

STRICKLAND) and others who participated in this. We are going to look forward to good success over the next 2 days. This is good news for the American people.

THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM IN AMERICA

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FORBES). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. GANSKE) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, September 11 did change this country. As we were just discussing here on the floor, all of us have very vivid memories of September 11. We see images seared into our minds of airplanes flying into buildings, those tall World Trade Center buildings collapsing, clouds of evaporated concrete, steel, glass, and our fellow human beings rolling down the streets. I have a picture in my mind of the flaming crater of the Pentagon and an American flag flying in front of it.

A few days after September 11, I visited ground zero. At that time there were six or seven stories of smoking rubble. I will never forget that visit. I kept seeing superimposed on that horrific sight, essentially the graveyard of 5,000 innocent Americans, words that I had seen written on the wall of a family relief center just a short time before visiting ground zero. This was a family relief center where families of victims could come in, get financial help and get counseling as well. All along one wall for probably about 100 yards, families had brought in pictures of their mothers and fathers and sons and daughters, put them on the wall and then written personal notes to them, and there were flowers and candles underneath these pictures. I kept seeing, as I was looking at that pile of rubble, I kept seeing the handwriting of a little girl. One could tell she was just learning to write from her handwriting and it said, "Daddy, I miss you. I will love you always."

I will tell my colleagues something. We still grieve for those victims. Every day in The New York Times there is one full page of obituaries from the victims of that attack. A little picture and a little story or vignette about that particular victim. I do not know about my colleagues, but I can only read about two or three of those, and that is all I can read for that day. They are very human stories. Because they remind us that these were people just like our neighbors, members of our families, and we grieve for these victims. We grieve for the victims of the bioterrorist attacks, the anthrax attack that has killed people and made many others sick.

I remember from September 11 about 170 Members of Congress gathering on the steps of the Capitol in the lengthening twilight shadows to say a prayer for those victims. As our leadership,

both parties, was walking off the steps, somebody started singing God Bless America. I felt a real sense of unity at that moment, because we were standing there, not as Republicans or Democrats, but as Americans. And the message that day and today and tomorrow to those terrorists is that we are one Nation, united we stand. You can challenge our Nation's spirit, but you cannot break it. And we will chase down to the ends of the Earth, if necessary, the terrorists who caused this attack on our country. Justice demands it for the victims' families, and our national security demands it.

I commend the brave men and women who, even at this moment, are fighting in Afghanistan, flying airplane raids against the Taliban, a thoroughly despicable lot, the Taliban and the terrorists they harbor. People who have taken little girls who have dared to do something like go to school, taken them to a soccer field and killed them.

The war is going well, but as President Bush has rightly said, this is a war that will probably go on for some period of time. It will not be easy to root out the nests of those vipers. They are intertwined throughout Europe in their nests and probably some yet in the United States. So we are devoting a lot of resources to find them. This Congress has acted on this. We have passed legislation to give assistance to our security forces and to our military, to give them the tools they need to find out these terrorists before they commit an act like an airplane hijacking or lacing letters with anthrax and sending them through our mail system.

I think we have done a pretty good job here of, in a bipartisan fashion, crafting, drafting legislation, getting it signed with overwhelmingly bipartisan votes and to the President's desk for his signature that balances the rights of individuals to their privacy and their constitutional protections and yet, at the same time, recognizes that one of the most important constitutional protections is to our citizens' health and safety.

Now, prior to coming to Congress I was a physician. I have taken care of patients with some pretty serious infections. I have treated patients who have had what is called necrotizing fasciitis, or in the popular vernacular, it is called the flesh-eating disease. But I will admit that when we found that there was anthrax that had gotten through the mail, contaminated the Hart Office Building, contaminated my office building, the Longworth Building, I needed to go back and review a little bit on the biology of anthrax and look up again some of my old medical textbooks on smallpox.

Mr. Speaker, we had thought that we had eradicated that disease from the world, and yet we are finding out that there very well may be supplies of anthrax not just in secure labs in the United States and Russia, but potentially also in some terrorist states. Something to worry about.

This last weekend I was in Iowa, I had several meetings; and I will tell my colleagues that people are concerned about aviation security and they are concerned about a bioterrorist attack. I would recommend to my colleagues that they see or watch the program that was on WETA just a few nights ago on bioterrorism, as well as constituents. We have even had a few phone calls from constituents back home who have been unhappy that we have answered their letters and sent them replies from Washington. One lady phoned up rather irate saying she did not want to get any letters from Washington that might be contaminated with anthrax. That may seem funny to some, but it was not funny to that lady. And so I believe that Congress needs to, before we leave for the end of the year, we need to deal with a bill to improve our national ability to deal with a bioterrorist attack, certainly one that could cause an epidemic.

It has been clear for many, many years that the managed care revolution has trimmed all the fat out of our health system and I would argue has trimmed bone and sinew as well. There is no hospital in this country, in my opinion, that is capable of handling an epidemic. I do not care whether we are talking about Johns Hopkins up the road in Baltimore or we are talking about the University of Iowa hospital in Iowa City, or if we are talking about your local hospital. There is no excess capacity in our health system to handle the massive type of casualties that we could see from a bioterrorist attack. Believe me, the threat is real.

All we need to do is read a few books. So here are my suggestions to my colleagues. The first book on the reading list, I think this should be required reading for every Congressman and every Congresswoman. That is a book out called "Biological Weapons and America's Secret War—Germs," by Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg and William Broad. This should be required reading for every Congressman and every Congresswoman. It is readable; it is understandable. It does not deal just with biology, but it deals with the bioterrorist threat.

There is another book that people should read, or at least parts of it. It is by a fellow named Ken Alibek, and it is called "Biohazard." It is referenced in this book "Germs."

Now, let me read a section. Ken Alibek was a Russian scientist who did germ warfare for the Soviet Union. He changed his name when he defected to the United States. His real name is Kanatjan Alibekov. He changed it to sound more American. Here is what this, a short section of what this book "Germs" says about the type of information Mr. Alibek brought to our intelligence agencies. What Alibek had to say was horrifying: "Moscow," he reported in grim detail, "had secretly produced hundreds of tons of anthrax." Let me repeat that. "Hundreds of tons

of anthrax, smallpox, plague germs meant for use against the United States and its allies."

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The amounts dwarfed anything American experts had ever imagined. Alibek also described a germ empire that stretched from the Soviet Council of Ministers to the Soviet Academy of Sciences through the Ministries of Health, Defense and Agriculture and into the Biopreparat, his own ostensibly civilian pharmaceutical agency.

In fact, Biopreparat was a biologic war machine that employed tens of thousands of people at more than 40 sites spread across Russia and Kazakhstan. We were worried about this.

This book goes through the long history of biologic warfare research, but we were particularly worried because there filtered out of the Soviet Union reports of an epidemic, an anthrax epidemic in one of these towns that proved to be a research town.

For years we tried to figure out whether in fact this had been tainted meat, like the Soviets had said, or whether in fact there had been a release of aerosolized anthrax by accident from one of the Soviet bloc labs. It turned out in the end that it was a leak, and there was a very significant contamination and loss of life in the Soviet Union from that.

The United States carried on research, too, but nothing to the scale of the Soviet Union. What is worrisome is that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic chaos that has ensued, so many of these biologists in the Soviet Union that were doing the type of research that Mr. Alibek was doing were basically unemployed. They were destitute.

It is fair to say that our defense and our intelligence agencies, members high up in our government, have been very concerned that these individuals and their expertise could get to terrorist states. So, all of a sudden when we had these letters laced with anthrax, the public became very aware of this potential threat.

Now, I should point out that this attack with anthrax was not the first biologic terrorist attack in the United States. I did my general surgery training in Oregon. Shortly after I left Oregon to go to Boston for some additional training, 750 people in a little town in eastern Oregon became deathly ill with salmonella.

The CDC sent investigators, and they just could not crack what happened. Eventually they said in the end, I think it is an accidental exposure, food poisoning.

It was about a year later that the true story came out. The story was, and this is the truth, that there was a group of Rajneeshis that had a compound in this county in eastern Oregon, thousands of Rajneeshis under the aegis of the Bhagwan.

They had had a lot of trouble with the county government, so a county

election was coming up. They wanted to put up their own slate of candidates and win that election.

So what did they do? They set up a medical corporation. They bought a bunch of incubation equipment. By having that medical corporation, they were then able to purchase from a lab in Maryland all sorts of different organisms, like salmonella. But they could have easily used typhoid and gotten the bugs.

Fortunately, they decided not to use something like typhoid, so what they did was they grew cultures and they brewed up a batch of salmonella. They put it into little slurries and they went to every restaurant and they sprinkled it over the salad bars.

I will bet Members think I am making this up. It is well documented. It is documented in this book. It was documented, but a lot of people did not know this full story until interviews were done years later. Consequently, about 700-plus citizens became deathly ill right around the time that there were elections. Fortunately, none of those people became so sick that they passed away.

I can tell the Members that I have had some personal experience with food-borne infection. A few years ago I was on a surgical mission down in Peru and ate some contaminated food and came down with a bad case of encephalitis, and nearly passed away. It is no fun to catch food-borne illnesses.

So this problem that we are looking at runs across many different aspects of American life. I believe that we need to address this before we leave for the end of the year.

It is clear that the United States faces a grave and I think growing threat from bioterrorism. There is some evidence that Osama bin Laden and his people have tried to develop biologic agents. We know that a terrorist group in Japan tried planting biologic agents in subways.

We have also found that the recent rather limited anthrax attacks on our country have stretched to the breaking point Federal, State, and local public health abilities, so I think we need to substantially invest in some bioterrorism preparedness. As I said before, a major epidemic I think would overwhelm our hospitals. It would overwhelm our Federal, State, and local health agencies, as well.

We need to be able to respond to a bioterrorist attack. We need to do things to improve the ability of victims to survive, improve our ability to treat the victims of an attack in a hospital. I think we need to improve our ability to contain an epidemic by expanding treatment. That means increasing our supplies of drugs, our pharmaceutical stockpiles. We need to accelerate the development of new treatments, including a smallpox vaccine.

So tomorrow, the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. BERRY) and I will introduce in the House a companion bill to

the bill that Senator BILL FRIST and Senator KENNEDY introduced on the Senate side today. It is called the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act. Let me just briefly summarize a few things that this bill does.

It would upgrade Federal capacity to respond to bioterrorism by expanding the strategic national pharmaceutical stockpile. It would expand the Centers for Disease Control capacities and improve training.

Public health laboratories, our laboratories, have been severely stretched in trying to deal with all of the types of cultures that we have been doing with just this anthrax attack. We need better disease surveillance so that we can coordinate information from all around the country, so that we have early warning systems and will be able to respond to those.

We need to enhance the controls on dangerous biologic agents. Anthrax is an organism that exists in the soil around the United States. We still see a sporadic anthrax case in cattle, for instance. There have been many, many sites around the country that have anthrax in their storerooms, in their stores, in their labs, because they have been doing research on this as it relates to animal diseases.

We need to make sure that those dangerous agents are properly secure so that they cannot be stolen. We need to improve the response at the State and local level.

Mr. Speaker, the States right now are having a tough time because, as the economy has gone down, we will see in practically every State's newspapers problems with meeting their State budgets. This is the case in Iowa. Our legislature just had a special session where they did an across-the-board 4 or 5 percent cut in Federal-State spending, but it is clear that these State public health services have been trimmed for several years and are very, very insufficient.

So we need to provide grants to the States, in my opinion, to assure for adequate planning and preparedness. We need to equip hospitals to respond to this threat. We need to develop new treatments, vaccines. We need to accelerate the production of the smallpox vaccine. We need to expand research grants for new product advancement. We need to authorize long-term contracts for vaccinations and drug development and be able to do it in a way that we do not violate things like antitrust.

We need to improve research and development coordination through both public and private partnerships.

We need to improve our food safety. We have an awful lot of food coming into this country from foreign countries. We need to make sure that there are no accidental exposures or acts of bioterrorism related to food coming into this country.

If nothing else, we need to make sure that our borders are secure so that somebody does not try to introduce, let

us say, hoof and mouth disease. Hoof and mouth disease resulted in a several billion dollar loss in England alone. If hoof and mouth disease were used by terrorists in this country, it could wreak economic devastation on our agricultural sector and significantly hurt the whole economy. We need to address that.

We need to increase inspections of food and products coming into this country. We need to improve the Federal Government's capacity to prevent and detect those terrorist activities on agriculture.

Now, we cannot do this on the cheap; but at the same time, we need to be careful that we spend wisely. Senator FRIST and Senator KENNEDY introduced their bill today. This bill would cost about \$3.2 billion. Let me run briefly through some of the areas where we need to do some spending and put this into perspective.

I have already mentioned that we need to improve the national strategic pharmaceutical stockpile. This would increase the coordination of activities, increase the amount of necessary therapies, including therapies for post-exposure vaccines. I think it would be reasonable to spend about \$640 million on this.

If we then moved down to title IV in the bill, smallpox vaccine, this would cost roughly \$500 million. So if we add up the drugs that we need plus the vaccines we need, we are already at about 1.2, \$1.1 billion. That is with nothing else. If we stopped at \$1.2 billion, we would have nothing left for doing the other things that we need to do.

For instance, we need to upgrade the CDC's bioterrorism capabilities. Under the bill that the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. BERRY) and I will introduce tomorrow, we set aside \$60 million for that.

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We need to improve the public health laboratory network through the CDC. That would be another \$60 million. We need to improve State and local preparedness capabilities.

There are about 280 million Americans, roughly speaking, in this country. We are proposing spending about \$1 billion in order to create a new emergency State bioterrorism program, a grant program that would assist all States in achieving some minimal levels of preparedness. We need to strengthen the current 319(C) grant programs to allow project grants to address public health capabilities.

Now, think of that, 280 million Americans, about \$1 billion; we are talking about probably less than \$3.75 per American to do this. Do you think most Americans think that that is too much to spend on being able to combat a terrorist activity at their State and local level?

What about hospitals? As I said before, hospitals have been cut to the bone. In Iowa, especially some of the rural hospitals, it is even worse than

that. They are already in the red because of low reimbursements rates from Medicare and from HMO's. So what do we need to do? We need to assist hospitals who are part of a consortium that would respond to an attack. I think a figure of about \$375 million is a reasonable figure for that.

Finally, I talked a little bit about things we need to do for agriculture. We have about \$500 million budgeted into this bill for that. These are not huge sums when you are talking about a country as big as the United States. This comes to about \$3.2 billion. As Senator FRIST said today, we think that this amount is enough to get us ready, to take us from an unprepared state, to get us to a prepared state. We may need to do more later on. But this is a good start.

Let me go into a few more details about the bill. Title I of this bill, the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001, basically deals with national goals to deal with this terrorist threat. The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act states that the United States should further develop and implement a coordinated strategy to prevent and, if necessary, to respond to biologic threats and attacks. I do not know anyone in this Congress that would disagree with that.

It further states that it is the goal of Congress that this strategy should, number one, provide Federal assistance to State and local government in the event of a biologic attack; number two, improve public health, hospital, laboratory communications and emergency response preparedness; number three, rapidly develop and manufacture needed therapies, vaccines, medical supplies; and number four, enhance the safety of the Nation's food supply and protect its agriculture from biologic threats. Noncontroversial section.

Title II of this bill, improving the Federal response to bioterrorism. This is important. It may sound a little dry, but unfortunately, we have a situation now where you have this responsibility spread out through about 40 different agencies. That is part of the reason why President Bush stood on this floor and said we need a director of homeland security. We need to consolidate. We need to streamline.

Title II of this bill does this because it requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to report to Congress within 1 year of enactment and 2 years afterwards on progress made towards meeting the objectives of this act. It provides authorization for the Strategic National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. It provides additional resources to the Centers for Disease Control to carry out education and training initiatives, to help those health professionals who are going to be on the front line, the first responders to a terrorist attack, to recognize in early stages when treatment may be effective, diseases such as anthrax.

We need to improve the Nation's lab capacity. We need to establish a na-

tional disaster medical response system of volunteers who can respond at the Secretary's direction to a national public health emergency.

This bill amends and further clarifies the procedures for declaring a national public health emergency. It expands the authority of the Secretary during the emergency periods.

Today, before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Secretary Tommy Thompson testified. He said very good things about this bill. The fact that the administration has worked hand-in-hand with Senator FRIST, Senator KENNEDY, Senator PAT ROBERTS, Senator CHUCK HAGEL, Senator EDWARDS and others to come to reasonable ways so that the Secretary can actually do his job.

A report by the General Accounting Office raised concerns about the lack of coordination of Federal anti-bioterrorism efforts. Therefore, this bill contains a number of measures to enhance that coordination and cooperation among various Federal agencies. Secretary Tommy Thompson agreed.

Title II establishes an assistant secretary for emergency preparedness at HHS. It creates an interdepartmental working group on bioterrorism that would include the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Defense, Veterans Affairs, Labor and Agriculture, FEMA, the Attorney General and appropriate other Federal officials because all of these officials are called upon to respond in this type of attack, and we need to have coordination in a working group.

Additionally, Title II helps the Federal Government to better track and control biologic agents and toxins. The Secretary would be required to review and update a list of biologic agents and toxins that could pose a severe threat to the public and to enhance regulations regarding the possession, use and transfer of agents or toxins.

Remember, I was telling the story about the Rajneeshis and how they were able to obtain these biologic agents. This section deals with that. Violations of these regulations could trigger civil penalties of up to 500,000 and criminal sanctions could be imposed.

Title III, we need to improve State and local preparedness. Numerous reports in recent years have found that the Nation's public health infrastructure is lacking. For example, nearly 20 percent of local public health departments have no e-mail capability. Fewer than half of our public health agencies have Internet or broadcast facsimile capabilities. Think of that. Half of our public health departments do not have fax transmission.

Before September 11 only one in five U.S. hospitals had a bioterrorism preparedness plan of any sort. Title III addresses this situation by including several enhanced grant programs to improve State and local public health preparedness.

Today, Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson

agreed. That is the former governor of Wisconsin. He knows what this is like. He knows how States are strapped for cash, how State public health departments have suffered, and how we need to do something to help.

So there would be grants given in this bill for those States. Activities funded under the grant would include conducting an assessment of core public health capacities, achieving the core public health capabilities and fulfilling preparedness plans. The bill would also establish a new grant program for hospitals, as I have mentioned.

Title IV, developing new countermeasures against bioterrorism. As I said, we need to expand our Nation's stockpile of smallpox vaccine, critical pharmaceuticals. Title IV gives the Secretary authority to enter into long-term contracts with sponsors to guarantee that the government will purchase a certain quantity of vaccine at a certain price.

This problem with vaccines has been one that has vexed the government for a number of years. The pharmaceutical companies traditionally have not been interested in producing vaccines. It is not a big money maker for them. Maybe one person in a million can suffer a serious problem, including death from a vaccine. It probably is closer to four to six people can suffer some serious permanent sequela from a vaccine and one person might die out of a million. Consequently, there have been problems with lawsuits and liability related to that.

The lab that the government has wanted to produce the anthrax has had real problems with control and sterility and cleanliness. It is clear we need to devote some funds for this.

Title V deals with our Nation's food supply. With 57,000 establishments under its jurisdiction, we have only 7-to 800 food inspectors, including 175 import inspectors for more than 300 ports of entry into this country. The FDA needs increased resources for inspections of imported food. There is no question about that. Secretary Tommy Thompson agreed with that today.

The President's emergency relief budget included a request for 61 million to enable the FDA to hire 410 new inspectors, lab specialists and other experts, as well as to invest in new technology and equipment. We think that should be done.

Title V grants the FDA needed authority to ensure the safety of domestic and imported food. It allows the FDA to use qualified employees from other agencies. It makes sure that the FDA has authority to prevent port-shopping by marking food shipments denied entry at one U.S. port to ensure that they just do not show up at another U.S. port. It gives the FDA additional tools to ensure proper records are maintained by those who manufacture, process, pack, transport, distribute, receive food. It may debar a person who engages in patterns seeking

to import contaminated food. A number of issues are involved.

There is one issue, for instance, local to my State of Iowa. We have in Ames, Iowa, the National Animal Disease Center. They deal with a lot of very powerful infectious diseases. We need to make sure that that facility is secure, and we need to make sure that it is updated and modernized in order to fulfill its function. My colleagues may remember that with these anthrax cases, the anthrax is being traced to a type of anthrax called the "Ames variety."

So these are a number of things that are in the bill that the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. BERRY) and I will introduce tomorrow, the companion bill to the Senate bioterrorist bill, Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001. I would strongly encourage my colleagues to sign up as cosponsors for this. We already have a fair number of bipartisan cosponsors for this bill. We will be dropping this tomorrow sometime.

This is something that the language will be out there. People can look at it over Thanksgiving recess, and I would hope then that we could have a debate on this, both in the Senate and in the House sometime in the first 2 weeks of December. This is something, along with aviation security, that I think our constituents are demanding that Congress put aside partisan concerns and address as a national security issue.

Once again, I want to recommend to my colleagues that they read this book on germs, become experts on this. We are going to get a lot of questions from our constituents at our town hall meetings. Sign up for this bill and we will be able to tell them some of the good things that we are going to be able to do to try to improve our ability to handle a potential epidemic or bioterrorist threat.

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So with that, Mr. Speaker, I hope that we proceed with this in a timely fashion.

RECESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FORBES). Pursuant to clause 12 of rule I, the Chair declares the House in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Accordingly (at 7 o'clock and 45 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 8 of rule XII, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

4582. A letter from the Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, transmitting a draft bill entitled, "Promotion and Support of Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Marriage Act of 2001"; to the Committee on Education and the Workforce.

4583. A letter from the Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, trans-

mitting a draft bill entitled, "FDA Export and Import Fee Act of 2001"; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

4584. A letter from the Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Acquisition Policy, General Services Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule—Federal Acquisition Regulation; Veterans' Employment [FAC 2001-01; FAR Case 1998-614; Item IV] (RIN: 9000-AI46) received November 13, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Government Reform.

4585. A letter from the Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Acquisition Policy, General Services Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule—Federal Acquisition Regulation; Very Small Business Pilot Program [FAC 2001-01, FAR Case 2001-001; Item VII] (RIN: 9000-AJ16) received November 13, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Government Reform.

4586. A letter from the Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Acquisition Policy, General Services Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule—Federal Acquisition Regulation; Small Entity Compliance Guide—received November 13, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Government Reform.

4587. A letter from the Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Acquisition Policy, General Services Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule—Federal Acquisition Circular 2001-01; Introduction—received November 13, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Government Reform.

4588. A letter from the Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Acquisition Policy, General Services Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule—Federal Acquisition Regulation; Application of the Davis-Bacon Act to Construction Contracts with Options to Extend the Term of the Contract [FAC 2001-01; FAR Case 1997-613; Item I] (RIN: 9000-AI47) received November 13, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Government Reform.

4589. A letter from the Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Acquisition Policy, General Services Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule—Federal Acquisition Regulation; Acquisition of Commercial Items [FAC 2001-01; FAR Case 2000-303; Item II] (RIN: 9000-AI88) received November 13, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Government Reform.

4590. A letter from the Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Acquisition Policy, General Services Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule—Federal Acquisition Regulation; Prompt Payment Under Cost-Reimbursement Contracts for Services [FAC 2001-01; FAR Case 2000-302; Item III] (RIN: 9000-AJ17) received November 13, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Government Reform.

4591. A letter from the Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Acquisition Policy, General Services Administration, transmitting the Administration's final rule—Federal Acquisition Regulation; Veterans' Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development Act of 1999 [FAC 2001-01; FAR Case 2000-302; Item V] (RIN: 9000-AI93) received November 13, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Government Reform.

4592. A letter from the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Social Security Administration, transmitting the Administration's draft bill entitled, "Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act Amendments of 2001"; jointly to the Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce.