

displaced persons (IDPs) in the Russian Federation. I recently chaired a Helsinki Commission hearing to assess the plight of IDPs, including those in the Caucasus region.

The first involves IDPs from Chechnya who, according to reliable sources, continue to be pressured by Russian authorities to return to the war-torn capital city of Grozny, despite continuing violence there and a lack of many basic services. According to the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2002, approximately 140,000 persons remained internally displaced within Chechnya, with 110,000 more displaced in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia. Despite international attention, including a letter initiated last fall by the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, the Russian Government continues to pressure IDPs to return, and in some cases limits the ability of NGOs to provide assistance.

My concern for the safety of Chechen IDPs is well founded, as authorities in the past year closed three IDP camps, two near the village of Znamenskoye in northern Chechnya and the Aki-Yurt camp in Ingushetia, effectively forcing the residents back to Grozny. Reports of violence and human rights violations by both Russian military units and Chechen rebels in Chechnya are disturbing. The ongoing chaos in that war-torn region has kept UNHCR from certifying Chechnya as a safe return destination, which is supported by the fact that many international aid agencies have limited or suspended their operations out of concern for the safety of aid workers.

Despite this lack of security, the United Nations estimates that more than 38,000 IDPs from Ingushetia returned to Chechnya last year, with many complaining of government coercion. While no camp has been closed since December 2002, Doctors Without Borders reports that government officials threaten to cut off assistance in Ingushetia and block future aid in Chechnya for those refusing to leave immediately. The stationing of Russian troops near IDP camps and the limiting of assistance from international agencies to camp residents represent pressure tactics to "encourage" the return of IDPs to Chechnya.

Clearly, the Russian Government is not respecting the fundamental right of individuals to seek safe refuge. As a participating State of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Russian Federation has committed to facilitate sustainable solutions to the plight of IDPs and the voluntary return of such individuals in dignity and safety. I urge President Putin to intervene to ensure that Russian policy and practice are consistent with these OSCE commitments and that no IDPs be effectively forced to return to their homes in Chechnya until the conditions have been created for their return. To do otherwise would place the lives of tens of thousands of innocent Russian citizens at risk.

The second situation I want to briefly highlight concerns the plight of Meskhetian Turks in the Krasnodar Krai region of the Russian Federation. Also known as Ahiska Turks or Meskhetians, Meskhetian Turks were forced to relocate twice within the past 50 years, first from Soviet Georgia in November 1944 to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan. In 1989, approximately 90,000 Meskhetian Turks fled ethnic conflicts in Uzbekistan to all parts of the Soviet Union, with the largest concentration today found in Krasnodar Krai.

Numbering approximately 13,000, these displaced individuals find themselves in a virtual no man's land, denied citizenship and permanent residency permits, as well as many other fundamental rights.

Due to loopholes in the Russian citizenship law and the improper application of this law by Krasnodar Krai authorities, Meskhetian Turks must register as "guests" every 45 days, may not legally register the purchase of a house or car, and their marriages and deaths are not officially recorded. Most are denied education above high school, as well. The Krasnodar regional legislature enacted a series of laws in 2002 in an attempt to pressure the Meskhetian Turks to leave. Corresponding with the expiration of the temporary registration held by most Krasnodar Meskhetian Turks, the laws reportedly cancelled leases on land or denied lease renewals for the 2002 crop season.

Furthermore, chauvinistic local authorities have not intervened to prevent local Cossack paramilitary units from repeatedly victimizing Krasnodar Meskhetian Turks through public harassment, robbery, and vandalism. In late May, a mob of around 50 people attacked Meskhetian Turks and other non-Russian-looking individuals in two villages, injuring 30 people and hospitalizing six.

By not granting citizenship or providing permanent residency status, current Russian policy enables the discriminatory practices subjugating the rights of Meskhetian Turks in Krasnodar Krai to continue. Mr. Speaker, President Putin cited the problems of citizenship and stateless persons in his annual State of the Federation address earlier this year. The Russian President pointed out the complexities and uncertainties faced by stateless persons in Russia. I urge him and Members of the State Duma to rectify the status of Meskhetian Turks and other stateless persons. Meanwhile, the Kremlin should intervene to ensure that Krasnodar Krai officials desist in their discriminatory treatment of the Meskhetian Turks until their status is normalized, as well as guarantee the prosecution of violent criminals.

TRIBUTE TO DR. JAMES E.
COTTRELL

HON. JERROLD NADLER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 24, 2003

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to an outstanding physician, scholar, educator, humanitarian and citizen from the State of New York, James E. Cottrell, M.D. Dr. Cottrell will soon complete his term as national president of the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA). I am very proud and pleased that one of New York's own served as the 2002–2003 president of this prestigious national organization that is recognized worldwide for its outstanding work in improving patient safety.

Founded in 1905, ASA is the predominant professional organization that represents more than 36,000 anesthesiologists. Since its founding, ASA has been the leader in the development of patient safety standards and guidelines for the delivery of safe patient care before, during and after surgery. Efforts on the part of the organization and its members are

recognized throughout the scientific and medical communities. The Institute of Medicine in its 1999 report on medical errors recognized the successes of organized anesthesiology's efforts to improve patient outcomes.

Anesthesiologists either directly administer or supervise 90 percent of all anesthetics performed throughout this country, in hospitals and outpatient surgical centers, and in urban and rural areas. In fact, anesthesiologists are the predominant provider of anesthetics in rural facilities. Besides the operating room, anesthesiologists are often found treating patients' pain and delivering critical medical care to patients in hospital intensive care units, emergency rooms and diagnostic facilities.

Dr. Cottrell received his medical degree from West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, and completed his anesthesiology residency at Mercy Hospital, Pittsburgh, PA.

As a recognized expert in the field of neuroanesthesia, he has lectured extensively worldwide, authored or co-authored more than 90 scientific papers, 114 scientific abstract presentations, 20 book chapters, was co-editor of three textbooks and has most recently authored a book that helps patients be better prepared for their surgery and anesthesia.

Dr. Cottrell currently serves on the Board of Directors of Doctors of the World and has served on the Board of Directors of God's Love We Deliver, an organization dedicated to serving and delivering meals to AIDS patients in New York City.

Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join me today in recognizing James E. Cottrell, M.D., for his notable career, outstanding achievements, humanitarian work and dedication to patient safety.

THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF
NORTHERN CYPRUS

HON. DAN BURTON

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 24, 2003

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, since 1974, Cyprus has been divided de facto into the government-controlled two-thirds of the island, the Republic of Cyprus, and the Turkish Cypriot one-third, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The anniversary of the events of July 1974 in Cyprus gives rise to misrepresentation of historical events. As the cliché goes, there are two-sides to every story. That is why I would like to share with my colleagues, the Turkish Cypriot point of view regarding the current situation on Cyprus.

The island of Cyprus gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960 and has been divided since 1974. At independence, the Republic's constitution defined elaborate power-sharing arrangements. It required a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president; each elected by their own community. The Treaty of Alliance among the Republic, Greece, and Turkey provided for 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers to help defend the island.

Cyprus' success as a new Republic lasted from 1960–63. After President Makarios proposed constitutional modifications in favor of the majority community in 1963, relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots deteriorated. In 1964, Turkish Cypriots withdrew from

most national institutions and began to administer their own affairs. Violence between Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities occurred in 1963–64 and again in 1967. Since the 1964 crisis, U.N. peacekeeping troops have been a buffer between the two communities.

In 1974, a military junta in Athens supported a coup against President Makarios, replacing him with a hardline supporter of enosis. Turkey, citing the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, sent troops in two separate actions and, by August 25, was in control of more than 36 percent of the island. The Athens junta fell and civilian government was restored. The legitimacy of the Turkish intervention was confirmed, among others, by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, by resolution 573, dated July 29, 1974, in which it is stated, "Turkey exercised its right of intervention in accordance with Article IV of the Guarantee Treaty of 1960." Greece withdrew from NATO's military command to protest NATO's failure to prevent Turkey's action.

According to Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Turkish intervention of July 1974 did not come about as an unprovoked invasion but in response to a coup d'état; was in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960; and therefore, was legal and legitimate. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot community saw the 1974 coup attempt as the culmination of a campaign to annex Cyprus to Greece.

Turkish Cypriots celebrate July 20 as their day of liberation. Since Turkey's arrival in Cyprus, peace has prevailed on the island, and the biggest beneficiaries of this atmosphere of peace and tranquility have been all Cypriots, Greek and Turkish. However, the Greek Cypriots enjoy a high level of economic prosperity, while the Turkish Cypriot economy continues to suffer from the embargoes imposed on the Turkish Cypriot North by the Greek Cypriot South.

Turkey's presence in Cyprus is within the confines of a security role and far from preventing a political settlement. Turkey has always supported a just and lasting settlement on the island, within the mission of the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General. Recently, Turkish Cypriots, with the full support of Turkey, demonstrated their good will by undertaking a series of confidence-building measures, including the opening of the borders to people and traffic from both sides. This has allowed, by Turkish Cypriot estimates, thousands of Turkish and Greek Cypriots to cross over to each other's territory.

This measure was followed-up by an offer to the Greek Cypriot side for the resettlement of the vacant town of Varosha in return for the re-opening of the now-defunct Nicosia International Airport. President Denktas also proposed to meet with Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos directly in order to discuss these and other related issues.

However, it appears that the Greek Cypriot side has shown little interest in a negotiated settlement. In a speech made on July 17, Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos again made clear that his side does not accept the "Annan Plan" for a settlement as it is, claiming that doing so would mean "legitimizing the gains accomplished by the occupation" and that if they did so, the (the Greek Cypriots) "would become accomplices in the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus."

It is my hope that efforts to reach a settlement will continue between Turkish and Greek

Cypriot leaders. I know there are two sides to the Turkish and Greek Cypriot conflict, and that is why it is important for Congress to adopt a balanced, even-handed approach to the issue of facilitating a just and lasting settlement between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

INTRODUCTION OF H.R. (UNITED STATES NONCONTIGUOUS SHIPPING OPEN MARKET ACT OF 2003), H.R. (HAWAII SHIPPING OPEN MARKET ACT OF 2003), AND H.R. (HAWAII AGRICULTURE/LIVESTOCK SHIPPING OPEN MARKET ACT OF 2003)

HON. ED CASE

OF HAWAII

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 24, 2003

Mr. CASE. Mr. Speaker, today, I introduce three bills to end a century of closed market cargo shipping to, from and within my isolated home state of Hawaii, as well as the other noncontiguous locations of our country. In doing so, we will break the stranglehold on the economics and peoples of these exposed communities which results from just a few shipping companies controlling the lifeline of commerce upon which our communities absolutely depend.

These bills all amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as the Jones Act. That federal law mandates that all cargo shipping between U.S. ports occur exclusively on U.S., not foreign, flagged vessels. (A similar federal law of the same vintage, the Passenger Vessels Services Act, provides the same mandate for cruise line and other passenger transit; the same arguments as drive these three bills apply there, but that is another effort, already commenced through limited Federal exemptions.)

The Jones Act was enacted in a protectionist era under the guise of preserving a strong national merchant marine. But today it is just an anachronism: most of the world's shipping is by way of an international merchant marine functioning in an open, competitive market. And those few U.S. flag cargo lines that remain have maneuvered the Jones Act to develop virtual monopolies over domestic cargo shipping to, from and within our most isolated and exposed locales: our island and offshore states, territories and possessions.

My Hawaii is a classic example. Located almost 2,500 miles off the West Coast, we import well over 90 percent of our life necessities by ocean cargo. There are no doubt plenty of international cargo lines who could and would compete for a share of that market. Yet only two U.S. flag domestic cargo lines—Matson Navigation and CSX Lines (fka Sea-Land)—operate a virtual duopoly over our lifeline.

While they are nominally subject to Federal regulation, the fact of the matter is that cargo prices have gone in only one direction—up, and fast—and it is indisputable that there is no downward market pressure which would otherwise result from meaningful competition. These accelerating cargo prices are not absorbed by the shipping lines, but passed through all the way down the chain, to the transporters, wholesalers, retailers, small businesses, mom-n-pops, and ultimately consumers, of all of the elementals of life, from

food, to medical supplies, clothes, housing and virtually all other goods. The result is a crippling drag on an already-challenged economy and the very quality of life in Hawaii.

The broadest, deepest effects of the Jones Act on Hawaii result from its impact on west-bound imports. But Hawaii is an export location as well, in key products such as agriculture and livestock. Here the Jones Act also effectively stifles meaningful competition in getting those products to their primary markets on the U.S. Mainland. Because the producers of these products and all that rely for their own livelihood on their successful export have to eat inflated shipping costs, these export industries, which any economist knows are the ultimate key to any economy's prosperity, are also crippled.

Let's take a concrete example: Hawaii's once-prosperous ranching/cattle industry, which is so key to the economic health and the very lifestyle of so much of the rural Second District which I proudly represent. That industry depends on getting its product, young cattle, to West Coast pens and transportation hubs in a cost-efficient manner.

There are foreign cargo carriers that specialize, through custom cattle ships and overall sensitivity and adjustment to rancher timetables and needs, in such transport, but the Jones Act outright excludes them from the Hawaii-Mainland market. As a result, Hawaii's ranchers are reduced to two crippling, cost magnifying options.

The first is to ship their cargo by foreign carriers to Canada, where they have to go through a myriad of bureaucratic, cost-magnifying gyrations to get their product eventually to their U.S. markets. The second is to beg for the goodwill of the domestic carriers, to whom this is simply a hindrance rather than a major commitment, to ship directly to the West Coast.

And it shows: most of the cattle are first shipped from Hawaii's Neighbor Islands, where the bulk of the cattle industry is located, to Oahu, in small "cow-tainers", where they sit for days in Honolulu Harbor awaiting the return to the Mainland of one of the massive cargo ships designed and utilized for quite another purpose. The result (besides associated higher costs): in-harbor cattle waste disposal challenges; higher in-transit cattle mortality; lower-weight cattle delivery to market. That's what happens when you try to squeeze a square peg into a round hole.

These three bills say: enough is enough. The first, H.R. —, the United States Noncontiguous Shipping Open Market Act of 2003, exempts all noncontiguous U.S. locations, including Hawaii, from the Jones Act. (Frankly I question whether we shouldn't outright repeal the Jones Act, but I leave it to my colleagues from the contiguous U.S. to evaluate that option; the consequences are especially acute in the noncontiguous U.S. and that is my focus.) The second, H.R. —, the Hawaii Shipping Open Market Act of 2003, exempts Hawaii. And the third, H.R. —, the Hawaii Agriculture/Livestock Shipping Open Market Act of 2003, exempts Hawaii agriculture and livestock. Essentially, the bills are intended to lay out the options from broad to narrow; we can get into the issue at any level and work our way up or down.