

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service: \$119 million for enhanced facility security, for support of border inspections, for pest detection activities, and for other areas related to bio-security and for relocation of a facility at the National Animal Disease Laboratory.

Food Safety Inspection Service: \$15 million for enhanced operational security and for implementation of the Food Safety Bio-Terrorism Protection Program.

Food and Drug Administration: \$151 million for food safety and counter-bioterrorism, including support of additional food safety inspections; expedited review of drugs, vaccines, and diagnostic tests; and enhanced physical and operational security.

State and Local Law Enforcement—\$400 million.

FEMA firefighting—\$210 million to improve State and local government capacity to respond to terrorist attacks.

Postal Service—\$500 million to provide equipment to cope with biological and chemical threats such as anthrax and to improve security for Postal workers.

Federal Antiterrorism Law Enforcement (excluding amounts for New York)—\$1.7 billion.

\$745 million for the FBI.

\$19 million for the U.S. Marshals.

\$78 million for Cyber security.

\$31 million for Federal Law Enforcement Training Center for training of new law enforcement personnel.

\$16 million for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

\$60 million for overtime and expanded aviation and border support for Customs.

\$73 million for the Secret Service.

\$209 million for increased Coast Guard surveillance.

\$95 million for Federal courts security.

\$70 million for Justice Department Legal Activities.

\$109 million for EPA for anthrax cleanup costs and drinking water vulnerability assessments.

\$66 million for EPA for bioterrorism response teams and EPA laboratory security.

\$25 million for the FEMA Office of National Preparedness.

\$30 million for the IRS.

\$27 million for Olympic security.

Airport/Transit Security—\$0.6 billion, including:

\$175 million for Airport Improvement Grants.

\$308 million for FAA for cockpit security, sky marshals and explosives detection equipment.

\$50 million for FAA research to expedite deployment of new aviation security technologies.

\$18 million for transit security.

\$50 million for Essential Air Service.

Port Security improvements—\$209 million, including \$93 million for DOT and \$116 million for Customs.

Nuclear Power Plant/Lab/Federal Facility Improvements—\$0.8 billion.

\$143 million for Energy for enhanced security at U.S. nuclear weapons plants and laboratories.

\$139 million for the Corps of Engineers to provide enhanced security at over 300 critical dams, drinking water reservoirs and navigation facilities.

\$30 million for the Bureau of Reclamation for similar purposes.

\$36 million for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to enhance security at commercial nuclear reactors.

\$50 million for security at the White House.

\$26 million for GSA and the Archives to improve federal building security.

\$109 million for NASA for security upgrades at the Kennedy, Johnson and other space centers.

\$256 million for improved security for the Legislative Branch.

Nuclear Non-proliferation—\$226 million for the safeguarding and acquisition of Russian and former Soviet Union missile nuclear materials and to help transition and retrain Russian nuclear scientists.

Border Security—\$0.7 billion.

\$135 million for Customs for increased inspectors on the border and for construction of border facilities, with emphasis on the northern border.

\$549 million for the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. HOLLINGS. First, let me commend the Senator from West Virginia. Over the years, I have seen him accomplish many feats. None would be more outstanding than what he has done on homeland security for the City of New York. Like Horatio at the bridge, he stood there against all forces, particularly with respect to the executive branch, and otherwise, and made sure we at least got some semblance of homeland security started. It is on account of Senator BYRD of West Virginia.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his kind words. I want to say this: If I were out in the streets of a big city and, for some reason, got into a street brawl, I would want Senator HOLLINGS with me. If that ever happened to me, I would say: Senator HOLLINGS, where is he? He is the man I want with me in a tough situation.

Mr. HOLLINGS. And if I were lost on a lonely, dusty road amongst the hills, I would want Senator BYRD with me.

PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY ACT OF 2001

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, under the unanimous consent agreement, can we turn to S. 1214 and ask the clerk to report?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the bill by title.

A bill (S. 1214) to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to establish programs to ensure greater security for U.S. Seaports, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from South Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. HOLLINGS. In my 5 minutes, I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona, my ranking member—this is really a bipartisan initiative—Senator GRAHAM of Florida who has been a leader in this regard and also Senator HUTCHISON of Texas.

I also thank the distinguished director of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, Mr. Kevin Kaye; Mr. Carl Bentzel, the expert on port security who has been working on this over the past several years; and Mr. Matthew Morrissey.

We actually reported the bill before September 11 of this year. We have been working diligently to take care of

the concerns on both sides of the aisle and both sides of the Capitol. We think this measure can pass expeditiously, as soon as the House returns.

Following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, we have worked hard to improve the security of America's transportation system, starting with the airline security bill just signed into law. However, protecting America from terrorist threats is only as effective as the weakest line of defense. That means every mode of transportation must be secured, including maritime transportation.

The United States has more than 1,000 harbor channels and 25,000 miles of inland, intracoastal, and coastal waterways. Those waterways serve 361 ports and have more than 3,700 terminals handling passengers and cargo. The U.S. marine transportation system each year moves more than 2 billion tons of domestic and international freight, imports 3 billion tons of oil, transports 134 million passengers by ferry, and hosts more than 7 million cruise ship passengers. Of the more than 2 billion tons of freight, the majority of cargo is shipped in huge containers from ships directly onto trucks and railcars that immediately head onto our highways and rail systems. However less than 2 percent of those containers are ever checked by Customs or law enforcement officials. The volume of maritime trade is expected to more than double by the year 2020, making maritime security even more important for the future. This is a gaping hole in our national security that must be fixed—and it must be fixed before enemies of the United States try to exploit our weakness.

Before discussing the specifics of our bill, I want to read an excerpt from a chilling story published October 8 in the *The Times of London*:

Intelligence agencies across the world are examining Osama bin Laden's multimillion [dollar] shipping interests. He maintains a secret fleet, under a variety of flags of convenience, allowing him to hide his ownership and transport goods, arms, drugs, and recruits with little official scrutiny.

Three years ago, nobody paid much attention to a crew unloading cargo from a rusting freighter tied up on the quayside in Mombasa, Kenya. The freighter was part of Osama bin Laden's merchant fleet and the crew were delivering supplies for the team of suicide bombers who weeks later would blow up the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Bin Laden's covert shipping interests were revealed at the trial of the bombers, but until now security services have been slow to track down how many vessels he operates.

Lloyd's List International reported that a NATO country's intelligence service has identified more than 20 merchant vessels believed to be linked to Osama bin Laden. Those vessels are now subject to seizure in ports all over the world. Some of the vessels are thought to be owned outright by bin Laden's business interests, while others are on long-term charter.

Several weeks ago, a suspected member of the Al Qaeda terrorist network

was arrested in Italy after he tried to stow-away in a shipping container heading to Toronto. The container was furnished with a bed, a toilet, and its own power source to operate the heater and recharge batteries. According to the Toronto Sun, the man also had a global satellite telephone, a laptop computer, an airline mechanics certificate, and security passes for airports in Canada, Thailand and Egypt.

These two stories really bring home this issue of seaport security. Except for those of us who live in port cities like Charleston, Americans often do not think about their ports—the ports that load industrial and consumer goods onto trucks and railroad cars heading directly to their hometowns. Therefore, security provided through our seaports ultimately affects landlocked communities in the heartland of the United States. Of the cargo imported and exported into the United States, 95 percent arrives through our seaports; the balance is shipped through land and air borders. The potential damage and destruction that can be accomplished through security holes at our seaports potentially exceeds any other mode of transportation. And yet we have failed to make seaport security a priority.

Many of our busiest seaports are not only near large cities, they are in the core of cities like Charleston, Boston, Miami, and Seattle. These seaports have been the historic hubs of economic growth, and, in some cases, they have existed for close to four centuries. By comparison, our rail infrastructure is 150 years old and most of our aviation infrastructure is less than 60 years old. The port areas in many cities have become increasingly attractive places to live because many people want a view of the water, and to live near the coast. So we are facing a major problem: the number of people who want to live close to the waterfront is growing rapidly, but the open nature of our seaports exposes them to risks associated with maritime trade, including the transport of hazardous materials.

Most Americans would be surprised to discover there is no unified federal plan for overseeing the security of the international borders at our seaports. And that's what seaports are: international borders that must be protected as well as our land borders with Canada and Mexico. Yet we have failed to make them secure. The U.S. Coast Guard and Customs Service are doing an outstanding job, but they are outgunned. In the year 2000, we imported 5.5 million trailer truckloads of cargo. Due to that volume, seaports, according to the Customs Service, are only able to inspect between 1 to 2 percent of containers. In other words, potential terrorists and drug smugglers have a 98 percent chance of randomly importing illegal and dangerous materials.

When traveling by airplane, we walk through metal detectors, our luggage is X-rayed, and Customs officials may

interview us and check our bags. The inspection rate is 100 percent. At our land border crossings, every single car and truck driver is stopped and interviewed, or at least reviewed by the federal government. Again, the inspection rate is 100 percent. However, at a U.S. seaport, a person has a 98 percent chance of importing a 48-foot truckload of cargo with no inspection at all. One marine container can carry more heroin than is used in the United States in one year. Some of these containers can carry as much as 30 tons, or 60,000 pounds of cargo. A medium sized tanker can carry as much as 32 million gallons of petroleum or hazardous materials. Nearly one-quarter of all hazardous materials are moved via water, most of it in bulk form via huge tankers. These shipments of oil or hazardous materials—most of them carried by foreign vessels—are especially dangerous targets for terrorists. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, we must take action to better secure our maritime borders.

The Congress recently approved a new law that spends \$3.2 billion to improve security at our airports. The highway reauthorization bill—TEA-21 passed in 1998—directed \$140 million a year for five years to improve roads and security infrastructure at our land borders. We annually fund the Border Patrol to guard against illegal entry at our land borders. At U.S. seaports, the federal government provides officers from the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service—but the federal government invests nothing in security infrastructure at our seaports. We leave that up to the state-controlled port authorities and private marine terminal operators. Thus, we have essentially abrogated the federal responsibility of our international seaport borders to states and the private sector.

Like airline security, seaport and international border security is one of the prime responsibilities of the federal government. We must meet the challenge head-on with enough resources to address these serious issues of national security, and to help our partners at the state and local levels protect their own communities. While these security holes at our seaports may be less obvious to the public, they do exist. Because of the magnitudes of the cargoes, the proximity of cargo delivery to large populations, and the transportability that water confers to certain hazardous materials or oil, seaports lacking adequate security are more vulnerable to attack and sabotage than our airports or land borders.

A couple years ago, Senator BOB GRAHAM convinced President Clinton to appoint a commission to look at seaport security. At the time, the main focus of port security was stopping illegal drugs, the smuggling of people, and cargo theft. While those problems still exist, the new—and very real—threat of terrorism strikes right at the heart of our national defense.

The Interagency Commission on Crime and Security at U.S. Seaports issued a report in September 2000 that said security at U.S. seaports “ranges from poor to fair.” Let me repeat that: 17 federal agencies reviewed our port security system and found that it is in poor shape.

According to the Commission:

Control of access to the seaport or sensitive areas within the seaports is often lacking. Practices to restrict or control the access of vehicles to vessels, cargo receipt and delivery operations, and passenger processing operations at seaports are either not present or not consistently enforced, increasing the risk that violators could quickly remove cargo or contraband. Many ports do not have identification cards issued to personnel to restrict access to vehicles, cargo receipt and delivery operations, and passenger processing operations.

At many seaports, the carrying of firearms is not restricted, and thus internal conspirators and other criminals are allowed armed access to cargo vessels and cruise line terminals. In addition, many seaports rely on private security personnel who lack the crime prevention and law enforcement training and capability of regular police officers.

The report also found that port-related businesses did not know where to report cargo theft and other crimes, and that federal, state and local law enforcement agencies responsible for a port's security rarely meet to coordinate their work.

That is what our legislation does—it creates mechanisms to integrate all these different security agencies and their security efforts at our seaports and the railways and highways that converge at our seaports. Our seaport security bill also directly funds more Customs officers, more screening equipment, and the building of important security infrastructure.

Each agency is good at what they do individually. But they will be even stronger working together, sharing information and tactics, and coordinating security coverage at our seaports. More teamwork between these federal, state and local agencies—along with our security partners in the private sector—will produce a more secure seaport environment that is stronger than the sum of each agency's individual efforts.

S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, requires the Secretary of Transportation to chair a National Maritime Security Advisory Committee. The Secretary is required to request participation of the U.S. Customs Service and invite the participation of other federal agencies with an interest in crime or threats of terrorism at U.S. seaports. The bill also authorizes the establishment of subcommittees, including a subcommittee comprised of Federal, State, and local government law enforcement agencies to address port security issues, and law enforcement-sensitive matters.

The Committee is required to advise on long-term solutions for maritime and port security; coordination of information-sharing and operations

among federal, state and local governments, and area and local port and harbor security committees; conditions for maritime security loan guarantees and grants; and the development of a National Maritime Security Plan. Given the varied nature and geographical structure of our port system, it will be important to consider private sector input. A one-size-fits-all approach will not work because we are looking at a wide variety of waterside facilities and maritime transportation-related infrastructure.

The bill will mandate, for the first time ever, that all ports and waterfront facilities have a comprehensive security plan approved by the Secretary of Transportation. An element of port security often overlooked are the intermodal means for transporting cargo from the ships: railroads, highways, and barges. The bill requires that all the modes of transportation converging at the port be covered by a port's security plan. To make the entire waterfront environment more secure, any facility that might pose a threat to the public must tender security plans to the Coast Guard for review and approval.

However, we will do more than just mandate security plans. We will have security experts to assess waterfront and port security, and provide those assessments to the individuals in charge of making security plans. Assessment information will be invaluable in helping the industry use the best information in order to complete effective security plans. The bill requires the Secretary to incorporate existing programs and practices when reviewing and approving security plans. The Department of Transportation will have to take into account the different security practices of our different ports. The Department must recognize and harmonize existing security practices to avoid duplicating costs. However, recognition of existing practices should not require the Department to endorse or approve faulty security.

At the seaport level, the bill will establish local port security committees at each U.S. seaport. The section would require membership of these committees to include representatives of the port authority, labor organizations, the private sector, and Federal, State, and local governments and law enforcement. The Committees would be chaired by the Coast Guard Captain of the Port, and meet 4 times per year. The Committees would be responsible for coordinating planning and other port security activities; making recommendations for the port security evaluations; annually reviewing security plans; and conducting a field security exercise at least once every 3 years. These committees will play a vital role—day to day and month to month—coordinating the actions of law enforcement and the private sector in combating threats of terrorism and crime.

The bill requires the Secretary of Transportation, in coordination with

the Director of the FBI, ensure that all area maritime counter-terrorism and incident contingency plans are reviewed, revised, and updated no less than once every three years. The Secretary shall ensure that local port security committees conduct annual simulation exercises for all such plans, and actual practice drills at least once every three years. The plans should be comprehensive and address terrorist threats to waterfront facilities and adjacent areas, and also cover elements of prevention and protection as well as response. I would hope that the Secretary would take steps to ensure that area maritime counter-terrorism and incident contingency plans are coordinated with security plans.

The bill creates standards and procedures for training and certifying maritime security professionals. The bill requires the Secretary of Transportation and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, "FLETC," to establish a Maritime Security Institute for training security personnel, in accordance with internationally recognized law enforcement standards. I look forward to working with the Department of Transportation and the FLETC to establish an Institute to strengthen and professionalize maritime law enforcement and security forces. I have worked with FLETC to establish a facility in Charleston, South Carolina to train Border Patrol personnel. I also look forward to working with the Secretary and FLETC to establish the Maritime Law Institute.

The legislation requires the Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Transportation, and the Attorney General to work together to establish shared dockside inspection facilities at seaports for Federal and State agencies. At some U.S. ports, federal investigators and inspectors do not have any space available to conduct inspections, and they have to route the cargo to other places before inspection. In other words, it would be similar to Customs officials at JFK airport asking arriving international passengers to take a cab to the Customs headquarters downtown in order to have their bags inspected. That is just not right.

To improve seaport security tactics, the bill directs the Secretary of Transportation to immediately establish domestic maritime safety and security teams for the purpose of responding to terrorist activity, criminal activity, or other threats to U.S. ports, especially in strategically important ports. The units shall consist of personnel trained in anti-terrorism, drug interdiction, navigation assistance, and facilitating responses to security threats. I want to thank Senator EDWARDS for his work on this security team initiative. I was pleased that we were able to include in the bill two other amendments authored by Senator EDWARDS: one promotes research and development funds for non-intrusive scanning technology; the second establishes standards for

locking marine containers. These amendments will contribute greatly to increasing security at our seaports.

Ports, terminals, waterfront facilities, and adjacent facilities will be required to immediately implement interim security measures, including securing their perimeters. The Secretary of Transportation will then prescribe regulations for the aforementioned parties to follow when designing the required maritime security plans. An important point is that the regulations will require ports to control and limit personnel access to security-sensitive areas. Ports also will be required to limit cars and trucks in security-sensitive areas, restrict firearms and other weapons, coordinate local and private law enforcement, and develop an evacuation plan. While the bill requires security programs to be individually tailored due to the varied nature of different ports, the Department of Transportation regulations will still require certain elements to be incorporated. In implementing new regulations, I would hope that the Department would review the feasibility of establishing a nationwide credentialing process. If we can harmonize identification procedures, we can eliminate duplication and reduce costs.

The Secretary of Transportation will write regulations to designate controlled access areas in the Maritime Facility Security Plan for each waterfront facility and other covered entities, and require ports to limit access to security-sensitive information, such as passenger and cargo manifests. The regulations may require physical searches of persons entering controlled access areas or exiting such areas, security escorts, and employment history and criminal background checks for individuals with unrestricted access to controlled areas or sensitive information. An individual will be eligible to work in such positions if they meet the criteria established by the Secretary, and a background check does not reveal a felony conviction within the previous 7 years, or release from prison during the previous 5 years. An individual that otherwise may have been disqualified from a security-sensitive position may still be hired if the employer establishes alternate security arrangements acceptable to the Secretary. The bill would allow the Secretary to access FBI, fingerprint, and other crime data bases to conduct the background investigations, and transmit the results to port authorities or other covered entities. The bill also would require the Secretary and the Attorney General to establish and collect reasonable fees to pay expenses incurred for the background checks.

The intent of conducting criminal background checks of port employees, employers and other maritime transportation-related employees or employers, is not to upset any of the existing work relationships or dynamics. Rather the background checks are intended to identify legitimate criminal

and national security risks. The Secretary of Transportation will write regulations outlining how background checks should be conducted, and will be responsible for conducting the background checks. In the aviation security bill, we created a Deputy Secretary for Transportation Security. The person in that position should be responsible for implementing the national security check program.

The Secretary also will determine which areas are controlled-access areas. Clearly, not all areas in ports are security risks areas justifying designation as such. I would suggest that controlled access areas include areas where ships tie up carrying combustibles, or storage areas for combustibles or explosives, areas where security admit credentialed persons into the port or terminal areas, or areas in the port or terminal where containers are opened or exposed. However, the Secretary should determine where risk or threat resides, and create a way to check the backgrounds of individuals who pose a national security or criminal threat by virtue of their presence in areas requiring a greater degree of control. Individuals subject to potential disqualification from positions with access to ocean manifests or segregated controlled access areas must be given full and adequate due process, and collected information must be protected from disclosure and only revealed to the extent that it is pertinent to security considerations.

The bill would give the Secretary of Transportation additional authority to address security risks arising from foreign ports, such as enhanced enforcement against vessels arriving from such port, travel advisories for passengers, suspension of the right of a United States vessel to enter such port, and authority to assist foreign port authorities to maintain an appropriate level of security. The Secretary of Transportation would be authorized to work through the Secretary of State to notify foreign countries of security problems with their ports, and to publish a list of ports with insufficient security that would be posted prominently at U.S. ports, on passenger tickets, and as a travel advisory by the State Department. The Secretary of Transportation, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, may prohibit or prescribe conditions of port entry into the U.S. for any vessel arriving from a port listed as not secure. In particular, I would like to commend both Senator KERRY, who chairs the Coast Guard Subcommittee, and Senator BREAU, who chairs the Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Subcommittee, for their efforts on this front.

Senators KERRY and BREAU authored another critical section of this bill: the Sea Marshal program. The bill would authorize the Coast Guard to board vessels in order to deter, prevent, or respond to acts of terrorism or otherwise provide for the safety and secu-

rity of the port and maritime environment. We would authorize \$13 million over five years for this new Coast Guard enforcement. The provision in question also requires the Secretary to evaluate the potential of using licensed U.S. merchant marine personnel to supplement the law enforcement efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard.

The bill would authorize the President, without prior notice or a hearing, to suspend the right of any vessel or person of the United States to enter from a foreign port or depart to a foreign port in which a condition exists that threatens the safety or security of passengers, vessels, or crew traveling to that port, or if a public interest requires the suspension of trade between the United States and that port. The bill would authorize the imposition of civil penalties of up to \$50,000 for violating the law.

S. 1214 will require that we know more in advance about the cargo and crew members coming into the United States. The more we know about a ship's cargo, and where it originated, the better our Customs agents and other law enforcement officers can target the most suspicious containers and passengers. Even with more screening equipment, we are still going to have an inadequate number of inspections. So targeting the highest risk cargo will be crucial.

The bill requires ships to electronically send their cargo manifests to the port before gaining clearance to enter. While denying vessel clearance to land is within the authority of Customs, I would urge that it be used only in the most extreme cases, and that enforcement alternatives for handling offending cargo interests be pursued in order not to disrupt all the other legal cargoes on-board a vessel. Unloading cargo will be prohibited if it is not properly documented. Advanced import information is regularly transmitted by nearly 90 percent of the ocean shippers. But for the shippers who are not transmitting that information, we will require it. By giving Customs advance cargo information, we can better screen imported cargo.

Specifically, the legislation requires carriers, including non-vessel-owning common carriers, to provide by electronic transmission, cargo manifest information in advance of port entry or clearance. However, the Secretary of Treasury may exclude classes of vessels for which the Secretary concludes these manifest requirements are not necessary, and in some cases such as trucking, where the electronic transmission may not be possible. Customs should use its authority to require electronic transmission, but recognize, because of the nature of certain categories of transport, that it may not be possible to conduct electronic transmissions in every situation. The bill also outlines the cargo and route information that must be transmitted to Customs.

The bill prohibits the export of cargo unless properly documented, and no

marine terminal operator may load, or cause to be loaded, any cargo that is not documented. The bill requires the U.S. Customs Service to be notified of improperly documented cargo that has remained in a marine terminal for more than 48 hours, and authorizes that cargo to be searched, seized, and forfeited. Undocumented cargo should not sit in port areas for extended periods of time. Specifically, shippers who file Shippers Export Declarations (SED) by paper shall be required to provide a copy of the SED to the carrier; shippers who file their SEDs electronically shall be required to provide the carrier with a complete master bill of lading or equivalent shipping instructions, including the Automated Export System number. While it is important that we obtain certain crucial pieces of information about cargo, Customs should recognize that certain elements of cargo information, such as weight discrepancies, may fluctuate and shippers should not be held responsible for 100 percent accuracy. The bill creates civil penalties for violating documentation requirements.

An important part of the legislation creates new requirements for the documentation and electronic transmission of passenger information in advance of entry or clearance into a port. It is imperative that the United States have advanced information on foreign passengers and crew members to ensure that we are not admitting security risks. Evidence indicates that materials used in terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania were shipped by vessels owned and operated by Osama bin Laden. More information—and more credible information—about foreign entrants will be vital given the volume of vessels, cargo and crew members entering into U.S. waters. In establishing such regulations, Customs should work with all federal agencies to harmonize data reporting requirements to ensure that entrants into the United States only need to file one form. Policies such as INS pre-qualification of crew members between specific pre-approved train routes between the United States and Canada should be allowed to continue. Such policies ensure advance compliance, and stimulate regular cross-border operation, while not jeopardizing security.

I am also pleased that we were able to accept an amendment authored by Senator CLELAND to allow the Commissioner of Customs to develop a pilot program to pre-clear cargo coming into the United States if it is determined that such program would improve the security and safety of U.S. ports. However, before implementation of such a program, Customs must determine that it would not compromise existing procedures for ensuring the safety of these ports and the United States. The pilot program should be used to determine whether we can successfully shift the evaluation of cargo and cargo security to points outside the United States, and also ensure that the subsequent delivery of cargo is accomplished in a

way that protects against tampering and maintains the integrity of the cargo seal.

The bill directs the Customs Service to improve reporting of imports, including consigned items and goods, of in-bond goods arriving at U.S. seaports. Current policies can sometimes allow goods to travel into the United States, and travel for, in some instances, up to 37 days, without recording formal entry. The bill will require the reporting of in-bond movements prior to arrival to ensure advance filing of information identifying the cosignor, consignee, country of origin, and the 6-digit harmonized tariff code. The new information must be electronically filed by the importer of record, or its agent. This information will better enable Customs to track cargo and to intercept any suspicious cargoes in a more timely fashion. This reporting is not intended to reflect formal entry, but will allow Customs to use their targeting system on in-bond cargoes, where current policies make it difficult to enter relevant targeting data.

Within 6 months of the bill's enactment, the bill would require a report that evaluates the feasibility of establishing a general database to collect information about the movements of vessels, cargo, and maritime passengers in order to identify criminal threats, national and economic security threats, and threats of terrorism. The Secretary would submit a report of the findings to Congress. Among several requirements, the report must estimate potential costs and benefits of using public and private databases to collect and analyze information, including the feasibility of establishing a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force on Maritime Intelligence. Additional information, and coordination of information will be crucial in allowing law enforcement to evaluate threats in advance of U.S. arrival, ultimately, policies allowing us to identify risks abroad will help us avoid being forced to rely on policies of deterrence and prevention on U.S. soil.

Perhaps most importantly, we need to give seaport authorities the resources to get the job done. It would be great if we could simply declare our ports to be more secure. However, it takes money to make sure the international borders at our seaports are fully staffed with Customs, law enforcement, and Immigration personnel. It takes money to make sure they have modern security equipment, including the latest scanners to check cargo for the most dangerous materials. And it takes money to build the physical infrastructure of a secure port.

Our bill will provide \$219 million over four years directly to these important national security functions. Cargo ships currently pay a tax on the gross registered tonnage the ship can carry. That tax rate, in current law, is scheduled to decline beginning in 2003. Our bill will simply extend the existing tax rate—which has been imposed since 1986—until 2006. All those revenues will

be directed to help beef up security. These tax revenues will have to be appropriated, but they can only be spent on the programs authorized by this seaport security bill.

However, the funds provided directly by the tonnage tax extension are insufficient to cover all of the port security needs. So the bill includes additional authorizations of \$965.5 million that Congress can appropriate as our colleagues come to realize the important security needs that must be met in the defense of our nation. Absent the realization of these authorized funds, Congress will be imposing an unfunded mandate on states and the private sector to secure our nation's maritime border.

The money will help pay for many of the items previously mentioned, and additionally will be focused on building infrastructure at our seaports, including gates and fencing, security-related lighting systems, remote surveillance systems, concealed video systems, and other security equipment. The bill will directly fund and authorize \$390 million in grants to local port security projects. Specifically, the bill amends the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to provide grants for security projects, of which the federal government will pay up to 75 percent. Projects under \$25,000 would not have a matching requirement, and the Secretary may approve federal contributions above 75 percent to a project the Secretary deems to have high merit.

The bill also will fund loan guarantees that, according to regular credit risk premiums for federal loans, could cover as much as \$3.3 billion in long term loans to port authorities acting to improve their security infrastructure. The loans could not cover more than 87.5 percent of the actual cost of a security infrastructure project, and can extend for up to 25 years. The loan guarantee mechanism allows the federal government to leverage funds by extending credit to cover loans for security infrastructure, and can help port authorities reduce their capital costs for security infrastructure by amortizing it over time. Ultimately, this policy will help us build an infrastructure at our maritime borders in the most cost-effective way. The bill makes directly available and authorizes \$166 million to cover the credit risks of loans extended under this provision.

U.S. Customs officers must be able to screen more than just 2 percent of the cargo coming into our seaports. Investing in new screening technologies will help human screeners inspect more cargo, and detect the most dangerous shipments. To increase the amount of cargo screened, the bill authorizes \$145 million for FY02 for additional Customs personnel, and to help Customs update their computer systems consistent with the requirements of this bill. Especially important is that the bill directly funds and authorizes \$168 million to purchase non-intrusive

screening and detection equipment for the U.S. Customs Service.

While we cannot expect to screen every marine container entering into the United States, we need to provide some expectation of inspection, or create some level of deterrence to dissuade smugglers from using the intermodal system to smuggle cargo. We are so busy investing in an anti-ballistic missile defense system, we fail to see perhaps even a greater threat: a cargo container equipped with a digital global positioning system can be delivered anywhere in the United States for less than \$5,000. Why would the enemies of America spend millions on a rocket launcher and go up against the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy when they could spend \$5,000 to ship a container full of explosives or other dangerous materials that has only a two percent chance of being inspected?

The bill also will authorize \$75 million to establish a grant program to fund the development, testing, and transfer of technology to enhance security at U.S. seaports. The screening technology would focus on finding explosives or firearms, weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons. The grants may not exceed 75 percent of the research program.

This bill is the product of bipartisan compromise. I want to thank the Administration for their efforts to produce this legislation. The Maritime Administration, Coast Guard and Office of the Secretary all played a vital role in helping draft the bill. I had intended to work to include legislation that would increase various maritime criminal statutes. Unfortunately, in the crush of time we were unable to clear these amendments. I think that both Senator MCCAIN and I agree that these amendments are really important to be included in final legislation on seaport security, and I will work with him, and Chairman LEAHY and Ranking Member HATCH of the Judiciary Committee to include provisions updating our maritime criminal laws.

The bill would require the Secretary of Transportation to prepare and publish a National Maritime Transportation Security Plan for prevention and response to maritime crime and terrorism. The plan would include an allocation of duties among federal departments and agencies and among state and local governments and agencies; procedures and techniques for preventing and responding to acts of crime or terrorism; and designation of the federal official who shall be the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator for each area for which an Area Maritime Security Plan is required and prepared. Additionally, the bill would also require the Secretary of Transportation to establish Area Maritime Security Committees comprised of members appointed by the Secretary. Each Area Maritime Security Committee would be required to prepare a maritime security plan, and work with state and local officials to enhance contingency

planning. Each Area Maritime Security Plan must be submitted to the Secretary of Transportation. The plans are required to outline how to respond to an act of maritime crime or terrorism in or near the area, describe the area covered by the plan, and describe in detail how the plan is integrated with other security plans. This requirement is similar to the planning requirements that we mandated in the Oil Pollution Act for oil spill response, and will help ensure that we have local, regional and national level responses to maritime crime and terrorism. The bill would also authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations establishing requirements for vessel security plans and programs for vessels calling on United States ports, would also authorize the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Attorney General, to require crewmembers aboard vessels calling on the United States ports to carry and present upon demand such identification as the Secretary determines.

The bill would require the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Treasury to establish a joint task force to work with ocean shippers in the development of a system to track data for shipments, containers, and contents. The Secretaries also would work with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop enhanced performance standards for in-bond seals and locks for use on or in containers used for water-borne cargo shipments.

The bill includes a number of reporting requirements to assess our progress on seaport security. I would like to thank Senator NELSON of Florida for his amendment asking for a Coast Guard and Navy study on the feasibility of creating a Center for Coastal and Maritime Security. We all look forward to the results of this important study.

We have made dramatic improvements to this bill since it was first approved by the Commerce Committee before the terrorist attacks. And I want to thank Senator McCAIN for working with me to co-sponsor this manager's amendment to the previous version of our seaport security bill, S. 1214. Senator McCAIN does not have many seaports in Arizona, but he understands that the cargo, materials and people who come through our seaports make their way quickly inland on trains and highways. So even if you are living in the desert, the security of our seaports affects all of us. I also would like to recognize and thank Rob Freeman of Senator McCAIN's staff, who invested hours of time and effort to finalize this product.

I also must recognize the extraordinary efforts of Senator BOB GRAHAM, who began working to improve port security long ago and put this issue on our radar screen. Senator GRAHAM's home state of Florida has been wrestling with issues of crime, theft and drug smuggling at its seaports for

many years. And while the federal government failed to address these problems, the state of Florida invested millions of dollars of its own resources to improve port security, which has helped the communities surrounding those ports. But they will still need much more. The states should not carry the entire burden of protecting the international boarders at our seaports. And yet, the problems had become so severe, that the state of Florida, led in part by BOB GRAHAM, decided it had to act on its own. Senator GRAHAM's leadership was vital as we developed this seaport security bill long before the terrorist attacks of September 11. I would also like to thank the fine work of Senator GRAHAM's staffer, Tandy Barrett, she also worked very hard on this legislation.

The initiatives in S. 1214 can help protect America and its citizens from potential terrorist threats against seaports and intermodal connections throughout the country. These initiatives will not make maritime transportation immune from attack. But this bill takes the necessary preventative steps to better protect the American public. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation that is vital to protecting our national security.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, once again I thank Chairman HOLLINGS for his efforts to address identified safety and security problems at our Nation's seaports. The legislation before us today is designed to address port security lapses that have been under review by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation for the past two years. After hearings earlier this year and last year, the Commerce Committee reported out S. 1214 in August. The bill is intended to provide both the guidance and funding needed to improve seaport security. I commend Chairman HOLLINGS' leadership on this very important issue to transportation safety and security.

It is widely reported that transportation systems are the target of 40 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide. Since September 11, we have been working on a bipartisan basis to address the nation's most pressing needs in the wake of the terrorist attacks. The Senate Commerce Committee has been conducting a series of hearings to gain the information we need to help us evaluate potential transportation security risks and determine how best to respond to those potential risks.

While it is impossible to precisely quantify, there is no question that an attack on any one of our nation's 361 seaports would have far-reaching effects. With 95 percent of our Nation's foreign trade moving through our seaports, the impact of such an attack would ripple through our Nation. Businesses nationwide would face problems getting supplies and exporting finished goods. Our entire economy would be impacted.

Both the Hart-Rudman Report on Homeland Security and the Inter-

agency Commission on Crime and Seaport Security found our seaports to be vulnerable to crime and terrorism. While there is no way to make our Nation's seaports completely crime free and impenetrable to terrorist attacks, the bill before us today is a very strong first step in closing the gaps in national security that now exist at our seaports.

I want to point out to my colleagues that the Commerce Committee had acted on S. 1214 prior to the September 11 attacks. As a result of the attacks, members of the committee and others have worked together to further modify the legislation to provide direction and funding to the agencies involved to focus their efforts not only on decreasing crime in our seaports, but to also increase protection against terrorist attacks.

In our efforts to increase our nation's seaport security, we have worked to take into account not only the wide range of threats and crimes surrounding our seaports, but also the unique nature of our ports. As I have said before, a "one-size-fits-all" approach will not work. Our ports are complex and diverse in both geography and infrastructure. This is why we have worked to ensure this provides for direct local input into the development of security plans for their ports, as well as for response plans for local responders should an attack occur.

S. 1214 would help address a wide range of security shortcomings at our Nation's seaport that were identified in the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports that was issued September 2000. According to the Commission's report, seaport crime encompasses a broad range of crimes, including the importation of illicit drugs, contraband, and prohibited or restricted merchandise; stowaways and alien smuggling; trade fraud and commercial smuggling; environmental crimes; cargo theft; and the unlawful exportation of controlled commodities and munitions, stolen property, and drug proceeds. These crimes are violations of federal law, and therefore, the primary responsibility for enforcement falls to Federal agencies. This bill would give those agencies the authority and funding needed to make up for these shortcomings.

Additionally, the bill would provide much needed improvements in preventing terrorist attacks at our Nation's seaports. While seaports represent an important component of the nation's transportation infrastructure, seaports' level of vulnerability to attack is high, and such an attack, as I just mentioned, has the potential to cause significant damage. The commission found little control over the access of vehicles and personnel to vessels, cargo receipt and delivery operations, and passenger processing operations. The main problem they were able to identify was the lack of a generally accepted standard for physical, procedural, and personnel security at

seaports that left seaports wide open for attack. This bill will allow the Department of Transportation, along with Federal, state and local law enforcement to take actions to close the security holes at ports nationwide.

The bill would authorize \$1.18 billion for seaport safety and security. The bill would require, for the first time ever, the Department of Transportation to assess the security status of U.S. seaports and require each port and related facility to submit security plans for review and approval. The bill would also improve advance reporting requirements for entry into the United States, provide more funding for screening equipment, facilitate law enforcement coordination at U.S. seaports, and authorize grants and loan guarantees to seaports and marine terminal operators to help finance the purchase of security equipment and defray the costs of security infrastructure.

I want to mention that while the Congress has already worked to approve aviation security legislation, and we are now moving forward on port security, both Chairman HOLLINGS and I remain committed to continuing our agenda during the next session to address transportation security issues in all modes of transportation, including railroads and buses.

I urge my colleagues swift approval of this critical legislation.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, allow me to congratulate our distinguished chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator HOLLINGS, for his outstanding work in putting together S. 1214, The Maritime and Port Security Improvement Act. I also wish to congratulate Senators GRAHAM and MCCAIN for all of their hard work in moving this very important legislation that is crucial to homeland defense.

I also wish to recognize Carl Bentzel of the Commerce Committee for his years of hard work in putting this legislation together.

I thank Senator HOLLINGS for including several provisions from S. 1589, the Port Threat and Security Act of 2001, in the final version of his bill. If I may, I would like to discuss the provisions from S. 1589 that were included in the final version of S. 1214.

Senator BREAUX and I recently held oversight hearings before our respective Subcommittees on the Coast Guard and its role in improving maritime security after the terrible attacks of September 11. As Senators HOLLINGS and BREAUX well know, even before September 11 our maritime and port security was in sorry shape. However, the attacks on New York and Washington made it clear we need to go farther afield to guard against terrorism and other crimes.

We need to improve our base of information to identify bad actors throughout the maritime realm. A provision of the bill would help us identify those nations whose vessels and vessel registration procedures pose potential

threats to our national security. It would require the Secretaries of Transportation and State to prepare an annual report for the Congress that would list those nations whose vessels the Coast Guard has found would pose a risk to our ports, or that have presented our government with false, partial, or fraudulent information concerning cargo manifests, crew identity, or registration of the vessel. In addition the report would identify nations that do not exercise adequate control over their vessel registration and ownership procedures, particularly with respect to security issues. We need hard information like this if we are to force "flag of convenience" nations from providing cover to criminals and terrorists.

This is very important as Osama bin Laden has used flags of convenience to hide his ownership in various international shipping interests. In 1998 one of bin Laden's cargo freighters unloaded supplies in Kenya for the suicide bombers who later destroyed the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. To that end, the bill requires the Administration to report on actions they have taken, or would recommend, to close these loopholes and improve transparency and registration procedures, either through domestic or international action—including action at the International Maritime Organization.

This legislation would also establish a national Sea Marshal program to protect our ports from the potential use of vessels as weapons of terror. Sea Marshals have recently been used in San Francisco and Los Angeles, and is supported strongly by the maritime pilots who, like airline pilots, are on the front lines in bringing vessels into U.S. ports. Sea Marshals would be used in ports that handle materials that are hazardous or flammable in quantities that make them potential targets of attack. The Coast Guard has taken a number of steps including using armed Coast Guard personnel to escort a Liquid Natural Gas, LNG, tankers into Boston since September 11. Prior to September 11 these vessels were escorted by Coast Guard vessels into the port but no armed guards were present on the vessel. I strongly believe that having armed personnel, such as Sea Marshals, on these high interest vessels is very important and will considerably increase security in our nation's ports, including Boston. The ability of terrorists to board a vessel and cause a deliberate release of LNG or gasoline for that matter is very real. Sea Marshals will make it much more difficult for this to happen. The Secretary of Transportation would be responsible for evaluating the potential use of Federal, State, or local government personnel as well as documented United States Merchant Marine personnel to supplement Coast Guard personnel as Sea Marshals. In addition it is my hope that the Secretary will establish training centers around the country for the

Sea Marshal program. I further believe that the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy or any of the State maritime academies would make excellent locations for such training centers.

Lastly, this legislation would allow the President to prohibit any vessel, U.S. flagged or foreign, from transporting passengers or cargo to and from a foreign port that does not have adequate security measures as determined by the Secretary of Transportation. I would like to remind my colleagues that a similar provision exists in the airline industry and I see no reason why the President should not have the power to suspend vessel traffic to and from ports with inadequate security, just like he can now do with international airports. The stakes are simply too high Mr. President, we cannot allow shipping containers to enter this country unless adequate security exists in foreign ports to prevent weapons of mass destruction from being loaded. In addition we should not allow cruise ships carrying U.S. passengers to visit foreign passenger ports that do not have adequate security.

I again wish to congratulate Senator HOLLINGS on this landmark legislation and to thank him for including several provisions from S. 1589. This legislation will ensure that the United States has the tools, the information, and the personnel to guard against waterborne threats to our Nation and our citizens.

Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, as many of my colleagues might know, my State of Louisiana depends heavily on maritime trade and transportation. After all, Louisiana is darn near close to being underwater, so I always have had an affinity for things that float.

Louisiana is fortunate to have the Mississippi River, along which barges haul grain, wheat and corn from the heartland of America, and coal from Wyoming. Our fortune extends to the fisheries resources of the Gulf of Mexico and our oil and gas resources in the outer continental shelf. We have invested in maritime-related oil and gas technologies to make that exploration as safe as possible. The Port of New Orleans, Lake Charles, and South Louisiana—as well as the other Louisiana ports—are major seaports handling containerized bulk and breakbulk cargoes, as well as passengers. The shipbuilding and repair industries employ thousands, as does the marine construction and dredging industry.

My constituents live close to waterways and the the Gulf of Mexico, and in many cases earn their living from our marine transportation system and its associated industries. So, as the Chairman of the Surface Transportation and Merchant Subcommittee—and as a resident of a State that relies so much on the smooth operation of its waterways and ports—maritime security is one of my primary concerns.

The security of our commercial sea and river ports has rarely been the focus of our national security plans. We have invested millions of dollars to

protect our airports and our land borders, but very little toward making sure that the goods and people arriving at our ports do not jeopardize our security. We know that Osama bin Laden controls a network of ships that hides his ownership. We have to assume that other terrorists and terrorist networks do, too. Therefore it is imperative that we take a more active Federal role in protecting the international boundaries of our seaports.

There is no unified Federal plan for overseeing security at the international borders of our sea ports. Right now the responsibility of building secure sea and river ports rests with states like Louisiana, its port authorities, and the private sector. That was a poor model for national security when we were fighting drugs and international smuggling—and it is totally inadequate after September 11 as we face the threat of terrorism.

That is why we must pass S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act.

For the first time we will require Federal approval of port security programs. These plans will have to meet rigorous standards for security infrastructure, screening equipment, evacuation plans, access controls, and background checks for workers in security-sensitive areas.

We also will require more information about the cargo and passengers arriving at our ports. Right now we do not know enough about the ships and the cargo that call 24 hours a day. We need to change that immediately. We will require that ships electronically transmit their cargo manifests—and if the manifest does not match the cargo, it will not be unloaded. We also will check crew and passenger manifest information to identify people who could pose a security threat. My Subcommittee held a hearing on rail and maritime security in the aftermath of the events of September 11. At that hearing we heard testimony that the Republic of Panama had issued more than one thousand false documents that allow unauthorized personnel to operate on-board their vessels.

More information—and more reliable information—is the key to fighting crime and terrorism. The more we know about these ships, including who owns them and where they have been, the better we can target our law enforcement resources at our ports to check on the most suspicious loads. We need to know who is on these ships, and, eventually, be able to quickly check the names with a computer database of known terrorists or other associates of international criminal organizations.

This bill will require Federal, State and local law enforcement officials to better coordinate the sharing of that information. If a local police officer arrests someone for breaking into a secure area of the port, timely sharing of that information with State and Federal officials might help identify the person as part of a larger international

network. It is critical that Customs agents work with the local police, that the State police work with Immigration officials, and that the FBI work with local port authorities. That type of cooperation will dramatically improve port security. Seaports have many different agencies and jurisdictions. So this bill attempts to harmonize their efforts, and will require the Coast Guard, in their role as Captain of the Port, to lead the coordination of law enforcement.

The businesses that operate in seaports also play a crucial security role. They must be brought into a cooperative environment in which a port's law enforcement information is communicated and shared confidentially with privately-hired security officers. In return, private security officers must have a direct line to share information with Federal, State, and local authorities.

To verify that the cargo loads match the manifests, we will need more Customs officials to check that cargo. Incredibly, only 2 percent of the cargo containers arriving at our ports are ever checked by Customs officials. That is a huge hole in our national security system that must be fixed. We seek to close this security hole by directly granting and authorizing more than \$168 million for the purchase of non-intrusive screening and detection equipment to be used by U.S. Customs officers. These Customs officers are on the front lines of protecting our country from the importation of illegal and dangerous goods. We must give them the latest technology and the most modern cargo screening equipment available.

We also must help the private sector and the port authorities meet these national security challenges. This problem would be much more simple to solve if the United States had national seaports under the control of the Federal Government—or if the Federal Government directly funded seaport infrastructure. However, that is not the case. Maritime infrastructure is owned by States and by the private sector. But the Federal Government has a role to play here for homeland security. We cannot force States and the private sector to comply with security mandates, yet not provide funding. The legislation will directly fund and authorize \$390 million in grants to local port security projects. The bill also will fund loan guarantees that could cover as much as \$3.3 billion in long term loans to port authorities acting to improve their security infrastructure. Upgrading that infrastructure means installing modern gates and fencing, security-related lighting systems, remote surveillance systems, concealed video systems, and other security equipment that contributes to the overall level of security at our ports and waterfront facilities.

Some of our shipping companies may worry that these new procedures requiring more security and customs

checks will slow the flow of international commerce. But as we did in the airline security bill, we can strike the balance between increased security and the convenience of our open country and economy. In Louisiana, our sea and river ports are a way of life, and an integral part of our economy. We have some of the largest seaports in America, and the Mississippi River runs through the heart of Louisiana. The river is a super-highway of commerce that helps drive our State's economy.

Security and the protection of our people from harm always will be our primary goal. However, we must do it in a way that does not dramatically slow the movement of goods that run our just-in-time-delivery economy. The answer to that problem is technology.

New scanners are now on the market that can x-ray and scan an entire 48-foot cargo container. Customs currently depends primarily on gamma-ray systems that are adequate for seeing through small vehicles or loosely-packed crates. But more powerful X-ray based machines—already used in Israel, the Netherlands, and Hong Kong—can pierce several inches of steel and peer through more densely packed boxes. These machines can see everything from false compartments down to the buttons on a remote control. And they can be programmed to spot “density signatures” that indicate explosive and nuclear materials. The more the Federal Government, ports and the private sector invest in using this new scanning technology, the fewer cargo containers and boxes will have to be opened and searched by hand. That will increase the efficiency of international commerce and trade—while at the same time making our nation more secure.

Investing in scanners is even more critical when you consider that the expanding global economy raises the volume of seaborne shipping by 7 to 10 percent each year. In other words, the amount of goods arriving and departing through our seaports is expected to double by 2020. While that increased trade will benefit our economy, it also poses a national security threat if we are unable to keep pace with the growing volume of goods and people passing through our ports.

That is why the private sector must get behind our efforts—and behind this bill. Before September 11, port security was something of an afterthought. We are now facing new threats. The more we invest in the infrastructure of making our ports secure, the less likely that your key products and supplies will be delayed at the ports due to increased security. As public officials, our primary duty is to protect public safety and national security. If the private sector engages and cooperates with our efforts, there will be less impact from that tightened security upon the free flow of goods and supplies through our major seaports. That is a public-private partnership that can work—and protect America at the same time.

We have made the investments at our airports and at our land borders to counter threats of terrorism and other international criminal organizations. It is now time to invest in the security of the international borders at our seaports, in order to protect our nation and our local seaport communities.

Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise to thank Chairman HOLLINGS and ranking member MCCAIN for agreeing to include in S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act, a Coast Guard and Navy study to evaluate the merits of establishing a Center for Coastal and Maritime Security.

The events of September 11 cruelly illustrated the challenges we face in providing comprehensive and reliable security for our homeland. There is no challenge more daunting than the integration of our Federal, State and Local law enforcement agencies and their coordinated efforts with our Armed Forces to protect our vast and complex maritime and industrial areas.

My amendment directs the administration to seriously consider establishing an institution that can provide integrated and coordinated training for the organization, planning and execution of security systems necessary to protect our vulnerable ports and coasts from potential terrorist attacks.

I am grateful for the inclusion of language directing this study because the U.S. Navy's Coastal Systems Station in Panama City, Florida is uniquely staffed with coastal security experts to help the Coast Guard conduct this assessment. In analyzing the costs and benefits of a Coastal and Maritime Security Center, I urge the Coast Guard to work closely with the Coastal Systems Station to ensure the best possible recommendation for the Administration and Congress.

Mr. President, I am confident that the study directed by this language will conclude that an investment in interagency integrated education and training to improve the protection of our ports and harbors is in the very best interests of our national security.

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, this bill would take a significant step toward securing our Nation against future terrorist actions.

Just as we have unanimously decided to bolster security at our airports, we must also improve the overall security and cargo processing operations at U.S. seaports.

If nothing else, September 11 has demonstrated the need to do more to secure our Nation from terror—whether it comes from land, sky or sea. Before discussing the specifics of this legislation, it is important to describe the circumstances that have caused the security crisis at our seaports.

Seaports represent an important component of the Nation's transportation infrastructure.

Each year, thousands of ships, and millions of passengers, enter and leave the United States through seaports.

It is estimated that 95 percent of the cargo that enters the country from

noncontiguous countries does so through the Nation's 361 coastal and inland ports.

Alarming, less than 2 percent of this enormous number of cargo containers are actually inspected.

Over the next 20 years, the total volume of imported and exported goods at seaports is expected to increase threefold.

Waterborne cargo alone contributes more than \$750 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product and creates employment for 13 million people.

Despite the massive volume of cargo that moves through our Nation's ports, there are no Federal security standards or guidelines protecting our citizens from potentially lethal cargo.

The Federal Government does not provide the resources for technology that adequately screen cargo moving through our ports, leaving them vulnerable to criminal activity—from smuggling to cargo theft to terrorism.

Security at our maritime borders is given substantially less Federal consideration than airports or land borders.

At U.S. seaports, the Federal Government invests nothing in infrastructure, other than the human presence of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and whatever equipment those agencies have on-hand to accomplish their mandates.

Physical infrastructure is provided by State or local controlled port authorities, or by private sector marine terminal operators.

There are no controls, or requirements in place, except for the minimal standards promulgated by the Coast Guard for the protection of cruise ship passenger terminals.

Essentially, where seaports are concerned, we have abrogated the Federal responsibility of border control to the State and private sector.

In the face of these new challenges, it appears that the U.S. port management system has fallen behind the rest of world.

We lack a comprehensive, nationwide strategy to address the security issues that face our seaport system.

In early 1998—in response to the almost daily reports of crime and narcotics trafficking at Florida seaports, and following the day I spent working with the Customs Service at Tampa's Port Manatee on October 14, 1997—I began an investigation of the security situation at seaports throughout the nation. At that time, and perhaps even more so today, I was very concerned that our seaports, unlike our airports, lacked the advanced security procedures and equipment that are necessary to prevent acts of terrorism, cargo theft and drug trafficking.

Based on this workday, and subsequent investigation, I asked President Clinton to establish a Federal commission to evaluate both the nature and extent of crime and the overall state of security in seaports and to develop recommendations for improvement.

In response to my request, President Clinton established the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports on April 27, 1999.

In October 2000, the Commission issued its final report, which outlines many of the common security problems discovered in U.S. seaports. Among other conclusions, the Commission found that: one, intelligence and information sharing among law enforcement agencies needs to be improved at many ports; two, that many ports do not have any idea about the threats they face, because vulnerability assessments are not performed locally;

Three, that a lack of minimum security standards at ports and at terminals, warehouses, and trucking firms leaves many ports and port users vulnerable to theft, pilferage, and unauthorized access by criminals; and four, advanced equipment, such as small boats, cameras, vessel tracking devices, and large scale X-rays, are lacking at many high-risk ports.

Our legislation addresses the problems of our seaports by instructing the Attorney General to coordinate the reporting of seaport related crimes with State law enforcement officials, so as to harmonize the reporting of data on cargo theft.

The bill would also increase the criminal penalties for cargo theft.

To address the lack of minimum security standards at America's seaports, the bill would require security programs to be developed by each port or marine terminal.

Each security program will be submitted to the Security of Transportation for review and approval.

These security programs would require maintenance of both physical and procedure security for passengers, cargoes, crew members, and workers; provisions for establishing secure areas within a waterfront; creation of a credentialing process to limit access to restricted areas so only authorized individuals gain admittance; restriction of vehicular access; development of an evacuation process from port areas in the event of a terrorist attack or other such emergency; and establish security awareness for all employees.

Our bill requires the Coast Guard, in consultation with the appropriate public and private sector officials and officials and organizations, develop a system of providing port security-threat assessments for U.S. seaports. The bill would authorize \$60 million over 4 years to carry out this provision.

The Seaport Commission report found that current inspection levels of containerized cargo are insufficient to counter potential security risks.

This bill will authorize \$168 million over five years, for the Customs Service to purchase non-intrusive screening and detection equipment for use at U.S. seaports.

It would also authorize \$145 million for 1,200 new customs inspector positions, and 300 new customs agent positions.

The bill would also create a research and development grant program to provide grants up to 75 percent of the cost of construction, acquisition or deployment of technology to help develop non-intrusive inspection technologies.

The bill would authorize \$15 million annually for fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2006 for this purpose.

Implementing the provisions of the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 will produce concrete improvements in the efficiency, safety, and security of our Nation's seaports, and will result in a demonstrable benefit for those who are currently pay tonnage duties.

This legislation is long overdue—that became all too apparent the morning of September 11. Not only is it required to facilitate future technological advances and the anticipated increases in international trade, but it would ensure that we have the sort of security controls necessary to protect our borders from threats of illegal aliens, drug smuggling and terrorism.

As we work to lift our Nation's fear of travel in our skies, we must also move to guarantee their safety on our seas.

This bill does not affect just those states with ports.

Each day 16,000 containers arrive in the United States. A single container can hold 30 tons.

These containers are either transported by truck or by rail throughout the United States.

To illustrate my point, I have a chart here which depicts a normal route of a cargo container entering the Port of Los Angeles and arriving in New York.

These containers travel across America, often more than a dozen States before reaching their destination.

Our seaports are our first line of defense in preventing a potential tragedy.

Seaports play one of the most critical roles in expanding our international trade and protecting our borders from international threats.

The "Port and Maritime Security Act" recognizes the importance of our seaports and devotes the necessary resources to move ports into the 21st century.

I urge my colleagues to look towards the future by supporting this critical legislation—and by taking action to protect one of our most valuable tools for promoting economic growth.

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I rise today to express my strong support for S. 1214, the Port Security and Improvement bill. This legislation is overdue and absolutely needed in broadening our response to the threat of terrorism.

The Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, issued in the fall of 2000, indicates that "the state of security in U.S. seaports generally ranges from poor to fair, and in a few cases, good." Now that this country is acutely aware of the repercussions of overlooking transportation security weaknesses, Congress would be severely remiss if we did not act promptly to improve on the "poor to fair" rating at our ports.

I believe that technology can play an important role in ensuring the integrity, safety, and security of goods coming into this country via ship. To that end, my amendment that is included in S. 1214 establishes a pilot program run and defined by the Customs Service to examine different technologies and how they can be employed to verify that a container's contents are what they say they are and that they have not been tampered with during transport. Shippers and transporters using effective such technologies could then enter U.S. ports on an expedited basis. With 95 percent of foreign trade entering or leaving the U.S. via ship, allowing a quicker entrance by certain "trusted shippers" will allow a quicker conveyance to American consumers.

Already, I have seen outstanding demonstrations from people all over this country of their detection technologies and how they can be used to improve security. My amendment is a challenge to these innovators to develop such technologies for use in the shipping world.

Additionally, I have heard testimony from maritime experts that America needs to find ways to "push its borders back." By "pushing back" our borders the intention is to ensure the integrity and inspection of goods entering the country at points farther out from our physical borders. If this process can be taken care of in a foreign port, confidence in the integrity of the goods increases and time is saved by domestic inspectors who can use their resources elsewhere. My amendment would allow the securing of goods in the port of origin so that when these goods arrive in the U.S. we can be assured of their safety.

I thank Senator HOLLINGS for his help with my amendment, and I look forward to working with Customs to implement this program, which I believe will be helpful to get goods to market in safe but timely manner.

NUCLEAR DEVICES DETECTION

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am encouraged that the Senate is poised to pass legislation bolstering security at our Nation's 361 seaports. I thank the members of the Senate Commerce Committee for their hard work on this bill.

While often out of the public eye, ports and harbors across the United States are America's economic gateways. Every year, U.S. ports handle over 800 million tons of cargo, valued at approximately \$600 billion. If you exclude border commerce with Mexico and Canada, our ports handle 95 percent of U.S. trade. Two of the busiest ports of the nation are in California, at Long Beach and Oakland.

Yet, just 1 or 2 percent of the 11 million shipping containers reaching our ports are inspected each year. The Federal Government has taken steps to beef up security along our northern and southern borders. And we are addressing aviation security. But just about everything that arrives by ship is waved through.

This bill will strengthen law enforcement at our ports by establishing a federal port security task force and providing more funding for local efforts to boost port security. It is crucial that we increase cargo surveillance and inspections. And it is crucial that we provide our Customs agents and other port security forces with the equipment needed to detect chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction, WMD.

Osama bin Laden has stated that he considers it his "religious duty" to obtain such weapons.

Earlier this month, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency warned, "The willingness of terrorists to commit suicide to achieve their evil aims makes the nuclear terrorism threat far more likely than it was before September 11th." According to the Agency, there have been 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear material since 1993 and 201 cases of trafficking in medical and industrial radioactive material. Sadly, it is no longer beyond the pale to imagine that bin Laden and his associates might try to smuggle a nuclear device or so-called "dirty bomb" onto a cargo ship entering one of our busy seaports and then detonate it.

I was prepared to offer an amendment to make it quite clear that references in the bill to chemical, biological, or other weapons of mass destruction include nuclear devices.

Mr. HOLLINGS. If the senior Senator from California will yield, I assure her that is our intent. Where was authorize activities or funding to step up surveillance, inspection, and detection of WMDs at our seaports, we would want to target any kind of nuclear devices as well as chemical and biological weapons.

So, for instance, any authorizations in the bill for the purchase of detection equipment could be used to buy radiation pagers for the Customs agents who inspect cargo, or for radiation detectors on cargo X-ray machines, or to retrofit existing X-ray machines with sensitive sodium iodide detectors.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the chairman for his clarification. It is absolutely vital that we upgrade our detection technology. Oakland's Howard Marine Terminal, for instance, is less than once-half mile from Jack London Square, a major tourist attraction. Ships that travel into and out of the Port of Oakland terminal pass within 400 yards of the Square.

Immediately following the September 11th attacks, a 920-foot tanker carrying 33 million gallons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) was prevented from entering Boston Harbor. The tanker was kept 6 to 8 miles offshore while authorities figured out a way to safeguard the Harbor. It was not until November 4—with Coast Guard escorts—that the tanker was allowed into the harbor.

Mr. HOLLINGS. The Senator from California has raised good points. I appreciate her interest in the matter and

her willingness to reach an accommodation with the Commerce Committee. We certainly want to interdict any nuclear devices as assuredly as we want to interdict other WMDs.

PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY ACT COLLOQUY

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, we worked hard with the Administration to incorporate many of their suggested changes in this bill to sharpen the policy and create a better legislative product. I had intended to work with Chairman LEAHY of the Judiciary Committee to modernize and update some of our maritime criminal laws to reflect the realities following the attacks of September 11th, and to strengthen our laws to protect against maritime terrorism. Unfortunately, the Administration did not consult or share with the Judiciary Committee the changes in criminal laws and other matters within the Judiciary Committee's jurisdiction that were provided to me. I would like to ask the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, if he would be willing to work to work with me and Senator McCain next year to consider whether new criminal provisions are necessary to enhance seaport security?

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am also very concerned that we develop policies to more adequately protect our maritime vulnerabilities and protect the public from the threats emerging as a result of maritime trade. I would be happy to work with Chairman HOLLINGS and Ranking Member MCCAIN next year to evaluate whether any gaps in our criminal laws to protect our maritime safety and seaport security exist and the appropriate steps we should take to close those gaps and at the same time ensure that the rights of port employees are protected.

Mr. President, I have also expressed to Chairman HOLLINGS my concerns that we properly limit access to and use of sensitive law enforcement information relating to background checks which are provided for in this bill. Chairman HOLLINGS has assured me that the bill sets strict and appropriate limits as to both when such access will be required and how the information will be used once obtained. Additionally, the Chairman understands my continuing concern over the need for appropriate due process protections for employees of ports at all levels who may be subject to background checks. These would include a hearing that would consider mitigating and extenuating circumstances related to the individual in question. Am I correct that it is the intent of the Chairman to ensure that the Department of Transportation and the nation's ports carry out background checks with proper safeguards in place that ensure due process protections for employees. And will the Chairman commit to work with me to that end? I would like to ask Chairman HOLLINGS if he could explain these provisions?

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, we have included the important protections and limitations for such use in

access in the bill. Background checks will be limited to those employees who have access to sensitive cargo information or unrestricted access to segregated "controlled access areas," that is defined areas within ports, terminals, or affiliated maritime infrastructure which present a critical security concern. Such controlled access areas could be: locations where containers will be opened, points where vessels containing combustible or hazardous materials are berthed and port security stations. In addition, under this bill the use of background information, once it is obtained, will be restricted to the minimum necessary to disqualify an ineligible employee. In other words, only the minimum amount of law enforcement information necessary to make eligibility decisions will be shared with port authorities or maritime terminal operators.

Moreover, this legislation ensures appropriate due process protections for port employees who may be subject to a background check. In the legislation the Secretary is required to establish an appeals process that includes notice and an opportunity for a hearing for individuals found to be ineligible for employment as prescribed in Section 106. I also agree that this process should evaluate any extenuating and mitigating circumstances. I will work to ensure that we accomplish these objectives as the port security legislation moves forward.

SECURITY OF INLAND WATERWAYS

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I rise to engage the distinguished chairman of the Commerce Committee in a colloquy on very important legislation he has sponsored—the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001. This legislation, which I am pleased to have cosponsored, would establish new Federal safeguards for the security of our ports and maritime commerce. I would appreciate the chairman clarifying whether the intent of this legislation is to cover not only the security of ports but also inland waterways such as the Columbia-Snake River system. This is an important issue for the Pacific Northwest region because dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers are not only critical for maritime transportation in our region but also a major source of our region's energy. Barges pass through the locks on these dams every day carrying gasoline and other explosive cargoes that could disrupt our waterways or energy production and even put residents downstream at risk of flooding if these cargoes exploded while in transit through one of the navigation locks. So I would ask my Chairman whether the authority provided to the Coast Guard and S. 1214 includes evaluating not just security for ports but also inland waterways like the Columbia/Snake River system?

Mr. HOLLINGS. I appreciate the Senator helping to clarify this point. I know it is especially important for the Senator's home State of Oregon and the Pacific Northwest region. The an-

swer to the Senator's question is yes, the intention is to cover all areas affected by maritime transportation and commerce. The legislation covers not only seaports but also "public or commercial structures located within or adjacent to the marine environment" including navigation locks.

Mr. WYDEN. I thank the Senator for his clarification. I also ask him whether under his legislation, the Coast Guard would have authority to oversee dangerous cargoes transported along the Columbia/Snake River system as well as cargoes in port?

Mr. HOLLINGS. Under the legislation, the Secretary of Transportation would issue regulations for security programs for cargo as well for protecting passengers, crew members and other workers. The authority for security of cargo is broad enough to cover not only cargoes in port but also dangerous cargoes anywhere in the maritime navigation system including those in transit through navigation locks.

Mr. WYDEN. I thank the chairman again for answer and commend him for his leadership on this important issue.

FREIGHT RAIL SECURITY

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, will my friend, the distinguished chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, the Senator from South Carolina, yield for the purpose of engaging in a colloquy?

Mr. HOLLINGS. I will be happy to yield for the purpose.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Commerce Committee.

Mr. President, I would like to ask the Senator from South Carolina if he would agree that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, this nation came to a number of stark realizations about our vulnerabilities and the overall state of our security?

We have become aware that glaring security gaps exist throughout our nation's transportation system. The Senator from South Carolina has been a leader in focusing the Senate's attention on the need to improve the safety of our ports, and he has been steadfast in his support for additional protections for our nation's rail passengers. I hope that he will agree with me that as important as improving the security in those areas is, our job is not complete until we pay similar attention to the security of our freight rail system.

One of the most serious vulnerabilities in the nation's transportation system is possibility that terrorists may target hazardous materials being transported across this nation's vast and largely unsecured freight rail network. I am sure the Senator is aware that several studies conclude that the chemical industry is particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and point to the shipment of hazardous materials by rail as one of

the most serious threats to the industry. In fact, I believe that a study requested by the Senator's Appropriations Subcommittee and due to be published this month, will come to this very conclusion.

I do not mean to suggest that transportation of chemicals or other hazardous materials should be curtailed. While the transportation of hazardous materials poses risks to human health, the expeditious movement of certain products, like chlorine for municipal water systems, is absolutely essential for the protection of human health.

The railroad and chemical industries have acknowledged the risks, and have taken strides toward improving the security of their facilities, hazardous materials shipments, and rolling stock since the September 11th attacks. These security improvements, and additional security enhancements that are planned, will be inordinately costly, perhaps reaching as high as \$150 million in this calendar year, and another \$150 million in 2002. I hope the Senator will agree that the extraordinary and unforeseen nature of the costs being incurred by hazardous materials shippers, tank car owners, and railroads, combined with the benefit to human health and public safety that these security enhancements represent, justifies a program of short-term federal grants to reimburse or defray some of the post-September 11th security-related expenses these companies are incurring.

If the Senator from South Carolina does agree with the need to improve our nation's rail security, and understands the unprecedented outlays that railroads and shippers have made or will make in the near future, would he commit to this Senator to hold whatever hearings deemed necessary, and to schedule a prompt mark-up in the Commerce Committee early in 2002 for legislation of mine to require the Secretary of Transportation to conduct a comprehensive terrorism risk assessment, and to set up a Rail Security Fund to make the types of grants that we have discussed here today?

Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the Senator for his comments on the state of our nation's transportation security, and I agree with his assertion that a complete treatment of our security needs would include legislation to improve the security of our rail network. I am aware that the need for the safe and expeditious rail transportation of chemicals and other hazardous materials is essential for our nation's economy, and that the movement of some chemicals, including chlorine, is necessary for the preservation of public health.

I am aware also of the security improvements that have been undertaken by railroads and hazardous materials shippers. I agree that the security-related expenses are extraordinary, and that in the interest of protecting the general public from the effects of a terrorist attack on hazardous materials shipped by rail, the federal government

should help these companies on a short-term basis to defray their post-September 11th security-related expenses. I will promise the Senator from West Virginia that the Commerce Committee will take up the issue of rail security as early as possible during the next session of the Congress.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank the Senator from South Carolina, and I thank the Presiding Officer.

BUS SECURITY ACT

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I appreciate the chairman's leadership in promoting safety in all modes of passenger and cargo transportation. In the Commerce Committee executive session on October 17, the committee addressed the important issue of passenger rail safety. The committee approved funding for the upgrading of Amtrak tunnels and bridges primarily along the much-used Northwest corridor. While I support and applaud the goal of increasing passenger rail safety and security—in fact I strongly support this legislation—at the same committee session I raised the issue of intercity bus security. Attention became acute on this issue after the October 3 incident on a Greyhound bus that resulted in the death of seven people. Since that event, there have been other attempts to cause mayhem on buses, but thankfully, none have resulted in deaths. With over 774 million intercity bus passengers annually with companies serving over 4,000 communities, we cannot wait to act on securing this important mode of transportation.

Mr. HOLLINGS. I appreciate the fact that the Senator from Georgia brought this matter to the committee's attention. Bus security is in fact an important issue which unfortunately cannot be appropriately addressed before the end of this year. I applaud the initiative of the Senator from Georgia and leadership on this issue and, in particular, his introduction of S. 1739, which establishes a competitive grant program to allocate funding to bus companies to increase security and safety and creates a research and development program for new technologies to increase bus security and safety. It is my intention to consider this legislation on the markup calendar of the Commerce Committee's first executive session of 2002.

Mr. CLELAND. I applaud the chairman's decision to advance the issue of bus safety. With bus terminals often sharing facilities with both airports and rail stations, omitting this critical component of the equation leaves a hole in the system. This mode of transportation is the largest domestic passenger service provider, and it has grown without the aid of federal support. Now that they need assistance to supplement their own efforts and protect our citizenry, it is time for Congress to act. This industry is made up of many small businesses, which may not be able to survive if assistance is not given to help boost security in

order to bring passengers back to bus travel. Otherwise, these businesses may have to increase the cost to the customer to pay for the necessary security upgrades.

Mr. HOLLINGS. As chairman of the Commerce Committee, I am very aware of the need of the bus community. It is an important segment of our transportation infrastructure. I look forward to working with my colleague from Georgia on his legislation at the earliest opportunity in 2002.

Mr. CLELAND. I thank the Senator for his support and attention to this matter, and I look forward to working with you in the future on this issue of national importance.

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I seek unanimous consent to say a few words about the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 and the herculean efforts of the Senate Commerce Committee Chairman, Senator HOLLINGS, to get it passed.

In the aftermath of September 11, most of the legislation considered in this chamber has been reactive in nature. This bill, like Senator BYRD's homeland security package, is decidedly different.

This bill is designed to prevent a terrorist attack on one of our nation's most vulnerable pieces of infrastructure—our ports. This bill anticipates the possibility of an attack, and sets out to make that impossible. This is exactly the kind of legislation that we were sent to Congress to pass.

Yet it would not have passed without the dogged efforts of Senator HOLLINGS, who forced the issue as most members of Congress were leaving town.

Finally, I would just like to comment on Senator HOLLING's use of David Stockman's *The Triumph of Politics*, in his remarks today. I too remember those days in the early 1980's, when the Laffer Curve and trickle-down economics were coming into vogue. I was a young congressman then, and I didn't believe it would work.

I still don't. And I share the chairman's disbelief that even after September 11—when our Nation's vulnerabilities have been so explicitly exposed and the need for additional security resources has been made so evident—we would again travel down that path.

Mr. President, I thank the Chairman for his efforts on this vital piece of legislation.

PORT SECURITY, S. 1214

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise today to thank Chairman HOLLINGS and Senator MCCAIN for accepting my amendment to this important bill will promote security at our Nation's seaports.

America's ports provide invaluable links between American productivity and markets both here at home and abroad.

Ports are a critical cog in the wheels of our economy. But quite frankly, our ports are vulnerable.

History has taught us lessons in vulnerability before, whether it be the USS *Maine* in Havana Harbor, the attack on Pearl, or the USS *Cole* in Yemen, ships and shipping are always a risky proposition, especially in the confines of port.

These lessons have new meaning in today's reality of war.

A single attack, on a single ship, in a single U.S. port could render the entire facility immobile.

What does that mean? No exports of U.S. autos. No freighters carrying ore on the Great Lakes. No grain barges up or down the Mississippi River. Simply put, No trade.

And perhaps most troubling, no energy.

In my State the Port of Valdez, at the end of the Alaska Pipeline, is responsible for providing much of the West Coast and Hawaii with its oil. And in Kenai, the facility sees billions of cubic feet of Liquefied Natural Gas transferred each year.

What would happen if these ports were closed by some horrific act? How could we move our Nation's domestically produced energy?

These facilities and others around the U.S. demand our best efforts to protect them.

But a large, and unfortunately growing, role for our ports is the importation of foreign-produced energy, crude oil, refined petroleum products and liquefied natural gas.

As imported energy becomes a larger share of the U.S. energy supply, we become more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

The energy trade itself creates new terrorist targets.

In the aftermath of September 11th, the Coast Guard was forced to suspend LNG shipments in to Boston Harbor for fear of those ships being used for terror.

What else is aboard those foreign flagged supertankers that enter our ports from the Middle East?

What is hidden in the holds? Biohazards? Chemical warfare?

What else has that crew been trained to do?

These situations take on a new sense of reality after September 11.

My colleagues are well aware of my efforts to reduce our dependence on foreign oil and foreign supertankers by using our own domestic resources.

The longer we wait, the more vulnerable we become.

The majority leader has used parliamentary tactics to subvert the will of the Senate and delay voting on our energy independence.

That is a debate that still lies before us.

But for today, as long as we remain dependent, we must do all we can to protect the safety of those ships and that energy.

My amendment which is now included in this bill makes certain that those who are the most knowledgeable in this most critically-important as-

pect of port operations are full participants in the effort to ensure port security.

It further ensures that when we talk port security, that we're talking about our Nation's energy security.

I greatly appreciate the willingness of the Chairman, Mr. HOLLINGS, and the Ranking Republican, Mr. MCCAIN, to accept this amendment.

This amendment will make a strong and much needed bill even stronger.

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. President, I rise today to support the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 and to speak about the need to protect our seaports from terrorist attacks.

Our seaports are critically important to our national, and global, economy. Our seaports enable us to export our goods to the rest of the world and allow us to import the goods we do not produce domestically. Ninety-five percent of all U.S. overseas trade is conducted through our 361 public seaports. Roughly 45,000 cargo containers enter the U.S. every day.

Our seaports are also an important component of our national security. In the interest of promoting trade, we accept increasing traffic in and around our seaports as ships, crew and cargo move goods between our nation and others. Yet even as we do this, we must recognize that the very volume of cargo moving through our seaports makes it difficult to adequately guard against a potential terrorist attack.

Traditionally, our seaports are viewed as highly vulnerable targets for terrorist attacks. They are open spaces, full of traffic, and difficult to monitor. Yet an attack against one of our larger seaports could dramatically impact our domestic economy by destroying cargo, eliminating jobs, and shutting off trading routes to other shippers.

Unfortunately, we have let our guard down with respect to our seaports by failing to adequately address the potential for a terrorist attack. We know how important our seaports are to our national and global economy, yet at best, inspectors are able to examine only about two percent of the cargo that passes through our seaports. This means that the vast majority of cargo entering our seaports is not inspected before the containers are allowed to move throughout the country. We can, and must, do better.

We must improve the quality of and deployment of detection technology and we must make sure that those who guard our seaports are equipped to prevent an attack. We have technology that scans containers to look for suspicious materials and shipments. It is in place right now, but not at all our seaports and not even at all of the largest seaports. We need to expand the deployment of this type of technology, and make sure all our seaports are equipped with the best available scanning technology. We must also make sure that the Coast Guard has the manpower and equipment it needs to pro-

tect our coast and ports and to respond in the event of an attack.

I am so pleased that we are passing the Port Security Bill. This is an extremely important piece of legislation and an important component of our national defense.

I would like to take this moment to thank Chairman HOLLINGS for working with me on several amendments I had to this important bill.

When the Commerce Committee held hearings on port security back in July, I raised several issues with the witnesses about the security of our ports and the ability to protect against a possible terrorist threat. I have been working since then to develop legislation to address some of the concerns I had that were confirmed at the hearing.

When the Commerce Committee marked up its port security bill in early August, I received assurances from Chairman HOLLINGS that we would continue to work to make sure my concerns were addressed when the bill came to the Senate floor. At that time, we of course had no idea that our country was only a month away from such a horrendous terrorist attack.

But I am pleased that we are now taking up this bill. It will make our seaports and our nation safer. And I want to again thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for working with me on these amendments and for including them in the final bill.

Specifically, these amendments will: improve our ability to safely handle cargo entering our country; provide the Coast Guard with additional anti-terrorism resources to protect domestic ports; and provide for the most modern security technology to be deployed in seaports.

My first amendment is an anti-tampering amendment that will ensure that the cargo we accept in our country has not been altered or interfered with. The amendment improves port security by allowing Customs to work with ocean shippers to better coordinate the tracking of cargo in our ports and across our country. It will improve security by enabling Customs to better assist shippers in preventing cargo tampering and cargo theft. It will also improve security by enabling Customs to track containers as they move cross-country to ensure that they are not diverted for criminal or terrorist purposes.

My second amendment establishes Port and Maritime Security Teams, teams of Coast Guard personnel with training in anti-terrorism, drug interdiction, and navigation assistance. These units will operate high-speed boats that are equipped to patrol our coastal waters and respond immediately to terrorist or other criminal threats to our coast and seaports. Similar teams are already used to protect U.S. vessels in foreign ports, my amendment brings them to our domestic defense.

My final amendment will ensure that the best available technology is deployed in our seaports to improve security, identify threats, and prevent terrorist attacks. The grant program would cover technologies to deal with such security risks as: explosives, firearms, weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons, drug and illegal alien smuggling, and trade fraud. This amendment is so important, because the type of cargo and containers that move through seaports are entirely different than what moves through our airports, and we need to make sure we are developing technology that recognizes those differences. Only about 2 percent of the cargo entering our seaports is inspected, without better technology, we are leaving ourselves too vulnerable to those who would exploit our seaports for terrorist or criminal activity.

Again, I would like to express my thanks to Chairman HOLLINGS and Senator MCCAIN for helping make sure that these amendments were included in the final bill and for making sure that we take aggressive action to protect our seaports.

AMENDMENT NO. 2690

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there is an amendment in order. The clerk will report the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS], for himself, Mr. MCCAIN, and Mr. GRAHAM, proposes an amendment numbered 2690.

(The text of the amendment is printed in today's RECORD under "Amendments Submitted.")

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment. It is a managers' amendment agreed to by Senators MCCAIN, GRAHAM, HUTCHISON, and myself.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 2690.

The amendment (No. 2690) was agreed to.

Mr. HOLLINGS. I urge passage of the bill, as amended.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield back all time?

Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield back all time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read the third time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall the bill pass?

The bill (S. 1214) was passed.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, may I be recognized?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

ECONOMIC STIMULUS

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, with respect to the stimulus bill, let's go

right to the point. It really was not a stimulus at all. Over a month ago, Joseph Stiglitz wrote an article entitled "A Boost That Goes Nowhere." I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 11, 2001]

A BOOST THAT GOES NOWHERE
(By Joseph Stiglitz)

The United States is in the midst of a recession that may well turn out to be the worst in 20 years, and the Republican-backed stimulus package will do little to improve the economy—indeed it may make matters worse. In the short term, unemployment will continue to rise and output will fall. But the U.S. economy will eventually bounce back—perhaps in a year or two. More worrying is the threat a prolonged U.S. recession poses to the rest of the world.

Already we see inklings of the downward spiral that was part of the Great Depression of 1929: Recession in Japan and parts of East Asia and bare growth in Europe are contributing to and aggravating the U.S. downturn.

Emerging countries stand to lose the most. Globalization has been sold to people in the developing world as a promise of unbounded prosperity—or at least more prosperity than they have ever seen. Now the developing world, especially Latin America, will see the darker side of its links to the U.S. economy. It used to be said that when America sneezed, Mexico caught a cold. Now, when America sneezes, much of the world catches cold. And according to recent data, America is not just sneezing, it has a bad case of the flu.

October unemployment figures show the largest monthly increase in two decades. The gap between the United States' potential gross domestic product—what it would be if we had been able to maintain an unemployment rate of around 4 percent—and what is actually being produced is enormous. By my calculations, it is upwards of \$350 billion a year! This is an enormous waste of resources, a waste we can ill afford.

It is widely held that every expansion has within it the seeds of its own destruction—and that the greater the excesses, the worse the downturn. The Great Boom of the 1990s had marked excesses. Irrational optimism has been followed by an almost equally irrational pessimism. Consumer confidence is at its lowest level in more than seven years. The low personal savings rate that marked the Great Boom may put even more pressure of consumers to cut back consumption now.

It seemed to me that we were headed for a recession even before Sept. 11. In the coming months we will have the numbers that make clear that we are squarely in one now. The economic cost of the attacks went well beyond the direct loss of property, or even the disruption to the airlines. Anxieties impede investment. The mood of the country discourages the consumption binge that would have been required to offset the reduction in investment.

In any case, monetary policy—the Federal Reserve's lowering of short-term interest rates to heat up the economy—has been vastly oversold. Monetary policy is far more effective in reining in the economy than in stimulating it in a downturn, a fact that is slowly becoming apparent as the economy continues to sink despite a massive number of rate cuts; Tuesday's was the 10th this year.

The Bush administration's tax cut, which was also oversold as a stimulus, is likely to haunt the economy for years. Now the con-

sensus is that a new stimulus package is needed; the president has ordered Congress to have one on his desk by the end of the month. Much of the stimulus debate has focused on the size of the package, but that is largely beside the point. A lot of money was spent on the Bush tax cut. But the \$300 and \$600 checks sent to millions of Americans were put largely into savings accounts.

What worries me now is that the new proposals—particularly the one passed by the Republican-controlled House—are also likely to be ineffective. The House plan would rely heavily on tax cuts for corporations and upper-income individuals. The bill would put zero—yes, zero—into the hands of the typical family of four with an annual income of \$50,000. Giving tax relief to corporations for past investments may pad their balance sheets but will not lead to more investment now when we need it. Bailouts for airlines didn't stop them from laying off workers and adding to the country's unemployment.

The Senate Republican bill, which the administration backs, in some ways would make things even worse by granting bigger benefits to very high earners. For instance, the \$50,000 family would still get zero, but this plan would give \$500,000 over four years to families making \$5 million a year—and much of that after (one hopes) the economy has recovered. It directs very little money to those who would spend it and offers few incentives for investment now.

It would not be difficult to construct a program with a much bigger bang for the buck:

America's unemployment insurance system is among the worst in the advanced industrial countries; give money to people who have lost their jobs in this recession, and it would be quickly spent.

Temporary investment tax credits also would help the economy. They are like a sale—they induce firms to invest now, when the economy needs it.

In every downturn, states and localities have to cut back expenditures as their tax revenues fall, and these cutbacks exacerbate the downturn. A revenue-sharing program with the states could be put into place quickly and would prevent these cutbacks, thus preserving vitally needed public services. Many high-return public investments could be put into place quickly—such as renovating our dilapidated inner-city schools.

This may all sound like partisan (Democratic) economics, but it's not. It's just elementary economics. If you really don't think the economy needs a stimulus, either because you think the economy is not going into a tailspin or because you think monetary policy will do the trick, only then would you risk a minimal-stimulus package of the kind the Republicans have crafted in both the House and Senate.

But what matters is not just how I or other economists see this: It matters how markets, both here and abroad, see things. The fact that medium- and long-term bond rates (that is, bonds that reach maturity in five or 10 years or more) have not come down in tandem with short-term rates is not a good sign. Nor is the possibility that the interest rates some firms pay for borrowing for plant and equipment may actually have increased.

In 1993, a plan of tax increases and expenditure cuts that were phased in over time, providing, reassurances to the market that future deficits would be lower, led to lower long-term interest rates. It should come as no surprise, then, that the Bush package, with its tax decreases and expenditure increases, would do exactly the opposite. The Federal Reserve controls the short-term interest rates—not the medium- and long-term ones that firms pay when they borrow money to invest, or that consumers pay when they borrow to buy a house, which are still far