back next year and we are going to spend another \$70 billion to \$100 billion more. Why don't we decide to put that money into the program and save it by adopting something right now, when we know, based upon the projections of prescription drugs, what is going to happen.

Let me suggest to you that the passage of strong legislation is going to be a damper on those exploding drug prices. So we have an opportunity and, if we miss it, it is going to cost Medicare a tremendous amount of money. Maybe \$100 billion is a little bit high, but \$70 billion to \$80 billion to \$90 billion would not be out of the realm of possibility. And we should also do it now so that baby boomers who have these good corporate plans they want to retire on are not shocked with a big difference between what 1965 Medicare is and what they have. They won't have to go through that if we have this bipartisan plan that gives seniors an option of having a new and improved and strengthened Medicare plan that is much closer to what they have now in the world of work.

The baby boomers are going to start to retire in only 8 years. So a new drug benefit could be incredibly expensive and could even put the existing Medicare Program at risk. In light of these facts, the truth is that we cannot afford an extravagant benefit. If we get to work and get it done now, it is not going to be so expensive.

The other main component of the bill that I have already made some reference to is a new, enhanced Medicare option, and it is not something seniors have to take if they don't want to. If they want to keep what they have right now, they can keep it, but if they want something a little closer to what

they have in the private sector, they will have that available.

I talked about Medicare or a prescription drug program, but there is a new and enhanced Medicare option that reflects 21st century health care. The enhanced option removes all cost sharing on preventive benefits. Just think. If somebody under the present Medicare has an opportunity to take a prostate cancer test, and they have a 20-percent copay, and they, say: "I just cannot afford it," or "I don't want to pay that copay," you are going to discourage that person from taking that test. And one out of three men might need an operation to catch it ahead of time so that cancer hasn't spread. No copay. That is more apt to be. That is an ounce of prevention worth a pound of cure. It brings Medicare into the 21st century. It adds protection against devastating costs due to serious illness. It features a single deductible of \$300 and a rational cost sharing rather than the irrational cost sharing in the existing fee-for-service system. It offers new, cheaper Medigap options. And with the improved coverage, beneficiaries might decide they don't need to buy Medigap at all.

This would create a tremendous savings for them and, potentially, for

Medicare. The enhanced options resemble what beneficiaries had when they were still working, and they might decide to take it. But this is all entirely voluntary. We don't say to a single senior citizen in America that they have to do this. It is their choice. If they like what they already have, what has been on the books since 1965, they can have it.

The cost of our reform provisions—this new and improved and enhanced Medicare—is only \$30 billion over 10 years.

Now, the AARP held a news conference today. Everyone around here knows that Senator DASCHLE's partisan approach cannot lead to 60 votes and can only lead to deadlock. Failure is not acceptable to the people of Iowa and it is not acceptable to me.

Let me comment on the substance of my bill, the 21st Century Medicare Act. The drug benefit we offer is a voluntary benefit with affordable premiums of \$24 a month. Unlike some proposals, it will provide drugs in a cost-effective manner, which is crucial. It will protect all seniors with drug costs, with special protections for low-income beneficiaries and those who incur very high costs. By law, at least two plans will be available everywhere in America, including rural areas, which is so important to me.

The Congressional Budget Office tells me that virtually all beneficiaries will find this drug benefit a good deal and will elect to take it. In fact, when you hear people demanding that "Cadillac" drug coverage be added to Medicare, what that tells you is that person doesn't really want legislation to pass. They just want an issue on which to campaign.

I have been very surprised and somewhat disappointed at the recent activity of the AARP on this issue. They ran ads this past weekend and they held a news conference today supporting the bill that Senator DASCHLE, we are told, plans to bring to the floor. In the same breath, they say they want a drug benefit that is permanent. They should make up their minds because Senator DASCHLE's bill is not permanent. That is because making it permanent would reveal how unaffordable it is. It is difficult to understand why they are sowing such confusion on the issue. Do they believe we should sunset the Medicare Program as a whole, as that bill does? I do not think we are going to sunset senior citizens. When the prescription drug program ends in 2009 or 2010, do they think the senior citizens of America are not going to need prescription drugs the next day? I hope AARP's members will tell Senator DASCHLE that is quite ludicrous, and they would be right.

Believe it or not, my bill—I should not say "my bill" because I have never had the pleasure of working with so many politically different people as Senator HATCH, Senator SNOWE, Senator BREAUX, Senator JEFFORDS, and myself—I am different, too. Over the

course of a year, we had give and take by people with so many different political philosophies, bringing us to where we are with this bill. So many times along the way we thought everything would fall apart, but we would come back together because people of good will working together can get things done.

That same good will is on the Senate Finance Committee if we just have an opportunity to work the will of the committee. But we have produced a product—and I said I am embarrassed it was this Monday; it could just as well have been May 1, but we just could not get the Congressional Budget Office to score the bill. Maybe it is legitimate. It is a whole new Government program. They had to take into consideration putting people on board. I suppose CBO had to do a lot of education of their own staff. All I can say is, it is here, and it is not here too late.

Believe it or not, this bill is the only true bipartisan bill in all of Washington, DC, to add a drug benefit to Medicare. If ever there was an issue where true bipartisanship was needed, it is in this bill, it is needed beyond the authors of this bill to the entire body, and we can get something done this year rather than wait next year to spend another \$100 billion more with the costs rising.

In short, the bipartisan 21st Century Medicare Act is the reasonable, pragmatic approach that can work even in an election year if Senator DASCHLE wants us to do it.

I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DAYTON). The Senator from Nevada.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I will be brief. The Senator from Utah has been waiting for some time. I am not going to talk long in this regard, but I say to my friend from Iowa, for whom I have the deepest respect—I consider him a friend and a fine Senator—that AARP supports Graham-Miller because it is good legislation. I do not think anyone could ever consider the AARP as some wild-like liberal group. They are very careful with the legislation they sign on to.

I also say to my friend from Iowa, it is too bad we had not been able to start debating his amendment and other amendments earlier. Every time we bring a bill up, we have to fight to get it on the floor, but we are going to continue to do that. As on the other bills I listed earlier today which we had to fight to pass, we are going to work hard on this bill. We are going to pass prescription drug legislation because it is necessary we do that.

2002 NATIONAL PEACE ESSAY CONTEST SOUTH DAKOTA WINNER, JESSICA HICKS

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I am honored today to present to my colleagues in the Senate an essay by Jessica Hicks of Rapid City, SD. Jessica is a student at St. Thomas More High

School and she is the National Peace Essay Contest winner for South Dakota. "Taking the Middle Ground: The Role of the Military in International Peacekeeping With Focus on Rwanda and Bosnia" is a call to U.S. leaders to seek an active American role in international peacekeeping that never loses sight of our national security interests. Jessica has tackled a vitally important subject with compassion, realism, and maturity. I can only hope that she continues to share her wisdom with the world, and I commend her essay to my colleagues' attention.

I ask unanimous consent that Jessica Hicks' essay be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TAKING THE MIDDLE GROUND: THE ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING WITH FOCUS ON RWANDA AND BOSNIA

(By Jessica Hicks)

"Never doubt that a small group of deeply committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has" (qtd. Mead). The U.S. military is composed of a group of "committed citizens" that works to serve the U.S. and its interests. As of late, the U.S.'s interests have turned to international conflicts and peacekeeping. International peacekeeping involves outside countries aiding in stabilizing an area through mediation, presence, and humanitarian aid. The military's role in international peacekeeping has often been called into question. Many feel that the U.S. military should only work to end conflict and to ensure peace in areas of interest to the U.S. Others believe that the U.S. should take an isolationist approach toward peacekeeping, with the focus of the military on protecting U.S. borders.

Critics may not agree, but the U.S. military does have an important role in international peacekeeping, a role that was especially apparent during the 1990s. During this decade, genocide occurred in Rwanda and Bosnia. In Bosnia, the U.S. military took an active part in peacekeeping efforts ("Why the Troops Should Go"), whereas in Rwanda, the U.S. did not contribute to the United Nation's (UN) initial peacekeeping mission (Onumah). In the next decade, the U.S. military should follow a "middle ground" policy in international matters, so as to be able to maintain national security and to participate in peacekeeping (Hull 77).

The Rwandan genocide that occurred in 1994 was a result of past tensions (Goble). In 1919, Belgium colonized Rwanda, whose majority population is composed of two ethnic groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis (Freeman 16). Belgian colonizers increased differences between the two groups by issuing ethnic identity cards and placing the Tutsis in high government positions, though the Hutus were in the majority (Prunier 28).

Frustrated by their lack of power, the Hutus overthrew the monarchy of Rwanda in 1959 (Giles 59). As a result of this change of power, many Tutsis were killed, and approximately 200,000 became refugees in neighboring countries ("Rwanda"). In 1962, Rwanda gained independence from Belgium, and the Hutus gained control of the government (Iliffe 251). In 1973, Habyarimana, a Hutu general, became president of Rwanda. His attempts to include minority parties in the government were unpopular with Hutu extremists (Prunier 74–75).

Meanwhile, the exiled Tutsis created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an army

rebel group. In 1990, the RPF launched a civil war against the Hutus (Giles 59). The United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) was sent in to Habyarimana's plan to share power with minorities (Shawcross 21). However, tensions between the Hutus and the Tutsis continued to increase, and in 1994, Hutu extremists shot down Habyarimana's airplane. Beginning in April of that year and continuing over the next three months, 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed in a genocide by the Hutus (Shawcross 21). The genocide ended in July, 1994, when the Tutsis regained control of the government. As a result, about two million Hutus left Rwanda, becoming refugees ("Rwanda"). When the killing began, most of the UNAMIR troops left Rwanda, and the genocide continued practically unrestrained by foreign influence (Goble). Although the U.S. sent humanitarian aid to Rwanda, it neglected to contribute much needed troops to initial UN peacekeeping efforts (Onumah).

The response of the U.S. military was different in Bosnia. Bosnia's tensions largely began with the creation of Yugoslavia after the First World War (Fromkin 135). Three ethnic groups have traditionally existed in Bosnia: the Croats, the Serbs, and the Muslims (Borden 16). Bosnia was part of communist Yugoslavia in the 1980s, and declared its independence in 1992 (Dragnich 192), Bosnian Serbs set out to create a "greater Serbia" by means of ethnic cleansing (Allen 44). In 1992, the UN responded by imposing naval blockades and trade sanctions on the former Yugoslavia (Ricchiardi 59), Croats and Muslims fought each other, as well as the Serbs. The United Nations unsuccessfully created six "safe havens" (protected cities) for the Muslims and the Croats in 1993 (Donia and Fine 243).

The U.S. helped to reduce the ethnic groups' fighting by mediating the signing of a peace agreement between the Croats and the Muslims in 1994 ("Fact Sheet: Human Rights Issues . . . "). Finally after atrocities committed by both sides, peace was reached in 1995, when, with the U.S.'s help the warring groups agreed to peace (to end war) in Dayton, Ohio ("Bosnia and Herzegovina"). To aid in peacekeeping, NATO sent in 60,000 troops as part of "multinational military Implementation Force" (IFOR) with U.S. soldiers comprising one-third of the troops ("Why the Troops Should Go"). The U.S. provided appropriate peacekeeping measures in Bosnia through mediation, presence, and humanitarian aid. Today, a reduced number of troops continues to remain in Bosnia to aid in keeping peace (Burg and Shoup 387).

The U.S. military has a vital role in international peacekeeping. Because of U.S. military influence, U.S. military involvement is critical to the success of peacekeeping efforts (Fromkin 49). The U.S. has access to resources that are essential to the peacekeeping process. In Rwanda, the U.S. initially did not want to be involved, and did not contribute troops, thus delaying peace in Rwanda (Jenish 24). In Bosnia, the U.S. military successfully worked through NATO to provide peacekeeping forces (Burg and Shoup 377-379). However, the U.S. should not dominate the peacekeeping process. A "middle ground" must be found in foreign policy. The "middle ground" policy involves the U.S.'s contributing military troops and aid, in cooperation with the UN, NATO, and other countries (Hull 77).

The U.S. military must determine whether its involvement is necessary in foreign conflicts. International peacekeeping turns the U.S. military away from its primary duty to protect the American borders and people. The U.S. must determine if the results of the conflict will affect its interests, such as na-

tional security (Fromkin 168). The U.S. military recognized that unrest in Bosnia could eventually cause conflict in Europe, whose stability is vital to the U.S. ("Why the Troops Should Go").

However, the U.S. also sends in military based on its ideals, such as recognition of a need for peace and stability (Fromkin 171). The U.S. has been accused of not being consistent in its involvement in international peacekeeping, and of becoming involved only when benefits are apparent for the U.S. The U.S. became involved in Bosnia partially because civilians felt that great injustices were occurring, and that peace was needed (Vulliamy 118).

Over the next decade, the U.S. military needs to continue aiding in international peacekeeping. However, a "middle ground" policy is a necessity when dealing with international matters. By maintain a "middle ground" policy, the U.S. can sustain a sufficient force at home for national security purposes (Hull 78). The U.S. military can also work with the UN, other countries, and regional organizations in peacekeeping. By taking the middle course, the U.S. military will be able to do its part in international affairs, while still protecting the American people.

In cooperation with the UN, the U.S. can work to provide mediation, presence, and material aid. Mediation was important in solving the Bosnia conflict. The U.S. helped arrange to have Bosnian leaders meet in Davton. Ohio, acting as a mediator at the peace talks (Burg and Shoup 408). The U.S. can contribute military troops to the UN forces to help local officials maintain peace. The U.S. military can help ensure that minority groups are not threatened. As illustrated in Rwanda, the U.S.'s hesitancy to send troops to aid the UN forces in 1994 prevented the cessation of the genocide in its early stages ("Rwanda Revisited: A Look Back . . . ''. Regional organizations should be utilized or established to help in peacekeeping actions, such as the distribution of humanitarian aid (Hull 93). When such organizations are not employed, aid can be misdirected, as in Rwanda, where corruption prevented appropriate distribution ("Humanitarian Efforts Threatened . . . "). Regional organizations are at the ground level of the problem, and, therefore, know who needs aid. Misappropriations of aid, as in Rwanda, can thus be avoided. These actions of mediation, presence, and material aid will be vital in the next decade.

The U.S. military has an important role in international peacekeeping, which was especially apparent in the 1990s. The U.S. military took an active part in Bosnian peacekeeping efforts. In Rwanda, however, the U.S. military failed to help in initial peacekeeping actions. The U.S. military should have a "middle ground" policy in dealing with international peacekeeping. This policy would allow the U.S. to maintain national security and to be active in international peacekeeping efforts. Because of the complicated nature of peacekeeping, the U.S. goals may not always be realized; but U.S. involvement is imperative for peace. As Theodore Roosevelt said, ". . . the man who really counts in the world is the doer, not the mere critic—the man who actually does the work, even if roughly and imperfectly. not the man who only talks or writes about how it ought to be done." The U.S. military aspires to take on this role in international peacekeeping.

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FUTURE OF ANTI-TERRORIST COOPERATION IN COLOMBIA

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise today to draw attention to the

plight of the people of Colombia. For decades they have been plagued by the scourges of drugs, war, and terrorism. Today, thousands, if not millions of Colombians live under constant threat of attack by leftist guerrillas and rightwing paramilitary groups. However, in the recent elections the Colombian people overwhelmingly voted to bring the forces of terror and violence to their knees.

In support of their fight against terror, I believe it is the responsibility of our great Nation to offer its unwavering moral support to the people of Colombia and their democratically elected leaders. Since President Monroe first offered a vision for our Nation's involvement in the Western Hemisphere, the United States has been the guarantor of peace and democracy for all the peoples of the Americas. This is a tradition we must continue.

Consequently, it is time for us as a Nation to explore further extending our support, both moral and physical to the cause of developing the institutes of justice and governance in Colombia. In doing so, we help the Colombians achieve a better way of life and further our own fight against the forces of global terror.

In closing, we should not forego this opportunity to help a neighbor and an ally. I offer my firmest support to the people of Colombia and their fight to eradicate terrorists and criminals in their own country.

Mr. John Norton Moore is a distinguished professor of law and is the Director of the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia. He has written thoughtfully on this matter. I found his remarks to be highly valuable and wish to share them with the Senate. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that an article written by Professor Moore be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ENDING TERRORISM IN COLOMBIA (By John Norton Moore)

The people of Colombia, after years of negotiation with the forces of terror, have courageously voted for their own war on terrorism. For almost four decades, the people of Colombia have been beset with drug lords, old-thinking leftists, and paramilitaries waging war against their democracy and their humanity. Every year in that war a much smaller country than the United States loses more people than were killed in 9/11. Kidnapping runs rampant and the force of law is held hostage to the law of force. It is time for the World to notice Colombia's plight and to join with them to decisively end the terror.

Why should the United States and others help? Simply because unchecked terrorism left free to ravage democracies anywhere ultimately affects us all. Simply because the drug business in Colombia will never be tamed without an end to the armies of terror it feeds. Simply because economic development in Latin America and an extension of hemispheric trade requires the rule of law. Simply because a decisive hemispheric victory over terrorism in Colombia will have powerful deterrent legs in the global war against terrorism. Simply because the people and democracies of Latin America matter. And simply because, as the people of Colombia have just attested, four decades of terror

How can the United States help? Visualizing the ghost of Vietnam, the body politic in the United States has been reluctant to become directly involved in what many see as a domestic struggle in Colombia. Human rights abuses from all sides have further discouraged assistance. Political consensus has only permitted an increased program of aid said to be directed at the war on drugs. Even in a post 9/11 World, it is unlikely that the American body politic wants an Afghan style American military presence on the ground in Colombia. Moreover, America has a full plate in the fight on terror at present, and an important agenda for peace in the Palestinian/Israeli dispute and now the India/ Pakistan dispute. But the alternative is not. and has never been, simply a U.S. military presence in Colombia or terror as usual.

The United States should take the lead in consultations with the new leadership of Colombia and the Organization of American States to put together a powerful Inter-American coalition under the Rio Treaty to decisively and permanently restore the reach of democracy over all of Colombia. The Rio Treaty, as the security arm of the Inter-American system, preceded NATO and, indeed, NATO was largely modeled on it. The Inter-American system as a whole has as a central purpose the protection of democracy and human dignity throughout the region. The Rio Treaty pledges the collective action of all of the American states to deal with threats to the peace to those ends. It is time to put that system to the test.

To be successful such as Inter-American effort would need the full agreement and cooperation of the new Colombian Government. In addition, it must be designed to field an overwhelming response against terror on all fronts and to prevail decisively and promptly. To do this would likely require a sophisticated package with major ground units from leading Latin American states, logistics, technological and intelligence assistance from the United States, a substantial package of economic aid, perhaps coordinated from Nations around the World, and a vigorous human rights effort to accompany the necessary military action. The action should also be coordinated with the United Nations Security Council even though as a matter of international law Colombia has every right simply to request assistance from any nation or the organization of American States to deal with its problem of terror. Further, the action should properly be placed in the global war on terror. Once the plan for overwhelming response has been adopted under the Rio Treaty, a requirement experience shows will lessen casualties on all sides, then the groups in Colombia resisting the rule of law should be given an opportunity to turn over their weapons and unconditionally accept democratic rule from the properly elected Colombia officials. If the perpetrators of terror refuse, the Inter-American plan should be carried out promptly and decisively to restore the rule of law and democracy throughout the proud nation of Colombia.

For many years I have heard brave representatives from Colombia describing the daily terror in their country. I have listened to the stories of car bombs, kidnappings, and a rural judiciary that had to wear running shoes to Court in order to be able to jump out of the window and run when the terrorist arrived. It is time to put those running shoes on those who challenge the rule of law.