FACTORS TO CONSIDER CONCERNING FOREIGN POLICY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. LEACH) is recognized for the balance of the time of approximately 30 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, 26 months after 9/11 and 7 months after the conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq, America is in a strategic pickle and Americans are in a judgmental quandary. The issue of our engagement in Iraq demands that we, as a society, probe the question of the limits of the superpower's power and the possible anomaly that there are severe liabilities to power, particularly for a superpower. Does, for instance, overwhelming military might protect us from terrorism or, if used unwisely, increase our vulnerability to terrorism? Likewise, does overwhelming economic power ensure loyalty or buy friendship from the countries most indebted to the United States? In other words, can military and economic might ever become a substitute for sensible and sensitive foreign policy? And given the dilemma of Iraq, could it, indeed, be that the most important ''multibillion'' problem America faces is not deficits measured in dollars, fiscal, or trade, but the antagonism of billions of people around the world who object to our current foreign policy?

Here let me say that I strongly believe the need for clarification of thought as it applies to policy, and anyone who wishes to review the reasoning I have applied to the Iraq issue, ranging from a floor explanation of a ''no'' vote on the congressional resolution authorizing war last year to calls for internationalizing the civil governance in Iraq several months ago, to a vote in favor of generosity in reconstruction efforts several weeks ago, can find explanatory statements on my congressional Web site.

What I would like to do today is summarize the dilemma we face and make the following points about where we might go from here.

Point number 1: there are no certitudes. Anyone who was not conflicted on the original decision to intervene or who does not see a downside to all courses of action today is not approaching the problem with an open mind. In an era of anger, of divisions in the world based on economics, on color of skin, on ethnicity, on religious belief, on happenstance of family and place of birth; in a world made smaller by technological revolutions in communications and transportation, those who have causes, good or bad, have possibilities of being heard and felt around the globe that never existed before. Great leaders like Gandhi and Martin Luther King appealed to the higher angels of our nature and achieved revolutionary change with nonviolence. Mendacious leaders like Hitler, Saddam Hussein, and Osama bin Laden have sought to impose their wills on others through appeals to hate and reliance on increasingly wanton instruments of oppression.

As the world's only superpower, the U.S. has no choice but to display firmness of purpose and resolve in deterring inhumane breaches of order. Yet, firmness and resolve must be matched by compassionate understanding of the reasons people of the world lash out. We have the world's greatest Armed Forces. But these forces cannot successfully be deployed to counter international misconduct if we do not also seek to undercut the causes of such conduct.

Reviewing the causes of World War I, historians quickly concluded that there was not enough flexibility in the European alliance system, and that this rigidity allowed a rather minor event, the assassination of an Austrian archduke, to precipitate a cataclysmic war. With this example in mind, political leaders in the 1930s erred on the side of irresolution, which led them to Munich and the partition of Czechoslovakia. Too much inflexibility caused one war; too little spine led to an even greater one.

The problem today is not whether we should meet problems with firmness or compassion. We often need both. The problem is determining whether and how to respond with firmness and when and how to express compassion. As in all human conduct, the challenge is wisdom.

Point number 2: we must listen as well as assert. Four decades ago, the British author Lawrence Durrell wrote a series of novels called the ''Alexandria Quartet'' in which he describes a set of events in Alexandria, Egypt preceding World War II. An experiment in the relativity of human perception, each of the four books views the same events through the eyes of a different character. While the events described are the same in each book, the stories as seen through the lens of each of the participants are surprisingly different. The reader comes to the realization that a broad understanding about events as they transpire can only be grasped by synthesizing the different perceptions of various protagonists.

To understand the Middle East today, we need to listen to everyone's story.

Point number 3: to shape or to deter opponents' actions, we need to understand how they think.

American policymakers, at their best, reason in a pragmatic, future-oriented manner. In much of the rest of the world, on the other hand, people reason by historical analogy. Events dating centuries back, especially umbrages, dominate thinking about today. People in the Middle East, as in the Balkans, are oriented to the past and are driven by values and ideas of honor of a very different shape and emphasis than those we derive from American culture. When we assume the Iraqi populace should accept a prolonged American presence because of our goodwill and desire to establish a Western-style democracy, Muslims see our presence as compounding grievances originating in the Crusades and, in some ways, even earlier Biblical times.

Point number 4: no country can go it alone for long and expect to be respected as an international leader.

Doctrines of American exceptionalism, the precept that we should not be bound by legal or procedural norms that bind others, which are now fashionable in certain Washington ideological circles, have led to intervention in Iraq without full U.N. sanction. Ironically, prior to 9/11, these same notions led to rejection of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and of upgraded verification provisions for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, agreements that would have stood in the way of weapons of mass destruction production in Iraq and provided a legal basis for possible armed intervention if violations occurred. The world is crying out for leadership in restraining weapons development. We are not providing it because Washington policymakers prefer that restraint on others not apply to ourselves.

Point number 5: be cautious of articulating policy doctrines.

Given the events of 9/11, consideration of preemption must continuously be on the table in Washington, but there is a distinction between needing to consider an action and setting forth a definitive doctrine. Here Teddy Roosevelt may have had the right adage: ''speak softly and carry a big stick.'' Any American President, Democratic or Republican, socialist, liberal, conservative, or libertarian, would not think more than a millisecond before ordering the Marines to intervention if he or she were presented information that on some island, somewhere, a terrorist group had gotten control of a weapon of mass destruction which it was prepared to explode or infilter in an American city. The problem is that raising a commonsense concern to the order of a doctrine legitimizes such a doctrine for others: China, India, Russia, North Korea, for example, and undercuts the premises of much of post-World War II international law.

Complicating the issue is the psychological assumption that once the leader articulates a doctrine, especially one that bears his name, it is difficult to advance a policy in a given circumstance which is not consistent with the doctrine. Not to do so would provide critics a chance to suggest that a doctrine like preemption is ethereal, lacking meatiness ness, unless it is made real.

□ 1915

Any leader who outlines such a doctrine but chooses not to intervene would be open to charges of lightness or worse. Hence, the simple articulation of a doctrine can have the effect of biasing decision-making in complicated circumstances. The exception

might be a doctrine of quietude; statesmanship often should be measured by what is not, rather than what is, said.

Point number six. When Washington policymakers speak on foreign policy, they must understand that their audience is more than one party's political base. While Saddam Hussein is widely perceived to be the worst sort of tyrant, many people around the world view us as bullies for attacking a sovereign country without prior armed provocation. That is why it is so critical that a case for intervention should be based in concern for the well-being of others as well as the United States' national interest. For foreign policy to be effective, it must be clearly articulated and convincing in those parts of the world most affected by it.

Point number seven. We must rededicate ourselves to building up an intelligence capacity that better understands the Middle East and Islamic world and is less susceptible to being politicized. Our inability to understand Islamic culture resulted in the greatest intelligence failure of our era. It is, however, not the sole intelligence failure. In one of the greatest judgmental errors of our time, we appear to have attempted to combat the ideological posturing of others by slanting our own intelligence. Based on what is known today, policymakers not only erred in assessing Saddam Hussein's WMD capacities but put too much faith in a narrow cadre of ideologues who suggested that the U.S. would be welcomed as a liberating, rather than conquering or worse yet, colonizing, force in Iraq. Estimates of the cost of war, the ramifications of involvement, of the expected reaction of the population, and of the likelihood of foreign support were dead wrong.

Point number eight. It is the responsibility of public officials to ensure that no American soldier is deployed as a defenseless magnet for terrorist attack or in such a way as to incite foreign radicals to commit terrorist acts in America itself. American soldiers have been trained to withstand the heat of battle in defense of America and American values. For 2¼ centuries, no country has been more effectively or more courageously served by a citizen soldiery than the United States. In Iraq, our Armed Forces could not have performed more professionally or valiantly than in the initial engagement.

But the difference between service in combat and service in occupation of a foreign land, especially in Islamic society, is profound. In Iraq, which is fast becoming for us much like Algeria was for the French in 1950s, our men and women in uniform are increasingly facing hit-and-run terrorist assaults, which are much more difficult to defend against than traditional military confrontations. The challenge of policymakers has recognized that there is a distinction between three endeavors: warfare, reconstruction, and occupation. Our Armed Forces are trained to prevail in the first, they can be helped on the second, but in the Islamic world no outside power is ever going to be well received as an occupying force. Hence, strategies that emphasize the first two endeavors and do not lead to a long-term reliance on the third should be the goal of the U.S. policymakers today.

Point number nine. Responses to terrorism often lead to escalating action-reaction cycles. When our armed services become subject to terrorist assault, and the perpetrators disappear into their neighborhoods, we, like Israel, will inevitably be tempted to retaliate in ways that may intensify, rather than restrain, future violence. Calls will be made not only to use air power in urban areas but to double or triple troop deployments perhaps without adequate assessments of what such troops would be assigned to do. In conventional warfare, the case for overwhelming superiority, sometimes referred to as the Powell Doctrine, is compelling. In a terrorist setting, as in modernist design, less can often be more. There may be cases where deploying a large force to combat terrorism is appropriate, there may also be cases, and I believe Iraq is one, where additional soldiers simply become additional targets; and a different mix of strategies is both preferable and more effective.

Point number ten. To defend against terrorism, especially when it is fueled by an explosive mix of religious and national sentiment requires frank acknowledgment of the nature and depth of the problem. For months, the administration has suggested that the problem in Iraq is limited to 5,000 dissidents. This is a five-digit miscalculation. At least half the Muslim world, over 500 million people, is outraged by the U.S. Government's attitudes and action. Long-simmering resentment of American policies in Muslim countries like Indonesia as in recent months metastasized into hatred. And in Europe, including what the Defense Department refers to as the ''new Europe'' as well as in south and east Asia, respect for American policy is in steep decline.

In the Vietnam War, we gave a great deal of attention to the notion of winning the hearts and minds of the people. We did not succeed in convincing the Vietnamese or world opinion of our good intentions despite the horrendous tactics of the Viet Cong in the communist north. Today, Americans must understand that in the battle for the minds of men, particularly in the Muslim world, we are doing less well than even the most difficult days of the Vietnam War.

In this context, we would be well advised to remember America's original revolutionary commitment to decent respect for the monies of mankind.

Point number eleven. While for the time being security in Iraq must remain the responsibility of U.S. military commanders in the field, we would be wise to put an international face on civil governance in the country and ask Secretary General Kofi Annan to immediately appoint a top civilian administrator to whom Ambassador Bremer and his staff would report. Transfer of interim civil authority to the U.N. would provide greater legitimacy to the formation of a new Iraqi government and encourage other countries to help with economic reconstruction and security requirements.

We should also work to transfer as soon as practicable responsibility for internal security to troops of other nations of the Iraqis themselves. Transferring the police function to others is a way to build up Iraq's own postwar internal security infrastructure and make evident that the U.S. does not desire long-term control.

Point number twelve. We should also move forthwith to transfer more political control to the Iraqi Governing Council and press for immediate elections and constitution-writing. Some argue that stability is more likely to be achieved with a long-term U.S. occupation. I believe the reverse is true. The longer we are in Iraq, the greater the instability there and the greater the likelihood that terrorism will spread to other countries, including the United States.

Point number thirteen. America cannot cut and run politically, economically, or militarily; but we would be wise to announce a timetable for troop withdrawal by the end of next year at the latest. Some experts in and out of government believe that American troops should stay in and control Iraq at least as long as we did in Japan and Germany after World War II. Such a timetable, a minimum of 5 years, is out of sync with the times and the mood of the Islamic world.

The world is more impatient today and Muslims in particular are more history-sensitive than ever before. While we assume the Iraqi populace accepts the American presence because of our goodwill, the Muslim world sees our force as the compounding of grievances dating back to the Crusades and more recently to the American support of Israel. The imagery Al Jazeera projects of Baghdad is that of another West Bank. In this context American commitments to ''slog on'' interminably play into the hands of extremists. All extremists have to do is continue blowing up a vehicle or two every day, thereby eliciting a military action that we might view as reasonable but the Islamic world is likely to see as heavy handed, angering the populace and emboldening further dissent.

The longer we stay, the greater the opportunity for al Qaeda and radical Baath Party supporters to claim that the war is continuing and that they are prevailing. To prevent this, and to keep control of events, we would be wise to announce a withdrawal timetable that we, not they, control. Setting such a timetable has the effect of asserting that the war itself is over and we prevailed and that Iraqis cannot dither in establishing a legitimate elected government.

A drawn out occupation plays into the hands of radicals. It gives them a rallying cry to keep up resistance in Iraq and expand terrorist assaults around the world. It gives them the chance to suggest that America is bent on continuing the crusades and, when we eventually withdraw, the prospect of claiming that they won the war. On the other hand, if we set a firm schedule for drawing down our troops, we define the war as being over in its 3rd week, not its 6th year. An announced timetable can later be modified to allow, for instance, a small force to remain briefly in northern Iraq to maintain sovereign cohesion. Timetables can also be abbreviated. But the point is that they underscore our reluctance to become an imperial power and, perhaps more importantly, our determination to control our own destiny.

Point number fourteen. Beware of partisan critiques. Some partisans are implying today ill motives in Presidential leadership and have suggested that American actions are constitutionally frail. Such criticisms miss the mark. This President is sincerely committed to his national security responsibilities, and his policies have received constitutional endorsement from the Congress. Other partisans are taking what some might perceive as an oxymoronic, liberal, neohawk perspective. They suggest the problem is the administration has not committed sufficient troops and sufficient time to do what we want to do in Iraq, whatever that might be.

The assumption is that Iraq will be a much better place if we aggressively occupy the country for prolonged periods of time. This assumption deserves review from two perspectives: the situation within and the political environment outside Iraq. From the first, the question has to be raised whether an occupying force has the effect of an over-stayed house guest: understandable for a short period, increasingly irritable with each passing day. In a domestic setting, house guests can at some point be pointed to the door. In Iraq, many have concluded that the only effective way of getting the uninvited to leave is to submit young soldiers to terrorist strikes and their local supporters to anarchist attacks.

A response to this dilemma cannot be developed in the simple linguistic context of resolving to stay the course, particularly when no clear course has been laid out. The language of intervention was couched in terms of concern for weapons of mass destruction and the need to retaliate against the forces that precipitated the events of 9/11. Postmortem analysis of these rationalizations put our actions in a questionable light. On the other hand, we must proceed from where we are not, where we thought we would have been. Wisdom might indicate that the emphasis be placed on, A, the humanitarian advantage to Iraqis in the region of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein; B, U.S. assistance and rebuilding Iraq's social infrastructure and help in bringing the country back into the mainstream of international politics and country; and, C, the laying of the groundwork for new political institutions.

None of these three emphases necessitates 5 to 10 years of occupation. Indeed, the longer we are there, the more likely a Saddam-type demagogue, albeit probably less secular, will emerge. It is true that the development of new civil institutions will take time, but it is also the case that the U.S. role in shepherding their development can be quickened. The judgment call we must make is whether U.S. leadership for change should be swift or slow paced. My sense is that swift actions are more likely to lead to Iraq-centric responsibility-taking. The U.S. will inevitably be dissatisfied with postwar circumstances in Iraq; but the longer the conflict continues, the more unstable the aftermath. Iraq will become more splintered and the U.S. more vulnerable to hateful reaction to others.

Another approach might be to indicate that we would expect to take most of our troops from Iraq within 6 months of Saddam Hussein's capture or death. Such a pronouncement would underscore that our problem is with his dictatorial regime, not with the Iraqi people or their religious faith. It might also provide incentive for the populace to help in apprehending their former head of state.

Point number fifteen. It is critical to the security of our troops as well as Iraqi security that we create an Iraqi police force as soon as possible. Responsibility for domestic security is an internal, not external, matter. We cannot be their policemen; and if we persist in trying, we will make it harder for stability to be established and maintained. Students of international politics have for the past generation questioned the capacity and moral authority of any country to be policemen for the world. But little academic attention has been devoted to the challenge of being policemen within a country after the conclusion of conflict. We have little experience with such responsibility. In Japan, MacArthur relied on indigenous Japanese police. In post-Hitler Germany, we quickly reconstituted a German constabulary at most levels.

Common sense would indicate that trying to police a country the size of France with soldiers unfamiliar with the language and culture of the society, untrained in the art of policing and unwelcome and resented in critical cities and towns must be a nearly impossible task.

□ 1930

Hence, the need to expedite the training of an indigenous Iraqi police force.

Point number sixteen. We should announce that we have no intention of establishing permanent military bases in Iraq.

Some Washington policymakers want such bases but they would be a political burden for any new government in Baghdad and a constant struggle for the U.S. to defend. Defense of American bases in Iraq from terrorism in the 21st Century is likely to be far more difficult than the challenge we first saw of maintaining United State sovereignty over the Panama Canal in the 20th Century.

The reason the Department of Defense concluded in the Carter Administration that it was wise to transfer control over the Panama Canal to the Panamanians was the estimation that the canal could be defended against traditional aggression but not sabotage or acts of terrorism. It seemed wiser to respect nationalist sentiment and provide for gradual transfer of the canal to local control than to insist in quasi-colonial assertions of power.

There are many reasons which Europeans are so smugly opposed to our policy in Iraq. One is historic experience to colonialism. The French were chased out of Algeria, the Russians, and earlier the British, out of Afghanistan. U.S. intervention in Iraq is seen in Europe is not too dissimilar to the British and French effort to reestablish control over the Suez Canal in 1956. It is noteworthy that the Islamic world deeply appreciated President Eisenhower's refusal to back the British and French intervention in Egypt at that time.

Europeans now think the shoe is on the other foot. We appear insensitive to history. In particular, those who call for multiyear occupation based on the World War II model seem not to comprehend that the Japanese understood that they attacked us and the Germans understood that our intervention was precipitated by their aggression. Iraqis, on the other hand, look at us as the aggressors, as imposers of alien values. They feel our presence is only justified at their behest.

Of all forms of government, successful occupation depends on consent of the governed. If it is lacking, problems are inevitable, particularly when and if foreign presence is of a military nature.

Point number seventeen. Credit will remain the dominant economic issue until Iraq's foreign debt is reduced or cancelled.

Neither significant private nor large-scale public credit will be made available to Iraqis until the burden of old debt is lifted. Accordingly, we should press vigorously for Saddam-era debt, which went largely to build palaces for Saddam's family and to buy weapons of aggression to be written off. We should also press to establish community-centered banks and credit unions where micro-credit can be offered.

Oil wealth has its advantages only if revenues are used for the benefit of society rather than political insiders. Increasing petroleum production is not enough. Oil is not a labor-intensive industry. Jobs matter and Iraq needs bankers and small business entrepreneurs far more than oil barrens. We

have no choice except to help rebuild Iraq's oil infrastructure, but we must make clear that we have no intention of controlling the country's oil reserves. The natural resource of Iraq must be treated as the patrimony of the Iraqi people.

Point number 18: Economic assistance to Iraq should be front-loaded and generous.

War has been a constant of history, but the concept of reconstruction is relatively new. The 20th century gave us two vastly different models. At the end of World War I, the victors imposed retributive terms on Germany, which so angered German society that it turned to fascism. World War II was the result.

The allies took a different approach at the end of World War II. Generosity was the watchword. The Marshall Plan was adopted to rebuild Europe and General MacArthur directed the reform and modernization of Japan. Model democracies emerged. The world was made more secure.

The economic plan for Iraq should be two-prong, debt forgiveness coupled with institution building. A better world is more likely to emerge if the American agenda places its emphasis on construction rather than destruction.

Here a note about the other reconstruction model in American history is relevant. With his call for malice toward none in his second inaugural address, Lincoln set the most conciliatory tone in the history of war. His successor once removed, U.S. Grant, proved to be a more proficient soldier than President and countenanced carpetbagging conflicts of interest.

Our government today would be well-advised to recognize that neither history, nor the American public, approves of war or postwar profiteering. Great care has to be taken to ensure transparency and integrity in government contracts. And common sense would indicate that the more Iraqis are involved in rebuilding their own society, the more lasting such efforts are likely would be to be.

Point number 19: Terrorism effects world economics as well as politics.

Markets depend on confidence and nothing undercuts confidence more than anarchist acts. Policies designed to deter terrorism can be counterproductive. International disapproval of our actions may jeopardize our economy and diminish the credibility of our political leadership in the world. Increased terrorism could well have the dual effect of precipitating new U.S. military engagements and, ironically, strengthening isolationist sentiment which in turn could degenerate into a disastrous spiral of protectionism.

Point number 20: The measure of success in reconstruction is not the sum of accomplishments.

During the Viet Nam War, the Pentagon gave progress reports mainly in terms of body counts. One of the most liberal critics of that war, I.F. Stone, once commented that he accepted the validity of the body counts, but thought that they did not reveal the big picture.

Suppose, Stone suggested, he was walking down a street and he bumped into a man running out of a bank, waving a gun and carrying a satchel full of money and were to ask the man, ''What are you doing?'' If the man responded, ''I am waiting for a car,'' he would be telling the truth but not revealing the big picture.

Good things are being accomplished in Iraq, particularly in the north where an American General has won a measure of popularity through progressive stabilization initiatives. Yet, terrorism cannot credibly be contained in the arms-infested Iraqi environment. American civilians, as well as Armed Services personnel who have been posted to Iraq, deserve to be commended for their commitment and sacrifices, but prudence suggests that brevity of service is preferable to a long-standing presence. Otherwise, in a world where terrorism is a growth industry, even extraordinary sacrifice and significant accomplishments could be for naught.

Point number 21: We must respect Iraqi culture and work to ensure that the art and artifacts of this cradle of civilization are preserved for the Iraqi people.

There are few umbrages more long-lasting than cultural theft. Cultural looting must be stopped, and the market for stolen antiquities squelched. For our part, we should ensure that Iraqi cultural sites are protected and that our laws are upgraded. Any stolen antiquities brought to America must be returned.

Point number 22: The war in Iraq should not cause us to forget Afghanistan.

While the center of our military attention may at the moment be Bagdad, we must remember that no Iraqi was involved in hijacking the planes that struck the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11.

Few countries are more distant physically or culturally from the United States than Afghanistan; yet, it is there the plotting for the terrorist acts began. The Taliban have been removed and a new, more tolerant government has been established; but the world community has not fulfilled its commitments to raise the country out of poverty and warlordism. The U.S. cannot continue to be complacent about economic and social development in that country, where foreigners have never been welcome. Failure of the Karzai government and a return of the Taliban would be a major setback in the battle with terrorism.

Point number 23: Lastly and most importantly, U.S. policymakers should never lose sight of the fact that events in Israel and Iraq are intertwined and that no challenge is more important for regional and global security than resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma.

Extraordinarily, from a priority perspective, administration after administration in Washington seems to pay only intermittent attention to the Palestinian issue. There should be no higher priority in our foreign policy than a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Attention in Washington should be riveted at all times on this singular problem. The current status quo is good neither for Israel nor for the Palestinians. Now, for the first time lack of progress in establishing a mutually acceptable modus vivendi between the parties may be even more damaging to countries not directly involved in the conflict. The need for U.S. leadership in pressing for peace has never been more urgent. It would be a tragedy if, focused as we are upon making war in one part of the Middle East, we neglected to give sufficient prority to promoting peace in another.

In conclusion, the world is noting that we are saying and what we are doing. Many are not convinced by our words; many are appalled by our actions. Yet nothing would be worse for the world than for us to fail. We must not. The key at this point is to recognize the limits as well as magnitude of our power and emphasize the most uplifting aspects of our heritage: democracy, opportunity, freedom of thought and worship. Motives matter; so do techniques to advance our values. The lesson of the past year is clear: America does better as a mediator and multi-party peace maker than as a unilateral interventionist.

IRAQ WATCH

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. RENZI). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. DELAHUNT) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I am here, and I anticipate being joined by several Members, to discuss the issues that the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. LEACH) was discussing, the gentleman, who commands great respect in this body and one who clearly possesses a profound knowledge of international relationships, and at the same time provides a perspective and an analysis that should be instructive and informative to all Americans. I think he had 23 points. I do not know whether he has any additional points he wishes to make, but if he does, I would be happy to yield to him.

It would appear that he does not. But again, let me acknowledge his contribution to the debate.

Myself and my colleagues for some weeks now, I think, on more than 20 occasions during the course of the time that is reserved after legislative business is concluded, the so-called ''special orders'' time, have come to the floor and we have labeled this particular initiative, the Iraq Watch. And, hopefully, we have had among us a conversation that has been both informative for the audience, as well as educational for the Members of the House in terms of this issue that, clearly, has a huge impact on the American people, both in terms of lives and the safety of our military personnel in Iraq, but also clearly in terms of our economy.