

of the room, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. NUSSLE), presented a budget on the floor that has held the line on discretionary spending. So we are going through the budget process under rules that I think need to be fixed. I want to fix them. I talked to the Speaker of the House yesterday about fixing them.

But under this budget resolution, the budget resolution that we are operating under, we cannot do anything about entitlements. We can only do something about discretionary spending. This supplemental spending bill that is before us this evening is somewhere between \$27.1 billion and a little over \$29 billion in supplemental discretionary spending. That is a good number, and we should vote for that and then work together on a bipartisan basis to reform the budget process later on so that we can do something about the larger issue.

Mr. Chairman, let us keep in mind that there is politics and there is policy. The policy embedded in this supplemental appropriation bill is a good policy. We should vote for it.

Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I have taken this time in order to discuss the schedule for the rest of the evening and, indeed, the rest of the week with the Members of this body.

Mr. Chairman, let me begin by apologizing to all the Members of this body. It had been my hope and my expectation that we would be able to complete our work for the week and our work on this bill this evening.

Given that expectation, which seemed reasonable at the time, it was me who advised so many of you to go ahead and make your travel plans so that you could return to your district work periods in your respective districts across the country as early as possible tomorrow. We are all anxious to get home to be with our families, to be with our constituents, and to take up that important work we have scheduled in our districts.

However, it seems that there are a large number of Members of the body that do not have that desire to get home, and have decided they would like to prolong this debate and discuss any number of matters. We could go on through the evening. We could work all night. But, Mr. Chairman, there would be nothing productive, worthwhile, or contributing to the well-being of this Nation if we spent our time in that way.

Far better, I would think, for us to go ahead and complete our work for the evening, rise from the committee, and then resume our work tomorrow. It being a Thursday, we will not be able to resume our work before 10 a.m. I can only make my commitment to the Members of the body that I and the other Members of the leadership, I am sure, on both sides of the aisle will do everything we can to work out whatever agreements might be possible so that we might be able to complete our

work at a reasonable time tomorrow, so that people might be able to reschedule their planes and their travel arrangements, and perhaps make it home by even possibly Friday for their district work period.

The distinguished chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. YOUNG), is a man of an extraordinary high ability and good heart, as is the distinguished ranking member, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. OBEY). I have every confidence that given the encouragement we might give these two gentlemen, we might find them capable of coming in tomorrow and working out an agreement between themselves and others who have amendments that might pend so that we can accommodate to the desire of the Members to complete this work.

I must say, however, that failure to arrive at these kinds of agreements would result in our staying through Friday, through Saturday, if necessary. I would hope that is not necessary. I know we all have family and constituents that we long to see. But this is about funding the war on terrorism and the security of this Nation. I am sure there is nobody in this body that wants to go home without completing this bill.

Mr. Chairman, while I will ask the Chairman of the Committee to rise from our work this evening and resume it in the morning, it is, again, as I said before, with my most sincere apology to all of the Members on both sides of the aisle who made travel plans based on my assurances that they will have to reschedule them, and it is my sincere hope and belief that we will be able to tell Members a timetable in the morning that will make it possible for them to reschedule in a manner that will be, let's say, accommodating to Members and their families and their travel plans.

I hope Members have a special evening. Let me just say as a final note, the Colorado Avalanche is winning tonight, so all is not lost.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. ISAKSON) having assumed the chair, Mr. THORNBERRY, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4775) making supplemental appropriations for further recovery from and response to terrorist attacks on the United States for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

COMMUNICATION FROM HONORABLE RICHARD K. ARMEY, MEMBER OF CONGRESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following commu-

nication from the Honorable RICHARD K. ARMEY, Member of Congress:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, May 21, 2002.

Hon. DENNIS J. HASTERT,
Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: This is to formally notify you, pursuant to Rule VIII of the Rules of the House, that I have determined that the subpoena for documents and testimony issued to me by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is not material and relevant, and may be inconsistent with the privileges and rights of the House. Accordingly, I have instructed the Office of General Counsel to object to and to move to quash the subpoena.

Sincerely,

RICHARD K. ARMEY,
Member of Congress.

COMMUNICATION FROM HONORABLE TOM DELAY, MEMBER OF CONGRESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Honorable TOM DELAY, Member of Congress:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, May 21, 2002.

Hon. DENNIS J. HASTERT,
Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: This is to formally notify you, pursuant to Rule VIII of the Rules of the House, that I have determined that the subpoena for documents and testimony issued to me by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is not material and relevant, and may be inconsistent with the privileges and rights of the House. Accordingly, I have instructed the Office of General Counsel to object to and to move to quash the subpoena.

Sincerely,

TOM DELAY,
Member of Congress.

INDEPENDENT COMMISSION NEEDED TO DETERMINE FACTS

(Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, evidence continues to mount that we suffered a major, major failure of intelligence prior to September 11.

Our colleague, Senator JOHN MCCAIN, writes in this morning's Washington Post that asking and urging and demanding answers by various agencies, the Federal Government failing to understand the enormity of the danger facing the United States is an obligation shared by all elected officials.

We were told in Newsweek earlier this week that even after the President asked, What is going on here, his intelligence advisors were unable to tease out the facts or decipher the information.

Mr. Speaker, that is why we need an independent commission. We need an independent commission to determine the facts.

Senator McCain goes on to say, "It is hardly a surprise that in a lively democracy, the partisan and institutional loyalties will influence both sides of an honest debate challenging and confronting Federal Government." That is all the more reason to consider impounding an independent commission of trustworthy and experienced statesmen who are not entirely devoid of partisan loyalties.

George Will, the columnist, then goes on to suggest such Americans as George Schultz, Sam Nunn, BOB GRAHAM, DICK LUGAR, Senator Danforth and others who can make up that commission. We owe it to this Nation. We owe it to the families of the victims of September 11.

[From the Washington Post]

THE WAY OUT

(By George F. Will)

"The best way out is always through."—Robert Frost.

The Bush administration is in a quandary which is, as Washington quandaries so often are, partly self-inflicted. There is only one way out of the growing—tardily growing; by no means grown too large—controversy about investigating intelligence inadequacies prior to Sept. 11. The way out for the administration is to go through an investigation, and not one conducted by itself.

Eleven days. That is how long it took President Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor to appoint a blue-ribbon commission, headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, to examine what was known, and what should have been, prior to Dec. 7, 1941.

More than 250 days have passed since Sept. 11. Last week, one of the most dispiriting in recent Washington history, the administration seemed surly and defensive regarding the inevitably rising tide of questions about governmental intelligence operations before the terrorist attacks.

Understandably, the administration was provoked by some Democrats' crassness in casting their questions in Watergate-era cadences—what did the president know and when did he know it? Actually, a blue-ribbon commission, concerning itself with all three branches of government, almost certainly would vindicate President Bush, who, after all, initiated the Aug. 6, 2001, briefing on the threat of al Qaeda operations in the United States.

The commission also would find that Congress has already begun correcting some problems—for example, belatedly funding modernization of FBI computers, more than 13,000 of which were too old to be compatible with crucial software last year. Given the rapid multiplication of new means of communication, from cell phones to the Internet, the commission should recommend revisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, passed in 1978. The commission should evaluate judicial standards of probable cause when law enforcement agencies seek wiretaps, access to computer hard drives and bank records, and other forms of surveillance covered by Fourth Amendment privacy protections.

The commission should be balanced between Republicans and Democrats but should have an even number of members to underscore the assumption that its proceedings are not expected to be internally adversarial, producing party-line votes and requiring a tie-breaker. A commission of sufficient prestige can perhaps impart to its recommendations momentum that will overwhelm the institutional rivalries that can

make national security a hostage to jurisdictional jealousies. So the co-chairman of the commission should be former secretary of state George Shultz and former senator Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat.

Shultz, who also was secretary of labor and of Treasury and was the first head of the Office of Management and Budget, has had more highlevel government experience than perhaps any American in history. And his memoir of his 6½ years running President Reagan's State Department, "Turmoil and Triumph," contains this laconic sentence: "Our knowledge of the Kremlin was thin, and the CIA, I found, was usually wrong about it." Nunn has a long-standing interest in a matter of increasing urgency: Russia's surplus nuclear weapons.

Sens. Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat, and Richard Lugar, the Indiana Republican, with considerable experience on the Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees respectively, can represent the legislative branch. Former senator Jack Danforth, the Missouri Republican, having conducted the investigation of the 1993 Waco disaster, understands investigating government misadventures. Former representative Lee Hamilton, the Indiana Democrat, served on the International Relations Committee for 34 years. Prof. Donald Kagan of Yale, author of "On the Origins of War," would bring a historian's understanding to the challenge of making retrospective judgments about events viewed through the lens of present knowledge. The eight and final member of the commission could be former senator Pat Moynihan. He was vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee—and in 1984 he resigned from it until CIA Director William Casey apologized for not informing the committee of CIA involvement in mining Nicaraguan harbors.

In his book "Secrecy: The American Experience," Moynihan says it is an iron law of institutions that the ration of unnecessary to necessary secrecy increases—including secrecy maintained by one part of the government against other parts. President Truman could have used the proof contained in intercepted messages between the Soviet Union and its agents in America, of espionage by Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs—but the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept it from him.

Secrecy renders societies susceptible to epidemics of suspicion. A blue-ribbon commission would be immunization against such an epidemic and preventive medicine against future failures. The administration and the nation need to go through it.

[From the Washington Post]

(By John McCain)

PROBE DEEP, AND FAIRLY

President Bush is a patriot. He responded forcefully to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11. And had he known that enemies of the United States were planning to seize four passenger aircraft and crash them into American buildings, I'm sure he would have done everything in his power to stop them. We can also safely assume that Vice President Cheney is a patriot, and a watchful guardian of our national security. That said, the government of the United States, which they now have the privilege of leading, failed the American people in the weeks, months and years leading up to Sept. 11.

The Sept. 11 attacks were incredibly depraved but not, as it turns out, unimaginable. As early as 1995, an accomplice of Ramiz Yousef revealed that the mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center attack intended to plant bombs on 12 U.S.-bound airliners and crash a light plane packed with explosives into CIA headquarters. The ac-

complice had trained as a pilot at three separate U.S. flight schools. In 1999 the Library of Congress prepared a report for the National Intelligence Council warning that al Qaeda suicide bombers "could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives" into the Pentagon, CIA or the White House.

Last July Kenneth Williams, an FBI field agent in Phoenix, suspected that terrorists had enrolled in an Arizona pilot training school. He urged the bureau to begin investigating whether other U.S. flight schools might be training terrorists to fly. A month later, FBI agents in Minnesota arrested flight school student Zacarias Moussaoui, whose lack of interest in learning how to land an aircraft had aroused the suspicions of his instructors, who dutifully alerted the FBI. It is uncertain how far up the chain of command suspicious about Moussaoui's intentions traveled. A week before Sept. 11, the FBI did notify the FAA of Moussaoui's arrest, his terrorist connections, and his interest in flying large commercial aircraft. The FAA chose not to share this rather pertinent information with the airlines.

Throughout last summer, CIA analysts were increasingly anxious that Osama bin Laden's operatives were planning imminent terrorist attacks against the United States and possibly planning to hijack planes in this country. The agency shared its concern with the president in August. Apparently no one from either the CIA or the FBI shared with the president information that terrorists might intend to use hijacked planes to destroy civilian and government targets.

Nor did the FBI and CIA make much of a habit of sharing information with each other. Had they done so, one presumes the President's Daily Briefing on Aug. 6 would have included a suspicion that the hijackers might have something much more atrocious than ransom demands on their agenda.

As administration officials have observed, the president is not expected to work as an intelligence case officer. It is not his job to drag from different agencies various bits of information, murky clues and suspicions that, considered together, begin to reveal the dimensions of a clear and present danger. But it is the responsibility of officials who serve at his pleasure.

Asking for, urging and demanding answers for why various agencies of the federal government failed to understand the enormity of the danger facing the United States is an obligation shared by all elected federal officials. As is the responsibility for understanding why and how the previous administration failed to combat the growing menace of international terrorism more effectively. As is responsibility for questioning Congress's inability or unwillingness to exercise more diligently its oversight responsibilities for these agencies. As is the expectation that officials who did not competently discharge their responsibilities be held accountable.

It's hardly a surprise in a lively democracy that partisan and institutional loyalties will influence both sides of an honest debate on the most critical challenge confronting the federal government. The administration's critics and its defenders suspect each other of motives less civic-minded than an honest search for answers, impairing our own and the public's ability to arrive at fair conclusions about what went wrong and how to repair it.

This is all the more reason to consider empaneling an independent commission of trust-worthy, experienced statesmen who, if not entirely devoid of partisan loyalties, are sufficiently removed by time and wisdom from the appeal of such loyalties to know when they conflict with the national interest.

Give them complete access to all intelligence reports and internal documents with arguable relevance to their inquiry, and charge them with rendering a judgment about who failed and why in this administration and its predecessors, as well as in Congress, and with recommending appropriate remedies to guard against a recurrence.

An independent inquiry will not impose a serious burden on the administration as it prosecutes our just war against terrorism, any more than a similar inquiry after Pearl Harbor impeded Franklin D. Roosevelt's prosecution of World War II. Nor should it prevent members of Congress, the press or any American citizen from questioning or criticizing the government's apparent failures before and after President Bush's inauguration. All wars and national security failures have occasioned contemporaneous criticism, and the Republic has managed to thrive.

It is irresponsible in a time of war, or any time for that matter, to attack or defend unthinkingly or because partisan identification is one's supreme interest. But it is not responsible or right to shrink from offering thoughtful criticism when and to whom it is due, and when the consequences of incompletely understanding failures of governance are potentially catastrophic. On the contrary, such timidity is indefensibly irresponsible especially in times of war, so irresponsible that it verges on the unpatriotic.

[From Newsweek, May 27, 2002]

WHAT WENT WRONG

(By Michael Hirsh and Michael Isikoff)

Forget James Bond. Intelligence gathering is more like taking a metal detector to the city dump. So much comes in, rumor, hearsay, disinformation, so little of it more than trash: once in a blue moon an agent-prospect may get lucky. But even then an agent's warning is likely to be dismissed as what Condoleezza Rice last week called "chatter." "There's always TMI—too much information," says former CIA agent Milt Bearden. Often agents poke fun at the sometimes obsessive quirks of their colleagues. "If a confidential memorandum comes from a guy out in, say, Phoenix, the first thing that goes up the line is, 'That's Harry again. He's like a broken clock twice a day,'" one ex-agent says. Even today, long after 9-11, streams of new threats pass unnoticed through Washington. In recent weeks, for instance, the FBI has gotten specific threats about a car- or truck-bomb attack on an "all-glass" building near the U.S. Capitol, and another threat against a Celebrity cruise ship off Florida. Neither was corroborated, or publicized.

Yet every now and then, amid the piles of dross, a nugget of pure gold turns up in intel files. The key for American national security—now and into the future—is to know it when we see it. Back in July 2001, Bill Kurtz and his team hit pay dirt, and no one seemed to care. A hard-driven supervisor in the FBI's Phoenix office, Kurtz was overseeing an investigation of suspected Islamic terrorists last July when a member of his team, a sharp, 41-year-old counterterrorism agent named Kenneth Williams, noticed something odd: a large number of suspects were signing up to take courses in how to fly airplanes. The agent's suspicions were further fueled when he heard that some of the men at the local Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University were asking a lot of questions about airport security.

Kurtz, who had previously worked on the Osama bin Laden unit of the FBI's international terrorism section, was convinced he and his colleagues might have stumbled on to something bigger. Kurtz's team fired off a lengthy memo raising the possibility that

bin Laden might be using U.S. flight schools to infiltrate the country's civil-aviation system. "He thinks of everything in terms of bin Laden," one colleague recalled. The memo outlined a proposal for the FBI to monitor "civil aviation colleges/universities around the country."

Williams, the agent who sniffed out the link, was described by one former colleague as a "superstar," a former SWAT sniper and family man who coaches Little League and, in 1995, helped track down Michael Fortier, Timothy McVeigh's former Army buddy. "Anything he says you can take to the bank," says former agent Ron Myers.

But little of that seemed to make a difference back in Washington, where the Kurtz team suffered a fate even worse than Cassandra's: not only were they not believed, they were ignored altogether. The FBI was concerned about racial profiling. Moreover, it wasn't used to gather intelligence, especially domestically, given American sensitivities about intrusive government and civil liberties. Its intelligence-assessment system was almost laughably antiquated. And under Attorney General John Ashcroft, the department was being prodded back into its old law-and-order mind-set: violent crime, drugs, child porn. Counterterrorism, which had become a priority of the Clintonites (not that they did a better job of nailing bin Laden), seemed to be getting less attention. When FBI officials sought to add hundreds more counterintelligence agents, they got shot down even as Ashcroft began, quietly, to take a privately chartered jet for his own security reasons.

The attorney general was hardly alone in seeming to de-emphasize terror in the young Bush administration. Over at the Pentagon, new Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld elected not to relaunch a Predator drone that had been tracking bin Laden, among other actions. In self-absorbed Washington, the Phoenix memo, which never resulted in arrests, landed in two units at FBI headquarters but didn't make it to senior levels. Nor did the memo get transmitted to the CIA, which has long had a difficult relationship with the FBI—and whose director, George Tenet, one of the few Clinton holdovers, was issuing so many warnings that bin Laden was "the most immediate" threat to Americans he was hardly heeded any longer.

Last week the tale of the missed signal from Phoenix became, for thousands of families of 9-11 victims, yet another tangle of pain stemming from that day. Indeed, it was part of a whole summer of missed clues that, taken together, seemed to presage the terrible September of 2001. The same week in early July that Kurtz and his team were dispatching their memo, the White House acknowledged for the first time, Bush was privately beginning to worry about the stream of terror warnings he was hearing that summer, most of them aimed at U.S. targets abroad. On July 5, five days before the Phoenix memo, Bush directed Rice to figure out what was going on domestically. A month later, America learned for the first time last week—nine months after the attacks—Bush received a "presidential daily brief" in Crawford, Texas, that mentioned the possibility of an airline hijacking as a domestic threat. The Aug. 6 briefing was only "an analytic report that talked about [bin Laden's] methods of operation, talked about what he had done historically," Rice said in a hastily called conference to contain the damage from the news.

Because Bush has long insisted he had no inkling of the attacks, the disclosures touched off a media stampede in a capital long deprived of scandal. The fact that the nation's popular war president might have been warned a little over a month before

September 11—and that the supposedly straight-talking Bushies hadn't told anyone about it—opened up a serious credibility gap for the first time in the war on terror.

There were, in fact, failures at every level that summer: from the shortcomings in the law-enforcement trenches—the FBI's poor record at domestic surveillance, the CIA's poor record at infiltrating Islamic groups and the lack of cooperation between the two agencies—to the fixed strategic mind-set of the Bush administration. Between the claims by the FBI and CIA that they didn't get enough information and the White House's insistence that it didn't receive any reports—"He doesn't recall seeing anything," Rice said when asked if Bush had read the Phoenix memo—the buck seems to be stopping nowhere. "If I were an average citizen, I'd be pissed at the whole American government," says a senior official who has worked on counterterrorism.

The question is not so much what the president knew and when he knew it. The question is whether the administration was really paying much attention. Terrorism is by nature stealthy and hard to crack, even in the face of the most zealous efforts to thwart it. What Americans should be asking is why the Bush administration in its first eight months, like the Clinton admiration for much of its eight years, did not demand the intelligence cooperation that was needed. At issue is not whom to blame for the past, but how to learn from it to safeguard our future.

The fact is, in a nation that prides itself on its mastery of the Information Age, almost no one in the U.S. government seemed to know what anyone else was doing. Even as what Rice called "major threat spikes" began to appear on Washington's . . .

In any case, few Americans seem to be in the mood any longer for more-of-the-same from Washington. September 11 has often been compared to Pearl Harbor as a fault line between a complacent and war-ready America. And, like Pearl Harbor, questions about whether it could have been prevented will forever haunt us. To give the Bush administration some credit, no government in modern history has ever predicted a major surprise attack. Britain and France missed the Blitzkrieg in 1940. The Germans missed D-Day in June 1944. And everyone missed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Even so, it's too simple to say that post-mortems now are somehow unfair or unpatriotic in "wartime America." The latest revelations could open up a Pandora's box of questions about the administration's pre-9-11 performance on terror—questions with complicated and interesting roots.

By the end of the Clinton administration, the then national-security adviser Sandy Berger had become "totally preoccupied" with fears of a domestic terror attack, a colleague recalls. True, the Clintonites had failed to act decisively against Al Qaeda, but by the end they were certain of the danger it posed. When, in January 2001, Berger gave Rice her handover briefing, he covered the bin Laden threat in detail, and, sources say, warned her: "You will be spending more time on this issue than on any other." Rice was alarmed by what she heard, and asked for a strategy review. But the effort was marginalized and scarcely mentioned in ensuing months as the administration committed itself to other priorities, like national missile defense (NMD) and Iraq.

John Ashcroft seemed particularly eager to set a new agenda. In the spring of 2001, the attorney general had an extraordinary confrontation with the then FBI Director Louis Freeh at an annual meeting of special agents in charge in Quantico, Va. The two talked before appearing, and Ashcroft laid out his priorities for Freeh, another Clinton holdover (though no friend of the ex-president's),

"basically violent crime and drugs," recalls one participant. Freeh replied bluntly that those were not his priorities, and began to talk about terror and counterterrorism. "Ashcroft didn't want to hear about it," says a former senior law-enforcement official. (A Justice Department spokeswoman hotly disputed this, saying that in May Ashcroft told a Senate committee terrorism was his "highest priority.")

That was unfortunate, because Freeh, despite his late-tenure interest in global terrorism, had left behind an FBI that badly needed fixing, especially its antiquated evidence-gathering methods. So fouled up is the FBI's communications system that it is almost impossible for agents to send classified e-mails to another agency like the CIA; the effect is that little is shared.

It wasn't that Ashcroft and others were unconcerned about these problems, or about terrorism. But the Bushies had an ideological agenda of their own. At the Treasury Department, Secretary Paul O'Neill's team wanted to roll back almost all forms of government intervention, including laws against money laundering and tax havens of the kind used by terror groups. At the Pentagon, Donald Rumsfeld wanted to revamp the military and push his pet project, NMD. Rumsfeld vetoed a request to divert \$800 million from missile defense into counterterrorism. The Pentagon chief also seemed uninterested in a tactic for observing bin Laden left over from the Clinton administration: the CIA's Predator surveillance plane. Upon leaving office, the Clintonites left open the possibility of sending the Predator back up armed with Hellfire missiles, which were tested in February 2001. But through the spring and summer of 2001, when valuable intelligence could have been gathered, the Bush administration never launched even an unarmed Predator. Hill sources say DOD didn't want the CIA treading on its turf.

And while most of the current controversy is about what America didn't do defensively, Rumsfeld and Bush didn't take the offensive, either. Upon entering office, both suggested publicly that the Clinton administration left America with a weak image abroad. The day after the Oct. 12, * * *

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2001, and under a previous order of the House, the following Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. NORWOOD) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. NORWOOD addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Ms. KAPTUR) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Ms. KAPTUR addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. WILSON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. WILSON of South Carolina addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. GEKAS) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. GEKAS addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from the District of Columbia (Ms. NORTON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Ms. NORTON addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

REVISIONS TO ALLOCATION FOR HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. NUSSLE) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I submit for printing in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD revisions to the 302(a) allocations and budgetary aggregates established by H. Con. Res. 83, the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2002. My authority to make these adjustments is derived from Sec. 314 of the Congressional Budget Act and Sec. 221(c) of H. Con. Res. 83.

As reported to the House, H.R. 4775, a bill making supplemental appropriations for fiscal

year 2002, includes emergency-designated appropriations. The total amount of emergency-designated appropriations included in the reported bill is \$29,432,000,000. Outlays flowing from those appropriations total \$8,466,000,000 in fiscal year 2002. Under the provisions of both the Budget Act and the budget resolution, I must adjust the 302(a) allocations and budgetary aggregates upon the reporting of a bill containing emergency appropriations.

Accordingly, I hereby increase the 302(a) allocation for fiscal year 2002 to the House Committee on Appropriations to \$735,432,000,000 in new budget authority and \$736,420,000,000 in outlays. I also increase the budgetary aggregates for fiscal year 2002 to \$1,708,604,000,000 in new budget authority and \$1,653,073,000,000 in outlays.

Section 2 of House Resolution 428 provided that House Concurrent Resolution 353, as adopted by the House, shall have force and effect in the House as though Congress has adopted a concurrent resolution on the budget. That section also directed me to submit for printing in the Congressional Record: (1) allocations contemplated by section 302(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 under a concurrent resolution on the budget; (2) accounts identified for advance appropriations, referred to in section 301(b) of House Concurrent Resolution 353; and (3) an estimated unified surplus, referred to in section 211 of such concurrent resolution.

The attached tables, which I submit for printing in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as directed, provide the required information.

Allocations of Spending Authority to House Committees: Appropriations Committee, 2003

[In millions of dollars]

General Purpose: ¹		
BA	746,174	
OT	738,992	
Highways: ¹		
BA		
OT	27,581	
Mass Transit: ¹		
BA		
OT	6,030	
Conservation: ¹		
BA	1,922	
OT	1,872	
Total Discretionary Action:		
BA	748,096	
OT	774,475	
Current Law Mandatory:		
BA	350,116	
OT	353,319	

¹ Shown for display purposes only.

ALLOCATIONS OF SPENDING AUTHORITY TO HOUSE COMMITTEES: COMMITTEES OTHER THAN APPROPRIATIONS

[By fiscal year in millions of dollars]

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total	
						2003-2007	2003-2012
Agriculture Committee:							
Current Law Base:							
BA	36,573	35,545	34,841	34,241	34,889	176,089	n.a.
OT	33,247	33,726	32,788	32,283	32,885	164,929	n.a.
Discretionary Action:							
BA	7,825	7,604	7,198	7,249	7,141	37,017	n.a.
OT	7,271	7,019	6,688	6,727	6,774	34,479	n.a.
Total:							
BA	44,398	43,149	42,039	41,490	42,030	213,106	n.a.
OT	40,518	40,745	39,476	39,010	39,659	199,408	n.a.
Armed Services Committee:							
Current Law Base:							
BA	76,090	78,358	80,609	83,134	85,779	403,970	n.a.
OT	75,258	77,722	80,228	82,780	85,466	401,454	n.a.
Discretionary Action:							
BA	516	652	1,025	1,605	2,006	5,804	n.a.
OT	516	652	1,025	1,605	2,006	5,804	n.a.