

Whereas the U.S.S. *Wisconsin* joined the Fifth Fleet to provide strategic cover for the assault on Iwo Jima by striking the Tokyo area;

Whereas the U.S.S. *Wisconsin* supplied crucial firepower for the invasion of Okinawa;

Whereas the U.S.S. *Wisconsin* served as a flagship for the Seventh Fleet during the Korean conflict;

Whereas the U.S.S. *Wisconsin* provided consistent naval gunfire support during the Korean conflict to the First Marine Division, the First Republic of Korea Corps, and United Nations forces;

Whereas the U.S.S. *Wisconsin* received 5 battle stars for World War II and one for the Korean conflict;

Whereas the U.S.S. *Wisconsin* returned to combat on January 17, 1991;

Whereas the U.S.S. *Wisconsin* served as Tomahawk strike warfare commander for the Persian Gulf, and directed the sequence of Tomahawk launches that initiated Operation Desert Storm; and

Whereas the U.S.S. *Wisconsin*, decommissioned on September 30, 1991, is berthed at Portsmouth, Virginia; and may soon be berthed at Nauticus, the National Maritime Museum in Norfolk, Virginia, where she would serve as a floating monument and an educational museum: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that—

(1) a commemorative postage stamp should be issued by the United States Postal Service in honor of the U.S.S. *Wisconsin* and all those who served aboard her; and

(2) the Citizen's Stamp Advisory Committee should recommend to the Postmaster General that such a postage stamp be issued.

MEASURE READ THE FIRST TIME—S. 3152

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I understand that S. 3152 is at the desk, and I ask for its first reading.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 3152) to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide tax incentives for distressed areas, and for other purposes.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask for its second reading and object to my own request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

The bill will be read a second time on the next legislative day.

MEASURE PLACED ON THE CALENDAR—H.J. RES. 110

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that H.J. Res. 110, the continuing resolution just received from the House, be placed on the calendar.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZING ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERPRETATIVE CENTER

WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS ACT

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the following bills en

bloc: Calendar No. 828, H.R. 3084, and Calendar No. 711, H.R. 2773.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bills by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 3084) to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to contribute funds for the establishment of an interpretative center on the life and contributions of President Abraham Lincoln.

A bill (H.R. 2773) to amend the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to designate the Wekiva River and its tributaries of Wekiva Springs Run, Rock Springs Run, and Black Water Creek in the State of Florida as components of the national wild and scenic rivers system.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bills.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that any committee amendment be agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The committee amendment to H.R. 3084 was agreed to, as follows:

H.R. 3084

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN INTERPRETIVE CENTER.

(a) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.—Subject to subsections (b) and (c), the Secretary of the Interior shall make grants to contribute funds for the establishment in Springfield, Illinois, of an interpretive center to preserve and make available to the public materials related to the life of President Abraham Lincoln and to provide interpretive and educational services which communicate the meaning of the life of Abraham Lincoln.

(b) PLAN AND DESIGN.—

(1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the entity selected by the Secretary of the Interior to receive grants under subsection (a) shall submit to the Secretary a plan and design for the interpretive center, including a description of the following:

(A) The design of the facility and site.

(B) The method of acquisition.

(C) The estimated cost of acquisition, construction, operation, and maintenance.

(D) The manner and extent to which non-Federal entities will participate in the acquisition, construction, operation, and maintenance of the center.

(2) CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION.—The plan and design for the interpretive center shall be prepared in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior and the Governor of Illinois and in cooperation with such other public, municipal, and private entities as the Secretary considers appropriate.

(c) CONDITIONS ON GRANT.—

(1) MATCHING REQUIREMENT.—A grant under subsection (a) may not be made until such time as the entity selected to receive the grant certifies to the Secretary of the Interior that funds have been contributed by the State of Illinois or raised from non-Federal sources for use to establish the interpretive center in an amount equal to at least double the amount of that grant.

(2) RELATION TO OTHER LINCOLN-RELATED SITES AND MUSEUMS.—The Secretary of the Interior shall further condition the grant under subsection (a) on the agreement of the grant recipient to operate the resulting interpretive center in cooperation with other Federal and non-Federal historic sites, parks, and museums that represent signifi-

cant locations or events in the life of Abraham Lincoln. Cooperative efforts to promote and interpret the life of Abraham Lincoln may include the use of cooperative agreements, cross references, cross promotion, and shared exhibits.

(3) COMPETITIVE BIDDING GUIDELINES.—As a condition of the receipt of a grant under subsection (a), the Secretary of the Interior shall require that the grant recipient comply with sections 303, 303A, and 303B of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 253-253b) as implemented by the Federal Acquisition Regulation issued pursuant to section 25 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 421) in planning, designing, and constructing the interpretive center.

(d) PROHIBITION ON CONTRIBUTION OF OPERATING FUNDS.—Grant amounts may not be used for the maintenance or operation of the interpretive center.

(e) NON-FEDERAL OPERATION.—The Secretary of the Interior shall have no involvement in the actual operation of the interpretive center, except at the request of the non-Federal entity responsible for the operation of the center.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of the Interior a total of \$50,000,000 to make grants under subsection (a). Amounts so appropriated shall remain available for expenditure through fiscal year 2006.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bills be read the third time and passed, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, and that any statements relating to the bills be printed in the RECORD, with the above occurring en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The bills (H.R. 3084, as amended, and H.R. 2773) were read the third time and passed.

SALE OF PUBLIC LAND IN LINCOLN COUNTY, NEVADA

EXCHANGE OF LANDS WITHIN THE STATE OF UTAH

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration en bloc of the following bills: Calendar No. 836, H.R. 2752, and Calendar No. 910, H.R. 4579.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the bills by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 2752) to direct the Secretary of the Interior to sell certain public land in Lincoln County through a competitive process.

A bill (H.R. 4579) to provide for the exchange of certain lands within the State of Utah.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bills.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bills be read the third time and passed, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, and any statements relating to the bills be printed in the RECORD, with the above occurring en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The bills (H.R. 2752 and H.R. 4579) were read the third time and passed.

GLOBAL ROLE V: ROLES OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE, AND THE MILITARY IN WAR-MAKING

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, today, with my dear friend and wonderful colleague from Kansas, Senator ROBERTS, we come to the fifth and final in our series of floor discussions on the global role of the United States. We will begin with consideration of the key instruments of national security policy, and we will conclude this series with a presentation of what we have learned over the course of these dialogs.

The inspiration for the first of today's topics comes from a source we have often cited in this series: The great 19th century military thinker, Karl von Clausewitz, who wrote in his seminal work on war these words:

Its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people. The scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone, it would be totally useless.

Our task, therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.

Attempts to find the proper balance between the roles of the people, the military and the government when America goes to war have been a major feature of the last 35 years, from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, to Operation Desert Storm, to Operation Allied Force. In my opinion, it is an effort which has not been overly successful. Certainly in the case of Vietnam, there was no real attempt to mobilize the American public in support of the war effort, nor for the Executive Branch to seek or the Congress to demand that the Constitutional role of the Congress to legitimize the conduct of hostilities be exercised. But I would also contend that much the same pattern is evident in more recent American interventions in the Balkans, and to an only somewhat lesser extent in the Gulf War.

The fact that we have emerged from all of these military interventions without major harm—though the negative impact from Vietnam was far from negligible—is a tribute to the efforts of our servicemen and women, the capabilities of our weaponry, but also, I would suggest, the fact that our vital national interests were never threatened in these cases. Only the Cold War, which by and large was prosecuted effectively, both militarily and politi-

cally and on a bipartisan basis, and in which we achieved a decisive victory, posed such a threat in the last half century.

We have spent much of the time in previous dialogues in discussing the proper ends of American national security policy in the post-Cold War era, but if we don't fix the problems in this "holy trinity" of means—the roles of the public, the military and the government—we are going to be continually frustrated in our achievement of whatever objectives we set.

Let's start with the first of Clausewitz' trinity: the people.

The post-Cold War world is not only producing changes abroad—changes which we have spoken of at some length in our previous global role discussions—but also a number of alterations here at home. Over the past decade or so, we have seen a democratization in terms of our foreign and defense policies in the sense that the American public is less and less disposed to leave these matters to the "experts," and to trust the assurances of the "Establishment" with respect to the benefits of internationalism.

While there is certainly nothing wrong with such skepticism, and indeed a demand for accountability is a healthy and appropriate attitude for the public to take, whether on national security or any other public policy, this democratization of national security policy has been marked by widespread public disengagement from the details of that policy:

For example, a 1997 Wall Street Journal/NBC News survey found that foreign policy and defense ranked last, at 9 percent, among issues cited by the public as the most important matters facing the country.

A 1997 Washington Post/Kaiser Foundation/Harvard poll discovered that 64 percent of the American public thought that foreign aid was the largest component of the federal budget, when in fact it is one of the smallest at approximately 1 percent.

A 1999 Penn and Schoen survey discovered that nearly half—48 percent—of the American public felt that the U.S. was "too engaged" in international problems, while just 16 percent expressed the view that we are "not engaged enough."

A 1999 poll for the Program on International Policy Attitudes found that only 28 percent of the American people wanted the U.S. government to promote further globalization while 34 percent wanted our government to try to slow or reverse it, and another 33 percent preferred that we simply allow it to continue at its own pace, as we are doing now.

Related to these results, I personally believe that the end of the draft and the dramatic reductions in defense personnel levels in recent years—since FY85 the size of our armed forces decreased by 30 percent—has produced a growing disconnect between the American public and the American military,

with fewer and fewer people having relatives or friends in the military, or living in communities in which a military base is a dominant feature of the local economy. This growing separation between the military and civilian worlds has produced a profound impact on the perspectives and performance of the U.S. government when it comes to the use of force, and I will return to this point later.

We can bemoan the public's skepticism and disengagement, and wish that it didn't exist, but it is a fact which impacts on all major foreign and defense policy issues facing the Congress. We saw it in the NAFTA debate, and in the debates on Iraq, NATO and the Balkans.

Now, I believe that the critics of foreign trade and foreign engagement raise important and legitimate concerns which need to be addressed. I do not believe we can stand behind platitudes that "foreign trade is always good," or "U.S. leadership is always essential." In my view, the burden is now on those who would urge engagement overseas, whether military, political or economic. As the just discussed public opinion data indicate, they have their work cut out for them, with widespread indifference, lack of knowledge and doubt about the value of such engagement. However, it is a debate worth having, and indeed is essential if we are to achieve the kind of national consensus we need in this post-Cold War era.

The second of the war-making trinity of Clausewitz is the military itself. Let's talk about the military. The subject of military reform is a fascinating and important one in its own right, but is somewhat beyond the scope of our dialogues on the U.S. global role. However, I would like to touch on a few areas in which the specific needs of our Armed Forces, and the perspectives of and about the American military have a direct bearing on our role as policymakers.

As perhaps the leading military analyst of the Vietnam War, Colonel Harry Summers, wrote in his excellent book *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context*:

Prior to any future commitment of U.S. military forces our military leaders must insist that the civilian leadership provide tangible, obtainable political goals. The political objective cannot merely be a platitude but must be stated in concrete terms. While such objectives may very well change during the course of the war, it is essential that we begin with an understanding of where we intend to go. I couldn't have said it better. As Clausewitz said, we should not "take the first step without considering the last . . ." There is an inherent contradiction between the military and its civilian leaders on this issue. For both domestic and international political purposes the civilian leaders want maximum flexibility and maneuverability and are hesitant to fix on firm objectives. The military on the other hand