

## S. 1172. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, 2002

[Spending comparisons—Senate-reported bill (in millions of dollars)]

	General purpose	Manda- tory	Total
Senate-reported bill:			
Budget Authority .....	1,944	99	2,043
Outlays .....	2,020	99	2,119
Senate 302(b) allocation:			
Budget Authority .....	2,877	99	2,976
Outlays .....	2,912	99	3,011
House-reported:			
Budget Authority .....	0	0	0
Outlays .....	0	0	0
President's request:			
Budget Authority .....	2,987	99	3,086
Outlays .....	2,921	99	3,020
SENATE-REPORTED BILL COMPARED TO—			
Senate 302(b) allocation:			
Budget Authority .....	(933)	0	(933)
Outlays .....	(892)	0	(892)
House-reported:			
Budget Authority .....	( <sup>1</sup> )	( <sup>1</sup> )	( <sup>1</sup> )
Outlays .....	( <sup>1</sup> )	( <sup>1</sup> )	( <sup>1</sup> )
President's request:			
Budget Authority .....	(1,043)	0	(1,043)
Outlays .....	(901)	0	(901)

<sup>1</sup> Not applicable. The House Appropriations Committee has yet to consider its 2002 bill for the Legislative Branch.

Notes: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. For enforcement purposes, the Budget Committee compares the Senate-reported bill to the Senate 302(b) allocation. Prepared by SBC Majority Staff, 7-19-01.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise to express my deep concern about the apparent lack of emphasis by the Department of Defense on the counterdrug mission. This has been a year of continual discussion of increased DOD funding for various military missions. However, all the indications I am hearing point to a decreased DOD interest in this mission, as well as decreased funding levels. I believe this would be a poor policy decision, and a poor indication of the Nation's priorities.

In May 2001 testimony, before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, on which I served as Chairman, the heads of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard all testified that DOD reductions would be detrimental to their agencies' counterdrug efforts. The Office of National Drug Control Policy summarized that, "DOD's command and control system provides the communications connectivity and information system backbone \* \* \* while the military services detection and monitoring assets provide a much need intelligence cueing capability."

The Commandant of the Coast Guard testified at length about DOD counterdrug support, stating "[w]e would go downhill very quickly" without DOD contributions. The Commandant also stated that 43 percent of Coast Guard seizures last year were from U.S. Navy vessels, using onboard Coast Guard law enforcement detachments. The Coast Guard concluded that "[s]hould there be any radical reduction of the assets provided through the Department of Defense \* \* \* it would peril the potential for all the other agencies to make their contributions as productive \* \* \* mainly because of the synergy that is generated by the enormous capability that the 800-pound

gorilla brings to the table \* \* \* They are very, very good at what they do. They are the best in the world \* \* \* and when they share those capabilities \* \* \* in terms of intelligence fusion and command and control, we do much better than we would ever otherwise have a chance to do." I understand that an internal review of DOD's drug role contemplated severe reductions as a working assumption. After years of decline in DOD's role in this area, I believe this sends the wrong signal and flies in the face of DOD's statutory authority.

I have consistently supported an integrated national counterdrug strategy. If we reduce the DOD role, we risk lessening the effectiveness of other agencies as well. We need to make these decisions carefully, and with full Congressional involvement. I urge the Department of Defense to keep in mind DOD's important role in, and necessary contribution to, a serious national drug control strategy.

## COST ESTIMATE ON S. 180

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on July 12, the Committee on Foreign Relations reported S. 180, the Sudan Peace Act. At the time the bill was reported, the cost estimate from the Congressional Budget Office was not available.

I ask unanimous consent that the CBO estimate be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST  
ESTIMATE, JULY 17, 2001

## S. 180: SUDAN PEACE ACT

[As ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 12, 2001]

S. 180 would condemn slavery and human rights abuses in Sudan, authorize the Secretary of State to support the peace process in Sudan, and require the President to devise a contingency plan for delivering aid to Sudan. CBO estimates that enacting S. 180 would have no significant budgetary impact. The act would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply. S. 180 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

Each year the United States provides nearly \$190 million in assistance to the people of Sudan through various emergency food-aid, disaster assistance, refugee assistance, and development assistance programs. The provisions of S. 180 would not substantially expand the Administration's authority to provide such assistance. CBO estimates that spending on those emergency and humanitarian programs would continue at current levels.

The bill contains several reporting and contingency planning requirements that would not affect the State Department's or the U.S. Agency for international Development's (USAID) workload significantly. Based on information from the department and USAID, CBO estimates that enacting S. 180 would increase the agency's spending by

less than \$500,000 annually, assuming the availability of appropriated funds.

On June 7, 2001, CBO prepared an estimate for a similar bill, H.R. 2052, as ordered reported by the House Committee on International Relations, on June 6, 2001. Like S. 180, H.R. 2052 would not significantly affect discretionary spending. That bill would require disclosure of business activities in Sudan prior to an entity trading its securities in any capital market in the United States. That provision constitutes a private-sector mandate, as defined in UMRA, but the cost of the mandate would fall below the annual threshold established in UMRA (\$113 million in 2001, adjusted annually for inflation).

The CBO staff contact is Joseph C. Whitehill, who can be reached at 226-2840. This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

## COST ESTIMATE ON S. 1021

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on July 12, the Committee on Foreign Relations reported S. 1021, a bill to reauthorize the Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998 through fiscal year 2004. At the time the bill was reported, the cost estimate from the Congressional Budget Office was not available.

I ask unanimous consent that the CBO estimate be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST  
ESTIMATE, JULY 16, 2001

## S. 1021: A BILL TO REAUTHORIZE THE TROPICAL FOREST CONSERVATION ACT OF 1998 THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2004

[As reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 12, 2001]

## SUMMARY

S. 1021 would extend the Tropical Forest Conservation Act for three years through 2004 and would authorize the appropriation of \$225 million for the cost of implementing the act over that period. Assuming the appropriation of the authorized amounts, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost \$221 million over the 2002-2006 period. Because S. 1021 would not affect direct spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply.

The Tropical Forest Conservation Act authorizes the Secretary of State to negotiate agreements with eligible countries to create local funds administered by local boards with the authority to make grants to preserve, maintain, and restore tropical forests. The local funds receive a stream of payments generated by modifying the terms of outstanding development assistance or food-aid debt owed to the United States. The debt modifications include authority to reduce and to restructure debt, to swap the debt, or to sell the debt back to an eligible country in ways that will generate income for the local funds. The amounts authorized by S. 1021 would be used to cover the cost, as defined by the Federal Credit Reform Act, of modifying the debt.

S. 1021 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

## ESTIMATED COST TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The estimated budgetary impact of S. 1021 is shown in the following table. The costs of

this legislation fall within budget function 150 (international affairs).

	By fiscal year, in millions of dollars—					
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION						
Spending Under Current Law for						
Debt Reduction of Developing						
Countries with Tropical Forests:						
Budget Authority <sup>1</sup> .....	13	0	0	0	0	0
Estimated Outlays .....	6	13	0	0	0	0
Proposed Changes:						
Authorization Level .....	0	50	75	100	0	0
Estimated Outlays .....	0	13	36	69	64	39
Spending Under S. 1021 for Debt						
Reduction of Developing Coun-						
tries with Tropical Forests:						
Authorization Level <sup>1</sup> .....	13	50	75	100	0	0
Estimated Outlays .....	6	26	36	69	64	39

<sup>1</sup> The 2001 level is the amount appropriated for that year for the cost of implementing the Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998.

#### BASIS OF ESTIMATE

CBO assumes that the authorized amounts would be appropriated by the start of each fiscal year and that outlays would follow historical spending patterns.

*Pay-As-You-Go Considerations:* None.

#### INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE-SECTOR IMPACT

S. 1021 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

#### PREVIOUS CBO ESTIMATE

On June 21, 2001, CBO prepared an estimate for H.R. 2131, a bill to reauthorize the Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998 through fiscal year 2004, and for other purposes, as ordered reported by the House Committee on International Relations. The amounts authorized and the estimated cost of implementing that bill and S. 1021 are the same.

*Estimate Prepared By:* Federal Costs: Joseph C. Whitehill (226-2840); Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Elyse Goldman (225-3220); and Impact on the Private Sector: Lauren Marks (226-2940).

*Estimate Approved By:* Robert A. Sunshine, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

#### COST ESTIMATE ON S. 494

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on July 12, the Committee on Foreign Relations reported S. 494, the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001. At the time the bill was reported, the cost estimate from the Congressional budget Office was not available.

I ask unanimous consent that the CBO estimate be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE, JULY 16, 2001

#### S. 494: ZIMBABWE DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 2001

[As ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 12, 2001]

#### SUMMARY

S. 494 would support a transition to democracy and promote economic recovery in Zimbabwe through a set of incentives and sanctions. The bill would require the United States to oppose lending by international financial institution to or debt relief for Zimbabwe until the President certifies to the Congress that certain conditions are satisfied. It would, however, authorize additional funds for programs to reform landholding

and to promote democracy and good governance in Zimbabwe. Assuming the appropriation of the authorized amounts, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost \$23 million over the 2002-2006 period. Because S. 494 would not affect direct spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply.

S. 494 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

#### ESTIMATED COST TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The estimated budgetary impact of S. 494 is shown in the following table. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 150 (international affairs).

#### BASIS OF ESTIMATE

S. 494 would earmark \$20 million for land reform and \$6 million for programs to promote democracy and good governance in Zimbabwe from funds otherwise authorized to be appropriated in 2002 for development assistance and economic support fund. No funds are currently authorized for 2002. CBO assumes that the specified amounts would be appropriated by October 1, 2001, and that outlays would follow historical spending patterns.

	By fiscal year, in millions of dollars—					
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Spending Under Current Law for						
Zimbabwe:						
Budget Authority <sup>1</sup> .....	16	0	0	0	0	0
Estimated Outlays .....	22	19	10	5	3	2
Proposed Changes:						
Authorization Level .....	0	26	0	0	0	0
Estimated Outlays .....	0	2	8	7	4	2
Spending Under S. 494 for						
Zimbabwe:						
Authorization Level <sup>1</sup> .....	16	26	0	0	0	0
Estimated Outlays .....	22	21	18	12	7	4

<sup>1</sup> The 2001 level is the amount appropriated for that year.

*Pay-As-You-Go Considerations:* None.

#### INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND PRIVATE-SECTOR IMPACT

S. 494 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

*Estimate Prepared By:* Federal Costs: Joseph C. Whitehill (226-2840); Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Elyse Goldman (225-3220); and Impact on the Private Sector: Lauren Marks (226-2940).

*Estimate Approved By:* Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

#### “DISAPPEARED” BELARUSIAN OPPOSITION LEADERS

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, earlier today, I had the opportunity to meet with the wives of four Belarusian opposition leaders who have either disappeared, been imprisoned, or have died under mysterious circumstances. Theirs is a compelling story which starkly illustrates the human toll of Alexander Lukashenka's regime in which human rights, democracy and the rule of law are violated with impunity.

These courageous women—Ludmilla Karpenko, Irina Krasovska, Tatiana Klimova and Svetlana Zavadzka—conveyed their concerns about their husbands as well as about the continuing climate of fear in Belarus.

Earlier this month, I led a delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Annual Session, where I met with Anatoly Lebedko, one of the leaders of the Belarusian democratic opposition.

Belarusian presidential elections are quickly coming up—on September 9. Unfortunately, the Belarusian authorities have not yet made a serious commitment to abide by criteria set forth well over a year ago by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, of which Belarus is a member. These criteria include an end of the climate of fear, equal access to the state media for all candidates, respect for freedom of assembly, as well as transparency and fairness in the registration of candidates and functioning of electoral commissions.

The Helsinki Commission, which I chair, continues to receive troubling reports concerning developments in Belarus. Indeed, the prospects for free and fair presidential elections this fall remain dim. The unbalanced composition of the regional electoral commissions is particularly disturbing given the apparent rejection by the authorities of all candidates—over 800—proposed by Belarusian democratic parties and non-governmental organizations. The Belarusian authorities need to guarantee the impartiality of the electoral commissions by ensuring that democratic parties and non-governmental organizations, NGOs, are represented meaningfully and to correct other reported violations of the electoral code.

The State Department has urged the Belarusian authorities to mount a credible investigation to account for missing former Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Zakharenka, 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Viktor Gonchar and his associate Anatoly Krasovskiy, as well as Russian Television cameraman Dmitry Zavadsky. They have urged the immediate release of political prisoners and 13th Supreme Soviet members Andrei Klimov and Valery Shchukin. Such an investigation, as well as the release of political prisoners, will be an essential factor in reducing the current climate of fear.

Finally, the Belarusian authorities need to work with the OSCE to facilitate the work of international and domestic observers and to help ensure that all candidates are able to organize freely, without harassment, and carry their campaigns to the people.

While it is not yet too late for the Belarusian authorities to take the steps necessary to ensure an atmosphere conducive to elections that will meet international democratic standards, time is of the essence. Free and fair presidential elections are an essential step if Belarus is to move ahead and end its self-imposed isolation. As President Bush has remarked in connection with this week's observance of Captive Nations Week, America must remain vigilant in our support of those living under authoritarianism. The people of Belarus have that support as they seek to overcome the legacy of