

3721 of title 31, United States Code, determine, compromise, adjust, and settle such claim in an amount not exceeding \$4,000 per claimant.

(b) Claimants shall file claims pursuant to this resolution with the Sergeant at Arms not later than December 31, 2002.

(c) Any compromise, adjustment, or settlement of any such claim pursuant to this resolution shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate on a voucher approved by the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration.

FAMILY HISTORY MONTH

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of S. Res. 330.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the resolution by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 330) designating the month of October 2002, as "Family History Month".

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the resolution and preamble be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table, and that any statements pertaining thereto be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution (S. Res. 330) was agreed to.

The preamble was agreed to.

The resolution (S. Res. 330), with its preamble, reads as follows:

S. RES. 330

Whereas it is the family, striving for a future of opportunity and hope, that reflects our Nation's belief in community, stability, and love;

Whereas the family remains an institution of promise, reliance, and encouragement;

Whereas we look to the family as an unwavering symbol of constancy that will help us discover a future of prosperity, promise, and potential;

Whereas within our Nation's libraries and archives lie the treasured records that detail the history of our Nation, our States, our communities, and our citizens;

Whereas individuals from across our Nation and across the world have embarked on a genealogical journey by discovering who their ancestors were and how various forces shaped their past;

Whereas an ever-growing number in our Nation and in other nations are collecting, preserving, and sharing genealogies, personal documents, and memorabilia that detail the life and times of families around the world;

Whereas 54,000,000 individuals belong to a family where someone in the family has used the Internet to research their family history;

Whereas individuals from across our Nation and across the world continue to research their family heritage and its impact upon the history of our Nation and the world;

Whereas approximately 60 percent of Americans have expressed an interest in tracing their family history;

Whereas the study of family history gives individuals a sense of their heritage and a sense of responsibility in carrying out a legacy that their ancestors began;

Whereas as individuals learn about their ancestors who worked so hard and sacrificed so much, their commitment to honor their ancestors' memory by doing good is increased;

Whereas interest in our personal family history transcends all cultural and religious affiliations;

Whereas to encourage family history research, education, and the sharing of knowledge is to renew the commitment to the concept of home and family; and

Whereas the involvement of National, State, and local officials in promoting genealogy and in facilitating access to family history records in archives and libraries are important factors in the successful perception of nationwide camaraderie, support, and participation: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate—

(1) designates the month of October 2002, as "Family History Month"; and

(2) requests that the President issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe the month with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

EXECUTIVE CALENDAR

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to executive session to consider Executive Calendar Nos. 1035, 1036, 1039 and the nominations on the Secretary's desk; that the nominations be confirmed; the motion to reconsider be laid on the table, the President be immediately notified of the Senate's action, and that any statements relating thereto be printed in the RECORD; and that the Senate then resume legislative session, with the preceding all occurring without any intervening action or debate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The nominations considered and confirmed are as follows:

NOMINATIONS

COAST GUARD

The following named officers for appointment in the United States Coast Guard to the grade indicated under Title 14, U.S.C., Section 271:

To be rear admiral (lower half)

Capt. Jody A. Breckenridge
Capt. John E. Crowley
Capt. Larry L. Hereth
Capt. Richard R. Houck
Capt. Clifford I. Pearson
Capt. James C. Van Sice

The following named officer for appointment to the grade indicated in the United States Coast Guard under Title 14, U.S. Code, Section 211:

To be Rear Admiral Lower Half

Stephen W. Rochon

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antonio Candia Amador, of California, to be United States Marshal for the Eastern District of California for the term of four years, vice Jerry J. Enomoto.

PN2162 Coast Guard nomination of David C. Clippinger, which was received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of September 17, 2002

PN2161 Coast Guard nominations (59) beginning Christine D Balboni, and ending Steven E Vanderplas, which nominations were

received by the Senate and appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of September 17, 2002

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now return to legislative session.

ORDERS FOR MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2002

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 2:30 p.m., Monday, September 23; that following the prayer and the pledge, the morning hour be deemed expired, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day, and there be a period for morning business until 3:30, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each, with the first half of the time under the control of Senator LOTT or his designee and the second half under the control of Senator DASCHLE or his designee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. REID. Mr. President, on Monday, the Senate will resume consideration of the Interior Appropriations Act. The next rollcall votes will occur on Monday at about 5:30 in relation to the Dodd amendment to the Interior Appropriations Act, and on cloture on the Byrd substitute amendment to the Interior appropriations bill.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. REID. If there is no further business now to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order following the remarks of the Senator from West Virginia, Mr. BYRD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BAYH). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, what is the parliamentary situation at the moment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in morning business.

Mr. BYRD. Is there an order permitting Senators to speak during morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The previous order is for 10 minutes.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed out of order for as much time as I may consume.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I do not expect to speak overly long. I think I should be able to complete my statement in 20 minutes.

HOW SADDAM HAPPENED

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, yesterday, at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I asked a question of the Secretary of Defense. I referred to a Newsweek article that will appear in the September 23, 2002, edition. That article reads as follows. It is not overly lengthy. I shall read it. Beginning on page 35 of Newsweek, here is what the article says:

America helped make a monster. What to do with him—and what happens after he is gone—has haunted us for a quarter century.

The article is written by Christopher Dickey and Evan Thomas. It reads as follows:

The last time Donald Rumsfeld saw Saddam Hussein, he gave him a cordial handshake. The date was almost 20 years ago, Dec. 20, 1983; an official Iraqi television crew recorded the historic moment.

The once and future Defense secretary, at the time a private citizen, had been sent by President Ronald Reagan to Baghdad as a special envoy. Saddam Hussein, armed with a pistol on his hip, seemed "vigorous and confident," according to a now declassified State Department cable obtained by Newsweek. Rumsfeld "conveyed the President's greetings and expressed his pleasure at being in Baghdad," wrote the notetaker. Then the two men got down to business, talking about the need to improve relations between their two countries.

Like most foreign-policy insiders, Rumsfeld was aware that Saddam was a murderous thug who supported terrorists and was trying to build a nuclear weapon. (The Israelis had already bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak.) But at the time, America's big worry was Iran, not Iraq. The Reagan administration feared that the Iranian revolutionaries who had overthrown the shah (and taken hostage American diplomats for 444 days in 1979-81) would overrun the Middle East and its vital oilfields. On the theory that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, the Reaganites were seeking to support Iraq in a long and bloody war against Iran. The meeting between Rumsfeld and Saddam was consequential: for the next five years, until Iran finally capitulated, the United States backed Saddam's armies with military intelligence, economic aid and covert supplies of munitions.

Rumsfeld is not the first American diplomat to wish for the demise of a former ally. After all, before the cold war, the Soviet Union was America's partner against Hitler in World War II. In the real world, as the saying goes, nations have no permanent friends, just permanent interests. Nonetheless, Rumsfeld's long-ago interlude with Saddam is a reminder that today's friend can be tomorrow's mortal threat. As President George W. Bush and his war cabinet ponder Saddam's successor's regime, they would do well to contemplate how and why the last three presidents allowed the Butcher of Baghdad to stay in power so long.

The history of America's relations with Saddam is one of the sorrier tales in American foreign policy. Time and again, America turned a blind eye to Saddam's predations, saw him as the lesser evil or flinched at the chance to unseat him. No single policymaker or administration deserves blame for creating, or at least tolerating, a monster; many of their decisions seemed reasonable at the time. Even so, there are moments in this clumsy dance with the Devil that make one cringe. It is hard to believe that, during most of the 1980s, America knowingly permitted the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission to import bacterial cultures that might be used to build biological weapons.

Let me read that again:

It is hard to believe that, during most of the 1980s, America knowingly permitted the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission to import bacterial cultures that might be used to build biological weapons. But it happened.

America's past stumbles, while embarrassing, are not an argument for inaction in the future. Saddam probably is the "grave and gathering danger" described by President Bush in his speech to the United Nations last week. It may also be true that "whoever replaces Saddam is not going to be worse," as a senior administration official put it to Newsweek. But the story of how America helped create a Frankenstein monster it now wishes to strangle is sobering. It illustrates the power of wishful thinking, as well as the iron law of unintended consequences.

America did not put Saddam in power. He emerged after two decades of turmoil in the '60s and '70s, as various strongmen tried to gain control of a nation that had been concocted by British imperialists in the 1920s out of three distinct and rival factions, the Sunnis, Shiites and the Kurds. But during the cold war, America competed with the Soviets for Saddam's attention and welcomed his war with the religious fanatics of Iran. Having cozied up to Saddam, Washington found it hard to break away—even after going to war with him in 1991. Through years of both tacit and overt support, the West helped create the Saddam of today, giving him time to build deadly arsenals and dominate his people. Successive administrations always worried that if Saddam fell, chaos would follow, rippling through the region and possibly igniting another Middle East war. At times it seemed that Washington was transfixed by Saddam.

The Bush administration wants to finally break the spell. If the administration's true believers are right, Baghdad, after Saddam falls will look something like Paris after the Germans fled in August 1944. American troops will be cheered as liberators, and democracy will spread forth and push Middle Eastern despotism back into the shadows. Yet if the gloomy predictions of the administration's many critics come true, the Arab street, inflamed by Yankee imperialism, will rise up and replace the shaky but friendly autocrats in the region with Islamic fanatics.

While the Middle East is unlikely to become a democratic nirvana, the worst-case scenarios, always a staple of the press, are probably also wrong or exaggerated. Assuming that a cornered and doomed Saddam does not kill thousands of Americans in some kind of horrific Gotterdammerung—a scary possibility, one that deeply worries administration officials—the greatest risk of his fall is that one strongman may simply be replaced by another. Saddam's successor may not be a paranoid sadist. But there is no assurance that he will be America's friend or forswear the development of weapons of mass destruction.

American officials have known that Saddam was a psychopath—

Get that.

American officials have known that Saddam was a psychopath ever since he became the country's de facto ruler in the early 1970s. One of Saddam's early acts after he took the title of president in 1979 was to videotape a session of his party's congress, during which he personally ordered several members executed on the spot.

Let me repeat that:

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Videotape—

a session of his party's congress, during which he personally ordered several members executed on the spot.

The message, carefully conveyed to the Arab press, was not that these men were executed for plotting against Saddam, but rather for thinking about plotting against him. From the beginning, U.S. officials worried about Saddam's taste for nasty weaponry; indeed, at their meeting in 1983, Rumsfeld warned that Saddam's use of chemical weapons might "inhibit" American assistance. But top officials in the Reagan administration saw Saddam as a useful surrogate. By going to war with Iran, he could bleed the radical mullahs who had seized control of Iran from the pro-American shah. Some Reagan officials even saw Saddam as another Anwar Sadat, capable of making Iraq into a modern secular state, just as Sadat had tried to lift up Egypt before his assassination in 1981.

But Saddam had to be rescued first. The war against Iran was going badly by 1982. Iran's "human wave attacks" threatened to overrun Saddam's armies. Washington decided to give Iraq a helping hand.

After Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad in 1983, U.S. intelligence began supplying the Iraqi dictator with satellite photos showing Iranian deployments. Official documents suggest that America may also have secretly arranged for tanks and other military hardware to be shipped to Iraq in a swap deal—American tanks to Egypt, Egyptian tanks to Iraq. Over the protest of some Pentagon skeptics, the Reagan administration began allowing the Iraqis to buy a wide variety of "dual use" equipment and materials from American suppliers. According to confidential Commerce Department export-control documents obtained by NEWSWEEK, the shopping list included a computerized database for Saddam's Interior Ministry (presumably to help keep track of political opponents); helicopters to transport Iraqi officials; television cameras for "video surveillance applications"; chemical-analysis equipment for the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), and, most unsettling, numerous shipments of "bacteria/fungi/protozoa" to the IAEC. According to former officials, the bacterial cultures could be used to make biological weapons, including anthrax. The State Department also approved the shipment of 1.5 million atropine injectors, for use against the effects of chemical weapons, but the Pentagon blocked the sale. The helicopters, some American officials later surmised, were used to spray poison gas on the Kurds.

The United States almost certainly knew from its own satellite imagery that Saddam was using chemical weapons against Iranian troops. When Saddam bombed Kurdish rebels and civilians with a lethal cocktail of mustard gas, sarin, tabun and VX in 1988, the