

morning business for up to 60 minutes, with the first 30 minutes of the time under the control of the Senator from Texas, Mrs. HUTCHISON, or her designee, and the second 30 minutes of the time under the control of the Democratic leader or his designee.

The Senator from Utah.

Mr. BENNETT. On behalf of the Senator from Texas, Mrs. HUTCHISON, I yield myself the first 30 minutes in morning business.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

IRAQ AND THE DEFICIT

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, we have come back from the break. Most Members, I imagine, have had the same kind of experience I have had in meeting with my constituents. We have discovered the question of what we should be doing in Iraq is foremost on our constituents' minds. Second, we have discovered—at least I have—that there is great concern about the size of the deficit. Those two issues were joined in debate in the Senate before we left for the break. I think it appropriate we talk about them together now that the break is over.

Let me first turn to the question of the deficit and the debate that took place in this Chamber with respect to the \$87 billion that has been requested by the President to pay for the war activities and the reconstruction of Iraq. We were told in this Chamber we had to raise taxes by \$87 billion to pay for this, and that if we did not, we would see the deficit go up by \$87 billion. We defeated that amendment, but there were those with whom I met during the break who still had that view.

The interesting thing we discovered during the break was that the projections for the size of the deficit changed. This is no surprise to anyone who has spent time paying attention to the deficit. As I have said in this Chamber over and over and as I will repeat over and over, the one thing I know with respect to the deficit projections, or surplus projections when those were the order of the day, is that they are wrong. I do not know if they are wrong on the high side or wrong on the low side but I do know they are wrong.

The other thing I know is that the further out they go, the more likely they are to be wrong. That is, a 10-year projection is absolutely certain to be wrong; a 5-year projection has a 99.94 percent chance of being wrong; a 3-year projection might be a little bit closer; and so on with a 2-year projection. The only ones that come really close to being accurate are the very near term projections.

The interesting thing that happened during the break was that the near-term projections of the size of this year's deficit changed. They went down. In other words, we found out during the last week that those who spend their time looking at the size of

the deficit have now looked at the numbers, now looked at the revenues coming into the Federal Government, and now project the current deficit will be roughly \$85 billion less than was projected when we had the debate.

If we had had those numbers during the debate, obviously I would have referred to them to point out that it is not necessarily the size of the tax rate that determines the amount of tax revenue. That is a truth, again, that we repeat over and over but that gets forgotten over and over. What determines the amount of tax revenue is the amount of economic activity that takes place in the economy as a whole tied to the tax rate, not the tax rate itself. If you set the tax rate too high, you guarantee the economic activity will slow and the tax take will go down.

We cut the tax rate at the beginning of this administration, we cut it again last year, and we are now seeing economic activity pick up to the point that tax revenues have gone up. As I say, according to those who are now projecting this year's deficit, the tax revenues have surprised us to the point that we are now going to have roughly \$85 billion more in revenue than was projected just a month ago.

That is a coincidental number because it comes very close to the \$87 billion we are asking for. I will not suggest in any sense that we should tie those two together. The closeness is purely coincidental. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that those who want to use the deficit as the reason for support of their opposition to what we are doing in Iraq are going to have to find another excuse because the economy is responding to the tax treatment that came out of this Congress. In that response we are getting more tax revenue, and it is going to be less of a financial burden on this country than we thought it would be even as recently as a month ago.

All right. Let me turn now to the other argument we hear, over and over and over, in a constant drumbeat, with respect to Iraq; that is, the argument that this administration somehow misled the American people, misled the world by claiming Saddam Hussein was a threat. Then you get into the details of that claim, and they say he had no weapons of mass destruction, his economy was in ruins, he did not have the ability to threaten his neighbors, he was no threat or, if we can go back to a phrase I have seen some columnists use: Saddam Hussein was no Hitler.

I want to address that this morning. I would hope in this Chamber, of all places, we would have a sense of history, we would understand what really went on in times past, and what really is going on in a historical framework in our present time.

Let me take that phrase, "Saddam Hussein was no Hitler," and use it as the framework for this kind of examination. If we go back in history to the time of Hitler, we can discover a time

when I think it could be said accurately that Hitler was no Hitler. Let me explain what I mean by that.

The Hitler we think of when we look back in history now is the Hitler who stood at the head of a major army of a major nation state waging world war upon all of the other nations around him. Hitler did not start out as that kind of a Hitler. He started out as a politician with a relatively small following and a bitter message in a world of turmoil.

When he became the chancellor of all of Germany, he was a minority politician leading just one party of a series of parties. The primary individuals in Germany at the time thought by making him chancellor they could buy him off and use him and his party in a way that would allow them to continue their power. They misjudged him. When he became chancellor, he, of course, moved to consolidate his power rather than to cooperate with anyone.

He then led Germany into a very risky military operation. He moved to reclaim land that had been taken from Germany in the First World War and ceded to France. If the French Army—arguably the largest on the continent at the time—had confronted him in that move, it would have meant the end of his political career; it would have made sure that nazism, the Nazi party would have disappeared, and Hitler would have been gone. But the French were afraid of a little bit of combat, they were afraid of a little bit of confrontation, and they allowed Hitler to take over that territory.

Well, without going into a complete history of the time, let's go forward to the pivotal event that preceded the Second World War, the Conference at Munich.

Here are the circumstances that led to that event: Hitler had designs on Czechoslovakia. Hitler insisted that Czechoslovakia belonged to Germany and announced he was going to take it, and take it by force. The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, contacted Hitler and said: Can we meet one more time before you act to take Czechoslovakia by force? Hitler agreed, and they met in Munich, Germany.

Chamberlain was terrified that war might break out. Chamberlain was afraid Great Britain was not ready for war. Chamberlain was anxious to give Hitler whatever he could, and, ultimately, Chamberlain gave Hitler Czechoslovakia. Without the British honoring the implied guarantee they would prevent any invasion of Czechoslovakia, Hitler was free to take over that country.

Now, again, if we look at it through the lens of Hitler at the top of his power, we would say, well, he proposed to swallow Czechoslovakia by his tremendous army. In fact, however, Hitler did not have a tremendous army prior to Munich. He had one on paper, but he did not have one in actuality. His generals were terrified as to what would happen to that army if, indeed, it was

ordered into the field against the combined forces of the British and the Czechs.

Indeed, there is evidence that Hitler's generals were prepared to depose him, to overthrow him, and to take Germany out from under him if, in fact, the British stood firm in Czechoslovakia. But instead of standing firm, the British Prime Minister said: Why do we care about people who live so far away from us, with whom we have nothing to do? And he gave Czechoslovakia to Hitler.

Now, it was not just that he swallowed a small country. If we look back on the history of the time, Czechoslovakia had some of the finest factories capable of producing war materiel of any country in Europe. It had some of the finest machine shops and other skills. By taking Czechoslovakia, Hitler obtained an absolutely vital strategic asset that made it possible for Hitler to become Hitler.

May I draw some historic parallels. When Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, he was taking a small, defenseless country that had enormous revenues and that was strategically located. If he had been allowed to keep them Saddam Hussein might very well have been on his road toward becoming Hitler. However, the President of the United States at the time, the first President Bush, was not Neville Chamberlain. The first President Bush stood in the House of Representatives and told a joint session of this Congress: This shall not stand.

There were those in this Chamber who opposed the first President Bush in his decision to confront Saddam Hussein. Indeed, there were those who, in their own words, said much the same as Chamberlain: What do we have to do with these people so far away? Why should we be concerned with something so far from our shores?

Fortunately, the majority of the Members of this Chamber at the time supported the first President Bush in that decision and, if I may, denied Saddam Hussein Kuwait in a way that Neville Chamberlain failed to deny Hitler Czechoslovakia.

In the aftermath of that first denial of Saddam Hussein's ambitions, inspectors went into Iraq and discovered Saddam Hussein had a serious program of producing weapons of mass destruction. About that there can be no doubt. Let us understand that. Let me underscore it one more time. Saddam Hussein was engaged in a serious program of producing weapons of mass destruction, and about that there can be no doubt. President Clinton affirmed that to the Congress. Madeleine Albright affirmed that to the Congress. The United Nations affirmed that to the Security Council in the form of not one but a dozen resolutions.

Saddam Hussein, left unchecked in his first invasion of Kuwait, was on his way to becoming Hitler. It was the first President Bush who made the decision to stop it.

There is some uncertainty as to what happened to Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction program after those inspectors were removed from Iraq in 1998. President Clinton believed the program was ongoing; Secretary Albright believed the program was ongoing; Prime Minister Blair of Great Britain believed the program was ongoing; and Inspector Kay, who has been there, confirmed that the program was ongoing. However, we have been unable to find caches of the weapons.

There are those who say: Well, since we can't find huge caches of weapons of mass destruction, the fact that the program was ongoing is immaterial; and, once again, when we went into Iraq the second time with the second President Bush, he did not represent a threat to us—he was not Hitler.

Again, history says if previous leaders had had the resolve of the two Presidents Bush, Hitler would never have become Hitler himself.

One of the things we have discovered in Iraq that says Saddam Hussein was, indeed, very much like Hitler is the mass graves. Estimates of those numbers of Iraqis who have ended up in mass graves have run as high as 500,000. Maybe there are still some to be discovered. There were efforts to hide those graves, just as Hitler made efforts to hide his concentration camps that became the instrument through which he sought the final solution to the Jewish problem.

His final solution, of course, was to eradicate them all, to send them to gas chambers, and then to bulldoze over the graves and pretend they had never been there. Saddam Hussein was doing the same thing in his own country to his own people, and we stopped it. By virtue of the resolve of the second President Bush, we stopped it. We stopped Saddam Hussein from reaching the kind of statistical plateau of horror that Adolf Hitler made famous in the world.

Am I sorry we stopped it? Do I now have to hang my head in shame when I meet my constituents who say the inspectors didn't find what you thought they would find and, therefore, you made a mistake in voting for this war?

Quite the contrary. As I examine the history of this situation, I am filled with gratitude for the first President Bush who prevented Saddam Hussein from taking over Kuwait and perhaps invading Saudi Arabia and thus becoming Hitler. And I am grateful and proud of the fact that I stood with the second President Bush, who moved into Iraq to make sure the weapons program we all know was going on did not reach the point where it could produce huge caches of weapons and that the slaughter, the systematic destruction of the Iraqi people who disagreed with Saddam Hussein, has been stopped. Are those consequences of which Americans should be ashamed? Are those consequences from which we should back away?

I believe, with Tony Blair, that history will look upon this action and say

we did the right thing. We all were in the Chamber when he made the point that if we were wrong in assuming that the weapons of mass destruction were there in great numbers, the consequences of our actions, at being wrong, were the elimination of a brutal tyrant and the freeing of 20 million people and the possibility of stability in that region. He said history will forgive that error.

But, he said, if our critics were wrong, and the program, which we know was in place and which has been confirmed to have been in place by Inspector Kay, had gone forward and produced those weapons, Saddam Hussein would have become Hitler and history would never forgive that mistake.

I go back to Munich. At the time when Neville Chamberlain came back to Great Britain, polls were overwhelmingly in his favor. He was greeted with cheers everywhere he went. The one man in the House of Commons who stood up and said "we have suffered a defeat of the first magnitude," whose name was Winston Churchill, got only a handful of votes in his opposition to Chamberlain. But, as Tony Blair said in our joint session, history has a harsh judgment of the mistake that Neville Chamberlain made. Neville Chamberlain's mistake allowed Hitler to become Hitler. George W. Bush made sure he would not make that same mistake in Iraq and allow Saddam Hussein to become Hitler.

Over the break, during the weekend, the Washington Post addressed this issue in some depth. The Washington Post, as we all know, is a paper that did not endorse George W. Bush for the Presidency and has often, in its editorial pages, been fairly harsh in its criticism. But the Washington Post is also a paper with editorial writers who were in favor of moving ahead in Iraq. Perhaps they had the same historic perspective I have tried to offer this morning, that we had to do something to stop, prior to the time when Saddam Hussein became Hitler, the possibility that he might. That is a doctrine that has now been called "preemptive war," about which everybody complains around the world and says: That is just terrible. We should never establish the precedent of attacking or using military force before the threat is imminent.

Well, Neville Chamberlain would have been well served to have adopted the doctrine back in the 1930s, and the world would have saved millions of deaths if he had.

The Washington Post addressed this in an editorial that ran on Sunday. It went from the top to the bottom of the page in two columns called "Iraq in Review." I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. BENNETT. It begins:

A reader asks: "When are you going to admit you were wrong?" We've received a

number of such inquiries (not all quite so polite) about our position on the war in Iraq, particularly from readers who were disappointed in our prewar stance.

They then go through all of the issues. There are certainly times where they are critical of the administration, critical of the administration in ways with which I might disagree. But they do make the essential points about the issues that are in contention, the essential point about the weapons of mass destruction.

They make the point that I have made here this morning, that Inspector Kay has demonstrated that Saddam Hussein had a program of developing weapons of mass destruction. Even if the caches of weapons have not been found, if the program had been allowed to go forward, the weapons would have come.

They talk about Saddam and al-Qaida. They make the point that while there is no direct link between Saddam and al-Qaida—and they claim the administration exaggerated, by implication, the links—that nonetheless there was a threat from terrorism in Iraq, and they summarize it with this sentence:

When combined with [Saddam Hussein's] continuing pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, that seemed to pose exactly the sort of threat that the Bush administration rightly focused on as part of the war on terrorism.

Then they talk about continuing costs. I have already addressed that this morning in my comment about the revision of the budget figures that says that the resurging economy we now have is going to give us a deficit that is going to be roughly \$85 billion less than we were talking about as recently as the time before the break.

In addition to their editorial in which the Washington Post says we still stand by our support of the decision to move ahead in Iraq even though things are not going as we had all hoped, they have five military men talking about the war in op-ed pieces. I will not put those in the RECORD or read them. My reading of the five is that three of them say we have to stay there and go forward and get it done in roughly the way the administration is asking us to. Two are saying, no, this is a quagmire; we should pull out now and walk away.

How do I summarize my history lesson this morning? History comes in chunks bigger than 2-week periods. History comes in chunks bigger than a news site. The history of the last century and this one tells me the two Presidents Bush, in confronting Saddam Hussein in the way they did—the first in reversing Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and the second one moving in to preserve the lives of Iraqi citizens being slaughtered by a man with Hitlerian impulses, if not full Hitlerian power—acted properly.

I am proud to have supported the second President Bush in his decision to do that. I say this to many who are

saying now that it didn't go the way you said it would, so therefore we have to walk away from it: Take a little time to read history and understand that things never go as people propose they will, but ultimately those who make the right decisions, for the right reasons, even if they have to make adjustments—sometimes serious changes in the way they pursue those decisions—are those to whom history gives the banner of having done the right thing.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 12, 2003]

IRAQ IN REVIEW

A reader asks: "When are you going to admit you were wrong?" We've received a number of such inquiries (not all quite so polite) about our position on the war in Iraq, particularly from readers who were disappointed in our prewar stance. Now they cite several postwar surprises, or ostensible surprises: the absence of weapons of mass destruction, the absence of a proven connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda and the continuing violence in Iraq. In light of these developments, it's important for supporters of military intervention to look back and, where necessary, reevaluate—something the Bush administration so far has resisted.

We believe that there has been more progress in Iraq than critics acknowledge, but also that the administration has made serious mistakes. Before the war, we repeatedly urged President Bush to plan postwar reconstruction more thoroughly and to level with Congress and the American people about the likely costs. We urged him to take the time to draw more allies to the cause. Shortcomings in both cases have proved highly damaging, as has the Pentagon's insistence on monopolizing political control over Iraq.

Yet simply to blame the administration is not a full answer to our readers. Taking the measure of the administration, of Congress and of their likely ability to see this through was a pre-war obligation, one of the factors in calculating risks and benefits. Moreover, postwar troubles and surprises were to be expected, even if they could not be precisely foretold. It's fair to ask now whether those troubles and surprises are so great as to prove the intervention unwise.

No matter how one answers that question, the critical judgments now involve future policy. It is essential that the United States do as much as possible to stabilize Iraq under a peaceable, representative government. It seems to us that opponents of the war ought to recognize, as some have, that this mission could be critical to the fight against terrorism and to the future of the Middle East. But insisting on doing the right thing now does not excuse supporters of the war from reexamining the judgments that led to this point.

Weapons of mass destruction. David Kay's 1,200-member survey team has reported that Saddam Hussein's nuclear program was "rudimentary" and that no large-scale production of chemical weapons occurred in recent years. We believed otherwise before the war, especially as regards chemical weapons, as did most governments with intelligence services. We have called on the Bush administration to account for what increasingly look like failures in the intelligence agencies' assessment of the Iraqi threat, as well as misstatements in the public case made for the war. The importance of this is hard to overstate: At issue is whether Americans, and the world, can believe U.S. intelligence

on the activities of hostile, dangerous, but hard-to-penetrate states like Iraq; and whether this president can be trusted not to distort that intelligence in pursuit of his own agenda.

But at issue also is whether the war should have been fought. Don't we no longer know that Iraq posed no imminent threat to the United States and that there was thus no need or legal justification for an invasion? This question turns on the phrase "imminent threat," which was invoked before the war by leading opponents of intervention, such as Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich). The Bush administration conveyed its own sense of dramatic urgency, and that too is something it should account for in light of what is now known. But we argued that the threat from Saddam Hussein was not imminent but cumulative: He had invaded his neighbors, used chemical weapons and pursued biological and nuclear arms. He threatened U.S. interests and security in a vital region and would continue to do so as long as he was in power. A decade of diplomacy, U.N. sanctions and no-fly-zone enforcement had failed to end that threat. Instead the credibility of the Security Council, along with constraints on the regime, had steadily eroded.

The debate over intervention was fraught precisely because many people understood that Saddam Hussein was not an imminent danger. We argued nonetheless that the real risk lay in allowing him to defy repeated U.N. disarmament orders, including Resolution 1441, the "final opportunity" approved by unanimous Security Council vote.

Though it pokes holes in U.S. intelligence and our assumptions, Mr. Kay's report contains much to substantiate this reasoning. Saddam Hussein, the report claims, never abandoned his intention to produce biological, chemical and nuclear arms—and he was aggressively defying Resolution 1441. He also was successfully deceiving U.N. inspectors. They failed to discover multiple programs for developing illegal long-range missiles as well as a clandestine network of biological laboratories, among other things. From a legal standpoint, the report shows that Iraq should have been subject to the "serious consequences" specified by Resolution 1441 in the event of noncompliance. More important, it strongly suggests that in the absence of intervention Iraq eventually would have shaken off the U.N. inspectors and sanctions, allowing Saddam Hussein to follow through on his intentions. He would have been able to renew his attempt to dominate the region and its oil supplies, while deterring the United States with the threat of missiles topped with biological warheads. In acting to enforce the U.N. resolution, the United States eliminated a real, if not "imminent," threat, while ensuring that future Security Council ultimatums carry some weight.

Saddam and al Qaeda. Mr. Bush and other administration officials, particularly Vice President Cheney, exaggerated the connections between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda and implied without foundation that Saddam Hussein may have had something to do with the attacks of 9/11. Critics add that since the invasion, terrorists seem to have flocked to Iraq, where the occupation has had to cope with a series of car and suicide bombings. The terrorism is worrisome, though the principal group behind it appears to be Ansar al-Islam, which was based in northern Iraq before the war and whose leader spent time in Saddam Hussein's Baghdad.

For our part, we never saw a connection between Iraq and 9/11 or major collaboration between Saddam and al Qaeda. But we did perceive a broader threat, in the sense that Saddam Hussein had frequently collaborated with other terrorist organizations and could be reasonably expected to continue doing so.

When combined with his continuing pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, that seemed to pose exactly the sort of threat that the Bush administration rightly focused on as part of the war on terrorism.

Continuing costs. The difficulty of rebuilding Iraq is huge. The steady stream of U.S. dead and wounded is agonizing. The strain on the U.S. military, its reserves and the families at home is growing. But these developments, while troubling, are not altogether surprising—except maybe to those who believed the Bush administration's shallow prewar rhetoric. The calculation on intervention required a weighing of risks: the risk of allowing Saddam Hussein to remain in power, defying U.N. demands, versus all the well-articulated risks of intervention. Before the war, these were frequently said to include starvation, an outpouring of refugees, a fracturing of Iraq, a descent into ethnic conflict or simple chaos. We believed that reconstruction would be long, costly and risky, and we judged nonetheless that intervention would be less risky than allowing Saddam Hussein to remain in power.

Were we wrong? The honest answer is: We don't yet know. But at this stage we continue to believe that the war was justified and necessary, and that the gains so far have outweighed the costs. Each of the 326 American servicemen and women who have died in Iraq represents an irretrievable loss for family and friends. But the nation already has reaped great benefit from their sacrifice. One of the most aggressive and brutal dictators in the history of the Middle East has been eliminated, along with his proven programs to acquire deadly weapons. Millions of Iraqis have been freed from fear, and an opportunity has opened to bring much-needed political change to a region that is the source of the greatest security threats to the United States. Polls show a sometimes grateful, sometimes grudging willingness by most Iraqis to go along with U.S. plans for reconstruction.

Many Americans understandably have been surprised by the continuing casualties months after the president's appearance on an aircraft carrier under the banner "Mission Accomplished." Mr. Bush's abrupt submission last month of a large and poorly explained spending request to Congress also has strengthened public support for the idea that the Iraq mission must be failing. Yet the president's missteps have merely obscured the facts that these costs were inevitable, and that outside of the Sunni towns where support for Saddam Hussein was strongest, there is no quagmire—only a slow, slogging progress forward.

Continued progress is far from guaranteed. In our view, the administration could improve the odds of success by forging a broader international coalition. For that to happen, the administration must drop its insistence on monopolizing power over Iraq's political transition, as well as the contracts for reconstruction. It must compromise with those well-meaning allies who want Iraq to succeed but disagree with U.S. tactics.

Success or failure in the effort to stabilize Iraq under a reasonably representative government that poses no threat to the world will provide the ultimate answer to the question of whether the war should have been undertaken. Because we continue to believe that U.S. security is at stake, we also believe that the United States must be prepared to dedicate troops and financial resources to that goal until it is achieved, even if it takes years. In our judgment success is possible, but much will depend on whether the administration and Congress face the magnitude of the challenge and summon the political courage and diplomatic skills necessary to meet it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. COLLINS). The Senator from Ohio is recognized.

HONORING OUR ARMED FORCES

Mr. DEWINE. Madam President, I rise this morning to pay special tribute to a special man whose life ended exactly as he lived it—in service to others. LTC Dominic Rocco Baragona—"Rocky" to his family and friends—passed away at the age of 42 on May 19, 2003, near Safwan, Iraq. He had been deployed to Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 16, 2003.

Lieutenant Colonel Baragona, originally from Niles, OH, was commander of the 19th Maintenance Battalion based in Fort Sill, OK. As commander, he was in charge of nearly 900 soldiers. At the time of his death, he was the highest ranking U.S. service member killed in Iraq.

Rocky Baragona dedicated his life to his country. After graduating from West Point Military Academy in 1982, he spent the next 21 years serving our Nation. He served with distinction, upholding what GEN Douglas MacArthur called the soldier's code—a code of duty, honor, and country. During his military career, he was stationed in Germany and twice in Korea, where he was the Terrorist Force Protection commander. He also served as an officer in the 101st Airborne and with the Green Berets.

Rocky was brilliant in regard to logistics. He received many honors while in the Army, including the Meritorious Service Medal, the Joint Commendation Medal, the Army Commendation Medal, the Joint Achievement Medal, the Army Achievement Medal, the Parachutist Badge, and the Bronze Star.

His superiors relied on Rocky. As BG Richard Formica, a commanding general of the Third Corps Artillery at Fort Sill, said:

I could count on him to tell me what I needed to hear, not what I wanted to hear.

Not only did they rely on him, they respected and admired him. According to BG Brian Gehan, who commands the Army's First Corps at Fort Bragg:

Rocky was a man of tremendous passion and of tremendous integrity. It was those qualities that set him apart.

I didn't know Rocky Baragona, but I wish I had. I say that because I learned a great deal about this man from listening to his family and his friends describe this man's remarkable life. On June 18 of this year, I had the honor of attending two memorial services for him—a private service, and then his burial on the hallowed ground of Arlington National Cemetery. What I learned is that Rocky Baragona lived life well. He lived it with purpose and he lived it with love of family and of country.

At his memorial services, someone said when Rocky was around, everyone else just seemed happier; there was always more laughing. Others said he

had a positive energy, was never judgmental, and never made fun of people.

He listened. He was a good friend. He looked out for his mom and his dad and he helped others achieve their dreams. He was selfless.

Without question, Rocky Baragona was a good man. He was a nice, decent, generous, hard-working man who loved his family unconditionally. He was always there for them, willing to help anyone, any time, any place. His family called him "the rock." He was the cement that bonded that family. As his father said, "When everybody went their own way, Rocky made sure the family stayed together." Whenever they needed anything, Rocky was there, whether it was at Christmastime to bring the family together and shower them with gifts, or just to watch the Cleveland Indian games with his dad.

Rocky will continue to be there for his family; he will continue to be there in spirit, forever loved and forever remembered.

LTC Dominic Baragona was a brave man who loved his country. He was a brave man who served as a true example of what defines patriotism and service to others. He was a brave man who dedicated his career and his life to helping his fellow man, fighting for a better future for us and for our children and our grandchildren.

Left to cherish his memory are his parents, Dominic and Vilma; his brothers and sisters, Tony, John, David, Pamela, and Susan; and several nieces and nephews. You all remain in my thoughts and in my prayers.

Madam President, I will conclude with something Rocky's brother John wrote when he described Rocky:

Rocky was the smartest of the seven kids. He was the most generous of the seven kids. He was the kindest of the seven kids. He was always there for all his brothers and sisters. He was my dad's best friend and my mom's pride and joy. He was always looking out for everyone else.

That is who Rocky Baragona was, and that is how he will be remembered.

I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader.

Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, can the Chair inform us as to the current circumstances involving morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in morning business. The remaining 30 minutes are under Democratic control.

Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Chair for the information. I will use my leader time rather than using morning business time to talk about three matters.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, we are back, as all of our colleagues know, on the supplemental appropriations request offered by the administration. There are a number of amendments