

It is not a political gimmick or a short-term, cynical fix we seek; instead, it is a change that should be reflected in Medicare, to bring Medicare into the 21st century. This is the challenge we confront, Mr. Speaker, working together, men and women of good will across the panorama of political philosophies, across the partisan divide, to heed the message of our seniors who say they need and want prescription drug coverage now; that the cost of medicines can be lowered, that we can usher in a new age of Medicare for the 21st century reflecting the changes in medical technology, utilizing some of the commonsense proposals and principles our parents taught us about the value of a dollar, weaning out waste, fraud and abuse, making the effort to continue to improve lives, to continue to improve the quality of life, and set a prudent public policy based on true compassion that is not only more effective, more responsive, but in the long term, more economical for all Americans.

That is the challenge we confront, and we do not shrink from that challenge. Daunting though it may be, we welcome it; we embrace it. It is our intent to move this people's House forward to work with our President to get this done, to see action taken in the other body, and leaving plenty of time for the other body to get the work done on this legislation, as well.

If we move forward this year, seniors can reap the benefit this year. Mr. Speaker, our parents, our grandparents, our Nation's seniors deserve nothing less.

Mr. Speaker, I offer a word of thanks for my colleague, the gentlewoman from Connecticut (Mrs. JOHNSON), who joined me for this time of dialogue on prescription drug coverage as part of Medicare, a new, stronger Medicare for the 21st century.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the importance of prescription drugs to seniors. I have talked to the seniors in my district about this, and I can tell you from my experience that this is of utmost importance to them. And it should be of utmost importance to us too. I am honored to be a part of the Speaker's Prescription Drug Action Team, working to achieve the best benefit possible for our seniors.

It is important that we provide prescription drug coverage for today's seniors while shoring up Medicare at the same time. The two go hand in hand. Unfortunately, Medicare is built around formulas that are outdated. We have a big job ahead of us, but it is one of the most important pieces of legislation to come before this body. We have to update Medicare at the same time we provide prescription drug coverage, so that both remain sound now and into the future.

But let's be clear about the prescription drug benefit: our seniors need coverage and they need it now, not later. We must act immediately to give them coverage such as 25% off the top of the first \$1000 they spend. Their monthly premium and yearly deductible have got to be as low as we can get them, so that those living on a fixed income can afford their

medications without worrying about whether or not they can afford food. And they have to be able to count on catastrophic coverage.

No senior should have to decide between prescription drugs and food, or prescription drugs and turning on the air conditioner in the middle of a brutal Oklahoma summer. That's just not fair. Our parents, and grandparents, deserve better than that. That's why I'm so excited to be on the Speaker's team, to help advise him on the concerns facing today's seniors. We have to be realistic about how we structure the plan, but the bottom line is that: seniors must be able to afford their prescriptions. I hope that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle would agree. This is our goal, and one we should reach across the aisle on, to help seniors. We must create policy, not politics. We must provide worthwhile prescription drug coverage for our parents and grandparents, and we must do it immediately.

DEFENDING PRESIDENT BUSH REGARDING KNOWLEDGE OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, THREAT, AND DETAILING UPCOMING TRAVEL TO RUSSIA, UZBEKISTAN, CHINA, AND NORTH KOREA

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ISSA). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON) is recognized provisionally for half the time remaining until midnight.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I take the time this evening, and thank the Speaker and the staff for bearing with me, to basically perform two functions.

First of all, I will respond to those critics of President Bush who have taken unfair shots at him over the 9-11 situation, and will factually refute what people like the minority leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. GEPHARDT), have said publicly about this President somehow not heeding evidence that was provided to him.

I am going to present the true facts of what we could have and should have done prior to September 11 that I think would have allowed us to both understand what was about to occur and to have done something about it.

The second action I am going to discuss this evening is an upcoming trip that I will be leading to Russia, Uzbekistan, Beijing, China, as well as Pyongyang, North Korea, the first delegation going into that country, and Seoul, South Korea, at the end of this week.

Mr. Speaker, let me start out by saying, first of all, in response to many of the media pundits who have spent the last week or 10 days criticizing President Bush and have publicly said that he had indications that should have alerted him to the upcoming attack on the World Trade Center, nothing could be farther from the truth. The facts are all in. The data the President got were basically individual elements provided by individual agencies about potential acts that might be against our country, nowhere near the immensity of what we actually saw on September 11.

They were bits of information, like the CIA saying there might be an attempt to hijack an airplane, but no linkage of that act to an attack on the Trade Center; or the fact that other agencies were looking at pilots that were obtaining licenses and had no intention of landing an airplane. Each of these bits of information, while being provided to the upper levels of our government, in and of themselves would not lead anyone to believe that an imminent attack was about to occur on the Trade Center.

But Mr. Speaker, as I said on September 11 on CNN live at 12 noon from the roof of a church across from the Capitol, on that day the government did fail the American people. Now, the President did not fail the American people, but the government failed the American people.

I am going to document for our colleagues today, and for the American public and the media, steps that we took in the years prior to September 11 when our agencies and the government did not respond. This started back in the Clinton administration and continued during the Bush administration.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, during the late 1990s, I chaired the Committee on Research for our national security, which meant that my job was to oversee about \$38 billion a year that we spend on cutting-edge technology for the military.

One of those projects that I helped get additional funding for was the Information Dominant Center that the Army was standing up down at Fort Belvoir, technically known as the LIWAC. This Land Information Warfare Assessment Center was designed to monitor on a 24-hour-a-day basis 7 days a week all of our military classified systems, those systems used to run the Army. Each of our services was in the process of standing up an entity like the one that the Army stood up at Fort Belvoir.

Back in 1997, as I was supporting increased funding for this capability, I was amazed in two trips that I took to Fort Belvoir that the Army was not just able to maintain security over their information systems, but they were able to use new software tools and high-speed computers to do what is commonly called "profiling," to take vast amounts of information about the classified and unclassified information and process it and analyze it so that a picture could be drawn and a threat could be developed, proliferation could be monitored.

□ 2310

Now, this was back in 1997. In fact, I had a chance to use these capabilities and I think this story, more than any other, underscores the inabilities of our agencies on September 11 to really understand the threat that was emerging.

As you might recall, back in 1997 we had gotten into a war in Kosovo to remove Milosevic from power. All of Congress was not supportive of that conflict. In fact, I opposed the initial involvement with President Clinton by our troops, not because I have supported Milosevic but because I felt that we did not force Russia or allow Russia to play a more vibrant role in helping us to get Milosevic out of power.

Two weeks after the bombing campaign started, I started to receive telephone calls and started to receive e-mails from my Russian colleagues in the State Duma. People who are senior leaders who called me and e-mailed me and said we have a real problem. Your policy of bombing Milosevic and innocent Serbs is causing the Russian people to lose confidence in what America's real intent is, and you are driving Russia further away from our country. And I said what do you want me to do? They said we need you to convince your president that Russia can help play a role in ending the war and getting Milosevic out of office. And the Russians told me that they wanted me to go to Belgrade in the middle of the conflict, that they would arrange a meeting with Milosevic.

Well, I told them that that was very much undoable because we were in the middle of a war. We were bombing Serbia at the time. But I asked them to put that request in writing and they did. Within the next few days I got a letter on official Duma stationery where the Russians outlined their desire to take me and a delegation of Members of Congress to Belgrade, Yugoslavia. They outlined who would come from the Russian side and they committed that they would have a meeting with Milosevic personally with a date and time certain. They also agreed to visit a refugee camp of our choosing so we could show them the damage that Milosevic had caused innocent people, and they also agreed to release the three American POWs that were being held hostage.

When the letter came, it also included the name of an individual I did not know. His name was Dragomir Kric. The Russians had told me that this individual was very close to Milosevic personally, that the Russians trusted him, and that he was the guy that would get Milosevic to agree to the terms to end the hostilities against the Serbian, Yugoslavian people.

The Russian request I then took to the State Department with my colleague, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER) on the other side. We had a 1 hour and 30 minute meeting in the Office of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. We outlined for him what the Russians had requested for us and that we were willing to lead a delegation into Belgrade in spite of the war going on. Strobe Talbott listened and he said, I do not think it is a good idea. He said we cannot guarantee your safety and we do not think Milosevic will do what the Russians say he will do,

and we think he will just use you. So my advice is not to go, but as citizens in America you can do what you want.

I said that we would not violate the request of our State Department and would not go. But the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER) suggested that perhaps we should meet the Russians in a neutral city and he suggested Vienna. Strobe Talbott said that was fine. So I came back to Capitol Hill and I sent a letter to all 435 members of the House outlining for them what the Russians had asked, what the administration response was, and invited every Member of this body to attend a meeting if they were interested in going with us to Vienna. From the meeting that we held 1- Members of Congress, 5 Democrats and 5 Republicans, volunteered to go with me to Vienna to meet with our Russian counterparts and Mr. Kric.

Now, before we left on that trip I wanted to know something about Kric so I called the CIA director, George Tennant. I said I do not know who this guy is. The Russians are convinced that he can give us information that will allow us to get Milosevic to agree to our terms. Can you tell me something about him as the director of the CIA?

He called me back the next day and gave me 2 or 3 sentences about Dragomir Kric and said that they thought he was tied in with the corruption in Russia but did not know much else about him.

Without telling anyone, Mr. Speaker, I went back to my friends at the Army Information Dominance Center, and I said can you run me a profile of a Dragomir Kric and tell me something about him. They ran a profile and they came back to me with 8 pages of information about this man, the profile of someone who was very close to Milosevic personally.

With that information, we left on a military plane on a Thursday afternoon after votes and flew all night to Vienna, arrived on Friday morning, and began our discussions in the hotel in Vienna with the 11 members of Congress, a State Department representative, the 5 Russians and Dragomir Kric.

We worked all through Friday into the night and into Saturday. And by Saturday midday something historic had happened. The Russians had agreed to the terms that we wanted to end the conflict. The Russians had agreed to things they had never agreed to. During the time when we were meeting, Kric was calling back to Belgrade talking to Milosevic on the phone personally. He would come back in the room and he would tell us what Milosevic was happy with and what he was not, but we were not there to negotiate with Milosevic. We were there to get the Russians to agree with us on an end to the conflict.

By 2 o'clock on Saturday afternoon we reached agreement. It was word for word read by the Russian and American side and we all signed off on an

end to the war. It was an historic time for us because we thought we could stop the bombing and stop killing innocent people and get Milosevic out of power.

Kric immediately left the room and made a phone call. He came back in the room and said I just talked to Milosevic personally, and he has assured me that if we go down as a group right now to Belgrade, and I will hire the bus, and we all go down together, Milosevic will meet with us, he will agree to this framework which ends his reign. He will agree to accept international peacekeeping force to disarm the Serbs, and he will agree to allowing a U.N. or NATO force to bring stability to this country. And he will also release the 3 POWs that have not been heard from since they were captured by Milosevic.

Well, that was pretty historic, Mr. Speaker. So my colleagues on the other side called the White House from Vienna. They get on the White House operation center phone line and talked to John Podesta, the chief of staff for the President. And they said we have something that you have to get to President Clinton immediately. We have negotiated what we think is the end of the Kosovo war with the Russians, with a representative of Milosevic agreeing to the terms.

Another representative with us of the State Department called the State Department operations center and he told them what had transpired. So he notified both the White House and the State Department. The State Department said let me talk to Congressman WELDON. So I got on the phone. On the other end of the line was Steven Sestanovich who was at that time in charge of the Russia desk at the State Department.

I outlined for him what had occurred. He said, Curt, this is amazing but it is above my pay grade. I cannot tell you what to do. Hold on and I will have someone else call you back. Thirty minutes later, Mr. Speaker, I got a call from Tom Pickering. Tom Pickering was at that time number three in the State Department and had been the ambassador for us to Russia. I had known him in that capacity. He said, Curt, what is going on? And I explained to him that we had met with the Russians and Kric. We had reached agreement, and that Milosevic through Kric was saying that he was prepared to end the war if we went down to Belgrade. So I said to Tom Pickering, what do you think we should do?

He said, Curt, first of all, we do not trust Milosevic. We do not think that he will live up to what he is telling you through this guy Kric; and, furthermore, Curt, I do not even know who Kric is. I never heard of this guy and how could you believe that somehow he speaks for Milosevic?

I said, Tom, I did not know Kric either before I came here, but I know the Russians. They are my friends, and they have convinced me that he is the

person that can get Milosevic to do what we want. He said, I do not think it is a good idea. In fact, let me tell you, the Reverend Jesse Jackson has been in Belgrade for a week. We have been in constant communication with him. In fact, he is coming home today. His delegation has been unsuccessful. They were trying to get the three POWs released, he said, but their mission has failed.

□ 2320

What makes you think that you can do something that the Reverend Jesse Jackson could do? I do not know, Tom. All I am telling you is what the Russians are saying based upon Kric's taught discussions with Milosevic. He said I do not think you should go, and I said okay, then we will not, because we are a Nation of laws and not of people.

I came back to the room where the Members of Congress were seated with our Russian counterparts. I told them the story, and they immediately became incensed at me. Kric called me a coward for not taking a delegation to Belgrade. He said, You just lost a chance to end the war and bring home your POWs.

I had Members of Congress from both parties telling me they were going to go on their own, and I said, Oh no, you are not; we came in a military plane that I acquired; you are going back to America with me.

So the 11 Members of Congress and the Russians and our State Department official sat down and discussed how we would implement our plan instead of going to see Milosevic in Belgrade. Kric went out of the room and came back in after making a phone call, and said, You just blew it; Milosevic had said you had a chance to end the war, to get him to publicly accept this agreement and he would release the POWs.

We continued to meet. Two hours later, our Navy escort came into the room, and he said to the 11 Members of Congress that CNN has just announced that Milosevic is releasing the POWs to Jesse Jackson's delegation. Kric told us that Milosevic did not want to keep them because he was fearful they would be harmed and we would blame him for their injuries. Even though he did not want to release them to Jesse Jackson, he did.

To continue the story and make my point, Mr. Speaker, we all came back home to America. We briefed our colleagues. We briefed the administration. We presented the framework that we negotiated, and 8 days later, or 2 weeks later, that became the basis of the G-8 agreement to end the war. So our work was fruitful, but something interesting happened that applies to September 11.

I got a call from the FBI in my office asking my staff to allow two agents to come over for me to brief them, for me to brief them, on a fellow named Dragomir Kric. I said, Fine, set it up

for Monday afternoon in my office in the Rayburn Building. I went back to Pennsylvania, and on the Friday before that Monday, my office paged me with a 911 page. I called them and they said, You must call CIA congressional affairs immediately. I did.

The CIA said, Congressman, we are going to fly two agents to Philadelphia right now. They will meet you at the airport, they will come to your home, they will come to a hotel, wherever you want to meet them, but they have to talk to you immediately. I said, What is the urgency? They said, We have been tasked by the State Department to brief them on Dragomir Kric and we want you to tell us what you know about him. I said, Well, the FBI already asked for that information, why can't we do it together on Monday afternoon?

So that Monday afternoon I had four agents in my office: two CIA agents, one CI person and two FBI agents. For two hours they grilled me with four pages of questions about Kric.

I answered all their questions. I told them that there were four Kric brothers, that they were the owners of the largest banking system in the former Yugoslavia; that they employed some 60,000 people; that their bank had tried to finance the sale of an SA-10 from Russia to Milosevic; that their bank had been involved in a \$4 billion German bond scam; that one of the brothers had financed Milosevic's election; that the house Milosevic lived in was really their house; that, in fact, Krics' wives were best of friends with Milosevic's wife; and that they were the closest people to this leader.

I told them all the information. When I got done, Mr. Speaker, I said, Now, do you want to know where I got my data from? They said, Yeah, you got it from the Russians. I said, No. They said, Well, then you got it from Kric. I said, No. I said, Before I went over there I had the Army's information dominant center run a profile for me of Dragomir Kric.

The FBI and the CIA in 1997 said to me, what is the Army's information dominant center? The FBI and the CIA had no knowledge that our military was developing a capability that would be able to do massive data mining of information to allow us to do a profile of a person or an event that was about to happen.

We took that model, based on that lesson which infuriated me as a Member of Congress to be asked to brief the CIA and the FBI, and working with people in the intelligence agencies, I developed a plan. This plan was to create a national collaborative center.

Back in 1997, Mr. Speaker, the national collaborative center where there were articles written, published in the media, technical media here was called the NOAH, N-O-A-H. It stands for National Operations and Analysis Hub. The function of the NOAH would be to have all 32 Federal agencies that have classified systems have a node of each

of those systems in one central location managed by one of their employees, and when tasked by the national command authority, the President or the National Security Council, their data would be entered into a massive computer using new software tools like STARLITE and SPIRES and six others that are used by the private sector to do data mining.

In addition to classified information systems, they would also run through massive amounts of unclassified data, newspaper stories, magazine story, TV broadcasts, radio broadcasts. A person cannot do that manually, but they can do it through high-speed computers, as the Army did for me in developing the profile of Kric.

We took this plan and we said to the intelligence community, this is what we need to have to be prepared for threats in the 21st century, because the threats we are going to see over the next several decades will not come only from one nation state, they will come from terrorist organizations. We need to be able to pool all this data together and be able to profile it, analyze it and then come back with a true picture of what may be about to occur.

Mr. Speaker, this was in 1997. I briefed John Hamre. Dr. John Hamre was then the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I said, John, you have got to go down to Fort Belvoir and see this facility; it is amazing. He went down twice. He called me back and he said, Curt, it is amazing what they are doing there. This profiling worked, and they could do it because unofficially some other secret lines were running through Fort Belvoir that the Army could unofficially access. So it really was an official process.

He said, But you know, Curt, I cannot get to where you want to go because the CIA and the FBI will not cooperate and neither will the other agencies. He said, So I have a suggestion for you. Why do you not host a meeting in your office? I will come and you invite my counterparts at the FBI and the CIA.

So, Mr. Speaker, in my office, in 1998, I had the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Director of the CIA and the Deputy Director of the FBI, four of us met for 1 hour. We briefed them on the NOAH. We talked about the need for a national collaborative center, national data fusion center; and the response was, We do not need to do that right now, we are doing our own systems in our own agencies; so thank you for your recommendations, and we are trying to share but not the way you want because that is too bold. That is too aggressive. This was 1998, Mr. Speaker.

Not satisfied with that, we held hearings. We did briefings for our colleagues; and in two consecutive defense bills, I put language in the bill that basically said the Defense Department and our intelligence agencies had to create a national collaborative center. So it became a part of the law; but Mr. Speaker, the agencies refused. They

said we do not need to do that, we do our job very well.

Each of them does their job very well, but the problem is the threats in the 21st century will be seen from a number of different sources. It may be information coming from the Customs Department or from the Defense Intelligence Agency or from the NSA or from the CIA or the FBI or Commerce, State and Justice, all of which have classified systems; or it may come from some public statements in articles in other countries. We can only have the capability to understand all of that if we have a national fusion center.

□ 2230

We did not have that capability before September 11. That is why I stood up on September 11, at 12 p.m. in the afternoon and said, "Today our government failed the American people." Because, Mr. Speaker, we knew what we should have done. We knew what we could have done. And we did not do it.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, I firmly believe that if we would have implemented the NOAH, which John Hamre offered to pay for with DOD dollars, back when we first recommended it, I am convinced we could have stopped or known about and prevented September 11 from ever happening.

Let me give an example. CIA information on terrorism, combined with what the FBI knew about training pilots and open-source information on remarks by al Qaeda, would have helped the intelligence community and enforcement agencies focus better on the threat. For example, in August of 2000, an al Qaeda member had been interviewed by an Italian newspaper and reported that al Qaeda was training kamikaze pilots. The intelligence community and enforcement agencies, however, do not read open-source information. Yes, they read all the classified stuff, but this interview in 2000 was in an open-source newspaper account in Italy.

If we would have had a fusion center, all of that data would have been processed, and in very real quick time, through massive high-speed computers, and we would have seen the linkages between what was occurring. But with each agency doing its own thing, it is impossible to see the linkages. And that is why when President Bush before September 11 got a bit of information from the CIA and a bit from the FBI, and something else, and nothing from open sources, there is no way he could have foretold what was about to occur.

If we would have had the NOAH in place, an idea that was developed with the intelligence community, an idea that was briefed to the FBI, briefed to the CIA and briefed to the Defense Department, I think we could have done something to prevent al Qaeda.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, there is another interesting development that occurred. After the Army showed the capability of the LIWAC model at Ft. Belvoir,

other services began to take interest. Special forces command down in Florida contacted the Army and said, hey, we hear you are doing some neat things. We want to build a mini version of what you are doing down at our headquarters.

I did not find out about this until October of 2001, after the attack on the trade center. A year before, special forces command developed their own mini version of a data processing or collaborative center with very limited capabilities. But what they did, Mr. Speaker, they did a profile of al Qaeda 1 year before 9-11.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ISSA). The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON) is recognized to continue until midnight.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, here is the chart, the unclassified chart of what special forces command had 1 year before 9-11. Interesting. The entire al Qaeda network is identified in a graphic chart with all the linkages to all the terrorist groups around the world.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, I was told by the folks who developed the capability for special forces command that this chart and the briefing that was supposed to be given to General Shelton, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, had a recommendation to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's network. Mr. Speaker, this was 1 year before 9-11. This was not during President Bush's administration. This occurred in the fall of the remaining term of President Bill Clinton.

The key question I have been trying to get at is why was this 3-hour briefing, which I also got, I got General Holland to bring his briefers up from Florida with special forces, I went in the Pentagon, went in the tank, and they gave me the briefing, as much as they could give me, because part of it is being used for our operational plan, why was that 3-hour briefing with the recommendations to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's network condensed down to a 1-hour brief when it was given to General Hugh Shelton in January of 2001? And why were the recommendations to take out 5 cells not followed up on? That is the question we should get answered, Mr. Speaker.

Because 1 year before 9-11, the capability that special forces built actually identified to us the network of al Qaeda. And they went beyond that and gave us recommendations where we could take out cells to eliminate their capability. So for those pundits out there sitting in their armchairs criticizing President Bush, they have it all wrong.

Facts are a tough thing to refute, and the fact is that back in 1997, we told the administration at that time what to do. In 1998, we briefed the agencies. In 1999, we put language in a defense bill. In 2000, we put language in a defense bill. In 2000, special forces command built another mini version of that capability. And in 2000 they briefed General Shelton telling him to

take out 5 cells of bin Laden's network. All of that activity could have prevented or helped to prevent 9-11 from ever occurring. I challenge my colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to review the facts. I challenge the media to report the truth.

We still do not have a national collaborative center. That capability still does not exist. We are getting there, but it has been a long road. I briefed our Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, with the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON), chairman of the Committee on Government Reform, about 4 months ago. He agreed with us, but he has not yet been able to achieve this new interagency collaborative center, and that is an indictment of our government that the American people deserve to be outraged over.

We need this kind of capability in the 21st century, because these bits of pieces of information have to be pieced together, both classified and unclassified, so that our analysts can get the clear picture of what may be about to occur against our people and our friends.

So, Mr. Speaker, I seek to clarify the charges against the President and to answer them, and I encourage my colleagues to learn more about the need for a national collaborative center, a national data fusion center or, as I call it, a national operations and analysis hub.

Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the RECORD the documentation from as far back as 1998, 1999, and 2000 with our recommendations to implement this kind of capability:

of an Office of Transformation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to advise the Secretary on—

(1) development of force transformation strategies to ensure that the military of the future is prepared to dissuade potential military competitors and, if that fails, to fight and win decisively across the spectrum of future conflict;

(2) ensuring a continuous and broadly focused transformation process;

(3) service and joint acquisition and experimentation efforts, funding for experimentation efforts, promising operational concepts and technologies and other transformation activities, as appropriate; and

(4) development of service and joint operational concepts, transformation implementation strategies, and risk management strategies.

(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS OF FUNDING.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should consider providing funding adequate for sponsoring selective prototyping efforts, wargames, and studies and analyses and for appropriate staffing, as recommended by the director of an Office of Transformation as described in subsection (b).

SEC. 903. REVISED JOINT REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL COLLABORATIVE INFORMATION ANALYSIS CAPABILITY.

(A) REVISED REPORT.—At the same time as the submission of the budget for fiscal year 2003 under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the congressional intelligence committees a revised report assessing alternatives for the establishment of a national

collaborative information analysis capability.

(b) **MATTERS INCLUDED.**—The revised report shall cover the same matters required to be included in the DOD/CIA report, except that the alternative architectures assessed in the revised report shall be limited to architectures that include the participation of All Federal agencies involved in the collection of intelligence. The revised report shall also include a draft of legislation sufficient to carry out the preferred architecture identified in the revised report.

(c) **OFFICIALS TO BE CONSULTED.**—The revised report shall be prepared after consultation with all appropriate Federal officials, including the following:

- (1) The Secretary of the Treasury.
- (2) The Secretary of Commerce.
- (3) The Secretary of State.
- (4) The Attorney General.

DEFENSE INFORMATION AND ELECTRONICS REPORT

WELDON: DOD NEEDS MASSIVE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK FOR SHARED THREAT INFO

Senior Pentagon officials are mulling over an idea proposed by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) that would link classified and unclassified documents in a massive intelligence clearinghouse that could be accessed by 33 federal agencies—a concept similar in some ways to one floated by DOD intelligence officials but with significantly fewer players involved.

“Our problem with intelligence is that we’re stove-piped,” said Weldon, chairman of the House Armed Services military research and development subcommittee, during a Nov. 8 interview. “Each agency has its own way of collecting data and analyzing it, but they don’t share that information with other agencies. The need is to have a better system of analyzing and fusing data sets across agencies and services—certainly within the Pentagon and the military, but my opinion is that we have to go further than that.”

Weldon first proposed the concept of a “National Operations Analysis Hub” to Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre last June, although the congressman said he kept his initiative quiet until a stronger plan could be developed.

The Pentagon-funded network of agencies would be operated by DOD. According to Weldon, it would pull together large amounts of information to produce intelligence profiles of people, regions and national security threats, such as information warfare and cyber-terrorism.

“The NOAH concept of a national collaborative environment supporting policy and decision-makers mirrors the ideas you have expressed to me in recent discussions, and it is a tangible way to confront the growing asymmetrical threats to our nation,” Weldon wrote in his July 30 letter to Hamre.

The NOAH concept, however, was not wholeheartedly embraced by Hamre, who met with Weldon last summer and told the congressman his suggested use of the Army’s Land Information Warfare Activity at Ft. Belvoir, VA, as a model for NOAH, would never stick.

Because LIWA is already short of resources, the Army is apprehensive about taking on any new tasks, Hamre told Weldon.

Weldon, in a July 21 letter to Hamre, also urged the Pentagon to support additional future funding for LIWA, citing critical budget shortfalls that he said have kept the agency from fulfilling a barrage of requests for intelligence files from Army commanders (Defense Information and Electronics Report, July 30, p1).

“There’s massive amounts of data out there, and you have to be able to analyze it

and create ways to focus on that data so its relevant to whatever you’re interested in,” he said this week about his support for LIWA. “Well, the Army has already done that.”

While Weldon continues to push for NOAH to be patterned after LIWA, he sees it operating on a much larger scale. Impressed by its ability to pull together huge amounts of both unclassified and classified data, Weldon noted LIWA’s Information Dominance Center can create in-depth profiles that could be useful to the CIA, FBI and the White House. Yet most federal agencies don’t even know LIWA exists, he added.

“Right now the military is limited to [its] own sources of information,” Weldon said. “And in the 21st century, a terrorist group is more than likely going to be involved with terrorist nations. So the boundaries are crossed all the time. We don’t have any way to share that and get beyond the stove-piping.”

Meanwhile, officials within the Defense Department’s intelligence community have been considering another way to amass intelligence information through a concept called the Joint Counter-intelligence Assessment Group. A DOD spokeswoman said proponents of the idea, for now, are unwilling to disclose details about it. She was also unable to say whether a formal proposal to Hamre had been made yet.

In Weldon’s July 30 letter to Hamre, however, Weldon alludes to an ongoing, “initiative to link counterintelligence groups throughout the community.”

“I have heard of an attempts to connect the Office of Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and [Office of the Secretary of Defense] assets with federal, state and local law enforcement agencies,” Weldon wrote.

However, Weldon said in the interview he believes JCAG is simply more “stove-piping.”

“I also have seen what the Army has done at LIWA, which has created a foundation for creating a higher-level architecture collaborating all of these efforts,” his July letter states.

NOAH would link together almost every federal agency with intelligence capabilities, including the National Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Energy Department, the CIA and the FBI. Both Congress and the White House would be offered a “node” for briefing capabilities, meaning intelligence agencies could detail situations on terrorist attacks or wartime scenarios.

“It’s mainly for policymakers, the White House decisionmakers, the State Department, military, and military leaders,” he said.

Although information-sharing among the intelligence community has yet to be formalized through NOAH or JCAG or a similar system, military officials have said they need some kind of linked access capability.

Intelligence systems need to be included within the Global Information Grid—the military’s vision of a future global network that could be accessed from anywhere in the world, said Brig. Gen. Marilyn Quagliotti, vice director of the Joint Staff’s command, control, communications and computers directorate, during a Nov. 5 speech on information assurance at a conference in Arlington, VA.

“We need a more integrated strategy, including help from [the Joint Staff’s intelligence directorate] with intelligence reports or warnings of an attack,” she said.

Quagliotti said the toughest challenge for achieving “information superiority” is the need to unite networks and network managers under one command structure with stronger situational awareness capabilities.

“Part of [the challenge] is the overwhelming amount of information, the ability to access that information, and the ability to reach back and get that information, which means that networks become more crucial to the warfight,” she said.

[From Signal, Apr. 2000]

FUSION CENTER CONCEPT TAKES ROOT AS CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST WAXES

Creation of a national operations and analysis hub is finding grudging acceptance among senior officials in the U.S. national security community. This fresh intelligence mechanism would link federal agencies to provide instant collaborative threat profiling and analytical assessments for use against asymmetrical threats. National policy makers, military commanders and law enforcement agencies would be beneficiaries of the hub’s information.

Prodded by a resolute seven-term Pennsylvania congressman and reminded by recent terrorist and cyberthreat activities, the U.S. Defense Department is rethinking its earlier aversion to the idea, and resistance is beginning to crumble. Funding to establish the national operations and analysis hub (NOAH), which would link 28 federal agencies, is anticipated as a congressional add-on in the Defense Department’s new budget. An initial \$10 million in funding is likely in fiscal year 2001 from identified research and development accounts.

Spearheading the formation of NOAH is Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA), chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives National Security Committee’s military research and development subcommittee. He emphasizes that challenges facing U.S. leaders are beginning to overlap, blurring distinction and jurisdiction. “The increasing danger is both domestic and international.”

Conceptually, NOAH would become a national-level operations and control center with a mission to integrate various imagery, data and analytical viewpoints. The intelligence products would support U.S. actions. “I see NOAH as going beyond the capability of the National Military Command Center and the National Joint Military Intelligence Command. NOAH would provide recommended courses of action that allow the U.S. to effectively meet emerging challenges in near real time,” the congressman illustrates.

“This central national-level hub would be composed of a system of agency-specified mini centers, or ‘pods,’ of participating agencies and services associated with growing national security concerns,” Weldon reports. “NOAH would link the policy maker with action recommendations derived from fused information provided by the individual pod.” Automation and connectivity would allow the pods to talk to each other in a computer-based environment to share data and perspectives on a given situation.

The congressman believes that NOAH should reside within the Defense Department and is modeling the hub’s concept on a U.S. Army organization he closely follows. He says the idea for NOAH comes from officials in several federal agencies. However, it is also based on his own experiences with the U.S. Army’s Intelligence and Security Command’s (INSCOM’s) Land Warfare Information Activity (LIWA) and Information Dominance Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Patterned after LIWA, (SIGNAL, March, page 31), NOAH would display collaborative threat profiling and analysis. With the aid of a variety of electronic tools, the hub would support national actions, Weldon discloses.

The congressman is conscious of other initiatives such as linking counterintelligence groups throughout the community. He also

is aware of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) counterterrorism center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) National Infrastructure Protection Center and a new human intelligence (HUMINT) special operations center. "We don't need another analytical center. Instead, we need a national-level fusion center that can take already analyzed data and offer courses of action for decision making," he insists.

Weldon's wide experience in dealing with officials from the FBI, CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) convince him that policy makers are continuing to work in a vacuum. "Briefings and testimonies are the primary vehicles for transmitting information to leaders. The volume of information germane to national security issues is expanding so rapidly that policy makers are overwhelmed with data," he claims.

Robust situational awareness of asymmetric threats to national security is a key in assisting leaders, Weldon observes. "Policy makers need an overarching information and intelligence architecture that will quickly assimilate, analyze and display assessments and recommend courses of action for many simultaneous national emergencies," he declares. The concept of NOAH also calls for virtual communications among policy makers.

Weldon's plan is for White House, Congress, Pentagon and agency-level leaders each to have a center where they receive, send, share and collaborate on assessments before they act. He calls NOAH the policy maker's tool. In the collaborative environment, the hub would provide a multiissue, multiagency hybrid picture to the White House situation room and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NOAH's concept also includes support for HUMINT and peacekeeping missions along with battle damage assessment. The same system could later help brace congressional committees and hearings. The new capability would allow application of foreign threat analyses to policy, while providing a hybrid situational awareness picture of the threat, Weldon relates. Industrial efforts of interest to the policy maker could be incorporated, and academia also could be directly linked.

In meetings with high-level FBI, CIA and defense officials, Weldon stressed the need to "acquire, fuse and analyze disparate data from many agencies in order to support the policy maker's actions against threats from terrorism, [ballistic missile] proliferation, illegal technology diversions, espionage, narcotics [trafficking], information warfare and cyberterrorism." He is convinced that current collection and analysis capabilities in various intelligence agencies are stovepiped. "To some extent, this involves turf protection, but it clearly hinders policy making."

Weldon, who was a Russian studies major, offers some of his own recent experiences as examples of why there is a strong need for NOAH. He maintains close contact with a number of Russians and understands their programs and technologies. The congressman is quick to recall vignettes about Russian officials and trips to facilities in the region.

During the recent U.S. combat action involvement in Kosovo, Weldon was contacted by senior Russian officials. Clamoring for Russia to be involved in the peace process they claimed that otherwise upcoming elections could go to the communists. The Russians proposed a Belgrade meeting with Weldon, congressional colleagues, key Serbian officials and possibly Yugoslave President Slobodan Milosevic.

After the first meeting with key officials from the departments of State and Defense and the CIA, Weldon and other members of Congress went to Vienna, Austria. The State

Department objected to a meeting in Belgrade, suggesting instead a neutral site. Before the departure, the Russians informed Weldon that Dragomir Karic, a member of a powerful and wealthy Kosovo family, would attend the meeting. Karic's brother was a member of the Milosevic regime.

At the end of the Vienna meeting, the Russians and Karic told Weldon that if he would accompany them to Belgrade, Milosevic was prepared to meet with them and publicly embrace a peace agreement concept reached during the Vienna meeting. The agreement would have directly involved Russia in the peace process. A diplomatic official with the U.S. delegation telephoned Washington, D.C., and the State Department objected to the Belgrade trip. The congressman and his colleagues returned home.

As soon as he arrived in Washington, D.C., the FBI telephoned to request a meeting with Weldon to gather details on Karic. It was clear, Weldon reports, they had very little information on him or his family. The following day, the CIA telephoned the congressman and asked for a meeting "about Karic." Instead, the congressman proposed a joint meeting with CIA and FBI agents in his office. Two officials from each agency attended with a list of questions.

Weldon learned from the agents that they were seeking information on Karic to brief the State Department. When he explained that the information came from the Army and LIWA, the CIA and FBI agents had no knowledge of that organization, he confirms. Before his departure for Vienna, the congressman received a six-page LIWA profile of Karic and his family's links to Milosevic.

"This is an example of why an organization like NOAH is so critically necessary," Weldon contends. "LIWA's Information Dominance Center provides the best capability we have today in the federal government to assess massive amounts of data and develop profiles. LIWA uses it contacts with other agencies to obtain database information from those systems," he explains. "Some is unclassified and some classified."

Weldon cites an "extraordinary capability by a former CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency official, who is a LIWA profiler, as one of the keys in LIWA's success. She does the profiling and knows where to look and which systems to pull information from in a data mining and extrapolation process," he proclaims. "She makes the system work."

Weldon intends to use LIWA's profiling capability as a model for building NOAH. "My goal is to go beyond service intelligence agencies and integrate all intelligence collection. This must be beyond military intelligence, which is too narrow in scope, to provide a governmentwide capability. Each agency with a pod linked to NOAH would provide two staff members assigned at the hub, which would operate continuously. Data brought together in 'this cluster would be used for fusion and profiling. Which any agency could then request,'" he maintains.

NOAH would not belong to the Army, which would continue with its own intelligence capabilities as would the other services. There would only be one fusion center, which would handle input from all federal agencies and from open sources. Weldon explains. "NOAH would handle threats like information operations and examine stability in various regions of the world. We need this ability to respond immediately." The congressman adds that he recently was briefed by LIWA on very sensitive, very limited and scary profile information, which he describes as "potentially explosive." In turn, Weldon arranged briefings for the chairman of the House National Security Committee, the Speaker of the House and other key congressional leaders.

"But this kind of profiling capability is very limited now. The goal is to have it on a regular basis. The profiling could be used for sensitive technology transfer issues and information about security breaches," the congressman allows. LIWA has what he terms the fusion and profiling state-of-the-art capability in the military, "even beyond the military." Weldon is pressing the case for NOAH among the leaders in both houses of Congress. "It is essential that we create a governmentwide capability under very strict controls."

Weldon adds that establishing NOAH is not a funding issue; it is a jurisdictional issue. "Some agencies don't want to tear down their stovepipes. Yet, information on a drug lord, as an example, could be vitally important to help combat terrorism." He makes a point that too often, federal agencies overlap each other in their efforts to collect intelligence against these threats, or they fail to pool their resources and share vital information. "This redundancy of effort and confusion of jurisdiction only inhibits our nation's capabilities," he offers.

NOAH would provide high-bandwidth, virtual connectivity to experts to agency pod sites. Protocols for interagency data sharing would be established and refined in links to all pod sites. The ability to retrieve, collate, analyze and display data would be exercised to provide possible courses of action. A backup site would be established for redundancy, and training would begin on collaborative tools as soon as it is activated.

This hub system would become part of the national policy creation and execution system. The tools available at LIWA would be shared so that every agency would have the same tools. Weldon explains that all agencies would post data on the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) highway in a replicated format sensitive to classification. NOAH's global network would use the NRO system as a backbone.

NOAH optimizes groups of expertise within each organization—experts who are always on hand regardless of the issue. This approach ties strategic analysis and tactical assessment to a course of action. "Before the U.S. can take action against emerging threats, we must first understand their relationship to one another, their patterns, the people and countries involved and the level of danger posed to our nation," Weldon says. "That is where NOAH begins."

STEPS TO ACHIEVE NOAH CAPABILITY

Establish baseline capability by building initial Hub Center and congressional virtual hearing room. Equip White House Situation Room to Collaborate with these sites.

Staff the Hub Center with two reps from each of the 28 key participating agencies.

Link up NOAH internal and external collaborative environment.

Hook in Backup Site for redundancy and begin training on collaborative tools.

Build the 28 Key Agency Pod Sites along model of the Information Dominance Center at Fort Belvoir, VA.

Link all Pod Sites to NOAH hub center.

Establish Protocols for Inter-agency data sharing.

Exercise live ability to retrieve, collate, analyze, display disparate data and provide policy makers course of action analysis at the NOAH Hub Center.

Refine procedures and Protocols.

AGENCIES REPRESENTED IN THE NATIONAL COLLABORATIVE CENTER

Central Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
National Imagery and Mapping Agency
National Security Agency

National Reconnaissance Office
 Defense Threat Reduction Agency
 Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Army/LIWA
 Air Force
 Navy
 Marine Corps
 Joint Counter-Intelligence Assessment
 Group
 ONDCP
 FBI
 Drug Enforcement Agency
 U.S. Customs
 National Criminal Investigative Service
 National Infrastructure Protection Center
 Defense Information Systems Agency
 State Department
 Five CINCs
 Department of Energy
 Department of Commerce
 Department of the Treasury
 Justice Department
 Office of the Secretary of Defense
 National Military Command Center
 National Joint Military Intelligence Com-
 mand

Elements to be connected to the national collaborative center would include the White House Situation Room, a Congressional Virtual Hearing Room and a possible redundant, or back-up site.

Mr. Speaker, the second topic I want to touch upon briefly is the President's summit, which will take place in Russia this week. When the President travels to Moscow and St. Petersburg this week, he will have something that no other president has had before in our relationship with Russia. This President will take with him a document that was prepared by a bipartisan group of our colleagues in the House and the Senate, supported by all the major U.S.-Russia thinktanks to broaden our relationship with Russia.

A year ago, I started working on trying to forge a new direction for our relationship with Russia. I contacted all the thinktanks from Harvard and Columbia to Monterrey, to the U.S.-Russia Business Council, the Tolstoy Foundation, Georgia Tech, and all those schools doing work with Russia and all those nonprofits and NGOs. I said, first of all, tell me what you are doing with Russia. Because, surprisingly, Mr. Speaker, not one Federal agency had a complete list of all the initiatives between the U.S. people and the Russian people, U.S. agencies and Russian agencies, U.S. NGOs and Russian NGOs.

That document became a 9-page appendix in the back of the report we prepared for President Bush, for the first time listing all the activities that we are engaged in with Russia on. How can we have a relationship when we do not even know what we are doing with that country and its people?

□ 2340

I also asked those groups to make recommendations for me of what new things we could be doing with Russia to expand our relationship beyond the issues where we disagree. Because you see, Mr. Speaker, in the past our Presidents would meet and they would argue over issues that we disagree on, how many missiles we had, how many nu-

clear weapons, the ABM treaty, and we argue when neither side trusts the other.

My point is before we can get to those difficult issues, we have a new President in Russia, a new President in America, a new Congress, why do we not expand our relationship based on the new direction Putin is taking Russia and truly become friends with the Russian people?

The resultant recommendations that we produced are contained in this document. Members can get it on my Web site, both in Russian and in English. It is also being transmitted over in Russia to the Duma, and I presented it to Putin himself in October of last year. This document, Mr. Speaker, says, and I hope that the upcoming summit will build on this and I am confident it will, that our relationship with Russia should be expanded to 11 areas, not just defense. They include agriculture, culture and education, economic development, energy and natural resources, the environment, health care, judicial and legal, local government, science and technology, space and aeronautics and defense and security. There are 108 recommendations. Some do not require any new programs, simply changes legislatively, like ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention basically elevating Russia out of Jackson-Vanik, supporting Russia's accession to the WTO, restructuring of the London and Paris Club debt.

Other recommendations require action on the part of the administration and the Congress. Many of these recommendations do not involve public money. They involve simply the support of existing private relationships, school to school, company to company, NGO to NGO. In fact, in the area of culture, that entire document was written by the Tolstoy Foundation. They receive no public money. All of their work is done with foundation and donations. In the economic area, we dealt with the U.S.-Russia Business Council. They gave us their recommendations. In health care I went to the Academy of Physicians. They are doing work in Russia in training doctors and nurses. They wrote that recommendation. The resultant document, 45 pages long, gave this President something no other President had, a detailed blueprint to expand the relationship between Russia and the U.S. to a new level.

In giving this to the President, Mr. Speaker, I did not want it to come from me. So I went to our colleagues in the House and the Senate. I had 2 days prior to the October summit to get signatures. Every Member I went to agreed to sign on as a supporter of this document and its recommendations. In the Senate, I went to CARL LEVIN, JOE BIDEN, and DICK LUGAR. They signed the front page with me. In the House I went to the far left, my good friend DENNIS KUCINICH who chairs the Progressive Caucus who immediately signed on. He has been with me to Russia three times. I went to my good

friend BERNIE SANDERS who has traveled to Russia with me, who is our only socialist in the Congress. I went to the chairman of the Hispanic Caucus, SILVESTRE REYES, who signed the document responding and representing all the Hispanic Members and moderate Democrats like HOWARD BERMAN, NORM DICKS, JACK MURTHA, all signed on in support of this new relationship.

On the conservative side I went to our colleagues and friends ROSCOE BARTLETT and JOE PITTS, JOHN DOOLITTLE, they all signed on, as well as the leadership, DICK ARMEY, CHRIS COX, J.C. WATTS, and HENRY HYDE.

In the end, Mr. Speaker, when this document was given by me to President Bush, Condoleezza Rice, and to President Putin before he left for Crawford, Texas, by me, it had the signatures of one-third of the Congress. So as President Bush travels to St. Petersburg and Moscow this week, he now has the unified support of this Congress to broaden our relationship with Russia like we have never done before. It is up to our President and the Russian President to stake out new territory.

The arms control agreement they have reached is historic. I commend President Bush overwhelmingly for what he has done to reduce the nuclear weapons from 6,000 to 2,000 on both sides. That in itself is a historic item, as is the new relationship with Russia and NATO. But, Mr. Speaker, that is not enough. The stars are all aligned this week. We have a new President in Russia who has done some dramatic things, things that would never have been thought of over the past 10, 15 years in Russia. He shut down Russia's largest listening station against us in Cuba without our asking. He ordered the pullback of trainloads of Russian military supplies in Moldova on the European border without our request. He offered us his airport that used to be a Soviet military base in Uzbekistan where our troops are currently housed.

He was the first elected official on September 11 to call President Bush to say Russia will give you whatever you need to fight terrorism. It was not Tony Blair. It was Putin. And he has given us full access to Russia's intelligence.

So we have a president in Russia who is taking some dramatic steps. He is being criticized for that back home. In fact, just a month and a half ago, 41 retired generals and admirals and two former defense ministers in Russia took out a full page ad in a Russian publication called *Nezavizimaya Gazeta*, one of the largest publications in Moscow. That full page ad criticized Putin for moving too close to America, for getting too friendly with the West.

You see, Mr. Speaker, there are hard-liners in Russia that want to take us back to the Cold War, that do not like America and Russia coming together; but it is not just in Russia, Mr. Speaker. There are hard-liners in our country that do not like the direction we are going in, either. President Bush and

President Putin have got to pull away from the Cold War mentality, those hard-liners in both countries, and have a historic opportunity to move our two nations into a new relationship, a relationship of trust, of understanding, and of mutual engagement, in the areas of health care, education, environment, energy, to show the Russian people that we truly want them to be a successful nation, that we want to be partners with them; and I am convinced now more than ever that we need Russia.

We need to reduce our dependency on Middle Eastern crude oil which is the reason why we have the major problem in the Middle East today, in Israel. If we reduce our dependency on Middle Eastern crude, the Russians have vast amounts of crude and gas that we can help them develop. We must work with them together.

So, Mr. Speaker, I wish the President well. I will lead a 19-Member delegation into Moscow the day that President Bush comes back home. We will follow up his meetings with Putin with members of the Duma and the Federation Council. We will follow up on the recommendations of the document and on Monday morning we will listen to President Putin give us a summary of his feeling about the summit. I am optimistic, Mr. Speaker, because I think these two Presidents are going to fundamentally change the face of the world security relationship. Russia and America, two archenemies for 70 years, I think in the 21st century will become two partners that will work to stabilize the world. Russia can assist us in dealing with Iran and Iraq because of their ties to those countries. In fact, Russia can assist us in a number of areas, in energy, in technology. It is in our interest and in theirs to work together.

Just 2 weeks ago on the floor of this Chamber, we took another historic vote. I offered an amendment to the defense bill that was supported by 362 Members of Congress from both parties to challenge the Russians to provide full transparency on their nuclear weapons, their nuclear testing, their nuclear program. That same day in my office, I was meeting with the Russian minister of atomic energy. He is a friend of mine. I have known him for the past 5 years when he worked at Kurchatov Institute for my friend Yevgeny Velakof. The minister of atomic energy was in my office when we voted on an historic measure that I offered to provide full transparency in our nuclear relationship with Russia. My hope is that this too will become a point of discussion between Presidents Bush and Putin, because if we truly want further arms reductions, if we truly want to have a more secure world, it has got to start by building a trust that we have not had for the past 10 years.

And if I were a Russian, I would not have trusted us either during the 1990s. After all, we turned our back when Yeltsin's friends were stealing billions

of dollars of IMF money. We pretended we did not see it, because we did not want to embarrass Boris Yeltsin. And when we saw evidence of technology being transferred out of Russia, by disgruntled generals and admirals, we pretended that we did not see that because we did not want to embarrass Yeltsin. So the Congress misread that and blamed the Russian Government and said we do not want to work with this country. So during the 1990s, we lost the trust and confidence of the Russian people. The best evidence of that to me was comparing what I saw in 1992 when Boris Yeltsin stood on a tank outside the Moscow White House waving the Russian flag with 20,000 or 30,000 Russians surrounding him, declaring the Soviet Union was dead, Communism had ended, Russia was a new country.

□ 2350

During that same speech, Yeltsin said America and Russia will be partners together, and the Russian people cheered. That was in 1992 when Yeltsin gave that speech.

Compare that to 1999. Yeltsin has health problems, drinking problems. Russia is filled with corruption, which we ignored. 1999, Yeltsin is being railroaded out of office, his popularity is down to 2 percent. The only people supporting Yeltsin was the United States leadership. That is why in the fall of 1999, two months before Yeltsin left office, 20,000 new Russians gathered outside our embassy in Moscow and burned the American flag, fired weapons at our embassy, and threw paint at the walls of our embassy compound. In seven short years we had gone from Russia's partner to the Russian people saying "we don't trust you, America."

This week, President Bush and President Putin have a chance to change all that, and unlike any other time, they have got the Congress behind them, the Duma behind them, the Federation Council behind them. Members of Congress will be in Moscow right following the summit telling the Russian people that this truly is a new time, a new beginning.

I ask and I urge all of my colleagues to thank the President for his leadership and to continue to support those efforts, especially passage of the Jackson-Vanik legislation, that will truly allow Russia to become a close partner and ally of our Nation.

Mr. Speaker, following our trip to Russia, we are going to do a few other historic things I want to highlight for our colleagues. We will leave Russia on Monday, after meeting with Putin in the morning and the Members of the Duma and the Federation Council, and we will fly in our military plane to Uzbekistan. In Taskent we will meet with the President of the country and leaders of their parliament.

Uzbekistan is a shining example of a former Soviet State that has now become one of our strongest allies, opening up its territory for our troops. We will visit with their parliament and we

will challenge them to start a new relationship between their parliament and our Congress like we have done with the Russian Duma, the Ukrainian Rada, the Moldavian Parliament.

While in Uzbekistan, after meeting with their leaders, we will go to our military base, we will meet with our troops, we will give them home-baked cookies from the kids and families of America, we will give them 6,000 hand-made greeting cards from elementary school children, we will give them Hershey candy bars and TastyKakes from Pennsylvania, and talk to them about what life is like back here in the States.

We may also visit one of our base camps in Afghanistan to show our support there for our troops as well.

Then we will leave Uzbekistan and we will travel to Beijing, China. In Beijing we will meet with the incoming leader, Mr. Hu, who was just recently in the U.S. I will speak at the National Defense University of the People's Liberation Army, the third time I have spoken there. I will give a speech on a major university campus in Beijing and interact with the up and coming leaders of that country.

We will also meet with the chairman and leadership of the People's Congress to talk about areas of mutual concern and interest between the U.S. and China.

We will leave Beijing on Thursday and fly into Pyongyang, North Korea, the first time ever that a U.S. Congressional delegation in a bipartisan, open way has visited North Korea. What a historic opportunity for us to open the door for dialog with the leaders of North Korea.

We will not be there to endorse them, we will not be there to support their government, because it is a communist dictatorship. We will be there to tell them as human beings we have to talk, we have to meet, we have to speak and exchange our views. And we want to tell them that we care about their people, we care about the education of their kids, the ability for them to feed their people and the ability of them to provide a stable quality of life for North Korean citizens. We will not reach any landmark agreements. We will do something that needs to be done, we will open the door to North Korea.

I will be taking a letter with me, Mr. Speaker, from the President of Drexel University in Philadelphia, a school with a huge population of foreign and Korean students, and the president of Drexel, Constantine Papadakis, will invite the President of the largest university in North Korea to establish an academic relationship between the two schools.

We will also be carrying a letter from the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia offering to host a conference in America on U.S.-North Korean relations.

I will be carrying a third letter signed by students of Drexel to students of the largest university in North

Korea asking to have a student exchange of letters and eventually trips back and forth. We will also discuss our relations with the People's Congress in North Korea and ways we can work together. Hopefully this will be the start of the opening up and the thawing of the relations between our country and North Korea.

Following our trip to Pyongyang, we will travel to Seoul, Korea. In Seoul we will brief the South Koreans who are enthusiastically supporting our trip about our discussions. We will brief the incoming candidates for the presidency of that country in the elections later this year. We will brief the parliamentary leaders, and give a press conference to the world about the trip and the implications of building peace with the Russians, the Uzbeks, the Chinese, the North Koreans, and our good friends, the South Koreans.

Mr. Speaker, what this all says is this Congress plays a vitally crucial role in not just helping to prevent incidents like 9/11 with recommendations that the administration needs to listen to, but this Congress also plays a constructive role in building peaceful relations with those countries that would be our enemy. I thank our colleagues for their support of this effort.

Mr. Speaker, I will insert in the RECORD a summary of our New Time, New Beginning document, as well as the accompanying letter signed by one-third of the Congress that was hand-delivered to President Bush and to President Putin prior to the Crawford Summit, which we hope will be the basis of the St. Petersburg summit.

I thank the staff and you for your indulgence in allowing me to present this information today.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, November 7, 2001.

President GEORGE W. BUSH,
Washington, DC.

DEAR PRESIDENT BUSH: As you prepare for the upcoming summit with President Putin, we commend the positive approach you have established with Russia. Too often, the focus of our bilateral relations has been on defense and security—precisely the issues on which our interests often collide. It would be more useful, as we move forward with a Russian policy for the 21st century to take a more holistic approach—one that takes into account Russia's myriad concerns as well as our own.

Therefore, in consultation with many of the leading experts on Russia, we propose a series of bipartisan initiatives to engage Russia on issues such as the environment, energy, economic development, health care—as well as defense and security. We call this proposal "A New Time, A New Beginning." Some of these are new ideas, but many are not. Many of these initiatives are already underway, and need additional support to make even greater progress.

Such engagement is in the U.S. interest as well as Russia's. If the United States and Russia cooperate on issues across the board, Russia will be more likely to work closely with America on the national security issues that matter most to us—missile defense, the war against terrorism, and proliferation.

We encourage you to review the enclosed proposal and hope that some of these initiatives will prove useful to you in the ongoing

discussions between Russia and America. We look forward to working with you to forge a new relationship that will benefit both our countries.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Connie Morella, Jim Maloney, Cass Ballenger, Nathan Deal.

Jerry Weller, Jim Gibbons, Jim Ryun, Judy Biggert, Jerry Costello, Eddie Bernice Johnson, Stephen Horn, Kay Granger, Ed Schrock, Tom Davis, Randy Cunningham, Gary Condit, Randy Forbes, Steven LaTourette, Joe Skeen, Bob Borski, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Chris Smith.

Adam Putnam, Frank Pallone, Johnny Isakson, Robert Andrews, Bernie Sanders, Nick Lampson, Rod Blagojevich, Jim Saxton, Jim Turner, Mike Ferguson, Van Hilleary, Ed Royce, Bob Filner, Luis Gutierrez, Danny Davis.

Jane Harman, Rick Boucher, Christopher John, Todd Akin, Dave Weldon, Bart Gordon, Virgil Goode, Jr., Alan Mollohan, Frank Wolf, Hilda Solis, Rush Holt, Carrie Meek, Amo Houghton, Paul Kanjorski, Bob Goodlatte, Doug Bereuter, John Shimkus, J.D. Hayworth.

James Greenwood, Kevin Brady, Bob Brady, Melissa Hart, Phil English, John Thune, Tom Allen, George Gekas, Robert Andrews, Mike Doyle, Shelly Moore Capito, Rob Simmons, Todd Akin.

A NEW VISION FOR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Those of us who value the U.S.-Russian relationship have been on a roller-coaster ride for the past decade. During the heady days of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union, it appeared that our two countries would cooperate as never before. The world cheered when Presidents Bush and Yeltsin hailed a new "strategic partnership" between America and Russia.

There followed, however, a dark period—marked by misguided American policies and rampant Russian corruption. The Russian economy sagged as American aid—money meant for the Russian people—was siphoned off and stashed in Swiss banks and American real estate investment. At the same time, NATO's war in Kosovo strained the already sinking bilateral relationship. What were the results of this increasingly bitter disenchantment? A more aggressive Russian foreign policy, increased proliferation from Moscow to rogue states, and the final coup de grace: Russia and China announcing last year a new "strategic partnership"—against the interests of America and the West.

Now is the time, with new leaders in Washington and Moscow, to improve the relationship for the long-term.

My interest in this relationship began when I was nineteen years old, when a college professor convinced me to switch my major to Russian Studies. Since that time, I have been fascinated with the Soviet Union and Russia—and have traveled there more than twenty-five times.

I began my travels when I was a member of my local County Council and was invited to travel to Moscow by the American Council of Young Political Leaders. I have continued to visit Russia since my election to Congress, as a member of the House Armed Services Committee, and later as co-chairman of the Duma-Congress Study Group, the official interparliamentary exchange between the U.S. and Russia.

My interactions with leaders across Russia have taught me that the Russians are a

proud people, historically aware, and mindful of Russia's unique global role. Increasingly, they are becoming aware of the limitless possibilities of U.S.-Russian cooperation on a host of issues.

This brief paper, then, is an effort to weave together a comprehensive program of U.S.-Russian cooperation across a wide-range of issues.

Too often, the focus of our bilateral relations has been on defense and security—precisely the issues on which our interests often collide. It would be more useful, as we move forward with a Russian policy for the 21st century, to take a more holistic approach—one that takes into account Russia's myriad concerns as well as our own.

Therefore, in consultation with many of the leading experts on Russia, I propose a series of initiatives to engage Russia on issues like the environment, energy, economic development, and health care—as well as defense and security. Some of these are new ideas, but many are not. Many of these initiatives are already underway, and need additional support to make even greater progress.

Such engagement is in the interest of the U.S. as well as Russia. For if the U.S. and Russia are cooperating on issues across the board, Russia will be more likely to work closely with America on the national security issues that matter most to us—missile defense, the war against terrorism, and proliferation.

This is not, and will never be, a finished product. The contours of our bilateral relationship change daily with world events. Nor will it likely be turned into a grand legislative proposal, although certainly parts of it may be. I hope that it is a starting point for discussions between Russia and America on ways that we can forge a new relationship that will benefit both our countries.

For if we make a new American-Russian relationship, one based on common interests that benefit the citizens of both countries, then we will make great progress—not just for America and Russia alone, but for peace and stability across the globe.

Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA)

U.S.-RUSSIA PARTNERSHIP

A NEW TIME A NEW BEGINNING

Summary of recommendations

Agricultural Development: Assist in agricultural production; expand private-sector investment; and enhance capacity to purchase essential agricultural inputs, commodities and equipment.

Cultural/Education Development: Expand cultural ties outside the major cities; assist regional museums in generating tourism; and provide for more Russian language and cultural studies in U.S. schools.

Defense and Security: Initiate new bilateral talks similar to the Ross-Mamedov talks on a Global Protection System; move forward with joint talks on a new non-proliferation regime; and encourage progress on the RAMOS program and restructure the Nuclear Cities Initiative.

Economic Development: Help facilitate Russia's accession to the WTO and its acceptance of all WTO agreements; increase funding for OPIC and EX-IM Bank projects in Russia; and work with Russia to improve intellectual property rights.

Energy/Natural Resources: Foster cooperative pilot projects, starting with oil and gas exploration in Timan Pechora; convene bilateral task force to discuss the energy ramifications of the war on terrorism; and eliminate bureaucratic obstacles to joint cooperation on energy.

Environmental Cooperation: Develop a revolving fund to assure development of promising Russian technologies; expand debt for

nature swaps; and dramatically expand cooperation on marine science research.

Health Care: Increase emphasis on chronic disease like cardiovascular disease and diabetes; develop more extensive physician exchange programs; and augment existing cooperation between NIH and appropriate Russian research institutes.

Judicial/Legal Systems: Support expansion of jury trials into all Russian regions; expand Environmental Public Advocacy Centers into Russia; and encourage a doubling of the number of legal clinics.

Local Governments: Propose ways to expand the tax base available to local governments; encourage political participation by increasing local partisan affiliations; and encourage the gradual devolution of services to the local level.

Science and Technology: Increase cooperation in the area of nuclear fuel cycles; expand cooperative fusion research on nonpolluting energy solutions; and involve Russian industry in embryonic U.S. nanotechnology efforts.

Space and Aeronautics: Utilize commercial joint ventures to enable Russia to meet its Space Station obligations; increase joint projects on space solar power, propulsion technology, and weather satellites; and cooperate on mutually-beneficial planetary defense tracking technologies.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Summary

United States government resources are employed in Russia to enhance Russia's capacity to purchase essential agricultural inputs, commodities, and equipment in order to assist agricultural production and expand private-sector investment to improve Russia's agricultural infrastructure. Neither Russia's government nor the private sector alone are willing or able to meet these needs. There are a number of programs carried out through USDA and USAID to benefit Russian agriculture. USDA and USAID officials have stated that there are no cooperative efforts between Russia and the U.S. in any third countries. Most programs are administered by private voluntary organizations (PVOs) which utilize USDA and USAID resources to carry out development activities within Russia. Additionally, private-sector efforts such as the U.S.-Russia Business Council utilize government resources through these programs in order to expand and enhance the U.S.-Russian commercial relationship.

Those PVOs involved in Russian that are actually working at ground level believe that greater efforts are required to improve the country's ability to provide for its citizens. Regarding USDA's programs, the Administration's food aid review, especially with regard to the 416(b) surplus disposal program, has thrown into question the amount of resources available for Russia, since many PVO projects are funded through monetized 416(b) donations. This situation may become clearer once U.S. food aid programs are reauthorized and/or altered through a new farm bill and once the Administration releases its food aid proposals as part of its FY03 budget request. As for USAID, PVOs express the concern that the agency's activities in Russia require a greater focus on agriculture.

The programs designed as a solution would require U.S. government resources (primarily, through USDA and USAID) because the Russian government and private capital markets cannot or will not provide the resources necessary to improve the Russian agriculture infrastructure. A number of proposals exist, and the number of proposals would increase with a greater commitment to Russian agriculture through USDA and USAID. Such efforts through USDA and

USAID would play a key role not only in improving the ability of Russia agriculture to meet the critical needs of its citizens, but in enhancing the Russian private sector and improving the prospects for future earnings of U.S. agribusiness.

Recommendations

Improving credit availability and production practices and attracting investment in Russian agribusiness are the areas of focus for redeveloping Russian agriculture. CNFA's Agribusiness Partnerships Program seeks to build financially and economically viable private sector agricultural systems within Russia and the former Soviet states.

For example, in 1993, the Russian baby food manufacturing industry was supplying less than half of the country's annual baby food required to assure minimum levels of health and nutrition to Russian infants and children. CNFA entered into a partnership with Heinz to increase domestic manufacturing output. Using USAID-funded technical assistance, CNFA and Heinz worked to develop and introduce more nutritious baby food products and enhance local production to increase the Russian baby food sector's ability to meet its domestic demand.

The recovery of Russian domestic production capacity may require foreign equity investment in production facilities and businesses along with access to credits for the purchase of production inputs. Without proactive PVO involvement, neither the Russian government nor private capital markets will be willing or able to meet these needs.

(a) CNFA has a proposal that would establish a fund which will provide long-term investment capital for the development of agricultural production, processing, packaging, and distribution businesses and establish a trade finance facility. This fund would address Russia's inability to purchase critical agriculture inputs and commodities and the lack of investment capital to develop the private sector agricultural infrastructure. The fund would be established through the monetization of USDA food aid commodities within Russia.

(b) Similarly, another PVO, ACIDI-VOCA, has submitted a large project proposal to improve rural credit availability and facilitate investment in medium-sized Russian food processing companies. Thus far, the proposal has not received approval. ACIDI-VOCA believes the approval has been stalled at the interagency food aid review process due to what it perceives as OMB's unease at utilizing 416(b) donations for monetizing. Again, this proposal would seek to address two principle problems: inadequate access to credit and inadequate capital investment.

CULTURAL/EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Summary

Cultural cooperation is known to be one of the best ways to overcome mutual distrust, insularity, and conflict among nations. By working together with artists, writers, musicians, and cultural institutions we can promote artistic freedom, good will, and international exposure, as well as support economic viability in the cultural sector. Additionally, in sharing knowledge, specific techniques, and skills—and in broadening horizons—we are investing positively and constructively toward greater mutual understanding and a more peaceful and stable world for ourselves and coming generations.

Recommendations

Encourage expansion of cultural ties and initiatives outside the major centers. In recent years too much emphasis has been placed by Western institutions on the major centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg. This policy fails to serve the rest of the country as reasons grapple with a range of chal-

lenges, from economic problems to the need to regain their own identity.

Create viable links with other like-minded institutions to promote cultural cooperation. Example: With the support of the Soros Foundation through their Open Society project entitled "Transformation of Russian Society," the L.N. Tolstoy Museum/Estate at Yasnaya Polyana (LNM/E) established the first association of museum/estates in Russia. In the mid 1990s, this project assisted in the development of regional museums as focal centers for the preservation and promulgation of local culture, with programs on literature, music, and the arts.

Link regional museum centers to promote much-needed tourism and other support for the economically-depressed heartland of Russia outside the major centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Help to stimulate programs by supporting grassroots initiatives. Example: LNM/E in Tula has been involved for many years now in a project to encourage local artisans and musicians in this economically-depressed region. With assistance from the Soros Foundation, the LNM/E has been able to provide a forum for exhibitions and concerts to help stimulate local talent and find a market for them as well.

Foster interest in and greater appreciation of Russian language and culture among youth in the U.S. and provide Russian language and cultural immersion programs for secondary school students in preparation for college.

Increase funding for collaborative academic and research programs between Russian and American scholars, local government leaders, journalists, heads of NGOs, and researchers.

Allocate more federal funding for cultural initiatives to the private sector. There are many small non-profit organizations in the U.S. which have both cultural sensitivity and proven track records, yet cannot compete for AID funding because of current bureaucratic restrictions.

Support initiatives to create a U.S. clearinghouse for the identification and consolidation of U.S.-Russian cultural initiatives and exchange programs. There is no central point that can identify and help consolidate programs or facilitate student exchanges. Many programs today—both government and private—are being duplicated.

The U.S. should follow through with funding promised by former President Bush for the establishment of the American University in Moscow. Support initiatives like the Soros Foundation linking U.S. schools with Russian schools. Expand education exchanges between teachers, administrators, and educators at all levels. Establish a university to university relationship between American and Russian universities. Every school should have a partner.

DEFENSE AND SECURITY

Summary

United States defense and security cooperation and assistance involving the Russian Federation should contribute to defining a new bilateral strategic framework that is not rooted in the notion of Mutual Assured Destruction. Instead, the new security framework should be based upon improving U.S. and Russian security by working with Russia to combat terrorism and to halt the spread of missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

America and Russia must forge an alliance beneficial to both, or face the near certainty that historical suspicions will reassert themselves and plunge the world into a new Cold War. Such an eventuality would be especially tragic since the United States and Russia have more in common than not. Indeed, given that the gravest and most imminent threats to both nations are terrorism

and WMD proliferation, these great common enemies should make the United States and Russia natural allies.

The Cold War era model of bilateral relations and arms control is predicated on mutual antagonism and nuclear threats: a situation that is unacceptable as the basis for 21st Century U.S.-Russian relations. Russia and the United States each have unique security concerns, but have more security concerns that are shared in common. U.S. policy should encourage Russia to recognize the advantages of U.S.-Russian cooperation in areas like counter-terrorism, nonproliferation and missile defense—and the dangers of pursuing a confrontational foreign policy. There is some evidence to suggest that Russia may grudgingly compromise on U.S. missile defense goals. However, the main thrust of current Russian foreign policy and military strategy is actively seeking to curtail American influence and enhancing Russia's status by trying to diminish the United States. U.S. policy must recognize the existence of both positive and negative strains in Russian foreign policy, and then encourage the positive strain that is consistent with U.S. national security interests.

There should be a clear intent in U.S. policy to transition from near-term measures rooted in U.S. nonproliferation goals to a long-term solution. For example, one component of a long-term solution might be transitioning the Russian economy from defense to non-military production so that scientists can participate in sustainable non-weapons work that benefits the Russian economy. Achieving this will require integration of defense and security cooperation, with broader social and economic assistance focused on regional economies—programs administered outside the U.S. security community.

This is consistent not only with U.S. nonproliferation goals, but Russian interests as well. According to President Putin, Russia must speed up its integration into the Western community. If Putin is serious, Russia should not be involved in activities that undermine the security of the West. While Russia has formed an alliance with China, President Bush and President Putin have since found mutual interests in fighting terrorism as a result of September 11, 2001.

The key to forging a U.S.-Russian alliance is to do it now, before U.S.-Russian relations deteriorate further. The United States must offer Russia a relationship that clearly benefits Russian as well as U.S. interests, and begin as soon as possible, working jointly toward mutually beneficial goals. As the victor in the Cold War, the greater burden for taking the initiative and building trust between the sides falls upon the United States. In its relations with Russia, the U.S. holds an array of levers—strategic, military-technical, economic, and social—that can be used as positive and negative inducements to move Russia toward cooperation, and ultimately toward alliance, with the United States. Even the most modest proposals and programs already underway should be viewed as means to the larger end of reforging the still adversarial relationship between Washington and Moscow into a new American-Russian alliance that will defeat terrorism, halt WMD proliferation, and establish a more stable global order for the growth of political and economic freedom everywhere.

Recommendations

Strategic

Begin a new, high-level dialog similar to the Ross-Mamedov talks of 1992 to discuss U.S. and Russian proposals for a Global Protection System. Transitioning the security dialog with Russia to a "normal" one primarily conducted by lower-level officials is a

laudable goal, but you can't "get there from here" without an interim step. That step is to initiate a high-level process that has a broad mandate and will provide "cover" for lower levels of the Russian defense and security establishment to talk productively about these issues. The resulting cooperative approach to BMD deployment could encompass U.S. NMD, the Russian proposal for a European missile shield, and new initiatives like a feasibility study of boost-phase intercept involving Russia, Israel, and Turkey.

Moscow has repeatedly proposed working with Washington against terrorism. Washington should propose a formal alliance with Moscow in a global war against terrorism that will involve military and intelligence cooperation and joint operations. The U.S.-Russian alliance against terrorism will help Russia by gaining U.S. support for Russia's war against terrorism in Central Asia, which will go far toward achieving the U.S. goal of crushing terrorism globally. Unless Central Asia is stabilized, the region threatens to continue to spiral toward chaos and become, like Afghanistan, a breeding ground for terrorism. Moreover, a U.S.-Russian alliance against terrorism would preempt the emergence of an anti-Western Sino-Russian alliance, pull Russia closer to the West, and give a second chance to Russian democracy.

Russia has advocated an expanded international nonproliferation regime that would, among other things, involve countries of proliferation concern to the United States. The Departments of State and Defense should begin detailed discussions with the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministries on this proposal to determine if a new regime could establish more stringent nonproliferation and arms trade criteria. According to these criteria, Russia would limit its sales of arms, military technology, weapons of mass destruction, and dual-use military-civilian technology to China and Iran, cease such sales to rogue states, and severely limit them to countries in conflict, such as India and Pakistan. U.S. support for the effort, which, if successful, would enhance Moscow's diplomatic prestige, should also depend on Russia's willingness to advocate the return of U.N. weapons inspectors to Iraq. Russia has proposed this regime as an alternative to U.S. NMD and the U.S. must make it clear that it does not accept that argument: missile defense and international cooperation on nonproliferation are not mutually exclusive (indeed, they actually reinforce each other).

Direct the Department of Defense and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to develop a strategy to evaluate the feasibility of increasing technical cooperation with Russian military industry on missile defense technologies. The strategy should include a risk assessment (e.g., the spread of knowledge to China) and an assessment of the possible benefits (technical and political) to U.S. programs of projects like co-development of the Russian S-500. For example, Russian scientists might participate in developing high-speed boosters for interceptor rockets and airborne and space-based lasers.

Demonstrate to Russia that the U.S. is not interested in taking advantage of Russian weakness. Traditional nuclear arms control only makes sense if the U.S. and Russia remain adversaries. The U.S. should immediately begin efforts to demonstrate that American policy seeks to support transparency rather than numerical equivalencies as a measure of our shared interest in "stability." We also seek to take a fuller account of each side's nuclear arsenals and infrastructure—including tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon production facilities—in any future nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Russia. We understand that both the U.S. and Russia increasingly

have different force structure requirements as determined by our respective threat perceptions, geography, and technical abilities. The Departments of Defense, State, and Energy should articulate a strategy for communicating our interest in transparency to the Russians and fulfilling our part of such transparency dialog. We cannot force the Russians to accept that our motives are benign and that such a dialog is in Russian interests. However, the offer, coupled with the array of economic and political outreaches inherent in our broader Russian Policy, would be a good faith effort.

Make clear to Russia that the potential for cooperation in areas like counterterrorism, joint operations with NATO, regional defenses for Europe, etc. are greatly undermined by the way Russia has chosen to wage its war in Chechnya.

Military-Technical

Encourage and continue the Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) program. The innovative U.S.-Russian space based remote sensor R&D program addresses defense and environmental concerns. Initial concept of co-orbiting U.S. and Russian satellites for simultaneous stereo observations should be continued.

Restructure CTR Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) funding to other more effective efforts. The NCI's near-term goal of providing non-weapon work for Russian scientists if more flexibly addressed by other programs (e.g., ISTC, IPP) while its longer-term goal of converting the nuclear cities to sustainable non-weapons work cannot be achieved without a broader focus on the economies of the respective regions.

Economic

Support the rescheduling of Russia's \$150 billion debt to the Paris Club if Russia demonstrates active cooperation in cutting the flow of advanced military technology to rogue states.

A sustained effort to increase the percentage of Cooperative Threat Reduction money actually being spent in Russia. The perception is that in too many programs inordinate amounts of money are spent on administration, U.S. contractors, and consultants. Program offices must be made aware that this issue is a congressional priority and reporting requirements should reflect that concern.

A more rigorous joint program accounting effort to monitor how U.S. funds are spent in Cooperative Threat Reduction and associated programs. This improves U.S. confidence that monies are being spent appropriately and gives Russians experience in the application of modern accounting methods. Waste, fraud and abuse of CTR funding is a serious concern to both governments and a vehicle like this is necessary lest the process devolve into an adversarial one of accusation and denial.

Insist that Russia stop taxing U.S. assistance provided to scientists through cooperative programs. The Administration should suspend all Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment Corporation Insurance and Credits to U.S. companies that do business with Russian entities that are linked to Iran's military build-up activities. Russian government-controlled companies, such as the natural gas monopoly Gazprom, should not be allowed to raise funds from U.S. investors for energy schemes in Iran, since they could fund Iran's military build-up, which ultimately could be used to threaten U.S. interests in the region.

Task the interagency WMD working group at the National Security Council with designing a strategy for sanctioning Russia and Iran because of their proliferation activities. The intelligence community should

be tasked with a comprehensive assessment of the ongoing technology transfer and weapons programs, and with providing recommendations identifying "choke points" that might be vulnerable to sanctions. The current WMD working group at the NSC should be tasked with developing a sanctions strategy that targets Russian and Iranian officials, businesses, and individuals involved in the proliferation of WMD technologies, material, or know-how, as well as their sources of financing.

Establish a vehicle, preferably through a Congressionally mandated organization like USIP, to target support to U.S. non-governmental initiatives that interface directly with official or semi-official Russia in a productive way. These initiatives need a level of analytical freedom and the ability to shape the agenda of their dialog that is sometimes not possible within more traditional Department or Agency sponsorship (it needs to be easy to "think outside the box" established by Administration policy). The Russians would almost certainly be responsive to an effort with this sort of background and it would serve to broaden the bilateral dialog at a time when Russian voices appear to be more reticent. Efforts supported should be conscious of congressional interest in spending money in Russia. For example, Congress could create a vehicle for funding unofficial academic research that would, of necessity, involve significant Russian participation at the official or senior unofficial level. Projects could be chosen for their potential to be "spun on" to the official foreign policy or House-Duma dialogs.

Encourage U.S.-Russian military officer exchange programs and greatly increase the numbers. Encourage joint participation in U.S., Russian, and NATO military exercises. This will help allay Russia's residual fear of the West and promote a climate of trust.

Ratify the Law of the Sea Convention to establish guidelines for international maritime waters.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Summary

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has experienced widespread economic dislocation and a drop of about 50 percent in GDP. However, after more than a decade of virtually uninterrupted decline, the Russian economy demonstrated many promising signs of recovery.

The year 2000 was one of the most successful years for Russia in over three decades. The growth of GDP was 7.7 percent, fixed assets grew more than 18 percent, unemployment fell by more than 9 percent, real income of the population increased, and pensions increased by 38 percent in real terms.

Recommendations

Work to facilitate Russia's accession and its implementation of WTO agreements. The U.S. government can help Russia to realize its enormous economic potential and enable the country to become a more significant participant in the global economy. Specifically, these efforts will support the growth of the Russian private sector by permitting Russia to negotiate the elimination of trade barriers faced by its exporters and to challenge the WTO-consistency of measures taken by other member countries.

Increase the budgetary allocations for EX-IM, OPIC, and TDA. To help solidify the policy transition from aid to trade, these program funds must be maintained and increased. Where feasible, U.S. institutional financial risk on appropriate large-scale projects should be shared with multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the EBRD.

Provide targeted financing opportunities for small- and medium-sized U.S. companies.

The practices of various U.S. government-sponsored funds should be reviewed to ensure that they promote access to capital for the development of small- and medium-size enterprises.

The continuing development of the Tax Code will greatly benefit Russia if it creates a tax system that encourages, rather than discourages, investment.

Investors in Russia continue to express concern over weakness in protecting the property rights investors are afforded under Russian law. Amendments to the current legal framework should address gaps and ambiguities associated with some of these risks.

Support Russian efforts to strengthen Intellectual Property Rights protection and enforcement. Anti-counterfeit legislation should be strengthened and penalties enforced, while training law enforcement and judicial officials in this area.

Currency control laws have failed to stop capital flight and instead have damaged the reputation of the Russian business community. The current framework, which acts as a disincentive to Western investment, should be replaced by control and monitoring arrangements that will encourage investment and allow Russian capital freedom of movement in the global economy, while protecting the Russian tax base and treasury.

Russia should be graduated from Jackson-Vanik. This would remove a longstanding irritant in our relationship with Russia and help foster a sense of "normal" trade relations between our countries.

Authorize and appropriate funds to achieve the goal of awarding 10,000 Masters of Business Administration degrees in Russia.

Revitalize the enterprise fund concept in Russia as a means of U.S. support to Russian entrepreneurs. Additional funding from the U.S.-Russia Investment Fund or other vehicles would be necessary.

ENERGY/NATURAL RESOURCES

Summary

Russia, as the world's second largest oil producer and a major supplier of gas to Western Europe, represents an important stabilizing force for global energy security. U.S. policy makers have long understood that in the post-Cold War era, bilateral energy cooperation can provide mutual benefits that go well beyond enhanced energy security. Cooperation in the energy sphere contributes to economic development in Russia, commercial opportunities for U.S. and Russian firms, and a highly positive foundation for the bilateral political relationship.

As our two countries proceed to re-engage across a broad range of important policy and cultural arenas, energy can claim its critical position as the centerpiece in the relationship, strengthening global energy security and promoting mutual economic growth.

Recommendations

Development of U.S.-Russian cooperation in energy should become a priority for international policy because of its capacity to address this risk of uncertain supplies and unnecessary dependence. The U.S. and Russia should initiate the development of a sustained institutional structure to move forward on critical areas hindering mutual development of Russian energy resources.

A high level Presidential task force with representation from both the Putin and Bush administrations should be immediately established as part of the partner offer in addressing the economic and energy components of the anti-terrorism campaign.

The institutional structure for moving forward on critical energy policy and projects should be established to eliminate bureaucratic tendencies that are delaying the implementation of a favorable investment cli-

mate in Russia and positive economic responses from the United States. On the U.S. side, this will require the direct involvement of the Secretaries of Energy and Commerce, as well as the Vice President. Members of Congress should be involved and regularly consulted.

The bilateral group should proceed with specific remedies to move projects forward. Official U.S. financial organizations, such as OPIC and U.S. Ex-Im Bank should play a prominent and ongoing role in the bilateral discussions.

An expanded program of energy cooperation will provide a critical reinforcement of the positive aspects of the bilateral relationship. One such project, for example, is the development of the oil and gas resources of the Timan Pechora region which offers enormous challenges in project development and investment, but also enormous rewards in new petroleum supplies for the world market.

Work of the Duma-Congress inter-parliamentary group should be intensified for purposes of using this efficient mechanism of bilateral consultation to encourage approval in Russia, at the parliamentary level and to promote investment and taxation laws that provide a positive environment for investment, such as full and appropriate finalization of PSA legislation.

This bilateral energy initiative should engage both official and non-governmental groups committed to moving forward on energy cooperation. The Moscow International Petroleum Club, a nongovernmental and consultative organization, is prepared to lend all assistance to "jump start" the process and provide ongoing support as a well-known and well-respect NGO in the energy area.

ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION

Summary

With Russia's economy ailing, substantial environmental improvements will necessarily be connected with socioeconomic, institutional, and cultural changes. This represents a challenge as well as an opportunity. While environmental protection cannot reasonably be regarded as a priority, it can as a consequence be a driver of societal changes on the whole.

It has been demonstrated that Russia's population suffers from environmental pollution to a degree that makes it not just a quality-of-life issue. The environmental pollution threatens Russia's economic well-being and public health, especially for poor families.

Western governments and international financial institutions should support projects to improve Russia's environmental infrastructure. Based on a market approach, Western donors should provide expertise and oversight to avoid excesses, lawlessness, and abuse. The Russian government should provide the appropriate incentives. Nothing would better mobilize the forces of capitalism for positive change while at the same time bring Russian and Western interests under one umbrella.

Recommendations

Russians have a strong bias in favor of engineered solutions (hardware) to problems, while advanced economies are taking a software approach (planning and organization). The hardware bias has been adopted in international assistance projects. This trend must be reversed.

Russia's scientific institutes and scientists have developed state-of-the-art technology to prevent and clean up environmental problems. For lack of funding these technologies have not been deployed in Russia and have not been commercialized in international markets. A revolving fund should be created

to deploy the technologies and solve the problems.

If trade benefits were extended to certified sustainably-produced products in Europe and North America, this alone could open markets wide enough for investors to take the risk of improving the degraded and polluting infrastructure. Trade rules benefiting sustainable production would also give an incentive to the Russian government, which bets heavily on export earnings from natural resource extraction, to enforce its laws.

By enlarging the concept of debt-for-nature swaps to environmental protection more generally, Russia's government would get real incentives and financial tools to tighten and enforce its rules. Oversight over environmental protection would thus move from the resource extraction agencies to less directly interested ones. Existing legislative proposals such as the Russian Economic Restoration and Justice Act of 1999 and the Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 2001 could, if modified, serve as cornerstones for financial cooperative assistance.

Financial tools such as a mortgage or a bond system must be developed for a market economy to flourish and be sustained. Issuing bonds to finance local environmental projects could be acceptable to Russians, especially where the environmental problems are clear and their impact severe.

Increase participation with groups such as Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE) and the Advisory Committee on the Protection of the Seas (ACOPS). Both organizations work with Russia to help conserve the world's most valuable ecosystems. A shared annual legislative agenda for Members of Congress and their colleagues in the Duma can bring attention to the threats to ecosystems such as ill-conceived development projects and poor environmental policy.

Increase cooperation in marine science research to better address the problems of the ocean where maintenance of stable fisheries is becoming a source of conflict. Such cooperation can increase our knowledge of the oceans, boast our ability to manage the oceans' rich resources, and enhance our understanding of ocean effects on climate and carbon sequestration.

Expand cooperation between the U.S. and Russian navies to help assist with preserving the environment.

Promote the DOE and the Ministry of Atomic Energy for the Russian Federation (MinAtom) to cooperate on the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). NCI seeks to increase U.S. national and global security through economic diversification and weapons complex down-sizing in Russia's Nuclear Cities.

Encompass all forms of energy in a comprehensive energy plan that includes attention to global warming and environmental impacts.

Establish a mechanism for the exchange of information and to assist in the implementation of initiatives that result from these recommendations.

HEALTH CARE

Summary

Since the collapse of the USSR, public health and the state of the medical care system in Russia have been deeply troubled. Mortality trends, which began to worsen in the late 1960s, accelerated downward in the past decade, leading to a decline in longevity unknown outside parts of the developing world. Russia sustained a net loss of 750,000 persons last year. Of the two factors behind this trend—decreased fertility and premature mortality—mortality is the more important. The major contributor to premature mortality is an excessive incidence of fatal cardiovascular disease—heart attacks and

strokes, due, in turn, to a high prevalence of unrecognized and unmanaged hypertension, an easily treatable disease but one that requires an innovative and sustained program of prevention and education. This record, unprecedented in time of peace for a developed country, reveals conditions that threaten to cause serious social and economic consequences for the nation. President Putin has acknowledged it as a key security issue for Russia.

For Russia as well as the West, the health issue is both a challenge and an opportunity. The history of U.S. and Western health assistance for Russia reveals a record of thin support, episodic contributions and, at times, counterproductive efforts. There has been a lack of appropriate leadership, absence of a coherent strategy, and a resignation generated by a feeling that the job was simply too overwhelming. Yet there are opportunities for constructive engagement for both professional contributions and community-based efforts in partnership with Russian colleagues in a well-conceived plan that builds on the strengths of the existing Russian resources.

Recommendations

An effective health assistance program for the Russian Federation should concentrate on important health issues and serious, life-threatening diseases—those which make the most prominent contribution to premature mortality and where effective intervention and prevention are possible. This implies a much increased emphasis on chronic diseases—especially cardiovascular disorders and diabetes. An effective program should combine clinical medicine, public health, and public education.

Develop, implement, and evaluate cooperative physician exchange programs for the sharing of knowledge and skills that improve the Russian medical profession's ability to meet the challenges of the burden of disease.

Develop and implement cooperative programs aimed at efficient use of medical care resources for treatment and prevention of disease.

Serve as a clearinghouse for privately and publicly sponsored programs designed to improve the health of Russians and improve the quality and effectiveness of preventive and therapeutic efforts there.

Develop close working relationships with private American and European philanthropic institutions interested in both security and health issues in the former Soviet republics.

Establish close working relationships with key commercial entities whose interests involve issues of health and medicine in the Russian Federation.

Assist professional education—continuing medical education for Russian physicians—by organizing exchanges in both directions, based in regional academic medical centers in several regions of the Russian Federation.

Support Russian versions of the American Medical Association, Center for Disease Control, etc.

Collaborate among complementary organizations on behalf of disease management and prevention by combining clinical medicine, public health, and public education. Key examples include cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and tuberculosis.

Assist in the selective provision of therapeutic drugs and medical equipment.

Increase cooperative biomedical research between the National Institutes of Health and research institutes in Russia.

A joint announcement by Presidents Bush and Putin for close bilateral cooperation on the eradication of AIDS, cancer, etc. would build support for these types of programs.

JUDICIAL/LEGAL SYSTEMS

Summary

Russia's judiciary is the least developed of the three branches. Reform has begun but some of the old structure and personnel are still in place. Trial by jury is being introduced and President Putin declared that it would become the norm nationwide by 2003. A major overhaul of the Soviet-era criminal code is nearing approval in the Duma.

Recommendations

Jury trials were a feature of the pre-revolutionary Russian legal system. Few initiatives have had such a concrete impact in promoting the rule of law in Russia and in promoting human rights. Putin will almost certainly succeed in his new effort to expand jury trials to other regions of the Russian Federation. The U.S. technical assistance community can and should play a critical role in promoting Putin's practical and high-minded initiative.

The Central and East European Law Initiative's (CEEELI) much-heralded Environmental Public Advocacy Center (EPAC) in Ukraine, Moldova, and Uzbekistan has successfully litigated high-impact environmental cases on behalf of citizens in the courts and has promoted citizen participation in advocacy and environmental decision-making. Russia would benefit from a proliferation of NGOs able to advocate on behalf of the public through proper, legal channels (as opposed to settling disputes through extra-judicial means). Average citizens should be involved in settling environmental disputes with businesses and the government in a manner that is familiar to Americans but wholly unfamiliar to most Russians.

Russia adopted a new system last year to expand judicial power to a group of magistrates, commonly referred to as Justices of the Peace. Work with these magistrates will prove to be critical because they will be the court of first instance for most common citizen complaints. These courts also will be the first in Russia to implement an abbreviated trial, pursuant to the current draft code of criminal procedure, which includes for the first time a system of plea bargaining. Likewise, the justices will have greater discretion under the draft code to determine the conditions of pre-trial release (bail).

The expansion of legal clinics in the last five years has proven to be successful in reforming the Russian legal education system. Encouraging the doubling of these clinics in the next 3-5 years will have a salutary effect on the legal education system in Russia, as well as facilitate access to justice for Russia's poor.

Russian law students and law professors continue to use outdated textbooks from Soviet times. The dearth of textbooks on newer subjects (particularly on commercial law) has hampered curriculum reform and the ability of professors to prepare their students to practice in a market economy. Through small grant programs targeting individual professors or groups of professors, this need could be addressed relatively inexpensively.

The Law on Advocates has passed its first reading in parliament and appears destined to be passed in final form in the near term. The new law will represent the legislative backbone for the restructuring of the legal profession in Russia. New, higher qualification standards, ethics standards, etc. will be mandated by the new law. A great deal of assistance and training will be needed in order to properly implement the law.

Continue to promote the passage of a modern criminal procedure code in Russia. The Code itself mandates of expansion of jury trials throughout the entire Federation by

2003 and sets other timetables for the transfer of the responsibility from prosecutors to judges for issuing arrest warrants, search warrants, wiretap orders, and setting conditions for pretrial release.

Encourage American law schools to provide tuition for at least one Russian student and establish a U.S. government program to cover all other costs. Additionally, Russian students should be able to apply for J, I (section 212E) visas.

Fully support and expand institutional relationships between the Russian and American local governments. State-to-state, city-to-city, and mayor-to-mayor initiatives should be further encouraged.

Support and expand training programs for local officials in Russia.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Summary

A successful transition to democracy in Russia cannot take place only at the national level. The democratization of national political institutions without corresponding changes taking place locally would be a prescription for political instability. Furthermore, there are a number of reasons why the attempt to build democracy at the sub-national level in Russia is conducive to a successful transition to democracy nationally.

In stable federal systems, legitimate and effectively functioning local governments can act as a balance to central power; their absence creates greater opportunity for abuse of power by the center.

Popular participation at the local level gives people a knowledge of the mechanics of democracy. Among the lessons to be learned through participation in local politics are tolerance for the opinions of others, majority rule, representation, and accountability.

Popular participation in local government also leads to stronger feelings of political efficacy—the sense that people have some control over the decisions that directly effect their lives. As such, democratically run local governments can instill greater support for democratic institutions nationally and so contribute to the development of a democratic political culture.

Finally, national policies must be implemented locally; local governments that are responsive and are perceived as legitimate are likely to be more effective in doing so. Local knowledge and proximate interest may improve the effectiveness of local service delivery.

The Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted in 1993 envisages two levels of government below the national level, both operating in accordance with democratic principles. The upper level consists of 89 federal subdivisions, considered part of the Russian state system. Below them are institutions of Local Self Government, generally municipalities. Chapter Eight of the Constitution is devoted to these institutions and accords them an essential role in promoting public participation in all local decision making. However, despite the high ideals expressed in the Constitution, democracy at the sub-national level in Russia has been slow to develop. Efforts to promote these ideals are crucial to building democracy in Russia.

Recommendations

Together with Russian specialists, assess the degree to which efforts to develop institutions of local self government in Russia have succeeded and identify areas of weakness which could benefit from American cooperation.

Propose ways to improve the tax base of local government in Russia and explore ways in which revenues might best be shared between levels of government.

Consider ways to encourage political participation locally, including efforts at building stronger political parties and organizations that represent elements of civil society.

Focus on strengthening local legal institutions, including the courts, the judiciary, and legal services for those who can least afford them, while encouraging legal education.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Summary

Under the existing 10-year Umbrella Agreement on S&T Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United States signed in 1993, a large number of projects have been underway involving more than 15 federal agencies. Areas of research have included space, the environment, agricultural science, energy, public health and medicine, infectious diseases, earth sciences, nuclear and molecular physics, information technology, and a wide range of basic science disciplines. Cooperative endeavors between U.S. and Russian scientists have resulted in numerous scientific and political breakthroughs.

Participating U.S. government agencies include: ARS, CDC, DOD, DOE, DOS, DOT, EPA, HHS, NASA, NIH, NIST, NOAA, NRC, NSF/CRDF, ONR, USDA, and USGS. In addition, private funds, such as the Soros and Turner Foundations, have made or are about to make sizable investments in the Russian science community.

Under the various programs administered by these agencies, thousands of Russian scientists and engineers have been involved in commercial and scientific relationships. Numerous areas of cooperation can be expanded and new areas can be explored. The U.S. needs to determine which areas of cooperation require focused attention. The goals of these programs should be self-sustained.

Recommendations

DoD/DoE should cooperate with MinAtom in the area of nuclear fuel cycles, including development of proliferation resistant fuel cycles for possible application in advanced nuclear countries and appropriate repositories for final disposition of spent fuel.

Stimulate arms control thinking by training the next generation of Russian nuclear weapons and public policy specialists in programs for natural and social sciences.

Encourage private firms and NGOs to utilize current technology to respond to and mitigate natural and environmental disasters.

Encourage industry by way of taxes and other incentives to develop and use Russian technology and to support the institutes that create the technology.

Continue and expand cooperative fusion research that began over 25 years ago because it is expected that fusion energy could become the long-term non-polluting solution to the world's energy needs.

Involve Russia in nanotechnology projects because materials research is an area of traditional Russian R&D strength.

Cooperate with Russia in the area of food safety and food security—in the production as well as processing and storage stages. This could provide significant benefits not only to the U.S. and Russia, but to developing countries as well.

Increase cooperation in marine science research to better address the problems of the ocean, where maintenance of stable fisheries is becoming a source of conflict. Such cooperation can increase our knowledge of the oceans, boost our ability to manage the oceans' rich resources, and enhance our understanding of oceanic effects on climate and carbon sequestration.

Further develop commercial relations in the high-tech area of information technology

using the strong mathematical and software development skills of Russian computer scientists. The existing NCI and IPP programs could serve as facilitators for this further development.

Restructure our scientific aid programs so that there are economic drivers for investments in science that complement the political issues and scientific advancements for the project. The existing NCI and IPP programs could serve as economic drivers.

Establish a mechanism for the exchange of information and to assist in the implementation of initiatives that result from these recommendations.

SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

Summary

At the dawn of the post-Cold War era, U.S. industry feared that Russia's vast rocket resources would disrupt the international satellite launch services market following the end of Soviet Communism. By formulating a framework for cooperative space activities, the U.S. and Russian governments opened the door for the creation of strategic partnerships between their respective aerospace companies. Today, the once secretive Russian Proton Rocket, now marketed alongside other western launch vehicles, is the result of joint ventures between U.S. and Russian space launch service providers. Such ventures, however, will not be limited to only marketing space transportation services as we enter the 21st century.

The push for greater commercialization of government space assets and operations is characteristic of new challenges for the 21st Century, as well as greater improvements in space-related technologies for the benefit of near-Earth space development and space exploration. Some members of Congress view a newly formulated partnership with Russia as a potential solution to the cost-related problems we now face with the International Space Station (ISS) and other future undertakings such as the colonization of Mars. Undoubtedly, the ISS, space exploration, and improvements in aerospace technology appear to be the major elements that will come to characterize U.S.-Russian cooperation in space and aeronautics activities in the mid-term.

Recommendations

International Space Station—Currently, Russia provides Progress re-supply cargo ships to support ISS refueling and logistics and Soyuz capsules for crew return. Russia is also expected to provide modules for docking and stowage, critical power, and research modules. Although Russia has invested large sums of money in the program, it is unclear whether it can continue as a viable partner in this effort due to schedule delays, funding shortages, and national security concerns. Additionally, the U.S. estimate of a growing projected Station cost overrun only compounds the problem. Joint commercialization ventures, however, may provide Russia with opportunities for meeting its ISS obligations. SpaceHab, Inc. has approached Russia regarding a cooperative arrangement to develop its Enterprise module, which would have the capability to meet Russia's docking and stowage obligations as well as provide a near-term solution for new habitation. Similarly, Boeing is interested in developing the Russian FGB-2 as an alternative means for providing habitation capability. Both proposals require substantial U.S. payments, which are not currently budgeted.

Space-Related Technologies and Missions—In the case of rocket engine development, Pratt & Whitney, Inc. currently imports Russia's RD-180 engines to power the new U.S. commercial Atlas III and Atlas V launchers. Pratt & Whitney is developing a

U.S.-based capability for manufacturing RD-180 engines for use on military launches of these systems. Additionally, American and Russian scientists were working to define a new space-based stereo viewing research project called the Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS). The goal of RAMOS was to build confidence between the United States and the Russian Federation by cooperating on a defense research and development program. This program has currently received an increase in funding. Potential joint U.S.-Russian cooperation programs are focused on a wide range of technologies and space operational needs.

(a) Space Solar Power: Russia and U.S. could further this joint technology risk reduction program. (b) Cooperative Aeronautics Research Program: This joint research program in advanced aeronautics and propulsion technologies could benefit both nations. (c) Advanced Space Propulsion Technology: We should build on previous U.S.-Russian cooperative activities on Russian electric propulsion technology for deep space missions. (d) Joint Weather Satellites: The U.S. and Russia could jointly develop polar and geostationary weather satellites and solar monitoring satellites. (e) Planetary Defense: Joint U.S.-Russian cooperative program to detect, monitor, and track potential Earth-crossing asteroids and develop capabilities to rapidly respond. There is an unmet need to develop a comprehensive catalogue of Earth-threatening objects and the means to rapidly respond to the threat they pose. (f) Aerospace and Aeronautics Research: Achievement of the goal of low-cost access will depend upon significant improvements in launch vehicle technology development. It must be understood that U.S.-Russian partnership on space initiatives will require U.S.-Russian partnership in the areas of aeronautics as well. The state of art in aircraft engine technology for both countries would benefit from an exchange in manufacturing techniques and materials science.

Further Space Exploration—The focus of joint programs involving humans exploring the solar system and beyond must involve launch vehicle technology development. Concentration in this area would allow coopera-

tive programs to move forward in exploring and determining whether there is life in the oceans beneath the ice on Europa, for example. Although NASA abandoned its Pluto mission earlier this year due to a lack of funds, a joint mission to Pluto and the Kuiper asteroid belts may make it feasible.

Support and expand private sector relationship. The Lockheed Krunachev Space Launch is an example of this partnership.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ISSA). Pursuant to clause 12 of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess until approximately 12:10 a.m.

Accordingly (at 11 o'clock and 57 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess until approximately 12:10 a.m.

□ 2430

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. SESSIONS) at 12 o'clock and 30 minutes a.m.

REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 3129, CUSTOMS BORDER SECURITY ACT OF 2002

Mr. REYNOLDS, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 107-482) on the resolution (H. Res. 426) providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3129) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for the United States Customs Service for antiterrorism, drug interdiction, and other operations for the Office of the United States Trade Representative, for the United States International

Trade Commission, and for other purposes, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

REPORT ON RESOLUTION WAIVING POINTS OF ORDER AGAINST CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 3448, PUBLIC HEALTH SECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ACT OF 2002

Mr. REYNOLDS, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 107-483) on the resolution (H. Res. 427) waiving points of order against the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 3448) to improve the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4775, 2002 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR FURTHER RECOVERY FROM AND RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES

Mr. REYNOLDS, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 107-484) on the resolution (H. Res. 428) providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 4775) making supplemental appropriations for further recovery from and response to terrorist attacks on the United States for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, and for other purposes, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.