

termed a "Partnership for Human Resource Development"—would be a standing body of senior officials from both nations which would meet at least once a year, alternating between the two capitals. The basic purpose would be to ensure that both countries accept "ownership" of the agreed programs and understand their responsibilities.

Membership in the partnership on the U.S. government side should come from the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, USAID, USTR, Members of Congress or their staff, and other appropriate agencies. Specialists could be brought in as needed on specific issues. Indonesian representation should be comparable. To ensure that the designated members participate fully and actively, we suggest participation not be at the cabinet level but perhaps at the deputy assistant secretary level, but the actual level should be set by the two governments.

It has been suggested that the private sector also be included in the partnership. To avoid the group becoming unwieldy and the need to make difficult choices regarding participation, we suggest that permanent private membership in the partnership be limited to several broad organizations focusing on the bilateral relationship such as the American Chamber of Commerce in Jakarta, the Indonesia Committee of the U.S.—ASEAN Business Council, the American-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce in New York, and the United States-Indonesia Society. The Indonesian side may wish to invite participation by a similar Indonesian organization or organizations. As issues requiring additional expertise arise, other private sector representatives (teachers, lawyers, NGO members and others) could be invited to participate in partnership meetings on a case-by-case basis.

We do not envisage the creation of a large bureaucracy, but we suggest it would be useful to have several working groups, located in Jakarta, to handle day-to-day liaison. These might include working groups on: civil governance and legal reform; trade and investment; education and public affairs; military relations; and police programs. USAID and the public diplomacy section of the U.S. embassy could provide leadership and continuity to these groups.

If the United States agrees to pursue such a partnership, it should be aware of three basic factors:

1. Fixing Indonesia's problems will take many years. In most cases it is not a matter of simply repairing something which is broken. Many of Indonesia's problems go back to the country's independence. The Indonesian military has been engaged in politics, civilian activities, and independent fund raising since the early days of the republic. Except possibly for a few years in the 1950s, the nation has never had an honest or credible legal or court system. The bureaucracy has been inefficient from the start and there has always been corruption, although it reached new heights under Suharto. Knowledgeable Indonesians estimate that it will take 10 to 15 years to get the military and the legal system on track. We agree.

2. What the United States can do directly is limited. Many of the basic reforms will have to come from within Indonesia, and this underscores the need for a partnership. U.S. exhortations, threats, and penalties are of minimal effect and can be counter-productive. What the United States can do, and do very well, is to train, encourage and support Indonesians who can reform from within. This underscores our strong emphasis in this report on education.

3. Indonesians are in a state of heightened sensitivity at present because of what they view as U.S. "unilateralism," "arrogance," and a tendency to lecture or threaten others.

They resent Congressional restrictions and demands that they "must" take certain actions. It is important that the United States consider the public diplomacy aspects of all bilateral assistance programs.

Monitoring arrangements. As we are recommending a substantial increase in the American commitment to Indonesia, so too should Indonesia demonstrate its commitment to internal reform and partnership with the United States in order to ensure maximum effectiveness of the additional U.S. assistance. As the details of U.S. assistance are worked out, we believe benchmarks should be established by the partnership to provide for verification of progress. The "Partnership for Human Resource Development" can serve as a forum for Americans and Indonesians to evaluate the progress of the various programs and identify areas of success or underperformance.

CONCLUSIONS

Indonesia faces three critical challenges: (1) It is striving to consolidate a fragile democratic system with little experience and limited resources. If it fails it could revert to authoritarianism or chaos. Some Indonesians already speak nostalgically of the stability and economic progress of the Suharto era; (2) Moderate Muslims, still a substantial majority, are under challenge from a radical fringe which has grown significantly during the past five years. The goal of the radicals is to capitalize on domestic vulnerabilities and international issues to win over or intimidate the moderate majority; (3) The nation is striving, in the face of rising economic nationalism, to work its way out of the economic mess left by the Suharto regime. The outcome of these three contests will be crucial to the future of Southeast Asia and U.S. relations with the region.

The National Commission on U.S.-Indonesian Relations recommends that the United States enter into a five-year "Partnership for Human Resource Development" with Indonesia in which the two nations agree to work together in the following areas:

We strongly believe that our top priority should be to help Indonesia in the field of education. We need urgently to help train the trainers and reformers. We leave to experts on both sides to work out specific programs, but we favor a major effort to help improve Indonesia's educational system and expand opportunities for education and training in Indonesia and the United States.

The United States should support expanded programs for legal reform.

The two nations should explore ways in which the United States could help strengthen the Indonesian parliament, including the establishment of cooperative arrangements with the U.S. Congress.

The United States and Indonesia should cooperate on programs to strengthen Indonesia's administrative services through support to Indonesia's civil service and other bodies.

The United States should initiate discussions with other major donors to encourage the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to increase fast-disbursing loans tied primarily to macroeconomic performance rather than to structural reforms.

The United States should work with Indonesia to reduce obstacles to foreign direct investment and, by offering technical assistance and lowering barriers to key Indonesian products, help Indonesia expand its exports to the United States. It should press other developed countries to do the same.

Indonesia, with U.S. cooperation, should revive the U.S.-Indonesia Energy Dialogue and other forums that will strengthen co-

operation between the private sectors in the two countries.

Working with Indonesian counterparts, the United States should expand support for the Indonesian police, with particular emphasis on education and training, and the establishment of long-term institutional relationships.

The United States should set aside plans to resume the International Military Education and Training program for Indonesia until the political climate is more conducive on both sides. The government should, however, continue to be alert to ways to expand contacts with the TNI in order to reduce its isolation.

If Indonesia wants U.S. help, the United States should provide appropriate assistance and support in seeking peaceful settlements in disputed or troubled areas.

U.S. public affairs should be significantly expanded to create additional opportunities for information and cultural programs.

The United States should take all possible measures to reduce the delay in issuing visas for Indonesian students, business representatives, scholars, and others with legitimate reasons to visit the United States.

The Commission sees this new relationship as a partnership and hopes accordingly that the Indonesian government, for its part, will take steps to make these programs successful.

The Commission commends the U.S. embassy and USAID in Jakarta and Washington for the excellent programs underway to strengthen civil governance, decentralization, and the electoral system. A good base has been built and the Commission recommends that these programs be expanded and augmented as noted in this report.

The Commission also recognizes and commends the efforts of the U.S. diplomatic mission to broaden the mission's contacts with political, media, religious and other leaders. We congratulate the ambassador in particular for his efforts to open dialogue with Muslim leaders, an area that has been neglected. These programs are of increasing importance in these difficult times, and the Commission calls on the U.S. government to provide full support.

TROOP MORALE

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, today two news articles came to my attention regarding the recent survey conducted by the Stars and Stripes newspaper on the level of troop morale in Iraq. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Stars and Stripes, Oct. 16, 2003]

GROUND TRUTH, DAY 2: IN SURVEY, MANY IN IRAQ CALL MORALE LOW; LEADERS SAY JOB IS GETTING DONE

(By Ward Sanderson)

What is the morale of U.S. troops in Iraq? Answers vary. High-ranking visitors to the country, including Department of Defense and congressional officials, have said it is outstanding.

Some troops on the ground have begged to differ, writing to Stars and Stripes and to others about what they call low morale on their part and on the part of their units.

There was a correlation between such things as local services and release dates on the one hand, and morale on the other.

Stars and Stripes sent a team of reporters to Iraq to try to ascertain the states of both conditions and morale. Troops were asked about morale, among many other issues, in a

17-point questionnaire, which was filled out and returned by nearly 2,000 persons.

The results varied; sometimes dramatically:

Among the largest group surveyed, Army troops, the results looked much like a bell curve. Twenty-seven percent said their personal morale was "high" or "very high." Thirty-three percent said it was "low" or "very low." The largest percentage fell in the middle, saying it was "average."

Among the second largest group, reservists and National Guard members, the differences were much starker. Only 15 percent said their own morale was "high" or "very high," while 48 percent said it was "low" or "very low."

Among the Marines, the next largest group 44 percent said their morale was "high" or "very high," and only 14 percent said it was "low" or "very low."

Among airmen, the smallest of the four major groups surveyed because fewer questionnaires were allowed to be circulated to them, the results were also very positive. Thirty-nine percent said their morale was "high" or "very high," and only 6 percent said it was "low" or "very low."

Very few Navy servicemembers could be found to question in Iraq.

The questionnaire findings can't be projected to all the servicemembers in Iraq. Still, the reporting of "lows" among the two largest groups surveyed, Army and Reserve/National Guard, seemed significant. The views of these troops, at least, appeared to contrast sharply with those of the visiting VIPs.

Respondents to the survey were not given a definition of morale. They responded according to what they interpreted the word to mean. Some believe morale reflects the degree of well-being felt by the servicemember. On the other hand, commanders say that in measuring morale, they want to know if the servicemember is following orders and getting the job done.

Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the top U.S. officer in Iraq, said that low morale isn't an issue because troops are fulfilling the mission.

"Morale is . . . not necessarily giving them Baskin-Robbins," he said in a Stars and Stripes interview. "Sometimes it's being able to train them hard and keep them focused in a combat environment so they can survive."

"So at its most fundamental level within our Army, taking care of soldiers and their morale could have very few worldly comforts. But the morale of the soldier is good. He's being taken care of, he's accomplishing his mission, he's being successful in the warfighting."

Other military leaders say they are always looking at ways to improve the morale of their troops. "Morale begins with caring leaders looking their soldiers in the eye," said Lt. Col. Jim Cassella, a Pentagon spokesman. "When senior leaders visit the troops in Iraq, they relate that the troops tell them that morale is good, a fact that's backed up by re-enlistment and retention rates."

(These rates have been acceptable or good for the services overall. Figures for re-enlistments in Iraq are not available yet, officials said. In the Stripes survey, half or more respondents from the Army, Marines and Reserves said they were unlikely to stay in the service. Officials say re-enlistments normally drop after conflicts.)

Cassella said that leaders visiting Iraq seek out the opinions of troops. Some say the views expressed may be distorted as a result of the nature of the get-togethers, "dog and pony shows," in the words of combat engineer Pfc. Roger Hunsaker.

"When congressional delegations came through," said one 36-year-old artillery master sergeant who asked not to be identified, commanders "hand-picked the soldiers who would go. They stacked the deck."

Others on the ground in Iraq think top leaders are right more times than they are given credit for.

"I heard that reporters/politicians were trying to say morale was down out here," Petty Officer Matthew W. Early wrote on his questionnaire at Camp Get Some in southern Iraq. "What do people back home expect us to feel after a war? Are we supposed to be as happy here as we are with our friends and families back home? Hell no."

"Of course, when confronted by reporters, we're going to voice out opinions about our situation. Unfortunately, some people like to complain about how they live or what they don't have. The complaint concerning morale is the voice of the minority, not the majority."

In the Stripes survey, troops consistently rated their unit's morale as lower than their own. John Kay, marketing director for the Army Research Institute, said, "Soldiers always rate self [personal] morale higher than unit moral. This is nothing new."

Troops may wish to report what they perceive as the true morale situation without getting themselves into trouble, a way of saying, "I'm OK, but the unit's not."

Some of the gap can also be the result of hearing other troops complain, compounding the impression that unit morale is low, even if each complainer believes his or her own morale is better.

"Both are true," said Charles Moskos, a military sociologist with Northwestern University.

The military studies morale regularly, but "the further you go up the chain in the officer corps, the reality of day-to-day morale cannot register completely," said Lt. Col. Daniel Smith, retired chief of research for the Center for Defense Information. "Whereas when you talk to the platoon sergeants, platoon leaders and even company commanders, you get a better sense of the true state of affairs. Do the weapons work? Are they getting hot meals? Are they getting enough rest? Are their leaders competent and not taking unnecessary risks?"

Unlike some officials who have visited Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, during a September stop in Iraq, spoke not about morale per se, but about the importance of the mission and about sacrifice.

"You're people . . . who weren't drafted, you weren't conscripted, you searched your souls and decided that you wanted to step forward and serve your country," he told the 4th Infantry Division, according to a Pentagon transcript.

Another speech to air assault soldiers of the 101st Airborne division echoed the sentiment:

"The important thing I would also add is that every one of you is a volunteer. You all asked to do this, and that is impressive and it's appreciated."

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 16, 2003]

MANY TROOPS DISSATISFIED, IRAQ POLL FINDS

(By Bradley Graham and Dana Milbank)

A broad survey of U.S. troops in Iraq by a Pentagon-funded newspaper found that half of those questioned described their unit's morale as low and their training as insufficient, and said they do not plan to reenlist.

The survey, conducted by the Stars and Stripes newspaper, also recorded about a third of the respondents complaining that their mission lacks clear definition and characterizing the war in Iraq as of little or no value. Fully 40 percent said the jobs they

were doing had little or nothing to do with their training.

The findings, drawn from 1,935 questionnaires presented to U.S. service members throughout Iraq, conflict with statements by military commanders and Bush administration officials that portray the deployed troops as high-spirited and generally well-prepared. Though not obtained through scientific methods, the survey results suggest that a combination of difficult conditions, complex missions and prolonged tours in Iraq is wearing down a significant portion of the U.S. force and threatening to provoke a sizable exodus from military service.

In the first of a week-long series of articles, Stars and Stripes said yesterday that it undertook the survey in August after receiving scores of letters from troops who were upset with one aspect or another of the Iraq operation. The newspaper, which receives some funding from the Defense Department but functions without editorial control by the Pentagon, prepared 17 questions and sent three teams of reporters to Iraq to conduct the survey and related interviews at nearly 50 camps.

"We conducted a 'convenience survey,' meaning we gave it to those who happened to be available at the time rather than to a randomly selected cross section, so the results cannot necessarily be projected as representing the whole population," said David Mazzarella, the paper's editorial director in Washington. "But we still think the findings are significant and make clear that the troops have a different idea of things than what their leaders have been saying."

Experts in public opinion and the military concurred that the poll was not necessarily representative, but they characterized it as a useful gauge of troops' sentiment. "The numbers are consistent with what I suspect is going on there," said David Segal, a military sociologist at the University of Maryland at College Park. "I am getting a sense that there is a high and increasing level of demoralization and a growing sense of being in something they don't understand and aren't sure the American people understand."

The paper quoted Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, saying in a Sept. 9 interview for the series that "there is no morale problem." He said complaints among troops are "expected" and part of "the Army's normal posture," whether the soldiers are deployed or not.

"We haven't had time to study the survey, but we take all indicators of morale seriously," said Bryan Whitman, a senior Pentagon spokesman. "It's the reason we've instituted several programs to address morale and welfare issues." A White House spokesman had no comment.

Some military experts pointed to good news for the administration in the survey. Military historian Eliot Cohen, who serves on a Pentagon advisory panel, noted that the proportion that said the war was worthwhile—67 percent—and the proportion of troops that said they have a clearly defined mission—64 percent—is amazingly high. He added that complaints are typical. "American troops have a God-given right and tradition of grumbling," he said.

In the survey, 34 percent described their morale as low, compared with 27 percent who described it as high and 37 percent who said it was average; 49 percent described their unit's morale as low, while 16 percent called it high.

In recent days, the Bush administration has launched a campaign to blame the news media for portraying the situation in Iraq in a negative light. Last week, Bush described the military spirit as high and said that life in Iraq is "a lot better than you probably think. Just ask people who have been there."

But Stars and Stripes raised questions about what those visiting dignitaries saw in Iraq. "Many soldiers, including several officers, allege that VIP visits from the Pentagon and Capitol Hill are only given hand-picked troops to meet with during their tours of Iraq," the newspaper said in its interview with Sanchez. "The phrase 'Dog and Pony Show' is usually used. Some troops even go so far as to say they've been ordered not to talk to VIPs because leaders are afraid of what they might say."

The newspaper also noted in that interview that its reporters were told that some soldiers who had complained of morale problems had faced disciplinary actions known as Article 15s, which can result in reprimand, extra duties and forfeiture of pay. Sanchez said he did not know of any such punishments, but he added that they would have been handled at a lower level.

The paper's project recorded significant differences in the morale of various units, but overall found that Army troops tended to sound more dissatisfied than Air Force personnel and Marines, and that reservists were the most troubled.

Uncertainty about when they are returning home was a major factor in dampening morale, according to the newspaper. The interviews were conducted at a time when some reserve and regular Army units were learning that their tours had been extended. The Pentagon has since sought to provide a clearer rotation plan and has begun granting troops two-week home leaves.

Although Pentagon officials say they have seen no sign yet of a rise in the number of troops deciding against reenlisting, the survey suggested that such a surge may be coming soon. A total of 49 percent of those questioned said it was "very unlikely" or "not likely" that they would remain in the military after they complete their current obligations. In the past, enlistment rates tended to drop after conflicts, but many defense experts and noncommissioned officers have warned of the potential for a historically high exodus, particularly of reservists.

HONORING ALBERTSON'S INCORPORATED OF BOISE, ID

Mr. CRAPO. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize a quiet patriot from Idaho. Our National Guard and Reserve troops who have been called up to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq have left behind not only families, but in many cases, full-time jobs. Many employers go the extra mile to provide support to their deployed employees, their families, and communities. One such employer-patriot is Albertson's Incorporated, headquartered in Boise, ID.

Albertson's Incorporated recently received recognition from the Department of Defense for its extraordinary ongoing efforts in support of deployed employees, and those employees' families. The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, ESGR, has chosen Albertson's Incorporated as one of only four companies nationwide to receive the 2003 ESGR Home Front Award. The Department of Defense recognizes the efforts of these companies to take steps such as providing pay differential, the continuation of benefits when their employees are mobilized, and a willingness to advocate Guard and Reserve service among their industry peers.

With many employees currently stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Albertson's has shown dedication to the values of freedom and democracy, and perseverance in light of limited personnel resources. Albertson's has translated patriotic words into action, and shown that corporations as well as individuals can lend a helping hand to the men and women of the Armed Forces, their families, and our Nation as a whole.

IN HONOR OF OFFICER JASON PRATT

Mr. NELSON of Nebraska. Mr. President, I honor one of Nebraska's finest who recently gave his life in the line of duty. His service and sacrifice are an inspiration to us all and a reminder of the appreciation we have for our law enforcement officers and first responders.

Officer Jason Pratt began his career with the Omaha Police Department in 1996 at the age of 23. He served honorably for 7 years and 2 days before being tragically killed in the line of duty on September 11, 2003. During his years on the force, his commitment and energy were recognized several times by his fellow officers, community members and superiors.

In February of 1997, Officer Pratt began work as a patrol officer. By April of that year—less than a year on the job—members of the Leavenworth Neighborhood Association were already noticing Jason for the work he and his crew did in the area. Jason's dedication to service did not wane and in May of 2001, he was recognized by the Neighborhood Association again for his efforts.

Jason followed that service with a year in the vice squad, a division of the intelligence unit. During this time, he kept family areas, such as neighborhood parks, safer for our families. Finally, he also spent time in the emergency response unit, placing himself in extreme danger on numerous occasions by taking high-risk offenders off the street.

Officer Pratt will be well remembered for being an officer who always came as back up to help out other officers. In September of 2001, he assisted bike officers with a traffic stop that ultimately led to the suspect being booked on a number of felony charges. In another instance, in April of 2003, he was responding to a house fire where an adult and two children were trapped. Poor weather conditions delayed a second fire unit so Officer Pratt assisted firefighters in carrying gear up to the house. Because of his actions, there were no further injuries that day.

Officer Pratt lost his life while trying to make our city safer. His sacrifices, and those of his family, are another reminder of the risks taken by police officers across the Nation to keep our cities and towns safe. Americans honor their commitment and we stand shoulder to shoulder with them when one is struck down.

I am proud to have witnessed the outpouring of support for his family given by the people of Omaha. His two children, Madison and Jordyn, and his wife Stacy, have lost their father and husband and he can never be replaced. But the people of Omaha have shown again and again that they will do whatever necessary to help the Pratt family in the weeks, months and years to come. Officer Pratt will not be forgotten and all of Omaha will work to ensure his family is safe.

Jason Pratt died doing what he always wanted to do. He died protecting his and our community through public service alongside his friends and fellow officers. In his memory, those officers will continue to serve every day knowing that if he were still alive; he would be standing at their side. I join with my fellow Nebraskans in thanking Officer Pratt and his family for all they have given to us and pledging to remember his work and his life and the difference he made in our community.

TRIBUTE TO THE LIFE OF MOTHER TERESA

Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to the life of Mother Teresa and to acknowledge her upcoming beatification of the Vatican. The process leading up to her beatification has been the shortest in modern history. In early 1999—less than 2 years after Mother Teresa's death—Pope John Paul II waived the normal 5-year waiting period and allowed the immediate opening of her canonization process. The rule has traditionally been used to allow for a more objective look at a person's life and achievements. However, the life and works of Mother Teresa were so astounding that Pope John Paul II was convinced that he did not need 5 years to objectively determine that she should be beatified.

Mother Teresa, the "Saint of the Gutters," was born in what is now Macedonia in 1910. She took her final vows as a nun in 1937, and in 1946, while riding a train to the mountain town of Darjeeling to recover from suspected tuberculosis, she received, as she says "a call within a call" from God to, "serve Him among the poorest of the poor." And it is in this capacity that the world came to know of Mother Teresa's endless charity and love for all human life. She confronted this monumental task one hovel at a time. She created a religious order to help the aged, the poor, the hungry, the sick, and the disabled to live and die with dignity. She received approval from the Pope to establish the Missionaries of Charity, which focused much of its attention on giving comfort to the dying. The year before she died, Mother Teresa's Missionaries of Charity were operating 517 missions in more than 100 countries. In addition, she opened schools, orphanages, and homes for the needy, as well as homes for AIDS victims, and hospices.

Mother Teresa was a woman who fought passionately for dignity for all