

The administration proposal has some interesting features and would do limited good, but limited is the operative word. The spending programs for the lower-income uninsured have shown themselves to be efficient ways of increasing coverage. Whatever the fate of the tax credit, they should be expanded. Much attention has lately been paid to the health care problems of the already insured. The elderly lack a drug benefit; people enrolled in managed care complain that care is sometimes sacrificed to cost. But at least these people have insurance. More than 40 million don't. The budget argument this year has been mainly about how large a tax cut to give the better-off. What about a timeout to pay a little heed to those who can't afford to get sick?

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. The Washington Post editorial states:

House conferees have been fighting with their Senate counterparts to reduce the spending levels in the congressional budget resolution. No doubt some cuts can be made in the Senate totals without the country's suffering harm. But at least one relatively minor Senate proposal deserves to remain.

They are referring to this \$28 billion that we can use to reduce the ranks of the uninsured. Currently that is about 17 percent of our fellow citizens, over 43 million Americans.

Senator WYDEN and I, when we came up with this idea, hoped we could cut this number in half. It is now up to the Finance Committee to achieve that. They have the money now authorized to accomplish that.

Good programs do exist for providing health care to the uninsured. Medicaid, as we all know, is working. It needs more resources. There is also the Children's Health Insurance Program, or CHIP, which has also reduced the number of uninsured children in this country.

One of the things I was most grateful to have been a part of when I first came to the Senate was a compromise between Senator HATCH and Senator KENNEDY for the CHIP program, which became the pivot point for the balanced budget agreement. Oregon's Children's Health Insurance Assistance Program has enrolled 13,000 children in our State. But there are more than 61,000 eligible children without coverage because of the limited amount of money budgeted for this purpose. Senator WYDEN and I hope the Finance Committee will expand this program to include their parents.

What we are doing is providing access to health care for low-income Americans. This is the No. 1 bipartisan agenda item we have. We have started on that plan and will build on its past successes.

I believe expanding coverage can be done in a way that will promote State flexibility, avoid new bureaucracies, and protect the employer-based coverage system, while providing a meaningful, affordable benefit to millions of Americans.

Our first component that we will propose to the Finance Committee will be to give businesses incentives to make quality health insurance more affordable for their low-income workers. Our

plan will give businesses a tax credit if they chip in more to offer quality health care to their low-income employees. Many low-wage employees are working hard but are having trouble paying the full amount for health insurance.

Second, our plan will extend Medicaid coverage to more low-income Americans. Many low-income adults who cannot afford or are not offered health insurance will be eligible for Medicaid coverage. As I indicated, we want to expand the CHIP program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BUNNING). The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 1 more minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. We believe that expanding health insurance to millions of hard working low-income Americans will relieve the uncertainty and fear many people face, knowing that they are one illness away from losing their life savings or their home. It is the right thing to do. It is the right time to do it.

As the editorial in the Washington Post says:

What about a timeout to pay a little heed to those who can't afford to get sick?

I thank my colleagues on the budget conference committee for preserving this critical line item for the uninsured. I urge all my colleagues to vote for it when it comes out of this conference and then later when it is crafted into final form by the Finance Committee.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ROBERTS). The distinguished Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, yesterday the President of the United States gave a very broad outline of a new national security strategy that moves away from the reliance on deterrence and arms control towards missile defenses and unilateral arms reductions.

Frankly, the President's brief remarks raise more questions than they answer. I wanted to take a few minutes to address in this Chamber some of the key issues he touched on yesterday.

First, the President stressed that we must move away from our reliance on deterrence to keep our citizens and our allies safe from aggression or from nuclear blackmail. While I agree that in principle we want to find alternative methods of being able to protect ourselves from the potential of nuclear blackmail or terrorism, the hard reality is that there will always be a measure of deterrence in any approach we find with respect to the prevention

of attack or maintaining the security of the United States of America.

If there is a real potential of a rogue nation—and I underscore "if" there is a real potential of a rogue nation—firing a few missiles at any city in the United States, responsible leadership requires the most thoughtful steps possible to prevent losses as a consequence thereof.

The same is true of accidental launch. If at some point in time, God forbid, there were to be an accidental launch of a nuclear missile, the notion that any country in the world, if technology were available, should be subject to that possibility would be unacceptable. All of us in the civilized world need to take steps to try to protect ourselves against the potential of that ever happening.

Let me make it clear. The rogue missile rationale that has been offered on many occasions really merits much greater analysis than many people have given it. For a state to develop a missile capacity, it would require some measure of testing, some measure of actual deployment, such as we have seen in North Korea with its Taepo Dong 2. It would also require a launch site and capacity, all of which are detectable by the United States, all of which are traceable over a period of time.

If, indeed, a state is to such a degree a rogue state that we think its leadership might be in a position of firing one or two rogue missiles at the United States, we ought to also think beyond that as to what they would be inviting as a response. Clearly, one or two missiles clearly traceable, obviously coming from a particular rogue state, would invite their annihilation.

So when we measure threats, we don't just measure capacity to be able to do something. We measure the intent to do something. We measure the consequences of somebody doing something. Indeed, Saddam Hussein, who possessed weapons of mass destruction, saw fit not to use those weapons of mass destruction when we went to war against him, even when he was losing the war. The reason that he didn't was because, Secretary Baker made it patently clear what would happen to them if they did.

Even the most unreasonable, most demonized of leaders still calculates risk and still calculates the repercussions of his actions.

Indeed, our military, in making a judgment about the different tiers of threat we face, places the threat of a rogue missile attack at the very bottom of threats the United States might face.

Here we are in a debate about education and we are being told we are not sure we have enough money for education; we are not sure we have enough money for alternative and renewable fuels; we are not sure we have enough money for a prescription drug program for seniors; we are not sure we have

enough money to fix our schools and provide the next generation with the kinds of education we want—we need to balance what we get for our expenditures in terms of national security against other initiatives that also have an impact on the national security of our country.

I say, with respect, that the President's efforts with respect to the rogue missile threat seem to be willing to do things to the ABM treaty, to our relationships with Russia and China that go well beyond what we could possibly gain in terms of our security.

Let me come back to missile defense, which is really only a response of last resort when diplomacy and deterrence have failed. I support research and development of a limited missile defense system that, indeed, might have the ability to knock down one or two incoming missiles. I think it would be, in fact, a step forward for the United States to be able to at least know that we have that capacity. I suggest, very respectfully, that most scientists and most strategists who are well respected in this country recognize the extraordinary difficulties developing a system that might do much more than take out a selected number of missiles, and that if this were something more than a limited system, if it were a system designed to provide some kind of shield or some kind of larger protection against the potential of a larger attack, and was in fact deployed in that way, we would simply be inviting the kind of counterresponse we saw throughout the cold war, when we unilaterally initiated some advance in technology which the Soviet Union interpreted in a way that invited them to respond.

Most people who make judgments about the potential of knocking down missiles, given the difficulties of decoys, of the extraordinary technological difficulty of discerning the difference between artificial and real targets, the capacity of 1 warhead to potentially carry 100 different bomblets, which you have to discern the difference between in a matter of seconds—to suggest you can somehow have a system that is going to be 100-percent effective would be to stretch the imagination to where I think no strategist would want to go. I don't think anybody worth their salt in making judgments about potential conflict would come to a conclusion that one is 100-percent failsafe protected.

So if you are not 100-percent failsafe protected, you are still dependent, ultimately, on deterrence. We can't get rid of that equation. If you know you are going to suffer some damage, the judgment then becomes, well, how much damage? If we suffer that amount of damage, what is it going to take in return to be able to guarantee that they will, too? So, in effect, you are pushed back into a corner where you are still dependent on the mutual assured destruction equation—the very equation we have lived with since the beginning of the Cold War in 1945.

If you have a system that is 100-percent effective, you have also dramatically changed the equation of the balance of power because if you are sitting there and your adversary says, well, they have a system that is 100-percent effective against an intercontinental ballistic missile, so we had better deliver systems that completely avoid the intercontinental ballistic missile—if, indeed, they are an adversary—if China is sitting there and their strategists are saying the United States now has the ability to shoot down all of our missiles—they have a 100-percent effective defense—that means they have the first strike capacity because the minute you have developed a 100-percent defense, you have translated defense into offense because if you are 100-percent protected, you can fire with impunity first, knowing nothing hits you in return.

So what you have done is really turned on its ear the very concept of fear by both sides that the consequences of a conflict are so great that you avoid the conflict. In point of fact, one of the reasons the United States restrained itself from considering even greater escalation in Vietnam, and in other parts of the world in conflicts, was knowing that the Soviet Union and China have this extraordinary capacity to escalate to the ultimate confrontation. It was always the fear of the ultimate confrontation that drove us to restrain ourselves and ultimately to put in place the ABM Treaty.

The ABM Treaty represents the conclusion of Republican and Democrat administrations alike that we need to find a way out of the continuing escalation of the arms race. That is why we put it in place. It gave us a guarantee that we knew we could begin to reduce weapons because neither side was going to upset this equilibrium. That is why China and Russia are so deeply upset at what we are now considering doing—if we do it unilaterally. I am not against doing it if it is arrived at mutually. I want to research the capacity. I think there is a value to being able to say to New York City or Los Angeles, you are never going to be hit by a rogue missile or an accidental launch.

But what good is it if you deploy it in such a way that you abrogate the treaty that has held the balance and invite your adversaries to interpret it as the efforts of the United States to gain this superior edge, which then leads them into the same response—the tit-for-tat syndrome that led us through the entire arms race in the first place?

That arms race is completely traceable. We were the first people to actually use an atom bomb. People forget that. We used it for a noble purpose—to end the war and hopefully save lives. But we used it. After that, quickly Russia did an atom bomb. Then we did the hydrogen bomb. Russia did the hydrogen bomb. Then we did long-range bombers. They did long-range bombers. We put them on submarines, and they

put them on submarines. In one—maybe two—instances, they beat us. With Sputnik, they beat us. In every other instance, the United States led. We were the first to put out the more sophisticated weaponry capacity.

But what happened? Inevitably immediately it may have taken we found ourselves in this race. The whole purpose of the SALT talks and the START talks—now START I and START II—where we have the capacity to lower from 7,200 weapons down to the 3,500, is the notion that we have arrived at an equilibrium and we are prepared to ratchet down together to make the world safer.

I say to my colleagues, very simply, if we can get China and Russia and our allies to understand that a mutual deployment of a clearly verifiable, highly transparent system, mutually arrived at in protocol—if we can deploy that, all of us together, with a clear understanding of the reductions we are seeking, that could be salutary in its extraordinarily limited way.

But if the United States insists on moving unilaterally, abrogating a treaty, we will send a message to already paranoid hardliners in other countries that the United States once again wishes to have technological superiority. That will drive them to respond as a matter of their security perception and as a matter of their politics, the same politics we have, where a bunch of people sit around and say: How can you allow them to do that? You are a weak leader. You had better respond. If you don't respond, you are going to be thrown out of office. And they respond. What happens? We wind up spending trillions of dollars on something that takes us to a place that we will ultimately decide is more dangerous than the place we are in today and from which we need to back off.

Sam Nunn and DICK LUGAR, two of the most respected Senators—one former Member and one current Member of this institution—have led this body in a well known effort to reduce the nuclear threat from the former Soviet Union. We had distinguished bipartisan testimony in the Foreign Relations Committee a few weeks ago that we need some \$30 billion more than we are allocating now just to reduce the threat of the nuclear missiles we are trying to dismantle in the former Soviet Union. Yet we are talking about spending more than that to create a whole new round of mistrust and misunderstanding.

The President, yesterday, also stressed the fact that national missile defense is only one part of a comprehensive national security strategy. I could not agree more; it is. But let me underscore that missile defense will do nothing to address what the Pentagon itself considers a much more likely and immediate threat to the American homeland from terrorists and from nonstate actors, who can quietly slip explosives into a building, unleash chemical weapons into a

crowded subway, or send a crude nuclear weapon into a busy harbor.

I ask my colleagues: What do you think is the more likely scenario? Do you really believe that North Korea will leave the trail of a missile, a targetable trail and send a missile to the United States, and like the sleeping giant that was awakened in Pearl Harbor, have us return the compliment, or do you believe if they were intent on doing injury to the United States, they would take a little bottle of anthrax and drop it in the water system in Washington, DC?

What do you think is more likely? Do you think it is more likely perhaps that some rogue nation might say: Wait a minute, they have the ability to knock down our missile, so let's put one of these illegally purchased weapons in the marketplace—because we are not doing enough to stop proliferation internationally so they can go out and purchase a small nuclear weapon—and they bring it in on a rusty freighter under the Verrazano Bridge, and detonate a nuclear weapon just outside New York City.

I would like to see us focus on those things that most threaten us, not create these notions of false threat that require us to debate for hours to stop something that does not necessarily promise a very positive impact for the long-term interests of our Nation.

Obviously, the President gave very few details yesterday because he cannot. We do not have an architecture yet. We do not even have a budget yet. We do not even have enough successful tests yet to suggest we should be rapidly deploying and abrogating the ABM Treaty. What are we talking about?

The President said he wants to pursue technology that would allow us to intercept a ballistic missile at the boost phase when they are moving the slowest. I agree with that. In June of 2000, I called on the previous administration to explore the technology for a boost phase intercept system which would build on the current technology of the Army's land-based THAAD and the Navy's sea-based theater-wide defense system to provide forward-deployed defenses against both theater missile ballistic threats and long-range ballistic missile threats.

I welcome President Bush's commitment to investing considerable resources needed to make those systems capable of reaching the speeds necessary to intercept an ICBM. A forward-deployed boost phase intercept system would allow us to target relatively small ballistic missile arsenals and shoot down a very few accidental or unauthorized launches.

Deploying such a system, even though it might require amendments to the 1997 ABM Treaty Demarcation Agreement, would establish the line between theater missile defense systems that are not limited by the treaty and the strategic defenses that the treaty prescribes.

In a nutshell, these agreements allow the United States to deploy and test

the PAC-3, the THAAD, and the Navy theater-wide TMD systems, but they prohibit us from developing or testing capabilities that would enable these systems to shoot down ICBMs.

Russia might not be happy about that, but I believe they would prefer that to a system that would really scrap the entire treaty and all the limitations on strategic defenses that would come with it.

I agree that the strategic situation we confront today is worlds apart from the one we faced in 1972, but nothing in this changed environment suggests that we will be better off by walking away from the ABM Treaty. If somehow Russia and China are not persuaded by President Bush's assurances that our missile defense system is not aimed at undermining their nuclear deterrent capabilities, and instead they perceive a growing threat to their interests, they will act to counter that threat. We will not be safer if our NMD system focuses their energies on developing—and eventually selling—new ways to overwhelm our defenses.

The ABM Treaty can be amended to reflect our changed security environment. But to abandon it all-together is to welcome an arms race that will make us more vulnerable, not less.

The President made a point of announcing that he will begin high-level consultations with our allies about his plans for NMD and he stressed that he would seek real input from them as he moves forward. This is critical. Even if, as can be expected, our allies in Europe and Asia accept a U.S. NMD system, they have a lot at stake in how we develop and deploy that system. The President must take their views into account as he determines what architecture he will pursue and the timing of deploying. Clearly, these are important discussions that will require more than one or two cursory consultations.

The administration must also pay close attention to our allies' concerns about Russia. Because they are keenly aware that a fearful, insecure Russia is a dangerous Russia, they have consistently stressed the importance of including Moscow in our discussions on NMD. Let me be clear: the importance of working with Russia as we move forward is not to suggest that Moscow has a veto over our missile defense plans. But we have an obligation to avoid unilateral steps that will throw our already tenuous relations with Russia into further turmoil. Serious discussions with Moscow on amending the ABM Treaty—even if they are not ultimately successful—will allow us to move toward NMD deployment transparently and with minimal provocation.

As with Russia, if an NMD decision is made absent serious discussions with China, the leadership in Beijing will perceive the deployment as at least partially directed at them. The Administration must try hard to reach a common understanding with China that there is a real threat from isolated re-

gimes bent on terrorism and accidental or unauthorized launches. The Clinton administration invested a great deal of time and diplomatic effort convincing Russia that the threat is real and it affects us both. We must make the same effort with China. If we fail to take this task seriously, we will jeopardize stability in the Pacific.

The President's proposal on NMD lacks specifics and his intentions on the ABM Treaty are vague. He and his advisors know that the American people will not support an expensive, ineffective NMD system, or one that comes at the expense of a Treaty that has made them safer over the last 20 years. So to sweeten the President's bad news on these two issues, he promised—again without any detail—to unilaterally reduce the U.S. arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons.

The proposal to unilaterally reduce U.S. nuclear stockpiles is an important and overdue first step toward reducing the nuclear danger. Unfortunately, before the President can make good on this promise, he will have to convince his Republican colleagues in the Congress to repeal a provision in the FY 98 Defense Department Authorization bill that prohibits the reduction of strategic nuclear delivery systems to levels below those established by the START I treaty.

Senate Democrats have tried for the last three years to repeal this provision, which prevents exactly the kind of nuclear reduction President Bush has spoken about. But they have been stymied by a Republican leadership that believes the U.S. should not move to START II arms levels even though the Senate ratified that treaty in 1996—before Russia has done so.

I hope we can move immediately to repeal this prohibition and begin the process of cutting our strategic arsenal in half—from more than 7,000 warheads today to the 3,500 allowed under START II. While those reductions are underway, the President should immediately proceed to talks with Russia on a START III agreement, which could bring our arsenal to below 2,000 warheads and codify similar, transparent, verifiable and irreversible reductions by Russia.

Mr. President, for 40 years, the United States has led international efforts to reduce and contain the danger from nuclear weapons. We can continue that leadership by exploiting our technological strengths to find a defense against ballistic missiles, and by extending that defense to our friends and allies. But we must not jeopardize stability in Europe and Asia by putting political ideology ahead of commitments that have kept us safe for decades.

BETTER EDUCATION FOR STUDENTS AND TEACHERS ACT—MOTION TO PROCEED—Continued

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for a few