

their rates will be re-evaluated. Some railroads may not even qualify for affordable insurance coverage. As small railroads are hit with higher and higher insurance costs, they will have less and less to invest in needed rehabilitation.

POINTS RELATED TO PENNSYLVANIA

Sixty percent of Pennsylvania's short line and regional railroad infrastructure is in need of extensive rehabilitation, including more than 170 bridges. Over 300 rail crossings require significant rehabilitation. Excluding the Bessemer & Lake Erie and Delaware & Hudson railroads, both of which have heavy load infrastructures, almost one third of Pennsylvania's short lines and regionals cannot effectively handle the heavier 286,000-pound cars that are becoming the new standard in the industry.

A recent survey of the state's short lines indicate that infrastructure needs total some \$280 million, and over 40% of those projects could be initiated in the immediate future.

More than 540,000 carloads of hazardous materials cross Pennsylvania's rail system each year.

The most modest forecasts for the movement of freight by the Federal Highway Administration indicate that increases of up to 70% can be expected in the Northeast over the next ten years. This growth will severely congest the national transportation network unless investments are made today. Railroads remain the safest and most viable mode for transporting hazardous materials, coal, industrial raw materials and bulk commodities. Investment in rail infrastructure is an investment in the country's economic future.

AMENDMENT NO.—

(Purpose: To provide additional funding for capital grants for rehabilitation, preservation, or improvement of railroad track of class II and class III railroads)

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

SEC. . There is appropriated to the Department of Transportation for the Federal Railroad Administration for fiscal year 2002, out of any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, \$350,000,000 for capital grants to be made by the Secretary of Transportation for rehabilitation, preservation, or improvement of railroad track (including roadbed, bridges, and related track structures) of class II and class III railroads. Funds appropriated by the preceding sentence shall remain available until expended.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.

Mr. REID. We are recessing at 2 p.m. Has the Senator completed his statement?

Mr. SPECTER. I have. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 4 p.m. Senator BYRD be recognized to speak in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate stands in recess until 4 p.m.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 1:59 p.m., recessed until 3:59 p.m. and reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. JOHNSON).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from West Virginia is recognized.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION-NUCLEAR ARMS TREATIES

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Nation's attention is focused on the threat of biological weapons. The pernicious nature of these types of weapons has been shown in the anthrax-laced mailings that were sent to the office of the majority leader, TOM DASCHLE, NBC news in New York, and American Media in Florida, which have resulted in contamination of a number of post offices in Washington, D.C., New Jersey, Florida, and perhaps elsewhere.

One question is on all American's minds: how can we defend ourselves against a threat that is literally microscopic? In the days of the Cold War, we became accustomed to being able to quantify the threats posed to the United States: we could count the number of Soviet missiles, bombers, tanks, and soldiers, and respond by increasing the capabilities of our own military.

But now, the threat to our security has changed. We can not quantify this threat and we can not track its movements until it might be too late. Building up our military will not affect our security from biological weapons. We must adjust our thinking on how to deal with these abhorrent weapons of pestilence.

Mr. President, remember that Jesus said: You shall hear of wars and rumors of wars, but the end is not yet. For nation will rise against nation and kingdom against kingdom. There will be famines and pestilences and earthquakes.

Pestilences, that is what I am talking about; germ warfare, viral warfare, anthrax. Building up our military, I said, will not affect our security from these pestilences. We must adjust our thinking, I say again, on how to deal with these abhorrent weapons of pestilence.

We do not yet know for certain whether the anthrax attacks were carried out by foreign or domestic agents, by someone across the seas or someone in our midst. We also do not know when the next biological weapons attack might happen, what type of germs or viruses might be used, or who might be planning it. But the U.S. must take action. The time is right now, in the midst of intensified international condemnation of the use of biological weapons, to form an international regime to eliminate the manipulation of nature for violent purposes.

Over 140 countries have signed the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. It is one of the simplest arms control treaties in existence. Parties of the treaty agree not to develop or retain any biological toxins or agents that are to be used for other than peaceful purposes. There are no means to verify this binding commitment, but the Convention has succeeded in its limited purpose by confirming among most of the world that biological weapons are abhorrent to all mankind.

Negotiations began in 1995 on how to add a binding protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention to create a regime that would verify compliance with the treaty. Parties to the Convention would thereby submit themselves to the same kinds of inspections that are conducted at nuclear facilities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and chemical facilities under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The purpose of these inspections would be to assure the whole wide world that potentially dangerous microbes, which are needed to conduct scientific and medical research, are handled in a safe manner, and are not being diverted to nefarious purposes.

Representatives at the last conference on the Biological Weapons Convention, which took place in July, hoped to gain consensus on the final text of the protocol, which may open for signature within weeks. The results of that conference were disappointing. Rather than negotiating toward the resolution of many outstanding issues on the protocol, the Bush Administration took the view that no protocol would be preferable to a negotiated protocol. Like much of the world, I was left wondering whether this Administration takes arms control seriously.

I am pleased to see that on November 1, the Administration unveiled a number of proposals to complement the Biological Weapons Convention. These voluntary measures are well-intentioned and they make sense. However, they do not go far enough.

I am wary of addressing our urgent and serious national security concerns simply through voluntary measures by foreign countries. With no formal multilateral protocol to spell out exactly what each country's responsibilities are, I fear that the future of the international ban on biological weapons will be a patchwork quilt of full compliance, non-compliance, half-measures, and more talk and less action. This could ultimately leave us even less secure from these horrific weapons.

There are other important treaty matters before our country. We are closing in on an agreement with Russia for sharp reductions in our nuclear stockpiles, and negotiations will continue on altering the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 to allow increased national missile defense testing. These deals, if concluded, would be a major development in our relationship with Russia and have a major impact on geopolitics. The strategic arms of the two biggest nuclear powers would be cut to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads, which is less than a third of our present level. We have not had as few as 2,000 strategic warheads in our nuclear arsenal since 1955.

I am not against reducing the nuclear stockpile. I am not against reducing the number of missiles, the number of warheads. I am not against that. But as important as this agreement would be, I am shocked by the President's view that an agreement on arms reductions need not be on paper. Legally and

technically he is right. It need not be on paper. But, Mr. President, it ought to be on paper. The President said that he was content to conclude arms reduction talks with nothing more than a handshake. Nothing more than a handshake.

Now, that is troubling me. If I sell a piece of property or if I buy a piece of property, I will shake hands with the person who buys my property. I will shake hands with the person from whom I buy property. But there will also be a deed and it will be registered at the courthouse in the county where the property exists. There will be a handshake—that is fine. A handshake carries with it the indication of honor. “It is an honor to deal with you—it is a pleasure, I have enjoyed doing business with you.” But it is that deed that is in writing that assures my grandchildren, and their children if necessary, that that property, that transfer of property is on record.

So I say again, the President said—he is reported to have said that he was content to conclude arms reduction talks with nothing more than a handshake. Are you? Are you, the people who are watching this Senate floor through those electronic eyes behind the Presiding Officer, are you content? Are you content that arms reduction talks be concluded with nothing more than a handshake?

We are closing in on a historic compact, and I cannot understand why this agreement should not be done as a formal written treaty. That would require a two-thirds vote, yes. But a simple handshake leaves many questions unanswered. I would like to see one or both Houses of the Congress having some say in that, and backing up that handshake, if needed, with their votes, the representatives, the elected representatives of the people.

A simple handshake leaves many questions unanswered. What will happen to the nuclear warheads once they are removed from their missiles? I must note that in this year's budget request, the Administration cut more than \$131 million from the programs that keep these powerful weapons from falling into the wrong hands. How will we verify? How will we verify that Russia carries out its arms reductions, and how will Russia, how will President Putin verify that we carry out ours? That we are carrying out our arms reduction? It was Ronald Reagan himself that said, “Trust, but verify.” In other words, yes, shake hands. But verify.

And what will happen to the agreement when President Bush and President Putin leave office? President Bush under the Constitution can serve 3 more years after this year, and if he is then elected again, he can serve 4 more years. But who knows what the attitude of his successor will be. If there is no treaty, no formal agreement in which this Senate, or on which the Senate and House—whichever type of agreement it might be—has been able to put a stamp of approval, who knows

what his successor might say. Or who knows how the successor to Mr. Putin might feel about it. A written treaty could provide clear answers to each of these important questions.

It would be a real mistake to make such an important international agreement in any other form, I think, than a treaty. We do not need fly-by-night arms control. We need arms control measures that are carefully examined to support our national security. We do not need hush-hush agreements with other countries on our nuclear weapons. We need public confidence in our military and foreign policy. Lacking the full confidence of the public, an informal agreement on nuclear arms and national missile defense is not worth the paper that it is—or is not—written on.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt once said, “Treaties are the cornerstones on which all relations between nations must rest.” Treaties are useful in clearly elaborating the responsibilities of each party, and formal ratification of treaties indicate a country's full acceptance of those responsibilities. The Founding Fathers of this country The Constitution and made reference to treaties in that Constitution, understood that, and that is why they secured for the Senate advice and consent responsibilities to any treaty made by the President.

We should not turn away from this treaty-making process for the simple convenience of the executive branch.

The Kings of England make treaties. The Kings of England have always made treaties. But this country has no King. This Republic has no King. Gentlemen's agreements on matters as important as international security or the control of weapons of mass destruction are simply not sufficient to inspire the confidence of the public in this or other countries. By making treaties, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the United States shows itself to be a reliable ally to our friends, and a principled actor to our opponents.

We should also consider the President's role in conducting our foreign policy, and his role as commander-in-chief. Is his hand in conducting future negotiations with Russia, in the case of the ABM Treaty and nuclear arms reduction, or with the other nations of the world, in the case of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and a host of other treaties, strengthened if he concludes these types of agreements without the advice and consent of the Senate?

Is his hand strengthened if he doesn't have the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate standing behind him? No. I don't think his hand would be strengthened. I would think just the opposite.

Senate approval or ratification of important international agreements is a signal to all the world that our nation not just a branch of our government approves of and will carry out those

agreements negotiated by the President. Senate approval of important treaties, such as a protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention or a new strategic agreement with Russia would strengthen the Chief Executive's hand to negotiate from a position of strength on other international matters, such as the Kyoto Protocol, possible NATO expansion, and future arms control treaties.

So I say that legally and technically, the President might not need to have it written on a piece of paper. Legally and technically, he may be able to do it with a handshake.

Let me say again that I am not proposing that we shouldn't reduce our nuclear weapons stockpile. I am not proposing that at all. I think the MX missile, for example, is old, and we shouldn't continue to keep that around. But a handshake is not enough. I don't rest easy. Do you, Mr. President? I am saying to the Presiding Officer, and I am saying to other Senators, would you rest easy with just a handshake in a matter of this nature?

The two issues I have just discussed, the Biological Weapons Convention and our strategic situation with regard to Russia, are very important to the security of our country. The United States must take a leadership position on these issues to crack down on the use of germs and viruses as weapons, and to clarify our relationship with the nation that has emerged from our Cold War opponent. These matters cannot rest on voluntary measures or unwritten pacts. I urge the Administration to pursue formal agreements on these issues in order to recognize their importance to Americans and the world.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THANKSGIVING

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, nearly 4 centuries ago, a courageous little group of people left their homeland, boarded a small, flimsy sailboat—it was not a steamboat; it was a sailboat, a sail ship—and they journeyed across a mighty ocean, and settled in an inscrutable unfriendly wilderness. They did all of this, took all of these risks.

Think about the risks that they took. They did not have any cell phones. They did not have any radios. They did not have any weather predictors. They did not have any newspapers to tell them what might lie ahead or what the weather conditions might be 24 hours away. They did not have any hospitals nearby. But they had faith. They had the guiding light of God's word. Many of them took all these