

REMARKS ON CHINA

HON. BOB SCHAFER

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 14, 2002

Mr. SCHAFER. Mr. Speaker, our government's consideration of China as a force for peace among its neighbors is impossible to substantiate and is overwhelmingly refuted by the facts. Our own good intentions are not sufficient to overcome the fact that China is a force for war, building up its military strength in warlike preparations aimed at its Asian neighbors such as Taiwan, and extending to the United States.

Policies of engagement with China do not excuse a lack of diligence by the United States over China's ballistic missile threat and arms buildup, as well as its failure to abide by non-proliferation agreements such as the one it signed in November 2000 to halt the sale of ballistic missiles and technology for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

In February 2002 Secretary of State Colin Powell noted how China's proliferation of ballistic missiles remained "an irritation in the relationship" between it and the United States. This irritation understates China's reliance on ballistic missiles as a key component of its military power, including their use as precision weapons capable of deep penetration without the delivery of weapons of mass destruction—conventional warfare.

In February 2002 CIA Director George Tenet, in testimony before the U.S. Senate, warned about China's increasing military power, saying,

Over the past year, Beijing's military training exercises have taken on an increasingly real-world focus, emphasizing rigorous practice in operational capabilities and improving the military's actual ability to use force.

Mr. Tenet added,

This is aimed not only at Taiwan but also at increasing the risk to the United States itself in any future Taiwan contingency. China also continues to upgrade and expand the conventional short-range ballistic missile force it has arrayed against Taiwan.

Mr. Tenet noted the link between China's threat to Taiwan and its threat to the United States.

I believe this House and our nation's president recognize the link between China's threat to Taiwan and the United States. In his question-and-answer session with Chinese students at Qinghua University in Beijing, when asked why he did not use the term "reunification" with China and Taiwan, President George W. Bush responded by referring to the Taiwan Relations Act, "which says we will help Taiwan defend herself if provoked."

The United States must be wary of China's subtle rhetoric. The PLA understands only one language—the language of military strength to force one's will upon another, just as communism was forced on China through the barrel of a gun as stated by Mao Zedung. While China may cloak its intent in soft words of diplomacy, in 1995 and 1996 it launched ballistic missiles off the coast of Taiwan in a show of force to intimidate it and the Far East.

China's diplomatic overtures to Taiwan lack sincerity. Vice Premier Qian Qichen's remarks on Taiwan in January 2002, supposedly ex-

tending goodwill to Taiwan and interest in holding talks, were apparently intended as propaganda to divide Taiwan's president from his party, and create an impression of goodwill in advance of our president's visit.

Shortly after Qian's remarks, China's Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhao-xing firmly repeated China's demand that Taiwan accept China's view of "one China" before it would negotiate with Taiwan's duly elected democratic government. He suggested how Qian's remarks did not represent a major softening of China's position and demand for eventual reunification. He further noted how Taiwan would be the most important topic of our Bush's visit.

China's overtures to Taiwan need to be understood in the context of its United Front strategy seeking to isolate Taiwan, and divide Taiwan's ruling DPP party by playing on the economic interests of DPP members who may have business relations with China. In addition, China is continuing to entice Taiwan to invest in it, seeking economic and technological growth.

In his February Senate testimony, Mr. Tenet warned how China's arms buildup directed at Taiwan represented an increasing risk to the United States. What may not be as apparent is how China's buildup of intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles, including the road-mobile, solid-fuel DF-31 ICBM, threaten the United States and U.S. forces in the Pacific.

These intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles form part of China's Long Wall Project as explained by the Taipei Times in May 2001:

The Long Wall Project is aimed at the US, not Taiwan. The Chinese military leadership plans to put longer-range ballistic missiles in the southwestern provinces so that they can cover US military targets in the Pacific . . .

They can fire, for instance, a Dong Feng-31 at a US navy battle group shortly after the group leaves its base in Hawaii. The Long Wall Project is basically a deterrent against the US' fighting forces in the Pacific . . .

While the use of ballistic missiles against U.S. naval vessels may seem implausible, it forms part of China's asymmetrical military strategy, seeking to counter U.S. strengths by exploiting its vulnerabilities. Moreover, it is feasible as should be realized by the accuracies the United States obtained from its Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile equipped with a radar-guided terminal seeker.

The United States has no defense against DF-31 ICBM. The U.S. Navy has no defense against the DF-31, nor does it have any defense against China's short and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which can threaten American forces and bases in the Far East and Pacific.

China's probable attainment of an operational capability with its DF-31 ICBM by the end of December 2001, and its probable deployment of the DF-31 at two or more base in 2001 should be of grave concern to the United States.

China recognizes how the United States and its armed forces are undefended from ballistic missiles, with the exception of the short-range Patriot, which is inadequate against intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles. China plans to exploit this weakness with a maximum of surprise.

To support its use of ballistic missiles in conventional warfare, even against ships,

China has not only developed accurate ballistic missiles, it is building reconnaissance satellites. These satellites include the Ziyuan-1 and Ziyuan-2 earth resource satellites believed to be for observing foreign military forces. The ZY-2, launched on September 1, 2000, is credited with a photographic resolution of about nine feet. Other reconnaissance satellites include the Haiyang-1 (HY-1) ocean color surveillance satellite expected to be launched by June 2002, and its follow on Haiyang-2 (HY-2).

Accurate ballistic missiles and the ability observe U.S. forces from space will give China the potential ability to attack U.S. ships at sea and in port. This capability is being enhanced by China's development of an integrated command and control system called Qu Dian, which relies on its Feng Huo-1 military communications satellite launched on January 26, 2000. Qu Dian, considered a major force multiplier, is similar to the U.S. Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, or JTIDS, and boasts a secure, jam-resistant, high capacity data link communication system for use in tactical combat. In addition to its potential use GPS and Glossnas satellite navigation, has developed its own Beidou navigation satellites.

Along with an integrated command and control system, China's improvements in inertial and satellite-aided navigation of ballistic missiles with potential breakthroughs in ballistic missile terminal guidance will give it a new form of precision attack, faster than relying on cruise missiles or aircraft.

The effect of China's ballistic missiles delivering a surprise blow must not be underemphasized. This type of attack, capable of being carried out with non-nuclear warheads, represents a new form of conventional warfare for the 21st century. Such an attack could occur in an hour. It could not only result in a major loss of U.S. military strength, it could create a sudden tide of momentum for China's regular forces to successfully challenge the United States.

The only comparison would be the German blitzkrieg unleashed against France in 1940. U.S. forces would be unlikely to respond in an effective manner, especially as the United States has not taken vigorous steps to counter its vulnerability to ballistic missiles.

The January 2002 CIA Report on Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats and Developments noted the transforming effect of China's ballistic missile forces as applied to its buildup of short-range ballistic missiles near Taiwan:

China's leaders calculate that conventionally armed ballistic missiles add a potent new dimension to Chinese military capabilities, and they are committed to continue fielding them at a rapid pace. Beijing's growing short-range ballistic missile force provides China with a military capability that avoids the political and practical constraints associated with the use of nuclear-armed missiles. The latest Chinese SRBMs provide a survivable and effective conventional strike force and expand conventional ballistic missile coverage.

This transformation applies to China's intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles as well, providing China with a capability for threatening the United States and its armed forces.

This development of China's military strategy was noted in the June 2000 Department of Defense Report on China's military power:

Chinese strategists believe that if a war against a technologically superior foe breaks

out, the enemy likely will deploy forces rapidly and then launch a massive air campaign. While the enemy is assembling its forces, there exists a window of opportunity for pre-emptive strike. This approach—"gaining the initiative by striking first"—is viewed as an effective method to offset or negate the advantages possessed by a more advanced military foe.

The only possible defense against China's ballistic missile threat is a strong and effective U.S. ballistic missile defense. This defense, to be effective against China's development of decoys, multiple warheads, and other counter-measures, needs to focus on the deployment of a space-based defense building on the research and development conducted under the Strategic Defense Initiative during the Reagan administration and his successor's administration.

The advantages of a space-based ballistic missile defense include global coverage, boost phase interception, and multiple opportunities for intercepting a ballistic missile. These advantages are not inherent with a ground-based interceptor defense, which is currently under development, which will have limited coverage, no opportunity for boost phase defense, and fewer opportunities for intercepting a missile.

Space-based defenses such as the *Brilliant Pebbles* space-based interceptor and Space Based Laser were shown to be technologically feasible a decade ago, but their programs were either terminated or cutback because of intense political opposition from Congress during your father's administration, or because of opposition from President Clinton who cutback U.S. missile defense programs, especially for space-based defenses like *Brilliant Pebbles*, which he terminated in 1993.

Mr. Speaker, our President's decision to withdraw from the obsolete and violated 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty should have opened the door for the United States to build the most effective ballistic missile defense possible using space as that treaty was especially intended to cutback advanced U.S. ballistic missile defense programs employing space-based defenses such as lasers or interceptors.

In this respect, the amendment by Congress at the end of 2001 that reduced funding for space-based defenses, and cut the Space Based Laser program for fiscal year 2002 from \$170 million to \$50 million must be viewed in a shameful light, a case of seeking an inferior defense at greater cost.

The failure of the Missile Defense Agency to pursue space-based defenses and emphasize their value to Congress is inexcusable. These defenses are not far off into the future. They were shown to be technologically feasible years ago.

In March 2002 China increase its official defense budget by 17.6 percent. This follows a 17.7 percent increase in 2001. These increases follow its five-year plan increasing its stated defense budget 15–20 percent annually. China's actual defense budget has been estimated at three to five times the size of its official budget. These increases are aimed at the United States. China is modernizing its forces to a high-tech military deploying accurate ballistic missiles as the edge of its military transformation.

In contrast, the United States is only beginning to rebuild its military after a protracted decline lasting more than a decade, and this

year's increase is largely attributable to house-keeping matters rather than an effort to modernize U.S. forces, or research and development, or the acquisition of a space-based ballistic missile defense.

The United States must recognize the peril it faces from China's transformational military strategy built around the ballistic missile, a transformation that can be seen in its DF-31 ICBM apparently aimed at U.S. forces.

Mr. Speaker, such an attack from China directed at U.S. forces could come before the end of this year. I would strongly urge you and our colleagues to take immediate action to overcome our vulnerability and include steps toward the support of a space-based ballistic missile defense.

Mr. Speaker, I hereby submit for the RECORD various sources supporting my remarks.

Mr. Speaker, I have also submitted these identical observations and conclusions to the President by letter which I have posted today.

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TRIBUTE TO DR. ALEXANDER E. BAILEY

HON. SANDER M. LEVIN

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 14, 2002

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to reflect on the work of Alexander E. Bailey, Ed.D., as he is honored for his exemplary community work by the Oak Park Business and Education Alliance on March 22, 2002. The Oak Park Business and Education Alliance was established in 1993 and is a non-profit organization of educators, businesses and government entities that provide assistance to the Oak Park School District to improve the educational experience of students.

Dr. Bailey's life of service began in the military, where he was a specialist in the U.S. Army Security Agency. After his military service, Dr. Bailey chose education as his field of study. Dr. Bailey began his career as a teacher at Paul Washington High School in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In 1971, he received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Elementary Education; in 1972, he received a Masters of Arts degrees in Counseling; in 1980, he became an Education Specialist, and in 1983, he earned a Doctorate of Education.

He continued his training at Yale University for the Training for School Development program from 1984–1986, as well as attending the University of California for Effective Teaching Strategies, Training for Trainers 1985–1987 and Harvard University for the Institute on Multi-Cultural Education in 1989.

After serving in various educational positions on the east coast he came to Michigan's Oak Park School District. Since 1991, Dr. Bailey has been a dynamic leader of the Oak Park School District serving as the Superintendent. Dr. Bailey is the author of several published works and presentations, some of which include "Strategies for Effective Alternative Education Programs", "Do You Know Your Child?" and "Appeal Motivation That Works".

Dr. Bailey's professional and civic affiliations are numerous, among them the Ethnic Task Force for the city of Oak Park, The Children's Center, African-American Superintendent's Group, the American Personnel and Guidance Association and the Oak Park Business and Education Alliance.

Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join me in honoring Dr. Bailey for his many accomplishments and service to the community of Oak Park and to the Business and Education Alliance.

HONORING DAVID C.G. KERR

HON. JIM DAVIS

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 14, 2002

Mr. DAVIS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise in honor of David C.G. Kerr, a deeply respected lawyer in the Tampa Bay community who recently lost his battle with Lou Gehrig's disease.

David, a veteran of the Korean War, worked at Tampa's Macfarlane, Ferguson and McMullen for nearly 40 years, specializing in