

Senate Amendment. It states the authority by which Congress adopts the various budgetary enforcement rules and procedures for the consideration of certain legislation set out in the budget resolution. An identical provision was included in section 234 of last year's budget resolution.

The Conference Agreement does not include the language from either section 210 or 211 of the Senate Amendment because all assumptions regarding revenues are taken into account within the actual revenue aggregates set out in the Conference Agreement. In addition, the issue of the level of funding for programs authorized in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act is taken into account within the levels for Function 500.

#### SENSE OF CONGRESS, HOUSE AND SENATE PROVISIONS

##### *House Resolution*

The House budget resolution contains the following Senses of the House or Congress that have no legal force but reflect the Congress' views on a variety of budget-related issues. The section numbers and section headings of these reserve funds are as follows:

Section 14 states a Sense of the House concerning Federal pay.

Section 15 states a Sense of Congress relating to Individual Development Accounts and the working poor.

Section 16 provides a Sense of Congress relating to Federal fire prevention assistance.

Section 17 states a Sense of the House regarding the deduction of state sales tax from Federal income taxes.

Section 18 states a Sense of Congress regarding funding for Graduate Medical Education.

##### *Senate Amendment*

The Senate amendment contains the following Sense of the Senate provisions:

Section 301 Sense of the Senate on Debt Reduction.

Section 302 Sense of the Senate on AIDS and Other Infectious Diseases.

Section 303 Sense of the Senate on Consolidated Health Centers.

Section 304 Sense of the Senate on Funding for Department of Justice Programs for State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance.

Section 305 Sense of the Senate on United States Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2002 Funding.

Section 306 Sense of the Senate on Strengthening our National Food Safety Infrastructure.

Section 307 Sense of the Senate with Respect to Increasing Funds for Renewable Energy Research and Development.

##### *Conference agreement*

The Conference Agreement contains the following Sense of the Senate and Sense of Congress provisions:

Subtitle A—Sense of the Senate provision.

Section 301 Sense of the Senate on conservation.

Section 302 Sense of the Senate on AIDS and other infectious diseases.

Section 303 Sense of the Senate on Consolidated Health Centers.

Section 304 Sense of the Senate on Funding for Department of Justice Programs for State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance.

Section 305 Sense of the Senate on United States Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2002 Funding.

Section 306 Sense of the Senate on Strengthening our National Food Safety Infrastructure.

Section 307 Sense of the Senate with Respect to Increasing Funds for Renewable Energy Research and Development.

Section 308 Sense of the Senate with respect to increased education funding.

Subtitle B—Sense of the Congress provisions.

Section 311 Asset building for the working poor.

Section 312 Federal Fire prevention assistance.

Section 313 Funding for graduate medical education at children's teaching hospitals.

Section 314 Concurrent retirement and disability benefits to retired members of the armed forces.

Section 315 Federal Employee Pay.

Section 316 Sales tax deduction.

JIM NUSSLE,

JOHN E. SUNUNU,

*Managers on the Part of the House.*

PETE DOMENICI,

CHUCK GRASSLEY,

DON NICKLES,

PHIL GRAMM,

KIT BOND,

*Managers on the Part of the Senate.*

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FLAKE). Under a previous order of the House, the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia (Ms. NORTON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Ms. NORTON addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. BURTON) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. BURTON of Indiana addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. HINOJOSA) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. HINOJOSA addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

#### CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON VTOL TECHNOLOGY WILL EXAMINE FAILED OSPREY PROJECT AND NEW TECHNOLOGY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. ROHRABACHER) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to discuss an issue that relates directly to the safety of the men and women whose task it is to defend our country. It also goes to the heart of the American lead in the aviation technology upon which we depend so much.

For over a decade, I backed a project that I believed would permit America to take the lead in the next major step in aviation technology, that is, Vertical Takeoff and Vertical Landing aircraft. Unfortunately, it is clear now that the project, the Osprey project, has been a costly and a dangerous failure.

Of the 11 aircraft built, four have crashed, and three of the crashes resulted in 30 fatalities. That is 30 dead heroes whom we cannot bring back.

The flight crews that were lost were the most experienced on this craft and some of the best and the brightest of the Marine Corps.

On page 32 of the most recent copy of the Marine Corps Gazette, there is an article by a pilot who is also a weapons and tactics instructor that underscores the skepticism about the viability of the Osprey program. Then there is the alarming allegations of a cover-up, a cover-up and records falsification by Marine officers directly involved in the Osprey's operational testing. Recently, the Defense Department's Blue Ribbon panel echoed the finding of the Marine Corps' Accident Mishap Board in recommending extensive redesign of the craft. All of this calls into question the Osprey's future use by the military and, of equal significance, its commercial viability. No commercial aviation company in this country is ever going to get insurance on a craft with this kind of safety record.

The Blue Ribbon panel mandates that we go back to the drawing board. That is not a condemnation of vertical landing, vertical takeoff; it is a condemnation of the Osprey program. Vertical Takeoff and Vertical Landing technologies are the way to alleviate our overcrowded airports, to ease our overburdened air traffic control systems, and to ensure our military's ability to respond when our runways have been destroyed by a wartime adversary. To pull us into the 21st century, we need a simple Vertical Takeoff, Vertical Landing aircraft with longer range, higher speed, and greater payload capacity. Perhaps like a transport version of the Harrier jet.

Tomorrow, the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, a subcommittee that I chair, will be holding a hearing on one such aircraft that holds promise for the future, and it will fly for the first time this summer. Let me note that my father was a Marine pilot.

Mr. Speaker, these 30 casualties during the testing of the Osprey program are unconscionable, 30 dead Marines. We do not need any more dead Marines. The Osprey program is a failure, but the Vertical Takeoff, Vertical Landing concept is not. We should not abandon that technology, and we should try to keep America first in aviation technology by ensuring that new concepts of Vertical Landing, Vertical Takeoff will be available to the American military and also available to commercial aviation so that the United States of America will be able to fly its up-to-date, cutting-edge aircraft throughout the world and remain the leader in aviation technology, creating jobs for our people and creating a capability, both militarily and commercially, that will keep America ahead of the competition and ahead of our adversaries.

So I would ask my colleagues tomorrow to pay attention to our hearing, and I would ask the public to pay attention to the hearing of the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

that I chair, and we will be examining the Vertical Takeoff and Vertical Landing concept, and perhaps some of the reasons why the old program failed and why there is hope that better technology is available in the future, technology that would protect our military people and offer great commercial possibilities for our country.

Mr. Speaker, I would submit for the RECORD the article in the Marine Corps Gazette entitled, "MV-22 Osprey or Edsel?"

[Ideas & Issues, MV-22 Osprey]

MV-22 OSPREY OR EDELSEL?

(By LtCol Bruce A. Milton, USMC)

IS THE OSPREY 'TOO MUCH' AIRCRAFT?

Mishaps have been an aviation bane ever since Orville and Wilbur made those first epic flights amid the dunes of Kitty Hawk. The early days of powered flight took an incredible toll on those intrepid airmen who ventured forth to challenge gravity. Despite tremendous losses, the potential benefits to both the civil and military complexes enabled a fledgling enterprise to evolve into the technologically advanced industry that we have today. I doubt few events in modern history can compare with the meteoric accomplishments of the aviation field. To think that Neil Armstrong walked on the moon less than 65 years after the Wrights' first powered flight is simply phenomenal.

Throughout these ever-evolving phases of aviation, countless steps have been taken to reduce the inherent risks associated with flying. There isn't adequate space in this article to pay homage to all the positive changes incorporated by manufacturers, operators, government entities, and others to enhance flight safety. Suffice it to say that the mishap rate—a tangible statistic that measures how safe we really are—has improved markedly over the years as a result of these positive changes.

However, just as the automotive industry has had models that were not successful, the annals of aviation history also include numerous aircraft that were "scrapped" or pulled from production. Unlike the doomed Edsel, a car that the driving public simply did not find aesthetically pleasing, many prematurely canceled aircraft, certainly many military aircraft, had their operational lives shortened because they were deemed too dangerous.

With a new aircraft, as with any complicated machine, there is a learning curve. This wringing out period includes the time that skilled test pilots put the aircraft through its paces. They "push the envelope" to establish limitations, procedures, and guidelines for subsequent squadron pilot usage. During this wringing out, the aircraft also undergoes operational test and evaluation (OTE). During OTE, more guidelines and procedures are established as how to best employ the aircraft in a tactical environment. Once the new aircraft has successfully completed this rigorous testing, it is ready for introduction to the fleet.

When speaking of the MV-22, it is with this latter portion of the learning curve that I am most concerned. I am not now, nor have I ever been, a test pilot. I have, however, spent the majority of my aviation career in some type of instructional capacity. From my days on active duty as a weapons and tactics instructor to my current duties as a training captain for a large commercial emergency medical services operator, I have amassed literally thousands of hours of flight instruction in both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. This experience has provided me with some insights into pilot performance and behavior.

Collectively, pilots are merely a cross section of society. As such, among pilots there exists a widely varying degree of aeronautical prowess and ability. I have flown with pilots whose seemingly effortless skill I admired. I have flown with those who struggled very hard to make the required grade. I have also flown with pilots whose performance made me wonder how they had progressed as far as they had. Interestingly enough, I suppose most of the pilots I have flown with over the last 19 years can be defined as being average.

In most communities and subcultures of naval aviation, there is certainly nothing wrong with average. Average can be equated to someone who is safe, reliable, and aware of his or her capabilities and limitations. However, in the case of the Osprey, I am concerned that average may not be good enough. As recent tragic events illustrate, "above average" or even "outstanding" may not be sufficient skill levels to successfully master the MV-22. We have lost the two most experienced Osprey aircrews, senior test pilots even, in the first stages of fleet incorporation. What happens when we man this aircraft with less than stellar experienced aircrews? I'm not sure the jury is "in" on this subject.

In my capacity as an instructor, I have more than a layman's appreciation for helicopter aerodynamics. I understand such phenomena as "settling with power" and "vortex ring state." I have deliberately induced this condition at altitude to show pilots how dangerous it can be if encountered in close proximity to the ground. I opine that in most helicopters, under most conditions—even tactically—it is rare to enter the vortex ring state. Reports I have read about the Marana incident attribute the mishap to the pilot having entered a vortex ring state. The speed and rates of descent reported certainly did not seem to me to be excessive. I have seen conditions far worse with no hint of loss of control. Is the margin of error or more correctly, margin of safety, of the Osprey so narrow as to put the aircrews at a disadvantage?

If the Osprey is as demanding to fly as it might seem, what happens when we man it with the inevitable average crew, cloak them in the fog of war, and send them forth in harm's way? Send them into a hot landing zone on a dark night wearing night vision goggles? Send relatively inexperienced crews into tactical situations where it is prudent to expedite time spent in the vulnerable landing phase? I cannot help but ponder such questions.

I do not particularly care about the politics involved in the overwhelming process of aircraft acquisition and employment. Instead, I worry about the troops tasked to fly in those aircraft. It is time to take a long, unbiased, nonpartisan look at the MV-22's future in the Corps. If it can be proven that cockpit workload and aircrew skill requirements are reasonable, then let us welcome its capabilities into our arsenal. If the aircraft needs further redesign or modification to make it safer, then we should pursue those changes. If it turns out that there is no rational or cost-effective solution to the current woes, then perhaps we should consider tabling MV-22 acquisitions until such time that it is safe.

We owe this analysis to our Marines. After all, the Edsel may have been unsightly, but it wouldn't kill you.

#### MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GREEN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak tonight to discuss a report that was just released yesterday from the National Institute for Health Care Management Foundation, which stated that spending on prescription drugs has increased almost 19 percent in the last year. I am deeply troubled by this report, as it underscores a critical need for this Congress to modernize Medicare to include a prescription drug benefit.

Spending on retail outpatient prescription drugs rose almost 19 percent in 2000, from \$111 billion to \$131.9 billion. Approximately half of that spending increase can be attributed to just 23 prescription drugs or pharmaceuticals. Among those drugs are the blockbuster ones we hear about, Vioxx, Lipitor, Celebrex and Glucophage, which I am not pronouncing correctly, but the very drugs that seniors rely on every day to treat chronic long-term illnesses such as diabetes, arthritis or high cholesterol. In fact, my mother-in-law, of those four drugs, actually takes three of them every day.

For the seniors that have no prescription drug coverage, they simply have no choice but to pay top dollar for these expensive medications or go without; and that is what they are doing every day, they are going without, because they cannot afford them. Fully one-third of our Medicare beneficiaries, and these are old numbers, because that was before so many of our Medicare HMOs withdrew from the market, at least one-third of them have no prescription drug coverage at all.

I hear from constituents literally every day who have to make these tough choices on whether to pay their electric bill or their prescription drugs. In fact, I have a letter I just received today from a constituent who tells me: "I am holding off on some of my medications until my Social Security checks are deposited in the bank on the 3rd, and I am out of some of them already." Seniors are struggling literally from Social Security check to Social Security check hoping they have enough medication until the end of the month.

Another constituent of mine was hospitalized for a severe infection. When she was dismissed from the hospital she was given three new prescriptions, one which cost more than \$700. Imagine an 85-year-old woman being asked to pay \$700 for one prescription. The other two cost her an additional \$150, bringing her grand total for these new prescriptions, only new ones for this current illness, to \$850 on one trip to the pharmacy. Talk about adding insult to injury.

Unfortunately, the high costs of prescription drugs are only getting worse. The recent government study predicts that the mapping of the human genome, the aging of the baby boom generation that I am a part of, and the increase in spending on biomedical research will lead to the introduction of