

of the Patients' Bill of Rights is one that is of importance not only to consumers, but it is also important to physicians. It is important to health care providers; it is important to insurance providers. It is important to Members of Congress because we recognize that today in health care across this country that there are some unresolved issues and some changes that have not taken place in the Nation. The Nation, unfortunately, is looking to Washington, D.C. to attempt to solve some of these problems.

Tonight I would like to float a new concept or idea which I believe will become part of the health care debate. We are all aware that by and large Republicans and Democrats, Members of this body, have come to an agreement on many things that will be necessary to solve the health care problem. Things like access to emergency rooms and making sure that sick people are taken care of and having doctors make decisions and making general reform under the Patients' Bill of Rights, but the impediment or the stopping point, why we have not been able to resolve this matter rests on the issue of liability. The issue of liability or accountability is one that has not been fully seen through with an answer.

Mr. Speaker, part of the problem goes back to something that is called ERISA, which is an act from 1974, an act that provides companies that have or do business across State lines the ability to give them a chance to have an insurance policy, a savings plan and other types of arrangements for their employees on a nationwide basis rather than looking directly at how they might comply with 50 State insurance commissioner plans or 50 State plans related to savings plans.

Because of ERISA, what is called ERISA preemption, it means that health care providers do not have to comply exactly because of this exemption that they have in the marketplace to liability issues. It gives them an exemption from being sued essentially in the marketplace.

So there are some HMOs that may or may not provide service that would be consistent with State plans, and so there is a call for us to level that playing field and decide how that is going to work.

Mr. Speaker, the answer that is generally accepted is that you just allow HMOs to be sued so that the consumer or a doctor's decision is taken into account and corrected.

We, as Members of this body, deliberated on this effort. Last year I voted for something called the Norwood-Dingell bill, which would allow this to take place, where a body, that is an HMO, could be sued for a decision that they would be making in health care. The inability that we have for this body to decide today how that lawsuit would take place, whether it would be caps or an unlimited amount of money, whether it would be suing in Federal court or State court, who would be

making medical decisions, whether medical decisions would be a part of this or whether it would be for harm, are things that have been widely debated.

The idea that I would like to discuss tonight is how we can go about resolving this. Essentially my plan that will be put forward is one that says that I believe that we should not skew the marketplace. We in fact want to have employers be protected when they do not make medical decisions. We do not want employers to be sued. We do not want lawsuits that would take money from health care and cause an incredible amount of draining off of resources out of health care to take place. So we want to protect employers. We want doctors to make decisions. We want doctors to make the decisions that they have been trained to do that are medically necessary.

We want to make sure as a public policy perspective that we are able to move on and give every single patient those things that they need and not hold up the delivery of those changes so that customers can, consumers can have what they need.

Mr. Speaker, my plan is simple. It separates process from harm. It says that we will not allow lawsuits as part of a difference that might take place between an HMO and a consumer, an HMO and a doctor. We will not allow those to go to a lawsuit where there is a nonharm that has been placed as a difference between these circumstances.

Why is this important? It is important because I do not believe that we should solve our differences in a court of law, but rather we should be dynamic in understanding that a doctor should be the one who is making the decisions about nondamage differences in the marketplace. So my bill will separate what I call process from harm.

The process would be, as has been accomplished in many States around the country, where there is a difference between a consumer, a patient, a doctor, and a health care provider, we would allow an internal and an external review, the internal review meaning that we would allow the HMO the opportunity to understand what their difference is and that they would have to respond back with a physician's answer, but that the final decision in this would be made by an external review, a panel that was made up of three expert physicians in this field. I believe it is important that we allow doctors to make medical decisions and not look to courts to do that.

On the other side of the coin where we deal with harm, I believe it is important that we go to a court of law, that we allow a harmed party an opportunity not only to go to a court to address these issues, but to be in front of a jury. That is where the other part of my bill will allow a party, a harmed party, to go to State court to resolve their differences.

It is my hope that this process that we are beginning will allow us an op-

portunity to move forward in a bipartisan way to address the issues and give patients those things that they need, address them under the Patients' Bill of Rights and also address them under liability.

PRESIDENT BUSH HAS HISTORIC MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PUTIN

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. WELDON) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to provide some information from the standpoint of one Member of Congress following President Bush's recent meeting with European leaders, and in particular with his historic meeting with Russian President Putin.

I wanted to take out this special order for a number of reasons; first of all, to follow up on the discussions that were held by our President and the Russian president, and talk about the substance of those discussions; and also, on the eve of the visit of the first elected delegation to arrive in Washington following that summit, which I will host tomorrow with my colleagues, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER) and members of the Duma Congressional Study Group here in Washington. In fact we have the First Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma, the highest elected official in the Duma, representing President Putin's party. And as the number two person of the Duma, she is the leader of the delegation here in Washington tonight.

Mr. Speaker, the delegation of elected Russian leaders includes representation of political factions in the Duma, and are here to have formal discussions with us as a part of our ongoing dialogue. Over the past 9 years since forming the study group, we have had scores of meetings both in Washington and Moscow and throughout each of our respective countries trying to find common ground on key issues which face America and Russia.

First, Mr. Speaker, let me follow the meeting that was held between our two Presidents. There were many who said American and Russian relations were in fact becoming sour; that because of actions, especially President Bush's speech on missile defense, that perhaps Russia was no longer willing to be a friend of ours.

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There was a lot of speculation that perhaps President Bush did not have a sensitivity relative to our relations with Russia; that perhaps President Putin was taking Russia in a different direction; that in fact America and Russia were doomed to become enemies again; and that Russia in fact was moving to become a closer ally with China and enemies of Russia as opposed to being our friend.

All during the past year in meeting with our new President, I was convinced that he understood what it would take to bring back a normalization of our relations. I can tell you, Mr. Speaker, that President Putin felt the same way. In fact, last summer I was contacted by the then chairman of President Putin's political party in the Duma, Boris Grislov. He contacted me because he wanted to come over and observe the Republican convention and build relationships between the Republican Party, and in particular our candidate, and the party of President Putin, the "Edinstvo" Faction or Unity Faction. I extended an invitation to Boris Grislov. He came to Philadelphia and spent the week with Members of Congress observing our convention, speaking to the Russian people through a media source that had come with him and understanding how our democracy worked and building ties with Republicans who were in Philadelphia.

He came back again in January of this year, again at my invitation, to visit and to observe the inauguration of our new President. We got him special passes and he observed and witnessed the inauguration of George W. Bush. Then he hosted a delegation that I took along with the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER) to Moscow approximately 10 weeks ago. The gentleman from Maryland and the delegation that traveled with us and I did an extensive 1-hour summary of that trip when we returned.

The point is that President Putin and his party wanted to reach out and establish a new relationship. Even though the media was reporting a souring of relations between Russia and the U.S., I was convinced that in the end once President Bush met face to face with President Putin, we would have a new beginning. In fact, when I was on Air Force One with President Bush right before my trip to Moscow 9 weeks ago, I said to President Bush on the plane, Mr. President, if I have a chance to meet with President Putin, which I may, and I certainly will meet with his leaders, what do you want me to tell him?

He said, CURT, you tell President Putin that I am looking forward to meeting him, that we have no quarrel with Russia, we want to be their friend. We have some differences, but we can work those out.

That is exactly what happened in the meeting between President Putin and President Bush this past weekend. I think they have struck a relationship that is good for both countries and good for the world. Now, there are problems. In fact, there is a great deal of lack of trust on the part of the Russian side. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I would call the attention of my colleagues to this collage of photographs that I assembled from news sources of street scenes in downtown Moscow a little over a year ago. The scenes are not very positive. You see Russians throwing rocks at the American embassy in

Moscow. You see young Russians holding up anti-USA signs. You see Russians putting a swastika on the American flag. And you see Russians burning the American flag. This was a part of a major demonstration of over 10,000 Russians against America.

Why did they do this? Was this because of President Bush's announcement about missile defense? No, Mr. Speaker. This demonstration occurred during the previous administration. Well, then why were they protesting so aggressively in the streets, because we have been led to believe that the Russian problem is with missile defense which President Bush announced we were moving aggressively into? That is not the problem that has caused a lack of trust in Russia, Mr. Speaker. It is a combination of several factors, the results of which President Bush has inherited.

First of all, the Russians were not properly briefed when we expanded NATO a few short years ago to get the full picture that NATO was not the natural enemy of Russia any longer. Now, President Bush went to great lengths on this recent trip to explain to the Russian people and the Russian leaders that NATO was not meant to be the enemy of Russia any longer and that in fact NATO expansion was meant to provide a more secure Europe. In fact, President Bush left the door open that, one day, if Russia chose and if she met the criteria, she too could become a member of NATO. But when we expanded NATO a few years ago, that was not the case. The Russian people were given the feeling by the way we mishandled it that perhaps it was an attempt to bring in those former Soviet allies and now make them enemies of Russia.

The second reason why the people in Moscow were demonstrating is because of the war in Kosovo. Russians were convinced that that war caused a tremendous loss of innocent lives, of innocent Serbs. Mr. Speaker, as you well know, myself and a group of our colleagues also disagree with the way that we got involved in the Kosovo conflict. It was not that we liked Milosevic. It was not that we thought Milosevic was some kind of a person that we should respect and honor. We felt that he was as much of a thug and a corrupt individual and leader as everyone else did in this body.

But our reason for disagreeing with the leadership of President Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain in going in and attacking the former Yugoslavia was that we had not given Russia a chance to use its influence in getting Milosevic out of power peacefully. In fact, Mr. Speaker, I was the one that led an 11-member delegation of five Democrats and five Republicans and myself to Vienna where we met with leaders of the Russian Duma from all the factions along with those who support Milosevic, and we were able to work out the framework that became the basis of the G-8 agreement

that eventually ended that conflict peacefully.

The Russians, and myself included, believe we could have ended that war and should have ended it much earlier, in fact should never have begun it in the first place and should have allowed and actually should have encouraged Russia, should have forced Russia to play a more aggressive role in peacefully removing Milosevic from power, not one year after we began the bombing but a matter of weeks after the allied nations would have worked with Russia. That was a second reason that the Russian people lost confidence in us.

But I think perhaps the most important reason the Russian people lost confidence in us is because over the past 5 years, they know that we saw billions of dollars of IMF money, International Monetary Fund money, World Bank money and in some cases U.S. taxpayer dollars going into Russia for legitimate purposes but ending up being siphoned off by corrupt leaders who in fact were friends of Boris Yeltsin, by corrupt institutions that were led by the oligarchs that had been hand-selected by Boris Yeltsin.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, 4 and 5 years ago, we were aware that corruption was running rampant in Moscow. We were made aware as Members of Congress that those people hand picked by Yeltsin to run the banking system in Russia were corruptly taking money that was supposed to benefit Russia's people and instead putting it in U.S. real estate investments and Swiss bank accounts. The problem was, Mr. Speaker, that our policy for the past 8 years under the previous administration with Russia was based on a personal friendship between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. Now, I am not against personal friendships. In fact, I think it is helpful; and hopefully President Bush and President Putin will become close friends. But President Clinton had become such a close friend of Boris Yeltsin that our whole policy for 8 years was based on keeping Yeltsin in power. When we had evidence that there was rampant corruption around Yeltsin, we should have done the right thing. We should have questioned Yeltsin directly, and we should have called him into a public accounting for the billions of dollars of money, much of it backed by the U.S. government and U.S. taxpayers, that was supposed to help the Russian people reform their economy and society but instead was benefiting Boris' personal friends. But we did not do that. We pretended we did not see it. We pretended that we did not know about it.

That is why, Mr. Speaker, in the 2 months before Boris Yeltsin resigned his position, the popularity polls in Moscow and throughout Russia showed that Yeltsin's popularity was only 2 percent. Only 2 percent of the Russian people supported him. But guess who else supported him, the President and Vice President of the United States.

We were still supporting a man that almost every Russian believed was corrupt and had a severe alcohol problem. And as we all know, Mr. Speaker, when Yeltsin finally resigned, one of the conditions for his resignation was that the new President, President Putin, in his first official act would have to give a blanket pardon to Boris Yeltsin and his entire family. That is exactly what President Putin did. His first official act was to pardon President Yeltsin and his family, because the Russian people and leaders in the Duma wanted to go after Yeltsin and those oligarchs for stealing billions of dollars of money that should have gone to help the Russian people.

Further evidence of this were the indictments handed down by the Justice Department in New York just 2 years ago, in the Bank of New York scandal, where the Justice Department has alleged in public documents that individuals in Russia and the U.S. were involved in siphoning off up to \$5 billion of IMF money that should have gone to the Russian people. So a third reason why these Russians were rampaging in the streets against America was because they felt that America let them down.

Now, if you believe the national news media and some of the liberals in this city, including my colleagues in this body and some in the other body, they would have you believe that our problem with Russia today is all about missile defense.

Tonight I want to talk about missile defense, Mr. Speaker, because that is not a problem with Russia. It is not a problem at least the way President Bush wants to move forward with missile defense. Some will say, Well, the Russians do not want us to move forward on missile defense. The Russians do not want us to have that capability. The fact of the matter is, Mr. Speaker, that Russia has had a missile defense system protecting Moscow and 75 percent of the Russian people for the last 25 years. In fact, they have upgraded that system at least three times and have improved it in terms of accuracy and guidance systems. We have no such missile defense system.

Why would we not have one, Mr. Speaker? Well, the ABM treaty which was negotiated back in 1972 was based on mutually assured deterrence, also called mutually assured destruction. At that time there were only two major superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. We each had offensive missiles with nuclear warheads on top. And so we dared each other. You attack us and we will wipe you out with a counterattack. And if we attack you, we know that you will wipe us out with a counterattack.

So deterrence was the strategic relationship between two superpowers from 1972 on. But that ABM treaty allowed one missile defense system in each country. The original treaty allowed two, but it was modified after a short period of time to only allow each coun-

try to build one missile defense system. That one system could only protect one city. Russia, because of its geography and because of its control by a Communist dictatorship picked Moscow. It just so happened in the former Soviet Union that Moscow and the environment around Moscow has about 75 percent of the Russian people. So it was fairly easy politically for the Communists in the Soviet Union to decide to protect Moscow with an ABM system, an antiballistic missile system. The people in the far east in the Soviet Union were not happy because they were left vulnerable. But if you are controlled by a Communist dictatorship, it does not matter what the people in the far east think. The Communist leadership determines which city will be protected. So Moscow was protected.

Now, over here in America we are a democracy. Our leaders could not politically pick one city. Which city would we pick? New York? Dallas? Los Angeles? Seattle? If we picked one city to protect, every other part of America would say, wait a minute. This is a democracy, a representative government where all of us are equal. You cannot pick one city and only protect one group of people. And besides, our population is not based in one area. So the ABM treaty, even though it did call and did allow for security through deterrence, did not allow America to provide a level of protection that Russian people have had for the past 25 years.

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The difference is that today we no longer live in a world with two superpowers. The Soviet Union does not even consider itself to be a superpower today, even though they have major offensive weapons. So there is one superpower left, and that is us.

The problem with the ABM treaty is that today we have other nations that have the same offensive capability that perhaps the U.S. and Russia have had over the past 30 years. On August 30 of 1998, North Korea did something that even the CIA was not aware they had the capability to do. They launched a three-stage missile up into the atmosphere over Japan. The CIA has acknowledged publicly that they were not aware that North Korea had a three-stage rocket potential. Even though that test did not go to completion, when the CIA analysts projected how far that missile could have traveled they have now said publicly it could reach the shores of the western part of the U.S. It could not carry a very heavy payload and it might not be very accurate, but if one of those North Korean missiles had a small chemical biological or small nuclear warhead, it could hit the western part of the United States. That is the first time in the history of North Korea that a rogue state has had the capability to hit our country directly, and we have no defense against that.

Now it is not that we think that North Korea will attack us, because

most of us do not. But let us imagine a scenario where North Korea might not be on friendly terms with South Korea, and we have seen evidence of that over the past several decades, and perhaps North Korea would attack South Korea. Whereupon, America would come in to help defend South Korea because of treaty relations. What if North Korea's leaders then said to our President, if you do not remove your troops from the Korean Peninsula we are going to nuke one of your western cities? For the first time in the history of the existence of North Korea, we now know they have that capability. It might not be a very accurate missile. They might aim for Los Angeles and hit Portland, but it does not matter. They have that capability.

What would be our President's response? Would we go in preemptively and nuke North Korea and wipe out all their capabilities and kill innocent people, even though they had not attacked us? Or would we wait until they launched the missile, which we could not defend against, and then counter-attack and wipe out North Korea? Which course would our President take, Mr. Speaker?

It presents a kind of dilemma that we never want our President to be in. But it is not just a rogue state like North Korea. Iran has now been working on a system, the Shahab-III, Shahab-IV and Shahab-V, which now possesses a capability of sending a missile about 2,500 kilometers. That covers a good part of Europe. Iran is also working on a missile system called the Shahab-V. That system will have a range, we think, of 5,000 kilometers. Iran's goal is to develop a long-range missile to eventually hit the U.S. Iraq has a similar goal, and they have improved their SCUD missile three or four times. They eventually want to have a capability to use against America.

So we now have other nations that are unstable nations building missiles that within 5 to 10 years will be able to hit the U.S. for which we have no defense. But it is not just those unstable nations, Mr. Speaker, that we are concerned about. President Bush and Members of Congress who support missile defense do not for a minute believe that Russia will attack us. That is not the case. Our colleagues do not believe that China will attack us for that matter.

Let me say what is a concern, Mr. Speaker, and it deals with a missile that I am going to put up on the easel right now.

This photograph, Mr. Speaker, is a Russian SS-25 long-range missile. You can see it is carried on what basically is a tractor-trailer with a number of wheels and tires. This missile, when put in the launch position, when the launch codes are entered, is pre-programmed to an American city and can travel 10,000 kilometers at an approximate time of 25 minutes from the time it is launched to landing on that American city which it has been pre-programmed to strike. Now, the exact

number is classified, but I can say unclassified that Russia has over 400 of these mobile launched SS-25s. Part of their doctrine is to drive them all over their territory so that we do not know where those missiles are at any given time, so there is an act of surprise there, an element of surprise if Russia would need to attack us. It is a basic part of their ICBM fleet.

Now we do not think that Russia will launch these against us deliberately, but let me give you, Mr. Speaker, an incident that did occur in Moscow and in Russia in 1995. Norway, in January of 1995, was going to launch a weather rocket into the atmosphere to sample weather conditions. So the Norwegian government notified the Russian government right next door, do not worry; this missile we are launching is not in any way offensive to you. It is simply a scientific experiment for us to sample upper atmospheric conditions for proper weather reporting.

Because of Russia's economic problems, Mr. Speaker, and because of Russia's lack of improving its sensing systems, when the Norwegians launched that rocket they misread it in Russia. The Russian military thought it was an attack from an American nuclear submarine. So when Norway launched their rocket for weather purposes, the Russian military misread that launch and thought it was an attack from a nuclear submarine off their coast. So the Russian leadership did what they would do if they were being attacked. They put their ICBM fleet on alert, which meant they were within a matter of minutes to launching one missile pre-programmed against an American city. That was their response.

The week after this incident occurred, President Yeltsin was asked by the Russian media, what happened, President Yeltsin? He acknowledged that this took place. He said, yes, it was only one of two times that ICBMs were put on full alert, but it worked; our system worked. I overruled, he said, our defense minister Pavel Grachev and I overruled the general in terms of our command staff, General Kalisnikov, and I called off the launch.

Mr. Speaker, estimates are that Russia was within 7 minutes of accidentally launching a 10,000 kilometer ICBM that would have hit an American city.

Now, Mr. Speaker, let us think for a moment. What if that launch would have occurred and what if it occurred under President Putin? Let us imagine a White House conversation between the two presidents. President Putin picks up the red phone, linking him directly up with Washington, and he gets President Bush on the phone and he says, Mr. President, we have had a terrible accident. One of our long-range missiles has been launched accidentally. Please forgive us.

What does President Bush then do? Well, he has two choices. He can then issue a launch code for one of our missiles to take out one of Russia's cities

in retaliation. That would end up in perhaps a half million people being killed in both countries, or he could perhaps go on national TV and tell the American people in the city where that missile was heading that they have 25 minutes to move.

The fact is, Mr. Speaker, today America has no system to shoot down an incoming missile. We have no capability to shoot down a missile once it has been launched.

If, likewise, one of these units controlling an SS-25 were to somehow get the launch codes for that missile and launch that missile, again we have no defense against that accident.

Mr. Speaker, that is why President Bush has said America must deploy missile defense. That is why this Congress voted with a veto-proof margin 2 years ago in favor of my bill, H.R. 4, to declare it our national law that we will deploy missile defense. It was not to back Russia into a corner. It was not to escalate an arms race. It was to give us protection against a threat that we do not now have.

Now, the liberal opponents of missile defense will say, well, wait a minute, Congressman WELDON, the threat, and I heard the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee say this on Sunday, there is a more likely threat of a truck bomb coming into our cities.

That is a little bit disingenuous, Mr. Speaker, because the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee knows full well that over the past 6 years the Congress has plussed up funding for dealing with weapons of mass destruction more than what the President asked for each year. We are spending hundred of millions of dollars on new detection systems, new intelligence systems, on dealing with weapons of mass destruction that could be brought in by terrorist groups. We are not ignoring that threat, but, Mr. Speaker, the facts are there. The largest loss of American military life in the past 10 years was when a low complexity SCUD missile was fired by Saddam Hussein into an American military barracks in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia. America let down our sons and daughters. Twenty-eight young Americans came home in body bags because we could not defend against a low complexity SCUD missile.

When Saddam Hussein chose to destroy American lives, he did not pick a truck bomb. He did not pick a chemical agent. He picked a SCUD missile, which he has now enhanced four times. When Saddam Hussein chose to kill innocent Jews in Israel, he did not pick truck bombs. He did not pick biological weapons. He sent SCUD missiles into Israel, and killed and injured hundreds of innocent Jews.

The facts are easily understood, Mr. Speaker. The weapon of choice is the missile. Today throughout the world, over 70 nations possess cruise, medium- and long-range missiles. Twenty-two nations today around the world are building these missiles. All the major

unstable nations are building missile systems today because they want to use them and threaten to use them against America, our allies and our troops.

Now others will say, well, wait a minute, wait a minute. This system will not work. Mr. Speaker, facts again do not support that notion. There have been 31 major tests of missile defense systems by our military over the past 5 years, 31 tests. These tests were with our Army program called THAAD, our PAC III program, the Enhanced Patriot, our Navy program, called Navy Area Wide Navy Upper Tier, and our national missile defense program, 31 tests. Now we had failures, I will acknowledge that, but, Mr. Speaker, the failures were not of hitting a bullet with a bullet. The failures were when we could not get the rocket into the atmosphere.

Now, that problem was solved by Wernher von Braun 40 years ago. If we use that as a reason to stop missile defense, then we better shut down our space program, because the same rocket technology that launches our satellites and our astronauts into outer space is the exact same technology we use for missile defense. So if we think that those failures should stop missile defense, then we should shut down Cape Kennedy, because it is the same rocket science.

The fact is, Mr. Speaker, of the 16 times of the 31 tests, where the seeker reached a level where it could see the target up in the atmosphere, 16 times, 14 of those times we hit a missile with a missile. We hit a bullet with a bullet. So our success rate has been 14 out of 16 times we have been able to hit a bullet with a bullet, proving that the technology is, in fact, at hand.

□ 2215

Last week, Mr. Speaker, General Kadish, the head of our Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, a three-star general, testified, and I asked the question, general, is the technology here today? He said, absolutely, Congressman. We understand and have the technology worked out.

I said, is it an engineering challenge now? He said, that is the challenge. It is engineering, a group of systems, the queuing system, the radar system, the Seeker itself, to work together to take out that missile when it is on the ascent phase heading toward our country or our troops. So it is not a technology problem, it is an engineering challenge.

Now, Mr. Speaker, some of the opponents of missile defense will say, well, wait a minute. You can defeat missile defense by having decoys. Any nation that we would try to defend against would simply build decoys. These would be balloons so that you would not be able to tell the warhead from the balloon.

That is an easy argument for people to make, but it does not hold water, Mr. Speaker. It is disingenuous. Because if we have countries that the liberals say cannot build missile systems

because they do not have the capability, how can we expect those same countries to be able to build technologies that would allow them to have decoys?

We tried to build decoys ourselves, and we are the most equipped nation in the world technologically. We have had problems building decoys. So you cannot say a foreign nation can build decoys that we cannot even build as a reason not to move forward with missile defense.

Now, we understand the challenge of being able to differentiate the actual warhead from a decoy. It is a challenge we have not yet totally solved. But, Mr. Speaker, even if we move for aggressive deployment today, we will not have a system in place for at least 5 years. We are on a time frame to solve the challenge of decoys during that time frame of deployment.

Now, some say the system would cost too much money. Mr. Speaker, the cost for missile defense is approximately 1 percent of our defense budget. One percent. Not our total budget, of our defense budget.

Now, we are building new airplanes to replace older ones, we are building new ships to replace older ships. We are building all kinds of new tanks and ammunition to replace older ones. But missile defense does not exist today. One percent of our defense budget to build defenses against missile systems is not too much to ask.

I would say to my colleagues, if you believe cost is a factor, then what price do you put on Philadelphia, or on Los Angeles, or on Washington, D.C.? Is it worth \$1 billion? Is it worth \$100 million? What price do we put on a city that could be wiped out from one missile launched into our country?

So price is not an issue. Technology is not an issue. Well, then what is the issue? Is it the Russians? Yes, we want to reassure Russia that this is not meant to threaten them. Do the Russians not trust us today on missile defense?

Mr. Speaker, the answer is yes. But, you know, Mr. Speaker, if I were a Russian today, I would not trust America on missile defense either. That is a pretty strong statement. Why would I say that? Why would I not trust America on missile defense if I were a Russian?

Because three times in the last 8 years under President Clinton we slapped Russia across the face on missile defense. Let me review the actual incidents one at a time.

In 1992, the new President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, challenged former President George Bush to work together on missile defense. He said let us have our two countries cooperate. President Bush said, I agree. So our State Department began high level talks with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Those talks were given a name, Ross-Manedov talks, named after the two people leading the discussions.

We had several meetings, quiet meetings, but very successful meetings. The

two governments were looking at ways to cooperate back in 1992 on missile defense.

Things changed in 1993. A new President came in, a President who ran against missile defense. What was one of the first acts that President Clinton did? With no advance warnings to the Russian side, he abruptly canceled the Ross-Manedov talks. So we sent our first signal to Russia back in 1993, we do not want to work with you on missile defense. We will work alone.

For the support of Congress, we kept one joint missile defense program operational with the Russians. It was the construction of two satellites, one controlled by Russia and one controlled by the U.S., to sense rocket launches around the world, so we could build confidence. The program is called RAMOS, Russian American program for space observations.

In 1996, with no advance warning to the Russians or the Congress, the Clinton administration canceled the program. I got frantic calls in my office from my Russian friends. They said, Congressman WELDON, what is going on? You have told us you are trying to work with us. Your government just announced they are cancelling the funds for the RAMOS program?

Democrats and Republicans in the Congress came together. CARL LEVIN in the Senate, myself in the House, joined by a number of other Members, said this cannot stand. We overturned the Clinton administration's decision to cancel the RAMOS program, and it is still being funded today.

But, you know what Mr. Speaker? That was the second time that Russia got a signal from us. Our administration canceled the program. It was the Congress who restarted it.

There was a third incident. In the late 1990s, with the ending of the two superpowers, the common thought in America was that the ABM Treaty, if it was kept in place, had to become more flexible to allow America to deal with new threats that were emerging.

What did the Clinton administration do? It sent its negotiators to Geneva to negotiate with the Russians two new amendments to the ABM Treaty. At a time when almost everyone in America was saying let us relax the treaty so America can defend herself, what did the Clinton administration do? They negotiated with Russia two new tightening amendments that made the ABM Treaty tighter than it had been back in 1972.

Most of us in the Congress had no idea what the President was up to. We knew the amendments were dealing with multilateralizing the treaty, and the other dealt with something called demarcation.

So, Mr. Speaker, I called the State Department in 1997 and I obtained permission to go to Geneva. I think I am the only Member of either body that went over there during the discussions. I sat down at the negotiating table, alongside of me was our chief nego-

tiator, Stanley Rivalos. Across from me at the table was the chief Russian negotiator, General Koltunov. We met for 2½ hours.

The first question I asked General Koltunov was, General, tell me, why do you want to multilateralize the ABM Treaty, meaning bring other nations in? It was only a treaty between two countries, the Soviet Union and the U.S. Why do you want to bring in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan? They do not have nuclear warheads nor long-range missiles. If you want to bring in former Soviet states, why did not you propose bringing them all in, all 15?

He looked at me. He said, Congressman, you are asking that question of the wrong person. We did not propose multilateralizing the ABM Treaty. Your side did.

I couldn't believe what I was hearing, Mr. Speaker. The Clinton administration went over to Geneva to negotiate a change in the treaty that brought in three former Soviet states to be equal signatories. Now, why would you do that, Mr. Speaker, unless, unless you wanted to make it tougher down the road to amend the treaty, because then you had to get four nations to agree as opposed to just Russia and the U.S.

The second issue was demarcation. I could not understand how we differentiated between a theater missile defense system and national missile defense. If you are in Israel, our THAAD program would be national missile defense, because it protects your whole country. You are a small country. So I said to General Koltunov on the Russian side, tell me, how do you make the difference between theater and national? How do you determine the speed and range that makes one system theater and one system national?

He said, Congressman, they are very delicate negotiations. I cannot explain it here. You have to go back and ask your scientists. So I came back home to America, not satisfied with the answers I got.

About a year later, Mr. Speaker, I got my answer. I was reading a press account in a Tel Aviv newspaper that Russia was trying to sell Israel its brand new latest missile defense system called the ANTEI-2500, A-N-T-E-I. They were also trying to sell the same system to Greece. I never heard of this system, and I know pretty much all of Russia's missile defense systems. I study them.

So I called the CIA and asked them to send an analyst over. The analyst came over to my office and brought a color brochure with him, in English. He handed me the brochure when he walked in my office and said Congressman, this is the ANTEI-2500.

I said, what is it? He said it is a brand new system that Russia is just now marketing. They are trying to sell it to Israel, Greece and other countries. He said I picked up this brochure at the air show in Abu Dhabi. The Russians were handing it out. It is in English. It is in color.

So I looked through the brochure, I still have the brochure in my office, and I turned through it to see all the pictures. And on the back page were all the technical capabilities of this new Russian system, including speed, intercept range and capabilities.

I looked at those figures and looked at the analyst and said, wait a minute. I have a hunch here that this system is right below the threshold of the demarcation that we got sucked into in Geneva, am I correct? He said yes, Congressman, you are correct. That is where the figure came from.

Well, we were in Geneva negotiating a definition of what is a theater system. The Russians knew they would be marketing the system a year later, so they wanted that demarcation to allow them to market that system, but deny us from going any better than that system. So we agreed to it.

President Clinton agreed to both of those changes in the ABM Treaty. So for the third time, we sent a signal to Russia. This third time the signal was we are going to tighten up the ABM Treaty. That is the policy of America.

Do you know what, Mr. Speaker? In our country we do live under a Constitution, and our Constitution says that no President can in fact negotiate a treaty without the advice and consent of the Senate. Now, President Clinton knows our Constitution very well, and he knew that when he negotiated those two changes in 1997, he had to submit them to the Senate for their advice and consent.

But, do you know what, Mr. Speaker? The President knew he could not get the votes to pass either one of them, even from his own party. So from 1997 until Bill Clinton left office, neither of those two changes to the ABM Treaty were submitted as required by our Constitution to the Senate. Yet the President convinced the Russians that that was our policy.

So the Russians last year, when they were ratifying START II, a very important treaty, the Duma attached those two treaty changes to the START II treaty itself. They had nothing to do with START II, but the Russians added those two protocols on. The Clinton administration, figuring they would tie the hands of the Senate, because if they could not submit those two changes separately by attaching them to START II, which the Russians ratified, they would force the Senate into a corner and they would have to ratify them as a part of START II ratification. That is why last summer the Senate said it would not take up START II. So, for the third time, the Clinton administration sent the wrong signal to Russia.

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That is why the Russians do not trust us, Mr. Speaker, because they got terribly mixed signals during the past 8 years. That is all changing now. President Bush has said we want to work with Russia. We want to work with Eu-

rope. We will do missile defense together.

The Russians believe in missile defense. They have the SA-10, SA-12. They have the ANTEI-2500. They have the S-300, the S-400, S-500; and they have national missile defense.

They have an ABM system. They have all of those systems, some of the best systems in the world. Is it wrong then for America to want to defend ourselves? Now, there is one additional problem and reason why the Russians do not trust us, Mr. Speaker, and this is going to be a pretty provocative statement. It is actually caused by the very arms control groups in this city who claim to be the advocates of peace.

Do I have any proof to back that up? Let me give you an example, Mr. Speaker. In the midst of the national missile defense debate in 1999, this article ran in Time Magazine, about Star Wars, the new version of missile defense, a two-page spread. The story is supposed to be about missile defense, defending our people and defending Russia's people.

Up here in the corner is this chart, which you cannot see, so I have had it blown up. What is the title of this chart, Mr. Speaker? "Destroying Russia. Arms control advocates map the Pentagon's top secret plan for waging war, 1,200 warheads hitting 80 targets, and they have the targets throughout Russia." Down at the bottom, "Killing zones, the vast spread of radiation wipe out more than 20 million Russian people."

Mr. Speaker, one of my best friends from Moscow was in my office and brought me this magazine. He threw it on my table and he said, Curt, I know what you are doing with missile defense, and I support you, but this is what the Russian people think you want. They see this story on missile defense in Time magazine, which is printed all over Russia; and they see a picture of a map destroying our country and killing 20 million people.

Who produced this chart, Mr. Speaker? The Natural Resources Defense Council. So the fear in Russia was not caused by missile defense. It was caused by the hate-mongering people in those arms control groups that have scared the Russian people into believing somehow we want to wipe out 20 million of their citizens.

And guess what, Mr. Speaker? They did it again. In this week's Newsweek magazine, there is another chart showing a nuclear hit in Russia. Again, it is attributed to Natural Resources Defense Council.

This will be on every news stand in Russia and will be the talk of the Russian people; and they will say to themselves, this is what America really wants, because their arms control people are telling this to their people; they want to destroy Russia.

They want to kill tens of millions of innocent Russian citizens. That is why Russians distrust us, Mr. Speaker. It is not because of what George Bush wants

to do. It is not because of what I want to do.

Tomorrow, I will lead discussions with Russia's leaders. We have 12 of their top Duma deputies in town, the first deputy speaker; and we will have discussions all day. I have been to Russia 26 times, Mr. Speaker.

I consider myself to be Russia's best friend in Congress, sometimes their toughest critic; but that is what good friends are for. This is not about backing Russia into a corner.

This is not about starting an arms race. This is not about bankrupting America. This is about protecting the American people. Mr. Speaker, if I wanted to hurt Russians, I would not have worked for the past 5 years on this project with the Russian Duma, which is to provide Russia for the first time with the Western-style mortgage program so that Russians can have houses like our middle-class people have in this country.

The program is called Houses for Our People. Almost every governor of every republic in Russia has given their stamp of approval for a program that we negotiated together to help Russian people buy homes.

We do not want to be Russia's enemy, but we sent the wrong signals to Russia over the past 8 years. We had an administration whose foreign policy toward Russia was like a roller coaster.

We backed them into a corner on the first NATO expansion. We went into Kosovo like wild people, trying to go in like cowboys from the Wild West, killing innocent Serbs instead of requiring Russia to help us.

We denied the fact that their Russian leaders were stealing billions of dollars of money that was supposed to help the Russian people, and we sent the wrong signals on missile defense.

All of that is changing now, Mr. Speaker, because we have a President who will treat the Russians with honesty and dignity. He has told the Russian leader face to face, eye to eye, we want to be your friend. We want to be your partner. We want to work with you economically. We want to help you with your environmental problems. We want to work with you on a mortgage program for your people. We want to help you grow your economy so that you become an aggressive trading partner with America.

All of us in this body and the other body should rally behind our President, and we should denounce those arms control groups in this city who use the distasteful practice of trying to convince the Russian people that somehow we are their enemy.

They are the warmonger, the people who put charts up who say that we somehow want to create a war that would wipe out 20 million Russians. They are the very warmongers, and we will not accept that. There is a place for arms control, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker, I am not against treaties, as long as they are enforced, and that means we have to have the accountability; and we have to have the

enabling capability to observe in both countries with candor whether or not we are adhering to treaties.

If we use the three simple requirements that Ronald Reagan laid out in dealing with both Russia and China, strength, consistency and candor, we will not have a problem in this century. We want the same thing for the Russian people that President Putin wants; we want them to have a better life than they had. We want their kids to have better education. We want them to have homes for family. We want their Duma to become a strong part of governing their country.

We want the Russian people to eventually realize the same kind of dreams that we realize in America, but we are not going to allow the American people to remain vulnerable. We are not going to deny the reality of what is happening in rogue and terrorist states.

When Members of the other body, like the Senate Foreign Relations chairman, are disingenuous and say our real concern are weapons of mass destruction, we have to counter that, because we do not have a corner on that. All of us understand that threat, just as we do the threat from cyberterrorism and narcodrug trafficking, but the fact is we cannot ignore the threat of missile proliferation.

We must work on arms control agreements. We must work on stabilization and building confidence and trust, and we must build limited systems that give us that protection that we do not now have. I am convinced, Mr. Speaker, that in the end, Russia and America will be prime partners together.

We will work on technology together. The Russians have expertise that we do not have. Together we can protect our children and our children's children, and we can deny those rogue states the chance of harming Russians or Americans or others of our allies by working together.

Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues to join President Bush in this effort; and I applaud him for his meeting with President Putin, and I look forward to our meeting tomorrow with the leaders of the Russian Duma.

REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 2216, SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001

Mr. SESSIONS (during Special Order of Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania), from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 107-105) on the resolution (H. Res. 171) providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 2216) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Ms. MCCARTHY of Missouri (at the request of Mr. GEPHARDT) for today on account of the funeral of a friend.

Mr. CANNON (at the request of Mr. ARMEY) for today on account of personal reasons.

Mr. ENGLISH (at the request of Mr. ARMEY) for today on account of travel delays.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. McNULTY) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Ms. NORTON, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. PALLONE, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ROSS, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DEFazio, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. SOUDER) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. HULSHOF, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GRUCCI, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. SOUDER, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DUNCAN, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Member (at his own request) to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. SESSIONS, for 5 minutes, today.

BILL PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Jeff Trandahl, Clerk of the House reports that on June 18, 2001 he presented to the President of the United States, for his approval, the following bill.

H.R. 1914. To extend for 4 additional months the period for which chapter 12 of title 11 of the United States Code is reenacted.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 10 o'clock and 38 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until Wednesday, June 20, 2001, at 10 a.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 8 of rule XII, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

2567. A letter from the the Director, the Office of Management and Budget, transmitting the cumulative report on rescissions and deferrals of budget authority as of June 1, 2001, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 685(e); (H. Doc. No. 107-89); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

2568. A letter from the Senior Legal Advisor to the Bureau Chief, Mass Media Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, transmitting the Commission's final rule—Amendment of Section 73.606(b), Table of Al-

lotments, Television Broadcast Stations (Galesburg, Illinois) [MM Docket No. 01-53; RM-10040] received June 14, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

2569. A letter from the Senior Legal Advisor to the Bureau Chief, Mass Media Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, transmitting the Commission's final rule—Amendment of Section 73.202(b), Table of Alotments, FM Broadcast Stations (Monticello, Maine) [MM Docket No. 01-64; RM-10074] received June 14, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

2570. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule—Airworthiness Directives; Lockheed Model 188A and 188C Series Airplanes [Docket No. 2000-NM-265-AD; Amendment 39-11980; AD 2000-23-10] (RIN: 2120-AA64) received June 14, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

2571. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule—Airworthiness Directives; Learjet Model 35, 35A, 36, and 36A Series Airplanes [Docket No. 2000-NM-127-AD; Amendment 39-12026; AD 2000-24-19] (RIN: 2120-AA64) received June 14, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

2572. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule—Airworthiness Directives; DG Flugzeugbau GmbH Models DG-500 Elan Series, DG-500M, and DG-500MB Sailplanes [Docket No. 99-CE-88-AD; Amendment 39-12005; AD 2000-23-32] (RIN: 2120-AA64) received June 14, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

2573. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule—Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 707 and 720 Series Airplanes [Docket No. 99-NM-378-AD; Amendment 39-12027; AD 2000-24-20] (RIN: 2120-AA64) received June 14, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

2574. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule—Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 Series Airplanes [Docket No. 2000-NM-31-AD; Amendment 39-12018; AD 2000-24-11] (RIN: 2120-AA64) received June 14, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

2575. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule—Airworthiness Directives; Fairchild Aircraft, Inc., SA226 Series and SA227 Series Airplanes [Docket No. 2000-CE-41-AD; Amendment 39-11885; AD 2000-17-11] (RIN: 2120-AA64) received June 14, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

2576. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule—Airworthiness Directives; Pratt & Whitney PW4000 Series Turbofan Engines [Docket No. 2000-NE-47-AD; Amendment 39-11947; AD 2000-22-01] (RIN: 2120-AA64) received June 14, 2001, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.

2577. A letter from the Program Analyst, FAA, Department of Transportation, transmitting the Department's final rule—Airworthiness Directives; Raytheon Model