

unemployment compensation program of up to 26 weeks financed by the State, then a Federally-funded Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation of up to an additional 13 weeks, and finally up to another 13 weeks for high unemployment states. By changing the trigger under this new proposal, we are saying more stages are eligible for extended benefits. We are saying benefits would be available in all states not just for 13 weeks but for 26 weeks, with some States even for an additional 7 weeks. This is getting expensive. This new plan is \$10 billion more than a straight extension.

Someone said we did this in 1990. That may not be the right way to do it. I am willing to work with my colleagues to provide assistance for those people in the States that really need help, but we ought to be very accurate in our language and not try to push something through too quickly. We ought to be responsible. We have enormous deficits now. We should try to do this in a fiscally responsible manner, so the bill can be signed. I will work with my colleagues from Massachusetts, from Minnesota, and others to see if we can come up with a bill that is affordable and has bipartisan support.

At this stage, you have to have almost unanimous support. I will work with my colleagues to see if we can

come up with it. The bill before the Senate, S. 3009, in my opinion, should not be passed. Maybe we can come up with a straight 13-week extension as we have done previously in the Senate. I will work with my colleagues and the Senator from Nevada to see if we can get something done. A straight extension would cost an estimated \$7.3 billion instead of \$17.1 billion. That is a possible.

This bill that would cost \$17 billion and would rewrite unemployment figures—I don't think that makes sense. Maybe we can work together and find something that is acceptable. I appreciate the cooperation of my colleagues.

I ask unanimous consent to have a preliminary CBO cost estimate printed.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, October 2, 2002.

Hon. KENT CONRAD,
Chairman, Committee on the Budget,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to a number of requests for information on the budgetary impact of S. 3009, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 2002, the Congressional Budget Office has prepared an estimate of the cost of that bill, as introduced on September 26, 2002.

S. 3009 would increase the number of weeks of Temporary Emergency Unemployment

Compensation (TEUC) available to unemployed workers who exhaust their regular unemployment benefits. Under current law, up to 13 weeks of TEUC benefits are available in all states, with an additional 13 weeks available in states with a high unemployment rate. The TEUC program is scheduled to end on January 1, 2003, with no benefits paid after that date. S. 3009 would increase the number of weeks of TEUC benefits paid in all states to 26, with an additional seven weeks available in states with high unemployment. In addition, the bill would allow eligible unemployed workers to begin to collect TEUC until July 1, 2003. Those receiving benefits by that date would be able to collect benefits until October 14, 2003.

As shown in the following table, CBO estimates that enactment of S. 3009 would increase direct spending by \$17.1 billion in fiscal year 2003. The effect over 10 years would be smaller—\$15.5 billion—because the increase in spending on emergency benefits would eliminate anticipated transfers over the 2009-2012 period from the federal accounts in the unemployment trust fund to the state benefit accounts.

Revenues would increase by about \$4.8 billion over the 10-year period. CBO estimates that state employment tax revenues, which are counted as federal receipts in the unemployment trust fund, would rise both to pay for the increase in regular unemployment compensation that would result from enacting the bill, and to make up for the reduction in revenues that states would otherwise have received in the form of intergovernmental transfers. These estimates assume that the bill will be enacted in October 2002.

ESTIMATED BUDGETARY IMPACT OF S. 3009, THE EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT OF 2002

	By fiscal year, in millions of dollars—									
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Estimated Budget Authority	17,100	400	0	0	0	0	-495	-505	-515	-525
Estimated Outlays	17,100	400	0	0	0	0	-495	-505	-515	-525
Estimated Revenues	0	230	330	330	270	230	250	560	1,080	1,540

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Christina Hawley Sadoti.

Sincerely,

BARRY B. ANDERSON
(For Dan L. Crippen, Director).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, we have a list of speakers who will begin the debate this morning. Senator REED of Rhode Island was given 45 minutes under the order by the Chair. I ask unanimous consent to substitute Senator LEAHY to speak for up to 30 minutes in exchange for Senator REED's time. We will work Senator REED in later.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, how much time does the majority retain?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eleven and one-half minutes.

Mr. REID. We have a number of Republicans here. They are ready to go. Why don't we let them go? If we decide to use that time, we will use it later. I ask unanimous consent that we proceed in that fashion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Missouri.

THE IRAQ RESOLUTION

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I take this opportunity to discuss the very serious matter that is before us today and this week. This is, I trust, going to be a very somber discussion as we had approximately 11 years ago when this body approved the actions which led to Desert Storm. Unfortunately, at that time we did not solve the problems confronting us as a result of Saddam Hussein and his murderous regime in Iraq.

As we move toward a resolution authorizing the use of force against the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, let us be clear about the intent. This resolution we will send a clear message to the world community and to the Iraqi regime that the demands of the United Nations Security Council must be followed. Saddam Hussein must be disarmed.

For over a decade now we have tried every means of diplomacy, sanctions, and inspections to encourage Saddam to keep the promises that he made after the gulf war. Nothing has worked. Saddam has made a mockery of the United Nations resolutions and the threat he now poses to the world is significant and growing.

President Bush stated last night that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein is a "murderous tyrant" who could attack the United States "on any given day" using unmanned aerial vehicles loaded with chemical or biological weapons. Iraq is unique. By its past and present actions, by its technological capabilities, by the merciless nature of its regime, Iraq is unique. Iraq is a true present danger to the United States. As a former chief weapons inspector of the U.N. has said:

The fundamental problem with Iraq remains the nature of the regime, itself. Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction.

The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more and, according to the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given. The regime has long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist groups, and we now know that there are al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq. In fact, senior members of the Iraqi government and members of the al Qaeda network have been in contact for many years. This regime is seeking a nuclear weapon and the delivery capability to go with it.

There have been reports in the past from Desert Storm that rather than having the acquisition of a nuclear weapon years in advance, it could have been within a year that they could have developed a nuclear weapon. Had he waited until he had that nuclear device before he invaded Kuwait, we would have been in a far different position as we attempted at that time to expel him from Kuwait.

The Iraqi dictator has answered a decade of resolutions with a decade of defiance. In the Southern and Northern No-fly zones over Iraq, coalition aircraft continue to be fired on and coalition pilots continue to put their lives on the line to enforce these resolutions.

There is an ongoing war that Saddam Hussein has carried out against the coalition which is seeking to enforce United Nations resolutions. Just this year alone, coalition aircraft have been fired on over 400 times. Since Saddam Hussein made what I believe, from past experience, will be shown to be a hollow promise to cooperate with the United Nations, they have fired on coalition aircraft more than 47 times. Saddam Hussein is a master at saying one thing and doing another.

As President Bush has stated in the past:

The Iraqi regime is led by a dangerous and brutal man. We know he is actively seeking the destructive technologies to match his hatred. And we know that he must be stopped. The dangers we face will only worsen from month to month and year to year. To ignore these threats is to encourage them—and when they have fully materialized, it may be too late to protect ourselves and our allies. By then, the Iraqi dictator will have had the means to terrorize and dominate the region, and each passing day could be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives anthrax or VX nerve gas or someday a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group.

The mantle of leadership requires this body to act. We have seen the results of a decade of speaking loudly and carrying a soft stick.

We have pointed out, in past years, the danger of this regime. We have called for changes. We have asked the United Nations to strengthen its resolutions. We have asked Saddam Hussein to readmit inspectors to assure us there are no deadly weapons of mass destruction being stockpiled. We have been rejected at all points.

Let us act now and pass this resolution in support of our President. This resolution is needed to send an important signal to our allies and to the United Nations. With our leadership, I am convinced the President will build a robust coalition to say no to Saddam Hussein. It will tell the world we are serious about disarmament, and it will reaffirm our message to Saddam Hussein.

Approving this resolution does not mean military action is imminent or unavoidable. The resolution will tell the United Nations and all nations America speaks with one voice and is determined to make the demands of the civilized world mean something.

If we do not act, then we face the terrible dangers of an attack with weapons of mass destruction. If the United Nations does not act, it faces the prospect of joining the League of Nations on the dustbin of history: an international organization, organized with the highest purposes, and by its inaction shown to be ineffective.

I believe and I trust we will give a strong vote, a bipartisan vote, in support of this resolution. I believe building on that resolution we will build a coalition, and our world will be a safer place, even though we have to take the risks that are necessary and that come with this resolution in order to secure that safety and that peace for ourselves, our children, and our future.

Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution. I look forward to working with them on this matter.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise to speak today on the resolution before this body concerning the use of force against Iraq.

For the third time in 12 years, the Senate is considering a resolution to address a threat posed by Saddam Hussein to America as well as to the global community.

As I said on the floor of the House of Representatives when I was a Member of that body in 1991, on behalf of the authorization of what would become Operation Desert Storm:

[T]he magnitude of the vote I now face is greater than any other I have or likely will cast.

That is true any time we consider whether to potentially place American men and women in harm's way. That is why I approached this particular vote with the deliberation and the solemnity it demands.

During that 1991 debate, I concluded Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait "threatened in infancy a new decade of hope." As I said at the time, I voted as I did:

... not because the military option is inevitable, but in order not to undermine the President's efforts to achieve a peaceful outcome to this crisis—efforts which require that a credible military threat be maintained against a brutal aggressor who only understands the language of force. A credible threat is necessary against a man who has raised one of the world's largest armies, used chemical weapons against his own people, invaded two neighbors and is developing nuclear and biological capabilities. We are hardly dealing with a man of peace in Saddam Hussein.

History, regrettably, has a way of repeating itself. Because 7 years later, in 1998, the Senate unanimously passed a resolution which found Iraq in "material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations" under previous U.N. resolutions—including Security Council Resolution 687 that set the terms and conditions for the 1991 ceasefire—and urged the President "to take appropriate action . . . to bring Iraq

into compliance with its international obligations." But compliance, as we know, never followed.

Which brings us to today, to the resolution we have before us, and to the two fundamental questions that are being asked here in Washington, in Maine, and throughout America: Why Saddam Hussein? And why now?

As to the first question, I have come to the conclusion—based on the facts—that Saddam Hussein's continued, aggressive production of weapons of mass destruction presents a real and immediate global mess, particularly in light of the absence of any U.N.-mandated inspectors over the last 4 years. Indeed, it was just 4 months after Congress passed the 1998 resolution that Hussein drove out the U.N. weapons inspectors.

And what were those inspectors leaving behind? A 1999 report by Richard Butler, the chief inspector, UNSCOM, found when they left Iraq, they were unable to account for 360 tons of bulk chemical agent, including 1½ tons of VX nerve agent, 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals, enough growth media to manufacture 25,000 liters of anthrax spores, and 30,000 special munitions for delivering of chemical and biological agents.

Today, there is no reason to believe Hussein has ever looked back. As reported in the U.S. intelligence community document made public on October 4, 2002, he has been seeking to revamp and accelerate his nuclear weapons program. The report concluded that if left unchecked, Iraq would "probably have a nuclear weapon during this decade," and that if Hussein could acquire weapons-grade fissile material from abroad "it could make a nuclear weapon within a year."

This information is echoed in the September 24, 2002, intelligence dossier released by British Prime Minister Tony Blair—a critical voice and ally in our war on terrorism. That dossier outlines Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs past and present.

It finds Hussein, following the departure of U.N. inspectors in 1998, is aggressively pursuing development of a nuclear capability, and is undeniably seeking items needed to enrich uranium, such as fissile material and gas centrifuge components like vacuum pumps and specialized aluminum tubes. Tellingly, the report also documents Iraq's attempts to buy large quantities of uranium from Africa, even though Iraq has no civil nuclear power program. All of this is in breach of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687.

Furthermore, the October 4 report states that Iraq is capable of "quickly producing and weaponizing" a variety of both chemical and biological agents, including anthrax, "for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the U.S. homeland." Both reports highlight that Hussein's weapons are hidden in "highly survivable" facilities, some of them mobile, and, of course, in further violation of

Resolution 687, his unrelenting effort to expand his ballistic missile capabilities beyond 150 kilometers.

Finally, the October 4 report found that Iraq has rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during U.S. cruise missile strikes in 1998. Iraq has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX—all lethal chemical toxins.

All of this is in flagrant violation not only of the case-fire resolution, but also 12 other U.S. calls for disarmament over the ensuing 11 years. So it should come as no surprise that the Security Council would have issued 30 letters of condemnation to Iraq over this last decade alone.

Iraq was condemned for failures to cooperate fully and immediately, failures to allow immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access, and failures to fulfill all of its obligations as set out in previous resolutions. The bottom line is, in every instance, he has failed to comply—and the U.N. has failed to enforce.

Which brings us to the question of: Why now? What urgency has interjected itself that would necessitate the actions we contemplate today? My answer begins not by citing a single fact or occurrence, but rather by illustrating a new, encroaching threat over the past decade that was foreshadowed by the first attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor—the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.

I believe that was the seminal moment when our enemies of today were introduced to the realm of the possible—as those who would wish our destruction developed and implemented comprehensive strategies to systematically assault Americans and our interests whenever, wherever, and however they could.

It also should have been an awakening for America. That is why I spearheaded investigations into the comings and goings of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the mastermind of that bombing in 1993, who entered and existed this country five times totally unimpeded.

What I found led me to introduce legislation in 1994, requiring information sharing among critical Government agencies, to ensure those on the front lines of securing America would have the resources to keep dangerous aliens from entering the U.S. But there were those who didn't take the threat seriously, and those reforms were quietly altered, and allowed to fade out of law in 1998, and out of the national consciousness.

Now, as we peel back the layers through further investigation, we discovered the Sheikh was closely tied to Osama bin Laden and the network we now know as al-Qaida. The point is, over the decade of the 1990s and into the fledgling days of the 21st century, our consciousness was not attuned to the emerging pattern of attacks, and so the pattern continued—from Khobar

Towers in 1996, to the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, to the attack on the USS *Cole* in the fall of 2000, and culminating in the horrific events of September 11, 2001.

That terrible day would finally and forever change the way we assess our security and vulnerability, single-handedly adding the term "homeland Security" to our national lexicon. It has changed our conception of what constitutes weapons and warfare—and how both may be used against us.

To paraphrase Governor Ridge, we are now compelled to come to grips with an enemy who makes no distinction between combatants and non-combatants. The battlefield itself has changed—today, asymmetrical threats accost us in a theater of engagement that includes our own backyard. There is no line of demarcation.

Before September 11, we underestimated the threat, and overestimated our security. That is why the Senate and House have been holding joint intelligence hearings, to determine how we can learn from failures of the past. The lapses were so egregious that it prompted our recent vote to authorize an independent commission, to conduct a more far-reaching inquiry into how we could have done better and how we must do better in the future.

Because there is no longer any question as to the scope of the threat—and the ability and intent of terrorist groups to bring devastation to our soil. As Secretary Rumsfeld said:

We have entered a world in which terrorist movements and terrorist states are developing the capacity to cause unprecedented destruction. Today, our margin of error is notably different. In the 20th century, we were dealing, for the most part, with conventional weapons—weapons that could kill hundreds of thousands of people, generally combatants. In the 21st century, we are dealing with weapons of mass destruction that can kill potentially tens of thousands of people—innocent men, women and children.

It is through this prism of the post-September 11 world that we must view an ever emerging convergence of threats over the last 10 years, represented on the one hand by transnational terrorism exemplified by al-Qaida—with cells in more than 30 countries—and on the other by a regime in Iraq that has already developed and deployed horrific weapons of mass destruction.

Even as far back as 1991, the United Nations was concerned enough about a potential linkage between terrorists and Saddam Hussein to include in Resolution 687 a requirement that Iraq inform the Security Council:

that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory . . .

Today, we know from Secretary Rumsfeld that "al-Qaida is operating in Iraq". . . that we have "accurate and not debatable" evidence of reportedly the presence of senior members of Al-Qaida in Baghdad, and other associations.

Iraq has also reportedly provided safe haven to Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of the FBI's most wanted terrorists, who was a key participant in the first World Trade Center bombing.

We also know that Saddam Hussein continues to provide \$25,000 rewards to the families of suicide bombers in the Middle East, continues to harbor the Abu Nidal Organization, and continues to harbor the Palestinian Liberation Front.

And so the question we really need to ask ourselves is, why is Hussein so single-mindedly and at all costs amassing such huge stores of horrific weapons? We know he has them. We know he has used them before. The question is, will he use them again?

The answer is that we don't know for certain. But from all I have been able to ascertain from high-level briefings, the logical conclusion—based on all the evidence, all the broken promises, all the obfuscation. And now the nexus between Hussein and terrorist groups and individuals—is that we simply can't afford the risk to humanity.

Some say we should wait until the threat is imminent. But how will we know when the danger is clear, present and immediate? When people start checking into hospitals? When the toxin shows up in the water supply? When the dirty bomb goes off?

Because, in the shadowy world of terrorism, as we have seen, that will already be too late. For these are not weapons that can be easily intercepted or anticipated. They aren't detected by sonar, and they don't show up on radar screens. Therefore, the standard by which we judge the level and immediacy of threat must be calibrated accordingly.

In the instance of Iraq, for a terrorist organization that shares Hussein's disdain for America, where better to acquire weapons of mass destruction? And for Saddam Hussein, what better way to deliver these weapons than a terrorist who might smuggle a vial of smallpox in a suitcase or store a canister of sarin gas in a cargo container or launch a drone aircraft or other unmanned aerial vehicle that sprays aerosolized biological agents.

In fact, Richard Butler, the former chief U.N. weapons inspector, was asked in an interview on October 8, 2002, "how easy it would be . . . for the Iraqis to arm a terrorist group, or an individual terrorist, with weapons of mass destruction." It would be "extremely easy." Ambassador Butler told the interviewer. "If they decided to do it, it would be a piece of cake."

It is true we cannot enter the diabolical mind of Saddam Hussein to know conclusively if and when he may deliver his weapons—or share those weapons with terrorists organizations. But we do have an obligation to make a judgment on which side of the equation we want to err—knowing he has the means and opportunity to strike, and knowing we will put potentially millions at risk should we misread his inclination, miscalculate this timing, or underestimate his capability.

And we have been wrong before. According to Secretary Rumsfeld, before Operation Desert Storm, “these best intelligence estimates were that Iraq was at least 5 to 7 years away from having nuclear weapons. The experts were wrong. When the U.S. got on the ground, it found the Iraqis were probably 6 months to a year away . . .” Just imagine if we were confronted with an Iraq that already had nuclear capability.

Today he is procuring his weapons with the \$6.6 billion in illicit revenue GAO estimates he has gained over the last 4 years through oil smuggling and “surcharges.” When you consider that al-Qaida spent merely \$500,000 to inflict such horror as we saw in New York, Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon, that equation becomes even more ominous—all the more so as September 11 raised our sense of urgency and illuminated a whole new range of dangerous scenarios that place Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction in a very different light.

As Henry Kissinger warned the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 26, “We are only at the beginning of global proliferation,” and thus we need to “consider not only the risk of action but the consequences of inaction.” In context of all we know—we can no longer assure Americans that he can be contained and confined to Iraq. Therefore, I believe the world must disarm Saddam Hussein now, when the development of his capability is imminent—not waiting until it is imminent he is about to strike.

In the absence of true strength of enforcement, Hussein will continue to exploit our every weakness through his methodical “cheat and retreat,” as he has done systematically and persistently in the past—resulting in more of the old dynamic of U.N. resolutions and economic sanctions, followed by the repeated inability of the U.N. to enforce its own mandates.

To change this paradigm, the President has now rightfully come to Congress to seek authorization and support for a resolution ensuring that when he speaks, he does so with the strength of a unified, unequivocal American voice that leaves no ambivalence as to the resoluteness of our position . . . no doubt where America stands.

Given the gravity of the global implications of Hussein’s serial intransigence, there is no substitute for the U.N. enforcing compliance, or for the U.S. working through the U.N. Appropriately, this resolution calls upon the President to use the full weight of this office, first and foremost through his diplomatic means and persuasive power—as well as that of his foreign policy team—to convince the U.N. to impose and enforce unfettered, unrestricted inspections. And as Secretary of State Powell has noted, “our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations would be helped by a strong Congressional resolution. . . .”

Furthermore, as many of my colleagues, as well as my constituents,

have expressed, the use of force should be the last resort, and under this resolution it is the last resort. The President emphasized in his speech to the Nation that, “congressional authorization does not mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable.”

I realize there are those who oppose unilateral action should the U.N. fail to act, and accordingly would oppose this resolution granting such Presidential authority. But for those who would ultimately preserve the right to authorize military action—even if we cannot secure a U.N. mandate for enforcement—this resolution is preferable to a two-tiered approach.

Why? In my view, by granting military authority to the President in advance, it leaves no question or uncertainty as to the level of our commitment, thereby strengthening the President’s ability to secure U.N. implementation of a new and enforceable resolution and potentially places us on a course toward a peaceful disarmament. As always, diplomacy must constitute our first line of defense. But in the event that action becomes necessary to safeguard our national security interests outside the auspices of the United Nations, let there be no mistake—the President must exert the last full measure of effort in building an international coalition to join us in disarming Saddam Hussein, because this shouldn’t have to be a solo endeavor for our nation.

Iraq is not just a threat to America. It is a threat to all of humanity. It is not just our interests we are protecting, it is the interests of a new century that must be free from the scourge of global terrorism. And our goals with regard to Saddam Hussein are inseparable from our mission to eradicate terror at its roots.

I have come to the regrettable conclusion that if we allow the Iraqi regime to continue developing its horrific capabilities with impunity, we are endangering mankind by sending a corrosive message that the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction buys immunity from international response.

If the United States and its allies offer nothing but disapproving rhetoric or ineffective sanctions as the only price for Iraq’s hostility and defiance, then we concede a victory to the tactics of aggression. Rather, if the free nations of the world are to remain the authors of our own destiny, history teaches us that we must never countenance the tyranny of such threats.

As Winston Churchill wrote in 1936 of the tyrants building stocks of state-of-the-art weapons of the day:

Dictators ride to and fro upon tigers which they dare not dismount. And the tigers are getting hungry.

The world can no longer ignore the tiger in Iraq.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a transcript of the “Today Show” of October 8, 2002, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MATT LAUER (co-host): As we reported, President Bush laid out his case against Saddam Hussein again in a speech on Monday night in Cincinnati. He talked about Iraq’s capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. Richard Butler was chief U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq and the last person to oversee an inspection team in Baghdad. Mr. Butler, good morning to you.

Mr. RICHARD BUTLER (Former U.N. Weapons Inspector): Good morning, Matt. Good to see you.

LAUER: Good to see you. In his speech last night, the president actually quoted you, saying that Saddam Hussein is, quote, “addicted to weapons of mass destruction.” You were last in Iraq in 1998, and before your inspection team was kicked out . . .

Mr. BUTLER: Mm-hmm.

LAUER: . . . you said, and I’m quoting a Time magazine article, quote, “you saw some really disturbing stuff,” end quote. Be more specific. What did you see that we should be afraid of now?

Mr. BUTLER: Well, in particular, Matt, one of the substances that the president mentioned last night, in may I say what I thought was an outstanding speech, I think the best he’s given, that substance is called VX. It is the most toxic of the chemical warfare agents. And we saw some deeply disturbing evidence that Iraq had made a very significant quantity of VX. I was pleased to see the president refer to that last night. We also saw evidence that they had loaded it into missile warheads. That’s the—the difficulty Iraq has always had, is how to weaponize this hideous stuff that they make and they continue to make. And in the case of VX, we saw evidence that they had loaded it into missile warheads for delivery.

LAUER: Iraq has agreed to let UN weapons inspection teams back into the country with limitations. They will not be allowed to inspect Saddam Hussein’s personal palaces. Is that worth anything, in your opinion?

Mr. BUTLER: No, it’s not, Matt. I’m really slightly stunned to think that we are now exactly where we were four years ago. And by the way, it’s not palaces, it’s presidential sites. The—the parts of Iraq that the Iraqis declared in the past to be of presidential significance measured some 75 square kilometers, you know, 50 square miles, much larger than the eight palaces that Saddam has. The number of buildings is what was really important in those presidential sites. It . . .

LAUER: What’s going on at . . .

Mr. BUTLER: . . . was 1,100 . . .

LAUER: . . . those sites . . .

Mr. BUTLER: . . . buildings.

LAUER: . . . in our opinion?

Mr. BUTLER: Well, no, we—we can’t know without inspection. But we had excellent intelligence information in the past that weapons were stored there, that materials, with which to make weapons were stored there. Matt, it’s always been the same, and it is the same today. The Iraqis say they have no weapons, OK. If they don’t, let the inspectors in. And what they have tried to do today, as they did four years ago, is say you can come in up to a point . . .

LAUER: Right.

Mr. BUTLER: . . . but not in the places that we say are presidential. That’s not good enough.

LAUER: And real, real quickly, how easy would it be, in your opinion, Mr. Butler, for the Iraqis to arm a terrorist group or an individual terrorist with weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. BUTLER: Really quickly, Matt? Extremely easy. If they decide to do it, piece of cake.

LAUER: Richard Butler. Mr. Butler, thanks very much for your time.

Mr. BUTLER: Thank you.

LAUER: It's 17 after the hour. Once again, here's Katie.

KATIE COURIC (co-host): Thanks, Matt.

Ms. SNOWE. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LEAHY). Without objection, it is so ordered.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, morning business is closed.

AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES AGAINST IRAQ

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of S.J. Res. 45, which the clerk will report.

The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:

A joint resolution (S.J. Res. 45) to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

Pending:

Lieberman/Warner Modified Amendment No. 4856, in the nature of a substitute.

Graham Amendment No. 4857 (to Amendment No. 4856), in the nature of a substitute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The senior Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. The Senate now turns to the resolution, it is my understanding.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. WARNER. The leadership has indicated there have been expressions of interest to speak this morning from Senator FEINGOLD for approximately 30 minutes; Senator KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON for 30 minutes; the Presiding Officer, Senator LEAHY, for 20 minutes; and Senator GRASSLEY for 20 minutes.

Further, we have expressions on this side by about half a dozen other Members who would hope to speak during the course of the day and the afternoon, but we will await announcement of names and times until the other side indicates the expression of interest on their side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, what is the pending business before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. I am advised it is the Graham second degree amendment.

Mr. MCCAIN. I thank the President for informing me of what the pending

business is before the Senate. I urge my colleagues to come and speak on behalf or in opposition to the Graham amendment so we can dispose of that amendment. It is my intention to move to table the Graham amendment after a reasonable length of time for my colleagues to come and speak for or against that amendment, which is my right, as is any Senator's right, but I want to make sure every Senator has the time, if they so wish, to speak on the pending business.

I see my dear friend from Wisconsin in the Chamber. I know he is talking about the overall issue. We need Senators to speak on the Graham amendment. I am sure my friend from Wisconsin and my colleague from West Virginia would be glad to speak, but we need to dispose of the pending Graham amendment and move on to other amendments.

I understand by 1 p.m. all amendments have to be filed. So let us move on and dispose of the Graham amendment.

I yield the floor.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, in debating this resolution on which we spent so much time and so much thought, we are making one of the most important decisions we have ever faced. The decision to send American troops into battle is not one we take lightly and I don't take lightly.

There is much at stake for this Nation. There is much at stake for the State of Nevada. Thousands of men and women in Nevada would undoubtedly be called to support or directly serve in a military conflict with Iraq. Our pilots from Fallon Naval Air Station and Nellis Air Force Base are considered the best aviators in the world. I know they would be asked to play a leading role in eliminating the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.

I am personally very grateful for the contributions that would be made by the National Guard and Reserve forces not only from Nevada but from across our country. These heroic citizen soldiers are such an integral part of the American military. We simply could not succeed without them. We must be mindful that their sacrifices are great because they leave their families and civilian occupations behind and become citizen soldiers. They serve proudly on behalf of our Nation. When called upon, they do not complain. They did not question the need to act. They did not ask why.

However, we must explain that these brave men and women are the reason for making this life-and-death decision. Therefore, I rise today to explain to one man why I intend to vote and how I intend to vote. That man is President George W. Bush. I say, President Bush, your father may recall that a decade ago I was the first Democrat in this body to publicly support his request for congressional authorization to make war to free Kuwait. At that time, I compared Saddam Hussein to Benito Mussolini. My position has not

changed, although I believe our continued efforts have degraded Hussein from a second-grade dictator to a third-rate thug.

In 1991, I said I thought the constitutional role of the Chief Executive is to make war. That is our role—halt or prevent an unjust or unwise conflict. I stated my strong belief that the President must be able to use the diplomatic corps and the Marine Corps with equal facility, subject only to our power to force a halt to actions taken contrary to the national interests.

President Bush, I intend once again to vote to give you that power on a geographically limited basis, but I do so with more reluctance because the situation has changed. We do not, as we did 10 years ago, face a dictator who successfully invaded a tiny and relatively defenseless neighbor.

We have not enlisted, as your father did so magnificently, the whole world to fight by our side. We have not yet convinced our people or the world that international law is on our side, or that we are champions of the new world order envisioned by your father in which the power of a nation is measured by the strength of its moral values and not by the size of its Armed Forces.

President Bush, the core ideal which motivated the Founding Fathers was that this would be a nation of laws not men. As such a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that we should declare the causes which impel our action. Our quarrel with Iraq is not about one two-bit tin-horn dictator. Rather, it is, and it ought to, be explained as a question of the rule of law.

I am voting you this power, Mr. President, because I know this nation would be justified in making war to enforce the terms we impose on Iraq in 1991, if we have to. But I am also voting you this power secure in the knowledge that no President of the United States of whatever political philosophy, will take this nation to war as a first resort alternative rather than as a last resort.

I found most encouraging your speech on Monday when you said war was not inevitable.

I urge you Mr. President to continue to make the case to the American people and to the world. The international coalition you have started to build is critical, not only for military and cost-sharing reasons, but also to assist in the rebuilding of Iraq.

Your father chose not to carry our fight into the cities of Iraq in 1991, and we have to live with his decision. He gave the Iraqi leadership a chance to reenter the community of peaceful nations. Saddam Hussein has squandered that opportunity.

We stopped the fighting based on an agreement that Iraq would take steps to assure the world that it would not engage in further aggression and that it would destroy its weapons of mass destruction. It has refused to take those steps. That refusal constitutes a breach of the armistice which renders