas, but only eye witnesses can pinpoint the possible locations for remains. As the population ages and the terrain of North Korea is shaped by construction, erosion, flooding, and other forces, it is becoming increasingly difficult to locate remains. Even after likely sites are identified, time-consuming excavations and careful forensic work are necessary to find and identify remains. U.S. and North Korean military personnel work side by side in the field during the recovery operations. According to U.S. participants in the operation, this interaction in the field has been constructive, deepening our understanding of the Korean People's Army.

Colonel Kwak told the delegation that the DPRK would like to expand the joint recovery operation, employing as many as 2,700 investigators to scour the country to conduct interviews with those elderly North Korean who might have knowledge of the location of U.S. remains. He indicated that the DPRK's commitment to the recovery operations is independent of the nuclear issue, and, in his opinion, should remain so. It is unclear, however, what role the DPRK envisions for U.S. forces in such an expanded operation. The

staff delegation believes that any expansion should be made contingent on greater U.S. access to those North Korean citizens claiming to have first-hand knowledge of the whereabouts of remains.

STAFF CONCLUSIONS

So as to reduce what we believe is a significant risk of conflict arising out of miscalculation or mis-communication, the United States should greatly expand dialogue with North Korea, both within the framework of multi-party talks, as well as through informal or "Track II" bilateral negotiations.

The United States should appoint a senior official to represent the United States solely on issues related to the Korean Peninsula. Alternatively, the Administration should endow the current negotiator, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, with greater authority to direct and coordinate the President's North Korea policy and gain access to more senior North Korean officials.

The United States should acknowledge recent improvements in WFP operations and continue food aid to the DPRK under UN auspices. The United States should also consider funneling a portion of future U.S. food aid through non-governmental organizations, some of which have been able to achieve strong monitoring capability for their humanitarian relief.

The U.S. should search for ways to expand outreach efforts by NGOs in the fields of rural energy development, agriculture, and public health.

The Joint Recovery Operation to identify the remains of U.S. servicemen from the Korean War affords the United States valuable contact inside North Korea. Any expansion of the operation, however, should be made contingent upon greater U.S. access to those North Korean citizens claiming to have first-hand knowledge of the whereabouts of remains.

LIST OF INTERLOCUTORS

*In Beijing, China*

- Michael Green, Director Asian Affairs, National Security Council
- David Straub, Korea Desk, U.S. Department of State
- Wang Yi, Vice Foreign Minister, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Fu Ying, Director General, Asian Department, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- He Yafei, Director General, North American Department, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Liu Jinsong, First Secretary, Asian Department, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Piao Jianyi, Executive Director, Center for Korean Peninsula Issues, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
- Gu Guoliang, Director, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies, Deputy Director, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
- Wang Jisi, Director, Institute of International Strategic Studies, Central Party School
- Wu Baiyi, Deputy Director, Research Division, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
- Yang Mingjie, Director, Division of Arms Control and Security Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
- Wei Zonglei, Deputy Director, Center of U.S.-European Studies, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
- Shi Yinhong, Director, Center for American Studies, People's University
- Ruan Zongze, Vice President, China Institute of International Studies

Liu Xuecheng, Director of American Studies, China Institute of International Studies  
 Shen Dingli, Deputy Director, Center for American Studies, Fudan University  
 Zhu Feng, Director of International Security Program, Beijing University

*In North Korea*

Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 Jong Dong-hok, First Secretary, United States Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Lee Yong Chol and Kim Yong Nam, United States Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Jong Yun-hyong, Director Flood Damage, Reconstruction Committee

Sr. Col. Kwak Chol-hui, Director, Joint Recovery Operation, Korean People's Army  
 Lt. Col. Li Jong Sop, Deputy Director, Joint Recovery Operation, Korean People's Army  
 Lt. Col. Byon Sol-hok, Joint Recovery Operation

Kim Song, Secretary General, Korean National Peace Committee

Richard Corsino, Country Director, World Food Program

*In South Korea*

Wi Sung-lac, Director General, North American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 Park Joeng-nam, Deputy Director, North American Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Yang Chang-suk, Director of International Cooperation, Ministry of Unification

Park Ro-Byung, Chief, Policy Coordination Bureau, National Security Council, Blue House

Kim Taewoo, Nuclear Policy Specialist, Korean Institute for Defense Analyses

Pak Yeong-tae, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

**HEALTHY FORESTS RESTORATION ACT OF 2003**

On Thursday, October 30, 2003, the Senate passed H.R. 1904, as follows:

H.R. 1904

*Resolved*, That the bill from the House of Representatives (H.R. 1904) entitled "An Act to improve the capacity of the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior to plan and conduct hazardous fuels reduction projects on National Forest System lands and Bureau of Land Management lands aimed at protecting communities, watersheds, and certain other at-risk lands from catastrophic wildfire, to enhance efforts to protect watersheds and address threats to forest and rangeland health, including catastrophic wildfire, across the landscape, and for other purposes.", do pass with the following amendments:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

**SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This Act may be cited as the "Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003".

(b) **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**—The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Purposes.

Sec. 3. Definitions.

**TITLE I—HAZARDOUS FUEL REDUCTION ON FEDERAL LAND**

Sec. 101. Definitions.

Sec. 102. Authorized hazardous fuel reduction projects.

Sec. 103. Prioritization.

Sec. 104. Environmental analysis.

Sec. 105. Special administrative review process.

Sec. 106. Judicial review in United States district courts.

Sec. 107. Effect of title.

Sec. 108. Authorization of appropriations.

**TITLE II—BIOMASS**

Sec. 201. Findings.

Sec. 202. Definitions.

Sec. 203. Grants to improve commercial value of forest biomass for electric energy, useful heat, transportation fuels, compost, value-added products, and petroleum-based product substitutes.

Sec. 204. Reporting requirement.

Sec. 205. Improved biomass use research program.

Sec. 206. Rural revitalization through forestry.

**TITLE III—WATERSHED FORESTRY ASSISTANCE**

Sec. 301. Findings and purposes.

Sec. 302. Watershed forestry assistance program.

Sec. 303. Tribal watershed forestry assistance.

**TITLE IV—INSECT INFESTATIONS AND RELATED DISEASES**

Sec. 401. Findings and purpose.

Sec. 402. Definitions.

Sec. 403. Accelerated information gathering regarding forest-damaging insects.

Sec. 404. Applied silvicultural assessments.

Sec. 405. Relation to other laws.

Sec. 406. Authorization of appropriations.

**TITLE V—HEALTHY FORESTS RESERVE PROGRAM**

Sec. 501. Establishment of healthy forests reserve program.

Sec. 502. Eligibility and enrollment of lands in program.

Sec. 503. Restoration plans.

Sec. 504. Financial assistance.

Sec. 505. Technical assistance.

Sec. 506. Protections and measures

Sec. 507. Involvement by other agencies and organizations.

Sec. 508. Authorization of appropriations.

**TITLE VI—PUBLIC LAND CORPS**

Sec. 601. Purposes.

Sec. 602. Definitions.

Sec. 603. Public Land Corps.

Sec. 604. Nondisplacement.

Sec. 605. Authorization of appropriations.

**TITLE VII—RURAL COMMUNITY FORESTRY ENTERPRISE PROGRAM**

Sec. 701. Purpose

Sec. 702. Definitions.

Sec. 703. Rural community forestry enterprise program.

**TITLE VIII—FIREFIGHTERS MEDICAL MONITORING ACT**

Sec. 801. Short Title.

Sec. 802. Monitoring of firefighters in disaster areas.

**TITLE IX—DISASTER AIR QUALITY MONITORING ACT**

Sec. 901. Short Title.

Sec. 902. Monitoring of air quality in disaster areas.

**TITLE X—HIGHLANDS REGION CONSERVATION**

Sec. 1001. Short title.

Sec. 1002. Findings.

Sec. 1003. Purposes.

Sec. 1004. Definitions.

Sec. 1005. Land conservation partnership projects in the Highlands region.

Sec. 1006. Forest Service and USDA programs in the Highlands region.

Sec. 1007. Private property protection and lack of regulatory effect.

**TITLE XI—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS**

Sec. 1101. Forest inventory and management.

Sec. 1102. Program for emergency treatment and reduction of nonnative invasive plants.

Sec. 1103. USDA National Agroforestry Center.

Sec. 1104. Upland Hardwoods Research Center.

Sec. 1105. Emergency fuel reduction grants.

Sec. 1106. Eastern Nevada landscape coalition.

Sec. 1107. Sense of Congress regarding enhanced community fire protection.

Sec. 1108. Collaborative monitoring.

Sec. 1109. Best-value contracting.

Sec. 1110. Suburban and community forestry and open space program; Forest Legacy Program.

Sec. 1111. Wildland firefighter safety.

Sec. 1112. Green Mountain National Forest boundary adjustment.

Sec. 1113. Puerto Rico karst conservation.

Sec. 1114. Farm Security and Rural Development Act.

Sec. 1115. Enforcement of animal fighting prohibitions under the Animal Welfare Act.

Sec. 1116. Increase in maximum fines for violation of public land regulations and establishment of minimum fine for violation of public land fire regulations during fire ban.

**SEC. 2. PURPOSES.**

The purposes of this Act are—

(1) to reduce wildfire risk to communities, municipal water supplies, and other at-risk Federal land through a collaborative process of planning, prioritizing, and implementing hazardous fuel reduction projects;

(2) to authorize grant programs to improve the commercial value of forest biomass (that otherwise contributes to the risk of catastrophic fire or insect or disease infestation) for producing electric energy, useful heat, transportation fuel, and petroleum-based product substitutes, and for other commercial purposes;

(3) to enhance efforts to protect watersheds and address threats to forest and rangeland health, including catastrophic wildfire, across the landscape;

(4) to promote systematic gathering of information to address the impact of insect and disease infestations and other damaging agents on forest and rangeland health;

(5) to improve the capacity to detect insect and disease infestations at an early stage, particularly with respect to hardwood forests; and

(6) to protect, restore, and enhance forest ecosystem components—

(A) to promote the recovery of threatened and endangered species;

(B) to improve biological diversity; and

(C) to enhance productivity and carbon sequestration.

**SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

In this Act:

(1) **FEDERAL LAND.**—The term "Federal land" means—

(A) land of the National Forest System (as defined in section 11(a) of the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (16 U.S.C. 1609(a))) administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, acting through the Chief of the Forest Service; and

(B) public lands (as defined in section 103 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1702)), the surface of which is administered by the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the Bureau of Land Management.

(2) **INDIAN TRIBE.**—The term "Indian tribe" has the meaning given the term in section 4 of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b).

**TITLE I—HAZARDOUS FUEL REDUCTION ON FEDERAL LAND**

**SEC. 101. DEFINITIONS.**

In this title:

(1) **AT-RISK COMMUNITY.**—The term "at-risk community" means an area—

(A) that is comprised of—

(i) an interface community as defined in the notice entitled "Wildland Urban Interface Communities Within the Vicinity of Federal Lands That Are at High Risk From Wildfire" issued by