

This is one of the worst ideas to come down the pike in a long time. It, obviously, arises out of a philosophy which is attracted to the way things occur in France and in Italy. It is a 1950s form of economics which was in vogue at one time, sort of a quasi-socialist view of the world which says essentially that someone should always be able to receive a benefit from the government, even if they are making choices which are basically counter to what the government policy should be.

It is a view of the world which seems to have incredible disregard for those Americans who are working and who are paying taxes, because it is essentially saying to those Americans who are working hard every day and paying taxes, we are going to subsidize someone to the tune of \$5,000 to take a job they do not necessarily need to take in many instances, but we are going to subsidize them, and then we are not going to ask that person to train. We are not going to ask that person to take a similar job. We are not going to ask that person to stay in the community. We are not going to find out whether that job was agreed to at arm's length. We are not going to check on the abuse. We are not going to check on even whether the person needs the job from a financial situation. We are simply going to pay that person \$5,000 to take less of a job, simply because they were allegedly put out of work as a result of a trade event and because they are over 50 years of age.

It delivers the wrong message to somebody who is working pretty hard, who is under 50 years old and happens to lose their job because they do not have this opportunity. It clearly delivers the wrong message to somebody who is working very hard trying to make ends meet, paying a significant amount of their income in taxes, and suddenly finds they are supporting someone to the tune of a \$5,000 benefit that creates less efficiency, less marketplace productivity, and undermines the basic concept of our approach as a nation to how one remains vibrant in a competitive world.

So this language, I would hope, would be deleted. Tomorrow we will have a vote on it. I appreciate the courtesy of the Senate, and especially the staff of the Senate, for listening.

I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DAYTON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the next Democratic amendments in order following the Torricelli amendment be a Landrieu amendment regarding maritime workers, a Harkin amendment re-

garding child labor, and a Reed of Rhode Island amendment regarding secondary worker TAA benefits. These, of course, will be interspersed with the Republican amendments, if they choose to offer them.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to a period of morning business with Senators allowed to speak therein for a period not to exceed 5 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RUSSELL JANICKE

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I would like to take a moment to commend Russell Janicke on his successful tour as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. *Louisville*. Under Russell's command, the *Louisville* has demonstrated superior tactical and operational competency, pioneered new tactics, and excelled in joint operations.

Russell was recently awarded the Retention Excellence Award for fiscal year 2000. This pennant recognizes ships, aircraft squadrons, shore commands and other units and organizations for achieving high levels of personnel retention—getting sailors to reenlist and stay in the Navy at the end of their first, second, and later terms of enlistment. It is awarded by the two fleet commanders in chief as well as by the commanders of other major commands.

This award is a visible recognition of Russell's commitment to maintaining a command climate that promotes retention. Russell's command's proactive personnel programs have led him to achieve the highest levels of retention excellence and have helped to reduce attrition. By receiving this award along with others, and praise Russell and his crew has received for successful missions, are testimony to his leadership qualities.

Sincere congratulations to Russell on a job well done.

AFGHANISTAN

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, as the *loya jirga* process moves forward in Afghanistan, all of us must realize that U.S. security depends on a political solution in that far-away country that truly creates functioning stability there. All of us know what the costs of an unstable Afghanistan have been—those costs were delivered to us on September 11.

A political solution in Afghanistan, in my opinion, cannot rely solely on the Northern Alliance leaders who control many aspects of the government today. While we have had numerous

military successes in Afghanistan, we must be as serious about our commitment to a truly multi-ethnic political resolution to the country's current ingovernability.

Last week, Dr. Marin Strmecki, a scholar on Afghanistan for the past 20 years, a fine intellectual who served on my staff many years ago, wrote an excellent analysis in the *National Review*. I have much respect for Dr. Strmecki's analysis and would urge my colleagues to read it. I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the *National Review*, May 20, 2002]

WINNING, TRULY, IN AFGHANISTAN

(By Marin J. Strmecki)

In late March, President Bush placed a call to Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of Italy that led to the delay of the departure from Rome of the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah. The king had wanted to return to his war-torn country in the hope of reunifying it—but the U.S. had credible information that there would be an attempt on his life. The most dismaying aspect of this news was that the ringleaders of the plan were members of the Northern Alliance, an Afghan faction closely aligned with the U.S. and propelled into Kabul by the U.S. rout of the Taliban.

This episode illustrates a growing danger: Despite having won militarily in Afghanistan, the U.S. may still lose politically. A complete victory would mean a pro-Western government in Kabul, one that would mop up the remnants of al-Qaeda and cooperate in the larger regional war. But if the U.S. doesn't change its policies soon, radical Islamists could end up in the driver's seat in Afghanistan.

The critical error came last fall, when U.S. officials selected their principal Afghan allies. The Bush administration opted against working with "the Rome group," a faction of Western-oriented Afghans (including the former king) who sought to recreate the country's moderate and secular pre-1978 government. Though it had no forces in the field, the Rome group could have rapidly mobilized sympathetic commanders and fighters, particularly in Taliban strongholds in southern and eastern Afghanistan. The U.S. chose instead to ally itself with the Northern Alliance, a faction supported by Iran and Russia and in control of about 10 percent of the country.

The Northern Alliance was a dubious choice. Two of its principal leaders, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, are major figures in the jihadist movement and were close associates of Osama bin Laden in the 1980s. When Rabbani served as president in the early 1990s, his administration granted visas to the foreign elements of al-Qaeda. Also, he and his party, Jamiat-i-Islami, sought to seize dictatorial power, with his secret-police and interior ministries, led by Qasim Fahim and Yunus Qanooni respectively, killing thousands of members of other political groups. Moreover, Rabbani's Tajik-led military forces carried out atrocities against ethnic Pashtuns in many areas, abuses that contributed greatly to the outbreak of the civil war out of which the Taliban emerged.

Not surprisingly, when Northern Alliance forces rolled into Kabul last fall, its leaders picked up where the Rabbani government had left off. Rabbani himself reoccupied the

presidential palace and appointed ministers and governors, all from his Islamist party. More troubling, the Northern Alliance opened the doors to Russian and Iranian advisers and intelligence operatives, who arrived in Kabul on a steady stream of air transports. Fahim, now the defense minister, garrisoned his forces in the capital and staffed the military high command exclusively with his political cronies and former Communist officers selected by his Russian allies.

Though international pressure forced the creation of a coalition government in late December, all of the powerful ministries—defense, interior, and foreign affairs—remained in the hands of the Northern Alliance. Qanooni, again the interior minister, and Fahim proceeded to use their power to harass political opponents, with several senior officials reportedly taking part in the assassination in January of a cabinet minister associated with the Rome group.

The Northern Alliance's winner-take-all approach threatens U.S. interests. First of all, the interim government has not been much help to U.S. forces against al-Qaeda in the south and east, where Pashtuns remember all too well the atrocities of the Rabbani government and seek to hold the new government at arm's length. Second, its Iranian allies have established two Hezbollah-style clandestine networks, Sepah-e-Mohammed and Sepah-e-Sahaba, to wage a campaign of Lebanon-style attacks designed to bog down the U.S. or even force it to withdraw. Third, Northern Alliance leaders have sought to delay or subvert the scheduled June meeting of the national assembly, or *loya jirga*, which is the key event in the planned transition to a more representative government. Fourth, if the dominance of the Northern Alliance persists, the Pashtuns (40-45 percent of the population) could rise up in a renewed civil war, and offer Pakistan's intelligence service an opportunity to reestablish its pernicious practice of supporting Taliban-style movements in Afghanistan.

The Bush administration must act carefully—but quickly. First, the U.S. must assert itself as the dominant foreign power in Afghanistan until the transition is completed (when elections take place in about two years). Bush has made excellent statements indicating that the U.S. will remain engaged over the long haul. In practical terms, this means that the U.S.—even as it moves on to other theaters—must retain sufficient strike power in the region to cow the Afghan factions. The U.S. also must check the roles of Russia and Iran. Although Bush encouraged Russia's President Putin to bolster the Northern Alliance as it fought to topple the Taliban, he must now explain to Putin that stability can only come from pluralism in an open political process—and that Moscow needs to rein in its client. The U.S. must also insist that the Afghan authorities cut off incoming flights from Iran.

Second, the U.S. must signal a shift away from its excessive reliance on the Northern Alliance. It should emphasize the need to pluralize Afghan politics and to distribute important cabinet seats more broadly: The stacking of ministries with Northern Alliance appointees—often incompetent and in many cases illiterate—must not be allowed to stand. The coalition should further insist that—with the deployment of the International security assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul—Northern Alliance troops begin to be redeployed back to their native provinces. At the same time, the U.S. and its allies must try to level the playing field for the *loya jirga*. Russia and Iran have provided vast amounts of money to the Northern Alliance to buy political support; the U.S. should assist pro-Western parties, just as it did in Europe after World War II.

Third, the U.S. should insist that the *loya jirga* end the current imbalance of power favoring the Northern Alliance. We should also demand that every new minister be professionally qualified for his position and that no minister have a history of massive human-rights abuses. These criteria would preclude reappointment of Qanooni and Fahim, who were deeply involved in massacres in the early and mid 1990s. This step is essential to opening a new chapter in Afghanistan's troubled recent history.

Fourth, the U.S. should take the lead—but with the smallest possible footprint—in solving the security problem in Afghanistan. The ISAF should not be drawn into policing Afghanistan. If its mission expands geographically, a larger deployment—even one with as many as 20,000 additional troops—would be spread so thinly as to be militarily meaningless. The primary U.S. goal should be, rather, the creation of professional, nonpolitical, and ethnically balanced police and military services. This would require playing an intrusive role in rebuilding Afghan security services, similar to the one the U.S. played in El Salvador in the 1980s. Qualified Afghan personnel are available, at home and abroad, and many were not involved in factional politics during the 1990s. Even before the defeat of the Taliban, members of the Rome group had organized an association of former officers of the Afghan armed forces and police in anticipation of the need to rebuild the government; the U.S. should use these professionals to form core groups in each agency or service who would then recruit and train their subordinates and line officers.

Because of its poverty, Afghanistan should have a military limited to approximately 50,000 troops, though these forces must have sufficient mobility to deploy rapidly anywhere in the country. This limits the scope of the task of rebuilding the armed forces, and the process could readily be completed in two to three years. Only by creating such a professional military force can the U.S. have a local ally sufficiently able to hunt down remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda elements and preclude their return after the U.S. moves on to other theaters.

Fifth, the U.S. must be willing to fund the operations of the Afghan government—and particularly its police and military services—until its capacity to raise revenues has been reestablished. Providing sufficient pay for troops is crucial, because it enables the government to draw the best personnel away from factional armies, such as those of the Northern Alliance, and from regional warlords.

Together, these actions can, over time, secure a political outcome commensurate with the victory won by American arms last fall. But the adjustment in policy is badly needed. If we stay on the present course, the most likely outcome is a Northern Alliance-dominated government—a result that will leave Islamists like Rabbani in power, extend Iranian and Russian influence, and set the stage for renewed civil war when Pakistan eventually reengages in Afghanistan's politics. If the United States wisely recalibrates, it can establish a moderate and pro-Western state in Afghanistan, an outcome that will have a powerful and unmistakable demonstration effect for those who seek positive political change in the members of the Axis of Evil.

VOTE EXPLANATION

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to discuss my absence during the vote to table the Senate amendment No. 3419 offered by my colleague Senator LIEBERMAN. Although my vote would

not have affected the outcome, I would have voted to table the amendment. The language in the legislation, which was also included in the Jordan Free Trade Agreement signed into law on September 28, 2001, is vital to ensuring that Congress preserves its exclusive right to establish and enforce U.S. labor and environmental standards.

During the vote I was attending a White House signing ceremony for H.R. 169, the Notification and Federal Employee Anti-discrimination and Retaliation Act, "No FEAR" Act. I was the sponsor of this legislation in the Senate, S. 201—the Federal Employee Protection Act.

The press has referred to the No FEAR Act as "the first civil rights bill of the new century." It significantly strengthens existing laws protecting Federal employees from discrimination, harassment, and retaliation for whistle blowing in the workplace. It is an unfortunate fact that too many federal employees are subjected to such treatment with alarming regularity.

I am pleased that President Bush has signed this important legislation and honored I was invited to the Oval Office for the signing ceremony. No FEAR will promote a more productive work environment by ensuring agencies enforce the laws intended to protect Federal employees.

LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2001

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about hate crimes legislation I introduced with Senator KENNEDY in March of last year. The Local Law Enforcement Act of 2001 would add new categories to current hate crimes legislation sending a signal that violence of any kind is unacceptable in our society.

I would like to describe a terrible crime that occurred in January 1998 in Springfield, IL. A gay man was abducted, tortured, and robbed. The attacker, Thomas Goacher, 27, was charged with a hate crime, aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, and aggravated battery in connection with the incident.

I believe that government's first duty is to defend its citizens, to defend them against the harms that come out of hate. The Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2001 is now a symbol that can become substance. I believe that by passing this legislation and changing current law, we can change hearts and minds as well.

COMMEMORATING MAY 15TH AS PEACE OFFICERS MEMORIAL DAY

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today more than 15,000 peace officers are expected to gather in Washington, D.C. to join with and honor the families of federal, state, and local officers who were killed in the line of duty.