

As the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts has just said, this resolution makes it possible for the Senate to work its will; and achieve legislative goals; it only makes it possible. We, the Members on both sides of the aisle, have to make it work. I am constrained to hope—yea, even believe—that we are going to make it work. The things I have heard said on this floor today make me believe that.

I thank the distinguished Senator. I have known him for a long time. I thank him for his contribution today.

Mr. President, if I may speak just for a few minutes, I ask unanimous consent I may address the Senate on another matter for not to exceed 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ALAN CRANSTON

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, on December 31st the Nation lost a remarkable man.

At his home in Los Altos, California, lands-end of the Nation and State he served, Alan Cranston did not witness the beginning of the new millennium.

It has been said that death is the great leveler. But Alan Cranston's accomplishments in life have clearly set him apart.

Nearly seven decades ago, a young American journalist from California published an unexpurgated version of Adolf Hitler's "Mein Kampf" "My Struggle"—revealing, as few had previously done, the true depth of the danger and the evil that Hitler embodied. Hitler successfully sued for copyright violation, and Alan Cranston wore that loss as a proud badge throughout his life.

After a career in journalism, service in the U.S. Army during World War II, business, and local politics, Alan Cranston joined the members of this U.S. Senate in 1969 by virtue of his election in the previous November.

Here, Senator Cranston's vision and rich composition of experiences, talents, and wisdom enriched our Senate deliberations.

In 1977, when I was elected Senate Democratic Leader, Senator Cranston won election as Assistant Democratic Leader, or "whip." In all his years of working, first as my proverbial "right hand" and, subsequently, as a close colleague in the Senate leadership when I became President pro tempore, Senator Cranston was a conscientious adjutant and a congenial friend and partner in numerous legislative efforts. Unfortunately, words alone cannot adequately convey the respect in which I held Senator Cranston, nor the solid appreciation that I felt for Senator Cranston and for his loyalty, his supreme dedication, his high purpose, his contributions to the Senate's work through many years.

He was a fine lieutenant, if I may use that term. He was always there when I needed him. And many times I said

that he was absolutely the best nose counter that I had ever seen in the Senate.

But friendship and respect are not always easily forged. Tragedy makes a bond. In 1980, Senator Cranston was dealt Fate's glancing blow with the death of a child, a loss of a promise to the future, when, his son, Robin Cranston, died in a traffic accident in 1980, at the age of 33. Two years later, my wife, Erma, and I were dealt a similar blow with the death of our grandson, John Michael Moore, in a traffic accident.

Mr. President, a valedictory is not always sad and it is fitting that Senator Cranston's final words on this Floor regarding his career be repeated here. On October 8, 1992, he made these short and poignant remarks:

Mr. President, a Senator from California gets involved in myriad issues. Just about every issue that exists has an impact, somehow, in the remarkable State of 30 million people that I represent. So I have been involved in countless issues over my time in the Senate.

Most of all, I have dedicated myself to the cause of peace, and to the environment. In many a sense I believe that my work on the environment is probably the longest-lasting work I have accomplished here.

When you deal with a social issue, or a war and peace issue, or an economic issue, or whatever the results, the consequences are fleeting. Whatever you accomplish is soon changed, and often what you have done leads to new problems that then have to be dealt with.

But when you preserve a wild river, or a wilderness, or help create a national park, that is forever. That part of your State, our Nation, is then destined to be there forever after, as God created it.

I worked with particular dedication over these years, too, on issues of justice, equal rights, human rights, civil rights, voting rights, equal opportunity. I worked for democracy and freedom in my country and in all countries. I focused particularly on housing, and transportation, and veterans.

I thank the people of California for the remarkable opportunity I have had to serve them in the Senate for almost a quarter of a century.

Today, I along with millions of Americans, thank my friend, Alan Cranston, for his work, his life, and his vision.

No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friends or of thine own were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.

I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to speak for up to 10 minutes in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to comment briefly on an issue that is im-

portant to our national security: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT, that would ban all nuclear weapon tests. This is an issue that the new President and the new Senate should think about carefully and deliberately during the 107th Congress.

Today General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented a report to President Clinton on his findings and recommendations on the CTBT. President Clinton had asked General Shalikashvili to conduct a comprehensive and independent study of the CTBT after the Senate voted against a resolution of ratification in October of 1999.

The CTBT negotiations were completed in 1996, and the United States was the first nation to sign the Treaty. To date, 160 nations have signed it and 69 have ratified it, including all our NATO allies, Japan, South Korea and Russia. However, to enter into force, it must be ratified by 44 specified nations that have nuclear reactors, including the United States.

The Treaty would prohibit all nuclear explosive tests. In so doing, it would make it much harder for nations to develop nuclear weapons, thus putting in place an important roadblock to nuclear weapon proliferation. The treaty provides for an expanded and improved international monitoring system that would improve our ability to detect and deter nuclear tests by other nations—but only if we ratify the treaty and it enters into force.

Secretary of Defense Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all support ratification of the CTBT, as do four former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including General Shalikashvili and Gen. Colin Powell.

When the Senate took up the CTBT in October 1999, it did so in haste and without the traditional bipartisan deliberation we have accorded other arms control treaties. On the eve of the vote, 62 Senators signed a letter urging the Senate leadership to delay that vote and to postpone final consideration of the CTBT until the 107th Congress. Unfortunately, that request, which was made by nearly two-thirds of the Members of the Senate, to delay the vote, was not heeded, and the result was that the resolution of ratification was defeated by a vote of 51–48, with one Senator voting present.

Again, General Shalikashvili was asked to review the entire situation, and in conducting his review, he met with a number of Senators from both sides of the aisle to discuss their concerns and their suggestions. He also met with many other experts on this issue, and he visited the nuclear weapons labs.

General Shalikashvili's report is a valuable contribution to this important topic. This report, which was just filed today, places the CTBT in the broader context of our nuclear non-proliferation goals and efforts and

points out that the CTBT is an important component of this enduring national security priority of nuclear non-proliferation. He concludes that the CTBT remains in our national interest and that the Senate should reconsider the treaty in a bipartisan manner, hopefully with the result that ratification is approved by the Senate.

General Shalikashvili's report reviews the major concerns which were expressed about the CTBT during our debate, and it offers recommendations in each of these areas, including ways to improve our monitoring and verification of foreign nuclear testing efforts and ways to improve our nuclear weapons Stockpile Stewardship Program. These recommendations address concerns raised about the CTBT and provide some commonsense and balanced steps to improve our security while bringing the CTBT into force.

Specifically, General Shalikashvili's report examines the larger non-proliferation context of the CTBT and concludes that the CTBT has a genuine nonproliferation value for our national security. His report studies the question of monitoring and verification and concludes that the monitoring system under the treaty will significantly enhance U.S. national monitoring capabilities and that cheating will be much harder and less useful than some fear. He evaluates our ability to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons and determines that we can do so without nuclear testing if we fully support the Stockpile Stewardship Program and manage it prudently.

Finally, General Shalikashvili's report looks at the question of whether CTBT should be of indefinite duration and recommends that in addition to the safeguards accompanying the treaty, the Senate and the executive branch should conduct a joint review of the treaty 10 years after ratification and at 10-year intervals thereafter.

One of the key points made by General Shalikashvili is that the CTBT is conditioned on a safeguard that will assure our ability to maintain a safe and reliable stockpile. Under safeguard F, the United States would maintain the right and the ability to withdraw from the treaty and to conduct any testing necessary if that were required to certify the safety and reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to our nuclear deterrent. General Shalikashvili's recommendation on the joint review would strengthen this safeguard by saying that if, after that joint review, grave doubts remained about the treaty's value for our national security, the President would be prepared to withdraw from the treaty.

I know General Shalikashvili's report will be considered carefully and seriously by the Senate and by the new administration. I hope we and the new administration will review his report and think through our CTBT position in a deliberate manner, and I will be making this point personally to President-elect Bush next Monday at a

meeting in Austin for congressional defense and security leaders.

We owe General Shalikashvili a national debt of gratitude for serving our Nation and its security once again. He has taken a great deal of his time since retiring to review the CTBT and to craft recommendations that I hope we will implement. I recommend his report to all Senators and to the new administration, and I hope we will reconsider the treaty in the best bipartisan spirit of the Senate as his report recommends.

I ask unanimous consent that General Shalikashvili's letter to the President, accompanying his report, and his introduction and recommendations from the report be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN
TREATY

January 4, 2001.

Hon. WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON,
President of the United States, The White
House.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Last year, you and the Secretary of State requested that I serve as your Special Advisor for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In this capacity, I met with senators from both sides of the aisle to discuss their concerns and suggestions for any additional steps that could be taken to build bipartisan support for ratification. I was deeply appreciative of their willingness to engage in serious, substantive discussions about the Test Ban Treaty.

In addition to talking with senators, I have also discussed the Treaty with senior members of your administration, leading national security experts from former administrations, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and numerous scientific and diplomatic experts. I have visited the three nuclear weapon laboratories, met with their directors, and talked with a number of senior nuclear designers. My representatives have traveled to the Air Force Technical Applications Center, which operates U.S. national technical means for monitoring compliance with nuclear test ban treaties, and to Vienna, where work is underway on the international verification system. I asked several think tanks to provide a "second opinion" about verification and the Treaty's impact on other countries' nuclear ambitions. I have also reviewed numerous reports by external expert groups.

At the end of my review of the Treaty's potential impact on U.S. national security, I support the Treaty, just as I did when I served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My discussions over the last ten months have only strengthened my view that the Treaty is a very important part of global non-proliferation efforts and is compatible with keeping a safe, reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent. I believe that an objective and thorough net assessment shows convincingly that U.S. interests, as well as those of friends and allies, will be served by the Treaty's entry into force.

The nation's nuclear arsenal is safe, reliable, and able to meet all stated military requirements. For as far into the future as we can see, the U.S. nuclear deterrent can remain effective under the Test Ban Treaty, assuming prudent stockpile stewardship—including the ability to remanufacture aging components. While there are steps that

should be taken to better manage the long-term risks associated with stockpile stewardship, I believe that there is no good reason to delay ratification of the Treaty pending further advances in the Stockpile Stewardship Program as long as we have a credible mechanism to leave the Treaty should a serious problem with the deterrent make that necessary. I fear that the longer entry into force is delayed, the more likely it is that other countries will move irrevocably to acquire nuclear weapons or significantly improve their current nuclear arsenal, and the less likely it is that we could mobilize a strong international coalition against such activities.

In my consultations with senators, I have found broad bipartisan support for strengthened U.S. leadership of a comprehensive international response to the dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The overarching question has been whether the contributions that the Test Ban Treaty can make to national and international security outweigh any potential risks. I have recommended a number of steps that do not involve renegotiating the Treaty and that would go a long way toward addressing specific concerns. I am confident that there would be broad bipartisan support for those of my recommendations that deal with developing a more integrated non-proliferation policy, enhancing U.S. capabilities to track nuclear proliferation and monitor nuclear testing, and strengthening stockpile stewardship. I urge their early implementation because these actions are important for national security without regard to the immediate fate of the Test Ban Treaty. Since these steps would also strengthen the U.S. position under the Treaty, I hope that the next Administration and the Senate will re-evaluate the Test Ban Treaty as part of a bipartisan effort to forge an integrated non-proliferation strategy for the new century.

I hope that the attacked report will prove useful in charting a course for future reconsideration and eventual ratification of the Test Ban Treaty. Should developments at home or abroad ever cast doubt on our ability to maintain a safe, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent, however, we should withdraw from the Treaty if a resumption of nuclear testing would make us more secure. My recommendations would reduce the likelihood of such problems and provide additional reassurances that, if they did occur, the United States would take the appropriate actions. As additional insurance, I am also recommending a joint ten-year Executive-Legislative review of the full range of issues bearing on the Treaty's net value for national security in response to concerns about the Treaty's indefinite duration.

The rest of the world is looking to us for continued leadership of global efforts to stop proliferation and strengthen the nuclear restraint regime. Nothing could be more important to national security and international stability.

Very respectfully,

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI,
General, USA (Ret.)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING
THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN
TREATY

(By General John M. Shalikashvili (USA, Ret.), Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State, January 2001)

I. INTRODUCTION

A decade after the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons are still important to U.S. and allied security, a silent giant guarding against a catastrophic miscalculation by a potential adversary. The United States has the safest, most reliable, most capable arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world. It will

need a credible deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Equally important to our security are global non-proliferation efforts. For the past half century, the United States has led the campaign to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries or terrorist groups, and to reduce the chances that such weapons would ever be used.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty places obstacles in the path of nuclear weapon development by states that could some day threaten the United States or its allies. The question associated with Treaty ratification is whether the security benefits from the Treaty outweigh any risks that a ban on all nuclear explosions could pose to the U.S. deterrent.

Four types of concerns have been most prominent in the debate on advice and consent to ratification in October 1999 and in my subsequent investigations:

1. Whether the Test Ban Treaty has genuine non-proliferation value;
2. Whether cheating could threaten U.S. security;
3. Whether we can maintain the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without nuclear explosive testing; and
4. Whether it is wise to endorse a Test Ban Treaty of indefinite duration.

After examining these issues, I remain convinced that the advantages of the Test Ban Treaty outweigh any disadvantages, and thus that ratification would increase national security. In each area, though, I am recommending additional actions to address concerns and further strengthen the U.S. position under the Treaty. I believe that we can go a long way toward bridging differences on these issues if they receive a level of sustained bipartisan attention equal to their high importance for national security.

The broad objectives of my specific recommendations are to:

1. Increase bipartisan and allied support for a carefully coordinated comprehensive non-proliferation;
2. Enhance U.S. capabilities to detect and deter nuclear testing and other aspects of nuclear proliferation;
3. Improve the management of potential risks associated with the long-term reliability and safety of the U.S. nuclear deterrent; and
4. Address concerns about the Test Ban Treaty's indefinite duration through a joint Executive-Legislative review of the Treaty's net value for national security to be held ten years after ratification and at regular intervals thereafter.

Test Ban Treaty supporters, skeptics, and opponents all agree that the United States needs to revitalize support for an integrated non-proliferation strategy, enhance its monitoring capabilities, and develop a bipartisan consensus on stewardship of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. I urge early implementation of my recommendations on these issues because they would strengthen U.S. security regardless of the immediate fate of the Test Ban Treaty. Action on these steps would also go a long way toward addressing concerns that have been voiced about the Treaty. Together with my recommendation on the ten-year joint review procedure, these steps offer a way to build bipartisan support for Test Ban Treaty ratification as an integral component of an overarching strategy to stop nuclear proliferation and strengthen the nuclear restraint regime.

VIII. COMPILATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation, and the Test Ban Treaty

A. Working closely with the Congress and with U.S. friends and allies, the next Admin-

istration should implement on an urgent basis an integrated non-proliferation policy targeted on, but not limited to, countries and groups believed to have an active interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.

B. To increase high level attention and policy coherence, the next Administration should appoint a Deputy National Security Advisor for Non-Proliferation, with the authority and resources needed to coordinate and oversee implementation of U.S. non-proliferation policy.

C. As part of its effort to build bipartisan and allied support for an integrated non-proliferation policy, the next Administration should review at the highest level issues related to the Test Ban Treaty. There should be a sustained interagency effort to address senators' questions and concerns on these issues of great importance to national security.

D. The United States should continue its testing moratorium and take other concrete actions to demonstrate its commitment to a world without nuclear explosions, such as continuing leadership in building up the International Monitoring System (IMS) being established for the Treaty.

Monitoring, Verification, and Foreign Nuclear Programs

A. Higher funding and intelligence collection priorities should be assigned to monitoring nuclear test activities and other aspects of nuclear weapon acquisition or development by other states.

B. Collaboration should be increased among U.S. government officials and other experts to ensure that national intelligence, the Treaty's international verification regime, and other scientific stations are used as complementary components of an all-source approach to verification.

C. The transition from research to operational use should be accelerated for new verification technologies and analytical techniques.

D. The United States should continue working with other Test Ban Treaty signatories to prepare for inspections and develop confidence-building measures.

E. Additional steps should be taken unilaterally or bilaterally to increase transparency regarding the nature and purpose of activities at known nuclear test sites.

Stewardship of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile

A. Working with the Department of Defense, other Executive Branch agencies, and the Congress, the Administrator of the NNSA should complete as soon as possible his comprehensive review of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The review will clarify objectives and requirements, set priorities, assess progress, identify needs, and develop an overarching program plan with broad-based support.

Highest priority should be given to aspects of stockpile stewardship that are most urgently needed to assure the near-term reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, i.e. surveillance, refurbishment, and infrastructure revitalization.

Enhance surveillance and monitoring activities should receive full support and not be squeezed by higher profile aspects of the SSP.

The NNSA should make a decision about the need for a large-scale plutonium pit remanufacturing facility as soon as possible after the next Administration has determined the appropriate size and composition of the enduring stockpile, including reserves.

A dedicated infrastructure revitalization fund should be established after the NNSA has completed a revitalization plan for its production facilities and laboratories.

B. The NNSA, working with Congress and the Office of Management and Budget,

should place the SSP on a multi-year budget cycle like the Department of Defense's Future Years Defense Program. Some increase in funds for the SSP is likely to be necessary.

C. Steps to improve interagency management of stockpile stewardship matters, such as the revitalization of the Nuclear Weapons Council, are essential and should be continued.

D. Appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that the performance margins of various weapon types are adequate when conservatively evaluated.

E. Strict discipline should be exercised over changes to existing nuclear weapon designs to ensure that neither an individual change nor the cumulative effect of small modifications would make it difficult to certify weapons reliability or safety without a nuclear explosion.

F. The Administrator of the NNSA should establish an on-going high level external advisory mechanism, such as a panel of outstanding and independent scientists.

Minimizing Uncertainty with a Treaty of Indefinite Duration

A. The Administration and the Senate should commit to conducting an intensive joint review of the Test Ban Treaty's net value for national security ten years after U.S. ratification, and at ten-year intervals thereafter. This review should consider the Stockpile Stewardship Program's priorities, accomplishments, and challenges; current and planned verification capabilities; and the Treaty's adherence, implementation, compliance, and enforcement record. Recommendations to address concerns should be formulated for domestic use and to inform the U.S. position at the Treaty's ten-year review conference. If, after these steps, grave doubts remain about the Treaty's net value for U.S. national security, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the Test Ban Treaty under the "supreme national interests" clause.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY REPORT

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, today, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, released his report reviewing the major issues regarding ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which was rejected by the Senate in a vote last fall. His review of the brief debate in the Senate over this critical matter of national security is thorough in its scope and balanced in its recommendations. I urge President Bush and his national security advisory team to review General Shalikashvili's report closely and undertake to address his observations and recommendations immediately.

When it comes to the proliferation or improvement of nuclear weapons, time is NOT on our side. The CTBT, when ratified and in force, will discourage non-nuclear weapons states from creating their own nuclear arsenals and prevent current nuclear states from building new capabilities that can endanger American and international security. The hearings held in the Senate last fall, although not nearly as comprehensive as they should have been,