

all aspects of the National Missile Defense debate in the coming months to ensure that whatever course we choose truly strengthen our national security and advance our national interests.

IS THIS SHIELD NECESSARY?

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 13, 2001]

(Samuel R. Berger)

In the first weeks of the Bush administration, national missile defense has risen to the top of the national security agenda. Having wrestled with this issue over the last years of the Clinton administration, I believe it would be a mistake to proceed pell-mell with missile defense deployment as though all legitimate questions about the system had been answered. They have not.

While the United States maintains strength unmatched in the world, the vulnerability of the American people to attack here at home by weapons of mass destruction is greater than ever. Dealing with our vulnerability to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons requires an ambitious, robust, comprehensive strategy.

But 20 years and tens of billions of dollars later, national missile defense is still a question-ridden response to the least likely of the threats posed by these weapons: a long-range ballistic missile launched by an outlaw nation.

President Clinton last year decided to continue research and development of national missile defense, but deferred a decision on deployment. In part, this was based on a judgment that we do not yet know whether it will work reliably. The Bush administration should reject arbitrary deadlines and, as part of Secretary Rumsfeld's laudable defense review, take a fresh look at the overall threat we face.

Without question we need to broaden America's defenses against weapons of mass destruction. But plunging ahead with missile defense deployment before critical questions are answered is looking through the telescope from the wrong end: from the perspective of bureaucratically driven technology rather than that of the greatest vulnerabilities of the American people.

President Reagan's global shield (SDI) has evolved into a more limited system aimed at defeating long-range missiles launched not by a major nuclear rival but by an irrational leader of a hostile nation, particularly North Korea, Iraq or Iran. Its premise is that an aggressive tyrant such as Saddam Hussein is less likely to be deterred than were the leaders of the Soviet Union by the prospect that an attack on us or our friends would provoke devastating retaliation.

It is further suggested that lack of a defense could intimidate U.S. leadership: We might have hesitated to liberate Kuwait if we knew Saddam could have delivered a chemical, biological or nuclear weapon to the United States with a long-range ballistic missile.

But why do we believe Saddam or his malevolent counterparts would be less susceptible to deterrence than Stalin or his successors? Indeed, dictators such as Saddam tend to stay in power so long because of their obsession with self-protection. And is it likely we would not use every means at our disposal to respond to a vital threat to our economic lifeline, even if it meant preemptively taking out any long-range missiles the other side might have?

The fact is that a far greater threat to the American people is the delivery of weapons of mass destruction by means far less sophisticated than an ICBM: a ship, plane or suitcase. The tragedies of the USS Cole and sarin gas in the Tokyo subway show that lethal power does not need to ride on a long-range missile.

We know that we increasingly are the target of a widespread network of anti-American terrorists. We know they are seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction. If deterrence arguably doesn't work against hostile nations, it is even less so for fanatical terrorists with no clear home address.

The real issue is what is the most cost-effective way to spend an additional 100 billion or more defense dollars to protect this country from the greatest WMD threats. In that broader context, is national missile defense our first priority?

Is it wiser to continue research and development and explore alternative technologies while we invest in substantially intensifying the broad-scale, long-term effort against terrorist enemies? (Such an effort would include increased intelligence resources, heightened border security, even training of local police and public health officials to recognize a deadly biological agent.)

The ultimate question is whether Americans will be more secure with or without a national missile defense. The answer is not self-evident. We can't build the system that is farthest along in development—a land-based one—without cooperation from our allies.

Their misgivings derive in significant part from the prospect of abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia; that could unravel the global arms control and nonproliferation system.

It has been suggested that we could address Europeans' concerns by including them in our missile defense system or helping them build their own. But such an amalgamation would be more capable against Russia and thus more likely to stiffen its resistance to change in the ABM; it could also increase the chance Russia would respond in ways that would reduce strategic stability—for example by retaining multiple-warhead ICBMs it has agreed to eliminate.

Of course no other country can ever have a veto over decisions we must take to protect our national security. But in making that judgment, we must understand that the basic logic of the ABM has not been repealed—that if either side has a defensive system the other believes can neutralize its offensive capabilities, mutual deterrence is undermined and the world is a less safe place.

Then there is China. It is suggested that we can work this out with China by at least implicitly giving it a "green light" to build up its ICBM arsenal to levels that would not be threatened by our national missile defense.

This strategy fails to take into account the dynamic it could unleash in Asia: Would China's missile buildup stimulate advocates of nuclear weapons in Japan? How would India view this "separate peace" between the United States and China? What effect would that have on Pakistan and the Koreans?

Will we be more secure as Americans with a missile defense system or less secure? It is not a question that answers itself. But it is a question that requires answers.

JERUSALEM EMBASSY
RELOCATION ACT OF 1995

HON. THOMAS G. TANCREDO

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 13, 2001

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Speaker, today I introduced a resolution expressing the sense of Congress with respect to relocating the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. In

1995, Congress passed the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Act of 1995, which states that as recognition of an undivided Israel, the U.S. Embassy should be moved to Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999. The bill, which President Clinton signed, also contains waiver authority that the president may exercise if he feels the embassy move should be delayed for national security reasons. Each year since the bill was passed, the President has issued a national security waiver, and the Embassy has still not been moved.

The recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital enjoys the broad support of the American public. Further, it would be consistent with the United States' practice of accepting the host nation's decision as to where its capital is, and where the U.S. Embassy is located. Currently, Israel is the only nation in which the U.S. Embassy is not located in a city recognized internationally as the capital.

In short, moving the Embassy to Jerusalem is consistent with U.S. policy, and does not infringe on the remaining issues of conflict over East Jerusalem. I call my colleagues to support this resolution and I am hopeful that the House International Relations Committee will consider it in the coming weeks. Finally Mr. Speaker, I submit for the RECORD the following essay, written by one of my constituents, which makes the case for an embassy move most eloquently:

RELOCATION OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY TO
JERUSALEM: A PROPOSITION WHOSE TIME
HAS COME

(By Cheston David Mizel)

ENGLEWOOD, CO.—On May 22, 2000 President George W. Bush, speaking in front of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, promised that he would begin to move the U.S. Ambassador from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem as soon as he was inaugurated. Now that he has been elected and the inauguration has passed, the time to move the U.S. Embassy has come. Moving the embassy, at this time, is not only morally and politically apropos, but would augment vital American interests by sending a clear and unequivocal message, to the region, reaffirming the vitality of the American-Israeli relationship.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and relocation of the U.S. Embassy would immediately and significantly bolster the President's standing with key constituencies on both sides of the aisle. Not only would it clearly demonstrate his determination to fulfill his campaign promises, but it would garner enormous favor among Jewish voters who have felt disenfranchised by the recent presidential election. The prompt relocation of the embassy would further the President's goal of uniting

MORAL IMPLICATIONS

An immediate relocation of the American Embassy is a morally appropriate decision. Israel is the only true western style democracy in a region dominated by ruthless dictatorships. Israel and the United States enjoy a relationship that is unparalleled in the region. Israel is clearly the most loyal pro-American state in the Middle East. Moreover, since biblical times, Jerusalem has always been considered the capital of the people of Israel, whether residing in their land

or in exile. The modern State of Israel is no exception. Jerusalem is the seat of Israel's government: the site of parliament and its Supreme Court. Despite Palestinian claims to the contrary, Jerusalem has never been the capital of any other nation during the more than 3,000 years of its existence. The official recognition of this reality by Israel's closest ally is long overdue. It is not appropriate for the United States to choose the location of the capital of any nation nor is it the practice of the United States to do so anywhere else in the world.

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

In 1995, The United States Congress passed the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Act requiring the embassy to be moved to Jerusalem. This act was passed in the senate by a vote of 93 to 5 and the House of Representatives by a vote of 347 to 37. Since that time, President Clinton refused to move the embassy, using the excuse that it would harm America's National Security. Nevertheless, it must be noted that Americans vital security interests in the region are closely tied to the security of Israel and its Capital. These interests would be strengthened, not weakened, as a result of an embassy move. In stark contrast to the paternalistic approach of the Clinton Administration, George W. Bush, in December of 1999, speaking before the Republican Jewish Coalition, acknowledged that "A lasting peace will not happen if our government tries to make Israel conform to our vision of national security."

In *Navigating Through Turbulence: America and The Middle East in A New Century*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Presidential Study Group concluded that "[t]he top Middle East priority for the new President is to prevent a descent into regional war." The Report cites multiple scenarios for the current situation deteriorating into a wide scale conflict. While the scenarios differ in regard to course of events, they are all connected to the same general instability in the region, which has been greatly contributed to by the United States' failure to demonstrate the strength of its allegiance to Israel. Indeed, the Presidential Study Group's initial recommendation in averting a war is that:

The United States needs to ensure that Middle Easterners have no doubt about the strength, vitality and durability of the U.S.-Israeli strategic partnership, about America's willingness to strengthen Israel's deterrent, and about the U.S. commitment to provide political, diplomatic and material support to Israel. These objectives can be achieved through presidential statements, meetings with senior Israeli officials and acts that signal U.S. resolve and support.

The rationale behind the Report's suggestion is that such a course would silence those extreme Anti-Israel elements which view Israel's willingness to compromise as a sign of weakness; and America's "evenhandedness" as evidence that Israel can be defeated while America stays uninvolved to preserve its "evenhanded" diplomatic role. The Presidential Study Group concludes, however, that a showing of stronger American commitment to Israel would actually "strengthen the U.S. role as mediator in negotiations, which flows from—and is not antithetical to—the U.S. role as Israel's ally." Where equivocal support has served to embolden Israel's enemies, a showing of strength and absolute support for Israel will command respect and force a recognition that Israel cannot be defeated and that compromise is the only viable Arab option.

In light of the Clinton plan for Jerusalem, which President Clinton himself acknowledged would not bind the Bush administra-

tion, Israel's position on Jerusalem has been significantly weakened and is in much need of rehabilitation. The Clinton proposal, which calls for division of Jerusalem's Old City, and transfer the Temple Mount to Palestinian control, is opposed by the majority of the Israeli people and has been ruled completely unacceptable by Israel's Chief Rabbinate. It should be noted that other elements of the Clinton proposal, such as transfer of the Jordan Valley, have drawn severe criticism from members of the Israeli security establishment as posing a severe danger to Israeli security and regional stability. What is worse is that the Clinton proposal has given the Palestinians an unrealistic expectation that they will receive even more than what has already been offered.

Moreover, this unrealistic expectation is exacerbated by the perception, in the Arab world, that the Bush administration will be even more sympathetic to Palestinian positions. This misconception could lead to dangerous miscalculations, with potentially dangerous consequences, and should be remedied.

So long as America encourages Israel to engage in a policy of appeasement, there can never be long-term stability in the Middle East. Each Israeli concession merely increases the appetite of its enemies. This process will inevitably lead to a scenario where Israel is unable to give any further and its foes will respond with escalated violence. In a world of Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation, America can not afford to re-learn the lessons of World War II concerning appeasement of hostile regimes.

U.S. Recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital and immediate movement of the American Embassy to the western part of the city, will force the Palestinians to revise their expectations. Nevertheless, it will still leave room for a Palestinian presence in the Eastern part of the city, if an agreement can be reached which is not opposed by the Israeli people and does not jeopardize Israel's security or national interests.

This policy is entirely consistent with President Bush's statement that "[his] support for Israel is not conditional on the outcome of the peace process. * * * And Israel's adversaries should know that in [his] administration, the special relationship will continue even if they cannot bring themselves to make true peace with the Jewish State."

TIMING CONSIDERATIONS

With negotiations deadlocked and a new administration taking root in Washington, the appropriate time to officially recognize Jerusalem and move the U.S. Embassy has come. The fragility of the Oslo process is no longer a deterrent to such a move in that many of the remaining issues have revealed themselves to be intractable.

Opponents of the immediate recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the relocation of the American Embassy generally argue that the appropriate time for the move would be within the context of a final status agreement. While this thinking may have been tenable before the outbreak of the current violence, when peace seemed an imminent possibility, it has little credibility in the current situation.

Initially, this argument relies on the premise that there will be an agreement in the near future. Given the fact that the Palestinians are unwilling to compromise on key issues, shamelessly fabricate blood-lies before the international community, and continue to inculcate anti-Israel sentiment in the media and schools, a final settlement could be generations away. Moreover, leaders throughout the Arab world have made very clear statements that there never will be peace without full Israeli recognition of the

Palestinian "Right of Return." (The "right" for the four million descendants of Arabs, who fled Israel in 1948 to make way for advancing Arab armies, to resettle within Israel proper, despite the creation of a neighboring Palestinian homeland.) Given the fact that such a recognition would mean demographic suicide for Israel, as a Jewish state, the perpetual call for Israel to accede to such a recognition, is little more than a politically correct euphemism for the old refrain of "Death to Israel."

In the current environment, any further delay in recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital and moving the embassy would simply reward Arafat for his intransigence. If the U.S. allows Arafat to set the American timetable and agenda, America's esteem is greatly diminished and its strategic interests are harmed.

Secondly, many argue that the relocation should only occur upon reaching a final agreement in order to avoid offending Arab sentiment. It is true that the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states will likely respond negatively. Such is the natural consequence of having faulty expectations shattered. Given the fact that the far-reaching concessions asked of Israel, in the Clinton proposal, were viewed by the Arab world as decidedly pro-Israel, any action which the United States takes in furtherance of its strategic relationship with Israel will always be condemned by the Arab world. They simply have not accepted Israel's right to exist. Moving the embassy will demonstrate the U.S. determination to support Israel's existence in the face of regional hostility. Failure to relocate the embassy only perpetuates unachievable expectations that make violent conflict all the more likely.

The Presidential Study Group recently concluded that America's ties with Arab states should not be dependent on avoiding pro-Israel positions, but rather;

America is the country with which the large majority of regional states will still wish to have close political, economic, and military ties. Maintaining a strong alliance with Israel has not stopped Arab Gulf states from welcoming the United States as their defender against potential subregional hegemony. Similarly, it has not prevented every state on Israel's border, except Syria, from accepting America as a major, if not the principal source of military aid and material. Indeed, the very closeness and solidity of U.S.-Arab ties is a reason why some Arab leaders and spokespersons can afford to use license in their rhetoric.

Finally, many of those who argue that a relocation of the embassy should not occur at this time subscribe to the notion that America should use its political capital with Israel to nurture Israel's willingness to engage in further negotiations and concessions. Not only does this directly contradict the approach suggested by the Presidential Study Group, but it also directly opposes President Bush's own statements that his support would not be conditional on the peace process.

CONCLUSION

We are at a critical time of transition for America, Israel, and the entire region. The Middle East, and perhaps the entire world, may be confronted with a situation with devastating potential. President Bush is just beginning his administration. He possesses the opportunity to make an eventful decision that will not only contribute to the advancement of his political agenda but will reinforce vital American interests in the region by contributing to stability through the promotion of more realistic Arab expectations.

The relocation of the embassy enjoys strong bi-partisan support. It will contribute

to the unifying culture being promoted by the administration. It will finally bring the United States into compliance with its own law and fulfill the weighty moral obligations imposed by the sacred principles of democracy and freedom to our faithful ally which has been ignored for too long.

PROVIDING MEDICARE COVERAGE
FOR FILIPINO WORLD WAR II
VETS

HON. PATSY T. MINK

OF HAWAII

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 13, 2001

Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Speaker, I rise to introduce a bill that would allow Filipino WWII Veterans to enroll in Medicare even if they do not meet the eligibility requirements.

The time is long overdue that we provide justice to the Filipino Veterans who fought side by side with the United States Army during World War II.

On July 26, 1941, the Philippine military was called on to join forces with the United States under an Executive Order by President Roosevelt. Their efforts were instrumental in the United States' successful final assault in the Pacific.

Despite their outstanding contributions, in 1946 Congress enacted the Rescission Act, which stripped members of the Philippine Commonwealth Army of being recognized as veterans of the United States. As a result, they were excluded from receiving full veterans benefits.

Last Congress, we provided disabled Filipino veterans living in the United States with the same payments for service-related disability compensation as other veterans receive.

Let's go one step further this year.

Under my bill, qualified WWII Filipino Veterans living in the United States would be entitled to Medicare Part A benefits and the option to enroll in Part B.

It is time to recognize the service of our friends and neighbors who fought so valiantly for freedom and democracy.

SECOND AMT BILL INTRODUCED

HON. RICHARD E. NEAL

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 13, 2001

Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, a week ago I introduced legislation to allow non-refundable personal credits, like the child credit and education credits, to be used against the alternative minimum tax. I have introduced this legislation in the past two Congresses, and it has been enacted into law twice on a temporary basis.

The legislation I introduce today corrects an additional critical problem with the AMT. In this case, the mere fact that a family has a large number of children forces them to become alternative minimum tax taxpayers, and they lose some of the benefit of their personal exemptions.

For example, my office has been in touch with a family in North Carolina for over a year. This military family has ten children, are home

schoolers, and began to pay the alternative minimum tax in 1998. An extension of the temporary law regarding nonrefundable personal credits will not help this family, and neither will President Bush's tax proposal help them out of the AMT or give them a rate reduction. While it may be true that this family will be "no worse off" than they are now, they will not be any better off either in terms of their current situation. I do not believe relief for this family from the alternative minimum tax should wait until it is more convenient, or until after this year is over.

Mr. Speaker, I think all the members of this body would agree that this family is not the type of family we meant to pay the minimum tax. They do not have large tax preferences with which they are sheltering income. Yet they are paying the minimum tax. Mr. Speaker, I hope all members will not just agree that we should provide families like this one relief, I hope they will act to provide that relief on the first tax bill on which Congress works.

INTRODUCTION OF FY2001 DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION

HON. NORMAN D. DICKS

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 13, 2001

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce an emergency supplemental appropriations bill for the Department of Defense and to ask my colleagues here in the House to pass it expeditiously.

This legislation will provide \$6.7 billion in emergency funding for critical readiness needs of the armed forces, and it will cover the cost of shortfalls in the Defense Health Program as identified by the Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

This amount is only what is required to cover unexpected cost increases for the most basic needs of our service members through the end of this fiscal year. This is an appropriate and an expected response to the kinds of unavoidable expenses—fuel, power increases, housing and other operations costs—that were not provided for in the regular appropriations bill for the Department of Defense. This is a routine and prudent exercise, Mr. Speaker, we must act expeditiously in order to avoid the cuts in each of the services that would be triggered soon—with nearly half the fiscal year over—if we were not to pass this bill.

There are many causes for this action that is now required. The basic cost of living for our armed forces is substantially higher than DOD's projections from last year. Congress approved the FY 2001 Defense Appropriations bill more than six months ago, and the budget Congress approved had been assembled well over a year ago. In the interim, energy costs have skyrocketed, housing costs have increased substantially because we've been making a conscious effort to improve the living conditions for our military personnel and their families. And Congress and President Bill Clinton have committed the nation to provide higher pay and a more complete

Let me also address the issue of why it is neither necessary nor prudent to wait until the new Defense Secretary completes his Stra-

tegic Review. It is clear to me that none of these costs will be affected in the slightest way by a strategic review of Pentagon systems. In most cases, these bills have already been incurred, and the money is already spent. The need for a supplemental appropriations bill to cover these costs is simply indisputable.

I believe that the current resistance to such a bill by the Bush Administration has more to do with the size and timing of tax cuts than it has to do with military strategy. Not paying these bills now forces the Department of Defense to reduce and delay training and maintenance. And it thus affects the readiness of our armed forces. It is simply too high a price to pay for the questionable goal of quick and massive tax cuts. I can understand why the political strategists may want to conduct a debate over large tax cuts without the annoyance of mentioning the costs of necessary budget increases for the Defense Department. I just do not believe it is responsible to do so, and I am therefore asking my colleagues from both sides of the aisle to approve this urgent supplemental defense spending bill as soon as possible.

Of the \$6.7 billion in this bill, a total of one billion dollars will go toward pay and housing allowances; \$4.3 billion will be for operations and maintenance costs such as training, force protection, aircraft and ship maintenance, base operations, and fuel cost increases. One billion dollars will be allocated for unanticipated health care costs; \$270 million to procure spare parts and force protection equipment, and \$110 million will be provided to offset the impact of energy price increases on military family housing.

I am proud to join with my original cosponsors, Representatives IKE SKELTON, NORM SISISKY, MARTIN FROST, CHET EDWARDS and ELLEN TAUSCHER in introducing this bill. I hope that the Appropriations Committee will move quickly to review and pass this bill. And I hope that President Bush will agree to sign it.

TRIBUTE TO THE VICTIMS OF THE
ORANGEBURG MASSACRE

HON. JAMES E. CLYBURN

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 13, 2001

Mr. CLYBURN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to the men and women who were victimized in the little known civil rights battle which has become known as the Orangeburg Massacre. And to thank South Carolina's Governor Jim Hodges for the remarks he made during last week's thirty-third anniversary of this catastrophic event which took place on February 8, 1968. The Governor's remarks are inserted below.

The Orangeburg Massacre's place in history has been overlooked, and is considered one of the most violent such events in South Carolina's struggle for civil rights. While many people believe the Kent State shootings were the first such event in our nation's history, the Kent State event occurred two years after the unrest at my alma mater, S.C. State. Henry Smith, 20, Samuel Hammond, 19, and Delano Middleton, 17, lost their lives during the bloody clash. Another twenty-seven people were also