

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

HON. SHELLEY BERKLEY

OF NEVADA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 21, 2003

Ms. BERKLEY. Mr. Speaker, due to a family emergency, I was unable to vote July 15, 2003 through July 18, 2003. If I was in attendance on July 15, 2003, I would have voted "nay" on rollcall No. 360; "yea" on rollcall No. 361; "nay" on rollcall No. 362; "nay" on rollcall No. 363; "nay" on rollcall No. 364; "nay" on rollcall No. 365; "yea" on rollcall No. 366; and "nay" on rollcall No. 367.

If I was in attendance on July 16, 2003, I would have voted "yea" on rollcall No. 368; "yea" on rollcall No. 369; "yea" on rollcall No. 370; "nay" on rollcall No. 371; "nay" on rollcall No. 372; "yea" on rollcall No. 373; "yea" on rollcall No. 374; and "yea" on rollcall No. 375.

If I was in attendance on July 17, 2003, I would have voted "yea" on rollcall No. 376; "yea" on rollcall No. 377; "nay" on rollcall No. 378; "nay" on rollcall No. 379; "yea" on rollcall No. 380; "nay" on rollcall No. 381; "yea" on rollcall No. 382; "yea" on rollcall No. 383; "yea" on rollcall No. 384; "yea" on rollcall No. 385; "yea" on rollcall No. 386; "yea" on rollcall No. 387; "nay" on rollcall No. 388; "nay" on rollcall No. 389; and "yea" on rollcall No. 390.

If I was in attendance on July 18, I would have voted "nay" on rollcall No. 391; "yea" on rollcall No. 392; "nay" on rollcall No. 393; "yea" on rollcall No. 394; "nay" on rollcall No. 395; "yea" on rollcall No. 396; and "nay" on rollcall No. 397.

FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 2004 AND 2005

SPEECH OF

HON. SHEILA JACKSON-LEE

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 15, 2003

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1950) to authorize appropriations for the Department of State for the fiscal years 2004 and 2005, to authorize appropriations under the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for security assistance for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and for other purposes:

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Hostettler/Gallegly amendment. The purpose of this amendment is to require the Secretary of the Department of State to regulate the issuance of consular identification cards by foreign missions in the United States. It directs the Secretary to issue regulations requiring foreign missions to issue consular identification cards only to bona fide nationals of the issuing country, to maintain accurate records of all such cards issued, to require recipients of such cards to notify the missions of address changes, to notify the Secretary of each such card issued in the United States, and to make records of such cards available for audit and review by the State Department at the Secretary's request.

In other words, this amendment would require the State Department to decide what the

consulates of other countries can and cannot do with respect to consular identification documents, above and beyond existing law. On the face of it, this is not a good idea. Do we want other countries to do the same to us? Do we want other countries to tell our consulates how they can relate to our own citizens abroad?

In fact, although this amendment would apply to all consulate offices in the United States, it is apparent that the objective of the amendment is to regulate the issuance of a particular consular document, the Matricula Consular issued by the Mexican consulates. The Mexican consulates issue these cards to create an official record of its citizens in other countries. The Matricula is legal proof of such registration. This registration facilitates access to protection and consular services because the certificate is evidence of Mexican nationality. It does not provide immigrant status of any kind, and it cannot be used for travel, employment, or driving in the United States or in Mexico. The Matricula only attests that a Mexican consulate has verified the individual's identity.

This amendment would interfere with the rights of Mexico and other sovereign nations to issue whatever identification cards they want to issue to their citizens abroad, provided that they meet the requirements of the Vienna Convention. Under that convention, consular function is established as "performing any other functions entrusted to a consular post which are not prohibited by the laws and regulations of the receiving State." There is no United States Federal law that forbids the issuance of consular identification cards. In fact, the Treasury Department has issued regulations under Section 326 of the PATRIOT ACT that would allow financial institutions to accept consular identification cards as valid forms of identification for the purpose of opening accounts.

The responsibility for carrying out the mandates of this amendment would fall on the State Department, but the State Department has an Interagency Working Group that is already working to address the issue of consular identification cards. The Mexican consulates have been issuing Matriculas for more than 130 years. We can wait a while longer to give the State Department an opportunity to formulate new policies on the basis of the report from that Interagency Working Group.

I strongly urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.

TRIBUTE TO CHELSEA HIGH SCHOOL SOFTBALL TEAM, CHELSEA, MI

HON. NICK SMITH

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 21, 2003

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to honor the Chelsea High School softball team who last month won their second consecutive Division II state championship. The Bulldogs compiled an impressive record of 36-4 and swept through the 2003 state playoffs outscoring their opponents 44 to 1 in the seven playoff games.

The Chelsea girls softball program has, over the past two seasons, compiled an outstanding overall record of 72-7-1 in winning

back-to-back state championships. I salute the hard work and dedication of the players: Julia Arnold, Brynna Darwin, Cynthia Johnson, Katie Herman, Becky Sprague, Carly Daniels, Nicole Collins, Ali Mann, Missy Morcom, Alise Augustine, Katrina Moffett, Jenna Connelly, Danielle McClelland, Anna Arend, Mary Kate Setta and Christyna Toon.

We in Congress also pay tribute to the coaches whose personal interest, strong support and active participation played no small part in the team's success: Bob Moffett, Mark Musolf, Chris DeFant, Jenni Driskill, Kathy Sprawka, and head coach Kim Reichard. Under their guidance, the players have refined not only their athletic talents but learned the value of sportsmanship, the joy of camaraderie, the importance of teamwork, how to become a leader and motivate others, the rewards of hard work, how to deal with success and failure. These valuable lessons combined with a good education will serve them long after their days on the diamond have passed.

KEY JUDGMENTS

HON. PETER T. KING

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 21, 2003

Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker, in light of the incessant barrage of attacks of inaccurate and baseless charges being made against President Bush by his political opponents and their allies in the media, I thought it important to include in the RECORD the declassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate released by the White House this past Friday. This NIE clearly states the consensus view of our intelligence agencies that Saddam Hussein was attempting to reconstitute his nuclear capacity. The first half of these documents are being submitted today and the second half tomorrow. I commend these documents to all willing to approach this vital issue with an open mind.

[From October 2002 NIE]

IRAQ'S CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. (See INR alternative view at the end of these Key Judgments.)

We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WJMD programs.

Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs; annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled, from \$580 million in 1998 to about \$3 billion this year.

Iraq has largely rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during

Operation Desert Fox and has expanded its chemical and biological infrastructure under the cover of civilian production.

Baghdad has exceeded UN range limits of 150 km with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which allow for a more lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.

Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad started reconstituting its nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM inspectors departed—December 1998.

How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.

If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad it could make a nuclear weapon within several months to a year.

Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009, owing to inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to produce highly enriched uranium and challenges in procuring the necessary equipment and expertise.

Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal interest in and Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors—as well as Iraq's attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools—provide compelling evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes probably are not part of the program.)

Iraq's efforts to re-establish and enhance its cadre of weapons personnel as well as activities at several suspect nuclear sites further indicate that reconstitution is underway.

All agencies agree that about 25,000 centrifuges based on tubes of the size Iraq is trying to acquire would be capable of producing approximately two weapons' worth of highly enriched uranium per year.

In a much less likely scenario, Baghdad could make enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by 2005 to 2007 if it obtains suitable centrifuge tubes this year and has all the other materials and technological expertise necessary to build production-scale uranium enrichment facilities.

We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX; its capability probably is more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved.

An array of clandestine reporting reveals that Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited CW agent production hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry.

Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents—much of it added in the last year.

The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles. We assess that they possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited number of covertly stored Scuds, possibly a few with extended ranges.

We judge that all key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war.

We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of

quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.

Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive BW program.

Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW agents.

Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability.

Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within three to six months* these units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war.

Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, including for a UAV probably intended to deliver biological warfare agent.

Gaps in Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddam retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with ranges of 650 to 900 km.

Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud and Ababi-100 SRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond the UN-authorized 150-km range limit; Iraq has tested an al-Samoud variant beyond 150 km—perhaps as far as 300 km.

Baghdad's UAVs could threaten Iraq's neighbors, U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, and if brought close to, or into, the United States, the U.S. Homeland.

An Iraqi UAV procurement network attempted to procure commercially available route planning software and an associated topographic database that would be able to support targeting of the United States, according to analysis of special intelligence.

The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability.

Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities, including a test stand for engines more powerful than those in its current missile force.

We have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use WMD.

Saddam could decide to use chemical and biological warfare (CBW) preemptively against U.S. forces, friends, and allies in the region in an attempt to disrupt U.S. war preparations and undermine the political will of the Coalition.

[Corrected per Errata sheet issued in October 2002]

Saddam might use CBW after an initial advance into Iraqi territory, but early use of WMD could foreclose diplomatic options for stalling the US advance.

He probably would use CBW when he perceived he irretrievably had lost control of the military and security situation, but we are unlikely to know when Saddam reaches that point.

We judge that Saddam would be more likely to use chemical weapons than biological weapons on the battlefield.

Saddam historically has maintained tight control over the use of WMD; however, he probably has provided contingency instructions to his commanders to use CBW in specific circumstances.

Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause for making war.

Iraq probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the U.S. Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge. Such attacks—more likely with biological than chemical agents—probably would be carried out by special forces or intelligence operatives.

The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) probably has been directed to conduct clandestine attacks against US and Allied interests in the Middle East in the event the United States takes action against Iraq. The US probably would be the primary means by which Iraq would attempt to conduct any CBW attacks on the US Homeland, although we have no specific intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks against US territory.

Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only an organization such as al-Qaida—with worldwide reach and extensive terrorist infrastructure, and already engaged in a life-or-death struggle against the United States—could perpetrate the type of terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct.

In such circumstances, he might decide that the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists in conducting a CBW attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.

CONGRATULATING OF THE CITY OF TEMPE, ARIZONA

HON. J. D. HAYWORTH

OF ARIZONA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 21, 2003

Mr. HAYWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to congratulate the City of Tempe, Arizona, one of ten communities in the United States selected to receive an All-America City Award from the National Civic League. The All-America City program recognizes civic excellence in communities in which citizens, government, businesses and non-profit organizations work together to address critical local issues.

This award is yet another recognition of what Tempe has achieved through innovative public-private partnerships that have made it one of the nation's finest cities. Dynamic collaboration on the three projects presented—Tempe Town Lake, Riverside Sunset Neighborhood and the Tumbleweed Youth Services—has enabled the city to successfully address important issues like crime, education and poverty. In this respect, Tempe is certainly a model for other cities.

Tempe Town Lake was a dry riverbed and crime magnet that has been cleaned up and is now the location of community festivals, athletic and cultural events, and development. Additionally, partnership with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will restore 170 acres into a natural habitat preserve.

To address the decline of the Sunset/Riverside Neighborhood, the city developed a series of partnerships with organizations and groups such as the Boys and Girls Club, the Riverside/Sunset Neighborhood Association, Scales Elementary School, and the Arizona State University College of Nursing. This collaboration successfully revitalized the neighborhood by building the Westside Multigenerational Center and offering numerous services including crime prevention services and new housing.