

can provide for their own retirement and, for that matter, health and medical needs." In July, Secretary O'Neill stated that "The Social Security trust fund does not consist of real economic assets."

Again, it is hard to argue that those are ringing endorsements of Social Security. If the Treasury Secretary believes that the assets in the trust fund are just worthless paper, why should Social Security beneficiaries have any faith in a certificate or in an administration to protect their best interests?

Most important, there is the President's Commission on Social Security. All of those appointed to the Commission last May were supporters of privatization, which may explain why none of those appointed to the Commission last May represented recognized senior, disability, women's, or minority organizations.

The three plans put forth by the Commission last December all include variations on the privatization theme. All the plans would jeopardize the Social Security guarantee in one way or another. Privatization would drain between \$1 trillion and \$1.5 trillion from the Social Security trust fund over the next decade alone. Privatization would shorten the life of the trust fund. One plan would increase the long-term Social Security deficit by 25 percent. Another tries to deal with the deficit by transferring \$6 trillion from the U.S. Treasury between 2021 and 2054 to make up the deficit.

Taking general revenues might help Social Security, but it would also eliminate resources necessary for Medicare, Medicaid, the Older Americans Act, job training, education, and other essential programs.

Privatization would jeopardize benefits to current and future beneficiaries. One of the Commission's proposals would cut benefits for future retirees by calculating initial benefits on the basis of growth in CPI rather than wages, which would greatly reduce the standard of living. Privatization would force workers to work longer in order to maintain benefits.

What we should be doing is rejecting privatization of Social Security. We should be working to strengthen it, and we should be strengthening Social Security, not privatizing it.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEW NUCLEAR POSTURE PAPER: HOW MANY THINGS CAN WE FIND WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of January 23, 2002, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. FRANK) is recognized during morning hour debates for 5 minutes.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Speaker, this new nuclear posture paper that the Bush administration has presented itself, from the Pentagon to the President, looks like an entry in a contest as to how many things can we find wrong with this picture.

To begin, most shockingly, it proposes to reduce the barrier that has long existed against the use of nuclear weapons. It proposes that we consider using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations. It proposes using nuclear weapons in a variety of ways previously uncontemplated, or at least not advocated in our policy.

There are several things, of course, wrong with that. In the first place, any American policy of trying to discourage other countries to develop nuclear weapons could not be more seriously undermined by anything we do.

□ 1300

The town drunk is not going to be very credible preaching temperance, and having America threaten a more promiscuous use of nuclear weapons makes no sense whatsoever. If, in fact, the policy were to be carried out, it would, of course, add greatly to the billions that would be spent in development of these newer weapons to be used in new situations, further straining our ability to meet important domestic needs. It could very well mean a violation of the proposal of the nuclear test ban treaty and of our, up until now, policy of not testing.

Reducing the psychological, physical, strategic barrier to the use of nuclear weapons is a very, very poor policy; but there is a silver lining. As with the proposal to have the Pentagon lie to us and others, as with the proposal to use military tribunals in place of the American domestic courts, as the Attorney General once suggested, we are now being told, well, never mind.

The Pentagon has developed a very interesting approach and the Bush administration with it. This is the third time we have seen very, very extreme proposals which when they encounter resistance we are told we should not have paid a great deal of attention to.

I am unpersuaded that the proposals were not meant in the first place. I am pleased in the face of the very wide and very thoughtful criticism that these proposals have brought forth the administration backs down; but we cannot be sure that they have totally disappeared and of all of the proposals this suggestion, more than a suggestion, this policy review urging more use of nuclear weapons in more situations against more countries is really quite frightening.

The President has justly commanded virtually unanimous support in the United States in his defense of America against terrorism. It cannot be in our interests for him to raise serious questions about his judgment in other strategic areas.

It is important that this policy not simply be characterized as a mere option but, in fact, repudiated thoroughly. There cannot be continuing suggestion, even more than a suggestion, that the United States contemplates this sort of use of nuclear weapons. Its impact on our alliances will be corrosive. It will have a nega-

tive, rather than a positive, effect on our ability to persuade even those countries to which we are opposed to respond in sensible ways.

The President's effort to work out some kind of role with Russia is undermined by this and particularly by the suggestion when he says he is going to take some nuclear weapons down, he simply means putting them in another place. This clearly undermines our efforts to reach agreement with China, with Russia and with a whole range of other countries; and it is a very embarrassing episode for the United States. I am pleased that the administration now appears to be backtracking, but it is important that we make sure that this one does not rise again.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to insert into the RECORD at this point some very good discussions of the absolute fallacy of this proposal, today's editorial from the New York Times, "America as Nuclear Rogue"; today's editorial from the Boston Globe, "A Twisted Posture"; and a very good article in today's Boston Globe by the writer Thomas Oliphant entitled, "Bush's Stealth Policy on Nuclear Arms."

I hope, Mr. Speaker, that this is the last time the Pentagon is going to play this game of putting forward something that is so demoralizing that it has to be withdrawn. We would be much better if these kinds of grave errors were not made in the first place.

[From the Boston Globe, Mar. 12, 2002]

BUSH'S STEALTH POLICY ON N-ARMS

(By Thomas Oliphant)

WASHINGTON.—It is not simply the fresh list of countries that the United States is willing to consider nuking someday.

What is truly significant—as well as stupid, scary, and outrageous—is the almost casual breaking of long-standing policy taboos about the unthinkable and the implications of this cavalier attitude for relations with the rest of the world and for future arms races.

The Russians and Chinese already know the United States is unilaterally departing from the 1972 treaty effectively banning missile defense systems. Now the world has reason to doubt the American commitment to the 1974 treaty to guard against nuclear proliferation as well as the honesty and good will of Bush administration "pledges" to cut back our post-Cold War nuclear arsenal and to maintain a moratorium on testing.

The cover story the administration sought to peddle on last weekend's TV talk shows—via Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice—is that contingency plans to target Syria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Russia, and China are more theoretical exercises than serious policy work and that no special notice need be taken.

The cover story is belied by actual intentions as revealed to Congress in a freshly completed Nuclear Posture Review and in the very faint, fine print of the recently unveiled Bush budget. Over the weekend the headline-making list of countries leaked from Capitol Hill, but as part of a leak of the underlying policy document that began four weeks ago.

On Feb. 13, the Natural Resources Defense Council—well-known for its thorough, documented research—put out the first detailed

summary of the posture review that had been ordered by Congress in late 2000 and of a special briefing the Defense Department has conducted on the document—without the secret list of countries.

At the time, no one really noticed. With the addition of the countries, The Los Angeles Times got noticed. Here's the council's highly critical but accurate summary view four weeks ago:

"Behind the administration's rhetorical mask of post-Cold War restraint lie expansive plans to revitalize U.S. nuclear forces and all the elements that support them, within a so-called "New Triad" of capabilities that combine nuclear and conventional offensive strikes with missile defenses and nuclear weapons infrastructure."

If the basic purpose of nuclear weapons since the end of World War II had been to prevent their use and proliferation, the deadly serious review by the Bush administration—with the force plans and massive spending as accompaniments—results in a doctrine that contemplates their use and appears indifferent to their proliferation.

Numbers tell a large chunk of the story. When the administration's intention unilaterally to abrogate the ABM treaty was made known, President Bush made much of a supposed intention to reduce its supply of deployed warheads from roughly 8,000 to below 4,000 in 2007 and eventually to between 1,700 and 2,200.

What the posture review actually reveals is a plan to cut "immediate force requirements" for "operationally deployed forces." What's going on here is more a change of terms than in posture, hidden by a new, gobbledegook accounting system that the council properly declared "worthy of Enron."

Behind the clearly visible nuclear inventory, the council found a "huge, hidden arsenal." It included, but no longer "counted," warheads on two Trident submarines being overhauled at all times, as well as 160 more now listed as "spare." It included nearly 5,000 intact warheads now in a status called "inactive reserve," not to mention a few thousand more bombs and cruise missile warheads as part of a new "responsive force." And on top of that there is to be a stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium and other components from which thousands more weapons could be assembled quickly. Extrapolating the information, the Defense Council estimated that the United States would have a total of 10,590 warheads at the end of 2006, compared with 10,656 this year.

And there's more. The administration's posture review also discloses plans to greatly expand the nuclear war infrastructure and to prepare for a resumption of testing, in part to make possible a new generation of warheads that could penetrate deep into the ground.

The rules of the nuclear road from the U.S. perspective have never included a flat-out promise never to be the first combatant to resort to nuclear war. During the Cold War, the United States was always prepared to go nuclear to stop a massive, conventional attack from the east in Europe, and before the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein got a stern message that all bets were off if he used chemical or biological weapons.

But this is different. This is a plan to use nukes in conventional war-fighting and to maintain a Cold War-sized arsenal by stealth and deception. It is disgraceful.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 12, 2002]

AMERICA AS NUCLEAR ROGUE

If another country were planning to develop a new nuclear weapon and contemplating pre-emptive strikes against a list of non-nuclear powers, Washington would

rightly label that nation a dangerous rogue state. Yet such is the course recommended to President Bush by a new Pentagon planning paper that became public last weekend. Mr. Bush needs to send that document back to its authors and ask for a new version less menacing to the security of future American generations.

The paper, the Nuclear Posture Review, proposes lowering the overall number of nuclear warheads, but widens the circumstances thought to justify a possible nuclear response and expands the list of countries considered potential nuclear targets. It envisions, for example, an American president threatening nuclear retaliation in case of "an Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbors, or a North Korean attack on South Korea or a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan."

In a world where numerous countries are developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, it is quite right that America retain a credible nuclear deterrent. Where the Pentagon review goes very wrong is in lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons and in undermining the effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The treaty, long America's main tool for discouraging non-nuclear countries from developing nuclear weapons, is backed by promises that as long as signatories stay non-nuclear and avoid combat alongside a nuclear ally, they will not be attacked with nuclear weapons. If the Pentagon proposals become American policy, that promise would be withdrawn and countries could conclude that they have no motive to stay non-nuclear. In fact, they may well decide they need nuclear weapons to avoid nuclear attack.

The review also calls for the United States to develop a new nuclear warhead designed to blow up deep underground bunkers. Adding a new weapon to America's nuclear arsenal would normally require a resumption of nuclear testing, ending the voluntary moratorium on such tests that now helps restrain the nuclear weapons programs of countries like North Korea and Iran.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, American military planners have had to factor these enormously destructive weapons into their calculations. Their behavior has been tempered by the belief, shared by most thoughtful Americans, that the weapons should be used only when the nation's most basic interest or national survival is at risk, and that the unrestrained use of nuclear weapons in war could end life on earth as we know it. Nuclear weapons are not just another part of the military arsenal. They are different, and lowering the threshold for their use is reckless folly.

[From the Boston Globe, Mar. 12, 2002]

A TWISTED POSTURE

The Bush administration's classified new Nuclear Posture Review, presented to Congress in early January and leaked this month to the Los Angeles Times, proposes new departures in the nation's military planning that are questionable at best and, at worst, truly dangerous and destabilizing.

The Nuclear Posture Review, signed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, amounts to a blueprint for undertaking what Joseph Cirincione, director of the Non-Proliferation Center at the Carnegie Endowment, calls "a major expansion of the role of nuclear weapons in US military policy." The new posture calls for new nuclear weapons, new missions and uses for those weapons, and a readiness to resume nuclear testing.

These are among the changes in US nuclear doctrine that make the leaked review dangerous. The hawkish proponents of these

changes were lobbying for minimukes and deep-penetrating bunker-busters well before the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11. They were also proposing resumed nuclear testing before that nightmarish atrocity. The reality, however, is that nothing in the Nuclear Posture Review would be likely to deter or counter the threat from terrorists sharing Osama bin Laden's demented notion of a holy war against America.

The review threatens to become destabilizing—and therefore to expand rather than reduce American security risks—because it recommends a lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Until now, America's nuclear arsenal was plainly meant only to deter other nuclear powers—principally the defunct Soviet Union—from using against the United States or from invading Western Europe.

Now those limits on the envisaged uses of nuclear weapons are to be abandoned. The new posture recommends that nuclear weapons "could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack," in response to another country's use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, and "in the event of surprising military developments."

If America, with its enormous technological and military advantages, says it is willing to resort to nuclear weapons under such vague conditions, what might nuclear states such as India and Pakistan be willing to do? And if the Pentagon conducts new tests of smaller, more usable nuclear warheads, why would India, Pakistan, and China not follow suit, ending the current suspension of nuclear tests and provoking a nuclear arms race?

The Pentagon's plan for enhancing "nuclear capability" and lowering the barrier against the use of nuclear weapons holds little hope of deterring new threats from terrorists or being able to eradicate Saddam Hussein's bioweapons, but it does increase the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in war. It should be revised to preserve the purely deterrent uses of nuclear weapons.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BALLENGER). Pursuant to clause 12 of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess until 2 p.m.

Accordingly (at 1 o'clock and 3 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess until 2 p.m.

□ 1400

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. STEARNS) at 2 p.m.

PRAYER

The Reverend Dr. David F. Russell, National Chaplain, American Legion, Spotsylvania, Virginia, offered the following prayer:

Our dear most gracious Heavenly Father, in whom we put our trust, we humbly thank You for this avenue of prayer in which we may come on behalf of this legislative body of government. We ask that You grant wisdom for all those who gather in this assembly that they, in turn, always act in the best interest of this Nation and its people whom they represent.