

skewed our national security priorities. Osama bin Laden is still at large. Despite the recent arrests in Pakistan, other key al Qaeda operatives are at large. Dramatic attacks, like the one in Bali, Indonesia, earlier this year, demonstrate that the international terrorist network is alive and well.

By elevating the threat of Iraq to the most dangerous threat to American security today, the Bush administration has helped create the impression that Iraq possesses the ability somehow of "blowing the United States off the face of the Earth." In fact, while Iraq certainly presents a threat to its neighbors, and, in a worst case scenario, could act to facilitate a terrible terrorist attack on this country, it does not possess nuclear weapons, which are the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction, and, unlike North Korea or Iran, is subject to an international inspections regime ongoing which can prevent it from making progress toward that goal.

In fact, it is instructive to remember that of the three countries identified as the "axis of evil" in the President's 2002 State of the Union address, Iraq is the country farthest away from acquiring such weapons.

So, far from a simple "us versus them" world that the Bush administration has painted, America faces a national security challenge of enormous complexity. We must simultaneously cope with several separate and potentially grave threats, from Iraq to North Korea and the continuing threat of international terrorist networks. Without progress on nuclear nonproliferation, this list could grow quickly.

At the same time, we remain committed to an ongoing military presence in the states of the former Yugoslavia and to the elusive process of a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lack of progress in both these areas could set back American security interests and lead to an escalation in violence and terrorism. In South Asia, two nuclear countries are poised army-to-army along a fragile border. And the list goes on. Eliminating Saddam Hussein will not address these very real problems.

So, finally, where do we go from here? We find ourselves at a crossroads. There is little daylight left. It is not a question of whether or not we can defeat Saddam Hussein militarily. We can. Rather, it is a question of the long-term risks to our security by proceeding in a manner that alienates our friends, creates opportunities for our foes, weakens the rule of law and undermines America's moral authority.

If the threat can be met in other ways, then why would we not pursue those options to their fullest? Some have argued that it is too late, that the cost of the huge U.S. deployments overseas demand that these troops not be brought home without seeing military action.

I disagree. The stakes are too high for that kind of thinking. The costs,

both human and financial, of deploying U.S. troops in the region, are insignificant compared to the costs of full U.S. military intervention and reconstruction of post-war Iraq.

We should not use our troop deployments as an excuse to act under an artificial timetable. Those deployments have played a role in achieving the more muscular inspections that we have seen in recent months.

We can always choose to take military action, but we cannot put the genie back in the bottle once we go down that road. Last Friday, Mr. ElBaradei, the Director of the IAEA, reported that there was no evidence of resumed nuclear activities in Iraq. He showed that the United States had unwittingly supplied the UN with forged documents to try and support our claim that Iraq had revived its nuclear weapons program.

The chief UN weapons inspector, Dr. Blix, who Secretary of State Powell has praised in the past as man of integrity and professionalism, Blix reported that Iraq had made progress toward disarmament and stated that the inspection process could be completed in a matter of months.

The use of force is a powerful and very important tool of foreign policy, but one that should generally be used as a last resort, when all other options fail. The heightened pressure the Bush administration has brought to bear on Iraq has focused world attention on Baghdad and reaped modest, but important, results with respect to Iraqi disarmament. I think most of the world believes that enforced UN inspections still have the potential to bring us to our primary goal, the disarmament of Iraq.

I believe the United States should give this process more time, both to further the goal of disarmament and to build broader international support for military action, should that become necessary to enforce the resolutions.

Mr. Speaker, in conclusion, I believe that the overall approach this administration has taken is taking us in a dangerous direction. I believe our moral standing, our greatest source of strength, has been diminished. We cannot build a more democratic and a more open world on the administration's policies of preventative war, disdain for international law and neglect of international cooperation.

We have our work cut out for us. We must fight for policies that help rebuild America's moral authority in world affairs. We must articulate a credible alternative foreign policy doctrine that is not based on American exclusionism, but on America's stake as a leading partner in a diverse international community.

We are a strong and rich country. We experienced a terrible tragedy on September 11, 2001, but we do not have to act out of fear. Our strongest weapon against hatred and extremism are our high ideals, our democratic example founded on the rule of law. We cannot,

we must not, allow this administration in the name of those ideals to pursue policies that are not worthy of our Nation's great history.

I yield the remainder of my time to the gentleman from North Carolina.

#### DEALING WITH A DEADLY CHALLENGE ON IRAQ

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and congratulate him on a very fine and thoughtful statement.

Mr. Speaker, there is a good possibility that our country will be at war in Iraq before the month is out. The President held out little hope for any alternative approach to disarming Iraq at his press conference last Thursday. Yet a majority of the American people continue to urge for more time for inspections while we are facing something close to a diplomatic meltdown with major allies. A failure to secure allied support will have major consequences for every American. Our citizens alone will shoulder the financial burden of this war and its aftermath. Our troops will need to be kept indefinitely in post-war Iraq, our country alone as an occupying force will be the target of hatred, resentment and hostility from many in the Arab world, and America will risk losing our standing among the world's democracies as one who leads by moral suasion and example as well as by military might.

Pollsters here at home say they have rarely seen an issue where the public's reaction is more conditional or ambivalent. Tonight I want to suggest this is because the Bush administration has not answered basic questions about this war and has backed us into a situation where we seem to be choosing between equally unsatisfactory ways of dealing with what most agree is a deadly challenge.

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The distinguished historian William Leuchtenburg citing Thomas Jefferson's maxim that "great innovation should not be forced on slender majorities," recently contrasted George W. Bush's unilateralism to the behavior of previous wartime Presidents and found him "unique in his defiance of so much international and domestic opinion."

Many of our constituents believe that the full range and intensity of public opinion has not been visible or audible in Congress. One reason is that, by our vote of October 10 which gave the President an open-ended authorization for the use of force, this institution forfeited its coordinate decision-making role. Mr. Speaker, an up or down vote on a resolution authorizing force is at best a blunt instrument for checking the executive's constitutional dominance of foreign and military policy; but by granting unchecked authority months in advance, we made that instrument blunter yet.

Still, I believe the questions and the challenges to the President's approach

emanating from the Congress, and from Democratic Members in particular, have been more persistent and more consistent than most media accounts have acknowledged. It is true, Democrats were divided on final passage of the October resolution. And, in fact, this is not an issue on which a stance of absolute opposition is called for. We all understand Saddam Hussein to be a brutal dictator who is implacably hostile to our country and what we stand for. There is near unanimity in this body and in the international community that whatever capacity he has to make or use weapons of mass destruction must be ended.

But critical questions remain regarding alternative means to this end. Many Members of this body have raised these questions with increasing intensity in recent weeks; and unfortunately, the Bush administration has rarely provided satisfactory answers. What accounting do we have for the costs and risks of a military invasion? How are we to secure and maintain the support and engagement of our allies? Can Iraq be disarmed by means that do not divert us from or otherwise compromise equally or more urgent antiterrorist and diplomatic objectives? And do we have a credible plan for rebuilding and governing postwar Iraq, and have we secured the necessary international cooperation to ensure that this does not become a perceived U.S. occupation?

Administration officials, for example, have persistently refused to put a price tag on a U.S. invasion which, unlike the Gulf War, would have almost no financial backing from allies. The President's budget omits any reference to an Iraq war. With deficits for 2003 and 2004 already predicted to break historic records and \$2 trillion slated to be added to the national debt by 2008, the addition of \$80 billion to \$200 billion in war costs could not come as welcome news. But it is an insult to this body and to the American people to submit a budget that absolutely fails to give an honest accounting, even within broad limits, of what those costs would be.

Daily dispatches from Korea leave little doubt that North Korea is taking advantage of our preoccupation with Iraq to dangerously ratchet up its nuclear program, and that the administration's diplomacy has not been up to this challenge.

And now we learn that the Bush administration, which, truth to tell, has never had its heart in Middle East peace-making, has rebuffed its so-called quartet partners, the European allies, Russia, and the United Nations, and insisted on yet another postponement in publishing the long-anticipated "road map" to an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Why? Because of the crisis in Iraq. President Bush in December demanded that release of the timetable for reciprocal steps and negotiations be delayed until after the Israeli elections. Now he is insisting

again that the effort be delayed, this time until after we deal with Iraq, seemingly thinking that victory in Iraq will be the key to solving this and most other problems in the Middle East.

As the New York Times editorialized last Sunday, "The Bush administration has not been willing to risk any political capital in attempting to resolve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, but now the President is theorizing that invading Iraq will do the trick."

The fact is that the festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Bush administrations's failure to do anything about it represent an enormous obstacle to enlisting the support we need to achieve our objectives in the region, including the war on terrorism. That is certainly the way the Europeans see it; and the President's rebuff has further poisoned the atmosphere, even as the administration struggles to gain allied support for military action against Iraq. Among the angriest allies reportedly is Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair, who for months has pleaded with President Bush to become more involved in Israeli-Palestinian peace-making.

The administration's torpedoing of the Quartet initiative is also ill advised and ill timed with respect to Palestinian efforts at reform. It comes precisely at the time that President Arafat, under considerable pressure, has nominated Mahmoud Abbas, otherwise known as Abu Mazen, for the new position of Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority. Abu Mazen, with whom the gentleman from Florida (Mr. DAVIS) and I had a cordial and useful visit in Ramallah in December, has been an outspoken critic of the militarization of the Palestinian uprising. How successful his appointment proves in reforming Palestinian governance will depend, among other things, on how much real authority he and his position are given. But President Bush could hardly have picked a more inauspicious time to throw cold water on the plans to get back to negotiations.

"There was a lot of dismay when the road map was put off before, and the dismay right now is even worse," one European diplomat told a New York Times reporter. "Without hope, the power of extremists will only grow," added another.

Such, Mr. Speaker, are the costs of allowing Iraq to trump everything else on our antiterrorist and diplomatic agenda.

Mr. Speaker, the world welcomed the President's decision last fall to take the Iraq matter to the United Nations and, apparently, to give more extensive inspections and the supervised destruction of weapons a chance to work. But his rhetoric since that time has led many to believe that he has always regarded the inspections as foreordained to failure and war as the only recourse. Suspicions have deepened as administration statements about links be-

tween Iraq and al Qaeda have become less and less measured. Such statements have helped persuade some 42 percent of the American public that Saddam Hussein was personally responsible for the 9-11 World Trade Center attacks. But prospective allies examining the rationale for war have understandably been less impressed.

Inspections, of course, are a two-way street. They will never work without Iraq's willing cooperation; and that cooperation, as Mr. Blix and Mr. El Baradei have made clear, has been far from satisfactory. No matter how numerous or how skilled the inspectors are, they cannot find what amounts to needles in haystacks without honest and complete information regarding the weapons and the material which the Iraqis claim to have destroyed and the whereabouts of any remaining stockpiles.

Still, it does matter how we reach the conclusion that Iraq has effectively continued its defiance that the inspections have failed, and that war is the only remaining option. In fact, the report of the inspectors at the United Nations last Friday significantly undermined the American position, arguing that progress has, in fact, been made and discounting the dangers of any Iraqi nuclear program.

It is essential that the world know and face the fact, as the President said last Saturday, that Iraq is still violating the demands of the United Nations by refusing to disarm. But we undermine our own credibility when we scoff at the destruction of a stockpile of Al Samoud missiles as a matter of no consequence, or insist on a U.N. resolution with so short a time frame as to make it seem merely a pretext for war.

In fact, the U.N. inspectors themselves have specified the tasks remaining before them, and there is every reason to support the systematic pursuit of those objectives within a tight, but feasible, time frame. In the meantime, we must resist the notion that the alternatives confronting us are either to invade in the next few days or to appear to "back down" in a humiliating and dangerous fashion.

It is true that the massing of 235,000 troops has created a momentum of its own, and they cannot stay in place indefinitely. But the risks and the costs of an invasion undertaken in the face of major allied opposition remain, and we need to give full consideration to options that avoid either leaving Iraq's weapons in place or inexorably marching to war.

What might those options be? Michael Walzer has suggested intensifying what he calls the "little war" in which we are already engaged and challenging the French and the Germans and the Russians to become part of the solution. This could include extension of no-fly zones to cover the entire country, maintaining an embargo on strategic and dual-use materials,

and intensifying the program of inspections and weapons destruction under international control.

If such a program succeeded in destroying or neutralizing Iraq's weapons capability, the U.S. and the U.N. could credibly declare their mission accomplished, and most of the troops could return home, having created the military pressure that helped prompt compliance. I realize that at present, prospects for such an outcome appear to be fading. But when we are in an untenable position, contemplating outcomes that are equally unacceptable, we have an obligation to press in new directions.

Mr. Speaker, whatever course our President and our country take, we will give our men and women in uniform our full support, and I am confident that a unified Congress will provide whatever resources they need to succeed. I have been moved by the farewell ceremonies for National Guard units in my own district, and I have the utmost respect for the service and sacrifice that these men and women exemplify. The debates we have over foreign and military policy do not change that in the least. In fact, we owe them, and all of our citizens, this debate, so that we do not choose our Nation's course either impulsively or by default, but with due consideration of our Nation's interests and values, and consideration of how our vast power can be a force for what is just and right in the world. May God grant us wisdom and courage for the facing of these days.

#### LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. NADLER (at the request of Ms. PELOSI) for today on account of official business in the district.

Mr. SNYDER (at the request of Ms. PELOSI) for today and the balance of the week on account of medical reasons.

Mr. JOHNSON of Illinois (at the request of Mr. DELAY) for today and the balance of the week on account of injuries suffered in a car accident and doctor's orders to stay in the district.

#### SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

The following Members (at the request of Mr. VAN HOLLEN) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:

Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. WOOLSEY, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. CUMMINGS, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. PALLONE, for 5 minutes, today.

Ms. NORTON, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. BLUMENAUER, for 5 minutes, today.

The following Members (at the request of Mr. KLINE) to revise and ex-

tend their remarks and include extraneous material:

Mr. DELAY, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana, for 5 minutes, today, March 12 and 13.

Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania, for 5 minutes, today.

Mrs. BIGGERT, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. WOLF, for 5 minutes, March 12 and 13.

Mr. COX, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. JONES of North Carolina, for 5 minutes, March 13.

(The following Members (at their own request) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. McDERMOTT, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ACEVEDO-VILÁ, for 5 minutes, today.

#### ADJOURNMENT

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 10 o'clock and 57 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, March 12, 2003, at 11 a.m.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 8 of rule XII, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1028. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Thiophanate Methyl; Pesticide Tolerance for Emergency Exemptions [OPP-2002-0355; FRL-7285-9] received February 3, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

1029. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Cyprodinil; Pesticide Tolerance [OPP-2002-0344; FRL-7289-7] received February 3, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

1030. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — 6-Benzyladenine; Temporary Exemption From the Requirement of a Tolerance [OPP-2002-0308; FRL-7287-2] received February 3, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

1031. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Oxadiazon; Tolerance Revocations [OPP-2002-0086; FRL-7187-3] received January 22, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

1032. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — 4-(Dichloroacetyl)-1-Oxa-4-Azaspiro [4.5] Decane; Pesticide Import Tolerance [OPP-2002-0245; FRL-7199-4] received January 22, 2003, pursuant to 5

U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

1033. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Pesticides; Tolerance Exemptions for Polymers [OPP-2003-0039; FRL-7291-7] received February 20, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

1034. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Pelargonic Acid (Nonanoic Acid); Exemption from the Requirement of a Pesticide Tolerance [OPP-2002-273; FRL-7278-7] received February 20, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

1035. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Chemical Recovery Combustion Sources at Kraft, Soda, Sulfite, and Stand-Alone Semicheical Pulp Mills [OAR-2002-0045; AD-FRL-7446-6] (RIN: 2060-AK53) received February 13, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

1036. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; New Jersey; Motor Vehicle Enhanced Inspection and Maintenance Program [Region II Docket No. NJ55-248, FRL-7441-4] received February 13, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

1037. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Approval and Promulgation of State Plans For Designated Facilities and Pollutants: New Hampshire; Plan for Controlling MWC Emissions From Existing Municipal Waste Combustors [NH-51-7175a; FRL-7447-7] received February 3, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

1038. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Maryland; Amendments to Volatile Organic Compound Requirements From Specific Processes [MD129/130-3089a; FRL-7437-7] received February 3, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

1039. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Revisions to the California State Implementation Plan, Santa Barbara County Air Pollution Control District and Yolo-Solano Air Quality Control District [CA 271-0374a; FRL-7427-8] received January 22, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

1040. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Listing of Substitutes for Ozone-Depleting Substances [FRL-7443-4] (RIN: 2060-AG12) received January 22, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

1041. A letter from the Acting Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Ohio: Final Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Management Program Revision [FRL-7442-8] received January 22, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.