

It appears that for some, the problem of working families struggling to get by merely serves as an excuse to pass massive, ineffective, irresponsible, and untargeted tax cuts. We must stay focused and pass measures that make sense and will put our economy on the right course both now and into the future.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

LIBERIA

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise to address the Senate concerning my concern—I think there are others who feel similarly—about the crisis situation that is rapidly developing in Liberia and the decision framework that has confronted, is confronting, and will confront our Government.

I carefully use the word “Government” because when men and women in the Armed Forces are sent into harm’s way, there is a constitutional responsibility on the President as Commander in Chief and the principal architect of our foreign policy to make the decision to send them into harm’s way. In no way in my 25 years in the Senate have I ever once questioned that constitutional authority. In fact, I will match my record—humble as it is—against any Member of this body with regard to participation in the war power debates, participation in the resolutions regarding the use of force, when we, as a body, are addressing our responsibilities with regard to the men and women of the Armed Forces.

The President has a constitutional right. There is always debate, as reflected in the history of the War Powers Act, to what extent should he consult and, indeed, to what extent should he receive the specific concurrence of the Congress before exercising that very heavy responsibility.

There are volumes written on this subject. But for simplicity, clarity, and brevity today, I simply say the Constitution gives that right to the President and should not be ever in question. To the extent that Congress has the opportunity, through consultation and through other actions working with the administration, I believe it is wise that Congress speak to this issue.

About 4 weeks ago, I appeared on “Meet the Press” and somewhat indirectly referenced my concern about Liberia at that time. I expressed that the need to make a decision was coming down upon this Government, as indeed it has, and that it would be wise for the Congress to take a role. I cannot predict how this body would vote on it if it got to a vote. But I think the involvement of Congress when men and women go in harm’s way is a very important responsibility as coequal branches of the Government, the executive and the legislative, and, indeed, an obligation.

I have tried each day to spend some time on these issues. I read what I can

from the press, which has been rather interesting and good coverage so far, and from other documents, official and otherwise.

The complexity of this situation is really considerable. We do have these historical ties dating to the 1840s to this small country. At times, we have taken actions there. At times through the history of this country, we have sort of looked the other way. We have gone in before to try to quell disruption and violence, but I do not find a long history of strong involvement. We now have a despot who has been elected to the highest official post in that country, who has made representation that he will leave subject to certain contingencies. The President of the United States has indicated he wants to try and help the people subject, again, to the Liberian leader taking certain actions. This whole framework is quite unclear.

The Secretary General of the United Nations visited here 2 weeks ago. I was privileged to sit in a small meeting hosted by the distinguished majority leader, at which time we expressed our views. He was quite concerned, as I am quite concerned—I think everybody is quite concerned who has followed this—about the extraordinary dimensions of human suffering, there is no dispute about that, human suffering as a consequence of the frightful public record of the current leader in Liberia, that leader who has indicated he is willing to leave.

As I stand here addressing the Senate, on orders from the President, a very significant force, largely of marines, has progressed from the Horn of Africa around to the Mediterranean and is approaching, probably in the next 72 hours, a location somewhere off the coast of Liberia, where the ships will be positioned to await such further orders as the President may direct.

Now, what of the role of the Congress? As chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I had hearings—at least a briefing—at my request on July 8. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs provided a very fine team of briefers where my committee, in S-407, heard their reports. A day or so ago, recognizing the Congress would soon be leaving for its August recess, I felt it wise to set a second briefing of the Armed Services Committee to which I invited really anyone in the Senate who wished to join, and also specifically a group of Senators, of which I am one, who soon will be embarking on a trip to the African continent. I was privileged to be included in that trip and expressed an interest to go primarily because of my concerns of national security in that region and the impending Liberian conflict. It had been my expectation that several of those Senators would have joined today had that briefing gone ahead.

Yesterday afternoon, the Department of Defense, following the regular procedures we always follow, sent up the names of three briefers—2 from the

Joint Staff and one from OSD policy—and it all seemed to be ready to go this morning when quite unexpectedly we received word from the Department of Defense that the briefers would not come.

I will not dwell further on that procedure. I will say in my 25 years in the Senate, it is most unusual to conduct our affairs in that way between the Senate and the Department of Defense. Indeed, I am not sure I know of a precedent of that type of abrupt cancellation, but I will put that to one side and press on. I did feel it would have been helpful, certainly, to this Senator and several others—I know one or two on the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday expressed to me their concerns of where could they get information. Both of those Senators were invited to attend this morning. One of them is on the Subcommittee on African Affairs and he expressed to me his concern and asked how best he could get involved in learning more.

I will move on now to this question about the seriousness of this problem. This type of civil war, regrettably, has persisted in Liberia for many years. There are essentially three factions now. There is one faction to the sort of fragile, if almost inconsequential, government that is in place today with this despotic leader. Then there is a group to the south that refers to themselves as the Model, M-O-D-E-L. There is a group in the north that refers to themselves as the Lurd, L U-R-D. Both of them are a mixture of groups of Liberians and others from other areas. Both groups are now converging on the central part of the country, Monrovia, and we have witnessed this outbreak once again of civil war and the devastation being wrought on innocent civilians.

So what to do about it? Again, I am not prepared to give a clear answer. I would presume the administration is proceeding and in due course will share this information, but it is likely one or more decisions will be made in the absence of the Congress in formal session, so that concerns me because I feel strongly that congressional involvement in this situation is very important. I go back to our obligation to the men and women in the Armed Forces.

Once this military force—that is the force at sea—is on station, I anticipate that will increase the international pressure on our Government—and I continue to use the phrase “government”—to become more actively involved and send these forces in. Again, under the Constitution, the President has every right to make that decision on his own initiative, with or without consultation with the Congress, and to proceed.

In doing that, I call the attention of the Senate to the military doctrine that has evolved since Vietnam. It was my privilege to serve in the Department of Defense for over 5 years during the Vietnam conflict as Navy Secretary. That period of history is indelibly etched in my memory, a period of

history which reflected the Congress breaking away from successive administrations that were involved in that conflict, and the animosity in the Congress against the Department of Defense. I shared my burden of that animosity, along with three Secretaries of Defense whom I served with in that period. Two remain very dear friends and valued advisers to me to this day. The third has passed on.

Out of that conflict, America began to examine the criteria by which this Nation should send men and women in uniform into harm's way—a very introspective, deep reflection on the tragic losses. My recollection is close to 50,000 men and women gave their lives in that conflict in Vietnam, and many more were wounded.

So often in the evening hours of our duties in the Pentagon in those days, I would, as did the other service Secretaries, call families and attend funerals. I frequently met with groups regarding their deep concern about that conflict and their losses. I remember meeting with the wives of the prisoners of war on regular occasions. Then this country unfortunately, in many respects, turned its discontent on the men and women of the Armed Forces themselves. When they would return home from their tours of duty in Vietnam, indeed there were instances in commands in the European theater of breakdown in discipline and morale, because of the uncertainty surrounding that conflict, the enormity of the casualties that we would take.

I mentioned the background because it was important America sit down and reflect on those criteria that Presidents—and indeed to the extent the Congress renders its approval—that Presidents and the Congress should follow.

A brief summary of that doctrine would be that military action should be used only as a last resort and only if there is a clear risk to national security interests of the United States of America; and at times we take into consideration the security interests of our valued allies.

So, is there a clear risk to national security by the intended target of our military action? What measure is the risk to the uniformed American? What measure is the risk to his or her life and limb?

The force when used should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy. There must be strong support for the campaign by the general American public and there must be a clear exit strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged.

I have generalized this but I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD following my statement a very important set of guidelines for the use of force that have been articulated through the years by our distinguished Secretary of State, Colin Powell—the so-called “Powell Doctrine.”

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 1.)

Mr. WARNER. I have fairly stated the basic precedents that I embrace wholeheartedly. The Members of the Senate, in general, embrace these precedents.

Therefore, I pose rhetorically the question: As the decision process is made at this time, given the Congress will be out of town, that process will be made by the executive branch, the President of the United States, assuming, as he does, full accountability, will those criteria for the use of force be the guideline or are we somehow going to make a departure, and if so, what is that departure?

I fully recognize the dimension of human suffering today and the potential for even greater human suffering tomorrow, perhaps the next day. But at the same time, I fully recognize to the best I have been able to ascertain, and I have not been able to ascertain it to my complete satisfaction, but there will be an element of risk. I have asked not one, not two, but half a dozen distinguished military officers—some active duty, some not—whether they share my concern that there will be a measure of risk should we send troops into Liberia.

I made reference to this in hearings we have had in the Armed Services Committee in connection with the reappointment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers and of the Vice Chairman, General Pace.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from renomination hearing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 2.)

Mr. WARNER. My concern is not just of today; it has been there for some significant period of time. This Senator has pressed the questions on that situation at every opportunity I have had to date.

I will also reflect on the personal involvement I have had in addition to the period in Vietnam. When I first came to the Armed Services Committee, I worked under some of the greatest men I have ever known in the Senate: Scoop Jackson, John Stennis, Barry Goldwater, John Tower. I try, as best I can, in my duties as Senator today to draw on the wisdom they imparted to me in their teachings. Those men were historic in proportion to the Senate. I shall never achieve but a small fraction of their stature but, nevertheless, having the responsibility, I do my very best.

I remember John Stennis asked me to work on a report for him of the effort we made to rescue the hostages illegally taken by the Government of Iran at the embassy. We all remember that challenge. The Pentagon prepared what I thought was a well thought through plan to rescue those hostages. It was the right thing to do. We put our military at great risk. It was a plan to use covert action and helicopters. I will

not dwell on it because I did write that report for Senator Stennis. It is somewhere in the archives.

The bottom line, a series of primarily mechanical failures, due to dust being taken into the intake systems, prevented the consummation of what I still to this day say could have been a successful operation. Certainly the heroics of the men involved who volunteered for that action were extraordinary.

John Tower, when he was chairman, we went together, just the two of us, to Beirut shortly after the bombing of the marine barracks in Beirut, marines who were sent there for the best of purposes to try to alleviate the suffering. The tragic loss.

Later, I was entrusted to work on the report for Somalia. My distinguished colleague, good friend, CARL LEVIN, and I went to Somalia. We worked on that report. It took us months to interview many individuals. How could we have experienced that tragic loss of men and women in our Armed Forces at the hands of savage attacks? That is a matter of record, the observations and conclusions Senator LEVIN and I put in that report.

I don't want to take any more time of the Senate on what I personally have done. Many have done as much, if not more, in respective responsibilities, but I do draw on some experience.

I am not hesitant to express my own concerns about some situations. If I were asked today, What should be done with respect to Liberia, I would simply say, I do not have the facts to make an informed decision. I hope in the executive branch there are those who do have sufficient facts to make an informed decision. Is this situation following the doctrine in our national security interests? I have even seen the word “vital” national security interests used. It has not been answered to my satisfaction.

If we are going to make a departure from the doctrine, is that predicated on sound principles that equate, somehow, to violation of security interests? If so, should we state them? If so, should we explain to the people?

I strongly believe, as I pointed out, that as we ask our men and women to take risks, we should, as an executive branch, as a legislative branch, have informed the American people, prepared the American—prepared them in a way to accept such losses as might occur. Has that been done? I fear, in my judgment, it has not been done.

I have tried my best to respond to my constituents. I have been questioned about it a number of times. I do not have the facts to my satisfaction. But it is very clear throughout the history of that Vietnam experience, we should have, as I stated, gained the support of the general public, the support of the families of the men and women in the Armed Forces who must go in harm's way. That has not, to my satisfaction, been done.

It is my hope that whatever decision process has to be made in the absence

of the Congress will be made and carefully thought through. If we are going to depart from this doctrine on the use of force, if there are geopolitical pressures, if there are domestic political pressures—whatever it is, spell it out: What were the factors taken into consideration to make such decisions as may—and I underline may—be made by the executive branch when the Congress is gone, assuming that some decisions will be made—I don't predict in any way what they may be, but assuming some decisions are made. Maybe the decision is not to be involved.

I do fervently hope the Congress becomes engaged when we return, that we consider whether we have a resolution—first at the request of the administration, with the concurrence of the Senate leadership, and perhaps maybe some consultation with the committee chairmen and ranking members who are involved in the oversight committees—mine, Foreign Relations, certainly the Subcommittee on Appropriations, and others. So we go through a process.

I was privileged—I remember it so well—in 1991 to be asked by then the distinguished leader, Robert Dole, to prepare a resolution for the utilization by the President of force in the Persian Gulf in the 1991 conflict. How well I remember that debate—3 days, 3 nights on this floor of the Senate and then the vote. And only by a margin of 5 votes did the Senate adopt a resolution in support of then the first President Bush to utilize force in that conflict.

We had a larger vote with regard to the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. We had some closer votes. I worked on these resolutions and so forth and decisionmaking by the Congress in the Balkan situation. I watched, carefully, all of those matters as they were addressed by this body.

Now, as we look at this situation in Liberia, we have a background of an ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and an ongoing conflict in Iraq. This mighty Nation is mourning the losses of uniformed members of the Armed Forces every week for some weeks now, doing the best we can individually to comfort and share the grief of the families.

Just this week, one Senator approached me: His State suffered a loss, and how could we facilitate the interment that this brave soldier deserved in Arlington in a timely way? Those steps are being taken. But a number of Senators have approached me, and I am glad to help as best I can with this situation back home in the context of the loss of the brave men and women of the Armed Forces.

This decision regarding Liberia could superimpose on those losses another level. It could. The risk, it seems to us, to be there—some of us who looked at this issue. Are we prepared as a nation to accept another circumstance in another theater that poses the threat of more casualties? I come back, is the United States of America—its citizens—prepared?

Our Armed Forces today, in my humble judgment, are stretched. We have seen some questioning the morale. I happen to think the morale is quite high. The recruiting, to the everlasting credit of the American spirit, is still strong; the retention is still strong. The All-Volunteer Force has exceeded every expectation we had.

I was privileged to be part of the framework in the Pentagon, under the leadership of a distinguished Secretary of Defense by the name of Melvin Laird, and a successor Secretary by the name of Jim Schlesinger, to envision and create and establish the All-Volunteer Force. It worked, and worked well. But that has its breaking points. Like everything else in life, it has its breaking points. I am not suggesting we have reached that limit, but we should never take our eye off the fact of that framework, that concept that everyone in uniform today is there because he or she has raised their arm and pledged allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and obligated themselves to accept the risks of military service. They do so thinking that the President, whoever that President may be, and the Congress, whatever the composition may be, are standing guard, protecting them and their families, protecting them and following the doctrine on the use of force, which presumably they have some knowledge of before accepting these obligations, that doctrine that I have enunciated and others have enunciated.

That is a heavy obligation upon us. We have to make certain that, as these conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are concluded and the goals that we stated are reached—goals which enable both of those nations to achieve a measure of democracy and freedom that they never have had, certainly not in the last 30 years—after that, those successive goals—and there is no doubt that we must be steadfast in our resolve to achieve them—we have to make certain our Armed Forces remain strong to meet the unexpected contingencies that arise around the world. Those contingencies that could challenge the vital security interests of this Nation. That means a strong, active, All-Volunteer Force, a strong Guard and Reserve.

We have to take those steps now to ensure that they are in place as we complete our mission in Afghanistan and Iraq, and indeed in many ways where our troops are throughout the world. I think they are on the border of being overdeployed and overextended, and we have to keep a very watchful eye.

Early this week, the Secretary of Defense came up to the Hill along with General Keane and went over a rotation policy which is going to correct—and I repeat in their words—that “some mistakes were made” of late with regard to our troops currently engaged in the Iraqi conflict. I commend the general. He recognized that some mistakes have been made. They are going to correct them.

I think now our forces will have a much clearer understanding, and their families—and I repeat—and their families will have a clear understanding as to their obligation. But always keep in mind that there is a tomorrow and a tomorrow, and what we do today in many ways establishes the foundation of what we can and cannot do on a tomorrow.

I wish our President Godspeed to make his decision. And I am hopeful that this body will engage itself when it returns from this recess.

EXHIBIT 2

U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Sir/Madam: There will be a meeting of the Committee on Armed Services, Room SR-325, the Caucus Room, Russell Senate Office Building, Thursday, July 24, 2003-9:30 a.m.

To consider the following nominations: General Richard B. Myers, USAF, for reappointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reappointment to the grade of general; and General Peter Pace, USMC, for reappointment as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and reappointment to the grade of general.

The nominees will be present.

Chairman WARNER. My last question would relate to Liberia and the decision process now underway by which the President is trying to make an assessment as to the force level and composition that could be put in by the United States to stabilize a very tragic situation in terms of human suffering.

But, on the other hand, in my judgment it is a situation that poses great personal risk to forces such as our forces that could be injected into that very fast-moving and volatile situation there in Monrovia and the greater Liberia.

General MYERS. If you will permit me, Mr. Chairman, let me just describe the situation that we currently have in Liberia. It hasn't changed dramatically in the last 24 hours.

But we have a situation where you have a leader who has got to go who, as we know, is not a good leader, has not done good things for Liberia or, for that matter, has not been—been a lot less than helpful to the countries in the region, and so President Taylor must leave, and that part is being worked.

The other thing is that the two rebel groups, the two major rebel groups, the LURD and the MODEL, it is unclear—in fact, it's, I think the intelligence community would tell us that it is probably not going to happen that you are going to get political leadership out of these rebel groups, that they are not a replacement for Taylor. So it is not clear who is going to step forward in a political sense when the situation settles down in Liberia, to take over the political leadership.

In the meantime, you have a humanitarian situation where food, clean water, medical care is a problem. All the nongovernmental organizations that were in there providing those kinds of capabilities have left because of the security situation. So it is a situation that is, as you have described it, is not a pretty situation. It is not going to give way to any instant fix. Whatever the fix is going to be is going to have to be a long-term fix.

Currently, we have the West African nations surrounding that area, to include Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, others, are looking to put a force in there to help stabilize the situation in Liberia. They, of course, have asked for U.S. support and what the administration is doing right now is trying to determine what is going to be the character of that support.

As a military person, I am concerned, like you, that whatever we do, that we have a very clear mission, we understand the mission we are asked to do, that we have an idea of when the mission is going to be over, in other words, when can we come out of the mission, and that we have sufficient force to deal with the security situation, that we do not go in on a shoestring when we need adequate force.

There are other things we can consider, but those are probably the three main things.

We have looked at options, all sorts of options. There has been no decision made—taken on this. I think I will just leave it there, I think. I think in the next few days we will—

Chairman WARNER. I would also add, for myself, and I draw that from statements made by our President in earlier days, that there be a clear and identifiable strategic interest, security interest, of this country. That to me remains somewhat to be defined in this situation, should the decision be made to go forward.

Can I just draw by way of conclusion your remarks that you concur, that in my judgment, this is not a risk-free operation, if we were to undertake it?

General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, I don't think any operation like this is risk-free. We have three, at least three warring factions, the LURD, the MODEL, the two rebel groups, and the government forces themselves. They are all armed. They are not disciplined troops as we know them. There are a lot of young people fighting in these groups. It is potentially a dangerous situation.

So when you go into it, you need to go into it knowing that. It may be that we can go in terms of support for these ECOWAS forces. And ECOWAS countries have come forward and volunteered forces. They will need some equipping and some training, some of the forces will, before they go in. So it is a little longer-term issue and it is a matter of months, probably not weeks, for some of those forces. Some of them probably can get in there fairly quickly, but small numbers.

And then eventually I believe Kofi Annan up at the U.N. said this will become a U.N. mission at some point. And that all has to be blended into this.

But I will go back to the larger issue. There is a political situation there with the president of a country, a "democracy," and how they deal with President Taylor, where he goes, what this interim government is also important to our security situation. And that is a somewhat cloudy picture today.

Chairman WARNER. General Pace, you had experience in your previous command before becoming Vice Chairman, in terms of Central and South America, do you have any views to add to those of the Chairman, General Pace?

General PACE. Sir, my experience in Somalia is a little more akin to the potential experience in Liberia. And I would echo what General Myers just said, that it is potentially a very dangerous situation. And when we—if we are asked to do something militarily, we need to make sure we do it with the proper numbers of troops and that we be prepared for the eventualities of having to take a military action.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Just on that Liberian issue, would you recommend going in unless Taylor is either gone or on his way out as we arrive?

General MYERS. So far, that has been one of the planning assumptions that we made, that otherwise, you get into a situation that General Pace knows only too well, and it

would define your mission, and the mission would be quite different if Taylor were to remain there than if he were gone. And so one of our planning assumptions is that he will leave, either before or simultaneously with the troops entering, whether they are ECOWAS troops or U.S., or U.S.-supported ECOWAS troops.

EXHIBIT 1

[The first public articulation of the "Powell Doctrine," a most influential mindset throughout the 1990s—and through the current administration, as well]

EXCERPTS FROM COLIN POWELL, "U.S. FORCES: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WINTER 1992

To help with the complex issue of the use of "violent" force, some have turned to a set of principles or a when-to-go-to-war doctrine. "Follow these directions and you can't go wrong." There is, however, no fixed set of rules for the use of military force. To set one up is dangerous. First, it destroys the ambiguity we might want to exist in our enemy's mind regarding our intentions. Unless part of our strategy is to destroy that ambiguity, it is usually helpful to keep it intact. Second, having a fixed set of rules for how you will go to war is like saying you are always going to use the elevator in the event of fire in your apartment building. Surely enough, when the fire comes the elevator will be engulfed in flames or, worse, it will look good when you get in it only to fill with smoke and flames and crash a few minutes later. But do you stay in your apartment and burn to death because your plans call for using the elevator to escape and the elevator is untenable? No, you run to the stairs, an outside fire escape or a window. In short, your plans to escape should be governed by the circumstances of the fire when it starts.

When a "fire" starts that might require committing armed forces, we need to evaluate the circumstances. Relevant questions include: Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?

As an example of this logical process, we can examine the assertions of those who have asked why President Bush did not order our forces on to Baghdad after we had driven the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. We must assume that the political objective of such an order would have been capturing Saddam Hussein. Even if Hussein had waited for us to enter Baghdad, and even if we had been able to capture him, what purpose would it have served? And would serving that purpose have been worth the many more casualties that would have occurred? Would it have been worth the inevitable follow-up: major occupation forces in Iraq for years to come and a very expensive and complex American proconsulship in Baghdad? Fortunately for America, reasonable people at the time thought not. They still do.

When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives. We must not, for example, send military forces into a crisis with an unclear mission they cannot accomplish—such as we did when we sent the U.S. Marines into Lebanon in 1983. We inserted those proud warriors into the

middle of a five-faction civil war complete with terrorists, hostage-takers, and a dozen spies in every camp, and said, "Gentlemen, be a buffer." The results were 241 Marines and Navy personnel and a U.S. withdrawal from the troubled area.

When force is used deftly—in smooth coordination with diplomatic and economic policy—bullets may never have to fly. Pulling triggers should always be toward the end of the plan, and when those triggers are pulled all of the sound analysis I have just described should back them up.

Over the past three years the U.S. armed forces have been used repeatedly to defend our interests and to achieve our political objectives. In Panama a dictator was removed from power. In the Philippines the use of limited force helped save a democracy. In Somalia a daring night raid rescued our embassy. In Liberia we rescue stranded international citizens and protected our embassy. In the Persian Gulf a nation was liberated. Moreover we have used our forces for humanitarian relief operations in Iraq, Somalia, Bangladesh, Russia and Bosnia.

All of these operations had one thing in common: they were successful. There have been no Bay of Pigs, failed desert raids, Beirut bombings or Vietnams. Today American troops around the world are protecting the peace in Europe, the Persian Gulf, Korea, Cambodia, the Sinai and western Sahara. They have brought relief to Americans at home here in Florida, Hawaii and Guam. Ironically enough, the American people are getting a solid return on their defense investment even as from all corners of the nation come shouts for imprudent reductions that would gut their armed forces.

The reason for our success is that in every instance we have carefully matched the use of military force to our political objectives. We owe it to the men and women who go in harm's way to make sure that this is always the case and that their lives are not squandered for unclear purposes.

Military men and women recognize more than most people that not every situation will be crystal clear. We can and do operate in murky, unpredictable circumstances. But we also recognize that military force is not always the right answer. If force is used imprecisely or out of frustration rather than clear analysis, the situation can be made worse.

Decisive means and results are always to be preferred, even if they are not always possible. We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the "surgery" is over and the desired results is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation—more bombs, more men and women, more force. History has not been kind to this approach to war-making. In fact this approach has been tragic—both for the men and women who are called upon to implement it and for the nation. This is not the argue that the use of force is restricted to only those occasions where the victory of American arms will be resounding, swift and overwhelming. It is simply to argue that the use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue. Wars kill people. That is what makes them different from all other forms of human enterprise.

When President Lincoln gave this second inaugural address he compared the Civil War to the scourge of God, visited upon the nation to compensate for what the nation had visited upon its slaves. Lincoln perceived war correctly. It is the scourge of God. We should be very careful how we use it. When

we do use it, we should not be equivocal: we should win and win decisively. If our objective is something short of winning—as in our air strikes into Libya in 1986—we should see our objective clearly, then achieve it swiftly and efficiently.

I am preaching to the choir. Every reasonable American deplores the resort to war. We wish it would never come again. If we felt differently, we could lay no claim whatsoever to being the last, best hope of earth. At the same time I believe every American realizes that in the challenging days ahead, our wishes are not likely to be fulfilled. In those circumstances where we must use military force, we have to be ready, willing and able. Where we should not use force we have to be wise enough to exercise restraint. I have finite faith in the American people's ability to sense when and where we should draw the line.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I rise today to salute a very special person, Joseph C. Chase, of the Senate Appropriations Staff who retired yesterday after 31 days of service in the Senate.

When asked for his wisdom and advice after such a long period of distinguished service, Joseph smiled and easily responded by saying "deal with people as they are and always in a positive way."

Joseph C. Chase was born on March 18, 1948. He was raised in Brandywine in Prince Georges County. He is a graduate of Gwynn Park Senior High School in 1967 and attended Bowie State University from 1968 to 1970 where he majored in physical education and studied to be a teacher.

Joseph comes from a large family. He is the tenth child in a family of 11, nine boys and two girls. In 1988, he donated a kidney to his brother Andrew Chase who worked for the Sergeant at Arms.

He has been married to his lovely wife Peggy Elsey Chase for 29 years. The Chases met in 1969, and were married on July 27, 1974. Peggy has been a teacher for over 30 years. The Chases have two children, a daughter JoVonna, born August 1, 1977, and a son Joseph Jr., born August 21, 1983. They have one granddaughter, Kylah who is 3½.

Joseph's family legacy on Capitol Hill started over 60 years ago with his uncle Lewis Brooks, age 89, who worked on the House side as a doorkeeper. Over the years, more than 20 members of Joseph's family have worked on Capitol Hill. After working as a driver for Master Distributors and Brody Brothers Trucking, Joseph started working for the Senate Sergeant at Arms in July of 1972. He then came to the Senate Appropriations Committee in March of 1973 under the chairmanship of Senator John McClellan. In total, Joseph has worked for the Senate for over 31 years.

Since that time, Joseph has witnessed the growth in size and power as well as a host of other changes on the Senate Appropriations Committee. When Joseph started it consisted of only 30 people—today we have 95. Full committee meetings and conferences were held in the Old Supreme Court Chamber, would last for days and days,

and were usually closed to only members and very few staff.

Joseph is actively involved in his church and community. He is a senior member of Asbury U.M. Church in Brandywine which is pastored by W. Otto Kent. In addition to being a member of the Prince Hall Masons, he is a vice president of the Danville Floral Park Citizens Association.

In closing, I just want to offer a special thank you to Joseph for all his outstanding contributions to the Senate Appropriations Committee over the past 31 years and wish him the best of luck in all his future endeavors.

HONORING DR. BILL MADIA

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize a true leader in the science community and to thank him for his hard work on behalf of Tennessee and the Nation. After 3 years as Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Dr. Bill Madia will be stepping down to return to Battelle headquarters in Columbus, OH as the Executive Vice President for Laboratory Operations. During his tenure in Oak Ridge, Bill has had a tremendous impact not only on the laboratory, but on the Oak Ridge community as well.

Bill Madia came to ORNL to continue the lab's tradition of world-class scientific research dating back to the Manhattan Project, and to advance its work on critical Department of Energy missions. His presence was felt immediately, as he took on an ambitious laboratory revitalization effort which included building new facilities to expand research capabilities, upgrading existing facilities to enhance ongoing research, and tearing down outdated facilities to relieve the lab from unnecessary overhead costs.

The cornerstone of this revitalization effort is the Spallation Neutron Source, a \$1.4 billion dollar user facility that will be the most powerful machine of its kind in the world. Under Bill's watchful eye, the SNS has remained on schedule and on-budget. Alongside the SNS is the site for the new Center for Nanophase Materials Sciences, the first of DOE's cutting-edge nanoscience centers. Down the hill is the upgraded High Flux Isotope Reactor; the combination of these three facilities has ORNL poised to become a premier neutron science laboratory.

Bill's vision for ORNL also includes scientific computing, and with the recent completion of the Center for Computational Sciences, one of the most modern computer laboratories in the world, ORNL is ready to be a major participant in the Department of Energy's high-end supercomputing programs.

On the biological sciences front, the old "Mouse House" is being replaced with a new facility, the Laboratory for Comparative and Functional Genomics. This updated lab will keep ORNL on the cutting edge of genetic

research utilizing the mouse colony to address the need to study gene function and apply that knowledge to curing human diseases. For this research ORNL is participating in a statewide effort known as the Tennessee Mouse Genome Consortium, a group that includes the University of Tennessee/Knoxville, the University of Tennessee/Memphis, Vanderbilt University, the University of Memphis, St. Jude Children's Hospital, Meharry Medical College and East Tennessee State University.

Bill's leadership and commitment have truly made a difference at ORNL and throughout Tennessee, and I thank him for his service. I wish him all the best in his future endeavors.

SENATE ENERGY AND WATER APPROPRIATIONS BILL SECTION 205

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, before we adjourn for the August recess, I'd like to make a brief statement related to Section 205 of the Senate Energy and Water appropriation bill. While we have not yet taken up this bill on the Senate floor, I expect that we will do so very quickly once we return from the August recess. I would therefore like to provide my views on a provision that has received significant attention in New Mexico.

Section 205 is a provision that addresses endangered species issues in the Middle Rio Grande in New Mexico. As a threshold matter, let me state that I support the approach taken in Section 205 to address the ongoing conflict between water use and the ESA in the Middle Rio Grande basin. While there is a remaining issue about the interpretation of one aspect of the language in that section, I have worked with Senator DOMENICI to address that issue and we will follow-up on that matter when the bill comes to the floor.

The conflict in the Middle Rio Grande was exacerbated by a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Section 205 responds to that decision. I think it is an appropriate response because it provides a level of certainty for water users in the basin but leaves intact the requirements and goals of the Endangered Species Act. Let me explain that in more detail.

As many of my colleagues have already heard, the decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys requires the Bureau of Reclamation to reallocate water from the San Juan-Chama project if necessary to meet the requirements of the Endangered Species Act. What is remarkable about this decision—which needs to be redressed in my view—is that the San Juan-Chama project water is not native to the Rio Grande basin. It is water that originates in the San Juan River basin, and is brought over as a supplemental water supply for use in the Rio Grande basin. Use of this water—quite simply—has not caused the decline of the Rio Grande silvery