

They have been on the floor this morning. They were yesterday, and I was listening to some of them on both sides and appreciating the eloquence and vigor with which they argued.

But I am at the point where I have to ask myself, what difference do those arguments really make in the face of the brute reality that every day thousands of kids in the District of Columbia get up and go to school where their parents and they know they are not safe, they will not learn, and it is not going to change? That is the position real people are in every day. They do not have any other options. That is the reality.

I think of this more and more from the standpoint of the parents, because I have talked to a lot of them over the years. I have three kids. They are 13 and 11 and 7. You will not be surprised to find out that my wife and I spend a lot of time talking about the education of these kids, trying to make the same decisions parents all over the country have to make about education: Which first grade teacher would be better for the 7-year-old? We spend a lot of time talking about that one. What kind of electives should the 7th grader take, now that he can finally take electives? Should he be in the public presentation class or Spanish or what? We talk about this, and these decisions are very important to our kids. These kinds of decisions for our kids might make a difference in terms of how far they go in life. It might make a difference in terms of how successful they are in life, so we spend an awful lot of time on it.

But I am going to tell you these parents I talk to about this issue, they are not making those kinds of decisions. Those are not the kinds of things they are debating. When I talk to them, there is a sense of urgency and sometimes a sense of panic in their eyes because they know a lot more is at stake than which teacher their kid is going to get in first grade. They know what is at stake for their kids may be not how successful they are in life or how far they go in life but whether they have a real shot at it at all. This is the difference between a good education and not a good education when you are trying to raise kids on your own in these neighborhoods and you don't have any help from anybody else anyway. That is why they feel this sense of panic, because they are looking at their kids and they know, if something is not done quickly—and it is not going to be done in the traditional system—if something is not done quickly for their kids, they are looking at kids who, if they are trapped in that school for their whole educational career, are a whole lot more likely to end up by the time they are 25 years old in a gang or on drugs or in jail or wounded or maybe dead. That is what these parents are thinking. That is why this bill is important to them.

We ought to give them a chance. That is for all they are asking. They

have been looking for this kind of relief for years. The House has voted it for years. The Senate has voted on it. The idea that this is something new this President has presented is just not correct. There are a bunch of us who have been involved in it one way or another for a whole lot of years. Now we actually have a chance to pass it. Now we have a chance to give these parents and their kids some options, and we just ought to do it.

The upside for these families is tremendous. The downside is just not that great. If it doesn't offer them a better education, they will not take advantage of these scholarships and the money will revert—I guess to the District of Columbia. Or does it revert to the Treasury? To the District of Columbia.

OK, the arguments against it. I guess the argument—I had not heard this but I suppose it could happen—the District of Columbia voted against vouchers 20 years ago. It was 20 years ago.

The argument I hear a lot, that opportunity scholarships or school choice will hurt the public schools.

This is kind of ironic and I have discussed this with parents. Of course, everybody else in the country, except these, usually, single moms in these neighborhoods, has school choice. Talk to somebody in the realtor business if you do not believe that. When people buy a house someplace what do they ask about? They ask about the schools, don't they? Because, for the average person in this country, if your school is a school where you think your kid is missing out, it is not a marginal question. If that school is really failing your kid, for whatever reason, you are going to do one of three things. You are going to move, you are going to put your kid in a private school or a different school of some kind, or—and this is an increasing number of people—you are home schooling your kids. You are going to do something.

But these moms can't do that because they don't have the money to move, they don't have the money to put their kids in a private school, and they are working, so they don't have the time to stay home and home school. So they are stuck.

Everybody else in the country has this kind of opportunity and that has not hurt the public schools. This is a country that believes in, and is enriched by, diversity, by people having different opportunities and different choices. Everybody has it except them. They think that argument is quite ironic.

The argument against this, that it will cost the public schools money—Mr. President, do words have meaning? It gives the public schools more money, \$13 million more than they would otherwise get. If the scholarships don't work, they will get more. The \$13 million will revert to the Treasury and we can give that to them as well.

I have already gone over the argument that it was foisted on the Mayor.

It wasn't. Boy, if it is, he is doing a pretty good job dealing with something that was foisted on him. I saw him down here in the Senate the other day.

I don't like to burden the Senate too much with my speeches. It is only when I have dealt with something for a while where I feel strongly about something. I do about this issue. I appreciate the opportunity to talk and I appreciate the passion and the sincerity of those who oppose this.

I would like to reach out and say to folks, let's try this year. I think it is going to work. These parents think it is going to work. We had 10,000 people line up in 1997 for 1,000 part-time scholarships. Let's give these kids a chance. I think we will be glad we did, if we will vote this in.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

#### MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now begin a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### MEASURE PLACED ON THE CALENDAR—S. 1657

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I understand S. 1657 is at the desk and is due for a second reading.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask we proceed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 1657) to amend section 44921 of title 49, United States Code, to provide for the arming of cargo pilots against terrorism.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I object to further proceeding on this measure so it can go to the calendar.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the rule, the bill will be placed on the calendar.

#### SCHEDULED MARKUP OF THE EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am here this morning to announce that we will have a markup of the supplemental request presented by the President, the emergency supplemental request for Iraq, on Tuesday morning at 10 a.m. I wish to state some of the reasons that I have scheduled this hearing.

Secretary Rumsfeld appeared before our committee and made several statements. I want to repeat a few quotes from his statement to our committee. He said:

Standing between our people and the gathering dangers is the courage of our men and women in uniform.

The vast majority of the funds the President has requested are going to troops who are risking their lives in this struggle. Of the \$87 billion the President requests, \$66 billion is to support ongoing military operations, money for military pay, fuel, transportation, maintenance, weapons, equipment, lifesaving body armor, ammunition, and other critical military needs.

Further on he says:

So \$66 billion or 75 percent of this request is for troops. They need it and they need it soon.

Again, continuing on through his statement, he pointed out that:

In less than 5 months virtually all major Iraqi hospitals and universities have been reopened and hundreds of secondary schools, a few months ago most often used as weapons caches, these have been rebuilt and are ready to start the fall semester; 70,000 Iraqis have been armed and trained in just a few months and have been contributing to the security and defense of their country. A new Army is being trained. More than 40,000 Iraqi troops are conducting joint patrols with coalition forces. By contrast, it took 14 months to establish a police force in post-Germany, and 10 years to begin training a new German Army.

He went on to say:

As security improves, so does commerce. Some 5,000 Iraqi small businesses opened since the liberation on May 1 and the Iraqi Central Bank was established and a new currency announced just two months ago—accomplishments that would have taken 3 years in postwar Germany.

He mentioned other items. He said that all of this and more has taken place in less than 5 months. The speed and breadth of what Ambassador Bremer, GEN Tom Franks, GEN Rick Sanchez, and GEN Abizaid and the civilian military and civilian teams have accomplished is impressive and it may be without historical parallel, whether compared to postwar Japan, Germany, Bosnia, or Kosovo.

I listened with great interest to the Secretary of Defense, and I am convinced he has made the case for the early consideration of this supplemental.

Before the Armed Services Committee, my distinguished colleague from West Virginia, Senator BYRD, asked Ambassador Bremer:

I believe you said you didn't need the money until January. I believe you said in the Appropriations Committee or in the Democratic caucus—whichever request it was. Is that a fact?

Ambassador Bremer said:

No, Senator. We need this money right away. I think there is some confusion. I was asked a specific question which was, When does the Iraqi government run out of money? And I said sometime in January. That's not the same as this. We have got to get these reconstruction programs going right away as quickly as possible. There is nothing more urgent.

Later, in response to a question by Senator WARNER, Ambassador Bremer said:

Yes, Senator. This is the most important thing that is accelerated by the supplemental. There are the security parts where we can speed up the training of the Iraqi army; instead of taking two years, take one.

We can't do that without more money speeding up particularly the training of the Iraqi police force which requires almost \$2 billion. Each month that goes by where we don't start those projects is a month longer where those guys potentially leave our troops with some of the duties that I have outlined in my statement. The same is true for the infrastructure. We need to get started letting contracts that we have to open—that we have to open bids. It is going to take time. If we can get started to get those bids started now quickly, we can get the repairs started quickly.

Chairman WARNER asked General Abizaid:

Is there a correlation, in your professional judgement, General?

The general said:

Sir, there certainly is. The more the Iraqis are policing and patrolling the security work to defend their own country the sooner we will be able to draw down our forces and the sooner we will be able to turn over the country to the rightful owners, which are the Iraqis.

Chairman WARNER asked:

It has a correlation to the tragic death, loss of life and limb by our forces and our coalition. Am I correct?

General Abizaid said:

Sir, there is a correlation. We should all make sure we understand as long as American troops are in Iraq there will be casualties.

I take the position that winning the war on terrorism requires us to finish our job in Iraq. Very clearly, we are in a different situation now than we were in World War II. In World War II, after the defeat of the Nazis, we went to the point of having an occupation force there for over 4 years. That occupation force had a military government. We have determined not to establish a military government in Iraq. We want to move toward having the Iraqis themselves start a new form of government for themselves. In doing so, we are in a position where the lives of our soldiers and our military there in Iraq depend upon the speed with which these people can establish their own government and their own military.

I came across an article this past week in the RAND Review for the summer of 2003. It is a most interesting article about "The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower." It points out that, from Germany to Afghanistan, we had a period of training. In terms of the training for the operations we are facing now in Iraq, each succeeding effort—what this person calls "nation building"—was somewhat better managed than the previous one. This article compares Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan to Iraq in terms of the problems we face.

I find it very interesting to note, quoting the article:

Among the recent operations, the United States and its allies have put 25 times more money and 50 times more troops on a per capita basis in post-conflict Kosovo than into post-conflict Afghanistan.

We are already learning how to move forward and establish the new govern-

ments in the countries we are involved with. Afghanistan is a good example.

If you follow through on what this person is stating, he is taking the position of the RAND organization:

We at RAND believe that Iraq will require substantial external funds for humanitarian assistance and budgetary support. It is highly unlikely that taxes on the Iraqi oil sector will be adequate to fund the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy in the near future. Judging by the experience of Bosnia and Kosovo, territories that have higher per capita incomes than Iraq, budgetary support will be necessary for quite some time. To manage immediate operating expenditures, we suggest that post-conflict authorities in Iraq first establish a reasonable level of expenditures, then create a transparent tax system and ask foreign donors to pick up the difference.

We have a donors' conference scheduled later next month.

The article goes on to say:

Post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction with the objective of promoting a transition to democracy appear to be the inescapable responsibility of the world's only superpower. Therefore, in addition to securing the major resources that will be needed to carry through the current operation in Iraq success, the United States ought to make the smaller long-term investments in its own institutional capacity to conduct such operations.

I find this article very interesting in terms of the problems we face. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

See exhibit 1.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, going back to the statements made before our committee, as Ambassador Bremer said to us on September 22:

There are some things I would like to point out about this \$87 billion request. No one part of the supplemental is indispensable and no part is more important than the others. This is a carefully considered request. This is urgent. The urgency of military operations is self-evident. The funds for nonmilitary action in Iraq are equally urgent. Most Iraqis welcome us as liberators and we glow with the pleasure of that welcome. Now the reality of foreign troops on the streets is starting to chafe. Some Iraqis are beginning to regard us as occupiers and not as liberators. Some of this is inevitable, but faster progress in reconstruction will help. Unless this supplemental passes quickly, the Iraqis will face darkness eight hours daily. The safety of our troops is indirect but real. The people who ambush our troops are small in number and do not do so because they have undependable electricity. However, the population of a few is directly related to their co-operation in hunting down those who attack us. Earlier progress gives an edge against terrorists.

As chairman of the Appropriations Committee, I take the position that we should act as quickly as possible on this bill. If we can get it to third reading before we leave here the next week, the House will act on the bill while we are gone. We can marry our version of the bill to the House version of the bill here in the Senate and take it up the first week we are back after the recess.

If we do that, we should be able to get this bill to the President and to the Department of Defense and to Ambassador Bremer's operation by mid-October at the latest. It is urgent we do that.

We have the option to demonstrate to the world we are not going there to occupy Iraq. We did not intend to occupy Iraq. As a matter of fact, under the Iraq Liberation Act enacted in 1998, Congress stated the policy:

It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.

Further, it stated:

It is the sense of the Congress once the Saddam Hussein regime is removed from power in Iraq, the United States should support Iraq's transition to democracy by providing immediate and substantial humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, by providing democracy transition to Iraqi parties and movements with democratic goals, and by convening Iraq's foreign creditors to develop a multilateral response to Iraq's foreign debt incurred by Saddam Hussein's regime.

That is what we are trying to do. We are trying to escape the long delay of military occupation and carry out our goal of liberation of the Iraqi people as we decided in 1998.

It is essential we proceed with this markup and get the bill to the Senate as quickly as possible. It is my hope it would be on the floor by Tuesday night. I hope the leader will give us the time during the next week to take this bill, that provides the funds, to third reading so we can act as an Appropriations Committee in conjunction with our colleagues from the House on the bill they will produce when we are on recess.

Nothing is more important than demonstrating to those people in uniform in Iraq that we mean business. We need this money. There is no question they need this money.

Because of the requests made during the debate on the last supplemental, we convinced the administration to submit a 2004 Defense bill. The 2004 Defense bill did not contain any money for Iraq. That was in the separate supplemental submitted to us in response to the request from the Congress to do just that.

For the first time in history the President has requested money in advance to conduct a war. All Presidents in the past have taken money from existing Government funds, spent them, and then came to Congress to replace the funds from which those moneys were taken.

This President submitted a concise request. As a matter of fact, one Member of the other side of the aisle in the budget markup asked for \$100 billion for the Iraqi defense activities. This President asked for a total of \$66 billion plus \$20.3 billion for the activities conducted under Ambassador Bremer's aegis to hasten the ability of the Iraqi

people to take over their own government, their own security, and their own future.

If we can act quickly, we can escape a long period of occupation. Compare the two sections of this bill: \$66 billion for defense, \$20 billion for the humanitarian and governmental activities. The longer we keep our troops in Iraq, the more expensive it will become from a military point of view. The sooner we can help these people establish their own government, provide their own security, their own army, the sooner we can bring our people out of Iraq and release these extraordinary expenses. The President has enabled us to view those expenses.

The bill we just passed, and the President will soon sign for 2004 for Department of Defense, does not contain money for Iraq. The money for Iraq is in a separate bill and demonstrates to everyone how expensive it is to keep an army in Iraq.

Our goal is to get that \$20.3 billion as quickly as possible. It is needed as much as the Defense money. I hope the Senate will work with us next week as we try to bring this bill to the floor and get it to third reading before we recess on the 3rd.

#### EXHIBIT 1

[From the Rand Review, Summer, 2003]

#### NATION-BUILDING

(By James Dobbins)

We at the RAND Corporation have compiled what we have found to be the most important lessons learned by the United States in its nation-building efforts since World War II. Not all these hard-won lessons have yet been fully applied to America's most recent nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

We define nation-building as "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy." We have compared the levels of progress toward this goal among seven historical cases: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These are the most important instances in which American military power has been used in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin democratization elsewhere around the world since World War II.

From our review of the historical cases, we at RAND have derived a number of overarching conclusions:

Many factors—such as prior democratic experience, level of economic development, and social homogeneity—can influence the ease or difficulty of nation-building, but the single most important controllable determinant seems to be the level of effort, as measured in troops, money, and time. Multilateral nation-building is more complex and time-consuming than a unilateral approach. But the multilateral approach is considerably less expensive for individual participants.

Multilateral nation-building can produce more thorough transformations and greater regional reconciliation than can unilateral efforts.

United of command is as essential in peace operations as it is in war. This unity of command can be achieved even in operations with broad multilateral participation when the major participants share a common vision and tailor the response of international institutions accordingly.

There appears to be an inverse correlation between the size of the military stabilization

force and the level of casualties. The higher the proportion of troops relative to the resident population, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted. Indeed, most of the post-conflict operations that were generously manned suffered no casualties at all.

Neighboring states can exert significance influence, for good or bad. It is nearly impossible to put together a fragmented nation if its neighbors try to tear it apart. Every effort should be made to secure their support.

Accountability for past injustices can be a powerful component of democratization. Such accountability can be among the most difficult and controversial aspects of any nation-building endeavor, however, and therefore should be attempted only if there is a deep and long-term commitment to the overall operation.

There is no quick fix for nation-building. None of our cases was successfully completed in less than seven years.

These lessons are drawn from the "best practices" of nation-building over the past 60 years. We explain the lessons in greater detail below and then suggest how they might be applied to future operations and, in particular, to Iraq. Although the combat phase of the war against Iraq went very well and the regime collapsed much faster than many had expected, the United States has been left with the unenviable task of seeking to build a democratic, economically vibrant Iraqi nation.

#### FROM GERMANY TO AFGHANISTAN

The cases of Germany and Japan set a standard for post-conflict nation-building that has not been matched since. Both were comprehensive efforts at social, political, and economic reconstruction. These successes demonstrated that democracy was transferable, that societies could be encouraged to transform themselves, and that major transformations could endure.

For the next 40 years, there were few attempts to replicate these early successes. During the cold war with the Soviet Union, America employed its military power to preserve the status quo, not to alter it; to manage crises, not to resolve the underlying problems; to overthrow unfriendly regimes and reinstall friendly ones, not to bring about fundamental societal change.

After 1989, a policy of global containment of the Soviet Union no longer impelled the United States to preserve the status quo. Washington was now free to overlook regional instability in places like Yugoslavia and Afghanistan as long as the instability did not directly threaten American interests. At the same time, though, the United States had the unprecedented opportunity of using its unrivaled power to resolve, not just to manage or to contain, international problems of strategic importance. In addition, the United States could secure broader international support for such efforts than ever before.

Throughout the 1990s, each successive post-cold war effort became wider in scope and more ambitious in intent than its predecessor had been. In Somalia, the original objective was purely humanitarian but was subsequently expanded to democratization. In Haiti, the objective was to reinstall a president and to conduct elections according to an existing constitution. In Bosnia, the objective was to create a multiethnic state out of a former Yugoslav republic. In Kosovo, the objective was to establish a democratic polity and market economy virtually from scratch.

From Somalia in 1992 to Kosovo in 1999, each nation-building effort was somewhat better managed than the previous one (see table). Somalia was the nadir. Everything

that could go wrong did. The operation culminated in the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1994 after a sharp tactical setback that had resulted in 18 American deaths in October 1993. This reverse, which became memorial-

ized in the book and film “Black Hawk Down,” was largely the result of an unnecessarily complicated U.S. and United Nations command structure that had three distinct forces operating with three distinct chains of

command. Despite its failure, the Somalia mission taught America crucial lessons for the future. One was the importance of unity of command in peace operations as well as in war. Second was the need to scale mission

AMERICA'S HISTORY OF NATION-BUILDING

Country or territory	Years	Peak U.S. troops	International cooperation	Assessment	Lessons learned
West Germany	1945–1952	1.6 million	Joint project with Britain and France, eventually NATO.	Very successful. Within 10 years an economically stable democracy and NATO member.	Democracy can be transferred. Military forces can underpin democratic transformation.
Japan	1945–1952	350,000	None	Very successful. Economically stable democracy and regional security anchor within a decade.	Democracy can be exported to non-Western societies. Unilateral nation-building can be simpler (but more expensive) than multilateral.
Somalia	1992–1994	28,000	United Nations (U.N.) humanitarian oversight.	Not successful. Little accomplished other than some humanitarian aid delivered in Mogadishu and other cities.	Unity of command can be as essential in peace as in combat operations. Nation-building objectives need to be scaled to available resources. Police may need to be deployed alongside military forces.
Haiti	1994–1996	21,000 (plus 1,000 international police).	U.N. help in policing	Not successful. U.S. forces restored democratically elected president but left before democratic institutions took hold.	Exit deadlines can be counterproductive. Need time to build competent administrations and democratic institutions.
Bosnia	1995–present	20,000	Joint effort by NATO, U.N., and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.	Mixed success. Democratic elections within two years, but government is constitutionally weak.	Unity of command is required on both military and civil sides. Nexus between organized crime and political extremism can be serious challenge to enduring democratic reforms.
Kosovo	1999–present	15,000 (plus 4,600 international police).	NATO military action and U.N. support.	Modest success. Elections within 3 years and strong economic growth. But no final resolution to Kosovo's status.	Broad participation and extensive burden-sharing can be compatible with unity of command and American leadership.
Afghanistan	2001–present	10,000	Modest contribution from U.N. and nongovernmental organizations.	Too early to tell. No longer launch pad for global terrorism. But little democratic structure and no real government authority beyond Kabul.	Low initial input of money and troops yields low output of security, democratization, and economic growth.

objectives to available resources in troops, money, and staying power. A third lesson was the importance of deploying significant numbers of international police alongside international military forces to places where the local law enforcement institutions had disappeared or become illegitimate.

America applied these lessons to Haiti in the mid-1990s. We had unity of command throughout the operation. We did not have parallel American and allied forces. We had a single force under a single command with a clear hierarchy of decisionmaking. We deployed a large number of police within weeks of the military deployment, and the police were armed with both weapons and arrest authority. Unfortunately, we were obsessed with exit strategies and exit deadlines in the wake of the Somalia debacle. So we pulled out of Haiti with the job at best half done.

The Bosnia experience of the late 1990s, was more successful. We set an exit deadline but wisely ignored it when the time came. On the negative side, there was a lack of coordination between the military stabilization efforts of NATO and those organizations responsible for civilian reconstruction. Consequently, the authority for implementing the civilian reconstruction projects became fragmented among numerous competing institutions. To complicate the situation further, the international police who had been deployed were armed with neither weapons nor arrest authority.

By the time of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, we and our allies had absorbed most of these lessons. We then made smarter choices in Kosovo. We achieved unity of command on both the civil and military sides. As in Bosnia, NATO was responsible for military operations. On the civil side, we established a clear hierarchical structure under a United Nations representative. Leadership was shared effectively between Europe and the United States. Working together, we deployed nearly 5,000 well-armed police alongside military peacekeepers. Although far from perfect, the arrangement was more successful than it had been in Bosnia.

During his presidential campaign in 2000, George W. Bush criticized the Clinton administration for this expansive nation-building agenda. As president, Bush adopted a more modest set of objectives when faced with a comparable challenge in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the attempt to reverse the trend toward ever larger and more ambitious U.S.-led nation-building operations has proven short-lived. In Iraq, the United States has taken on a task comparable in its vast scope

to the transformational efforts still underway in Bosnia and Kosovo and comparable in its enormous scale to the earlier American occupations of Germany and Japan. Nation-building, it appears, is the inescapable responsibility of the world's only superpower.

QUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS OF CASES

For each of the seven historical cases of nation-building, we at RAND compared quantitative data on the “inputs” (troops, money, and time) and “outputs.” The outputs included casualties (or lack thereof), democratic elections, and increases in per capita gross domestic product (GDP).

Troop levels varied widely across the cases. The levels ranged from 1.6 million U.S. troops in the American sector in Germany at the end of World War II to 14,000 U.S. and international troops currently in Afghanistan. Gross numbers, however, are not the most useful numbers for comparison, because the size and populations of the nations being built have been so disparate. We chose instead to compare the numbers of U.S. and foreign soldiers per thousand inhabitants in each occupied territory. We then compared the proportional force levels at specified times after the conflict ended (or after the U.S. rebuilding efforts began).

Figure 1 shows the number of international troops (or in the German and Japanese cases, U.S. troops) per thousand inhabitants in each territory at the outset of the intervention and at various intervals thereafter. As the data illustrate, even the proportional force levels vary immensely across the operations. (The levels vary so tremendously that they require a logarithmic, or exponential, scale for manageable illustration.)

Bosnia, Kosovo, and particularly the U.S.-occupied sector of Germany started with substantial proportions of military forces, whereas the initial levels in Japan, Somalia, Haiti, and especially Afghanistan were much more modest. The levels generally decreased over time. In Germany, the level then rose again for reasons having to do with the cold war. Overall, the differences in force levels across the cases had significant implications for other aspects of the operations.

Figure 2 compares the amount of foreign economic aid per capita (in constant 2001 U.S. dollars) provided to six of the territories during the first two years. Although Germany received the most aid in raw dollar terms (\$12 billion), the country did not rank high on a per capita basis. Per capita assistance there ran a little over \$200. Kosovo, which ranked fourth in terms of total assistance, received over \$800 per resident. With

the second-highest level of economic assistance per capita, Kosovo enjoyed the most rapid recovery in levels of per capita GDP. In contrast, Haiti, which received much less per capita than Kosovo, has experienced little growth in per capita GDP.

Germany and Japan both stand out as unequaled success stories. One of the most important questions is why both operations fared so well compared with the others. The easiest answer is that Germany and Japan were already highly developed and economically advanced societies. This certainly explains why it was easier to reconstruct their economies than it was to reconstruct those in the other territories. But economics is not a sufficient answer to explain the transition to democracy. The spread of democracy to poor countries in Latin America, Asia, and parts of Africa suggests that this form of government is not unique to advanced industrial economies. Indeed, democracy can take root in countries where neither Western culture nor significant economic development exists. Nation-building is not principally about economic reconstruction, but rather about political transformation.

Because Germany and Japan were also ethnically homogeneous societies, some people might argue that homogeneity is the key to success. We believe that homogeneity helps greatly but that it is not essential, either. It is true that Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan are divided ethnically, socioeconomically, or tribally in ways that Germany and Japan were not. However, the kinds of communal hatred that mark Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan are even more pronounced in Bosnia and Kosovo, where the process of democratization has nevertheless made some progress.

What principally distinguishes Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo from Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan is not their levels of Western culture, democratic history, economic development, or ethnic homogeneity. Rather, the principal distinction is the level of effort that the United States and the international community have put into the democratic transformations. Among the recent operations, the United States and its allies have put 25 times more money and 50 times more troops on a per capita basis into post-conflict Kosovo than into post-conflict Afghanistan. These higher levels of input account in significant measure for the higher levels of output in terms of democratic institution-building and economic growth.

Japan, one of the two undoubted successes, fully meets the criterion regarding the duration of time devoted to its transformation. In the first two years, Japan received considerably less external economic assistance per capita than did Germany, Bosnia, or Kosovo, indeed less than Haiti and about the same amount as Afghanistan. Japan's correspondingly low post-conflict economic growth rates reflect this fact. Japan's subsequent growth of the 1950s, spurred by American spending linked to the Korean War, helped to consolidate public support for the democratic reforms that had been put in place in the immediate postwar years. As with the German economic miracle of the 1950s, the experience in Japan suggests that rising economic prosperity is not so much a necessary precursor to political reform as a highly desirable successor and legitimizing factor.

In proportion to its population, Japan also had a smaller military stabilization force (or, as it was then termed, occupation force) than did Germany, Bosnia, or Kosovo, although the force was larger than those in Haiti and Afghanistan. The ability to secure Japan with a comparatively small force relates to both the willing collaboration of the Japanese power structures and the homogeneity of the population. A third important factor was the unprecedented scale of Japan's defeat—the devastation and consequent intimidation wrought by years of total war, culminating in the fire bombing of its cities and finally two nuclear attacks. In situations where the conflict has been terminated less conclusively and destructively (or not terminated at all), such as Somalia, Afghanistan, and most recently Iraq, we have seen more difficult post-conflict security challenges. Indeed, it seems that the more swift and bloodless the military victory, the more difficult can be the task of post-conflict stabilization.

The seven historical cases have differed in terms of duration. The record suggests that although staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early assures failure. To date, no effort at enforced democratization has been brought to a successful conclusion in less than seven years.

#### UNITY OF COMMAND

Throughout the 1990s, the United States wrestled with the challenge of gaining wider participation in its nation-building endeavors while also preserving adequate unity of command. In Somalia and Haiti, the United States experimented with sequential arrangements in which it initially managed and funded the operations but then quickly turned responsibility over to the United Nations. In Bosnia, the United States succeeded in achieving both broad participation and unity of command on the military side of the operation through NATO. But in Bosnia the United States resisted the logic of achieving a comparable and cohesive arrangement on the civil side. In Kosovo, the United States achieved broad participation and unity of command on both the military and civil sides by working through NATO and the United Nations.

None of these models proved entirely satisfactory. However, the arrangements in Kosovo seem to have provided the best amalgam to date of American leadership, European and other participation, financial burden-sharing, and unity of command. Every international official in Kosovo works ultimately for either the NATO commander or the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General. Neither of these is an American. But by virtue of America's credibility in the region and America's influence in NATO and on the U.N. Security Council, the United States has been able to maintain a satisfactory leadership role while fielding

only 16 percent of the peacekeeping troops and paying only 16 percent of the reconstruction costs.

The efficacy of the Bosnia and Kosovo models has depended on the ability of the United States and its principal allies to attain a common vision of the objectives and then to coordinate the relevant institutions—principally NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, and the United Nations—to meet the objectives. These two models offer a viable fusion of burden-sharing and unity of command.

In Afghanistan, in contrast, the United States opted for parallel arrangements on the military side and even greater divergence on the civil side. An international force—with no U.S. participation—operates in the capital of Kabul, while a national and mostly U.S. force operates everywhere else. The United Nations has responsibility for promoting political transformation, while individual donors coordinate economic reconstruction—or, more often, fail to do so.

The arrangement in Afghanistan is a marginal improvement over that in Somalia, because the separate U.S. and international forces are at least not operating in the same physical space. But the arrangement represents a clear regression from what we achieved in Haiti, Bosnia, or, in particular, Kosovo. It is therefore not surprising that the overall results achieved to date in Afghanistan are better than in Somalia, not yet better than in Haiti, and not as good as in Bosnia or Kosovo. The operation in Afghanistan, though, is a good deal less expensive than those in Bosnia or Kosovo.

#### APPLYING THE LESSONS TO IRAQ

The challenges facing the United States in Iraq today are formidable. Still, it is possible to draw valuable lessons from America's previous experiences with nation-building. There are four main lessons to be learned for Iraq.

The first lesson is that democratic nation-building can work given sufficient inputs of resources. These inputs, however, can be very high. Regarding military forces, Figure 3 takes the numbers of troops used in the previous cases of nation-building and projects, for each, a proportionally equivalent force for the Iraqi population over the next decade. For example, if Kosovo levels of troop commitments were deployed to Iraq, the number would be some 500,000 U.S. and coalition troops through 2005. (There are roughly 150,000 coalition troops stationed in Iraq today.) To provide troop coverage at Bosnia levels, the requisite troop figures would be 460,000 initially, falling to 258,000 by 2005 and 145,000 by 2008.

In addition to military forces, it is often important to deploy a significant number of international civil police. To achieve a level comparable to the nearly 5,000 police deployed in Kosovo, Iraq would need an infusion of 53,000 international civil police officers through 2005 (in addition to the forces represented in Figure 3).

It is too early to predict with accuracy the required levels of foreign aid, but we can draw comparisons with the previous historical cases. Figure 4 takes the amount of foreign aid provided in six of the seven previous cases of nation-building and projects proportionally equivalent figures for the Iraqi population over the next two years. If Bosnia levels of foreign aid per capita were provided to Iraq, the country would require some \$36 billion in aid from now through 2005. Conversely, aid at the same level as Afghanistan would total \$1 billion over the next two years.

We at RAND believe that Iraq will require substantial external funds for humanitarian

assistance and budgetary support. It is highly unlikely that taxes on the Iraqi oil sector will be adequate to fund the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy in the near future. Judging by the experiences of Bosnia and Kosovo, territories that have higher per capita incomes than Iraq, budgetary support will be necessary for quite some time. To manage immediate operating expenditures, we suggest that the post-conflict authorities in Iraq first establish a reasonable level of expenditures, then create a transparent tax system, and ask foreign donors to pick up the difference until the nation gets on its feet. We believe that this will be the most efficacious avenue to economic recovery.

At the same time, we suspect that Iraq will not receive the same per capita levels of foreign troops, police, or economic aid as did either Bosnia or Kosovo. Figures of 500,000 troops or \$36 billion in aid are beyond the capacity of even the world's only superpower to generate or sustain. Even half those levels will require the United States to broaden participation in Iraq's post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction well beyond the comparatively narrow coalition that fought the war, thereby mounting a broader international effort on the Balkan models. According to the lessons learned, the ultimate consequences for Iraq of a failure to generate adequate international manpower and money are likely to be lower levels of security, higher casualties sustained and inflicted, lower economic growth rates, and slower, less thoroughgoing political transformation.

The second lesson for Iraq is that short departure deadlines are incompatible with nation-building. The United States will succeed only if it makes a long-term commitment to establishing strong democratic institutions and does not beat a hasty retreat tied to artificial deadlines. Moreover, setting premature dates for early national elections can be counterproductive.

Third, important hindrances to nation-building include both internal fragmentation (along political, ethnic, or sectarian lines) and a lack of external support from neighboring states. Germany and Japan had homogeneous societies. Bosnia and Kosovo had neighbors that, following the democratic transitions in Croatia and Serbia, collaborated with the international community. Iraq could combine the worst of both worlds, lacking both internal cohesion and regional support. The United States should consider putting a consultative mechanism in place, on the model of the Peace Implementation Council in the Balkans or the "Two Plus Six" group that involved Afghanistan's six neighbors plus Russia and the United States, as a means of consulting with the neighboring countries of Iraq.

Fourth, building a democracy, a strong economy, and long-term legitimacy depends in each case on striking the balance between international burden-sharing and unity of command. As noted above, the United States is unlikely to be able to generate adequate levels of troops, money, or endurance as long as it relies principally upon the limited coalition with which it fought the war. On the other hand, engaging a broader coalition, to include major countries that will expect to secure influence commensurate with their contributions, will require either new institutional arrangements or the extension of existing ones, such as NATO.

In its early months, the American-led stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq have not gone as smoothly as might be expected, given abundant, recent, and relevant American experience. This is, after all, the sixth major nation-building enterprise the United States has mounted in eleven years, and the fifth in a Muslim nation or province.

Many of the initial difficulties in Iraq have been encountered elsewhere. Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan also experienced the rapid and utter collapse of their prior regimes. In each of those instances, the local police, courts, penal services, and militaries were destroyed, disrupted, disbanded, and/or discredited. They were consequently unavailable to fill the post-conflict security gap. In Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, extremist elements emerged to fill the resultant vacuum of power. In all five cases, organized crime quickly developed into a major challenge to the occupying authority.

In Bosnia and Kosovo, the external stabilization forces ultimately proved adequate to surmount these challenges. In Somalia and Afghanistan, they did not or have not yet, respectively.

Throughout the 1990s, the management of each major stabilization and reconstruction mission represented a marginal advance over its predecessor, but in the past several years this modestly positive learning curve has not been sustained. The Afghan mission cannot yet be deemed more successful than the one in Haiti. It is certainly too early to evaluate the success of the Iraqi nation-building mission, but its first few months do not raise it above those in Bosnia and Kosovo at a similar stage.

Over the past decade, the United States has made major investments in the combat efficiency of its forces. The return on investment has been evident in the dramatic improvements demonstrated from one campaign to the next, from Desert Storm to the Kosovo air campaign to Operation Iraqi Freedom. But there has been no comparable increase in the capacity of U.S. armed forces, or of U.S. civilian agencies for that matter, to conduct post-combat stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Nation-building has been a controversial mission over the past decade, and the extent of this controversy has undoubtedly curtailed the investments needed to do these tasks better. So has institutional resistance in both the state and defense departments, neither of which regards nation-building among its core missions. As a result, successive administrations tend to treat each new such mission as if it were the first and, more importantly, the last.

This expectation is unlikely to be realized any time soon. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration conducted a major nation-building intervention, on the average, every two years. The current administration, despite a strong disinclination to engage American armed forces in these activities, has launched two major such enterprises in a period of eighteen months.

Post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction with the objective of promoting a transition to democracy appear to be the inescapable responsibility of the world's only superpower. Therefore, in addition to securing the major resources that will be needed to carry through the current operation in Iraq to success, the United States ought to make the smaller long-term investments in its own institutional capacity to conduct such operations. In this way, the ongoing improvements in combat performance of American forces could be matched by improvements in the post-conflict performance of our government as a whole.

Mr. STEVENS. I yield the floor.

Ms. LANDRIEU. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Ms. LANDRIEU. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2004—Continued

Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. President, I know my colleagues will be coming to the floor to speak more about the situation in Iraq, but I take a moment as one of the managers of the DC bill to give a few closing remarks on that subject and wrap up a couple of issues this morning. Then I understand the Democratic leader will come to the floor. When he does, I will be happy to yield. And I see one of my other colleagues.

For the record, I follow up a couple of comments from my friend from Missouri who spoke just a few minutes ago on the subject.

One, he referred to a letter from Secretary Paige. We on our side do not have a copy of that letter. It has not been submitted to us. We would be pleased to receive it if there is such a letter indicating support for this three-sector approach, because all we have is the "Statement of Secretary of Education Rod Paige On the DC School Choice Initiative Before the House Committee on Government Reform," dated June 24, 2003.

I have spent the last 30 minutes reviewing again the statement, which I had read once before, and there was no mention at all in this statement of any three-sector approach. It is approximately 20 pages long, and I have highlighted every reference to the choice initiative fund proposed by the President, and there is no reference in here for charter schools or for education reform for traditional public schools.

So I want to submit this statement for the RECORD. That is all we have on this side. If there is a new statement from the Secretary, we would be happy to review it. I ask unanimous consent that the statement of Secretary Paige be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF EDUCATION ROD PAIGE ON THE DC SCHOOL CHOICE INITIATIVE BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, JUNE 24, 2003

Chairman Davis and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Bush Administration's proposal to initiate a program to expand school choice in the District of Columbia in fiscal year 2004. I welcome the opportunity to describe our proposal and explain our reasons for putting it forward. I am also very pleased to appear at this hearing with Mayor Anthony Williams, who has been, and will continue to be, our partner in developing this initiative. I truly appreciate the Mayor's willingness to work with us, and the relationship we have developed around the simple idea that wider educational options can benefit the children of the District of Columbia.

This hearing occurs very close to the anniversary of a very historic moment in the history of educational choice in America. On Friday, we will observe the one-year anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the case that determined that a properly structured school voucher program is constitutional. When the Court announced that decision, I hailed it as one that could open doors of opportunity to thousands of children and could transform the educational landscape in our country. That statement is worth repeating today, as we think about how to improve and reform elementary and secondary education in Washington, DC.

Mr. Chairman, I know that officials in my Department and Members of Congress have been concerned about the quality of education in the District of Columbia for many years. D.C. public schools are only a short walk from our offices, we see District students going to and from school each day, and we read about the challenges of the D.C. public schools in the newspapers almost daily. We all want the capital of the greatest nation on earth to have some of the finest schools on earth. At one time this city's schools were considered among the best in the entire Nation. But for many years we have been disappointed by the performance of public schools in the District, and at the seeming inability of public school officials to manage schools and programs effectively.

In some respects, the situation in the District may be no different from that in other urban school districts that educate large numbers of children living in poverty, but in other respects the District has sometimes seemed uniquely resistant to reform and improvement. I say that with full respect for Superintendent Vance and with appreciation for what he is trying to accomplish and for some of the things he has achieved, but I think it's the truth.

Let's consider the performance of D.C. students on the National Assessment of Educational Progress, or NAEP as it's called, the assessment that measures the performance of students over time in reading, writing, math, and other core academic subjects. In the most recent mathematics assessment, administered in 2000, only 6 percent of D.C. fourth-graders tested at the "proficient" or "advanced" levels, the levels that show that students have demonstrated competency over challenging subject matter. A lower percentage of students in D.C. demonstrated proficiency than was the case for any State. At the other end of the scale, 76 percent of D.C. fourth-graders scored at the "below basic" level, which means that they could not demonstrate even partial mastery of the math skills and knowledge that are appropriate at the fourth-grade level. The 2000 8th grade math results were very similar; only 6 percent of D.C. students tested at the "proficient" or "advanced" levels, and 77 percent were "below basic."

The most recent NAEP reading assessment took place in 2002, and the National Assessment Governing Board announced the results just last week. The results for D.C. students were a little better than the 2000 math scores, but still were completely inadequate. Only 10 percent of D.C. fourth-graders could read proficiently, while 69 percent were "below basic." At the 8th grade level, 9 percent were "proficient" or "advanced" and 52 percent were "below basic."

Looking at the quality of a school system requires more than just reviewing scores on achievement tests. But when we look at other indicators, they too show that D.C. public schools are not providing the education that children in the District need or deserve. The most recent edition of Quality County, the annual review of education trends and data produced by the newspaper Education Week, gave the District a grade of only a D+ for having an acceptable system of academic standards and accountability, a C in the area of success in recruiting new