

CONFERENCE TOTAL—WITH  
COMPARISONS

The total new budget (obligational) authority for the fiscal year 2003 recommended by the Committee of Conference, with comparisons to the fiscal year 2002 amount, the 2003 budget estimates, and the House and Senate bills for 2003 follows:

[In thousands of dollars]

|  |              |
|--|--------------|
| New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 2002 .....              | \$10,604,400 |
| Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 2003 ..... | 9,664.04     |
| House bill, fiscal year 2003 .....                                       | 10,083,000   |
| Senate bill, fiscal year 2003 .....                                      | 10,622,000   |
| Conference agreement, fiscal year 2003 .....                             | 10,499,000   |
| Conference agreement compared with:                                      |              |
| New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 2002 .....              | -105,400     |
| Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 2003 ..... | +834,959     |
| House bill, fiscal year 2003 .....                                       | +416,000     |
| Senate bill, fiscal year 2003 .....                                      | -123,000     |

DAVID L. HOBSON,  
JAMES T. WALSH,  
DAN MILLER,  
ROBERT ADERHOLT,  
KAY GRANGER,  
VIRGIL H. GOODE, Jr.,  
JOE SKEEN,  
DAVID VITTER,  
C.W. BILL YOUNG,  
JOHN W. OLVER,  
CHET EDWARDS,  
SAM FARR,  
ALLEN BOYD,  
NORMAN D. DICKS,  
DAVID R. OBEY,

*Managers on the Part of the House.*

DIANNE FEINSTEIN,  
DANIEL K. INOUE,  
TIM JOHNSON,  
MARY L. LANDRIEU,  
HARRY REID,  
ROBERT C. BYRD,  
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON  
CONRAD BURNS,  
LARRY CRAIG,  
MIKE DEWINE,  
TED STEVENS,

*Managers on the Part of the Senate.*

FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF H.  
RES. 114, AUTHORIZATION FOR  
USE OF MILITARY FORCE  
AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF  
2002

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HULSHOF).

(Mr. HULSHOF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HULSHOF. Mr. Speaker, "When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for the people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them."

When the delegates to the Second Continental Congress began to debate those immortal words in July of 1776,

they did not have the long lens of history to guide them. These bold men adopted the radical idea of independence based upon deeply-held convictions and beliefs that bloodshed, though unwanted, was a probable course. Indeed, when the document declaring independence was executed in August of that year, 30,000 British and Hessian troops were assembled at Staten Island, New York, a 3 days' journey from Philadelphia.

At first blush, those of you reminded of this narrative would quickly make the distinction that those Philadelphia delegates and the colonists they represented were in imminent peril, and we are not. Is that in fact the case after September 11? America's enemies today do not dispatch columns of infantrymen "across the green" or battleships upon the high seas. Instead, we face a deadlier threat in chemical and biological weapons willing to be dispersed by an army of anonymous killers. This 107th Congress, as our forefathers before, must face this difficult issue without the benefit of history's clarity.

I have been contacted by a number of Missourians with wide-ranging opinions, and some have proclaimed, "Let us not wage war with Iraq." Would that I could will it so, possessing the knowledge as I do of the threat Iraq poses. Would that Saddam Hussein lay down his arms, those weapons designed to commit mass murder against the defenseless.

Now, time does not permit me to make my case, but there has been a lot of discussion about the case that has been made, and I am convinced that Iraq continues to possess and manufacture weapons of mass destruction in defiance of 12 years of Security Council resolutions.

My colleague, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. LOFGREN), a good friend, a moment ago said there is no definitive link between Iraq and the attacks of September 11, 2001; and I acknowledge that. However, our United States intelligence services have detected that Saddam's regime has begun efforts to reach out to terrorist groups with global reach.

I acknowledge that Saddam Hussein's regime is largely secular and has often clashed with fanatical religious fundamentalist groups. However, I am mindful of a disquieting adage, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

The resolution I support today suggests a variety of means to disarm Iraq without immediately resorting to the end of open warfare. It is imperative that the United Nations take strong action to implement a comprehensive and unfettered regime of weapons inspections. It is deeply troubling to me, however, that the only thing that seems to compel Saddam Hussein into compliance is the threat of military force. Certainly many questions remain. However, the risks of inaction are greater, in my mind, than the risks of action.

Ironically, a number of family members who lost loved ones last September have come to Capitol Hill and have questioned the inability of our intelligence agencies to foresee those attacks prior to September 11. Why did we not act upon those threads of information, they ask plaintively? Why did we not prevent the horrific attacks of that crisp, clear morning?

Mr. Speaker, let us not allow that tragic history to be repeated. We have a moral responsibility to defend our Nation from harm. This conflict has been brought to us, and we have provoked it only by being free. We must move forward decisively, confident in the knowledge that our voices, which cry out so desperately for a lasting peace, have been and will be heard by the rest of the world.

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. PASTOR), a member of the House Committee on Appropriations, a top member of the Committee on Energy and Water and on the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.

(Mr. PASTOR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I am committed to the war against terrorism and believe that stopping Saddam Hussein from developing weapons of mass destruction is a necessary part of that effort. But at this time, however, I believe it is premature to authorize a unilateral attack on Iraq.

Working with the international community is the surest means of addressing this threat effectively, sharing costs and resources and ensuring stability in Iraq and throughout the Middle East in the event of a regime change. While the President has spoken of the value of a coalition effort, the resolution before the House today undermines the importance of our allies and of maintaining the momentum of international cooperation in the wider war on terrorism.

I support the Spratt amendment to this resolution. This amendment would authorize the use of U.S. forces in support of a new U.N. Security Council resolution mandating the elimination, by force, if necessary, of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and means of producing such weapons. Should the Security Council fail to produce such a resolution, the amendment calls on the President then to seek authorization for unilateral military action. In this way, the amendment emphasizes our preference for a peaceful solution and coalition support, while recognizing that military force and unilateral action may be appropriate at some point.

We should not rush into war without the support of our allies. We should not send American troops into combat before making a full-faith effort to put U.N. inspectors back into Iraq under a more forceful resolution. We should not turn to a policy of preemptive attack, which we have so long and so rightly

condemned, without first providing a limited-time option for peaceful resolution of the threat.

America has long stood behind the principles of exhausting diplomacy before resorting to war; and, at times like this, we must lead by example.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GRAVES).

Mr. GRAVES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 114, authorization of use of force against Iraq.

After the attacks of September 11, Congress reaffirmed our commitment to keep the American people safe from international threats. That commitment faces its first true test as we debate this resolution.

We are faced with clear evidence of a threat against the security of the American people. We have several options to deal with this threat. This resolution will provide all necessary options to the President for protecting the security interests of the American people.

By giving the President the needed flexibility, Iraq and the rest of the world will know that we are prepared to enforce our demands for disarmament with the use of force.

By giving the President this flexibility, the American people can be fully defended from the threat Iraq poses to our national security.

It is clear that Saddam Hussein constitutes a grave threat to the security of the United States through his motives, history, technological capabilities and his support for international terrorism. Saddam Hussein is a ruthless dictator who has sworn eternal hostility to the United States. There is evidence that this same dictator has financed and supported international terrorism, including harboring members of al Qaeda. Despite agreeing to fully disarm by ridding itself of weapons of mass destruction, Iraq has worked to actually enhance its weapons program, increasing its stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons and working to build nuclear weapons.

Saddam Hussein has used weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors and his own people. He has attempted assassinations of foreign leaders, including an American president.

Alone, these facts are very troubling. Together, they present a clear and present danger to the national security of the United States. Saddam Hussein has the motive, has the capabilities and the absence of humanity that is all too clear. Ignoring this evidence would be abandoning our duty to the security of the American people.

Now we are faced with this question: How do we deal with this threat? The answer is to leave all options at the President's disposal on the table, including military options. Like everyone in this Chamber, I sincerely hope and pray it will never come to that. Nevertheless, I believe the evidence

justifies the President to act in the interests of our national security. This resolution gives the President the necessary authority to deal with this threat.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, the resolution that will come before us for final passage has already been written at the White House. I very much wish that it had a different phraseology, but that is not the choice of individual Members. The only question that will come before us that we can influence as individual Members is by what margin does that resolution pass. Does it get 325 votes, or 375, or somewhere in between?

□ 1645

Saddam Hussein does not fully understand our political process. He sees a nation in the throws of an election where we speak quite harshly to each other on domestic issues, and we will be doing more of that in the coming weeks. There is no better way to assure that Saddam capitulates on the issue of inspectors, no better way to assure that this war does not have to be fought, no better way to assure a peaceful resolution of this conflict than for us to pass this resolution by the largest possible margin and make sure that Saddam understands that America is united and capitulation on the issue of inspectors is the only rational course and the only course that will assure his own personal safety.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. SHAW).

Mr. SHAW. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

I rise in strong support of this most balanced resolution. Like most of my colleagues who support the President in this important matter, I am not voting for this resolution because I have any wish to speed to war; I am voting for this resolution because I hold out hope for peace, a peace that can still come, but only if the United Nations will apply decisive pressure to Iraq to open itself to unconditional, unfettered weapons inspection.

Unfortunately, the last decade has shown that without the use of force as a threat, Saddam Hussein will continue to stonewall and ignore every resolution issued by the United Nations, all the while amassing weapons of terror. The resolution before us today does not send us to war, but it does provide a powerful incentive for Hussein to finally comply with the dictates of the United Nations. With the threat of force, the United Nations and President Bush will be able to negotiate from a position of strength.

Nobody, no legislator, Republican or Democrat, takes this responsibility of sending our children off to war lightly, but nor can we stand by as Saddam Hussein and his regime continue to work to amass stockpiles of the world's most deadly weapons. My deepest fears lay in the thought that he could soon

supply terrorists with nuclear weapons. We simply cannot ignore our responsibility to protect our country, democracy, and our lone democratic ally in the Middle East, the State of Israel.

Mr. Speaker, again, I hold out my hope for peace; but to rely upon a dictatorial madman with little respect for the life of even his own people, let alone American life, to bring about a peaceful resolution to this crisis would be foolhardy. It is for that reason I strongly believe that we must strengthen the President's hand. With a hopeful heart, but realistic concern over this threat, I will cast my vote in support of this resolution as a last chance for peace.

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. WATSON), a member of the Committee on International Relations and former ambassador to Micronesia.

Ms. WATSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I stand to oppose H.J. Res. 114, the authorization for military force against Iraq.

Mr. Speaker, I have attended numerous administrative hearings on Iraq where not one bit of new evidence was offered to demonstrate that presently Saddam Hussein is more of a menace than that proven diabolical character, Osama bin Laden. Why are we not still focusing our attention on him? I remember so well the declaration made by the President: "Wanted, dead or alive." We have painfully experienced his capacity to wreak havoc on thousands of our people from thousands of miles from his own perch. And now, he appears to be an afterthought.

We have given Saddam Hussein the power to force the greatest country on Earth to abandon its domestic agenda, to potentially violate the U.N. charter, and possibly take unilateral and preemptive action before exhausting all diplomatic efforts. I am not convinced that Saddam Hussein warrants the daily headlines and the extraordinary amount of time and resources given to him. We are equating his power with ours and, in some ways, ascribing it to be beyond our ability to detect.

While we are monitoring his every move, I have no doubt that if he were to plan an attack on the United States or on our allies, we would be able to stop him in his tracks. But what we cannot do is to provide the proof of Osama bin Laden's whereabouts or whether he is dead or alive, or who spread anthrax and, currently, right here in this country, who is killing innocent Americans in a close radius of the White House. But our focus remains thousands of miles away on a villain who cowardly goes after the weakest. It is beneath us to choose war over diplomacy, and not only carry a big stick, but beat our perceived enemy over the head with it.

The United Nations is being diminished with our rhetoric of the last few weeks. As a charter member, we are not giving it credit for trying to uphold the principle of sovereign equality of

all its members. The U.N. charter states that in recognition of the sovereignty of all nations, all shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means. The U.N. charter also states that all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

Chapter VI of the charter empowers the Security Council to investigate any disputes and to recommend appropriate procedures for the settlement of the dispute. If the dispute is not resolved, it is then referred to the Security Council for action. Under Chapter VII, the U.N. Security Council shall determine the existence of threats to peace. Article 46 provides that plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council. The U.N. charter does not provide for preemptive or first-strike options of member states against a perceived threat.

Too little in this House has been made of peace. When will we mature to a point when we will find noncombative ways to settle our differences? When are we ready to use our higher selves to find ways to be nonviolent? To effect a regime change, we are threatening an invasion of a territorial foe to enhance our own security; but such an invasion will, in fact, degrade and diminish us.

This resolution offers only the incessant drumbeat of war. During the Vietnam War, it was often said that ever every time we kill a Viet Cong guerrilla, we create two more. Our invasion of Iraq will be watched by millions of Muslim men and women. Many governments around the world will become less cooperative in helping us track down terrorist operatives in their countries. Hundreds, if not thousands, of American men and women may perish in the streets of Baghdad. Our invasion will engender a bottomless well of bitterness and resentment towards the United States that will haunt us for decades to come. We now have a choice to maintain the moral high ground or sink to the depths of our tormentors. History will record this moment.

MAKING IN ORDER AT ANY TIME CONSIDERATION  
OF CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 3295, HELP  
AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002

Mr. NEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order at any time to consider the conference report to accompany H.R. 3295; that all points of order against the conference report and against its consideration be waived; and that the conference report be considered as read when called up.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LINDER). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. PICKERING).

Mr. PICKERING. Mr. Speaker, today I rise in support of the resolution before us.

The most grave responsibility any Member of Congress ever undertakes or considers is the vote to give the President of the United States the authority to use force if necessary.

On September 11, I drove past the Pentagon. I came in to my congressional office building, and I was informed that a plane had just struck the Pentagon. We left our offices, we went to a place, we tried to call our families, the communications systems were jammed. It took 3 hours until I could finally talk to my wife and I have five sons, and I began talking to each of my boys. I got to my second son, Ross, and he was crying, and he asked me, Daddy, are we safe?

In my lifetime, I never asked that question. I never asked that question, Are we safe, of my mother and daddy, of my father, because the generations that went before us gave us the blessings of liberty. They protected and defended our safety and security when a threat, a challenge emerged; when we were at risk, they answered the call. So many times in our Nation's history, we have had the strong voices that have given us warnings and called us to action, and so many times we did not listen. Winston Churchill called on the world to look and to act at the threat that Hitler posed, and the world did not listen; and because of that, more death and more destruction and world war came.

Today, we have an opportunity, backed by a clear and convincing threat, and backed by a leader of character, to hear the warnings, to know that nuclear capability is around the corner in the hands of a dictator, in the hands of a tyrant; and he could use it, and the death and the destruction that it could cause would be devastating. It would be overwhelming. But if we act now, we can stop it. We can prevent it. We can preempt it.

For those reasons, we have the moral obligation to act. I support the resolution, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BOYD).

(Mr. BOYD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BOYD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. I rise in support of H.J. Res. 114.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of giving the President the authority to go to war with Iraq if it becomes necessary. I came to this difficult decision only after considering the threat to our national security that allowing Saddam Hussein to acquire long range missiles and nuclear weapons represents. While we should continue to seek a diplomatic solution, inaction is not an option. I feel that we must give the president the option of using force to remove this threat to our nation if diplomacy does not work.

No one in the United States wants another war with Iraq if it can be avoided. However, we know that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, and is frantically working to develop

nuclear weapons and a way to deliver them to the United States. This presents a serious threat to our national security and has the potential to destroy any chance for peace in the Middle East.

I believe our first step should be to develop a new, tougher weapons inspection resolution which would allow the U.N. inspectors unfettered access to all sights in Iraq, including the presidential palaces. If it is implemented successfully, the resolution would serve to disarm Iraq and would not require an armed confrontation. However, as President Bush has noted, the track record of Iraq's compliance with U.N. resolutions is abysmal, and this time we must give him the tools necessary to ensure that Iraq is truly disarmed.

In addition, I believe that before we use military force against Iraq that the administration should work to reassemble the coalition that was so successful during the Gulf War or like the one we developed to combat terrorism. While we could defeat Iraq without a coalition, policing and rebuilding Iraq will take years, and we will need allies to undertake this long and difficult task.

Those of us in this chamber who have worn the military uniform of this great country, understand the ravages and consequences of war, and do not take this vote lightly. All diplomatic options should be exhausted before the use of military force, but I believe the option of force must be available to the President as a last resort. Giving the authority to use force does not mean war, it only gives our commander-in-chief the maximum flexibility to protect our nation.

If it comes to war, many of our nation's sons and daughters will be put in harms way in order to protect our freedoms from Saddam Hussein's reign of terror and to keep him from acquiring nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them to the United States. I would never send our young men and women into combat unless it was absolutely necessary; and unless Iraq allows weapons inspectors into the country with unfettered access it will be necessary. Congress needs to give the President the authority he needs to protect America while encouraging the use of diplomacy and negotiations to try and arrive at a peaceful solution to this problem before turning to military force and this is why I will vote to give him the ability to eliminate this threat to American security.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. KIND), who has just arrived and is now available to convince the entire House of Representatives.

(Mr. KIND asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KIND. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. We have before us today one of the most important issues that a democracy must decide, whether to potentially go to war against another nation. It is a vote of conscience, and I believe reasonable people can disagree while looking at the same set of facts.

□ 1700

September 11, however, has changed the psyche of our Nation forever. We witnessed in horror what a few suicidal terrorists can accomplish in a low-tech

operation, and now we shudder to imagine what suicidal terrorists can accomplish if they gain access to high-tech weapons of mass destruction.

I believe Saddam Hussein has biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction and that he is aggressively seeking to develop nuclear capability. But I also believe that he can be deterred because, as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman puts it, Saddam loves his life more than he hates us.

It is, however, irrefutable that Saddam is in blatant violation of numerous U.N. resolutions that call for his disarmament of these weapons. Now the question becomes: How do we enforce these resolutions and accomplish the universal goal of disarming his weapons of mass destruction?

I have come to the conclusion that my two sons' futures and the future of all our children across the globe will be made a little safer if Saddam disarms, on his own or with our help; militarily, if necessary. I pray that it is done peacefully. I pray that he blinks.

But I have also concluded that we are dealing with a person who will not do the right thing unless, literally, he has a gun pointing at his head. Therefore, I support the resolution before us today.

But I also support the Spratt amendment, because how we accomplish our goals and with whom can make all the difference. We need to do this with the help and the support of the international community. I believe that it would be disastrous if we try to accomplish disarmament through unilateral military action.

The process we take will determine whether the rest of the world views us as a beacon or as a bully. We could remain a beacon of hope and optimism as the leader of the free world, promoting economic progress for all, respecting human rights, and ensuring democratic values such as freedom, political pluralism, religious tolerance, free speech, and respect for the rule of law; or we could be viewed as the superpower bully, imposing our military power whenever we want and wherever we want.

I give the President the benefit of the doubt when he now says that the use of military force will be a last resort, not a first option; that regime change can also mean attitude change of Saddam's; and that we will work hard to gather international support for disarming him before military action is taken.

That is what the administration should have been saying from day one, and it is now reflected in the new resolution before us today.

We need to do this the right way because U.N. engagement and international support is essential. I subscribe to the Thomas Friedman "crystal store" theory of U.S. foreign policy: If you break it, you own it. If we break Iraq, we will have the responsibility to rebuild it, just as we need to rebuild Afghanistan today. This is another

vital reason why international support is critical for our action in Iraq, for what happens the day after.

We have never been good at nation building. We can accomplish military goals with little help, but our democracy does not have the experience or the sustainability for successful nation building. Therefore, we must approach the aftermath of any conflict in the region with the greatest degree of humility.

In addition, I am concerned that the administration is developing a blind spot. They are becoming overly intoxicated with the use of our military power. I am glad that we have the world's most powerful military; but this is not just a battle of military might, it is also a battle of values and ideas in the region. Our message to the outside world needs to be better than: You are either for us or you are against us; and if you are against us, we are going to kill you.

Instead, we need to send a message through words and deeds that we are interested in being good global citizens as well. Unfortunately, the unilateralist message this administration has sent from day one has now come back to haunt us in our attempt to secure support against Iraq: No to the global climate treaty, no to the biological treaty, no to the land mines treaty, no to the ABM treaty, no to an international crimes tribunal. If the rest of the world does not like it, that is just tough.

Instead, the world needs to hear from us that we are concerned about our global environment; we are concerned about their economic progress; we are concerned that 2 billion people must survive on just \$1 a day; that 1.5 billion people, most of them children, cannot even get a clean glass of water; and that we want to help eradicate the scourge of AIDS.

Furthermore, the world needs to hear that we are truly interested in being honest brokers in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Middle East. We need to recognize that the real battleground for peace throughout the world ultimately lies in education. We cannot just keep looking at the Arab world as a great gas station, indifferent to what happens inside their countries, because the gas now is leaking, and there are people starting to throw matches around.

If we have learned anything from September 11, it is that if we do not visit and help in a bad neighborhood, that bad neighborhood can come and visit us.

So for the sake of our young military troops, for the sake of the Iraqi people, and for the sake of our Nation as it is perceived by the rest of the world in the 21st century, I pray that we can accomplish Saddam's disarmament peacefully and, if not, then with international support.

But today we need to give the President this tool in his diplomatic arsenal, and also pray that he uses it wisely.

May God continue to bless these United States of America.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. BASS).

(Mr. BASS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BASS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of House Joint Resolution 114.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to address the House today in support of the resolution before us. The decision to allow our military to use force against Iraq will be one of the most important votes we cast in this Congress, but the responsible choice to support the resolution is clear.

Over the past few weeks, we have labored over the proper scope and limitations for this significant measure. The compromise language has been drafted by key House and Senate leaders, and the President.

This resolution is in the best interest of America's national security. After a decade of deceit and deception, in which we have permitted a hostile dictator to repeatedly violate every agreement we have in good faith put before him, the use of force has become a necessary option. I think I speak for all members of this Congress when I say that I hope and pray that military force does not become required; however, we must prepare for all possible outcomes.

This resolution protects the Congress' ability to remain fully involved in future decisions and actions in Iraq. It provides the resources for the United States to act on the best interest of our national security, while remaining committed to generating support for a multilateral coalition.

I support our President and commend his efforts to ensure that the citizen's of American do not live in fear of another tragic terrorist attack or of harm from rogue nations. With passage of this resolution, we will provide our Commander in Chief with the resources necessary to carry out his greatest task of all—providing for the continued safety of our citizens.

This resolution to authorize military action against Iraq is one that has been seriously deliberated by the President, his policy makers, and this Congress.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. BOEHNER), the chairman of the Committee on Education and the Workforce.

Mr. BOEHNER. Mr. Speaker, "does this body have the will and resolve to commit this Nation to a future of peace, or will we leave for our children an inheritance of uncertainty and world instability? I do not want to see our Nation at war, and I pray that this crisis will be resolved peacefully. But I cannot in good conscience deny to the President of the United States every power and tool that he is entitled to in his efforts to resolve this crisis."

Mr. Speaker, I spoke these words right here in this very spot on the floor of the House of Representatives during my first speech as a Member of this body. One day later, on January 12, 1991, I cast my first vote, one to give

the President the authority to use the Armed Forces in removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

As a freshman Member of Congress, I could not ever have imagined that more than a decade later this body again would be faced with the challenge of dealing with Saddam Hussein's outlaw regime. But here we are in 2002, and Saddam is once again at the heart of our national security concerns.

The September 11 terrorist attacks have changed this Nation forever. Those tragic events increased our appreciation of our vulnerability to terrorist attacks, particularly from weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein has actively developed a deadly biological and chemical weapons program, and he is actively pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. We cannot ignore this reality.

What has changed since the last time I voted to use our Armed Forces against Iraq has not been a new identification of our enemy, but the reassessment of our national security risk. The last 11 years have proven that attempting to contain Saddam through an ineffective weapons inspection regime does not alter his intentions nor force him to disarm. We must resolve to stand firm against Hussein's regime to guarantee security for Americans and the international community and justice for the Iraqi people.

I commend President Bush for his consistent consultation with the international community and with the congressional leadership on both sides as he develops a strategy for confronting this grave threat. The resolution before us today is a result of those consultations, and its passage is the United States government's opportunity to speak with one voice in its efforts to protect American interests at home and abroad.

We cannot expect the United Nations Security Council to take action to protect not only our interests but the interests of the international community without sending it a strong signal of our own resolve.

Looking back on the vote that this House cast to authorize force back in 1991, I can recall how somber my colleagues and I were as we contemplated the consequences of our actions. Today, I sense a similar mood in the House. Whenever Congress votes to authorize the use of the greatest Armed Forces in the world, it is destined to be one of the most serious and difficult votes ever cast by our Members. It is not a decision we relish, but it is one that we must make.

I pray and hope that the need to use military force to disarm Hussein's regime is not imminent. However, I stand ready to support such an action should the President deem it necessary.

The famous legislator and philosopher, Sir Edmond Burke from England, once said, "All that is needed for evil to exist is for good men to do nothing." I also recall the words of our great President Ronald Reagan when he said "If not now, when? If not us, who?"

It is time for us to act, it is time to support our President, and it is time to tell the rest of the world that the American people speak with just one voice.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. SOUDER).

(Mr. SOUDER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Speaker, today the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight unanimously approved the report of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources titled "Federal Law Enforcement at the Borders and Ports of Entry," the most comprehensive report ever on our Nation's border security.

As chairman of this subcommittee, I would like to discuss some of the findings and how I feel they impact the debate on the resolution regarding Iraq that is before us.

There are 130 official ports of entry on the northern border at which it is legal to cross, whether by vehicle or foot. There are an additional over 300 unofficial crossing areas along the northern border, roads which are unmonitored and allow for individuals or groups to cross undetected.

Near Blaine, Washington, the only barrier is a narrow ditch easily stepped over and containing no water between two roads. In northwest North Dakota, it is even easier: It is flat for miles, and there is no ditch. As for the southern border, it is not exactly known as impenetrable. If we cannot stop tens of thousands of illegal immigrants, it does not breed a lot of confidence that we can stop all terrorists.

Our subcommittee has also begun to study port security. The challenges in our largest harbors, Long Beach and Los Angeles, are overwhelming. But by the time a nuclear device has slipped into L.A., we are already in deep trouble. Preclearance at point of origin, or at a point prior to coming into the U.S., is a probable method to reduce risk; but shipments could have chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons added en route at the receiving harbor or in transit to the next shipping point.

I have not even discussed airport security.

The point of my comments is this: If those opposed to this resolution somehow think we are going to stop terrorists from crossing our borders, that by itself is an incredibly high-risk strategy doomed to probable failure. As chemicals come across in different forms or nuclear weapons in parts, even with dramatically improved security we will not catch it all.

We need a multifaceted approach. We need a vastly improved intelligence collection and information-sharing. That is obvious to everyone. We are working to improve border security, port security, and airport security. But when we can see the chemical and biological facilities that have manufactured, can manufacture, and probably

are manufacturing weapons of mass destruction intended for us, we need to act to destroy those facilities. When we get solid intelligence that someone intends to kill Americans and that they have the weapons to do so, we need to eliminate their capacity to do so.

If this leader and nation have already demonstrated, as Saddam Hussein has, a willingness to use such weapons of mass destruction to terrorize, like Iraq, alone in the world in demonstrating such willingness, then the need to act becomes urgent.

The American people do not want to burn while the politicians fiddle. We need to strengthen our borders. We need to monitor suspected terrorists and arrest those who become active. We need to take out the capacity of those bent on terrorizing our Nation.

If we implement all of these strategies, we have a chance of success. Partial, timid strategies against people bent upon killing Americans will not save lives. They will cost lives.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. JENKINS).

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution.

The preamble of this resolution sets out in detailed chronological order the obligations that were imposed upon and accepted by the regime of Saddam Hussein as the result of a United Nations-sponsored ceasefire in 1991. They were clear obligations for Saddam Hussein to end his nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver them and to end his support for international terrorism. I have heard no one deny the existence of these obligations. I have heard no credible denial of their breach.

Since our country has been attacked by terrorists and we continue to be threatened, at least in part, due to the breach of these obligations, it becomes the duty of the President and this Congress to chart a course of action that will protect our country and all its citizens. This resolution in my opinion charts such a course.

□ 1715

It provides that the President is authorized to use the Armed Forces as he deems necessary and appropriate to defend the national security of the United States, and, secondly, to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

In the final analysis, it boils down to a matter of judgment, whether we should vote "yes" or "no." My judgment is unless I vote "yes," I have failed to meet the obligation that I have to the more than 630,000 men, women and children who constitute the First Congressional District of Tennessee who are at risk today because of the failures of Saddam Hussein.

Is there any question in anybody's mind what the votes of any of those brave leaders who founded or helped perpetuate our Nation would be? Leaders like President Washington, President Lincoln, President Truman, or

President Eisenhower, all who demonstrated during their time in office the good judgment to chart and the courage to complete a difficult course.

Can we not agree all of us in this Chamber that mankind would have been spared terrible agony and death if the judgment of Winston Churchill had been heard and heeded and adopted as a course of action in the 1930's?

The eyes of all our great leaders of the past and the eyes of all who have laid down their lives for our freedom are upon us today to see if we are proper stewards of the freedom and the opportunities that they afforded us with their sacrifices. This decision is vital, not only to the future of Americans, but to the future of the world community and to all who would throw off the yoke of tyranny and oppression and escape the horrors of chemical, bacteriological, and nuclear warfare.

If we are forced to action following this resolution, and it is everybody's hope that we will not be, it will be easier in proportion to our accord for those who represent us on the battlefield.

Mr. Speaker, I urge passage.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CAPUANO).

Mr. CAPUANO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, over the last 6 weeks, the President has changed long-standing policy that prohibits a unilateral American first strike and has argued that his new policy should be imposed upon Iraq.

President Bush, to his credit, has decided to include Congress in this process and to seek international support for his positions, although he will not wait for such support to enforce his new policy.

The process is important, but it is not the most important aspect of his efforts. For me, the most important question in this entire matter is what happens after Saddam Hussein is de-throned. Forty years ago we amended our policies to state that America will no longer allow long-range nuclear weapons to be installed in our hemisphere, a precise policy that applied only to Cuba at that time.

Twenty years ago we amended our policy to state that America will not allow foreign leaders to enrich themselves by using their governmental structure to ship illegal drugs into America. Again, a precise policy which applied only to Panama at the time. Although the President has changed some of his arguments, there do seem to be three constant points that he uses.

Number one, Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Number two, Iraq has supported terrorists even if the link to al Qaeda cannot be proven. Number three, Iraq has a history of aggression and brutality against its own people and against its neighbors. We all agree on all of those points. They are not subject to debate. Based on constant repetition of these factors, we

must conclude these are the criteria America will use to implement our new unilateral strike policy. But is this reaction to Iraq's threat comparable to previous reactions to such threats? Is it clear and precise? Who else violates this new policy and, therefore, who would be next to have our new policy implemented against them?

Let us start with Iran. They have weapons of mass destruction. Iran has certainly supported terrorists and does so today. In fact, many people believe that this country, Iran, now is home to more al Qaeda members than any other country in the world. Finally, Iran has a history of aggression and brutality against its own people and its neighbors. When do we attack Iran?

What about China? They certainly have very powerful weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. They are the leading sellers of both weapons of mass destruction and, more importantly, the industrial means to produce such weapons around the world. They have ignored all calls to withdraw from Tibet or to treat Tibetans fairly. They brutalize the Falun Gong. They brutalize Christians. They threaten Taiwan and the peace in all of Asia. When do we attack China?

When do we attack the Sudan? When do we attack North Korea? When do we attack Russia itself?

Each of these countries meets all of the criteria the President is now using to say we should attack Iraq unilaterally.

Most Americans want Saddam Hussein gone. So do I. Most Americans want the United States to remain the strongest Nation in the world. So do I. But most Americans also want the United States of America to continue to be the world's moral leader while we accomplish both of these goals.

President Bush's unclear, imprecise new policy in support of a unilateral force first strike does not do it.

Not long ago another American stated, "Our purpose is peace. The United States intends no rashness and seeks no wider war. We seek the full and effective restoration of international agreements." This House reacted by voting, "The United States is prepared as the President determines to take all necessary steps including the use of armed forces."

I am sure some of you recognize these words from the 1963 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that led to the Vietnam debacle. We all know the results of that resolution. We all know that this House had to repeal this resolution 6 years later.

This resolution before us tonight uses virtually the same language and grants the President comparable authority to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. But I think our actions here today may actually prove to be more dangerous because we base them on a new policy of unilateral first strike. At a minimum, the President needs to refine his new policy before we implement. Until we do so, America must

adhere to the long-standing policies in existence now. Those policies require international agreement on war and peace, and they require war to be the last alternative, not the first.

As of today, the United States, and we know it, has not exhausted our peaceful options; and by tomorrow when we vote on this, we will have set America and the world on a new course that has not yet been fully thought out or debated. We owe it to ourselves and to our children to go slow.

Others have cited history as well. Let me be clear, no one has forgotten September 11. Everyone wants to avoid another such incident. But no one has divine insight as how to best accomplish that goal. Let me ask those who have cited World War II and to remind them that when Iraq did try to expand its borders, the world did react. This Congress reacted, unlike Europe in the 1930's. The comparison is not valid.

If necessary there will be plenty of time to wage war against Iraq, and I may support it. But if an unnecessary war is waged, we risk forfeiting America's well-deserved reputation as humanity's best hope for a long-lasting worldwide peace.

Mr. Speaker, I urge this Congress to vote "no" on this resolution.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4½ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON).

(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the resolution and want to focus on what this debate is all about.

This debate is all about whether Saddam continued to build weapons of mass destruction after 1991 and would he use them. Well, I think everyone is in agreement in the second question, that he will use them because he has already done that. He has done it with the Kurds. He has done it with his own population a number of times.

Let us talk about whether or not he has weapons of mass destruction and how he got them. Mr. Speaker, I have given no less than 12 speeches on the floor of this House about the proliferation that occurred to Saddam Hussein in the 1990s.

Mr. Speaker, I insert two documents that I have inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD five times in the past.

Mr. Speaker, these are chronologies of weapons-related transfers of technology to Saddam by Chinese interests and Russian interests.

[Los Angeles Times Editorials, May 21, 1998]

INDIGNATION RINGS SHALLOW ON NUKE TESTS

(By Curt Weldon)

Escalating tensions between India and Pakistan should come as no surprise to the Clinton administration. Since the president took office, there have been dozens of reported transfers of sensitive military technology by Russia and China—in direct violation of numerous international arms control agreements—to a host of nations, including Pakistan and India.



Yet the Clinton administration has repeatedly chosen to turn a blind eye to this proliferation of missile, chemical-biological and nuclear technology, consistently refusing to impose sanctions on violators. And in those handful of instances where sanctions were imposed, they usually were either quickly waived by the administration or allowed to expire. Rather than condemn India for current tensions, the blame for the political powder keg that has emerged in Asia should be laid squarely at the feet of President Clinton. It is his administration's inaction and refusal to enforce arms control agreements that have allowed the fuse to grow so short.

In November 1992, the United States learned that China had transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan. The Bush administration imposed sanctions for this violation but Clinton waived them a little more than 14 months later. Clearly, the sanctions did not have the desired effect: Reports during the first half of 1995 indicated that M-11 missiles, additional M-11 missile parts, as well as 5,000 ring magnets for Pakistani nuclear enrichment programs were transferred from China. Despite these clear violations, no sanctions were imposed. And it gets worse.

Not to be outdone by its sworn foe, India aggressively pursued similar technologies and obtained them, illicitly, from Russia. From 1991 to 1995, Russian entities transferred cryogenic liquid oxygen-hydrogen

rocket engines and technology to India. While sanctions were imposed by President Bush in May 1992, the Clinton administration allowed them to expire after only two years. And in June 1993, evidence surfaced that additional Russian enterprises were involved in missile technology transfers to India. The administration imposed sanctions in June 1993, and then promptly waived them for a month, never following up on this issue.

Meanwhile, Pakistan continued to aggressively pursue technology transfers from China. In August 1996, the capability to manufacture M-11 missile or missile components was transferred from China to Pakistan. No sanctions. In November 1996, a special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic equipment were transferred from China to an unprotected Pakistani nuclear facility. No sanctions. Also during 1996, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency issued a report stating that China had provided a "tremendous variety" of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program and was the principal supplier of nuclear equipment for Pakistan's program. Again, the Clinton administration refused to impose sanctions.

Finally, in recent months we have learned that China may have been responsible for the transfer of technology for Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile. Flight tested on April 6, 1998, the Ghauri missile has been

widely blamed as the impetus for India's decision to detonate five nuclear weapons in tests earlier this month. Again, no sanctions were imposed on China.

Retracing the history of these instances of proliferation, it is obvious that Pakistan and India have been locked in an arms race since the beginning of the decade. And the race has been given repeated jump-starts by China and Russia, a clear violation of a number of arms control agreements. Yet rather than enforce these arms control agreements, the Clinton administration has repeatedly acquiesced, fearing that the imposition of sanctions could either strain relations with China and Russia or potentially hurt U.S. commercial interests in those countries.

Now the Clinton administration has announced a get-tough policy, threatening to impose sanctions on India for testing its nuclear weapons. But what about Russia and China, the two nations that violated international arms agreements? Shouldn't they also be subject to U.S. sanctions for their role in this crisis? Sadly, the Clinton administration is likely to ignore the proliferators and impose sanctions solely on India. In the meantime, China and Russia will continue their proliferation of missile and nuclear technology to other nations, including rogue states such as Iran, Iraq and Syria.

#### CHRONOLOGY OF CHINESE WEAPONS-RELATED TRANSFERS

| Date of transfer or report | Reported transfer by China  | Possible violation  | Administration's response   |
|----------------------------|---|---|---|
| Nov. 1992                  | M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan (The Administration did not officially confirm reports that M-11 missiles are in Pakistan.)                                  | MTCR—Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act   | Sanctions imposed on Aug. 24, 1993, for transfers of M-11 related equipment (not missiles); waived on Nov. 1, 1994.       |
| Mid-1994 to mid-1995       | Dozens or hundreds of missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools to Iran.  | MTCR—Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act  | No sanctions.   |
| 2nd quarter of 1995        | Parts for the M-11 missile to Pakistan  | MTCR—Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act   | No sanctions.   |
| Dec. 1994 to mid-1995      | 5,000 ring magnets for an unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment program in Pakistan.   | NPT—Export-Import Bank Act, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Arms Export Control Act   | Considered sanctions under the Export-Import Bank Act; but announced on May 10, 1996, that no sanctions would be imposed. |
| July 1995                  | More than 30 M-11 missiles stored in crates at Sargodha Air Force Base in Pakistan.   | MTCR—Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act   | No sanctions.   |
| Sept. 1995                 | Calutron (electromagnetic isotope separation system) for uranium enrichment to Iran.  | NPT—Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Control Act   | No sanctions.   |
| 1995–1997                  | C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles and C-801 air-launched cruise missiles to Iran.   | Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act   | No sanctions.   |
| before Feb. 1996           | Dual-use chemical precursors and equipment to Iran's chemical weapon program.   | Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act  | Sanctions imposed on May 21, 1997.  |
| summer 1996                | 400 tons of chemicals to Iran   | Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, <sup>1</sup> Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act                                  | No sanctions.   |
| Aug. 1996                  | Plant to manufacture M-11 missiles or missile components in Pakistan.   | MTCR—Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act   | No sanctions.   |
| Aug. 1996                  | Gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment for missile guidance to Iran.  | MTCR—Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act  | No sanctions.   |
| Sept. 1996                 | Special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic equipment to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan.  | NPT—Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Control Act   | No sanctions.   |
| July-Dec. 1996             | Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) reported "tremendous variety" of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program.                                 | MTCR—Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act   | No sanctions.   |
| July-Dec. 1996             | DCI reported "tremendous variety" of assistance for Iran's ballistic missile program.   | MTCR—Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act  | No sanctions.   |
| July-Dec. 1996             | DCI reported principal supplies of nuclear equipment, material, and technology for Pakistan's nuclear weapon program.   | NPT—Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Administration Act                                      | No sanctions.   |
| July-Dec. 1996             | DCI reported key supplies of technology for large nuclear projects in Iran.   | NPT—Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, Export-Import Bank Act, Arms Export Administration Act | No sanctions.   |
| July-Dec. 1996             | DCI reported "considerable" chemical weapon-related transfers of production equipment and technology to Iran.   | Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act   | No sanctions.   |
| Jan. 1997                  | Dual-use biological items to Iran   | BWC—Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act   | No sanctions.   |
| 1997                       | Chemical precursors, production equipment, and production technology for Iran's chemical weapon program, including a plant for making glass-lined equipment.                | Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act   | No sanctions.   |
| Sept. to Dec. 1997         | China Great Wall Industry Corp. provided telemetry equipment used in flight-tests to Iran for its development of the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 medium range ballistic missiles. | MTCR—Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act  | No sanctions.   |
| Nov. 1997/April 1998       | May have transferred technology for Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile that was flight-tested on April 6, 1998.   | MTCR—Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act   | No sanctions.   |

<sup>1</sup> Additional provisions on chemical, biological or nuclear weapons were not enacted until February 10, 1996.

BWC: Biological Weapons Convention; MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime; and NPT: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

#### CHRONOLOGY OF SUSPECTED RUSSIAN WEAPONS-RELATED TRANSFERS

| Date of transfer or report | Reported Russian transfers that may have violated a regime or law  | Possibly applicable treaties, regimes, and/or U.S. laws | Administration's response  |
|----------------------------|--|---|--|
| early 1990s                | Russians sold drawings of a sarin plant, manufacturing procedures, and toxic agents to a Japanese terrorist group.   | AECA sec. 81, EAA sec. 11C                              | No publicly known sanction.  |
| 1991                       | Transferred to China three RD-120 rocket engines and electronic equipment to improve accuracy of ballistic missiles. | MTCR, AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B                        | No publicly known sanction.  |
| 1991–1995                  | Transferred Cryogenic liquid oxygen/hydrogen rocket engines and technology to India.                                 | MTCR, AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B                        | Sanctions against Russia and India under AECA and EAA imposed on May 6, 1992; expired after 2 years. |
| 1992–1995                  | Russian transfers to Brazil of carbon-fiber technology for rocket motor cases for space launch program.              | MTCR, AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B                        | Sanctions reportedly secretly imposed and waived.  |
| 1992–1996                  | Russian armed forces delivered 24 Scud-B missiles and 8 launchers to Armenia.  | MTCR, AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B                        | No publicly known sanction.  |

## CHRONOLOGY OF SUSPECTED RUSSIAN WEAPONS-RELATED TRANSFERS—Continued

| Date of transfer or report | Reported Russian transfers that may have violated a regime or law  | Possibly applicable treaties, regimes, and/or U.S. laws  | Administration's response  |
|----------------------------|--|--|--|
| June 1993 .....            | Additional Russian enterprises involved in missile technology transfers to India.  | MTCR, AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B .....   | Sanctions imposed on June 16, 1993 and waived until July 15, 1993; no publicly known follow-up sanction. |
| 1995-present .....         | Construction of 1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr in Iran.   | IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FOAA, NPPA sec. 821, FAA sec. 620G .....  | Refused to renew some civilian nuclear cooperation agreements; waived sanctions on aid.                  |
| Aug. 1995 .....            | Russian assistance to Iran to develop biological weapons .....   | BWC, AECA sec. 81, EAA sec. 11C, IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FAA sec. 620G and 620H.                            | No publicly known sanction.  |
| Nov. 1995 .....            | Russian citizen transferred to unnamed country technology for making chemical weapons.   | AECA sec. 81, EAA sec. 11C .....   | Sanctions imposed on Nov. 17, 1995.  |
| Dec. 1995 .....            | Russian gyroscopes from submarine launched ballistic missiles smuggled to Iraq through middlemen.  | United Nations Sanctions, MTCR, AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B, IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FAA sec. 620G and 620H. | No publicly known sanction.  |
| July-Dec. 1996 .....       | DCI reported Russia transferred to Iran "a variety" of items related to ballistic missiles.  | MTCR, AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B, FAA sec. 620G and 620H, IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FOAA.                     | No publicly known sanction.  |
| Nov. 1996 .....            | Israel reported Russian assistance to Syria to build a chemical weapon plant.  | AECA sec. 81, EAA sec. 11C, FAA sec. 620G and 620H .....   | No publicly known sanction.  |
| 1996-1997 .....            | Delivered 3 Kilo diesel-electric submarines to Iran .....  | IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FAA sec. 620G and 620H .....  | No publicly known sanction.  |
| Jan.-Feb. 1997 .....       | Russia transferred detailed instructions to Iran on production of the SS-4 medium-range missile and related parts.   | MTCR, AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B, FAA sec. 620G and 620H, IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FOAA.                     | No publicly known sanction.  |
| April 1997 .....           | Sale of S-300 anti-aircraft/anti-missile missile system to Iran to protect nuclear reactors at Bushehr and other strategic sites.  | IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FAA sec. 620G and 620H .....  | No publicly known sanction.  |
| Oct. 1997 .....            | Israeli intelligence reported Russian technology transfers for Iranian missiles developed with ranges between 1,300 and 10,000 km. Transfers include engines and guidance systems. | MTCR, AECA sec. 73, EAA sec. 11B, IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605, FAA sec. 620G and 620H, FOAA.                     | No publicly known sanction.  |

## Regimes:

BWC: Biological Weapons Convention; and MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime.

## U.S. Laws:

AECA: Arms Export Control Act; EAA: Export Administration Act; FAA: Foreign Assistance Act; FOAA: Foreign Operations Appropriations Act; IIANPA: Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act; and NPPA: Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act.

Mr. Speaker, during the 1990s, I would remind my colleagues, 37 times we had evidence of China and Russia transferring weapon technology to Hussein. Every one of those should have required a response, should have required sanctions. The previous administration imposed sanctions a total of four times out of 37. In nine of those cases, it was chemical and biological weapon technology, the very technology today that we are worried about. We saw it being transferred, and we did nothing about it. In fact, only in two of those nine cases did we impose the required sanctions.

Mr. Speaker, we have evidence which I will submit in the RECORD also of Iraq's policy on their defense system and offensive capabilities, both a 1984 document and a 1987 document. In the document Saddam's military talks about the use of chemical and biological weapons.

In President Bush's speech this past week he said, "All that might be required of Saddam are a small container and one terrorist or Iraqi intelligence operative to deliver it."

Well, here it is. Mr. Speaker, this is a biological disarming device. You can build it for less than \$100. If I would not offend the Parliamentarian, I would turn it on and you would have a plume in this room. If you put that device in the Metro station subway in D.C. and activate it, based on a study by the Office of Technology Assessment, you would have 150,000 people in the D.C. commuter system killed by the dispersion of 4.5 kilograms of anthrax.

Just like we saw back in the 1990s when we had evidence that Russian entities transferred these devices, a Soviet accelerometer and a Soviet gyroscope, which the previous administration did nothing about, never imposed the required sanctions. Now we have to pay the price.

Does Saddam have chemical and biological weapons? Absolutely. Where did he get it from? He got it from those 37 transfers that we knew about that are now in the record that we did nothing about. Does he have a nuclear weapon

like the one I have in front of me that General Alexander Lebed told my delegation in 1997 that they built? And the previous administration when it became public said, we deny the Russians ever built them.

The previous administration sided with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and said we have no reason to doubt them, even though two top Russian leaders said there was reason to believe 80 of these devices were missing.

The reason why we have to support the President is because the failures of our policies in the past decade have given Saddam Hussein biological and chemical weapon capability, nuclear weapon capability, missile capability, none of which should have occurred during the 1990s if we would have enforced the very arms control agreements that the other side now talks about. Thirty-seven times we had evidence, nine cases of chemical and biological weapons going from Russian and China to Iraq. And what did we do? We went like this and like that. And now we are faced with the consequence.

So what President Bush has said is we must stand up and we must show the world that we will not tolerate what went on in the 1990s. We will not sit back and allow 37 violations to go unchecked. We will not pretend we do not see them because we want to keep Yeltsen in power. We will not pretend we do not want to see them because we want to protect the financial interests of the PLA for our fund-raising purposes.

We should have done this during the 1990s, but we did not. I say to my colleagues, support this resolution. Give the President a unanimous voice that says to the U.N., we will act to finally do what we did not do in the 1990s, and that is enforce the requirements of the six resolutions that were passed back then.

And if my colleagues want to see what a biological disbursement weapon looks like, come see me. I will activate it for them in the cloak room.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. LEWIS).

Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution. As I have listened to this thorough debate and thought about the resolution we are about to vote on, it seems to me the Persian Gulf War has never really ended. In 1991 Saddam Hussein agreed to a conditional surrender. He has not met the conditions of his surrender. Iraq is still fighting, and we need to respond.

I have heard some of my colleagues say that use of force against Iraq would be a preemptive strike. I disagree. In 1991 Saddam Hussein said Iraq would comply with all United Nations resolutions. Iraq has not done so. Iraq agreed to eliminate nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs. Today Iraq still has weapons of mass destruction and the will to use them.

Hussein agreed to allow unfettered weapons inspection in this country. However, Iraq has done everything possible to obstruct those inspections. Iraq pledged to keep planes out of the no-fly zone. In the past few years, his pilots have fired on U.S. and British troops 1,600 times. They have shot at us 460 times this year alone.

Iraq continues to be a threat to the area. In 1993 Iraqi troops moved toward the Kuwaiti border. Iraqi planes continued to fly in the no-fly zone. When Iraq banned U.N. inspections in 1998, President Clinton responded by launching missiles into the country.

□ 1730

Was that a preemptive strike? Along with the British, we dropped more than 600 bombs on Iraqi military targets. We have continued strikes against Iraq air defense installations and in response to Iraq shots at our planes in the no-fly zone.

Iraq must be held to the conditions it agreed to. This Congress authorized action to bring Iraq into compliance in 1998. We must do so again. Until Iraq



complies with the terms of its conditional surrender, there has been no surrender. The Persian Gulf War is ongoing.

Further, U.S. action against Iraq is not a preemptive strike, but is our responsibility to bring Saddam Hussein's continued plotting of his international obligations to an end. President Bush wants the commitment that Congress stands with him in dealing with Iraq.

I urge that Congress stand with President Bush and support the resolution to finally end the Gulf War once and for all.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. STEARNS).

(Mr. STEARNS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution, but we are engaged in debating the most difficult decision that Members of Congress are called upon to make.

Notwithstanding that, Saddam Hussein is uniquely evil, the only ruler in power today, and the first one since Hitler, to commit chemical genocide. I believe there is reason for the long term to remove him from power. This resolution is the first step.

My colleagues, remember that Israel absorbed the world's hatred and scorn for its attack on and destruction of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. Today it is accepted by most arms control experts that had Israel not destroyed Osirak, Hussein's Iraq would have had nuclear power by 1990, when his forces pillaged their way through Kuwait.

We can see on this chart all the resolutions that were passed and that Saddam Hussein did not comply with. In fact, there were 12 immediately after the war; 35 after those 12. All together, 47 resolutions, of which he scarcely complied.

Now, let us take the resolution on this chart, which is 687, governing the cease-fire in 1991. It required that Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless its chemical and biological weapons. Within 15 days after the passage of the resolution, Iraq was to have provided the locations, the amounts, and types of those specified items. Over a decade later, we still have little information on that.

That is why I applaud President Bush for taking his case to the United Nations and placing the burden of action upon the organization to enforce its own resolutions passed on Iraq. We owe diplomacy and peaceful opportunities the due diligence necessary to rid this despotic regime of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism sponsorship. However, if the U.S. is not credible in alternatives for noncompliance, we will again be at the crossroads asking the same question: If not now, when?

Let us move forward with this resolution, develop a consensus, and work together with other nations to remove this evil dictator.

Mr. Speaker, our vote this week will be whether or not to authorize the President of the United States to use necessary and appropriate force to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq. I would like to emphatically state that no decision weighs heavier on the mind of a President, or a Member of Congress, than the decision to send our men and women of the Armed Forces into action.

And I want to thank the President for working hard to make the case for possible—and I want my colleagues and the public to understand this—possible action against Iraq. The President stated last night that he hopes military action is not required. Iraq can avoid conflict by adhering to the security resolutions requiring “declaring and destroying all of its weapons of mass destruction, ending support for terrorism and ceasing the persecution of its civilian population. And, it must release or account for all gulf war personnel, including an American pilot, whose fate is still unknown.”

To quote a recent article from the “Weekly Standard”:

There are, of course, many repugnant dictators in the world; a dozen or so in the Middle East alone. But Saddam Hussein is a figure of singular repugnance, and singular danger. To review: There is no dictator in power anywhere in the world who has, so far in his career, invaded two neighboring countries; fired ballistic missiles at the civilians of two other neighboring countries; tried to have assassinated an ex-president of the United States; harbored al-Qaida fugitives . . . attacked the soldiers of an enemy country with chemical weapons; conducted biological weapons experiments on human subjects; committed genocide; and there is, of course, the matter of the weaponized aflatoxin, a tool of mass murder and nothing else.

And lastly, my colleagues, President Bush is not alone in calling for a regime change. Congress made the need for regime change clear in 1998 with the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act. The congress specifically stated “It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.” In that legislation we also called upon the United Nations to establish an international criminal tribunal to prosecute Saddam Hussein and those in his regime for crimes against humanity and criminal violation of international law.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to respond to the comments made by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON), who pointed out that our actions against Saddam during the 1990s were not as aggressive as they should have been.

I would point out that we were also not aggressive until September 11 of the prior year. Both administrations failed to grasp the importance of Saddam Hussein's weapons program until September 11 of last year.

I would also point out that when the prior administration did take military action against Saddam Hussein, it did not receive the level of support and unified support that it should have.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 5½ minutes to the extremely distinguished and thoughtful gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. FORD).

Mr. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, and I join the gentleman from California and associate myself with his remarks. I would hope my friend, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON), who I believe is right on this issue, would refrain from politicizing. If there is blame to go around, there is certainly enough blame to go around here in this town today, yesterday, and even a few days ago.

After careful consideration, Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution. This vote is the most important and difficult one I have cast since coming to Congress some 6 years ago. I sincerely hope, as I imagine most of my colleagues do, that we will never have to cast another one like it.

I have listened carefully to the concerns and objections of many of my colleagues and constituents; and having never served in the Armed Forces, I have sought the counsel of those who have. I have reviewed the available intelligence about the threat from Iraq and weighed the risk of a potential conflict with Iraq in the context of our ongoing war on terrorism; and I have reached the conclusion, as many have, that the risk of inaction and delay far outweigh the risk of action.

Saddam Hussein has stockpiled chemical and biological weapons, as all have mentioned today, and is seeking the means to deliver them, if he does not already have the capacity now. He is developing missile delivery systems that could threaten American citizens, service members, and our own allies in the region. But in today's world, a sworn enemy of America does not need a missile to deliver weapons of mass destruction. All he needs is a suitcase, a small plane, a cargo ship, or a single suicidal terrorist.

The most compelling case for action, however, Mr. Speaker, is the nuclear threat. Let us be clear. We do not have the intelligence suggesting that an imminent nuclear threat is upon us. I would urge Secretary Rumsfeld to cease suggesting to Americans that there is some connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda unless he has evidence to present to this Congress and to this public.

What we do have evidence of is that Saddam Hussein continues to desire to obtain a nuclear weapon. And we know that should he obtain the raw materials, which may be available to him in any number of ways, he could build a nuclear bomb in less than a year. The Iraqi regime's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons are coupled with the recklessness of the Iraqi dictator. We know that Saddam is capable of murder and untold cruelty. We know that Saddam is capable of aggression and also capable of miscalculating his adversary's response to his aggression.

Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a cruel, reckless, and misguided dictator pose a clear and present danger to our security. I could not vote to authorize military action

abroad if I did not believe that Saddam Hussein poses a growing threat to our security, one that will not recede just because we hope it goes away. That is why I support giving the President the authority to achieve our fundamental goal: disarming the Iraqi regime of all weapons of mass destruction.

As we consider this resolution, every Member should read it carefully so we do not mischaracterize what we are voting on here today. So what is this resolution for? First, it is a resolution stating Congress' support for our diplomatic efforts. This resolution must not be taken as an endorsement of unilateralism. It explicitly affirms Congress' support for the President's efforts to work through the U.N. Security Council to address Iraq's "delay, evasion and noncompliance." It calls for prompt and decisive action by the U.N. Security Council to enforce its own mandates on Iraq.

Second, this resolution is not a declaration of war. The resolution forces the President to affirm that all diplomatic and peaceful means have proven inadequate to protect our Nation's security. This gives the President the flexibility to dangle a stick with that carrot.

At the same time, it affirms that military action must be used only as a last resort. If it were up to some of us in this Congress, we would have done it another way, perhaps building international support before coming to Congress, but this President chose to do it another way.

Third, the resolution more defines our purpose in authorizing the use of force. The use of force has two clearly defined purposes: one, to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and, two, to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

Unlike the White House's draft language, the resolution carefully limits its authorization to Iraq and only Iraq. And it is clear that our purpose is to protect against the threat to the United States. This resolution authorizes military action to disarm Iraq but does not mention regime change. The goal is Iraq's disarmament and full compliance with U.N. mandates.

I applaud Leader GEPHARDT and others, including Republicans and Democrats in the Senate, for helping to negotiate such language.

Although I strongly support the President in addressing the threat from Iraq, I believe the President must be more candid with us and the American people about the long-term commitment that is going to be needed in Iraq. It has been a year since we began the campaign in Afghanistan; and our efforts there politically, economically, and militarily are nowhere close to concluding. I visited Afghanistan in February and March and witnessed firsthand how fragile the peace is there. It will take years to forge stability in Afghanistan and years in Iraq.

War is the last outcome that I want, and the last outcome I believe the President wants; but when America's national security is at stake, the world must know that we are prepared to defend our Nation from tyrants and from terrorists. With that, I ask every Member of Congress to support this resolution supporting our President and supporting our Nation.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. KINGSTON).

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, and I stand in support of Joint Resolution 114.

Mr. Speaker, the way I see it is this way. Let us just say, hypothetically, if it was August 2001, and I stood before this House and said, listen, there is a guy out there named Osama bin Laden who is associated with a terrorist group named al Qaeda, and this terrorist group has found safe haven inside the corrupt Taliban government of Afghanistan. And, my colleagues, I think we should do something about it because our intelligence is not necessarily absolute, but this guy is up to no good and we need to strike before he strikes us.

Now, if I had said that in August of 2001, people would have said, that war monger, that jingoistic guy from Georgia. What is he talking about? Yet before September 11, would it not have been nice if we could have had that speech and maybe prevented the tragedy of September 11?

Well, here we are. We know Saddam Hussein has violated treaty after treaty which happened after Desert Storm, starting with U.N. Resolution 660, U.N. Resolution 678, U.N. Resolution 686, 687, 688, 701, all of them. In fact, 16 total of very significant matters going back to Resolution 660. All of them violated, Mr. Speaker.

And then here is the situation with the weapons. We know that they have VX. It is a sticky, colorless liquid that interferes with nerve impulses of the body, causes convulsions and paralysis. U.N. inspectors estimate that Iraq has the means to make 200 tons of VX. Sarin Gas. And, of course, we know that it causes convulsions and paralysis as well. It was used in a small quantity in a Tokyo subway in 1995. Again, inspectors estimate that they have maybe as high as 800 tons of sarin gas. It goes on. Mustard gas, anthrax, and other great worrisome chemical and biological weapons in their stockpile. We also know that he is trying to become nuclear capable.

Finally comes the question of terrorism. We know that the State Department has designated Iraq as a state that sponsors international terrorism. We know that they shelter the Abu Nidal terrorist organization that has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 different countries and killed over 900 people.

We also know that Iraq shelters several prominent terrorist Palestinian

organizations, including the Palestine Liberation Front, which is known for its attacks on Israel, including one on the Achille Lauro ship that killed the United States citizen, Leon Klinghoffer.

My colleagues, the time to act is now. If we could just think for a minute what the price of action is versus inaction. Had Todd Beamer and the other passengers of Flight 93 elected a course of inaction on September 11, the price would have been significantly different for particularly those of us in this building. This is a time that calls for action. And in the great words of Todd Beamer, let me close with this: "Let's roll."

It is time to do something. Let us pass this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of House Joint Resolution 114, Authorizing the Use of Military Force Against Iraq.

Here's how I view the situation: Suppose last August (2001), I gave a speech announcing, "There's a guy named Osama Bin Laden who is involved in a terrorist group called Al Quida, which has found a safe haven and training opportunities inside the corrupt Taliban government of Afghanistan. Bin Laden and his terrorist allies probably were involved in the 1993 bombing of the WTC, the bombing of the USS *Cole* in Yemen, and the bombing of our embassies in Africa. We know Bin Laden hates America and it is likely his group will attack our country in the future. Therefore we need to eliminate him. I suggest we start bombing his hideouts in Afghanistan immediately."

Had I given that speech, I would have been laughed at and called a warmonger, even though action against Al Quida in August 2001 could have saved thousands of lives in both America and Afghanistan. But this, in fact, is our situation today. Saddam Hussein hates us. He harbors terrorist groups, possesses chemical and biological weapons, and may become nuclear capable in a short period of time. America traditionally does not do preemptive strikes, but the events of September 11th change everything. Americans will not tolerate the threat of another horrific attack against the United States. Although no American desires a war, the best way to ensure Hussein's compliance with UN resolutions, and reduce the threat he poses to our national security, is for Congress to confirm the United State's willingness to use force if necessary.

Mr. Speaker, let me give you an account of all the reasons why I support this resolution.

The whole world knows that Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated all 16 of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) for more than a decade. These violations should not be taken lightly and are worthy of review. The list is substantial:

UNSCR 678—NOVEMBER 29, 1990—VIOLATED

Iraq must comply fully with UNSCR 660 (regarding Iraq's illegal invasion of Kuwait) "and all subsequent relevant resolutions."

Authorizes U.N. Member States "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."

UNSCR 686—MARCH 2, 1991—VIOLATED

Iraq must release prisoners detained during the Gulf War.

Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.

Iraq must accept liability under international law for damages from its illegal invasion of Kuwait.

UNSCR 687—APRIL 3, 1991—VIOLATED

Iraq must “unconditionally accept” the destruction, removal or rendering harmless “under international supervision” of all “chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities.”

Iraq must “unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material” or any research, development or manufacturing facilities.

Iraq must “unconditionally accept” the destruction, removal or rendering harmless “under international supervision” of all “ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 KM and related major parts and repair and production facilities.”

Iraq must not “use, develop, construct or acquire” any weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq must reaffirm its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Creates the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify the elimination of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programs and mandated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify elimination of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.

Iraq must declare fully its weapons of mass destruction programs.

Iraq must not commit or support terrorism, or allow terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq.

Iraq must cooperate in accounting for the missing and dead Kuwaitis and others.

Iraq must return Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.

UNSCR 688—APRIL 5, 1991—VIOLATED

“Condemns” repression of Iraqi civilian population, “the consequences of which threaten international peace and security.”

Iraq must immediately end repression of its civilian population.

Iraq must allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations to those in need of assistance.

UNSCR 707—AUGUST 15, 1991—VIOLATED

“Condemns” Iraq’s “serious violation” of UNSCR 687.

“Further condemns” Iraq’s noncompliance with IAEA and its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Iraq must halt nuclear activities of all kinds until the Security Council deems Iraq in full compliance.

Iraq must make a full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs.

Iraq must allow U.N. and IAEA inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

Iraq must cease attempts to conceal or move weapons of mass destruction, and related materials and facilities.

Iraq must allow U.N. and IAEA inspectors to conduct inspection flights throughout Iraq.

Iraq must provide transportation, medical and logistical support for U.N. and IAEA inspectors.

UNSCR 715—OCTOBER 11, 1991—VIOLATED

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. and IAEA inspectors.

UNSCR 949—OCTOBER 15, 1994—VIOLATED

“Condemns” Iraq’s recent military deployments toward Kuwait.

Iraq must not utilize its military or other forces in a hostile manner to threaten its neighbors or U.N. operations in Iraq.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors.

Iraq must not enhance its military capability in southern Iraq.

UNSCR 1051—MARCH 27 1996—VIOLATED

Iraq must report shipments of dual-use items related to weapons of mass destruction to the U.N. and IAEA.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. and IAEA inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

UNSCR 1060—JUNE 12, 1996—VIOLATED

“Deplores” Iraq’s refusal to allow access to U.N. inspectors and Iraq’s “clear violations” of previous U.N. resolutions.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

UNSCR 1115—JUNE 21, 1997—VIOLATED

“Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access” to U.N. inspectors, which constitutes a “clear and flagrant violation” of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom U.N. inspectors want to interview.

UNSCR 1134—OCTOBER 23, 1997—VIOLATED

“Condemns repeated refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access” to U.N. inspectors, which constitutes a “flagrant violation” of UNSCR 687, 707, 715, and 1060.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

Iraq must give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraqi officials whom U.N. inspectors want to interview.

UNSCR 1137—NOVEMBER 12, 1997—VIOLATED

“Condemns the continued violations by Iraq” of previous U.N. resolutions, including its “implicit threat to the safety of” aircraft operated by U.N. inspectors and its tampering with U.N. inspector monitoring equipment.

Reaffirms Iraq’s responsibility to ensure the safety of U.N. inspectors.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

UNSCR 1154—MARCH 2, 1998—VIOLATED

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. and IAEA weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have the “severest consequences for Iraq.”

UNSCR 1194—SEPTEMBER 9, 1998—VIOLATED

“Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation” with U.N. and IAEA inspectors, which constitutes “a totally unacceptable contravention” of its obligations under UNSCR 687, 7078, 715, 1060, 1115, and 1154.

Iraq must cooperate fully with U.N. and IAEA weapons inspectors, and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.

UNSCR 1205—NOVEMBER 5, 1998—VIOLATED

“Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation” with U.N. in-

spectors as “a flagrant violation” of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions.

Iraq must provide “immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation” with U.N. and IAEA inspectors.

UNSCR 1284—DECEMBER 17, 1998—VIOLATED

Created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace previous weapon inspection team (UNSCOM).

Iraq must allow UNMOVIC “immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access” to Iraqi officials and facilities.

Iraq must fulfill its commitment to return Gulf War prisoners.

Calls on Iraq to distribute humanitarian goods and medical supplies to its people and address the needs of vulnerable Iraqis without discrimination.

While all these violations are extremely serious, there are 3 or 4 items that stand out in my mind.

His blatant refusal to allow U.N. weapons inspectors to oversee the destruction of his weapons of mass destruction.

His continued development of new biological and chemical weapons.

His continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, and

His support and harboring of terrorist organizations inside Iraq (including Al Quida).

Mr. Speaker, some people have said, “why are we doing this now?” They say there is no “clear and present danger.” I don’t know how much clearer it has to be. The facts of the matter are documented, and undoubtedly pose a clear and present danger to our national security.

Documented U.N. weapons inspector reports show that Iraq continually deceived the inspectors and never provided definitive proof that they destroyed their stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons.

Iraq has admitted producing the world’s most dangerous biological and chemical weapons, but refuses to give proof that they destroyed them. Examples of Iraq’s chemical weapons include VX, Sarin Gas and Mustard Gas.

VX, the most toxic of chemical weapons, is a sticky, colorless liquid that interferes with the body’s nerve impulses, causing convulsions and paralysis of the lungs and blood vessels. Victims essentially choke to death. A dose of 10 milligrams on the skin is enough to kill.

Iraq acknowledged making nearly 4 tons of VX, and “claimed” they destroyed it, but they never provided any definitive proof. U.N. inspectors estimate that Iraq has the means to make more than 200 tons of VX, and Iraq continues to rebuild and expand dual-use facilities that it could quickly adapt to chemical weapons production.

Sarin gas, a nerve agent like VX, causes convulsions, paralysis and asphyxiation. Even a small scale Sarin Gas attack such as the one used in the Tokyo subway in 1995 can kill and injure vast numbers of people.

Iraq acknowledged making approximately 800 tons of Sarin gas and thousands of rockets, artillery shells and bombs containing Sarin, but they have not accounted for hundreds of these weapons. Iraq willingly used these weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and it also used them against Kurdish Iraqi civilians.

Mustard Gas, a colorless liquid that evaporates into a gas and begins dissolving upon

contact with the skin causes injuries similar to burns and damages the eyes and lungs.

Iraq acknowledged making thousands of tons of mustard gas and using the chemical during its war with Iran, but told U.N. inspectors they "misplaced" 550 mustard filled artillery shells after the Gulf war.

Examples of Iraq's biological weapons include Anthrax, Botulinum Toxin and Aflatoxin.

Anthrax, as we all know, is a potentially fatal bacterium that causes flu like symptoms before filling the lungs with fluid and causing death. Just a few tiny spores are enough to cause the deadly infection.

Iraq has acknowledged making 2,200 gallons of anthrax spores—enough to kill millions, but U.N. inspectors determined that Iraq could have made three times as much. Inspectors say that at least 16 missile warheads filled with Anthrax are missing, and Iraq is working to produce the deadlier powdered form of Anthrax that could be sprayed from aircraft, put into missile warheads, or given to terrorists.

Botulinum Toxin, is a poison that is one of the deadliest substances known to man. Even in small doses it causes gastrointestinal infection and can quickly advance to paralysis and death. A mere 70 billionths of a gram is enough to kill if inhaled.

Iraq acknowledged making 2,200 gallons of Botulinum Toxin, most of which was put into missile warheads and other munitions. At least five missile warheads with Botulinum Toxin are missing according to U.N. inspectors.

Aflatoxin, is a poison that can cause swelling of the abdomen, lungs and brain resulting in convulsion, coma and death.

Iraq acknowledged making more than 520 gallons of Aflatoxin and putting it into missile warheads and bombs. At least four Aflatoxin—filled missile warheads are missing according to U.N. inspectors.

It is also a fact (and a clear and present danger) that Saddam Hussein continues his work to develop a nuclear weapon.

We know he had an advanced nuclear weapons development program before the Gulf War, and the independent Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that Saddam Hussein could build a nuclear bomb within months if he were able to obtain fissile material.

We now know that Iraq has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb. In the last 14 months, Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes, which are believed to be intended for use as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium.

As if weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a ruthless dictator were not enough, we now know that Saddam Hussein harbors terrorist organizations within Iraq.

Iraq is one of seven countries that have been designated by the State Department as "state sponsors of international terrorism." UNSUR 687 prohibits Saddam Hussein from committing or supporting terrorism, or allowing terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq. Saddam continues to violate these UNSUR provisions.

Iraq shelters the Abu Nidal Terrorist Organization that has carried out terrorist attacks in twenty countries, killing or injuring almost 900 people. These terrorists have offices in Baghdad and received training, logistical assistance, and financial aid from the government of Iraq.

Iraq also shelters several prominent Palestinian terrorist organizations in Baghdad, in-

cluding the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), which is known for attacks against Israel and is headed by Abu Abbas, who carried out the 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and murdered U.S. citizen Leo Klinghoffer.

Hussein increased from \$10,000 to \$25,000 the money he offers to families of Palestinian suicide/homicide bombers who blow themselves up with belt explosives.

Several former Iraqi military officers have described a highly secret terrorist training facility in Iraq known as Salman Pak, where both Iraqis and non-Iraqi Arabs receive training on hijacking planes and trains, planting explosives in cities, sabotage, and assassinations.

And in 1993, the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) attempted to assassinate former U.S. President George Bush and the Emir of Kuwait. Kuwaiti authorities thwarted the terrorist plot and arrested 17 suspects, led by two Iraqi nationals.

Mr. Speaker, I don't know how much clearer it needs to be. The American people will not understand if we ignore these facts, sit back, and wait for the unacceptable possibility of Saddam Hussein providing a weapon of mass destruction to a terrorist group for use against the United States.

Saddam Hussein was the only world leader to fully condone the September 11 attacks on America. His media even promised the American people that if their government did not change its policies toward Iraq, it would suffer even more devastating blows. He has even endorsed and encouraged acts of terrorism against America.

The case is clear. We know Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction, we know he harbors terrorists including al-Qaida, and we know he hates America, so the case against Saddam really isn't the issue. The question is what are we going to do about it.

Clearly, we must authorize the use of military force against Iraq in case it becomes necessary. The President has said that military action is a last resort, and our bipartisan resolution calls for the same tact, but Saddam Hussein must know that America is prepared to use force if he continues to defy UN Security Council resolutions and refuses to disarm.

As the President said, approving this resolution does not mean that military action is imminent or unavoidable. The resolution will tell the United Nations, and all nations, that America speaks with one voice and is determined to make the demands of the civilized world mean something. Congress will be sending a message to Saddam Hussein that his only choice is full compliance—and the time remaining for that choice is limited.

The Speaker, the price of taking action against this evil dictator may be high, but history has shown that the price of inaction is even higher. Had Todd Beamer and the passengers of flight 93 elected a course of inaction on September 11th, the price may have been far higher for those of us in this building. There comes a time when we must take action. A time when we must risk lives in order to save lives. This resolution authorizes action, if necessary, to protect America.

Mr. Speaker, I am confident that I speak for every member of this House when I say I hope we can avoid war & that Saddam Hussein will allow unfettered access to all sites and willingly disarm. But if he does not, then the Congress will have done its duty and given the President the authority he needs to

defend our great nation. The authority to take action if Iraq continues to delay, deceive and deny. If Hussein complies, our resolution will have worked, but if he does not, then in the words of that brave American Todd Beamer, "Let's Roll!"

□ 1745

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. ENGLISH).

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Speaker, in this body our first and highest responsibility is protecting our homeland, and that responsibility may from time to time require us to embrace unpopular policies and justify them to our constituents when we recognize a transcendent danger to our country.

Mr. Speaker, I realize my vote for this resolution authorizes a military action that may put at risk thousands of American lives in Iraq. However, the tragedies of September 11 have vividly highlighted the danger that inaction may risk tens, if not hundreds of thousands of innocent American lives here at home from terrorism.

This bipartisan resolution was drafted in recognition of this fact and, therefore, presents our President with the initiative in continuing the global war against terrorism.

Mr. Speaker, we know that Saddam Hussein, like Osama bin Laden, hates America and has called for the murder of Americans everywhere. We know that Saddam Hussein even in the face of crippling economic sanctions has found the resources to reconstruct his chemical and biological weapons programs, even at great painful expense to his people.

We know that Saddam Hussein is directing an aggressive program to procure components necessary for building nuclear devices and that he actively supports terror in other nations, including Israel. So the question before us is, do we wait for Saddam Hussein to become a greater threat, or do we address that threat now?

CIA Director Tenet has told us in recent days that al Qaeda has sought cooperation from Iraq. I cannot stand here and trust that Saddam Hussein will not supply al Qaeda and other terrorist networks with weapons that could be used to massacre more Americans. On the contrary, we have every reason to believe that the Iraqi dictator would share his growing arsenal of terror with agents willing to strike at the United States.

With this in mind, and given other revelations from captured members of al Qaeda, it is clear that time is not on our side. That is why I support this balanced and nuanced resolution providing our President with the powerful backing of Congress in an effort to disarm Iraq. It is my sincere hope that this resolution will stimulate intrusive and decisive action by the United Nations and at the same time lead to a full disarmament of Saddam Hussein. But if it does not, the United States of America must stand willing to act in

order to prevent more events like those of September 11.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. THOMPSON), a member of the Committee on Armed Services and a combat veteran from Vietnam.

Mr. THOMPSON of California. Mr. Speaker, the vote we are debating today will be the most significant vote that we cast during this Congress and perhaps during our entire careers. I say that for two reasons.

First, this vote may very well send our American soldiers into what has been called on this floor "harm's way." Make no mistake about it, it is important to note that is a very nice and sanitary way of saying that our soldiers will be going to war. They will face combat conditions that our forces have not seen during most of our lifetimes. According to the military experts and the generals I have heard from, the casualty rates may be high.

If, as some expect, Saddam Hussein uses chemical and biological weapons to defend Baghdad, the results will be horrifying.

Mr. Speaker, I have been in combat; and I am not willing to vote to send another soldier to war without clear and convincing evidence that America or our allies are in immediate danger and not without the backup and support of allied forces.

The President delivered a good speech on Monday evening. I agree with him that Saddam Hussein is a ruthless dictator and that he is trying to build an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. However, he showed us no link between Iraq and September 11, nor did he produce any evidence that even suggests that America or our allies are in immediate danger.

This morning we learned from the CIA that Saddam Hussein is unlikely to use chemical or biological weapons if unprovoked by a U.S. military campaign. Most alarming about that news today is the report concludes by saying that, if we attack, the likelihood of him using weapons of mass destruction to respond would be "pretty high."

Second, this vote is a radical departure from the foreign policy doctrine that has served us honorably for the past 200 years. This radical departure to an unprovoked, preemptive first-strike policy creates what I believe will be a grave new world. This new foreign policy doctrine will set an international precedent that tells the world, if they think their neighbor is a threat, attack them.

This, I believe, is precisely the wrong message for the greatest Nation, the only true superpower Nation and the most wonderful democracy our planet has known, to send to Russia and Chechnya, to India and Pakistan, to China and Taiwan, and to whomever else is listening. And one thing we know, everyone is listening.

For these two reasons, I cannot support a resolution that does not first require that all diplomatic options be ex-

hausted, that we work with the United Nations Security Council, and that we proceed to disarm Iraq with a broad base of our allies.

I appreciate the President's new position that war is the last option and that he will lead a coalition in our effort in Iraq. But, unfortunately, that is not what this resolution says. This resolution is weak at best on exhausting the diplomatic options and relinquishes to the executive branch Congress' constitutional charge to declare war. I believe that is wrong.

We must address the potential danger presented by Saddam Hussein. The first step should be the return of the U.N. weapons inspectors; and they must have unrestricted and unfettered access to every square inch of Iraq, including the many presidential palaces. We must then work with the Security Council to ensure the strictest standards, protocols, and modalities are in place to make certain that Hussein cannot weasel out of any of these inspections.

Finally, we need to amass the allied support necessary to carry out the inspections in a manner that will guarantee Iraq is completely stripped of all weapons of mass destruction and left unable to pursue new weapons of this type.

We had great success in building a coalition to fight terrorism, and we should do no less when it comes to disarming Saddam Hussein. We must respect international order and international law in our efforts to make this world a safer place.

With our military might, we can easily gain superiority over anyone in the world. However, it takes more than military might to prevail in a way that provides hope and prosperity, two ingredients that make it less likely for terrorism to breed and impossible for repressive dictators to rule.

Mr. Speaker, if it is the decision of this Congress to go to war, I will support our troops 1,000 percent. However, I saw Baghdad and I know fighting a war there will be ugly and casualties may be extremely high. Let us exhaust the diplomatic options, return the weapons inspectors, continue to build an international coalition so Saddam Hussein sees the world, not just the U.S. at the end of the gun. By doing this, we can avoid sending our soldiers into combat in Baghdad unless it is absolutely the last option.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. YOUNG), chairman of the Committee on Appropriations.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution.

Mr. Speaker, voting to authorize sending young Americans to war is a serious decision. Members will make that decision in this Chamber tomorrow.

Yesterday and today we have heard very impressive debate, most of which favors the resolution; some did not. We

have heard over and over again the threat that Saddam Hussein and his regime is not only to the United States and our interests but to many other parts of the world.

I am not going to restate those issues that have already been stated yesterday and today, but as one of the many cosponsors of House Joint Resolution 114, I do rise in support of this resolution to authorize the use of United States military force against Saddam Hussein's regime.

Much like the first hours and days after September 11, the world, our friends and our foes, wondered how would the United States respond to that attack on our Nation? They wanted to know if we as a Nation would follow through with a serious response to bring the terrorists to justice. They wanted to see if we would respond with a token strike, as we did following the attack on U.S. troops in Somalia, at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, against our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and in the attack on our sailors aboard the USS *Cole*. The world watched. Our credibility was at stake. Before joining us, many of our friends were waiting to see if we were serious this time. Our enemies were not concerned because they believed they could absorb another token response, as they had in past years.

But the message became clear just 3 days after September 11. A response was certain when Congress, with a strong bipartisan vote, stood and unanimously approved a \$40 billion emergency supplemental appropriations bill to allow the President of the United States to lead not only a recovery effort in those parts of our country that were attacked in New York City and at the Pentagon but to pursue the war against the Taliban and against al Qaeda and against any terrorist, wherever they might be hiding. It was to fund the war against terrorism, wherever they were waiting to attack again.

When Congress spoke, almost immediately, with unity and with force, our friends knew we were serious this time, and it was with confidence that they joined our cause. And our enemies knew right away that America was serious; and when President Bush said what it was we were going to do, they knew that we had the resolve to fight the battle, no matter how long it would take or where it would lead.

Today, we are in a similar situation. There is no question about the threat to our Nation from Saddam Hussein's regime, to our allies, and to world peace. As has been pointed out here many times today, he has defied one United Nations resolution after another for more than a decade.

Remember, he lost the war. He lost the war in Desert Storm, and he signed up to certain rules and regulations which go along with losing a war, and he has ignored all of them. He has developed and stockpiled chemical and biological weapons. We know that he is seeking nuclear weapons. We know

that he has aided and abetted terrorists who have struck international targets around the world. But now it is time for Congress to speak again with a firm and resolute voice, just as we did on September 14, 3 days after the cowardly attacks on innocent Americans.

Many of our friends are watching and they are waiting today, as they were last year. Are they going to join with us, or not? Is this a serious effort, or not? Is Congress speaking for the American people to support the President of the United States as he seeks to protect this Nation and our interests?

President Bush needs Congress to act to convince our allies, our friends, and our enemies that we are serious. They need to know that our Nation is resolved to continue this battle against terrorism into Iraq if necessary.

Many have said that Saddam Hussein is not a real threat to the United States because he is so far away, and he is far away. It is a long distance.

□ 1800

Many have said that the President's speech Monday night did not address a lot of new subjects. He compiled and organized very well, many of the existing arguments. But he did say something new for those who paid really close attention. The President discussed for the first time publicly information that many of our colleagues who work with intelligence issues have been aware of for quite some time. That involves Saddam Hussein's aggressive efforts to develop and use unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, as a delivery method for his weapons of mass destruction. The SCUDs did not have a very long range. The SCUDs were not very accurate. I can attest to that because one night visiting with General Schwarzkopf during Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia, a SCUD was launched near our site, and it landed not too far away; but it was far enough away that it did not hurt anybody. So we know that the SCUDs were not that accurate. UAVs are a different story. UAVs have a much longer range; UAVs are able to be piloted and trained specifically on a target. UAVs are dangerous. And if my colleagues do not think UAVs have a long range, we ourselves have flown a UAV from the United States to Australia and back. Saddam is aggressively seeking ability to use those long-range UAVs to put so many more targets in his sights. We cannot let that happen.

Mr. Speaker, with this resolution Congress reaffirms our support for the international war against terrorism. It continues to be international in nature, as this resolution specifically expresses support for the President's efforts to strictly enforce, through the United Nations Security Council, and I will repeat that, through the United Nations Security Council, all relevant Security Council resolutions applicable to Iraq. It also expresses support for

the President's efforts to obtain prompt decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion, and non-compliance with those resolutions.

One of the lessons of September 11 is that terrorism knows no boundaries. Its victims are men and women, children and adults. It can occur here; it can occur abroad. It can occur anywhere. Terrorists strike without warning. If we are to fight and win the war on terrorism, we must remain united, united in the Congress, united with the President of the United States, and united with the American people. President Bush told the Nation last September that victory would not come quickly or easily. It would be a battle unlike any our Nation has ever waged. Now is not the time to send a mixed message to our friends and allies. Now is not the time to show our enemies any weakness in our resolve.

Mr. Speaker, as we prepare to record our votes on this important resolution, we should remember the victims of terrorism, September 11 and other examples, and our promise last year to seek out and destroy the roots of terrorism whether it be its sponsors, planners, or the perpetrators of these cowardly missions. We should remember the unity of our Nation and the world. The battle continues, the stakes remain high, and the cause remains just. America must again speak one more time with unity, with force, and with clarity. This resolution does that.

Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CAMP).

Mr. CAMP. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, the Iraqi regime has posed a threat to peace, to the United States, and to the world for too long. In order to protect America against this very real and growing threat, I support giving the President the authority to use force, to use military action if necessary against Iraq. Without a doubt this is one of the most difficult decisions I have had to make as a Member of Congress. But after briefings from the administration, testimony from congressional hearings, I am convinced the threat to our Nation's safety is real. After repeatedly failing to comply with U.N. inspections, Saddam Hussein's efforts to build weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical and nuclear, have gone unchecked for far too long. The world cannot allow him to continue down this deadly path. Saddam Hussein must comply with U.N. inspections; but if not, America and our coalition must be prepared to meet this threat.

After the Gulf War, in compliance with U.N. resolutions, a no-fly zone was implemented. The purpose was to protect Iraqi Kurds and Shiite Muslims from Saddam Hussein's aggressions and to conduct aerial surveillance. But since its inception, pilots patrolling the zones have come under repeated attack from Iraqi missiles and artillery.

The connection between Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and its longstanding ties to terrorist networks such as al Qaeda has significantly altered the U.S. security environment. The two linked together pose a clear and present danger to our country. Consider that Saddam Hussein could supply the terrorists who have sleeper cells in our land with weapons of mass destruction to attack the U.S. while concealing his responsibility for the action. It is a very real and growing threat. The Iraqi regime has been building a case against itself for more than 10 years, and if we fail to heed the warning signs and allow them to continue down this path, the results could be devastating, but they would not be a surprise.

After September 11, we are on notice. If Saddam Hussein refuses to comply with U.N. resolutions and diplomatic efforts, we have only one choice in order to ensure the security of our Nation and the safety of our citizens.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. PITTS), a member of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Speaker, years ago when I was a world away fighting to contain the scourge of communism in Southeast Asia, a movement grew up here at home to protest what we were doing. Late in the war, one of the anthems of that movement was a song by John Lennon called "Give Peace a Chance." We are not here to debate the Vietnam War, but we are discussing war and peace. Peace is a very precious thing, and we should defend it and even fight for it. And we have given peace a chance for 11 long years.

We gave peace a chance through diplomacy, but Saddam Hussein has broken every agreement that came out of that diplomacy. We gave peace a chance through weapons inspections, but Saddam Hussein orchestrated an elaborate shell game to thwart that effort. We gave peace a chance through sanctions, but Saddam Hussein used those sanctions as an excuse to starve his own people. We gave peace a chance by establishing no-fly zones to prevent Saddam Hussein from killing more of his own citizens, but he shoots at our planes every day. We gave peace a chance by allowing him to sell some oil to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people, but instead he used the revenue to build more weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Speaker, we have given peace a chance for more than a decade, and it has not worked. Even now our President is actively working to achieve a diplomatic solution by getting the United Nations to pass a resolution with teeth; and while the United Nations has an important role to play in this, no American President and no American Congress can shirk our responsibility to protect the American people. If the U.N. will not act, we must.



If we go down to the other end of the national Mall, we will see on the Korean War Memorial the words "Freedom is not free." Peace is not free either. What some of those who are protesting the President's request for military authority do not understand is that our freedoms were not won with poster paint. Antiwar protestors do not win our freedoms or our peace. The freedom to live in peace was won by men and women who gave their lives on the battlefields of history.

As the world's only remaining superpower, we now even have an even greater responsibility to stand up to prevent mass murder before it happens. No world organization can override the President's duty and our duty to protect the American people. If Mohammed Atta had had a nuclear weapon, he would have used that weapon in New York and not an airplane. By all accounts Saddam Hussein is perhaps a year away from having nuclear weapons. He already has chemical and biological weapons capable of killing millions.

When police detectives investigate a crime, they look for three things: means, motive, and opportunity. Clearly Saddam Hussein has the means, he has the weapons, and he has the motive. He hates America, he hates the Kurds, he hates Kuwaitis, he hates Iran, he hates Israel, he hates anyone who gets in his way. And we know that when he hates people, he kills them, sometimes by the thousand. He has shown the propensity to use his weapons and so he has the means and the motive. But does he have the opportunity? Saddam Hussein could easily pass a suitcase with a nuclear weapon off to an al Qaeda terrorist with a one-way ticket to New York. No fingerprints, no evidence, and several million dead Americans.

Mr. Speaker, this is a very real danger. Before September 11 we might have thought this could never happen. Today we are too wise to doubt it, and it is a danger that grows every day. Every day Saddam Hussein grows stronger. Every day Saddam Hussein builds more chemical and biological weapons. Every day Saddam Hussein comes a little closer to achieving nuclear weapons capability. Every day that passes, America grows more vulnerable to a Saddam-sponsored terrorist attack.

In this case inaction is more costly than action. The price of delay is a greater risk. The price of inaction could be catastrophic, even worse than September 11. We must disarm Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Speaker, we are not advocating war. We are calling for peace, but peace might only be possible if we are willing to fight for it, and the President needs that authority to do that. I urge support for the resolution.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. BROWN) and that he be able to control and yield that time to others.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GILCHREST). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. MALONEY).

Mrs. MALONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, this is a very difficult vote for me. If there is ever one vote that should be made in the national interest, a vote that transcends politics and where Members must vote their conscience, it is the one that is before us tonight.

I have received thousands of letters against the resolution, and just this past weekend over 15,000 gathered in Central Park in my district to protest. But what is at stake are not our political careers or an election, but the future of our country and our way of life. I believe there is a more compelling case now against Saddam than 12 years ago. Then the threat was of a geopolitical nature, a move to change the map of the Middle East. But I never saw it as a direct threat to our Nation.

The main question before us today is whether Saddam is a threat to the United States and our allies. No one doubts that he has chemical and biological weapons. No one doubts that he is trying to stockpile weapons of mass destruction. No one doubts that he has thwarted inspections in the past and has developed UAVs. No one doubts that he has consistently worked to develop nuclear power. No one doubts that he has twice invaded his neighbors. The question is, Will he use these weapons against the United States and our allies, and can we deter him without using force?

As Lincoln said in the beginning days of the Civil War: "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise to the occasion. As our case is new, so must we think anew and act anew."

I would be for deterrence if I thought it would work. We are in a new era and no longer in the Cold War. Deterrence depends on the victim knowing from where the aggression will come and the aggressor knowing the victim will know who has attacked him. It has been a year since the anthrax attacks in our Nation, and we still do not know where the attacks came from. Saddam has likely taken notice that we were unable to tie evidence of attacks to their source, and if he believes he can give weapons of mass destruction to terrorists to use against us without our knowing he has done so, our ability to deter him from such a course of action will be greatly diminished.

□ 1615

Opponents of our war talk about the unintended consequences of war. They do not talk about the unwanted consequences of not disarming Saddam. In

today's environment, it is very possible he could supply weapons to terrorists who will attack the United States or our allies around the world.

I am pleased the resolution has been improved with congressional input. We should proceed carefully, step by step, and use the United Nations and the international community to disarm Saddam so that we are safer in the United States and New York and in our respective States and clear around the world.

Just today I spoke with British Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, on this issue. Ambassador Greenstock told me that the members of the Security Council, both permanent and otherwise, will approve a robust inspection resolution; and if this fails to disarm Iraq, he expects a second resolution that may authorize force.

I come from a family of veterans. Most recently, my brother served in the 101st Airborne in Vietnam. It happens to be his birthday today. He told me that he parachuted many times behind enemy lines to acquire enemy intelligence. He saw many of his friends machine gunned down. This searing experience left deep wounds. So it is my deepest hope that we will not have to send our men and young women into harm's way.

So it is with a very heavy heart, but a clear resolve, that I will be voting to support this resolution. The accumulation of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam and the willingness of terrorists to strike innocent people in the United States and our allies across the world have, unfortunately, ushered in a dangerous new era. It is a danger that we cannot afford to ignore.

I will be voting yes. I will be supporting the President on this resolution.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. BROWN).

Mr. BROWN of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of this resolution to authorize the use of military force against Iraq. I stand behind the Commander-in-Chief and our men and women in uniform who may be called upon to defend America's freedom again.

The War Powers Resolution was passed to ensure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply before the introduction of our Armed Forces into hostilities. I want to commend the President for working with Congress on crafting this critical resolution.

Time and time again, Mr. Speaker, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime have refused to comply with the sanctions imposed by the United States and its international community. In 1990, Iraq committed an unprovoked act of aggression and occupation against its Arab neighbor Kuwait, a peace-loving nation.



After the Gulf War, the Iraqi government continually violated the terms of the United Nations-sponsored ceasefire agreement. They refused to provide access to weapons inspectors to investigate suspected weapon production facilities.

Americans and coalition force pilots have been fired upon thousands of times while lawfully enforcing the no-fly zone crafted by the United Nations Security Council. In 1993, they attempted to assassinate former President Bush. As we speak here today, members of al Qaeda are known to be within the borders of Iraq.

Mr. Speaker, history has proven that Saddam Hussein and his government cannot be dealt with through diplomatic channels or peaceful means. He only understands death, destruction and trampling on the human rights of others, as evidenced by his treatment of the Kurdish people in Northern Iraq and anyone in his government who questions his power.

Some may argue that America is acting as the aggressor and planning a preemptive strike without justification. To the contrary, this is anticipatory self-defense against evil forces and weapons that threaten our national security and peace and stability throughout the Persian Gulf and the world.

We do not want to see another day like September 11 ever again in America, or anywhere else on God's great Earth. If we do not put an end to Iraq's development of its weapons of mass destruction program, the future could be worse.

America must act forcefully and with great resolve because the costs are too high. The time has come for America once again to set the example for the rest of the free world. Our children and our grandchildren should not have to face this threat again.

I ask all of my colleagues to vote in favor of this joint resolution.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. ADERHOLT).

Mr. ADERHOLT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my support for the President in his policy regarding Iraq. Resolutions regarding war are not something we consider without much thought, and this should be very serious business for this House and each Member of it.

The last few months, there has been much talk about Iraq being given the opportunity to respond to weapons inspections. Sometimes this is said as if it were a new idea. However, when a defiant Saddam Hussein has repeatedly rejected inspections and threatened inspectors, there is little reason to believe that he will cooperate.

You may have seen the movies in which a prison is going to be inspected. The warden replaces the spoiled food with fresh vegetables and maybe even a meat entree. If Saddam Hussein allows inspectors in, it will only be at specific locations and not the unlimited, sur-

prise inspections that we need in order to have our questions answered.

The fact that our President would consider any additional form of inspection is a testimony of his desire to avoid conflict. Saddam Hussein's actions in the past show a lack of regard, both for his own people and for his neighboring nations.

I remember back about 10 years ago as a young man preparing to practice law. It was about that time that the U.S. and our allies spent an enormous time and effort freeing the Kuwaiti people and hoped that the Iraqi people would also be able to free themselves from the dictator.

In World War II, Hitler introduced a concept of blitzkrieg, a high-speed attack by land and air. Today's increasingly long-range and accurate rockets, armed with warheads of mass destruction, makes blitzkrieg look like slow motion.

The President's top advisers and the Secretary of Defense, along with other members of the President's Cabinet, have briefed Members of Congress repeatedly and in a timely manner. I went down to Pennsylvania Avenue to the White House just last week, and back on September 19 met with the Secretary of Defense along with several other Members of Congress at the Pentagon to discuss and be briefed on the situation in Iraq.

Now, the President needs our support so that he can act quickly and decisively against the threat of Iraq should he deem that action necessary.

Again, let me stress, the action that we take this week is not just another vote for the United States Congress. It is, indeed, one of those landmark votes that will be long remembered and recorded in the history books. The action that we take this week might just, and certainly we pray, negate the need to send our troops into harm's way.

I would urge all the Members to support our President and vote yes on this resolution.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, it is my great pleasure to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. NETHERCUTT).

(Mr. NETHERCUTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, it is appropriate that we fully discuss here the most serious responsibility that is entrusted to Congress, and that is authorizing the President to use force in the defense of our Nation. The decision by Congress to authorize the deployment of the U.S. military requires somber analysis and sober consideration, but it is not a discussion that we should delay.

The President has presented to the American people a compelling case for intervening in Iraq, and this body has acted deliberately in bringing to the House floor a resolution that unequivocally expresses our support for our Commander-in-Chief.

The threat to our national security from Iraq could not be more apparent. After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq succeeded in destroying thousands of chemical munitions, chemical agents and precursor chemicals. Iraq admitted to developing offensive biological weapons, including botulinum, anthrax, aflatoxin, clostridium and others.

Yet this list of poisons describes only what the U.N. inspectors were able to detect in the face of official Iraqi resistance, deception and denial. They could not account for thousands of chemical munitions, 500 mustard gas bombs and 4,000 tons of chemical weapons precursors. In the intervening period, development efforts have continued unabated, and accelerated following the withdrawals of U.N. inspectors.

Iraq has repeatedly demonstrated a resolve not only to develop deadly weapons of mass destruction but to use them on their own people: 5,000 killed, 20,000 Iranians killed through mustard gas clouds and the most deadly agents that were inflicted on human beings. Perhaps in different hands the deadly arsenal possessed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq would be less of an imminent threat.

This authorization of force that we will vote on soon is at some level also a recognition of the ongoing state of war with Iraq. In the last 3 weeks, 67 attempts have been made to down collision aircraft. Four hundred and six attempts have been made this year.

The U.S. has struggled against the tepid resolutions and general inactivity of the international community for a decade. Regime change cannot happen through domestic posturing. Disarmament requires more than fervent hopes and good wishes.

On December 9, 1941, President Roosevelt said, "There is no such thing as impregnable defense against powerful aggressors who sneak up in the dark and strike without warning. We cannot measure our safety in terms of miles on any map."

In 1941, Congress stood with the President and promised full support to protect and defend our Nation. I urge our colleagues today to do the same.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. BROWN), who serves with distinction on the Committee on International Relations and is the ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee on Health Care of the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, for years our policy in this country has been one of containment, of deterrence, of collective security, of diplomacy. We contained and we deterred Joseph Stalin and the Soviets for decades. We have contained and deterred Fidel Castro and the Cubans for 40 years. We have contained and deterred Communist China in its expansionist tendencies for 5 decades.

Now this President wants to radically change our decades-old foreign policy of containment and deterrence to a policy of first strike. What does that tell the world? Does it embolden Russia to attack Georgia to better deal with Chechnya? Does it set an international precedent for China to go into Taiwan or deal even more harshly with Tibet? Does it embolden India or Pakistan, or both, each with nuclear weapons, from going to war in Kashmir?

The whole point of the Security Council is to prevent member states, including veto-wielding permanent members, perhaps especially veto-wielding permanent members, to prevent those member states from launching first strike, unilateral, unprovoked war.

Resolution 678, which authorized the Gulf War, called explicitly for countries cooperating with the exiled Kuwaiti loyalists to create a coalition to use force. No country, no country in international law, has the unilateral right to decide Iraq has not complied with U.N. requirements, let alone what the U.N. response should be.

A couple of weeks ago, three retired four-star generals testified in the other body, stating that attacking Iraq without a United Nations' resolution supporting military action could limit aid from allies, would supercharge, in the general's words, supercharge recruiting for al Qaeda and undermine our war on terrorism.

□ 1830

There are too many questions the administration has yet to answer. If we strike Iraq on our own, what happens to our campaign against terrorism? Most of our allies in the war on terror oppose U.N. unilateral action against Iraq. Will our coalition against terrorism fracture? And if we win a unilateral war, will we be responsible for unilaterally rebuilding Iraq?

I am not convinced this administration possesses the political commitment to reconstruct the damage after we defeat Saddam Hussein to bring democracy to that country. It will entail appropriations of hundreds of millions of dollars a year, year after year after year. Do we have the political will and the financial commitment to do that in that country, in that region? Should a new enemy arise while we are paying for the campaign against al Qaeda and the reconstruction of Iraq, will our resources be so overextended that we will not be able to address this new threat?

This Congress should not authorize the use of force unless the administration details what it plans to do and how we will deal with the consequences of our actions, namely, what will the U.S. role be after military action is completed? We should set stronger conditions before any military action is permitted.

The President should present to Congress a comprehensive plan that addresses the full range of issues associated with action against Iraq: a cost

estimate for military action, a cost estimate for reconstruction of Iraq, along with a proposal for how the U.S. is going to pay for these costs. We are going more into debt. Will there ever be a prescription drug benefit? Will we continue to underfund education? Will the economy continue to falter if we do this war?

We should do an analysis of the impact on the U.S. domestic economy of the use of resources for military action and the use of resources for reconstruction of Iraq. We should answer the questions.

We should have a comprehensive plan for U.S. financial and political commitment to long-term cultural, economic, and political stabilization in a free Iraq if the President is going to talk about Iraq being a model of democracy in the Middle East.

We should have a comprehensive statement that details the extent of the international support for military operations in Iraq and what effect a military action against Iraq will mean for the broader war on terrorism.

We should have a comprehensive analysis of the effect on the stability of Iraq, and the region, of any regime change in Iraq that may occur as a result of U.S. military action.

And, finally, we should have a commitment that the U.S. will take necessary efforts to protect the health, safety, and security of the U.S. Armed Forces and Iraqi civilians.

Mr. Speaker, before we send our young men and women to war, before we put our young men and women in harm's way, we must make certain in every way that this is the best course of action.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, could I inquire as to the time remaining on both sides.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GILCHREST). The gentleman from California (Mr. ISSA) has 2 hours and 26 minutes remaining; the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF) has 39 minutes remaining; and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. DELAHUNT) has 20 minutes remaining.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the gentleman on the other side of the aisle if we could agree to a 2- or 3-to-1 split in order to normalize the time, since there is such a disparity in the amount consumed.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I would agree to a 2-to-1 split, I would say to my friend from California.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman. We will proceed with two in a row and then yield.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TOM DAVIS).

(Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, if there is anything that 9-11 and the events of that day

taught us, it is that our policy of containment and deterrence does not work against terrorists who are willing to blow themselves up and, at the same time, innocent civilians.

I rise in support of this historic resolution, fully aware that this may be one of the most important votes this body casts.

We all hope that we can disarm Iraq without bloodshed. That is our goal. We all hope and pray that risking the lives of the women and men of our Armed Forces will prove unnecessary. We hold out hope that this time, against the recent tide of history, Saddam will allow U.N. inspectors full access, free of deception and delay. But if the events of 9-11 and ongoing intelligence-gathering have shown us anything, Mr. Speaker, it is that we must remain ever vigilant against the new and growing threat to the American way of life. Terrorists who are willing to commit suicide to murder thousands of innocents will not be halted by the conventional means and policies of deterrence we have deployed.

The greatest danger we face is in not acting, in assuming the terrorists who are committed to destroying our Nation will remain unarmed by Saddam. The first strike could be the last strike for too many Americans.

Mr. Speaker, we know enough at this point about the specific dangers posed by Iraq to make this resolution unavoidable: large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, an advanced and still-evolving nuclear weapons production program, support for and the harboring of terrorist organizations, the brutal repression and murder of its own civilian population, and the utter disregard for U.N. resolutions and dictates.

Mr. Speaker, we know enough.

We all applaud and support the President's commitment to working with the U.N. Security Council to deal with the threat that Iraq poses to the United States and our allies. I continue to hope and pray for a peaceful, internationally driven resolution to this crisis, but I believe that passing this resolution strengthens the President's hand to bring this about.

But with the events of September 11 still fresh in our minds and in our hearts, we cannot rest our hopes on the possibility that Iraq will comply with U.N. resolutions. Iraq has defied the United Nations openly for over a decade.

Today we are being asked to fulfill our responsibilities to our families, our constituents, and our Constitution; and I think we have to give the President the appropriate tools to proceed if Saddam does not cooperate with the arms inspectors and comply with existing U.N. resolutions.

While we should seek the active support of other nations, we must first and foremost protect our homeland, our people, and our way of life.

Mr. Speaker, I pray for the best as we prepare for the worst. Today, we recognize that there may come a time in a

moment when we realize that we are involved in a profound global struggle in which Saddam's regime is clearly at the epicenter on the side of evil; when it becomes clear there are times when evil cannot be appeased, ignored, or simply forgotten; when confrontation remains the only option.

There are moments in history when conscience matters, in fact, when conscience is the only thing that matters. I urge my colleagues to vote their conscience and acknowledge the danger confronting us, by not entrusting our fate to others, by demonstrating our resolve to rid the world of this menace. I urge this with a heavy heart, but a heart convinced that if confrontation should be required, we are ready for the task.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BUYER).

Mr. BUYER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this resolution.

Defending America against all enemies, foreign and domestic, is the first and fundamental purpose of the Federal Government. Once, it took countries of great economic wealth to field a powerful military, to threaten the United States, and to place our people in fear. The threat of this new century has now changed, because we have individuals that truly hate us and can use something as simple as box cutters to place our people in fear and terror.

With regard to the threat of Saddam Hussein, it must be recognized for what it is: a deliberate and patient campaign by Saddam to terrorize free people and undermine the very foundations of liberty.

I am sufficiently convinced without hesitation that Saddam represents a clear and present danger. As a Gulf War veteran, I am filled with emotion to contemplate that my comrades will once again be upon the desert floor. I submit that it is easier to be ordered to war than to vote that someone else may go in my place. However, now is the time for our Nation to in fact be vigilant and to authorize the President to preserve freedom through military action, if necessary, and to take our foreign policy as defense in depth.

In many respects, this resolution represents a continuation of the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein agreed to provisions of the cease-fire. He has violated his cease-fire, he has been flagrant in his violations, and the hostility is now open and notorious. After a decade of denial, deception, and hostility toward the world, it is time to seek Iraq's compliance and, if necessary, remove this despotic dictator, his weapons of mass destruction, and the terrorists he supports and harbors.

Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath Party rule Iraq through terror and fear. I will share some personalized stories.

Through interrogations at the enemy prisoner of war camp during the Gulf War, having done these interviews with Iraqi high command conscripts, I

learned several things: number one, the Iraqi people do not like Saddam because he, in fact, keeps the great wealth to himself, keeps different tribes in ignorance, to the pleasure of his own tribe. In fact, one of the conscripts that I interrogated was scared to death of an American soldier. Why? Because they had been told that if you are captured by Americans, that you, in fact, would be quartered, your body would be quartered. Over 90,000 Iraqis that were held in two prisoner of war camps, I say to my colleagues, have had the opportunity to tell the stories of how well they were treated by Americans and, in fact, they called the prisoner of war camps "the hotel."

Let me tell about their leadership. Before the interrogation of a two-star Iraqi general, he was sitting with his legs crossed on the desert floor with his hands in his face weeping like a child. I had an interpreter with me. When I walked up, I kicked the bottom of his boot and, through the interpreter, I asked him to stand at attention. He stood up and I asked him if he was an Iraqi general. He responded and said yes, he was. Here I am, an American captain in the Army, and I told him, then if you are an Iraqi general, then act like one.

Mr. Speaker, why would an Iraqi general be weeping upon the desert floor? Because Saddam hand-selects his general officers. They do not earn it. The men who serve in their military have not earned the trust and confidence.

Also, what will be told is the lethality of American combat troops. They know exactly what happened in the short war of the gulf. The operations with regard to any military action that may occur in the Gulf War, I say to my colleagues, is so completely different than the operations of 10 years ago.

Mr. Speaker, I have faith in the Iraqi people because I also remember them. Do my colleagues know what their request was at the prisoner of war camp to bring calm? They just wanted to listen to Madonna. So that is what we did. We piped in Madonna. They wanted to listen to "The Material Girl." Their culture is far more Westernized than we could ever imagine, and they like Americans.

This is not against the Iraqi people. This is any action to get Saddam Hussein to comply with the cease-fire to disarm; and if, in fact, he does not, then force is the means of last resort. And the soldiers, while they prepare to fight and win the Nation's wars, they are the ones who have taken the oath to lay down their life for the Constitution, and they do not want to fight. In fact, they want peace. But if called upon, they, in fact, will serve.

So I will vote for this resolution, and I will think about my comrades who may be placed in harm's way, and I also will think of the children that are left behind and the spouses who will keep the watch fires burning for their loved ones. Support the resolution.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. CARSON).

Mr. CARSON of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, for more than a decade, American foreign policy has struggled to define its role in the post-Cold War world. Unsure of when to use military force, how to use it, and with which allies, we have stumbled from engagement to ad hoc engagement from Somalia to Kosovo. We have at times acted hastily in the world; more often, far too late.

Our recent fecklessness points up the foreign policy confusion that the welcome end of the long war with totalitarianism has left with us. Confronted with the Soviet Union, Democrats and Republicans were united in the goals of containment and deterrence, this latter purpose backed up by the threat of nuclear annihilation. Such strategies are, of course, still not outdated, as we face an unstable Russia and a growing China, both armed with significant nuclear arsenals. But the primacy of these doctrines has no doubt receded with the Peace of Paris and with the difficult challenges that have arisen since.

As our Nation enters the 21st century, we are confronted by some of these challenges, like humanitarian crises in Somalia which are brought into our homes through the global reach of communications technology, and world opinion demands action to bring relief. Ethnic cleansing, with its echoes of the Holocaust, insist that the United States and its Western allies make good on the promise of "never again." And the spread of weapons of mass destruction, which means that, for the first time in history, a nonstate actor can inflict lethal harm on a State, compels us to develop new doctrines of defense.

□ 1845

It is amidst this intellectual muddle that the current crisis with Iraq arises. There are certain undeniable facts about Saddam Hussein, who has so ruthlessly ruled Iraq for more than 20 years. He alone in the world has used chemical weapons, against his own people. He has a sophisticated biological weapons program. Most importantly, he has an insatiable appetite for nuclear weapons, which, but for the foresight of Israel and the success of the Gulf War, he would already possess. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein has repeatedly tried to dominate the Middle East, a region of critical importance to the United States.

These facts alone dictate immediate action to disarm Iraq. If Saddam Hussein were to acquire a nuclear weapon, he would be able to muscle surrounding states, as he attempted to do with Kuwait in 1990, with relative impunity, for the threat of nuclear reprisal would deter all but the most determined vindicators of international law and Middle East stability.

Were Saddam Hussein to control not only his own mighty oil fields but also

those of his neighbors, the havoc to the world economy could not be overestimated, as would the danger to our long-standing ally, Israel.

Many people over the last 2 days have spoken eloquently of the need for United Nations approval before any American action against Iraq. President Bush was wise to recently address the U.N., and I am confident that the United Nations will acknowledge the need to enforce its own resolutions demanding the disarmament of Iraq; and recognize, too, that only the threat of military force can make those demands understood.

But if the United Nations itself has so little self-regard as to not demand compliance by Iraq, then that body's impotence should not forestall the United States from making the world's demands on its own.

While consistency is not always valued highly in Congress, my own party would well remember that President Bill Clinton chose to take action in Kosovo without any approval from the Security Council; indeed, against the opposition of at least one permanent Security Council member, but with the approval of most Democrats in the House of Representatives.

Still others of my colleagues have suggested that we must wait for further provocation by Iraq. Somehow, they argue, it is against the American tradition to take preventative military action; or they argue that Iraq can be deterred in the same manner as was the Soviet Union, Grenada, Panama, and Haiti rebut the notion that the United States is a stranger to unilateral preventative action, as does the commonsense realization that times have changed, and it is not so much the detonation of a nuclear bomb that threatens the United States but Iraq's mere possession of such a weapon.

Deterrence works well when it must, but the assumption that all are deterrable is, in the wake of September 11, on very shaky footing, indeed.

There is, in the end, no choice about disarmament. The only alternatives are between forced agreement or non-consensual military force. Paradoxically, it is the threat of force which we authorize in this resolution that offers the best chance for a peaceful disarmament.

The authorization of force, which has in recent years taken the place of formal declarations of war, is the most grave and momentous decision anyone in Congress can make, but we will authorize force against Iraq tomorrow, and we will be right to do so. We will be right not because we desire war with Iraq, but because we desire to prevent it; right not because we lead this cause, but because no one else will; and right not because war is our first resort, but, unlike Iraq, it is always our last.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. MICA), Chair of the Subcommittee on Aviation.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, in a perfect world, if given a simple choice, no rational human being would advocate war over peace. No father and no mother would ever want to send their daughter or son into harm's way. No truly civilized people would ever want to sit idly by and let their friends and allies be annihilated.

Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, these are principled beliefs, all of which confront us at this difficult time. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, today we do not live in a perfect world. Tonight, however, as we debate the question of giving our President and Commander-in-Chief Congress' authorization to conduct war, we must remember the lessons of history. More than 60 years ago, many closed their eyes, many covered their ears, or chanted the same chorus for peace that we now hear. Mr. Speaker, when will we learn that we cannot trust, we cannot pacify, and we cannot negotiate with a mass murderer?

Mr. Speaker, humanity cannot afford ever to experience another Holocaust as a cruel reminder. Israel is not an expendable commodity.

Tonight, just a few miles from here near our Nation's Capitol, a mad killer lurks. Think of the terror tonight of those in range of that single madman. Think also of the terror in Israel, never knowing true security. I ask the Members, is that the kind of world we want our children and grandchildren to live in? I say no, a thousand times no.

That is why tonight I will support this resolution. I rise in support of the resolution and our President to ensure that we do not repeat history, or that we do not have our children live in that kind of world.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. CRANE).

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of House Joint Resolution 114 to provide authorization for the use of military force against Iraq. While I hope and pray President Bush does not have to commit our troops to such action, I believe that he must have the authority he needs to protect U.S. national security interests.

The events of September 11 showed that we are not protected from an attack on our homeland. There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein possesses and continues to cultivate weapons of mass destruction. The U.N. weapons inspectors were thrown out of Iraq 4 years ago for a reason. A first strike made with weapons of mass destruction can result in millions dead, and the U.S. must be prepared to act preemptively.

Some ask why we must act against this threat in particular. The answer is that this threat is unique. I need not remind anyone that Hussein has used weapons of mass destruction already against his own people. In addition, he has tried to dominate the Middle East and has struck other nations in the re-

gion, including our ally, Israel, without warning.

Keeping this in mind, it seems to me that we, as guardians of freedom, have an awesome responsibility to act to ensure that Saddam Hussein cannot carry out a first strike against the United States or our allies.

Mr. Speaker, while there is no doubt that unqualified support for military intervention from the U.N. is preferable, we must be prepared to defend ourselves alone. We must never allow the foreign policy of our country to be dictated by those entities that may or may not have U.S. interests at heart.

The resolution before us does not mandate military intervention in Iraq. It does, however, give President Bush clear authority to invade Iraq should he determine that Hussein is not complying with the conditions we have laid before him. Chief among these is full and unfettered weapons inspections. If he fails to comply, we will have no choice but to take action. Our security demands it.

Mr. Speaker, the world community watching this debate ought not conclude that respectful disagreements on the floor of this House divide us. On the contrary, we find strength through an open airing of all views. We never take this privilege for granted, and we need look no further than to Iraq to understand why.

At the end of this debate, Congress will speak with one voice. I find comfort in the knowledge that this unity represents a promise that we will never back down from preserving our freedoms and protecting our homeland from those who wish to destroy us.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Mrs. JONES), who serves on the Committee on Financial Services and whose career has been earmarked by respect for the rule of law.

Mrs. JONES of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman for that kind yielding of time to me.

Mr. Speaker, this is a quote: "I'm concerned about living with my conscience, and searching for that which is right and that which is true, and I cannot live with the idea of being just a conformist following a path that everybody else follows. And this has happened to us. As I've said in one of my books, so often we live by the philosophy 'Everybody's doing it, it must be alright,' we tend to determine what is right and wrong by taking a sort of Gallup poll of the majority opinion, and I don't think this is the way to get at what is right."

"Arnold Toynbee talks about the creative minority and I think more and more we must have in our world that creative minority that will take a stand for that which conscience tells them is right, even though it brings about criticism and misunderstanding and even abuse."

That is excerpted from a 1967 interview of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Mr. Speaker, I stand here today as a part of a creative minority in Congress

who oppose this apparently inevitable resolution granting the President the authority to use force to remove Saddam Hussein from power. But I will not be a silent minority.

I know who Saddam Hussein is. I know he has viciously killed hundreds of thousands of Kurds in northern Iraq with chemical and biological weapons. I know he has murdered members of his own cabinet; in fact, his own family. I remember vividly his aggressions in Iran and Kuwait and the SCUD missiles he launched into Israel in the Gulf War. I know the contempt he has shown toward the U.N. and its weapons inspectors as they attempted to enforce post-Gulf War resolutions; and I know that the world, and particularly the Gulf region, would be a better and safer place without Saddam Hussein in power and those of his ilk in power.

But I also know that the resolution before us is a product of haste and hubris, rather than introspection and humility. I have seen President Bush confront the Iraq question with arrogance and condescension, initially bullying this Congress, our international allies, and the American people with accusations and threats and tales of terror eliciting fear in their hearts and minds.

President Bush has told us that war is not inevitable, but does anyone really believe that? For months, this administration has marched inexorably towards an attack on Iraq, changing its rationale to suit the circumstances. I have no doubt that, regardless of what we do here or what Saddam does there, we will go to war. I pray I am wrong.

The CIA today said Saddam is unlikely to initiate a chemical or biological attack against the United States and presented the alarming possibility that an attack on Iraq could provoke him into taking the very actions this administration claims an invasion would prevent.

I know, too, who we are. America has never backed down from a just war. From the Revolutionary era to the Civil War, across Europe, Asia, and Africa, in two world wars, just a dozen years ago in the Persian Gulf, and countless missions to faraway places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Liberia, and Afghanistan, America fought. We fought with righteousness, determination, and vision. We fought because principles and freedoms were threatened. We fought because fighting was our last choice.

America has always fought with a vision to the future and has been merciful and generous in our victories.

But the White House has not offered any vision for post-Saddam Iraq. As a Nation founded on moral principles, we have a moral obligation to prepare a plan for rebuilding Iraq before we declare war. Iraq, like Afghanistan and many of the other nations in the Gulf region, is made up of many ethnic groups that will compete for power in the vacuum that is created by Saddam Hussein's ouster. But as important as the tactical plans to overthrow Sad-

dam Hussein are, we must address how we intend to help the Iraqi people institute a democratic government.

I ask the President, can he not answer a few simple questions: Have we completed the war on terrorism? What happened to Osama bin Laden? Do we know how long a war in Iraq would last? Has there been any assessment for the American people of how much a war in Iraq will cost our economy? Does he have any idea of the human loss we should expect in a war with Iraq?

Instead of answers, he gives us bombast. Yes, we have all heard the rhetoric: Saddam is evil, Saddam hates America, Saddam must be stopped, and you are either with us or against us. If you are not with us, we don't need you.

□ 1900

But when the rhetoric is peeled away, truth emerges.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot go on but I say to all of my colleagues, let us be the creative minority. Vote against allowing force against Iraq.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GILCHREST). Members are reminded to address their remarks to the Chair and not to the President.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the time for debate on this resolution be extended for 2 hours to be equally divided between the majority and minority.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair grants an additional hour to be controlled by the gentleman from California (Mr. ISSA) and by the gentleman from California (Mr. SCHIFF).

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. PORTMAN).

Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from California (Mr. ISSA) for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, as Members of Congress we face no more important issues than those of war and peace, and for that reason I agree wholeheartedly with my colleague from Ohio (Mrs. JONES) who just spoke that this must be a vote of Congress. For that reason this extended debate on the House floor is very appropriate and the views expressed by Members of Congress are deserving of respect. Having read it closely, my view is that the carefully crafted resolution before us is the right approach.

On Monday in my hometown of Cincinnati, the President of the United States clearly explained to the country what is at stake. He not only made the case that inaction is not an option, but that given the dangers and defiance of the Iraqi regime, the threat of military action must be an available option. Time and time again, Saddam Hussein has proven to be a threat to the peace and security of the region. That is why

the international community through the United Nations has repeatedly called on the Iraqi regime to keep its word and open all facilities to weapons inspections. Yet repeatedly Iraq has refused, defying the United Nations. There is no reason to believe that without the threat of force, the disarmament the Iraqi regime agreed to as part of the disarmament after the Gulf War more than 10 years ago will ever occur.

And there is other gathering danger and risk to America and all freedom-loving people. The horror of September 11, Mr. Speaker, awakened us to that reality. We know that the Iraqi regime is producing and stockpiling chemical and biological weapons. We know they are in the process of obtaining a nuclear weapon. We know that this regime has a consistent record of aggression of supporting terrorist activities. Once the Iraqi regime possesses a nuclear weapon, it, or the technology that creates it, could easily be passed along to a terrorist organization. Already chemical and biological weapons could be provided. We must not permit this to happen.

The resolution will authorize military action but only if it is necessary. I would hope that every Member in this Chamber would pray that it would not be necessary. But the choice is clear, and it is a choice for the Iraqi regime to make. If the regime refuses to disarm, our military and our coalition partners will be compelled to make a stand for freedom and security against tyranny and terrorism. And if we take this course, it will not be unilateral as others on this floor have said. The United States will not be alone.

I commend the President for his diplomatic initiatives, for continuing to try to work through the United Nations, and for an impressive array of coalition partners already assembled. I do not take lightly the fact that the course laid out by this resolution may put at risk the lives of young men and women in uniform. But I believe not authorizing the possible use of force would put even more innocent Americans at risk.

This is a solemn debate and a tough vote of conscience. Mine will be a vote for an approach that I believe faces up to the very real dangers we face and maximizes the chance that these dangers can be addressed with a minimum loss of life. I will strongly support our President, Mr. Speaker, and I support the resolution.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. DELAHUNT) and that he be able to control and yield that time to others.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. TANNER).

(Mr. TANNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TANNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

September 11, 2001, is a day that will rank with December 7, 1941, as a day of infamy in the history of the United States. That one event, 9-11, changed the world we live in forever. I serve as a delegate to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly from the Congress and never have I seen the outpouring of good will and support from our NATO allies as we experienced in the aftermath of 9-11.

For the first time in the 50-plus-year history of the mightiest military alliance in modern times, article 5 of the NATO charter was invoked stating in essence that when one member nation comes under attack, all consider themselves under attack and each pledges to the other member nations all military, diplomatic, and territorial assets they individually and collectively possess.

This past summer, less than a year from 9-11, the President and Vice President began to talk about a regime change in Iraq. The philosophy was this: Saddam Hussein is a despot and a threat to develop and perfect weapons of mass destruction including nuclear capabilities; and, therefore, he must be removed. Further, we, the United States, were going to effectuate that change with or without our allies, save the British. Suddenly the good will and support for America began to erode, particularly among our European allies and even here at home.

In fact, some with good reason, in my view, think an election in Germany turned on this one issue. The United States, led by President Bush and Vice President CHENEY's rhetoric, was boxing herself into a very dangerous and potentially disastrous position. Should that policy have continued, I would have voted "no" on this resolution.

Why do I say that? The best offense we have available to us to protect our country and our citizens is accurate, timely intelligence information so that we know what al Qaeda or others are planning, how they are planning it, when they are planning to attack us again so that we can stop it. In this war of terrorism, all of the United States military might and every weapon our country possesses is of little or no value in the defense of our homeland without these intelligence resources.

This unilateral approach by the administration threatened to jeopardize cooperation from those around the world who may be in a position to give us such intelligence information. World support, world opinion and the good will of every nation, no matter how small or militarily insignificant, has never been more important to us. A whisper in one ear from Kabul to Baghdad to the Philippines to Germany or even to Oregon can be more important in this war than all of the military might on Earth, for it may give us the

warning we need to stop another event in this country as occurred on 9-11.

Thankfully, the President's appearance at the United Nations last month and his speech in Cincinnati Monday night sent a signal to our allies and to many of our own citizens who do not and did not support the "lone cowboy" approach, that the administration finally recognized the importance of international cooperation and the role of all civilized people as expressed by the United Nations in this war against humanity. Again, I refer not to the military resources offered by our global allies, but to the intelligence information which is vital or perhaps more vital to our national defense.

The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT) has an amendment which I believe does no harm to the substance of the resolution and in my view is much preferable and more compatible with our constitutional powers as Congress. I hope every Member will seriously consider its adoption. But should that fail, I believe that passage of this resolution is in the best interest of our country at this time. Such action on our part will hopefully spur movement in the international arena to enforce the United Nations resolutions when violated, with civilization as the prosecutor and humanity as the victor.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I join my many esteemed colleagues today in support of the resolution authorizing the President to use force against Iraq. This is a historic moment in our country, and it should not be taken lightly. But it is not the first historic moment when it comes to Saddam Hussein's regime. This is hopefully the last chapter in a long saga of our dealings with Saddam Hussein.

More than 20 years ago he began to endanger his neighbors. More than 12 years ago he invaded Kuwait. His cruel regime has had a long history of the kind of practices that are not tolerated anywhere on this globe, and yet they persist.

Mr. Speaker, Saddam Hussein is in fact writing the last chapter as we speak in a 12-year war. We are not considering action which would be preemptive or a strike to begin a war. We are, in fact, dealing with an absence of peace which has cost America lives and time and effort for more than a decade. Over the past 10 years he has made a mockery of the United Nations and the multi-national diplomacy that we have in fact participated in. He has systematically undermined the United Nations resolutions that were designed to disarm and reform his regime. He threw out weapons inspectors in 1998 and has rebuilt his weapons of mass destruction; and there is no question he intends to target America. In fact, in 1993 he targeted President George Herbert Bush for assassination.

Each of those events was more than sufficient for us to do what we now must do. But the United States was pa-

tient. The United Nations was patient. We have all been patient for more than a decade. I believe that we need not look for the proverbial straw that breaks the camel's back; but in fact we need to simply ask, Why did we wait so long? Why did we tolerate this dictator so long? Even why in 1998 when the last administration rightfully so called for a regime change did we not act?

I hope that this body in its consideration of this resolution does not ask why should we act today, but in fact should ask why should we not act and why did we take so long?

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. JACKSON-LEE), who serves as the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims on the House Committee on the Judiciary, as well as a member of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, who recently returned from Afghanistan where she conducted a fact-finding mission.

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished member of the Committee on International Relations for his kindness in yielding me time.

As many of us who have come to this floor, I come with a heavy heart but a respect for my colleagues and the words that they have offered today.

□ 1915

As I stand here, I sometimes feel the world is on our shoulders, but I also think that my vote is a vote for life or death—I have chosen life and so I take the path of opposition to this resolution in order to avoid the tragic path that led former Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara to admit, in his painful mea culpa regarding the Vietnam War, we were wrong, terribly wrong.

He saw the lost lives of our young men and women, some 58,000 who came home in body bags; and after years of guilt stemming from his role in prosecuting the war in Vietnam, MacNamara was moved to expose his soul on paper with his book, "In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam." He noted the words of an ancient Greek philosopher that "the reward of suffering is experience," and concluded solemnly, let this be the lasting legacy of Vietnam; that we never send our young men and women into war without thoughtful, provocative analysis and an offer of diplomacy.

I stand in opposition for another reason, and that is because I hold the Constitution very dear. I might suggest to my colleagues that when our Founding Fathers decided to write the Constitution over 4 months of the hot summer of 1787, they talked about the distribution of authority between legislative,



executive and judicial branches, and they said it was a bold attempt to create an energetic central government at the same time that the sovereignty of the people would be preserved.

Frankly, the people of the United States should make the determination through this House of a declaration of war. And as the Constitution was written, it said, "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, provide for the common defense, establish the Constitution of the United States of America." For that reason, I believe that this Nation, that suffered a war in Vietnam, should understand the importance of having the Congress of the United States declare war.

The reason I say that is we continue to suffer today as countless veterans of that generation from Vietnam have never recovered from the physical and mental horrors of their experiences, many reliving the nightmares, plagued by demons as they sleep homeless on our streets at night. What a price we continue to pay for that mistake. Can we afford to make it again?

Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to this resolution because it so clearly steers us towards a treacherous path of war while yielding sparse efforts to guide us to the more navigable road to peace. As Benjamin Franklin said in 1883, "There never was a good war or a bad peace." Mr. Speaker, we have yet to give the power of diplomacy a chance and the power of the moral rightness of the high ground the chance that civilization deserves. Do we not deserve as well as the right to die the right to live? We have had the experience of Vietnam to see the alternatives. So if the unacceptable costs of war come upon us, why not use diplomacy? It is time to use diplomacy now.

The resolution before us is unlikely to lead to peace now or in the future because of the dangerous precedent that it would set. The notion of taking a first strike against another sovereign nation risks upsetting the already tenuous balance of powers around the world. In a time when countless nations are armed with enough weaponry to destroy their neighbors with the mere touch of a button, it can hardly be said that our example of attacking another country in the absence of self-defense is an acceptable way to go. The justification would sow the seeds of peace if we decided to follow peace.

It is important to note that rather than the President's proposed doctrine of first strike, we would do well to look to diplomacy first. The first strike presumption of the President would represent an unprecedented departure from a long-held United States policy of being a nonaggressor. We would say to the world that it is acceptable to do a first strike in fear instead of pursuing all possible avenues to a diplomatic solution.

Imagine the world in chaos with India going after Pakistan, China opting to fight Taiwan instead of negoti-

ating, and North Korea going after South Korea and erupting into an all-out war. Because actions always speak louder than words, the United States' wise previous admonitions to show restraint to the world would go to the winds, and then, of course, would fall on deaf ears.

There is another equally important reason I must oppose this resolution. It is because to vote for it would be to effectively abdicate our constitutional responsibility as a Member of Congress to declare war when conditions call for such action. The resolution before us declares war singly by the President by allowing a first strike without the knowledge of imminent danger and without the input of Congress. It is by article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of the United States that calls for us to declare war.

Saddam Hussein is evil. He is a despot. We know that. And I support the undermining of his government by giving resistance to the United States, to be able to address these by humanitarian aid, by military support in terms of training, and also by providing support to the resistance. Yet I think we can do other things. Diplomacy first, unfettered robust United States weapons inspections, monitored review by United Nations Security Council, Soviet Union model of ally-supported isolation, support of democratization, and developing a more stringent United States containment policy.

This resolution is wrong. We must not abdicate our responsibility. And most importantly, Mr. Speaker, as I go to my seat, I stand here on the side of saving the lives of the young men and women of this Nation.

As I stand on the House floor today with great respect for the heartfelt positions of my colleagues, I must take the path of opposition to this resolution in order to avoid following the tragic path that led former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to admit in his painful mea culpa regarding the Vietnam war, "We were wrong, terribly wrong." After years of guilt stemming from his role in prosecuting the war in Vietnam, McNamara was moved to expose his soul on paper with his book: "In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam." He noted the words of the ancient Greek dramatist Aeschylus who said "The reward of suffering is experience," and concluded solemnly, "Let this be the lasting legacy of Vietnam." Therefore this legacy should remind us that war is deadly and the Congress must not abdicate its responsibility.

This Nation did suffer as result of that war, and we continue to suffer today as countless veterans of that generation have never recovered from the physical and mental horrors of their experiences, many reliving the nightmares, plagued by demons as they sleep homeless on our streets at night. What a price we continue to pay for that mistake. Can we afford to make it again? I think not.

Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to this resolution because it so clearly steers us toward a treacherous path of war, while yielding sparse efforts to guide us to the more navigable road to peace. And as Benjamin Franklin said in

1883, "there never was a good war or a bad peace"—but we have yet to give the power of diplomacy and the power of the moral high ground the chance that civilization itself deserves. We have had the experience of Vietnam to see the alternatives, so if there were ever a time for diplomacy, it has got to be now.

The resolution before us is unlikely to lead to peace now or in the future because of the dangerous precedent that it would set. The notion of taking a first strike against another sovereign nation risks upsetting the already tenuous balance of powers around the world. In a time when countless nations are armed with enough weaponry to destroy their neighbors with the mere touch of a button, it can hardly be said that our example of attacking another country in the absence of a self-defense justification would sow the seeds of peace around the world. Rather, the President's proposed doctrine of first strike, which would represent an unprecedented departure from a long-held United States' policy of being a non-aggressor, would say to the world that it is acceptable to do a first strike in fear, instead of pursuing all possible avenues to a diplomatic solution. Imagine the chaos in the world if India and Pakistan abandoned all notions of restraint, if China and Taiwan opted to fight instead of negotiate, and if North Korea and South Korea erupted into all-out war. Because actions always speak louder than words, the United States' wise previous admonitions to show restraint in the aforementioned conflicts would fall upon deaf ears as the nations would instead follow our dangerous lead.

There is another equally important reason that I must oppose this resolution. It is because to vote for it would be to effectively abdicate my Constitutional duty as a Member of Congress to declare war when conditions call for such action. The resolution before us does authorize the President to declare war without the basis of imminent threat. Congress may not choose to transfer its duties under the Constitution to the President. The Constitution was not created for us to be silent. It is a body of law that provides the roadmap of democracy and national security in this country, and like any roadmap, it is designed to be followed. Only Congress is authorized to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, and make the rules for these armed forces. There is nothing vague or unclear about the language in Article I, section 8, clauses 11–16 of our Constitution. In it, we are told that Congress has the power:

To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;

To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;

To provide and maintain a navy;

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; and

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.

This system of checks and balances, which is essential to ensuring that no individual or branch of government can wield absolute power, cannot be effective if one individual is impermissibly vested with the sole discretionary authority to carry out what 535 Members of Congress have been duly elected by the people to do. It is through the process of



deliberation and debate that the views and concerns of the American people must be addressed within Congress before a decision to launch our country into war is made. The reason that we are a government of the people, for the people and by the people is because there is a plurality of perspectives that are taken into account before the most important decisions facing the country are made. Granting any one individual, even the President of the United States, the unbridled authority to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate is not only unconstitutional, but is also the height of irresponsibility.

Saddam Hussein is indeed an evil man. He has harmed his own people in the past, and cannot be trusted in the future to live peacefully with his neighbors in the region. I fully support efforts to disarm Iraq pursuant to the resolutions passed in the aftermath of the Gulf war, and I do not rule out the possibility that military action might be needed in the future to see that those efforts come to fruition. I voted for the Iraqi Liberation Act in 1998 and still stand behind my decision to support the objective of helping the people of Iraq change their government. But that legislation contained an important caveat that precluded the use of United States armed forces to remove the government from power, and instead provided for various forms of humanitarian assistance. That Act, now has the effect of law, and unlike Iraq, we are a nation that respects the rule of law. And our Constitution, the supreme law of the land, sets forth the duties and responsibilities of Congress in clear, unambiguous language.

The indictment against Saddam Hussein is nothing new. He is a despot of the worst kind, and I believe that when the United Nations Security Council passes a resolution determining his present status and outlining a plan for the future, that will provide further documentation for Congress to act on a military option in Iraq. Right now, however, we are moving too far too quickly with many alarmist representations yet undocumented.

Some of us have begun to speculate about the cost that a war in Iraq might be. And while our economy now suffers because of corporate abuse and 2 years of a declining economy with high unemployment, I cannot help but to shudder when I think of what the cost might be—not only in dollars—but in human lives as well. My constituents, in flooding my offices with calls and e-mails all vehemently opposed to going to war, have expressed their concerns about the unacceptable costs of war. One Houston resident wrote, "This is a war that would cost more in money and lives that I am willing to support committing, and than I believe the threat warrants. Attacking Iraq is a distraction from, not a continuation of the 'war on terrorism'." I truly share this woman's concerns. In World War II, we lost 250,000 brave Americans who responded to the deadly attack on Pearl Harbor and the ensuing battles across Europe and Asia. In the Korean war, nearly 34,000 Americans were killed, and we suffered more than 58,000 casualties in Vietnam. The possible conflict in Iraq that the President has been contemplating for months now risks incalculable deaths because there is no way of knowing what the international implications may be. Consistent talk of regime change by force, a goal not shared by any of the allies in the United Nations, only pours fuel

on the fire when you consider the tactics that a tyrant like Saddam Hussein might resort to if he realized that had nothing to lose. If he does possess chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, we can be assured that he would not hesitate to use them if the ultimate goal is to destroy his regime, instead of to disarm it. With that being the case, there can be little doubt that neighboring countries would be dragged into the fray—willingly or otherwise—creating an upheaval that would dwarf previous altercations in the region or possibly in the world. The resolution, as presently worded, opens the door to all of these possibilities and that is why I cannot support it.

Because I do not support the resolution does not mean that I favor inaction. To the contrary, I believe that immediate action is of the highest order. To that end, I would propose a five-point plan of action:

1. Diplomacy first;
2. Unfettered, robust United Nations weapons inspections to provide full disarmament;
3. Monitoring and review by United Nations Security Council;
4. Soviet Union model of allied supported isolation—support of democratization through governance training and support of resistance elements; and
5. Developing a more stringent United States containment policy.

What I can and will support is an effort for diplomacy first, and unfettered U.N. inspections. As the most powerful nation in the world, we should be a powerful voice for diplomacy—and not just military might. Since we are a just nation, we should wield our power judiciously—restraining where possible for the greater good. Pursuing peace means insisting upon the disarmament of Iraq. Pursuing peace means insisting upon the immediate return of the U.N. weapons inspectors. Pursuing peace and diplomacy means that the best answer to every conflict and crisis is not always violence.

Passing this resolution, and the possible repercussions that it may engender, will not enhance the moral authority of the United States in the world today and it will not set the stage for peace nor ensure that are providing for a more peaceful or stable world community.

Instead, as we ensure that Iraq does not possess illegal weapons, we should make good on the promise to the people that we made in the passage of the 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act. We should do all that we can to assist the people of Iraq because as President Dwight Eisenhower said, "I like to believe that people in the long run are going to do more to promote peace than our governments. Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days, governments had better get out of the way and let them have it." I oppose this resolution—H.J. Res. 114.

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Arizona (Mr. SHADEGG).

Mr. SHADEGG. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time, and I am pleased and privileged to join this serious debate.

I want to talk on a number of issues that I think are very, very important to us as we confront the decision we must make and the vote we must take tomorrow. I want to talk about the seriousness of this issue. I want to talk about the question of preemption and

why America might even contemplate striking under these circumstances. I want to address the concerns of those who say they simply do not want to go to war and talk about why I do not want to go to war either, but sometimes war is necessary. I want to talk about the issue of why now, because I think that is a very pressing issue. And I want to talk, most importantly, about how I believe this resolution is the most certain way, indeed perhaps the only way, we have to avoid war.

Let me begin with the seriousness of this issue. Beyond a shadow of a doubt, this will be the most solemn, most serious vote I believe I will cast in my tenure in the United States Congress. I have been here for some pretty serious votes. I have seen us balance a budget, I have seen us impeach a President, but nothing comes close to the vote on a resolution of force such as the one we will consider tomorrow. I approach that vote with the grave appreciation of the fact that lives are in the balance: lives of American soldiers, lives of innocent Iraqis, lives of people throughout the world.

I also approach that vote with the grave knowledge that while my son is 16 years old and would not likely serve in this war, I have many constituents and many friends with sons and daughters who are 18 years old or 19 or 20, and who may be called upon to go to war. This is, indeed, I believe, the most serious issue this Congress can contemplate, and it is one that has weighed on me for weeks.

Some of those amongst my constituents who are deeply worried about this issue say why should we act and why should we act under these circumstances? They argue that we should pursue deterrence. They argue that we should pursue containment; and then they argue that if neither deterrence nor containment work, we should wait until a first strike is launched and then we should respond.

Well, I would respond by saying history has proven sadly over the history of the Saddam Hussein regime that deterrence does not work. This is a man who has proven by his conduct over and over again that he cannot be deterred. This is a man who will not respond to the kind of signals that the rest of the world sends in hopes that a world leader would respond. Although we have attempted containment, this is a man who has proven he will not respond to containment.

At the end of the Gulf War, he agreed to a number of things that we are all now painfully aware of and that have been covered in this debate. He agreed to end his efforts to procure chemical and biological weapons. He agreed to end his efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. He agreed to end his efforts to have and to develop long-term missiles and other delivery systems. And yet none of those have worked.

At the end of the day, deterrence and containment simply have proven, over a pattern of 11 years, not to work. His

deceit, his deception, his continued pattern of forging ahead show us beyond a question of a doubt that he will not be deterred and he will not be contained.

We know some things. We know that because of the nature of the weapons that he has, and because of his willingness to use those weapons and to use them perhaps secretly, we cannot wait. I listened to the debate last night, and I was very impressed with it. One of my colleagues in this institution came to the floor and made an impassioned speech against this resolution and said, we absolutely should wait, and he cited the Revolutionary War and the command to our troops to wait until fired upon. I would suggest to my colleagues that when we have an enemy who has chemical and biological weapons of the nature of those that this enemy has, we simply cannot wait.

VX nerve gas kills by paralyzing the central nervous system and can result in death in 10 minutes. Sarin nerve gas, cyclosarin nerve gas, mustard gas. I am afraid the words "chemical weapons" have lost their meaning; but they should not, because they are abhorrent weapons, and he has them. There is no doubt.

Biological weapons. He has anthrax. He has botulism toxin. He has aflatoxin and he has resin toxin. It would be bad enough if he simply had those, but we know more. He has them and he has tried to develop strains of them that are resistant to the best drugs we have, resistant to our antibiotics. That is to say he has them, he could use them, and not until they had been used could we discover that the best our science has cannot match them.

Now, why can we not wait, given that type of history and that type of chemical? Because the reality is we do not know when he will strike. He could indeed strike and we would not know it for days or weeks, until it began to manifest itself.

But let us talk also about the whole possibility of him using terrorists. We talk a lot about him, and we get deceived by this discussion of he does not have a long-range missile that can reach the United States, because he does not have aircraft that can reach the United States, we ought not to worry about those. We talk about the issue that it could be months or a year before he could develop a nuclear weapon. All of those are false pretexts. All of those are serious mistakes.

The reality is that if he chooses to deliver those weapons through any of the means that we know he possibly could. By handing them in a backpack to a terrorist, we might never know that it was Saddam Hussein that delivered the weapon. And if he chooses to use chemical or biological weapons for such an attack, we might not know until hundreds, indeed until thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, perhaps millions of Americans were infected and fatally wounded and would die, and we would not know until afterwards.

I would suggest that the old doctrine of wait until they fire is simply no longer applicable under these circumstances.

Now, I have conscientious colleagues and I have constituents who come to me and say, I am not ready for war; I do not want war. I want to make it clear that no one wants war. Not a single Member of this body would choose war. And this resolution, as the President said the other night, does not mean that war is either imminent or unavoidable. The President made it clear he does not want war. But I would urge my colleagues that there are some certainties. One of those is that the best way to prevent war is to be prepared for war.

□ 1930

The best way to prevent such a war is to send clear and unmistakable signals. He has unarmed aerial vehicles. That is to say, he has model airplanes, and he has larger airplanes which can be operated by remote control.

It has been pointed out that, given his lack of trust, an unmanned aerial vehicle, an unmanned airplane, is the perfect weapon for this leader, this insane leader, to use, because he does not have to trust a pilot who might not follow orders. He has the operator of a remote-controlled vehicle standing next to him. If, in fact, the pilot were to choose to not drop his load, there would be little he could do in a manned aircraft to that pilot. But in an unmanned aerial vehicle, equipped with a chemical or biological weapon, he remains in control; and it could easily be done.

He could bring that kind of weapon to our shores in a commercial ship like the hundreds lined up right now off the coast of California and launch them from there, and we would not know about the attack until after it was done.

It seems to me that we cannot wait under these circumstances; and it seems to me that he has proven beyond a doubt that deterrence and containment, although we have tried them, simply will not work.

One colleague pointed out he has chemical and biological weapons; and in time, because he is seeking them, he will have nuclear weapons. It was also pointed out that if we want to rely upon a scheme of inspections, and my constituents back home would hope that we could rely on inspections. I would hope that also. But make no mistake about it, there are two serious flaws.

An inspection regime that relies on inspecting a country where hundreds of acres are off limits, cannot be gone into, the presidential palaces that are there, an inspection regime that relies on that is not an inspection regime at all. But an inspection regime where we know to a moral certainty that he has mobile production facilities is an inspection regime that will give us false hope.

I was in the Middle East when the first weapons inspectors were kicked out of Iraq. I was on a CODEL with the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HASTERT) and four or five other Members of Congress. They left Baghdad and went by ground to Jordan and flew to Bahrain. We had an opportunity to meet with them in Bahrain the first night they reached there. One of my colleagues who was there is here tonight on the other side of the aisle. We spent 2 to 2½ hours talking with weapons inspectors who had just been kicked out of Baghdad.

They made some serious impressions upon me which I will never forget. One was echoed in the President's speech last night, and that is the Iraq people are not our enemy. In fact, weapons inspectors explained to us that when individual Iraqis would learn that a given weapons inspector was an American, they would say, America, great place. I have a sister in San Francisco. I have a brother in Philadelphia.

The President said it right the other night. The Iraqi people are not our enemies, but they delivered another message to us and made another impression. That is, they explained to us carefully, six congressmen in a hotel room in Bahrain, now 7 years ago, they said, make no mistake about it, every time they got close to making a real discovery, every time they were at the door of a facility that they were convinced was producing chemical and biological weapons, there would be a stall, there would be a delay. They would be forced to stand outside the gates of that building for hours and hours while the inside was obviously being cleaned up.

Indeed, they would sometimes, when they got savvy to this, the inspectors would send somebody around to the back gate and watch the equipment, watch the trucks roll out the back door.

There is no question but that an inspection regime where they are determined to deceive you, where they are determined to deny you access to some locations, and where they have mobile facilities is no inspection regime at all.

I do not want war. No one wants war. But I am convinced that the risk of waiting is indeed too high.

I do not believe, and I agree with one of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who said, I do not believe that Saddam Hussein will ever submit to a legitimate inspection regime. But I know this much, he will never submit to such an inspection regime until and unless it is backed by credible threat of force. That is what we are talking about here tonight.

We also on that trip went and visited our American troops enforcing the no-fly zone, both the southern and the northern no-fly zone. The American people deserve to know that we have been at a state of war with this regime for 11 years. He has fired on our pilots over and over and over again. He probably fired on them today. He has certainly fired on them within the last

month. He has fired hundreds of times, and he has declared war against us. He has declared a holy war against us.

We know some other facts. We know over time Saddam Hussein's weapons regime will grow, and the threat will become worse. We do not want war, but it would appear doing nothing is the one way to ensure war.

I believe to the depth of my soul that this resolution is a measured and thoughtful proposal to achieve one thing, and that is the disarmament of Iraq and the Saddam Hussein regime, hopefully by peace, but if necessary by force.

I think we know that it has the potential of creating the coalition we all want. If America sends a weak signal and says we are not sure of our course, we are not sure of our path, how can we even hope to bring into our ranks and to our side allies in a battle against an insane leader such as Saddam Hussein?

I think we also know, those of us who intend to vote for this resolution, it holds a second potential and that is it could lead the United Nations, indeed, I am prayerful, as is the President, that it will lead the United Nations to rise to its obligations, to make its resolutions meaningful, to remove itself from the irrelevancy that it currently has by not enforcing its resolutions, and to stand with strength and to say once and for all to this vicious dictator, we will not let you flaunt the rule of law and the requirements imposed by the U.N.

It could indeed cause Saddam Hussein to come to his senses. I hope it will.

I know failing to act involves too great a risk. Failing to act exposes not just the people of his nation, whom he has terrorized and butchered and tortured, to suffer longer.

We know the dimensions to which he will go. We know the threat. We know he will in fact and has used violence of every dimension against his own people, and we know for a moral certainty he will bring that aggression against the rest of the world if not stopped.

No one is happy about this moment, but I believe it is the right course and, for those who truly want peace, the only course.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD a column from the New Yorker written by Jeffrey Goldberg. It is called "The Great Terror." It is an interview of the people who were the victims of Saddam Hussein's attack on his own people. It documents his murder of some 50,000 to 200,000 Kurds.

[From the New Yorker, Mar. 25, 2002]

#### THE GREAT TERROR

(By Jeffrey Goldberg)

In northern Iraq, there is new evidence of Saddam Hussein's genocidal war on the Kurds—and of his possible ties to Al Qaeda.

In the late morning of March 16, 1988, an Iraqi Air Force helicopter appeared over the city of Halabja, which is about fifteen miles from the border with Iran. The Iran-Iraq War was then in its eighth year, and Halabja was near the front lines. At the time, the city

was home to roughly eighty thousand Kurds, who were well accustomed to the proximity of violence to ordinary life. Like most of Iraqi Kurdistan, Halabja was in perpetual revolt against the regime of Saddam Hussein, and its inhabitants were supporters of the peshmerga, the Kurdish fighters whose name means "those who face death."

A young woman named Nasreen Abdel Qadir Muhammad was outside her family's house, preparing food, when she saw the helicopter. The Iranians and the peshmerga had just attacked Iraqi military outposts around Halabja, forcing Saddam's soldiers to retreat. Iranian Revolutionary Guards then infiltrated the city, and the residents assumed that an Iraqi counterattack was imminent. Nasreen and her family expected to spend yet another day in their cellar, which was crude and dark but solid enough to withstand artillery shelling, and even napalm.

"At about ten o'clock, maybe closer to ten-thirty, I saw the helicopter," Nasreen told me. "It was not attacking, though. There were men inside it, taking pictures. One had a regular camera, and the other held what looked like a video camera. They were coming very close. Then they went away."

Nasreen thought that the sight was strange, but she was preoccupied with lunch; she and her sister Rangeen were preparing rice, bread, and beans for the thirty or forty relatives who were taking shelter in the cellar. Rangeen was fifteen at the time. Nasreen was just sixteen, but her father had married her off several months earlier, to a cousin, a thirty-year-old physician's assistant named Bakhtiar Abdul Aziz. Halabja is a conservative place, and many more women wear the veil than in the more cosmopolitan Kurdish cities to the northwest and the Arab cities to the south.

The bombardment began shortly before eleven. The Iraqi Army, positioned on the main road from the nearby town of Sayid Sadiq, fired artillery shells into Halabja, and the Air Force began dropping what is thought to have been napalm on the town, especially the northern area. Nasreen and Rangeen rushed to the cellar. Nasreen prayed that Bakhtiar, who was then outside the city, would find shelter.

The attack had ebbed by about two o'clock, and Nasreen made her way carefully upstairs to the kitchen, to get the food for the family. "At the end of the bombing, the sound changed," she said. "It wasn't so loud. It was like pieces of metal just dropping without exploding. We didn't know why it was so quiet."

A short distance away, in a neighborhood still called the Julakan, or Jewish quarter, even though Halabja's Jews left for Israel in the nineteen-fifties, a middle-aged man named Muhammad came up from his own cellar and saw an unusual sight: "A helicopter had come back to the town, and the soldiers were throwing white pieces of paper out the side." In retrospect, he understood that they were measuring wind speed and direction. Nearby, a man named Awat Omer, who was twenty at the time, was overwhelmed by a smell of garlic and apples.

Nasreen gathered the food quickly, but she, too, noticed a series of odd smells carried into the house by the wind. "At first, it smelled bad, like garbage," she said. "And then it was a good smell, like sweet apples. Then like eggs." Before she went downstairs, she happened to check on a caged partridge that her father kept in the house. "The bird was dying," she said. "It was on its side." She looked out the window. "It was very quiet, but the animals were dying. The sheep and goats were dying." Nasreen ran to the cellar. "I told everybody there was something wrong. There was something wrong with the air."

The people in the cellar were panicked. They had fled downstairs to escape the bombardment, and it was difficult to abandon their shelter. Only splinters of light penetrated the basement, but the dark provided a strange comfort. "We wanted to stay in hiding, even though we were getting sick," Nasreen said. She felt a sharp pain in her eyes, like stabbing needles. "My sister came close to my face and said, 'Your eyes are very red.' Then the children started throwing up. They kept throwing up. They were in so much pain, and crying so much. They were crying all the time. My mother was crying. Then the old people started throwing up."

Chemical weapons had been dropped on Halabja by the Iraqi Air Force, which understood that any underground shelter would become a gas chamber. "My uncle said we should go outside," Nasreen said. "We knew there were chemicals in the air. We were getting red eyes, and some of us had liquid coming out of them. We decided to run." Nasreen and her relatives stepped outside gingerly. "Our cow was lying on its side," she recalled. "It was breathing very fast, as if it had been running. The leaves were falling off the trees, even though it was spring. The partridge was dead. There were smoke clouds around, clinging to the ground. The gas was heavier than the air, and it was finding the wells and going down the wells."

The family judged the direction of the wind, and decided to run the opposite way. Running proved difficult. "The children couldn't walk, they were so sick," Nasreen said. "They were exhausted from throwing up. We carried them in our arms."

Across the city, other families were making similar decisions. Nouri Hama Ali, who lived in the northern part of town, decided to lead his family in the direction of Anab, a collective settlement on the outskirts of Halabja that housed Kurds displaced when the Iraqi Army destroyed their villages. "On the road to Anab, many of the women and children began to die," Nouri told me. "The chemical clouds were on the ground. They were heavy. We could see them." People were dying all around, he said. When a child could not go on, the parents, becoming hysterical with fear, abandoned him. "Many children were left on the ground, by the side of the road. Old people as well. They were running, then they would stop breathing and die."

Nasreen's family did not move quickly. "We wanted to wash ourselves off and find water to drink," she said. "We wanted to wash the faces of the children who were vomiting. The children were crying for water. There was powder on the ground, white. We couldn't decide whether to drink the water or not, but some people drank the water from the well they were so thirsty."

They ran in a panic through the city, Nasreen recalled, in the direction of Anab. The bombardment continued intermittently, Air Force planes circling overhead. "People were showing different symptoms. One person touched some of the powder, and her skin started bubbling."

A truck came by, driven by a neighbor. People threw themselves aboard. "We saw people lying frozen on the ground," Nasreen told me. "There was a small baby on the ground, away from her mother. I thought they were both sleeping. But she had dropped the baby and then died. And I think the baby tried to crawl away, but it died, too. It looked like everyone was sleeping."

At that moment, Nasreen believed that she and her family would make it to high ground and live. Then the truck stopped. "The driver said he couldn't go on, and he wandered away. He left his wife in the back of the truck. He told us to flee if we could. The chemicals affected his brain, because why else would someone abandon his family?"

As heavy clouds of gas smothered the city, people became sick and confused. Awat Omer was trapped in his cellar with his family; he said that his brother began laughing uncontrollably and then stripped off his clothes, and soon afterward he died. As night fell, the family's children grew sicker—too sick to move.

Nasreen's husband could not be found, and she began to think that all was lost. She led the children who were able to walk up the road.

In another neighborhood, Muhammad Ahmed Fattah, who was twenty, was overwhelmed by an oddly sweet odor of sulfur, and he, too, realized that he must evacuate his family; there were about a hundred and sixty people wedged into the cellar. "I saw the bomb drop," Muhammad told me. "It was about thirty metres from the house. I shut the door to the cellar. There was shouting and crying in the cellar, and then people became short of breath." One of the first to be stricken by the gas was Muhammad's brother Salah. "His eyes were pink," Muhammad recalled. "There was something coming out of his eyes. He was so thirsty he was demanding water." Others in the basement began suffering tremors.

March 16th was supposed to be Muhammad's wedding day. "Every preparation was done," he said. His fiancée, a woman named Bahar Jamal, was among the first in the cellar to die. "She was crying very hard," Muhammad recalled. "I tried to calm her down. I told her it was just the usual artillery shells, but it didn't smell the usual way weapons smelled. She was smart, she knew what was happening. She died on the stairs. Her father tried to help her, but it was too late."

Death came quickly to others as well. A woman named Hamida Mahmoud tried to save her two-year-old daughter by allowing her to nurse from her breast. Hamida thought that the baby wouldn't breathe in the gas if she was nursing, Muhammad said, adding, "The baby's name was Dashneh. She nursed for a long time. Her mother died while she was nursing. But she kept nursing." By the time Muhammad decided to go outside, most of the people in the basement were unconscious; many were dead, including his parents and three of his siblings.

Nasreen said that on the road to Anab all was confusion. She and the children were running toward the hills, but they were going blind. "The children were crying, 'We can't see! My eyes are bleeding!'" "In the chaos, the family got separated. Nasreen's mother and father were both lost. Nasreen and several of her cousins and siblings inadvertently led the younger children in a circle, back into the city. Someone—she doesn't know who—led them away from the city again and up a hill, to a small mosque, where they sought shelter. "But we didn't stay in the mosque, because we thought it would be a target," Nasreen said. They went to a small house nearby, and Nasreen scrambled to find food and water for the children. By then, it was night, and she was exhausted.

Bakhtiar, Nasreen's husband, was frantic. Outside the city when the attacks started, he had spent much of the day searching for his wife and the rest of his family. He had acquired from a clinic two syringes of atropine, a drug that helps to counter the effects of nerve agents. He injected himself with one of the syringes, and set out to find Nasreen. He had no hope. "My plan was to bury her," he said. "At least I should bury my new wife."

After hours of searching, Bakhtiar met some neighbors, who remembered seeing Nasreen and the children moving toward the mosque on the hill. "I called out the name Nasreen," he said. "I heard crying, and I went inside the house. When I got there, I

found that Nasreen was alive but blind. Everybody was blind."

Nasreen had lost her sight about an hour or two before Bakhtiar found her. She had been searching the house for food, so that she could feed the children, when her eyesight failed. "I found some milk and I felt my way to them and then I found their mouths and gave them milk," she said.

Bakhtiar organized the children. "I wanted to bring them to the well. I washed their heads. I took them two by two and washed their heads. Some of them couldn't come. They couldn't control their muscles."

Bakhtiar still had one syringe of atropine, but he did not inject his wife; she was not the worst off in the group. "There was a woman named Asme, who was my neighbor," Bakhtiar recalled. "She was not able to breathe. She was yelling and she was running into a wall, crashing her head into a wall. I gave the atropine to this woman." Asme died soon afterward. "I could have used it for Nasreen," Bakhtiar said. "I could have."

After the Iraqi bombardment subsided, the Iranians managed to retake Halabja, and they evacuated many of the sick, including Nasreen and the others in her family, to hospitals in Tehran.

Nasreen was blind for twenty days. "I was thinking the whole time, Where is my family? But I was blind. I couldn't do anything. I asked my husband about my mother, but he said he didn't know anything. He was looking in hospitals, he said. He was avoiding the question."

The Iranian Red Crescent Society, the equivalent of the Red Cross, began compiling books of photographs, pictures of the dead in Halabja. "The Red Crescent has an album of the people who were buried in Iran," Nasreen said. "And we found my mother in one of the albums." Her father, she discovered, was alive but permanently blinded. Five of her siblings, including Rangeen, had died.

Nasreen would live, the doctors said, but she kept a secret from Bakhtiar: "When I was in the hospital, I started menstruating. It wouldn't stop. I kept bleeding. We don't talk about this in our society, but eventually a lot of women in the hospital confessed they were also menstruating and couldn't stop." Doctors gave her drugs that stopped the bleeding, but they told her that she would be unable to bear children.

Nasreen stayed in Iran for several months, but eventually she and Bakhtiar returned to Kurdistan. She didn't believe the doctors who told her that she would be infertile, and in 1991 she gave birth to a boy. "We named him Arazoo," she said. Arazoo means hope in Kurdish. "He was healthy at first, but he had a hole in his heart. He died at the age of three months."

I met Nasreen last month in Erbil, the largest city in Iraqi Kurdistan. She is thirty now, a pretty woman with brown eyes and high cheekbones, but her face is expressionless. She doesn't seek pity; she would, however, like a doctor to help her with a cough that she's had ever since the attack, fourteen years ago. Like many of Saddam Hussein's victims, she tells her story without emotion.

During my visit to Kurdistan, I talked with more than a hundred victims of Saddam's campaign against the Kurds. Saddam has been persecuting the Kurds ever since he took power, more than twenty years ago. Several old women whose husbands were killed by Saddam's security services expressed a kind of animal hatred toward him, but most people, like Nasreen, told stories of horrific cruelty with a dispassion and a precision that underscored their credibility. Credibility is important to the Kurds; after all this time, they still feel that the world does not believe their story.

A week after I met Nasreen, I visited a small village called Goktapa, situated in a green valley that is ringed by snow-covered mountains. Goktapa came under poison-gas attack six weeks after Halabja. The village consists of low mud-brick houses along dirt paths. In Goktapa, an old man named Ahmed Raza Sharif told me that on the day of the attack on Goktapa, May 3, 1988, he was in the fields outside the village. He saw the shells explode and smelled the sweet-apple odor as poison filled the air. His son, Osman Ahmed, who was sixteen at the time, was near the village mosque when he was felled by the gas. He crawled down a hill and died among the reeds on the banks of the Lesser Zab, the river that flows by the village. His father knew that he was dead, but he couldn't reach the body. As many as a hundred and fifty people died in the attack; the survivors fled before the advancing Iraqi Army, which levelled the village. Ahmed Raza Sharif did not return for three years. When he did, he said, he immediately began searching for his son's body. He found it still lying in the reeds. "I recognized his body right away," he said.

The summer sun in Iraq is blisteringly hot, and a corpse would be unidentifiable three years after death. I tried to find a gentle way to express my doubts, but my translator made it clear to Sharif that I didn't believe him.

We were standing in the mud yard of another old man, Ibrahim Abdul Rahman. Twenty or thirty people, a dozen boys among them, had gathered. Some of them seemed upset that I appeared to doubt the story, but Ahmed hushed them. "It's true, he lost all the flesh on his body," he said. "He was just a skeleton. But the clothes were his, and they were still on the skeleton, a belt and a shirt. In the pocket of his shirt I found the key to our tractor. That's where he always kept the key."

Some of the men still seemed concerned that I would leave Goktapa doubting their truthfulness. Ibrahim, the man in whose yard we were standing, called out a series of orders to the boys gathered around us. They dispersed, to houses and storerooms, returning moments later holding jagged pieces of metal, the remnants of the bombs that poisoned Goktapa. Ceremoniously, the boys dropped the pieces of metal at my feet. "Here are the mercies of Uncle Saddam," Ibrahim said.

## 2. THE AFTERMATH

The story of Halabja did not end the night the Iraqi Air Force planes returned to their bases. The Iranians invited the foreign press to record the devastation. Photographs of the victims, supine, bleached of color, littering the gutters and alleys of the town, horrified the world. Saddam Hussein's attacks on his own citizens mark the only time since the Holocaust that poison gas has been used to exterminate women and children.

Saddam's cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, who led the campaigns against the Kurds in the late eighties, was heard on a tape captured by rebels, and later obtained by Human Rights Watch, addressing members of Iraq's ruling Baath Party on the subject of the Kurds. "I will kill them all with chemical weapons!" he said. "Who is going to say anything? The international community? Fuck them! The international community and those who listen to them."

Attempts by Congress in 1988 to impose sanctions on Iraq were stifled by the Reagan and Bush Administrations, and the story of Saddam's surviving victims might have vanished completely had it not been for the reporting of people like Randal and the work of a British documentary filmmaker named Gwynne Roberts, who, after hearing stories

about a sudden spike in the incidence of birth defects and cancers, not only in Halabja but also in other parts of Kurdistan, had made some disturbing films on the subject. However, no Western government or United Nations agency took up the cause.

In 1998, Roberts brought an Englishwoman named Christine Gosden to Kurdistan. Gosden is a medical geneticist and a professor at the medical school of the University of Liverpool. She spent three weeks in the hospitals in Kurdistan, and came away determined to help the Kurds. To the best of my knowledge, Gosden is the only Western scientist who has even begun making a systematic study of what took place in northern Iraq.

Gosden told me that her father was a high-ranking officer in the Royal Air Force, and that as a child she lived in Germany, near Bergen-Belsen. "It's tremendously influential in your early years to live near a concentration camp," she said. In Kurdistan, she heard echoes of the German campaign to destroy the Jews. "The Iraqi government was using chemistry to reduce the population of Kurds," she said. "The Holocaust is still having its effect. The Jews are fewer in number now than they were in 1939. That's not natural. Now, if you take out two hundred thousand men and boys from Kurdistan—an estimate of the number of Kurds who were gassed or otherwise murdered in the campaign, most of whom were men and boys—you've affected the population structure. There are a lot of widows who are not having children."

Richard Butler, an Australian diplomat who chaired the United Nations weapons-inspection team in Iraq, describes Gosden as "a classic English, old-school-tie kind of person." Butler has tracked her research since she began studying the attacks, four years ago, and finds it credible. "Occasionally, people say that this is Christine's obsession, but obsession is not a bad thing," he added.

Before I went to Kurdistan, in January, I spent a day in London with Gosden. We gossiped a bit, and she scolded me for having visited a Washington shopping mall without appropriate protective equipment. Whenever she goes to a mall, she brings along a polyurethane bag, "big enough to step into" and a bottle of bleach. "I can detoxify myself immediately," she said.

Gosden believes it is quite possible that the countries of the West will soon experience chemical and biological-weapons attacks far more serious and of greater lasting effect than the anthrax incidents of last autumn and the nerve-agent attack on the Tokyo subway system several years ago—that what happened in Kurdistan was only the beginning. "For Saddam's scientists, the Kurds were a test population," she said. "They were the human guinea pigs. It was a way of identifying the most effective chemical agents for use on civilian populations, and the most effective means of delivery."

The charge is supported by others. An Iraqi defector, Khidhir Hamza, who is the former director of Saddam's nuclear-weapons program, told me earlier this year that before the attack on Balabja military doctors had mapped the city, and that afterward they entered it wearing protective clothing, in order to study the dispersal of the dead. "These were field tests, an experiment on a town," Hamza told me. He said that he had direct knowledge of the Army's procedures that day in Halabja. "The doctors were given sheets with grids on them, and they had to answer questions such as 'How far are the dead from the cannisters?'"

Gosden said that she cannot understand why the West has not been more eager to investigate the chemical attacks in Kurdistan. "It seems a matter of enlightened self-inter-

est that the West would want to study the long-term effects of chemical weapons on civilians, on the DNA," she told me. "I've seen Europe's worst cancers, but, believe me, I have never seen cancers like the ones I saw in Kurdistan."

According to an ongoing survey conducted by a team of Kurdish physicians and organized by Gosden and a small advocacy group called the Washington Kurdish Institute, more than two hundred towns and villages across Kurdistan were attacked by poison gas—far more than was previously thought—in the course of seventeen months. The number of victims is unknown, but doctors I met in Kurdistan believe that up to ten per cent of the population of northern Iraq—nearly four million people—has been exposed to chemical weapons. "Saddam Hussein poisoned northern Iraq," Gosden said when I left for Halabja. "The questions, then, are what to do? And what comes next?"

### 3. HALABJA'S DOCTORS

The Kurdish people, it is often said, make up the largest stateless nation in the world. They have been widely despised by their neighbors for centuries. There are roughly twenty-five million Kurds, most of them spread across four countries in southwestern Asia: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The Kurds are neither Arab, Persian, nor Turkish; they are a distinct ethnic group, with their own culture and language. Most Kurds are Muslim (the most famous Muslim hero of all, Saladin, who defeated the Crusaders, was of Kurdish origin), but there are Jewish and Christian Kurds, and also followers of the Yezidi religion, which has its roots in Sufism and Zoroastrianism. The Kurds are experienced mountain fighters, who tend toward stubbornness and have frequent bouts of destructive infighting.

After centuries of domination by foreign powers, the Kurds had their best chance at independence after the First World War, when President Woodrow Wilson promised the Kurds, along with other groups left drifting, and exposed by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, a large measure of autonomy. But the machinations of the great powers, who were becoming interested in Kurdistan's vast oil deposits, in Mosul and Kirkuk, quickly did the Kurds out of a state.

In the nineteen-seventies, the Iraqi Kurds allied themselves with the Shah of Iran in a territorial dispute with Iraq. America, the Shah's patron, once again became the Kurds' patron, too, supplying them with arms for a revolt against Baghdad. But a secret deal between the Iraqis and the Shah, arranged in 1975 by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, cut off the Kurds and brought about their instant collapse; for the Kurds, it was an ugly betrayal.

The Kurdish safe haven, in northern Iraq, was born of another American betrayal. In 1991, after the United States helped drive Iraq out of Kuwait, President George Bush ignored an uprising that he himself had stoked, and Kurds and Shiites in Iraq were slaughtered by the thousands. Thousands more fled the country, the Kurds going to Turkey, and almost immediately creating a humanitarian disaster. The Bush Administration, faced with a televised catastrophe, declared northern Iraq a no-fly zone and thus a safe haven, a tactic that allowed the refugees to return home. And so, under the protective shield of the United States and British Air Forces, the unplanned Kurdish experiment in self-government began. Although the Kurdish safe haven is only a virtual state, it is an incipient democracy, a home of progressive Islamic thought and pro-American feeling.

Today, Iraqi Kurdistan is split between two dominant parties: the Kurdistan Demo-

cratic Party, led by Massoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, whose General Secretary is Jalal Talabani. The two parties have had an often angry relationship, and in the mid-nineties they fought a war that left about a thousand soldiers dead. The parties, realizing that they could not rule together, decided to rule apart, dividing Kurdistan into two zones. The internal political divisions have not aided the Kurds' cause, but neighboring states also have fomented disunity, fearing that a unified Kurdish population would agitate for independence.

Turkey, with a Kurdish population of between fifteen and twenty million, has repressed the Kurds in the eastern part of the country, politically and militarily, on and off since the founding of the modern Turkish state. In 1924, the government of Atatürk restricted the use of the Kurdish language (a law not lifted until 1991) and expressions of Kurdish culture; to this day, the Kurds are referred to in nationalist circles as "mountain Turks."

Turkey is not eager to see Kurds anywhere draw attention to themselves, which is why the authorities in Ankara refused to let me cross the border into Iraqi Kurdistan. Iran, whose Kurdish population numbers between six and eight million, was not helpful, either, and my only option for gaining entrance to Kurdistan was through its third neighbor, Syria. The Kurdistan Democratic Party arranged for me to be met in Damascus and taken to the eastern desert city of El Qamishli. From there, I was driven in a Land Cruiser to the banks of the Tigris River, where a small wooden boat, with a crew of one and an outboard motor, was waiting. The engine sputtered; when I learned that the forward lines of the Iraqi Army were two miles downstream, I began to paddle, too. On the other side of the river were representatives of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the peshmerga, the Kurdish guerrillas, who wore pantaloons and turbans and were armed with AK-47s.

"Welcome to Kurdistan" read a sign at the water's edge greeting visitors to a country that does not exist.

Halabja is a couple of hundred miles from the Syrian border, and I spent a week crossing northern Iraq, making stops in the cities of Dahuk and Erbil on the way. I was handed over to representatives of the Patriotic Union, which controls Halabja, at a demilitarized zone west of the town of Koysinjak. From there, it was a two-hour drive over steep mountains to Sulaimaniya, a city of six hundred and fifty thousand, which is the cultural capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. In Sulaimaniya, I met Fouad Baban, one of Kurdistan's leading physicians, who promised to guide me through the scientific and political thickets of Halabja.

Baban, a pulmonary and cardiac specialist who has survived three terms in Iraqi prisons, is sixty years old, and a man of impish good humor. He is the Kurdistan coordinator of the Halabja Medical Institute, which was founded by Gosden, Michael Amitay, the executive director of the Washington Kurdish Institute, and a coalition of Kurdish doctors; for the doctors, it is an act of bravery to be publicly associated with a project whose scientific findings could be used as evidence if Saddam Hussein faced a war-crimes tribunal. Saddam's agents are everywhere in the Kurdish zone, and his tanks sit forty miles from Baban's office.

Soon after I arrived in Sulaimanya, Baban and I headed out in his Toyota Camry for Halabja. On a rough road, we crossed the plains of Sharazoor, a region of black earth and honey-colored wheat ringed by jagged, snow-topped mountains. We were not traveling alone. The Mukhabarat, the Iraqi intelligence service, is widely reported to have

placed a bounty on the heads of Western journalists caught in Kurdistan (either ten thousand dollars or twenty thousand dollars, depending on the source of the information). The areas around the border with Iran are filled with Tehran's spies, and members of Ansar al-Islam, an Islamist terror group, were said to be decapitating people in the Halabja area. So the Kurds had laid on a rather elaborate security detail. A Land Cruiser carrying peshmerga guerrillas led the way, and we were followed by another Land Cruiser, on whose bed was mounted an anti-aircraft weapon manned by six peshmerga, some of whom wore black bal-clavas. We were just south of the American- and British-enforced no-fly zone. I had been told that, at the beginning of the safe-haven experiment, the Americans had warned Saddam's forces to stay away; a threat from the air, though unlikely, was, I deduced, not out of the question.

"It seems very important to know the immediate and long-term effects of chemical and biological weapons," Baban said, beginning, my tutorial. "Here is a civilian population exposed to chemical and possibly biological weapons, and people are developing many varieties of cancers and congenital abnormalities. The Americans are vulnerable to these weapons—they are cheap, and terrorists possess them. So, after the anthrax attacks in the States, I think it is urgent for scientific research to be done here."

Experts now believe that Halabja and other places in Kurdistan were struck by a combination of mustard gas and nerve agents, including sarin (the agent used in the Tokyo subway attack) and VX, a potent nerve agent. Baban's suggestion that biological weapons may also have been used surprised me. One possible biological weapon that Baban mentioned was aflatoxin, which causes long-term liver damage.

A colleague of Baban's, a surgeon who practices in Dahuk, in northwestern Kurdistan, and who is a member of the Halabja Medical Institute team, told me more about the institute's survey, which was conducted in the Dahuk region in 1999. The surveyors began, he said, by asking elementary questions; eleven years after the attacks, they did not even know which villages had been attacked.

"The team went to almost every village," the surgeon said. "At first, we thought that the Dahuk governorate was the least affected. We knew of only two villages that were hit by the attacks. But we came up with twenty-nine in total. This is eleven years after the fact."

The surgeon is professorial in appearance, but he is deeply angry. He doubles as a pediatric surgeon, because there are no pediatric surgeons in Kurdistan. He has performed more than a hundred operations for cleft palate on children born since 1988. Most of the agents believed to have been dropped on Halabja have short half-lives, but, as Baban told me, "physicians are unsure how long these toxins will affect the population. How can we know agent half-life if we don't know the agent?" He added, "If we knew the toxins that were used, we could follow them and see actions on spermatogenesis and ovogenesis."

Increased rates of infertility, he said, are having a profound effect on Kurdish society, which places great importance on large families. "You have men divorcing their wives because they could not give birth, and then marrying again, and then their second wives can't give birth, either," he said. "Still, they don't blame their own problem with spermatogenesis."

Baban told me that the initial results of the Halabja Medical Institute-sponsored survey show abnormally high rates of many diseases. He said that he compared rates of

colon cancer in Halabja with those in the city of Chamchamal, which was not attacked with chemical weapons. "We are seeing rates of colon cancer five times higher in Halabja than in Chamchamal," he said.

There are other anomalies as well, Baban said. The rate of miscarriage in Halabja, according to initial survey results, is fourteen times the rate of miscarriage in Chamchamal; rates of infertility among men and women in the affected population are many times higher than normal. "We're finding Hiroshima levels of sterility," he said.

Then, there is the suspicion about snakes. "Have you heard about the snakes?" he asked as we drove. I told him that I had heard rumors. "We don't know if a genetic mutation in the snakes has made them more toxic," Baban went on, "or if the birds that eat the snakes were killed off in the attacks, but there seem to be more snakebites, of greater toxicity, in Halabja now than before." (I asked Richard Spertzel, a scientist and a former member of the United Nations Special Commission inspections team, if this was possible. Yes, he said, but such a rise in snakebites was more likely due to "environmental imbalances" than to mutations.)

My conversation with Baban was suddenly interrupted by our guerrilla escorts, who stopped the car and asked me to join them in one of the Land Cruisers; we veered off across a wheat field, without explanation. I was later told that we had been passing a mountain area that had recently had problems with Islamic terrorists.

We arrived in Halabja half an hour later. As you enter the city, you see a small statue modelled on the most famous photographic image of the Halabja massacre: an old man, prone and lifeless, shielding his dead grandson with his body.

A torpor seems to afflict Halabja; even its bazaar is listless and somewhat empty, in marked contrast to those of other Kurdish cities, which are well stocked with imported goods (history and circumstance have made the Kurds enthusiastic smugglers) and are full of noise and activity. "Everyone here is sick," a Halabja doctor told me. "The people who aren't sick are depressed." He practices at the Martyrs' Hospital, which is situated on the outskirts of the city. The hospital has no heat and little advanced equipment; like the city itself, it is in a dilapidated state.

The doctor is a thin, jumpy man in a tweed jacket, and he smokes without pause. He and Baban took me on a tour of the hospital. Afterward, we sat in a bare office, and a woman was wheeled in. She looked seventy but said that she was fifty; doctors told me she suffers from lung scarring so serious that only a lung transplant could help, but there are no transplant centers in Kurdistan. The woman, whose name is Jayran Muhammad, lost eight relatives during the attack. Her voice was almost inaudible. "I was disturbed psychologically for a long time," she told me as Baban translated. "I believed my children were alive." Baban told me that her lungs would fail soon, that she could barely breathe. "She is waiting to die," he said. I met another woman, Chia Hammassat, who was eight at the time of the attacks and has been blind ever since. Her mother, she said, died of colon cancer several years ago, and her brother suffers from chronic shortness of breath. "There is no hope to correct my vision," she said, her voice flat. "I was married, but I couldn't fulfill the responsibilities of a wife because I'm blind. My husband left me."

Baban said that in Halabja "there are more abnormal births than normal ones," and other Kurdish doctors told me that they regularly see children born with neural-tube defects and undescended testes and without anal openings. They are seeing—and they

showed me—children born with six or seven toes on each foot, children whose fingers and toes are fused, and children who suffer from leukemia and liver cancer.

I met Sarkar, a shy and intelligent boy with a harelip, a cleft palate, and a growth on his spine. Sarkar had a brother born with the same set of malformations, the doctor told me, but the brother choked to death, while still a baby, on a grain of rice.

Meanwhile, more victims had gathered in the hallway; the people of Halabja do not often have a chance to tell their stories to foreigners. Some of them wanted to know if I was a surgeon, who had come to repair their children's deformities, and they were disappointed to learn that I was a journalist. The doctor and I soon left the hospital for a walk through the northern neighborhoods of Halabja, which were hardest hit in the attack. We were trailed by peshmerga carrying AK-47s. The doctor smoked as we talked, and I teased him about his habit. "Smoking has some good effect on the lungs," he said, without irony. "In the attacks, there was less effect on smokers. Their lungs were better equipped for the mustard gas, maybe."

We walked through the alleyways of the Jewish quarter, past a former synagogue in which eighty or so Halabjans died during the attack. Underfed cows wandered the paths. The doctor showed me several cellars where clusters of people had died. We knocked on the gate of one house, and were let in by an old woman with a wide smile and few teeth. In the Kurdish tradition, she immediately invited us for lunch.

She told us the recent history of the house. "Everyone who was in this house died," she said. "The whole family. We heard there were one hundred people." She led us to the cellar, which was damp and close. Rusted yellow cans of vegetable ghee littered the floor. The room seemed too small to hold a hundred people, but the doctor said that the estimate sounded accurate. I asked him if cellars like this one had ever been decontaminated. He smiled. "Nothing in Kurdistan has been decontaminated," he said.

#### 4. AL-ANFAL

The chemical attacks on Halabja and Goktapa and perhaps two hundred other villages and towns were only a small part of the cataclysm that Saddam's cousin, the man known as Ali Chemical, arranged for the Kurds. The Kurds say that about two hundred thousand were killed. (Human Rights Watch, which in the early nineties published "Iraq's Crime of Genocide," a definitive study of the attacks, gives a figure of between fifty thousand and a hundred thousand.)

The campaign against the Kurds was dubbed al-Anfal by Saddam, after a chapter in the Koran that allows conquering Muslim armies to seize the spoils of their foes. It reads, in part, "Against them"—your enemies—"make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly."

The Anfal campaign was not an end in itself, like the Holocaust, but a means to an end—an instance of a policy that Samantha Power, who runs the Carr Center for Human Rights, at Harvard, calls "Instrumental genocide." Power has just published "A Problem from Hell," a study of American responses to genocide. "There are regimes that set out to murder every citizen of a race," she said. "Saddam achieved what he had to do without exterminating every last Kurd." What he had to do, Power and others say,



was to break the Kurds' morale and convince them that a desire for independence was foolish.

Most of the Kurds who were murdered in the Anfal were not killed by poison gas; rather, the genocide was carried out, in large part, in the traditional manner, with round-ups at night, mass executions, and anonymous burials. The bodies of most of the victims of the Anfal—mainly men and boys—have never been found.

One day, I met one of the thousands of Kurdish women known as Anfal widows: Salma Aziz Baban. She lives outside Chamchamal, in a settlement made up almost entirely of displaced families, in cinder-block houses. Her house was nearly empty—no furniture, no heat, just a ragged carpet. We sat on the carpet as she told me about her family. She comes from the Kirkuk region, and in 1987 her village was uprooted by the Army, and the inhabitants, with thousands of other Kurds, were forced into a collective town. Then, one night in April of 1988, soldiers went into the village and seized the men and older boys. Baban's husband and her three oldest sons were put on trucks. The mothers of the village began to plead with the soldiers. "We were screaming, 'Do what you want to us, do what you want!'" Baban told me. "They were so scared, my sons. My sons were crying." She tried to bring them coats for the journey. "It was raining. I wanted them to have coats. I begged the soldiers to let me give them bread. They took them without coats." Baban remembered that a high-ranking Iraqi officer named Bareq orchestrated the separation; according to "Iraq's Crime of Genocide," the Human Rights Watch report, the man in charge of this phase was a brigadier general named Bareq Abdullah al-Haj Hunta.

After the men were taken away, the women and children were herded onto trucks. They were given little water or food, and were crammed so tightly into the vehicles that they had to defecate where they stood. Baban, her three daughters, and her six-year-old son were taken to the Topzawa Army base and then to the prison of Nugra Salman, the Pit of Salman, which Human Rights Watch in 1995 described this way: "It was an old building, dating back to the days of the Iraqi monarchy and perhaps earlier. It had been abandoned for years, used by Arab nomads to shelter their herds. The bare walls were scrawled with the diaries of political prisoners. On the door of one cell, a guard had daubed 'Khomeini eats shit.' Over the main gate, someone else had written, 'Welcome to Hell.'"

"We arrived at midnight," Baban told me. "They put us in a very big room, with more than two thousand people, women and children, and they closed the door. Then the starvation started."

The prisoners were given almost nothing to eat, and a single standpipe spat out brackish water for drinking. People began to die from hunger and illness. When someone died, the Iraqi guards would demand that the body be passed through a window in the main door. "The bodies couldn't stay in the hall," Baban told me. In the first days at Nugra Salman, "thirty people died, maybe more." Her six-year-old son, Rebwar, fell ill. "He had diarrhea," she said. "He was very sick. He knew he was dying. There was no medicine or doctor. He started to cry so much." Baban's son died on her lap. "I was screaming and crying," she said. "My daughters were crying. We gave them the body. It was passed outside, and the soldiers took it."

Soon after Baban's son died, she pulled herself up and went to the window, to see if the soldiers had taken her son to be buried. "There were twenty dogs outside the prison. A big black dog was the leader," she said.

The soldiers had dumped the bodies of the dead outside the prison, in a field. "I looked outside and saw the legs and hands of my son in the mouths of the dogs. The dogs were eating my son." She stopped talking for a moment. "Then I lost my mind."

She described herself as catatonic; her daughters scraped around for food and water. They kept her alive, she said, until she could function again. "This was during Ramadan. We were kept in Nugra Salman for a few more months."

In September, when the war with Iran was over, Saddam issued a general amnesty to the Kurds, the people he believed had betrayed him by siding with Tehran. The women, children, and elderly in Nugra Salman were freed. But, in most cases, they could not go home; the Iraqi Army had bulldozed some four thousand villages, Baban's among them. She was finally resettled in the Chamchamal district.

In the days after her release, she tried to learn the fate of her husband and three older sons. But the men who disappeared in the Anfal roundups have never been found. It is said that they were killed and then buried in mass graves in the desert along the Kuwaiti border, but little is actually known. A great number of Anfal widows, I was told, still believe that their sons and husbands and brothers are locked away in Saddam's jails. "We are thinking they are alive," Baban said, referring to her husband and sons. "Twenty-four hours a day, we are thinking maybe they are alive. If they are alive, they are being tortured, I know it."

Baban said that she has not slept well since her sons were taken from her. "We are thinking, Please let us know they are dead. I will sleep in peace," she said. "My head is filled with terrible thoughts. The day I die is the day I will not remember that the dogs ate my son."

Before I left, Baban asked me to write down the names of her three older sons. They are Sherzad, who would be forty now; Rizgar, who would be thirty-one; and Muhammad, who would be thirty. She asked me to find her sons, or to ask President Bush to find them. "One would be sufficient," she said. "If just one comes back, that would be enough."

##### 5. WHAT THE KURDS FEAR

In a conversation not long ago with Richard Butler, the former weapons inspector, I suggested a possible explanation for the world's indifference to Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons to commit genocide—that the people he had killed were his own citizens, not those of another sovereign state. (The main chemical-weapons treaty does not ban a country's use of such weapons against its own people, perhaps because at the time the convention was drafted no one could imagine such a thing.) Butler reminded me, however, that Iraq had used chemical weapons against another country—Iran—during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. He offered a simpler rationale. "The problems are just too awful and too hard," he said. "History is replete with such things. Go back to the grand example of the Holocaust. It sounded too hard to do anything about it."

The Kurds have grown sanguine about the world's lack of interest. "I've learned not to be surprised by the indifference of the civilized world," Barham Salih told me one evening in Sulaimaniya. Salih is the Prime Minister of the area of Kurdistan administered by the Patriotic Union, and he spoke in such a way as to suggest that it would be best if I, too, stopped acting surprised. "Given the scale of the tragedy—we're talking about large numbers of victims—I suppose I'm surprised that the international community has not come in to help the sur-

vivors," he continued. "It's politically indecent not to help. But, as a Kurd, I live with the terrible hand history and geography have dealt my people."

Salih's home is not prime ministerial, but it has many Western comforts. He had a satellite television and a satellite telephone, yet the house was frigid; in a land of cheap oil, the Kurds, who are cut off the Iraqi electric grid by Saddam on a regular basis, survive on generator power and kerosene heat.

Over dinner one night, Salih argued that the Kurds should not be regarded with pity. "I don't think one has to tap into the Wilsonian streak in American foreign policy in order to find a rationale for helping the Kurds," he said. "Helping the Kurds would mean an opportunity to study the problems caused by weapons of mass destruction."

Salih, who is forty-one, often speaks bluntly, and is savvy about Washington's enduring interest in ending the reign of Saddam Hussein. Unwilling publicly to exhort the United States to take military action, Salih is aware that the peshmerga would be obvious allies of an American military strike against Iraq; other Kurds have been making that argument for years. It is not often noted in Washington policy circles, but the Kurds already hold a vast swath of territory inside the country—including two important dams whose destruction could flood Baghdad—and have at least seventy thousand men under arms. In addition, the two main Kurdish parties are members of the Iraqi opposition group, the Iraqi National Congress, which is headed by Ahmad Chalabi, a London-based Shiite businessman; at the moment, though, relations between Chalabi and the Kurdish leaders are contentious.

Kurds I talked to throughout Kurdistan were enthusiastic about the idea of joining, an American-led alliance against Saddam Hussein, and serving as the northern-Iraqi equivalent of Afghanistan's Northern Alliance. President Bush's State of the Union Message, in which he denounced Iraq as the linchpin of an "axis of evil," had had an electric effect on every Kurd I met who heard the speech. In the same speech, President Bush made reference to Iraq's murder of "thousands of its own citizens—leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children." General Simko Dizayee, the chief of staff of the peshmerga, told me, "Bush's speech filled our hearts with hope."

Prime Minister Salih expressed his views diplomatically. "We support democratic transformation in Iraq," he said—half smiling, because he knows that there is no chance of that occurring unless Saddam is removed. But until America commits itself to removing Saddam, he said, "we're living on the razor's edge. Before Washington even wakes up in the morning, we could have ten thousand dead." This is the Kurdish conundrum: the Iraqi military is weaker than the American military, but the Iraqis are stronger than the Kurds. Seven hundred Iraqi tanks face the Kurdish safe haven, according to peshmerga commanders.

General Mustafa Said Qadir, the peshmerga leader, put it this way: "We have a problem. If the Americans attack Saddam and don't get him, we're going to get gassed. If the Americans decided to do it, we would be thankful. This is the Kurdish dream. But it has to be done carefully."

The Kurdish leadership worries, in short, that an American mistake could cost the Kurds what they have created, however inadvertently: a nearly independent state for themselves in northern Iraq. "We would like to be our own nation," Salih told me. "But we are realists. All we want is to be partners of the Arabs of Iraq in building a secular, democratic, federal country." Later, he added, "We are proud of ourselves. We have



inherited a devastated country. It's not easy what we are trying to achieve. We had no democratic institutions, we didn't have a legal culture, we did not have a strong military. From that situation, this is a remarkable success story."

The Kurdish regional government, to be sure, is not a Vermont town meeting. The leaders of the two parties, Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, are safe in their jobs. But there is a free press here, and separation of mosque and state, and schools are being built and pensions are being paid. In Erbil and in Sulaimaniya, the Kurds have built playgrounds on the ruins of Iraqi Army torture centers. "If America is indeed looking for Muslims who are eager to become democratic and are eager to counter the effects of Islamic fundamentalism, then it should be looking here," Salih said.

Massoud Barzani is the son of the late Mustafa Barzani, a legendary guerrilla, who built the Democratic Party, and who entered into the ill-fated alliance with Iran and America. I met Barzani in his headquarters, above the town of Salahuddin. He is a short man, pale and quiet; he wore the red turban of the Barzani clan and a wide cummerbund across his baggy trousers—the outfit of a peshmerga.

Like Salih, he chooses his words carefully when talking about the possibility of helping America bring down Saddam. "It is not enough to tell us the U.S. will respond at a certain time and place of its choosing," Barzani said. "We're in artillery range. Iraq's Army is weak, but it is still strong enough to crush us. We don't make assumptions about the American response."

One day, I drove to the Kurdish front lines near Erbil, to see the forward positions of the Iraqi Army. The border between the Army-controlled territory and the Kurdish region is porous; Baghdad allows some Kurds—nonpolitical Kurds—to travel back and forth between zones.

My peshmerga escort took me to the roof of a building overlooking the Kalak Bridge and, beyond it, the Iraqi lines. Without binoculars, we could see Iraqi tanks on the hills in front of us. A local official named Muhammad Najjar joined us; he told me that the Iraqi forces arrayed there were elements of the Army's Jerusalem brigade, a reserve unit established by Saddam with the stated purpose of liberating Jerusalem from the Israelis. Other peshmerga joined us. It was a brilliantly sunny day, and we were enjoying the weather. A man named Azlz Khader, gazing at the plain before us, said, "When I look across here, I imagine American tanks coming down across this plain going to Baghdad." His friends smiled and said, "Inshallah"—God willing. Another man said, "The U.S. is the lord of the world."

#### 6. THE PRISONERS

A week later, I was at Shinwe, a mountain range outside Halabja, with another group of peshmerga. My escorts and I had driven most of the way up, and then slogged through fresh snow. From one peak, we could see the village of Biyara, which sits in a valley between Halabja and a wall of mountains that mark the Iranian border. Saddam's tanks were an hour's drive away to the south, and Iran filled the vista before us. Biyara and nine other villages near it are occupied by the terrorist group Ansar al-Islam, or Supporters of Islam. Shinwe, in fact, might be called the axis of the axis of evil.

We were close enough to see trucks belonging to Ansar al-Islam making their way from village to village. The commander of the peshmerga forces surrounding Biyara, a veteran guerrilla named Ramadan Dekone, said that Ansar al-Islam is made up of Kurdish Islamists and an unknown number of so-

called Arab Afghans—Arabs, from southern Iraq and elsewhere, who trained in the camps of Al Qaeda.

"They believe that people must be terrorized," Dekone said, shaking his head. "They believe that the Koran says this is permissible." He pointed to an abandoned village in the middle distance, a place called Kheli Hama. "That is where the massacre took place," he said. In late September, forty-two of his men were killed by Ansar al-Islam, and now Dekone and his forces seemed ready for revenge. I asked him what he would do if he captured the men responsible for the killing. "I would take them to court," he said.

When I got to Sulaimaniya, I visited a prison run by the intelligence service of the Patriotic Union. The prison is attached to the intelligence-service headquarters. It appears to be well kept and humane; the communal cells hold twenty or so men each, and they have kerosene heat, and even satellite television. For two days, the intelligence agency permitted me to speak with any prisoner who agreed to be interviewed. I was wary; the Kurds have an obvious interest in lining up on the American side in the war against terror. But the officials did not, as far as I know, compel anyone to speak to me, and I did not get the sense that allegations made by prisoners were shaped by their captors. The stories, which I later checked with experts on the region, seemed at least worth the attention of America and other countries in the West.

The allegations include charges that Ansar al-Islam has received funds directly from Al Qaeda; that the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein has joint control, with Al Qaeda operatives, over Ansar al-Islam; that Saddam Hussein hosted a senior leader of Al Qaeda in Baghdad in 1992; that a number of Al Qaeda members fleeing Afghanistan have been secretly brought into territory controlled by Ansar al-Islam; and that Iraqi intelligence agents smuggled conventional weapons, and possibly even chemical and biological weapons, into Afghanistan. If these charges are true, it would mean that the relationship between Saddam's regime and Al Qaeda is far closer than previously thought.

When I asked the director of the twenty-four-hundred-man Patriotic Union intelligence service why he was allowing me to interview his prisoners, he told me that he hoped I would carry this information to American intelligence officials. "The F.B.I. and the C.I.A. haven't come out yet," he told me. His deputy added, "Americans are going to Somalia, the Philippines, I don't know where else, to look for terrorists. But this is the field, here." Anya Guilsher, a spokeswoman for the C.I.A., told me last week that as a matter of policy the agency would not comment on the activities of its officers. James Woolsey, a former C.I.A. director and an advocate of overthrowing the Iraqi regime, said, "It would be a real shame if the C.I.A.'s substantial institutional hostility to Iraqi democratic resistance groups was keeping it from learning about Saddam's ties to Al Qaeda in northern Iraq."

The possibility that Saddam could supply weapons of mass destruction to anti-American terror groups is a powerful argument among advocates of "regime change," as the removal of Saddam is known in Washington. These critics of Saddam argue that his chemical and biological capabilities, his record of support for terrorist organizations, and the cruelty of his regime make him a threat that reaches far beyond the citizens of Iraq.

"He's the home address for anyone wanting to make or use chemical or biological weapons," Kanan Makiya, an Iraqi dissident, said. Makiya is the author of "Republic of Fear," a study of Saddam's regime. "He's going to be the person to worry about. He's got the

labs and the knowhow. He's hellbent on trying to find a way into the fight, without announcing it."

On the surface, a marriage of Saddam's secular Baath Party regime with the fundamentalist Al Qaeda seems unlikely. His relationship with secular Palestinian groups is well known; both Abu Nidal and Abul Abbas, two prominent Palestinian terrorists, are currently believed to be in Baghdad. But about ten years ago Saddam underwent something of a battlefield conversion to a fundamentalist brand of Islam.

"It was gradual, starting the moment he decided on the invasion of Kuwait," in June of 1990, according to Amatzia Baram, an Iraq expert at the University of Haifa. "His calculation was that he needed people in Iraq and the Arab world—as well as God—to be on his side when he invaded. After he invaded, the Islamic rhetorical style became overwhelming,"—so overwhelming, Baram continued, that a radical group in Jordan began calling Saddam "the New Caliph Marching from the East." This conversion, cynical though it may be, has opened doors to Saddam in the fundamentalist world. He is now a prime supporter of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and of Hamas, paying families of suicide bombers ten thousand dollars in exchange for their sons' martyrdom. This is part of Saddam's attempt to harness the power of Islamic extremism and direct it against his enemies.

Kurdish culture, on the other hand, has traditionally been immune to religious extremism. According to Kurdish officials, Ansar al-Islam grew out of an idea spread by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the former chief of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and now Osama bin Laden's deputy in Al Qaeda. "There are two schools of thought" in Al Qaeda, Karim Sinjari, the Interior Minister of Kurdistan's Democratic Party-controlled region, told me. "Osama bin Laden believes that the infidels should be beaten in the head, meaning the United States. Zawahiri's philosophy is that you should fight the infidel even in the smallest village, that you should try to form Islamic armies everywhere. The Kurdish fundamentalists were influenced by Zawahiri."

Kurds were among those who travelled to Afghanistan from all over the Muslim world, first to fight the Soviets, in the early nineteen-eighties, then to join Al Qaeda. The members of the groups that eventually became Ansar al-Islam spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan, according to Kurdish intelligence officials. One Kurd who went to Afghanistan was Mala Krekar, an early leader of the Islamist movement in Kurdistan; according to Sinjari, he now holds the title of "emir" of Ansar al-Islam.

In 1998, the first force of Islamist terrorists crossed the Iranian border into Kurdistan, and immediately tried to seize the town of Haj Omran. Kurdish officials said that the terrorists were helped by Iran, which also has an interest in undermining a secular Muslim government. "The terrorists blocked the road, they killed Kurdish Democratic Party cadres, they threatened the villagers," Sinjari said. "We fought them and they fled."

The terrorist groups splintered repeatedly. According to a report in the Arabic newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat, which is published in London, Ansar al-Islam came into being, on September 1st of last year, with the merger of two factions: Al Tawhid, which helped to arrange the assassination of Kurdistan's most prominent Christian politician, and whose operatives initiated an acid-throwing campaign against unveiled women; and a faction called the Second Soran Unit, which had been affiliated with one of the Kurdish Islamic parties. In a statement

issued to mark the merger, the group, which originally called itself Jund al-Islam, or Soldiers of Islam, declared its intention to "undertake Jihad in this region" in order to carry out "God's will." According to Kurdish officials, the group had between five hundred and six hundred members, including Arab Afghans and at least thirty Iraqi Kurds who were trained in Afghanistan.

Kurdish officials say that the merger took place in a ceremony overseen by three Arabs trained in bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan, and that these men supplied Ansar al-Islam with three hundred thousand dollars in seed money. Soon after the merger, a unit of Ansar al-Islam called the Victory Squad attacked and killed the peshmerga in Kheli Hama.

Among the Islamic fighters who were there that day was Rekut Hiwa Hussein, a slender, boyish twenty-year-old who was captured by the peshmerga after the massacre, and whom I met in the prison in Sulaimaniya. He was exceedingly shy, never looking up from his hands as he spoke. He was not handcuffed, and had no marks on the visible parts of his body. We were seated in an investigator's office inside the intelligence complex. Like most buildings in Sulaimaniya, this one was warmed by a single kerosene heater, and the room temperature seemed barely above freezing. Rekut told me how he and his comrades in Ansar al-Islam overcame the peshmerga.

"They thought there was a ceasefire, so we came into the village and fired on them by surprise," he said. "They didn't know what happened. We used grenades and machine guns. We killed a lot of them and then the others surrendered." The terrorists trussed their prisoners, ignoring pleas from the few civilians remaining in the town to leave them alone. "The villagers asked us not to slaughter them," Rekut said. One of the leaders of Ansar al-Islam, a man named Abdullah a'Shafi, became incensed. "He said, 'Who is saying this? Let me kill them.'"

Rekut said that the peshmerga were killed in ritual fashion: "We put cloths in their mouths. We then laid them down like sheep, in a line. Then we cut their throats." After the men were killed, peshmerga commanders say, the corpses were beheaded. Rekut denied this. "Some of their heads had been blown off by grenades, but we didn't behead them," he said.

I asked Rekut why he had joined Ansar al-Islam. "A friend of mine joined," he said quietly. "I don't have a good reason why I joined. A guard then took him by the elbow and returned him to his cell."

The Kurdish intelligence officials I spoke to were careful not to oversell their case; they said that they have no proof that Ansar al-Islam was ever involved in international terrorism or that Saddam's agents were involved in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But they do have proof, they said, that Ansar al-Islam is shielding Al Qaeda members, and that it is doing so with the approval of Saddam's agents.

Kurdish officials said that, according to their intelligence, several men associated with Al Qaeda have been smuggled over the Iranian border into an Ansar al-Islam stronghold near Halabja. The Kurds believe that two of them, who go by the names Abu Yasir and Abu Muzaham, are high-ranking Al Qaeda members. "We don't have any information about them," one official told me. "We know that they don't want anybody to see them. They are sleeping in the same room as Mala Krekar and Abdullah al-Shafi"—the nominal leaders of Ansar al-Islam.

The real leader, these officials say, is an Iraqi who goes by the name Abu Wa'el, and

who, like the others, spent a great deal of time in bin Laden's training camps. But he is also, they say, a high-ranking officer of the Mukhabarat. One senior official added, "A man named Abu Agab is in charge of the northern bureau of the Mukhabarat. And he is Abu Wa'el's control officer."

Abu Agab, the official said, is based in the city of Kirkuk, which is predominantly Kurdish but is under the control of Baghdad. According to intelligence officials, Abu Agab and Abu Wa'el met last July 7th, in Germany. From there, they say, Abu Wa'el travelled to Afghanistan and then, in August, to Kurdistan, sneaking across the Iranian border.

The Kurdish officials told me that they learned a lot about Abu Wa'el's movements from one of their prisoners, an Iraqi intelligence officer named Qassem Hussein Muhammad, and they invited me to speak with him. Qassem, the Kurds said, is a Shiite from Basra, in southern Iraq, and a twenty-year veteran of Iraqi intelligence.

Qassem, shambly, and bearded, was brought into the room, and he genially agreed to be interviewed. One guard stayed in the room, along with my translator. Qassem lit a cigarette, and leaned back in his chair. I started by asking him if he had been tortured by his captors. His eyes widened. "By God, no," he said. "There is nothing like torture here." Then he told me that his involvement in Islamic radicalism began in 1992 in Baghdad, when he met Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Qassem said that he was one of seventeen bodyguards assigned to protect Zawahiri, who stayed at Baghdad's Al Rashid Hotel, but who, he said, moved around surreptitiously. The guards had no idea why Zawahiri was in Baghdad, but one day Qassem escorted him to one of Saddam's palaces for what he later learned was a meeting with Saddam himself.

Qassem's capture by the Kurds grew out of his last assignment from the Mukhabarat. The Iraqi intelligence service received word that Abu Wa'el had been captured by American agents. "I was sent by the Mukhabarat to Kurdistan to find Abu Wa'el or, at least, information about him," Qassem told me. "That's when I was captured, before I reached Biyara."

I asked him if he was sure that Abu Wa'el was on Saddam's side. "He's an employee of the Mukhabarat," Qassem said. "He's the actual decision-maker in the group"—Ansar al-Islam—"but he's an employee of the Mukhabarat." According to the Kurdish intelligence officials, Abu Wa'el is not in American hands; rather, he is still with Ansar al-Islam. American officials declined to comment.

The Kurdish intelligence officials told me that they have Al Qaeda members in custody, and they introduced me to another prisoner, a young Iraqi Arab named Haqi Ismail, whom they described as a middle-to high-ranking member of Al Qaeda. He was, they said, captured by the peshmerga as he tried to get into Kurdistan three weeks after the start of the American attack on Afghanistan. Ismail, they said, comes from a Mosul family with deep connections to the Mukhabarat; his uncle is the top Mukhabarat official in the south of Iraq. They said they believe that Haqi Ismail is a liaison between Saddam's intelligence service and Al Qaeda.

Ismail wore slippers and a blanket around his shoulders. He was ascetic in appearance and, at the same time, ostentatiously smug. He appeared to be amused by the presence of an American. He told the investigators that he would not talk to the C.I.A. The Kurdish investigators laughed and said they wished that I were from the C.I.A.

Ismail said that he was once a student at the University of Mosul but grew tired of life in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Luckily, he said, in 1999 he met an Afghan man who persuaded him to seek work in Afghanistan. The Kurdish investigators smiled as Ismail went on to say that he found himself in Kandahar, then in Kabul, and then somehow—here he was exceedingly vague—in an Al Qaeda camp. When I asked him how enrollment in an Al Qaeda camp squared with his wish to seek work in Afghanistan, he replied, "Being a soldier is a job." After his training, he said, he took a post in the Taliban Foreign Ministry. I asked him if he was an employee of Saddam's intelligence service. "I prefer not to talk about that," he replied.

Later, I asked, the Kurdish officials if they believed that Saddam provides aid to Al Qaeda affiliated terror groups or simply maintains channels of communication with them. It was getting late, and the room was growing even colder. "Come back tomorrow," the senior official in the room said, "and we'll introduce you to someone who will answer that question."

#### 7. THE AL QAEDA LINK

The man they introduced me to the next afternoon was a twenty-nine-year-old Iranian Arab, a smuggler and bandit from the city of Ahvaz. The intelligence officials told me that his most recent employer was bin Laden. When they arrested him, last year, they said, they found a roll of film in his possession. They had the film developed, and the photographs, which they showed me, depicted their prisoner murdering a man with a knife, slicing his ear off and then plunging the knife into the top of the man's head.

The Iranian had a thin face, thick black hair, and a mustache; he wore an army jacket, sandals, and Western-style sweatpants. Speaking in an almost casual tone, he told me that he was born in 1973, that his real name was Muhammad Mansour Shahab, and that he had been a smuggler most of his adult life.

"I met a group of drug traffickers," he said. "They gave us drugs and we got them weapons," which they took from Iran into Afghanistan. In 1996, he met an Arab Afghan. "His name was Othman," the man went on. "He gave me drugs, and I got him a hundred and fifty Kalashnikovs. Then he said to me, 'You should come visit Afghanistan.' So we went to Afghanistan in 1996. We stayed for a while, I came back, did a lot of smuggling jobs. My brother-in-law tried to send weapons to Afghanistan, but the Iranians ambushed us. I killed some of the Iranians."

He soon returned with Othman to Afghanistan, where, he said, Othman gave him the name Muhammad Jawad to use while he was there. "Othman said to me, 'You will meet Sheikh Osama soon.' We were in Kandahar. One night, they gave me a sleeping pill. We got into a car and we drove for an hour and a half into the mountains. We went to a tent they said was Osama's tent." The man now called Jawad did not meet Osama bin Laden that night. "They said to me, 'You're the guy who killed the Iranian officer.' Then they said they needed information about me, my real name. They told Othman to take me back to Kandahar and hold me in jail for twenty-one days while they investigated me."

The Al Qaeda men completed their investigation and called him back to the mountains. "They told me that Osama said I should work with them," Jawad said. "They told me to bring my wife to Afghanistan." They made him swear on a Koran that he would never betray them. Jawad said that he became one of Al Qaeda's principal weapons smugglers. Iraqi opposition sources told me that the Baghdad regime frequently smuggled weapons to Al Qaeda by air through

Dubai to Pakistan and then overland into Afghanistan. But Jawad told me that the Iraqis often used land routes through Iran as well. Othman ordered him to establish a smuggling route across the Iraq-Iran border. The smugglers would pose as shepherds to find the best routes. "We started to go into Iraq with the sheep and cows," Jawad told me, and added that they initiated this route by smuggling tape recorders from Iraq to Iran. They opened a store, a front, in Ahvaz, to sell electronics, "just to establish relationships with smugglers."

One day in 1999, Othman got a message to Jawad, who was then in Iran. He was to smuggle himself across the Iraqi border at Fao, where a car would meet him and take him to a village near Tikrit, the headquarters of Saddam Hussein's clan. Jawad was then taken to a meeting at the house of a man called Luay, whom he described as the son of Saddam's father-in-law, Khayr Allah Talfah. (Professor Baram, who has long followed Saddam's family, later told me he believes that Luay, who is about forty years old, is close to Saddam's inner circle.) At the meeting, with Othman present, Mukhabarat officials instructed Jawad to go to Baghdad, where he was to retrieve several canisters filled with explosives. Then, he said, he was to arrange to smuggle the explosives into Iran, where they would be used to kill anti-Iraqi activists. After this assignment was completed, Jawad said, he was given a thousand Kalashnikov rifles by Iraqi intelligence and told to smuggle them into Afghanistan.

A year later, there was a new development: Othman told Jawad to smuggle several dozen refrigerator motors into Afghanistan for the Iraqi Mukhabarat; a canister filled with liquid was attached to each motor. Jawad said that he asked Othman for more information. "I said, 'Othman, what does this contain?' He said, 'My life and your life.' He said they—the Iraqi agents—were going to kill us if we didn't do this. That's all I'll say."

"I was given a book of dollars," Jawad went on, meaning ten thousand dollars—a hundred American hundred-dollar bills. "I was told to arrange to smuggle the motors. Othman told me to kill any of the smugglers who helped us once we got there." Vehicles belonging to the Taliban were waiting at the border, and Jawad said that he turned over the liquid-filled refrigerator motors to the Taliban, and then killed the smugglers who had helped him.

Jawad said that he had no idea what liquid was inside the motors, but he assumed that it was some type of chemical or biological weapon. I asked the Kurdish officials who remained in the room if they believed that, as late as 2000, the Mukhabarat was transferring chemical or biological weapons to Al Qaeda. They spoke carefully. "We have no idea what was in the canisters," the senior official said. "This is something that is worth an American investigation."

When I asked Jawad to tell me why he worked for Al Qaeda, he replied, "Money." He would not say how much money he had been paid, but he suggested that it was quite a bit. I had one more question: How many years has Al Qaeda maintained a relationship with Saddam Hussein's regime? "There's been a relationship between the Mukhabarat and the people of Al Qaeda since 1992," he replied.

Carole O'Leary, a Middle Eastern expert at American University, in Washington, and a specialist on the Kurds, said it is likely that Saddam would seek an alliance with Islamic terrorists to serve his own interests. "I know that there are Mukhabarat agents throughout Kurdistan," O'Leary said, and went on, "One way the Mukhabarat could destabilize the Kurdish experiment in democracy is to link up with Islamic radical groups. Their in-

terests dovetail completely. They both have much to fear from the democratic, secular experiment of the Kurds in the safe haven, and they both obviously share a hatred for America."

#### 8. THE PRESENT DANGER

A paradox of life in northern Iraq is that, while hundreds, perhaps thousands, of children suffer from the effects of chemical attacks, the child-mortality rate in the Kurdish zone has improved over the past ten years. Prime Minister Salih credits this to, of all things, sanctions placed on the Iraqi regime by the United Nations after the Gulf War because of Iraq's refusal to dismantle its nonconventional-weapons program. He credits in particular the program begun in 1997, known as oil-for-food, which was meant to mitigate the effects of sanctions on civilians by allowing the profits from Iraq oil sales to buy food and medicine. Calling this program a "fantastic concept," Salih said, "For the first time in our history, Iraqi citizens—all citizens—are insured a portion of the country's oil wealth. The north is a testament to the success of the program. Oil is sold and food is bought."

I asked Salih to respond to the criticism, widely aired in the West, that the sanctions have led to the death of thousands of children. "Sanctions don't kill Iraqi children," he said. "The regime kills children."

This puzzled me. If it was true, then why were the victims of the gas attacks still suffering from a lack of health care? Across Kurdistan, in every hospital I visited, the complaints were the same: no CT scans, no MRIS, no pediatric surgery, no advanced diagnostic equipment, not even surgical gloves. I asked Salih why the money designated by the U.N. for the Kurds wasn't being used for advanced medical treatment. The oil-for-food program has one enormous flaw, he replied. When the program was introduced, the Kurds were promised thirteen per cent of the country's oil revenue, but because of the terms of the agreement between Baghdad and the U.N.—a "defect," Salih said—the government controls the flow of food, medicine, and medical equipment to the very people it slaughtered. Food does arrive, he conceded, and basic medicines as well, but at Saddam's pace.

On this question of the work of the United Nations and its agencies, the rival Kurdish parties agree. "We've been asking for a four-hundred-bed hospital for Sulaimaniya for three years," said Nerchivan Barzani, the Prime Minister of the region controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Party, and Salih's counterpart. Sulaimaniya is in Salih's territory, but in this case geography doesn't matter. "It's our money," Barzani said. "But we need the approval of the Iraqis. They get to decide. The World Health Organization is taking its orders from the Iraqis. It's crazy."

Barzani and Salih accused the World Health Organization, in particular, of rewarding with lucrative contracts only companies favored by Saddam. "Every time I interact with the U.N.," Salih said, "I think, My God, Jesse Helms is right. If the U.N. can't help us, this poor, dispossessed Muslim nation, then who is it for?"

Many Kurds believe that Iraq's friends in the U.N. system, particularly members of the Arab bloc, have worked to keep the Kurds' cause from being addressed. The Kurds face an institutional disadvantage at the U.N., where, unlike the Palestinians, they have not even been granted official observer status. Salih grew acerbic: "Compare us to other liberation movements around the world. We are very mature. We don't engage in terror. We don't condone extremist nationalist notions that can only burden our people. Please compare what we have

achieved in the Kurdistan national-authority areas to the Palestinian national authority of Mr. Arafat. We have spent the last ten years building a secular, democratic society, a civil society. What has he built?"

Last week, in New York, I met with Benon Sevan, the United Nations undersecretary-general who oversees the oil-for-food program. He quickly let me know that he was unmoved by the demands of the Kurds. "If they had a theme song, it would be 'Give Me, Give Me, Give Me,'" Sevan said. "I'm getting fed up with their complaints. You can tell them that." He said that under the oil-for-food program the "three northern governorates"—U.N. officials avoid the word "Kurdistan"—have been allocated billions of dollars in goods and services. "I don't know if they've ever had it so good," he said.

I mentioned the Kurds' complaint that they have been denied access to advanced medical equipment, and he said, "Nobody prevents them from asking. They should go ask the World Health Organization"—which reports to Sevan on matters related to Iraq. When I told Sevan that the Kurds have repeatedly asked the W.H.O., he said, "I'm not going to pass judgment on the W.H.O." As the interview ended, I asked Sevan about the morality of allowing the Iraqi regime to control the flow of food and medicine into Kurdistan. "Nobody's innocent," he said. "Please don't talk about morals with me."

When I went to Kurdistan in January to report on the 1988 genocide of the Kurds, I did not expect to be sidetracked by a debate over U.N. sanctions. And I certainly didn't expect to be sidetracked by crimes that Saddam is committing against the Kurds now—in particular—"nationality correction," the law that Saddam's security services are using to implement a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Large-scale operations against the Kurds in Kirkuk, a city southeast of Erbil, and in other parts of Iraqi Kurdistan under Saddam's control, have received scant press attention in the West; there have been few news accounts and no Security Council condemnations drafted in righteous anger.

Saddam's security services have been demanding that Kurds "correct" their nationality by signing papers to indicate that their birth records are false—that they are in fact Arab. Those who don't sign have their property seized. Many have been evicted, often to Kurdish-controlled regions, to make room for Arab families. According to both the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, more than a hundred thousand Kurds have been expelled from the Kirkuk area over the past two years.

Nationality correction is one technique that the Baghdad regime is using in an overall "Arabization" campaign, whose aim is to replace the inhabitants of Kurdish cities, especially the oil-rich Kirkuk, with Arabs from central and southern Iraq, and even, according to persistent reports, with Palestinians. Arabization is not new, Peter Galbraith, a professor at the National Defense University and a former senior adviser to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says. Galbraith has monitored Saddam's anti-Kurdish activities since before the Gulf War. "It's been going on for twenty years," he told me. "Maybe it's picked up speed, but it is certainly nothing new. To my mind, it's part of a larger process that has been under way for many years, and is aimed at reducing the territory occupied by the Kurds and at destroying rural Kurdistan."

"This is the apotheosis of cultural genocide," said Saedi Barzinji, the president of Salahaddin University, in Erbil, who is a human-rights lawyer and Massoud Barzani's legal adviser. Barzinji and other Kurdish leaders believe that Saddam is trying to set up a buffer zone between Arab Iraq and

Kurdistan, just in case the Kurds win their independence. To help with this, Barzinji told me last month, Saddam is trying to rewrite Kirkuk's history, to give it an "Arab" past. If Kurds, Barzinji went on, "don't change their ethnic origin, they are given no food rations, no positions in government, no right to register the names of their new babies. In the last three to four weeks, hospitals have been ordered, the maternity wards ordered, not to register any Kurdish name." New parents are "obliged to choose an Arab name." Barzinji said that the nationality-correction campaign extends even to the dead. "Saddam is razing the grave-stones, erasing the past, putting in new ones with Arab names," he said. "He wants to show that Kirkuk has always been Arab."

Some of the Kurds crossing the demarcation line between Saddam's forces and the Kurdish zone, it is said, are not being expelled but are fleeing for economic reasons. But in camps across Kurdistan I met refugees who told me stories of visits from the secret police in the middle of the night.

Many of the refugees from Kirkuk live in tent camps built on boggy fields. I visited one such camp at Beneslaw, not far from Erbil, where the mud was so thick that it nearly pulled off my shoes. The people at the camp—several hundred, according to two estimates I heard—are ragged and sick. A man named Howar told me that his suffering could not have been avoided even if he had agreed to change his ethnic identity.

"When you agree to change your nationality, the police write on your identity documents 'second-degree Arab,' which they know means Kurd," he told me. "So they always know you're a Kurd." (In a twist characteristic of Saddam's regime, Kurdish leaders told me, Kurds who agree to "change" their nationality are fined for having once claimed falsely to be Kurdish.)

Another refugee, Shawqat Hamid Muhammad, said that her son had gone to jail for two months for having a photograph of Mustafa Barzani in his possession. She said that she and her family had been in the Beneslaw camp for two months. "The police came and knocked on our door and told us we have to leave Kirkuk," she said. "We had to rent a truck to take our things out. We were given one day to leave. We have no idea who is in our house." Another refugee, a man named Ibrahim Jamil, wandered over to listen to the conversation. "The Arabs are winning Kirkuk," he said. "Soon the only people there will be Arabs, and Kurds who call themselves Arabs. They say we should be Arab. But I'm a Kurd. It would be easier for me to die than be an Arab. How can I not be a Kurd?"

Peter Galbraith told me that in 1987 he witnessed the destruction of Kurdish villages and cemeteries—"anything, that was related to Kurdish identity," he said. "This was one of the factors that led me to conclude that it is a policy of genocide, a crime of intent, destroying a group whole or in part."

#### 9. IRAQ'S ARMS RACE

In a series of meetings in the summer and fall of 1995, Charles Duelfer, the deputy executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission, or UNSCOM—the now defunct arms-inspection team—met in Baghdad with Iraqi government delegations. The subject was the status of Iraq's nonconventional-weapons programs, and Duelfer, an American diplomat on loan to the United Nations, was close to a breakthrough.

In early August, Saddam's son-in-law Hussein Kamel had defected to Jordan, and had then spoken publicly about Iraq's offensive biological, chemical, and nuclear capabilities. (Kamel later returned to Iraq and was killed almost immediately, on his father-in-

law's orders.) The regime's credibility was badly damaged by Kamel's revelations, and during these meetings the Iraqi representatives decided to tell Duelfer and his team more than they had ever revealed before. "This was the first time Iraq actually agreed to discuss the Presidential origins of these programs," Duelfer recalled. Among the most startling admissions made by the Iraqi scientists was that they had weaponized the biological agent aflatoxin.

Aflatoxin, which is produced from types of fungi that occur in moldy grains, is the biological agent that some Kurdish physicians suspect was mixed with chemical weapons and dropped on Kurdistan. Christine Gosden, the English geneticist, told me, "There is absolutely no forensic evidence whatsoever that aflatoxins have ever been used in northern Iraq, but this may be because no systematic testing has been carried out in the region, to my knowledge."

Duelfer told me, "We kept pressing the Iraqis to discuss the concept of use for aflatoxin. We learned that the origin of the biological-weapons program is in the security services, not in the military—meaning that it really came out of the assassinations program." The Iraqis, Duelfer said, admitted something else: they had loaded aflatoxin into two Scud-ready warheads, and also mixed aflatoxin with tear gas. They wouldn't say why.

In an op-ed article that Duelfer wrote for the Los Angeles Times last year about Iraqi programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, he offered this hypothesis: "If a regime wished to conceal a biological attack, what better way than this? Victims would suffer the short-term effects of inhaling tear gas and would assume that this was the totality of the attack: Subsequent cancers would not be linked to the prior event."

United Nations inspectors were alarmed to learn about the aflatoxin program. Richard Spertzel, the chief biological-weapons inspector for UNSCOM, put it this way: "It is a devilish weapon. Iraq was quite clearly aware of the long-term carcinogenic effect of aflatoxin. Aflatoxin can only do one thing—destroy people's livers. And I suspect that children are more susceptible. From a moral standpoint, aflatoxin is the cruellest weapon—it means watching children die slowly of liver cancer."

Spertzel believes that if aflatoxin were to be used as a weapon it would not be delivered by a missile. "Aflatoxin is a little tricky," he said. "I don't know if a single dose at one point in time is going to give you the long-term effects. Continuous, repeated exposure—through food—would be more effective." When I asked Spertzel if other countries have weaponized aflatoxin, he replied, "I don't know any other country that did it. I don't know any country that would."

It is unclear what biological and chemical weapons Saddam possesses today. When he maneuvered UNSCOM out of his country in 1998, weapons inspectors had found a sizable portion of his arsenal but were vexed by what they couldn't find. His scientists certainly have produced and weaponized anthrax, and they have manufactured botulinum toxin, which causes muscular paralysis and death. They've made Clostridium perfringens, a bacterium that causes gas gangrene, a condition in which the flesh rots. They have also made wheat-cover smut, which can be used to poison crops, and ricin, which, when absorbed into the lungs, causes hemorrhagic pneumonia.

According to Gary Milhollin, the director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, whose Iraq Watch project monitors Saddam's weapons capabilities, inspectors could not account for a great deal of weaponry believed to be in Iraq's possession, in-

cluding almost four tons of the nerve agent VX; six hundred tons of ingredients for VX; as much as three thousand tons of other poison-gas agents; and at least five hundred and fifty artillery shells filled with mustard gas. Nor did the inspectors find any stores of aflatoxin.

Saddam's motives are unclear, too. For the past decade, the development of these weapons has caused nothing but trouble for him; his international isolation grows not from his past crimes but from his refusal to let weapons inspectors dismantle his nonconventional-weapons programs. When I asked the Iraqi dissident Kanan Makiya why Saddam is so committed to these programs, he said, "I think this regime developed a very specific ideology associated with power, and how to extend that power, and these weapons play a very important psychological and political part." Makiya added, "They are seen as essential to the security and longevity of the regime."

Certainly, the threat of another Halabja has kept Iraq's citizens terrorized and compliant. Amatzia Baram, the Iraq expert at the University of Haifa, told me that in 1999 Iraqi troops in white biohazard suits suddenly surrounded the Shiite holy city of Karbala, in southern Iraq, which has been the scene of frequent uprisings against Saddam. (The Shiites make up about sixty percent of Iraq's population, and the regime is preoccupied with the threat of another rebellion.) The men in the white suits did nothing; they just stood there. "But the message was clear," Baram said. "What we did to the Kurds in Halabja we can do to you." It's a very effective psychological weapon. From the information I saw, people were really panicky. They ran into their homes and shut their windows. It worked extremely well."

Saddam's weapons of mass destruction clearly are not meant solely for domestic use. Several years ago in Baghdad, Richard Butler, who was then the chairman of UNSCOM, fell into conversation with Tariq Aziz, Saddam's confidant and Iraq's deputy Prime Minister. Butler asked Aziz to explain the rationale for Iraq's biological-weapons project, and he recalled Aziz's answer: "He said, 'We made bioweapons in order to deal with the Persians and the Jews.'"

Iraqi dissidents agree that Iraq's programs to build weapons of mass destruction are focussed on Israel. "Israel is the whole game," Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, told me. "Saddam is always saying publicly, 'Who is going to fire the fortieth missile?'"—a reference to the thirty-nine Scud missiles he fired at Israel during the Gulf War. "He thinks he can kill one hundred thousand Israelis in a day with biological weapons." Chalabi added, "This is the only way he can be Saladin"—the Muslim hero who defeated the Crusaders. Students of Iraq and its government generally agree that Saddam would like to project himself as a leader of all the Arabs, and that the one sure way to do that is by confronting Israel.

In the Gulf War, when Saddam attacked Israel, he was hoping to provoke an Israeli response, which would drive America's Arab friends out of the allied coalition. Today, the experts say, Saddam's desire is to expel the Jews from history. In October of 2000, at an Arab summit in Cairo, I heard the vice-chairman of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council, a man named Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, deliver a speech on Saddam's behalf, saying, "Jihad alone is capable of liberating Palestine and the rest of the Arab territories occupied by dirty Jews in their distorted Zionist entity."

Amatzia Baram said, "Saddam can absolve himself of all sins in the eyes of the Arab and Muslim worlds by bringing Israel to its knees. He not only wants to be a hero in his

own press, which already recognizes him as a Saladin, but wants to make sure that a thousand years from now children in the fourth grade will know that he is the one who destroyed Israel."

It is no comfort to the Kurds that the Jews are now Saddam's main preoccupation. The Kurds I spoke with, even those who agree that Saddam is aiming, his remaining Scuds at Israel, believe that he is saving some of his "special weapons"—a popular euphemism inside the Iraqi regime for a return visit to Halabja. The day I visited the Kalak Bridge, which divides the Kurds from the Iraqi Army's Jerusalem brigade, I asked Muhammad Najar, the local official, why the brigade was not facing west, toward its target. "The road to Jerusalem," he replied, "goes through Kurdistan."

A few weeks ago, after my return from Iraq, I stopped by the Israeli Embassy in Washington to see the Ambassador, David Ivry. In 1981, Ivry, who then led Israel's Air Force, commanded Operation Opera, the strike against the Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad. The action was ordered by Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who believed that by hitting the reactor shortly before it went online he could stop Iraq from building an atomic bomb. After the attack, Israel was condemned for what the Times called "inexcusable and short-sighted aggression." Today, though, Israel's action is widely regarded as an act of muscular arms control. "In retrospect, the Israeli strike bought us a decade," Gary Milhollin, of the Wisconsin Project, said. "I think if the Israelis had not hit the reactor the Iraqis would have had bombs by 1990"—the year Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Today, a satellite photograph of the Osirak site hangs on a wall in Ivry's office. The inscription reads, "For General David Ivry—With thanks and appreciation for the outstanding job he did on the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981, which made our job much easier in Desert Storm." It is signed "Dick Cheney."

"Preemption is always a positive," Ivry said.

Saddam Hussein never gave up his hope of turning Iraq into a nuclear power. After the Osirak attack, he rebuilt, redoubled his efforts, and dispersed his facilities. Those who have followed Saddam's progress believe that no single strike today would eradicate his nuclear program. I talked about this prospect last fall with August Hanning, the chief of the B.N.D., the German intelligence agency, in Berlin. We met in the new glass-and-steel Chancellery, overlooking the renovated Reichstag.

The Germans have a special interest in Saddam's intentions. German industry is well represented in the ranks of foreign companies that have aided Saddam's nonconventional-weapons programs, and the German government has been publicly regretful. Hanning told me that his agency had taken the lead in exposing the companies that helped Iraq build a poison-gas factory at Samarra. The Germans also feel, for the most obvious reasons, a special responsibility to Israel's security, and this, too, motivates their desire to expose Iraq's weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. Hanning is tall, thin, and almost translucently white. He is sparing with words, but he does not equivocate. "It is our estimate that Iraq will have an atomic bomb in three years," he said.

There is some debate among arms-control experts about exactly when Saddam will have nuclear capabilities. But there is no disagreement that Iraq, if unchecked, will have them soon, and a nuclear-armed Iraq would alter forever the balance of power in the Middle East. "The first thing that occurs

to any military planner is force protection," Charles Duelfer told me. "If your assessment of the threat is chemical or biological, you can get individual protective equipment and warning systems. If you think he's going to use a nuclear weapon, where are you going to concentrate your forces?"

There is little doubt what Saddam might do with an atomic bomb or with his stocks of biological and chemical weapons. When I talked about Saddam's past with the medical geneticist Christine Gosden, she said, "Please understand, the Kurds were for practice."

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. BORSKI).

(Mr. BORSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution.

We in Congress must stand behind the President in granting him the authority to use military force against Iraq. The only chance to prevent war is to be prepared to go to war. We will not rush to war, but we cannot stand by while Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program poses a growing threat to our national security. Over the past few weeks, many have voiced a number of questions, including why we must take action at this moment, how long our armed forces may be in Iraq, and what the humanitarian, economic, and political costs of a military response may be. These are all valid concerns and questions I have considered. Ultimately, we must decide whether the threats we face merit the risk of American lives. The consequences of this vote are serious, and I have not had to make a more difficult decision in my 20 years in Congress. I believe that support for this resolution will send a strong, decisive signal to Saddam Hussein that his continued violation of U.N. Security Resolutions will not be tolerated.

This vote is evidence that the challenges we face today are unique in the context of our history. We as a nation, could not have prevented the horrific acts of September 11th and I witnessed the destruction firsthand, at both the World Trade Center and at the Pentagon. Because of the events of September 11th, we cannot wait to act on a threat to our nation and to the American people, lest we allow ourselves to be victims once again. We are faced with a situation in which the lessons of history speak clearly of danger, and we face a threat unlike any other in history. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has proven himself to be a ruthless and unpredictable enemy, and even the slightest threat posed by his regime is one that we are unable to ignore without great risk to our national security. The world has come to know a long and terrible list of grievances against Saddam Hussein, including the brutal repression and torture of his political opponents, the use of chemical weapons against his own people, and his tireless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. It is this record of brutality and tendency toward violence that should focus our attention on Iraq. Intelligence reports from both the United States and Great Britain highlight Iraq's relentless drive to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and there is mounting evidence that

Saddam Hussein is only 1–5 years away from nuclear weapons capability. Knowing that containment and deterrence are ineffective against the Iraqi regime, we have no choice. Knowing that Saddam Hussein has consistently violated United Nations resolutions we must act. We must act in a timely fashion to avoid the possibility that Saddam Hussein will use these weapons or that he would transfer these weapons to a terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda, which would not hesitate to use them against us. We cannot wait to protect ourselves until it is too late to do so. Now more than ever we must be proactive to protect Americans, our country, and our way of life.

In 1991, after the United States and United Nations had demonstrated a willingness to peacefully resolve the crisis that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and after Saddam Hussein refused to comply with several U.N. Security Council Resolutions, I cast my vote in favor of military action against Iraq. I voted for the resolution then because I believed that my support would help demonstrate that Congress, the President, and the American people stand together against Saddam Hussein's defiance.

Since the Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein has repeatedly demonstrated his disdain for the authority of international law by defying U.N. Security Council Resolutions that were designed to ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and security. Inspections and sanctions have both failed in the past to address the threat posed by Iraq. We should work toward a viable U.N. Security Council Resolution and build an international coalition to support action to dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. If we do take military action with such broad support, it will not set a precedent for preemption, but will boldly state the necessity for any future disputes to be resolved first through diplomatic channels.

I firmly believe that diplomatic efforts should precede any military action before we commit our men and women to fight for peace and justice. At a recent briefing, Secretary of State Colin Powell assured me that every effort is being made to reach an agreement on a U.N. Security Council Resolution, so that if we act, we will not act alone. Military power must not be the basis of our strategy, but should be one of many options we have at our disposal. It is my hope that we will do all that we can to avoid armed conflict, but should we engage, we will do so to promote peace and protect our national security.

Our unity in this vote will deliver a message to the international community that we as Americans share the belief that the threat we face is real, and that our cause is just. It is my hope that this vote is the first step toward increased peace and stability in the Middle East and a more secure future for the United States and for the world.

I believe that a strong vote in favor of this resolution will prompt the American people, the United Nations, and the international community to join in support of action to neutralize the threat that is posed by Saddam Hussein and the proliferation of his program of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Speaker, a few years ago, when my youngest daughter, Maggie, was only 5 years old, she was here with my family for the swearing-in ceremony for Members of the

House. Members were then casting their votes for our party leadership, and I tried to test her by asking her if we were Republicans or Democrats. "We're Americans, aren't we Dad?" was her reply. This is how I believe we, as Members of Congress, should view this vote. All of us want the best for the American people and I hope that partisanship can be put aside for the moment, as each of us vote our conscience. We have come together as a nation since September 11th, and we still must remain unified in the face of any threat to our nation. I urge a vote in favor of this resolution.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. COSTELLO).

(Mr. COSTELLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I stand in opposition to this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, the most important and difficult decision a Member of Congress must make is the decision to send our troops—our sons, daughters, husbands and wives—in harm's way.

Each member must do as I have done—listen to the arguments on both sides of the issue, assemble and review all available information and then do what they believe is in the best interest of our nation.

Some people have questioned the President's motives and the timing of this resolution. A few members of this body traveled to Baghdad to meet with officials of the government of Iraq.

Frankly, I was appalled to see a Member of the Congress from my party in Baghdad questioning the motives of President Bush. I do not question the President's motives. I believe the President is doing what he believes is in the best interest of our nation.

After much thought and deliberation, I have decided to vote against the resolution before us giving the President the discretion to send our troops to war in Iraq. I do so for the following reasons:

First, I believe we have a moral obligation and a responsibility to exhaust every possible resolution before sending our troops into harm's way. I do not believe that we have attempted to assemble an international coalition similar to the coalition that President George Herbert Walker Bush brought together to undertake the mission of Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990–1991.

Second, Iraq does not present a direct immediate threat to the United States. I have attended numerous briefings from the Bush administration on this topic, and I have yet to hear a good explanation as to why Saddam Hussein is a greater threat to us today than he was six months or a year ago. In fact, our intelligence agencies have concluded that Saddam Hussein is unlikely to attack the United States unprovoked, but there is a real change that Saddam Hussein will use weapons of mass destruction in response to an invasion.

Last and more importantly, the President's decision to change our military doctrine from containment to preemptive action could have major ramifications to the United States and may lead to war between other countries.

For the past 50 years, the United States has used our military troops to contain aggression against the U.S. and our allies. We have been able to persuade our allies to use restraint instead of their military under the most difficult circumstances and times. During the Persian Gulf war, the U.S. was able to persuade Israel to show great restraint while Saddam Hussein was deploying scud missiles toward Israel. Since the Persian Gulf war, the Israelis at the request of the United States have shown restraint in dealing with Arafat and the PLO.

If the U.S. military attacks a country in order to counter a perceived future security risk, other countries may very well adopt the same preemptive policy. Those countries are more likely to follow the U.S. and less likely to show restraint, with serious potential consequences for Israel and the Palestinians, India and Pakistan, Russia and Chechnya, China and Taiwan, and the list goes on.

Secretary Colin Powell recently reminded us that other countries look to the United States for our leadership and example. I agree! I only hope that when looking to the United States that they do not adopt the new preemptive military policy and use that same policy against their enemies.

Mr. Speaker, this administration should follow the example of the President's father prior to Desert Shield and during Desert Storm. We should be putting together an international coalition to send in weapon inspectors and if necessary take military action to disarm Saddam Hussein. A "go it alone" attitude or policy could have devastating consequences on our troops, the people of Israel and other parts of the world.

Mr. Speaker, therefore, I will vote against this resolution and in favor of the Spratt substitute.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. STUPAK), a distinguished member of the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

(Mr. STUPAK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Speaker, we are being asked to commit our young servicemen and women to a possible war in Iraq. It is important for everyone to understand the gravity of this vote and the legal, ethical and moral grounds for such a grave commitment of U.S. lives and resources.

To date, I have received nearly 900 communications opposed to the United States acting unilaterally against Iraq and approximately 16 communications in support of the President's position. No matter what the result of the vote on each proposed resolution, I am confident that every Member will rally around our brave young servicemen and women if or when they are committed to hostile action in Iraq or anywhere else in the world.

Over the past few weeks, I have attended classified briefings on Capitol Hill, at the Pentagon, and with the President. In reflecting upon the views, opinions, and concerns expressed by my constituents, and after a thorough review of international law, it is clear that war with another country should only be declared if your country is directly attacked; if another nation is an accomplice in the attack on your country; if there is an immediate pending attack on your country; and, finally, if there is defiance of international law in the community.

To rush headlong into war without world support under any one of these four conditions violates every principle and every ideal on which this great Nation is founded and on which a free and democratic world exists.

In review of these four principles, there is no question that Iraq did not directly attack America. The evidence is also clear that Iraq was not an accomplice with the al Qaeda attacks on America. If there was any complicity by Iraq and Saddam Hussein, I am confident the President would have addressed this complicity in his U.N. address or in Monday's speech to the American people. In the classified briefings, no one could document with any certainty Iraq's complicity in the attacks on America.

There is no dispute that Iraq is not an immediate imminent military threat to the United States at this time. Some people would argue Saddam Hussein will give biological, chemical or nuclear weapons when obtained to terrorist groups, but there has been no credible evidence provided to House Members of these weapons being supplied to terrorists.

Individuals may still argue that we must assume that Iraq must have an accomplice with the al Qaeda attacks of September 11. If we wish to make this assumption, and it is only an assumption, not fact, then the President already has the authority to use "all necessary and appropriate force against Iraq." If Saddam Hussein and Iraq are directly or indirectly responsible in any way with the attacks of September 11, the President has the authorization to take whatever means necessary to bring them to justice. The authority was given to the President just 3 days after the cowardly attacks on our country.

The link between the September 11 attacks and Saddam Hussein is so tangential even the President cannot justify military action against Saddam Hussein and Iraq based on complicity.

The strongest claim for military action against Iraq is its continued defiance of international law since the 1991



Gulf War cease-fire. It is on this principle that President Bush went to the U.N. to seek their approval to use the U.S. military to enforce U.N. resolutions against Iraq. The legal, ethical and moral justification to get rid of Saddam Hussein and invade Iraq is enforcement of international law, the U.N. resolutions.

The United States has never invoked a first strike invasion of another nation based on a fear of what might happen tomorrow. Now is not the time for a first strike policy based on fear, but let us strike with the support of the U.N. Security Council resolutions, with

a multinational force to once and for all rid the world of Saddam Hussein.

If we now allow the U.S. military to invade a nation or change a regime because of fear, then the goals of terrorism have been accomplished. If we allow the U.S. to become a first-strike nation in the name of defeating terrorism because of the possibility of future terrorist attacks, this opens the world to a Pandora's box of selected conflicts around the world. The U.S. would lose its moral, ethical and legal grounds and its stature to protest or to prevent, for example, Russia from invading Georgia to hunt down Chechnya

rebels, Pakistan from invading India, or China from invading Taiwan.

In our world, terrorism would now be defined and determined by the aggressor nation. The United States would lose its legal and moral ability to protest, as it did in 1979, the Soviet army's invasion of Afghanistan.

The situation in Iraq must be addressed, but we must not be seen as moving forward unilaterally, and we must not alienate our allies who support it and fought with us in the Persian Gulf War.

## NOTICE

*Incomplete record of House proceedings. Except for concluding business which follows, today's House proceedings will be continued in the next issue of the Record.*

### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 8 of rule XII, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

9573. A letter from the Administrator, Department of Agriculture, transmitting the Department's final rule — Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops Program (RIN: 0551-AA63) received October 7, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.

9574. A letter from the Secretary, Department of Labor, transmitting a bill entitled, "Black Lung Consolidation of Administrative Responsibilities Act"; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce.

9575. A letter from the Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Approval and Promulgation of State Plans For Designated Facilities and Pollutants: Massachusetts; Plan for Controlling MWC Emissions From Existing Large MWC Plants [MA-01-7203a; FRL-7387-5] received October 7, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

9576. A letter from the Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of Iowa [IA 154-1154a; FRL-7392-6] received October 7, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

9577. A letter from the Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Indiana [IN144-1a; FRL-7390-3] received October 7, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

9578. A letter from the Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; West Virginia; To Prevent and Control Air Pollution from the Operation of Hot Mix Asphalt Plants [WV 047-6021a; FRL-7391-3] received October 7, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

9579. A letter from the Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Approval and Promulgation

of Air Quality Implementation Plans; State of Utah; Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance Programs; Salt Lake County and General Requirements and Applicability [UT-001-0038, UT-001-0039, UT-001-0040; FRL-7262-2] received October 7, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

9580. A letter from the Principal Deputy Associate Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting the Agency's final rule — Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; New Hampshire; Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) of Air Quality Permit Requirements [NH-01-48-7174a; A-1-FRL-7376-5] received October 7, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

9581. A letter from the Senior Legal Advisor to the Media Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, transmitting the Commission's final rule — Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992; Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming Distribution: Section 628(c)(5) of the Communications Act; Sunset of Exclusive Contract Prohibition [CS Docket No. 01-290] received October 3, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

9582. A letter from the Senior Legal Advisor to the Bureau Chief, Media Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, transmitting the Commission's final rule — Amendment of Section 73.622(b), Table of Allotments, Digital Television Broadcast Stations (Fort Wayne, Indiana) [MB Docket No. 01-302, RM-10333] received October 8, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

9583. A letter from the Secretary of the Commission, Federal Trade Commission, transmitting the Commission's final rule — Rule Concerning Disclosures Regarding Energy Consumption and Water Use of Certain Home Appliances and Other Products Required Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act ("Appliance Labeling Rule") — received October 4, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

9584. A letter from the Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, transmitting the Commission's final rule — Specification of a Probability for Unlikely Features, Events and Processes (RIN: 3150-AG91) received October 7, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

9585. A letter from the Chairman and Co-Chairman, Congressional Executive Commission on China, transmitting the Commission's first 2002 annual report; to the Committee on International Relations.

9586. A letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, transmitting the Department's final rule — Schedule of Fees for Consular Services, Department of State and Overseas Embassies and Consulates — received October 7, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on International Relations.

9587. A letter from the Auditor, District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of a report entitled, "Mismanaged Special Education Payment System Vulnerable to Fraud, Waste and Abuse," pursuant to D.C. Code section 47-117(d); to the Committee on Government Reform.

9588. A letter from the Auditor, District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of a report entitled, "Certification of the Fiscal Year 2002 Revenue Projection in Support of the District's \$283,870,000 Multimodal General Obligation Bonds and Refunding Bonds," pursuant to D.C. Code section 47-117(d); to the Committee on Government Reform.

9589. A letter from the Executives Resources and Special Programs Division, Environmental Protection Agency, transmitting a report pursuant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998; to the Committee on Government Reform.

9590. A letter from the Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Atlantic Highly Migratory Species Fisheries; Atlantic Bluefin Tuna [I.D. 083002D] received October 8, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Resources.

9591. A letter from the Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Fisheries Off West Coast States and in the Western Pacific; Coastal Pelagic Species Fisheries; Closure of the Fishery for Pacific Sardine North of Pt. Piedras Blancas, CA [Docket No. 011218302-1302-01; 091202B] received October 7, 2002, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Resources.

9592. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Regulatory Programs, NMFS, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule — Stone Crab Fishery of the Gulf of Mexico; Amendment 7 [Docket