

The second threat posed by the nuclear legacy of the cold war is the danger of the proliferation of material, technology, or expertise. Consider just the case of North Korea. Last summer, North Korea held the world's attention as a result of indications that they were preparing to test a long-range Taepo Dong ballistic missile. Through skillful diplomacy, the United States was able to convince the North Koreans to halt their missile testing program.

However, the stability of the entire east Asian region was in jeopardy as a result of the possibility of such a test. North Korea is one of the most backward countries in the world. It is a country where millions of its own citizens have starved to death. Yet this country was able to affect the actions of the United States, Japan, and China as a result of their ability to modify what is, in truth, outdated Soviet missile technology. As has been indicated publicly, the Taepo Dong is little more than a longer range version of the 1950s Soviet Scud missile. One can only imagine the consequences to our security if North Korea had a nuclear capability and the means to deliver it. But this illustrates the threat posed by proliferation. Without real management of these materials and technology—much of it Russian in origin—it will become easier for third and fourth rate powers to drastically affect our own security decisions.

Both of these threats—accidental or unauthorized launch and proliferation of these weapons to rogue nations—present a new challenge to the United States. It is a challenge very different from the cold war standoff of two nuclear superpowers. Classic deterrence, better known as mutual assured destruction, was the bedrock of our policy to confront nuclear threats during the cold war. Mutual assured destruction was based on the premise that our enemies would not dare to attack the United States as long as they knew that such an attack would be met with an overwhelming, deadly response by the United States. This theory, however, provides no safety from an accidental launch caused by the failure of outdated technology. It provides no safety net from the use of these weapons by a terrorist state whose only objective is the death of as many Americans as possible.

We need to develop a completely new and comprehensive approach to confront these threats. National missile defense will not add to our security if it is built as a stand alone venture. As part of a comprehensive approach it most assuredly can. To succeed, we should work with Russia to develop a new strategic partnership. We need a partnership based on cooperation, not confrontation—a partnership that builds on the many areas of mutual concern, not those that divide—a partnership that recognizes the nuclear legacy of the cold war threatens all of us, and that only by working together can we truly reduce this threat.

The possibility of a new approach where our interests intersect with those of Russia can be seen in a proposal made by Russia to our arms control negotiators in Geneva. The Russians offered to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,500 on each side. We rejected the offer based on an assessment of minimum deterrence levels that are 500 to 1,000 strategic warheads higher. But this assessment has been overtaken by events in Russia which now make it likely the Russians will be unable to safely maintain more than a few hundred of their own nuclear weapons.

As the Russian capability to maintain their stockpile dwindles, it is natural to assume our threshold for deterrence will also significantly decrease. Thus, by keeping more weapons than we need to defend our national interests, we are encouraging the Russians to maintain more weapons than they are able to control. The net effect is to increase the danger of the proliferation or accidental use of these deadly weapons which decreases the effectiveness of national missile defense.

So, here is the outline of a win-win proposal to the Russians. We jointly agree to make dramatic reductions in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenal. We jointly agree that national missile defense is an essential part of a strategy to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. And, we jointly agree that parallel reductions in our nuclear forces must include arrangements—and a Congressional commitment to provide funding—to secure and manage the resultant nuclear material.

We are fortunate that we will not begin from scratch on this problem. We can build upon one of the greatest acts of post-cold war statesmanship: the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. To facilitate these dramatic reductions, we must look for ways to expand upon the success of this program, to enlist new international partners, and to work with the Russians to find new solutions to the problems of securing nuclear material. Additionally, we should continue our lab-to-lab efforts that are assisting the transition of Russian nuclear facilities and workers from military to civilian purposes. These are the practical, on the ground programs that will help us reduce the chance of the proliferation of nuclear materials and know-how.

In exchange for deep nuclear reductions and technical assistance, the Russians would agree to changes in the ABM Treaty. With this alternative, the President would not have to choose between national missile defense and future cooperation with Russia. Instead, by working in cooperation with Russia on a comprehensive basis, we will be able to deploy a limited NMD system designed to protect the United States from accidental or rogue state ballistic missile launches.

We can reach such an agreement with Russia because the Russian people now know they are not immune from the

threats of extremism. Their security is also endangered by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and rogue states. This now presents us with an opportunity to begin to work with Russia diplomatically to confront this emerging threat from countries like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry's success in halting North Korea's missile testing program highlights the potential power of diplomacy to reduce these threats. But by developing a strategic partnership with Russia, and working cooperatively to bring change in North Korea, to end Saddam Hussein's brutal regime, or to foster real reform in Iran, we will reduce nuclear dangers and create a safer world.

So as President Clinton considers his decision about NMD, I hope he considers an alternative strategy that embraces a comprehensive approach to the threats we face in today's world. Now is the time to reach out to Russia and to create a partnership that will build the basis for securing the post-cold war peace for our children.

Mr. President, in the aftermath of the administration's rejection of the offer to substantially reduce strategic weapons, the issue of a previous analysis of the minimum deterrence done by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, was raised. I say to my colleagues, I intend to read carefully that report and revisit the floor with an opportunity to discuss what I believe is a rational minimum deterrence level necessary to protect the people of the United States of America. Obviously, that must be a concern of ours as well.

But I believe there is a historic opportunity. It will be difficult for us to seize that opportunity if Republicans and Democrats do not agree that still the most important thing for all of us to do is to make certain the safety and security of the American people are secured through not only our policies but our active efforts.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from Iowa is recognized.

MONITORING DRUG POLICY

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, while we were away for the winter break, the annual high school survey on drug use trends among 8th, 10th, and 12th graders came out. This annual Monitoring the Future study, released on December 17, revealed little change in trends of illicit drug use among our young people. The administration has tried to put a happy face on the results. But there is little to be happy about.

Although the Monitoring the Future study found that the increase in drug use among teens has slowed down, what the data show is that use and experimentation remain at high levels. You can see from this chart that we still face the discouraging fact that nearly 50 percent of our high school seniors reported use of marijuana, not only in

1999, but in the 2 previous years as well. In fact, 12th grader use of marijuana is at its highest since 1992. In addition, 23 percent of the high school seniors questioned in the past 3 years, reported that they had used marijuana in the past 30 days. Sadly, the study also found that the percentage of 10th graders who reported use of marijuana increased from 39.6 percent in 1998 to nearly 41 percent in 1999. Hardly news to find comfort in.

Marijuana remains a gateway drug for even worse substances and this next chart shows overall illicit drug use among high school seniors. You can see in this second chart that, in 1999, nearly 55 percent of 12th graders reported using an illicit drug in their lifetime. What that "lifetime" means is that 55 percent of 17-year-olds have at least tried marijuana or other dangerous, illicit drugs. That's an appalling figure. You can also see that this number is the highest it's been since 1992. With the Office of National Drug Control Policy's recent blitz of ads through the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, these high numbers are truly disappointing. It seems though, as the news gets worse, the press releases get happier. But it's still double-speak.

Another upsetting finding was the increase in the use of the "club drug," Ecstasy. Use of Ecstasy among 10th graders increased from 3.3 percent in 1998 to 4.4 percent in 1999. In addition, use among 12th graders increased from 1.5 percent in 1998 to 2.5 percent in 1999. The increase in the use of these so called club drugs, such as Ecstasy, is particularly disturbing. This is so, because club drugs are frequently referred to as recreational drugs and are perceived by many young people as harmless. On December 23 of this past year, we were given a glimpse of the sheer magnitude and severity of the market for Ecstasy, when Customs officials seized 700 pounds of Ecstasy. These 700 pounds would have been enough to provide 1 million kids each with a single dose. Unfortunately, Ecstasy is quickly becoming the drug of choice among our young people. And it too is a gateway to wider drug use. Parents need to take a harder look at what their children are being exposed to.

Last session I gave a floor statement on one particular club drug, that is frequently used in sexual assault cases, called GHB. I am pleased to learn from this year Monitoring the Future study that in next year's survey, young people will be questioned about use of GHB. But the issue is not this drug or that drug but the climate that encourages use and recruits kids into the drug scene. We must work to reverse the trend to normalize and glamorize drug use that has taken root in recent years.

There is an encouraging decline in the use of inhalants among 8th and 10th graders. And, use of crack cocaine among 8th and 10th graders is down slightly. In addition, 12th graders reported a significant decrease in the use

of crystal meth from 3 percent in 1998 to about 2 percent in 1999.

As we begin not only a new year but a new millennium, we are faced with the difficult challenge of making the 21st century safe for our young people. Although we have made some progress, these study results leave our young people facing an uncertain future. We cannot be satisfied with unchanging trends in teenage drug use. We have not seen a significant decline in drug use among our country's young people since 1992. In fact, what we have seen are dramatic increases. This fact makes me pause and wonder what we have been doing for the past 8 years. Whatever it is, it has failed to make the difference we need to be seeing. We need to move toward significant decreases in use. We need coherent, sound, accountable efforts. We must not neglect our duties in keeping our young people drug free. We are not in any position to let our guard down. We need policies and strategies that make a difference.

WHY CHINA SHOULD JOIN THE WTO

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, the Senate will soon make a very important and historic decision about whether to grant permanent normal trade relations status to China. This decision would pave the way for China's accession to the WTO. China's likely accession to the WTO is one of the most pivotal trade developments of the last 150 years. It is also perhaps the single most significant application of the most-favored-nation principle, or non-discrimination principle, in modern trade history.

I believe we should approve permanent normal trade relations for China. I also strongly believe China should be admitted to the World Trade Organization. Because this is such an important matter, I would like to address this issue today in a careful and thorough way.

I have two main points. First, The Core principle of the WTO, the principle of nondiscrimination, or most-favored-nation treatment, is the only way we have to keep markets open to everybody.

We should seek the broadest possible acceptance of this basic principle of non-discrimination in trade. History shows that when countries trade with each other on a nondiscriminatory basis, everyone wins. History also shows that free and open trade is one of the most effective ways to keep the peace.

Second and lastly I also support China's entry into the WTO because it is in our national self-interest to have a rules-based world trading system that includes China.

Mr. President, I would like to say a few words about my first point, that everyone wins when we have non-discriminatory trade, which gives us a better chance to keep the peace.

Most-favored-nation treatment, or what we now call normal trade relations, started with Britain and France in the 1860s. These two nations negotiated free trade agreements based on the most-favored-nation principle of nondiscrimination, which later became the cornerstone of the GATT, and, in 1993, the WTO.

The results of these early international trade treaties was spectacular. It began a new era of free trade that led to a great increase in wealth around the world. Unfortunately, this hey-day of free trade didn't last long. It ended in about 1885, when Europe turned inward, and retreated from the free-trade principle.

Just 30 years after Europe abandoned the nondiscrimination principle in trade, the war "to end all wars" ravaged most of the continent. Events following the First World War also massively disrupted international trading relationships. Many countries pursued beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies, including harsh trade restrictions.

When the Great Depression set in, many countries adopted extreme forms of protectionism in a misguided attempt to save jobs at home. The worst of these misguided laws was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, which was enacted into law by the 71st Congress.

The act started out with good intentions. Its aim was to help the American farmer with a limited, upward revision of tariffs on foreign produce. But it had the exact opposite result. It strangled foreign trade. It deepened and widened the severity of the Depression. Other countries faced with a deficit of exports to pay for their imports responded by applying quotas and embargoes on American goods.

Mr. President, I went back to the historical record to see what happened to United States agricultural exports when other countries stopped buying our agricultural products after we enacted that tariff. I was shocked by the depth and severity of the retaliation.

In 1930, the United States exported just over \$1 billion worth of agricultural goods. By 1932, that amount had been cut almost in half, to \$589 million. Barley exports dropped by half. So did exports of soybean oil. Pork exports fell 15 percent. Almost every American export sector was hit by foreign retaliation, but particularly agriculture.

As U.S. agricultural exports fell in the face of foreign retaliation, farm prices fell sharply, weakening the solvency of many rural banks. Their weakened condition undermined depositor confidence, leading to depositor runs, bank failures, and ultimately, a contraction of the money supply.

Mr. President, I'm not saying that if we hadn't abandoned the non-discrimination principle we wouldn't have had a depression. But it wouldn't have lasted as long. It wouldn't have hit as hard. It wouldn't have destroyed as many lives.

President Roosevelt attempted to correct this mistake with a major shift