

distinguished office, athlete, and mentor. While doing all this, he has managed to go back to school and earn a degree. For this outstanding service to his community, he is indeed worthy of receiving our recognition today. I hope that all of my colleagues will join me in honoring this truly remarkable man.

OUTSTANDING SERVICE TO THE COMMUNITY

**HON. ROSA L. DELAUR**

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, June 12, 2001*

Ms. DELAUR. Mr. Speaker, it is with great pleasure that I rise today to join the Connecticut Federation of Educational and Professional Employees, AFT, AFL-CIO in paying tribute to their president of twenty-two years, and my dear friend, George C. Springer as he celebrates the occasion of his retirement. His outstanding leadership and unparalleled dedication has made a difference in the lives of thousands of families across Connecticut.

I have always held a firm belief in the importance of education and a deep respect for the individuals who dedicate their lives to ensuring that our children—our most precious resource—are given a strong foundation on which to build their futures. As a twenty year veteran of the New Britain, Connecticut school system, George made it his personal mission to help our students learn and grow—touching the lives of thousands of students.

During his tenure in the New Britain school system, George also served as an officer and negotiator for the New Britain Federation of Teachers, Local 871. Twenty-two years ago, he was elected to the position of state federation president. As the state president, George has been a tireless advocate for his membership and their families. I have often said that we are fortunate to live in a country that allows its workers to engage in efforts to better employee standards and benefits. George has been a true leader for teachers across the state, providing a strong voice on their behalf.

George set a unique tone for this organization, extending their mission beyond the fight for better wages, better work environments, and more comprehensive health benefits. He has led the effort of the Connecticut chapter to become more involved with the larger issues of how to improve our schools—for teachers and for students. Though we will miss him in the long battle ahead, George's leadership and outspoken advocacy on behalf of our public school system will continue to be an inspiration to us all.

In addition to his many professional contributions, George has also been involved with a variety of social service organizations in the community. The John E. Rodgers African-American Cultural Center, New Britain Boys Club, Amistad America, Inc., Coalition to End Child Poverty, and the New Britain Foundation for Public Giving are just a portion of those organizations who have benefitted from his hard work and contagious enthusiasm.

It is my great honor to rise today to join his wife, Gerri, their four children, ten grandchildren and four great-grandchildren, as well as the many family, friends, and colleagues who have gathered this evening to extend my deepest thanks and appreciation to George C.

Springer for his outstanding contributions to the State of Connecticut and all of our communities. He will certainly be missed but never forgotten.

INTRODUCTION OF THE RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY ACT—H.R. 2121

**HON. TOM LANTOS**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, June 12, 2001*

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to introduce HR 2121, the Russia Democracy Act—legislation designed to enhance our democracy, good governance and anti-corruption efforts in order to strengthen civil society and independent media in Russia. Without a viable civil society, Russia cannot achieve true economic prosperity—nor will it cease to be a potential security threat to the United States.

The Freedom Support Act, signed into law in 1992 by the former President Bush, focused on eliminating the threat to U.S. national security from political instability and “loose nukes” in Russia, and was therefore primarily a government-to-government program. This effort succeeded in significantly reducing this security threat, and consistently won bipartisan support and funding in Congress.

The Russia Democracy Act expands upon U.S. initiatives that have proven successful in Russia. Among other things, it provides further support for local democratic governments through the Regional Investment Initiative; expands training for Russian journalists in investigative techniques designed to ferret out corruption; and it broadens successful U.S.-Russia cultural exchanges, such as those sponsored by the Library of Congress.

The Russia Democracy Act also launches a number of new initiatives to take advantage of new developments in Russian society over the past decade. It harnesses new information technologies to provide Internet access to Russian citizens, independent media and NGOs. It builds upon successful business education programs to establish new “American Centers” at Russian universities to share public policy, rule of law and civics experience and expertise. And it taps the growing network of local, independent media outlets to spread democratic principles through Radio Liberty and Voice of America.

By targeting assistance to Russian civil society at the grassroots level, and by staying ahead of the development curve, the Russia Democracy Act represents a bold new effort to support agents of democratic change in Russia.

Having laid the groundwork of democracy over the past decade, the Russian people must now develop the civil society and a genuine democratic culture to sustain it. Russia is no longer starting from ground zero. For the first time in their democratic institutions are in place, and civil society is taking shape thousand year history, the Russian people felt empowered to make their own decisions about matters that concern them. Millions of Russians have been able to travel freely outside their country. A myriad of citizens groups and NGOs exist, including parent-teacher associations, legal defense organizations, environmental interest groups, small business associations, societies for the protection of soldier conscripts, and many others.

On the other hand, Russia's government no longer embraces Western assistance as a matter of national pride—even if this cuts across Russia's national interests. For instance, just last month, President Putin rejected a World Bank loan that would have helped address Russia's growing tuberculosis crisis. Under these circumstances, we must look for more creative and targeted engagement with Russia's civil society and local authorities, rather than limiting our contacts to Russia's central government.

Russia is in the mid-stream of this transformation with much unfinished business—economic and structural reforms, eradication of corruption, arresting capital flight, reforming the military, rationalizing relations between the federal center and the regions, and countless others. Rather than preserving newly acquired democratic freedom, the current leadership in Moscow appears bent on its reversal. In an effort to implement economic reforms and reassert Russian national interests on the world stage, Putin is consolidating state power at the expense of Russian civil society. He condones the abuse of government power to quash internal dissent and silence criticism of his regime. The raid and hostile government takeover of Russia's most important independent newspaper, magazine and television outlets, and last week's prevention of a human rights leader Sergei Grigoryants from boarding a flight bound for Washington where he was to attend a conference on Russia are sad examples of this trend.

The Congress has a responsibility to aid the President in cultivating Russian civil society. Historically, America's lawmakers have played a central role in this effort. The Jackson-Vanik amendment of the 1970's, for instance, linked economics and human rights, and effectively undermined Soviet Communism and hastened the arrival of Russian democracy. The Congress must again rise to the occasion.

In the final analysis, a democratic Russia, respecting human rights and observing international norms of peaceful behavior, is squarely in U.S. national security interests. Millions of Russians want to be part of the West culturally, politically, and in many other senses. These forces need to be strengthened. In my judgement the Russian Democracy Act is an incredibly prudent investment on the part of the United States to bolster whatever democratic forces there are in Russia. This is a critically important piece of legislation, and I urge my colleagues in Congress to support it.

GRADUATION ADDRESS AT US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

**HON. IKE SKELTON**

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, June 12, 2001*

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I had the privilege to give the commencement address at the US Army War College on June 9, 2001. It was a terrific honor. My speech to that group is set forth as follows:

MILITARY HISTORY AND THE BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

A couple of years ago, I prepared an article with the assistance of the Congressional Research Service entitled, “Learning on the

Job: Applying the Lessons of Recent Conflicts to Current Issues in Defense Policy". It was the premise of my article that a careful look at significant U.S. military operations over about the past twenty years—roughly the period of time that I have served in Congress—can help shape answers to a surprisingly large number of contemporary issues in defense policy.

#### LESSONS LEARNED

My research revealed at least twelve military operations during my tenure in Congress, ranging from the small-scale 1985 interception of an aircraft carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers to the Persian Gulf War in 1991. We discovered that there were lessons learned in each of these military operations. I won't go into all of these lessons or all of these military operations, but let me summarize just a few of them:

In Lebanon, 1982-1984, we learned that we need force protection measures wherever we deploy our forces.

In Grenada, 1983, we discovered shortcomings in the ability of our forces to plan and execute joint operations.

Panama, 1989-1990, taught us that night operations could be conducted successfully and that stealth technology could work in an operational setting.

The Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991, showed that tactical, operational and strategic thought, derived from the study of yesterday's conflicts, pays off on the battlefield. It also demonstrated the devastating efficacy of high technology munitions like smart bombs, the success of stealth technology, the importance of establishing air supremacy, and the advantages of disabling the enemy's infrastructure and command, control, and communications ability. The war also made clear that the threat of the use of chemical and biological weapons is real.

It is also interesting to note how General Schwartzkopf used the lessons of history in at least three instances in his successful Desert Storm campaign: First, the thorough 40-day air campaign which preceded the ground war recalls the failure to conduct adequate bombardment at the island of Tarawa in November of 1943. The price paid for that failure at Tarawa was heavy Marine Corps casualties. In the Gulf War, the ability of Iraqi forces to offer opposition to our forces was severely reduced. Second, consider the successful feint carried out by the 1st Cavalry Division prior to the actual start of the ground war. This recalls Montgomery's strategy in 1942 at the Battle of the Marne Line in North Africa against the German Afrika Corps. This action was a prelude to the decisive battle at El Alamein. Third, by utilizing a leftward flanking movement when he launched the ground war, General Schwartzkopf was taking a page from the book of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson at the Battle of Chancellorsville. As you will recall, Jackson's forces conducted a brilliant flanking maneuver and completely surprised Union forces under General Joseph Hooker, in the May 1863 battle.

Somalia, 1992-1993, taught us that we should strive to avoid mission creep, and that requests from on-scene commanders for additional equipment, personnel, or other resources must be given appropriate attention by the national command authority.

In summary, my research revealed that even apparently limited military operations have required a very broad range of well-trained and well-equipped forces. We don't have the luxury of picking and choosing what missions to prepare for. And all of this is expensive—we cannot expect to have global reach, or to be engaged in Europe, Asia, and other places around the world, on the

cheap. We learned that while we still have much to work on—making the Army more deployable for one thing, how to move from peacekeeping by military forces to nation-building by largely civilian institutions for another—we have actually done a lot right. The U.S. military has shown the ability to absorb the lessons of each new operation. Improvements have been made in command arrangements, in operational planning, in tactics and doctrine, in training, and in key technologies. Precision strike capabilities have matured. Congress, yes Congress, has sometimes helped. Congress's establishment of an independent Special Operations Command in 1987 has been vindicated by the continued critical importance of special operations forces in a host of military actions since then, and by the marvelous performance of those forces when called upon. Congressional passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 clearly helped to clarify and strengthen command arrangements.

#### KOREA, 1950

What caused me to think back on a now two-year-old article was the information that a group of Korean War Veterans would be in the audience today. No veterans from any war suffered more from the failure to heed the lessons of history than the veterans of the Korean War. Let me quote a passage from a book by former journalist Robert Donovan which describes the experience of elements of the 24th, Division upon their arrival in Korea in July, 1950:

"Out-gunned, lacking in heavy antitank weapons, unfamiliar with the terrain, ill prepared for combat after the soft life of occupation duty in Japan, the 24th Division soldiers were disorganized and confused, hampered by early-morning fog, exhausted by midday heat, and frustrated by faulty communications. Mis-directed mortar fire from one unit caused injuries and death in another. Chronically, supplies of ammunition ran low. Men were ambushed or were completely cut off in strange villages and never seen again. Mortars and machine guns were abandoned in the bedlam of battle . . ."

This was the experience of Task Force Smith and the other units which were among the first to deploy to Korea. Historians can argue over why we were so unprepared for conflict in Korea. Perhaps it was overconfidence after our great victory in World War II. Perhaps it was the tendency of the U.S. to "bring the boys home" immediately after a war—a tendency then-Major George C. Marshall noted in a 1923 speech—which led to cuts in the military that were too deep in a still-dangerous world.

Whatever the reason for our unpreparedness, there can be no disagreement on this: No group of Americans ever fought more bravely than those we called upon to serve in the Korean War. In the past decade, a lot of people have stepped forward to take credit for winning the Cold War. Let me tell who should get the credit. It is these Korean War veterans who are with us today. Their courage, their sacrifices, drew a line in sand against Communist expansion. There would be other battles—in Vietnam and in other places around the globe. But in Korea, a country most Americans had never heard of before 1950, the message was sent. America would fight to preserve freedom. We owe you a debt of gratitude we can never repay. Indeed, the whole world owes you a debt of gratitude. It is not enough, but I just want to say, "Thank you."

#### THE BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

Recently, I visited TRADOC headquarters at Ft. Monroe, and received an excellent briefing from General John Abrams and his staff, especially Colonel Maxie MacFarland,

on the "Battlefield of the Future". Allow me to summarize that briefing from my perspective—a country lawyer who serves on the House Armed Services Committee, and who is an avid student of military history:

It should be obvious that we are not the only military that has learned lessons from these U.S. military operations which I discussed earlier, and from others around the world, such as Chechnya. The U.S. military is the most studied military in the world. All major U.S. field manuals and joint doctrinal publications are freely available on the internet, and indeed, U.S. military internet sites are frequently accessed by foreign organizations. Foreign military students from 125 countries around the world attend U.S. military education institutions, such as this one, or specialized U.S. military schools under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. Our openness and reliance on information systems means that our adversaries in the future will have a greater depth of knowledge about the capabilities and operational designs of U.S. military forces.

We have advantages now in air, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other technology, and we will likely continue to have these advantages in the future. Our potential adversaries know we have these advantages and they will seek to offset them in some of the following ways:

They will seek to fight during periods of reduced visibility, in complex terrain, and in urban environments where they can gain sanctuary.

They may use terrorist organizations to take the fight to the U.S. homeland, and they could possibly use weapons of mass destruction, or attacks on infrastructure and information systems.

They will attempt to confuse U.S. forces so that the size, location, disposition, and intention of their forces will be impossible to discern. They will try to make U.S. forces vulnerable to unconventional actions and organizations.

To offset the U.S. technological overmatch, they will use selective or niche technology, perhaps even commercially-obtained technology, to degrade U.S. capabilities. As an example, during the first Chechen War, the Chechens bought commercial scanners and radios, and used them to intercept Russian communications.

They will endeavor to exploit the perception that the American will is vulnerable to the psychological shock of unexpected and unexplained losses. Their goal will be a battlefield which contains greater psychological and emotional impacts.

In this environment, U.S. forces may no longer be able to count on low casualties, a secure homeland, precision attacks, and a relatively short duration conflict. Conflict may occur in regions where the enemy has a greater knowledge and understanding of the physical environment, and has forces which know how to take advantage of it. They will seek to avoid environments where U.S. abilities are dominant. They will have more situational awareness than possible for U.S. forces.

My briefers at TRADOC referred to this kind of conflict as "asymmetric warfare". And as I listened to the briefing, I thought back on my military history and I realized the truth of the old cliche that there is "nothing new under the sun." Asymmetric warfare is not something new. In fact, it has been a part of American military history. Let me give you a couple of examples:

The first is from that series of conflicts that we collectively refer to as the Indian Wars, and it has a direct relation to the place we are standing right now. On July 18, 1763, during Pontiac's War, Colonel Henry

Bouquet left Carlisle in command of a British army force of 400 men to relieve Fort Pitt, 200 miles to the west. On August 5 near a small stream known as Bushy Run, Bouquet's forces were attacked by Indians who were part of Pontiac's forces.

If you go to the Bushy Run Battlefield State Park today, as I have done, you will see open fields—perfect terrain for the mass formation warfare that Europeans knew how to fight. But on August 5 and 6, 1763, the area around Bushy Run was old growth forest offering limited fields of fire. This was a physical environment that the Indians knew and understood, and they took advantage of it. They forced Colonel Bouquet's forces back into a defensive position on a hilltop. The Indians attacked this position repeatedly, but never waited for a counter attack. They simply faded into the forest, as was their style, suffering few casualties. By the end of the first day of battle, however, sixty of Bouquet's troops had been killed or wounded. As fighting continued on the second day, British losses were mounting and the situation was becoming desperate. At this point, Bouquet saved his forces with a brilliant maneuver, borrowed from Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae. First, he feigned a retreat. As the Indians, sensing victory, left their cover and charged in, they came under devastating fire on their flanks and rear from Bouquet's redeployed forces. Bouquet's strategy had caused the Indians to abandon their asymmetric tactics, and leave the cover of the forest. They were quickly routed and fled the battlefield.

One other interesting point regarding Bushy Run: The official history says that Bouquet's forces were engaged and surrounded by Indian forces at least equal in size to his own. However, when I toured the battlefield, Indian re-enactors, who have studied the battle extensively from the Indian point of view, maintained that the Indians numbered no more than ninety, and that the tactics they used in the forest made their numbers seem larger. Recall that my TRADOC briefing mentioned as an element of asymmetric warfare that adversaries would attempt to confuse U.S. forces so that the size of their forces would be impossible to discern.

Example number two. Just south of here is the site of the largest battle of the War Between the States. At Gettysburg, two large armies faced off in what was, by the standards of the time, conventional, or symmetrical, warfare.

But in Western Missouri, where I grew up and still live, the War Between the States was far different. In that border state, where loyalties were divided, large battles fought by conventional forces were the exception, not the rule. Most engagements were fought between small units, usually mounted. The fighting was brutal, vicious, and the civilian population was not spared from attack.

In this theater, Union forces suffered from some distinct disadvantages:

Many of the Union units were infantry, which were useless in a conflict where most engagements were lightning cavalry raids.

Union cavalry units were equipped with the standard issue single shot carbines and sabers. As I will later explain, this armament was ineffective against their adversaries.

Because Union leaders considered Missouri a backwater, Union troops got the leftovers—the Army's worst horses, officers deficient in leadership skills, and poor training.

Not surprisingly, these Union Army units suffered from poor morale and lacked unit cohesion.

In contrast, guerrilla units fighting on behalf of the Confederacy did not have leaders trained at West Point or field manuals to

teach them tactics. But they did have strengths that they were able to take advantage of:

Their troops did not need training. They were tough, young farm boys, already skilled in riding and shooting.

Their basic weapon was the best revolver in the world—the six-shot Colt .44 Navy. Most guerrillas carried four Colts, some as many as eight. Through trial and error, they discovered that they could shoot more accurately with a smaller charge, without sacrificing lethality. Moreover, this saved powder, a precious resource to the guerrillas. Thus armed, no guerrilla was ever killed by a Union cavalry saber.

Western Missouri was then noted for its fine horses, and the guerrillas got the pick of the lot in terms of speed and endurance.

They did not adhere to traditional ways of fighting. They preferred ambush and deception, often dressing in Union uniforms in order to get within point-blank range.

They had been raised in the area and knew the terrain, and how to travel on paths through the woods to conceal their movements. The Union troops traveled mostly on the main roads.

They received assistance from the local population—horses, clothing, food, intelligence, shelter, medical care. When the Union army tried to punish the locals for giving this assistance, these repressive measures only made the locals more supportive of the guerrillas.

Well, by now this should sound familiar. One does not usually find the term “asymmetric warfare” used in connection with Missouri in the 1860's, but you can see many elements in common with those mentioned in my TRADOC briefing on the Battlefield of the Future.

#### THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY

No doubt during your time here at the Army War College you have had the opportunity to read and study a great deal of military history. Let me urge you to make that a lifetime commitment.

In 1935, the newly-elected U.S. Senator from Missouri visited a school then known as Northeast Missouri State Teachers College. While there he was introduced to a young man who was an outstanding student and the president of the student body. The Senator told the student, “Young man, if you want to be a good American, you should know your history.” That young student, the late Fred Schwengel, went on to become a Member of Congress from Iowa, and later, President of the U.S. Capitol Historical Society. And, as you may have guessed by now, that newly-elected Senator went on to become President of the United States. The school is now named for him—Truman State University.

I can't say it any better than Harry S. Truman. The main praise for building an increasingly flexible and effective force must go mainly to the generation of military officers that rebuilt U.S. military capabilities after the Vietnam War. This generation has now almost entirely reached retirement age. The task of the next generation of military leaders is to learn as well as its predecessors. You are bridge between those generations. You have served under the Vietnam generation. You will lead, train, and mentor, the generation to follow. If you do your job well, some future leader in some future conflict will be able, like Colonel Bouquet at Bushy Run, like General Schwarzkopf in Desert Storm, to call on a lesson from military history to shape the answer to a contemporary problem.

#### GRATITUDE

The Roman orator Cicero once said that gratitude is the greatest of virtues. Those of you who serve in uniform, your families, and

our veterans who have served in uniform and their families, deserve the gratitude of our nation. I know sometimes you feel unappreciated. Yes, there are days set aside to officially honor our service members and our veterans:

Veterans Day is set aside to honor those who have served in our nation's wars. But is only one day.

On Memorial Day we pay our respects to those who have given that “last full measure of devotion”. Again, one day.

Armed Forces Day is dedicated to those currently serving in uniform. One day. And, because it is not a national holiday, most people don't know the date of Armed Forces Day.

I want you to know that many Americans do appreciate you every day. They don't need a holiday to do it. So, let me express gratitude to you personally, and on behalf of the American people, for all that you do, and all that you have done. And, let me ask you as senior leaders to do your part to show gratitude. Let me tell you why: The difference between keeping someone in uniform and losing them might just be an encouraging word at the right time. So, when you go out to your next assignments, and that junior officer or that young NCO puts in those extra hours, or does something that makes you look good, take the time to express your gratitude. Let them know how much they are appreciated.

Thank you and God bless you.

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#### A TRIBUTE TO TOP STUDENT HISTORIANS FROM BISHOP, CALIFORNIA

#### HON. JERRY LEWIS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 12, 2001

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to your attention the outstanding accomplishments three student historians who are protégées of retired teacher Irene Sorensen of Bishop, California. Working with Mrs. Sorensen on independent study assignments, eighth graders Lauren Pollini and Kristen Kamei, and 10th grader Patrick Koske-McBride won a place on the California team at the National History Day competition at the University of Maryland this week. The competition involved students from across the United States who submitted projects on this year's theme: “Frontiers in History: People, Places, Ideas.”

Lauren and Kristen qualified for the national competition by first winning California State History Day competitions at the county and state levels. Their exhibit, entitled “An Education Frontier: Assimilation Through Education: An Owens Valley Paiute Experience,” won the state junior group exhibit category. This is Lauren's second trip to the National History Day competition—she was a finalist last year in the Junior Historical Paper competition.

This is also Patrick's second trip to National History Day. The Bishop Union High School student qualified for the national competition this year with a historical paper titled “Genetics Genesis: How the Double Helix Transformed the World.” He also wrote his project independently of his regular classroom work.

The outstanding accomplishments of Lauren, Kristen and Patrick were undoubtedly guided by the leadership of her teacher, Mrs.