

In past disasters, EDA funding, combined with Community Development Block Grants, has been a critical tool in helping towns and cities recover: Midwest Floods in 1993—\$200 million for EDA plus \$200 million for CDBG; Northridge Earthquake in 1994—\$55 million for EDA plus more than \$225 million for CDBG; Tropical Storm Alberto in 1994—\$50 million for EDA plus \$180 million for CDBG; Red River Valley Floods in 1997—\$52 million in EDA plus \$500 million for CDBG; and in the Agriculture Appropriations, there is no EDA or CDBG funding allocated for Hurricane Floyd affected states. None.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared on both sides of the aisle.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.

The amendment (No. 3589) was agreed to.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.

SENATOR INOUE OF HAWAII

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, there has been discussion of the great honor that the distinguished senior Senator from Hawaii earned. He actually earned it when I was a child. He earned it on the battlefield in Europe, particularly in Italy, my mother country.

I will speak further on this at a more appropriate time. But I have served with DAN INOUE for 25 years, and only because I was managing this bill was I not with him when he received the honor today. I talked to him before. I told him how enormously proud I am of him—all of his colleagues are proud of him—for the 25 years that I have served with him.

While he did not receive the honor at the time it was due—and many know why—his bravery was so well demonstrated at a time in this country when our sense of inclusion of people of all races was not as good as it is today. But I think the feeling of veterans and the feeling of historians have vindicated his achievements throughout all of this time.

I think of one thing. I was overseas for the 50th anniversary of D-Day, and when DAN INOUE walked onto the stage when his name was announced, veterans from all over this country cheered and applauded. He was accompanied by another distinguished Member of this body who was also cheered, from the Presiding Officer's State, Senator Dole. It was an emotional moment for all Senators who were there to see two such loved Members of this body received that way.

Today we open a new chapter in our country—closing not a very good chapter—and we did the right thing telling everybody that DAN INOUE earned the Congressional Medal of Honor.

I yield the floor.

FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2001—Continued

AMENDMENT NO. 3545

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. President, due to some confusion in the processing of cleared amendments, a mistake was made. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent to vitiate action on amendment No. 3545.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators COVERDELL, KENNEDY, and I be added as cosponsors to the Dodd amendment regarding the Peace Corps.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator from Kentucky will yield, I would like to clarify some issues regarding additional assistance to Lebanon.

Mr. MCCONNELL. I would be happy to yield to my colleague from Michigan.

Mr. ABRAHAM. As the Senator knows, I have a special interest in the provision of the bill that provides \$15 million for development activities in Lebanon, including support for the American educational institutions there. I am pleased that this year that level of funding is maintained in the bill as it was reported from committee, and I wish to thank the Senator from Kentucky for his leadership and the interest that he too has taken in Lebanon's future.

As you know, earmarking \$15 million in economic assistance is an important beginning to a comprehensive aid package to Lebanon. However, the recent events in the South of Lebanon call for a more detailed and larger aid package to Lebanon.

A larger aid package can help the country rebuild itself due to the devastation of the past 30 years. Specifically, Lebanon needs the financial assistance to: rebuild its schools; repair and rebuild its sewage systems; repair its destroyed power generation plants; upgrade its water purification facilities; and construct general infrastructure projects.

In my opinion, a package similar to the recent Jordanian package of \$250 million would provide the type of support needed to effectively launch the rebuilding effort.

Unfortunately, it appears that the Administration is not currently prepared to present a comprehensive aid package. Several inquiries of the Administration have produced no budgetary figures. This is disappointing in that your legislation is clearly the appropriate vehicles in which to include this funding. Notwithstanding their re-

luctance, I would like to offer my amendment to increase Lebanon's funding to \$250 million.

Mr. MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator ABRAHAM.

I, like you, am dismayed to learn that the Administration has not offered any budgetary amounts for an aid package to Lebanon. You are absolutely right that the current events in Lebanon demand that we reexamine our foreign aid package to that country.

As such, I pledge to work with you every step of the way to see that a more comprehensive aid package to Lebanon is considered here in the Senate. I appreciate your suggested amount, and would like to work with you once all the elements for a successive aid package are assembled. This requires input by the Administration, and a plan as to what programs would be funded and which ones would receive priority funding. It is my hope that the Administration will consult with us as soon as possible regarding figures for an assistance package. However, until the Administration produces a comprehensive package, I will have to lay your amendment aside.

Mr. ABRAHAM. I withdraw my amendment.

Mr. MCCONNELL. The Senator's comments are appreciated. As always, I will work with you and consult you as we put this package together. I highly value your expertise on Lebanon.

Mr. ABRAHAM. I thank the Senator for that clarification. I also wish to commend him and his committee for their strong interest in a financial assistance package for Lebanon.

CLIMATE CHANGE LANGUAGE

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, Sec. 576 of S. 2522 contains language regarding implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. I would like to ask the distinguished Chairman and Ranking Member of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee two questions to clarify their understanding of this provision.

The United States is currently engaged in climate change negotiations to ensure meaningful participation of developing countries and to ensure that greenhouse gas emissions reductions are achieved in the most cost-effective manner. Is my understanding correct that this provision is not intended to restrict the Administration from engaging in these international negotiations related to both the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which was ratified by the Senate in 1992, and the Kyoto Protocol to that Convention?

As you also know, the Senate has clearly expressed its views regarding the Kyoto Protocol in S. Res. 98, adopted unanimously by the Senate on July 25, 1997. That resolution calls on the Administration to support an approach to climate change that protects the economic interests of the United States and seeks commitments from

developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Administration is aggressively engaging developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through international projects and activities emphasizing market-based mechanisms and environmental technology. It is my understanding that this provision is not intended to restrict international programs or activities to encourage commitments by developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Is my understanding correct?

Mr. MCCONNELL. I thank the distinguished Senator from West Virginia for his questions. Your understanding is correct. Sec. 576 is not intended to restrict U.S. negotiations or activities such as you have described. Rather, it is intended to prevent the Administration from implementing the Kyoto Protocol prior to its ratification.

Mr. LEAHY. The Senator's understanding is correct. Sec. 576 is not intended to prohibit the United States from engaging in international climate change negotiations or activities that would encourage participation by developing countries.

THE INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, last year, the Senate adopted an amendment to the FY 2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act that deleted language restricting the availability of funds for the Inter-American Foundation. I offered that amendment, which was included in the managers' amendment to the bill and accepted without objection, because the basis for restricting the Foundation's funding was inaccurate and misleading. Chairman STEVENS and Chairman MCCONNELL, when apprised of the facts of the situation, agreed to remove the language from the bill, and I appreciate their willingness to do so.

This year, the report contains language that is similarly inaccurate and misleading, and that implies that a principal reason for terminating funding for the Foundation is an ongoing concern about the activities of a staff member of the Foundation. Based on the agreement of Chairman STEVENS and Chairman MCCONNELL to remove similar language from the bill last year, as well as the subsequent resolution of this matter, I was surprised to again see a reference to this matter in the Committee's report.

First, let me say that I am not passing judgment on whatever other reasons the Committee may have for terminating the funding for the Inter-American Foundation. However, I object to the Committee's continued reference to an individual staff member of the Foundation as a reason for shutting down the Foundation. Let me take a moment to clearly state the facts of the matter.

Last year, the General Accounting Office conducted an investigation of allegations of contract and hiring regulatory abuses at the Foundation that were reported anonymously to their

fraud hotline. The GAO completed their investigation and forwarded a report to the Committee on May 20, 1999, and requested permission to brief the Board of Directors of the Foundation on their findings, as well as certain additional allegations received during the course of interviews at the Foundation. On June 30, 1999, when Chairman STEVENS and Chairman MCCONNELL agreed to remove language from the bill last year that withheld funding for the Foundation until GAO completed a further investigation, the GAO was free to brief the Foundation. At that time, the Chairmen advised me that, by referring the matter to the Foundation's Board, the Appropriations Committee would view this investigation as complete and no further action would be taken by the Committee regarding the subject of the GAO investigation.

GAO briefed the Foundation Board on July 23, 1999. The minutes of that Board meeting indicate that GAO investigators stated that GAO had issued a final report on their review of the Foundation's contracting and personnel actions and that no further review would be undertaken. In addition, GAO investigators stated to the Board that the anonymous allegations received against a Foundation staff member were administrative in nature and would not be further investigated by GAO. Board members expressed concern and indignity at the allegations against the staff member, and concluded that no further action would be necessary. On August 5, 1999, the Board adopted a formal resolution to that effect.

Mr. President, continued references to unfounded, disproven anonymous allegations against this staff member contribute nothing to the public's understanding of any legitimate reasons the Committee may have for terminating the funding for the Inter-American Foundation. I would like to ask Chairman STEVENS if he agrees that long-resolved issues regarding a now-former staff member at the Foundation are not related to the Committee's action.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I share the views of my colleague, Senator MCCAIN, that the Committee's report language could be misread to imply that the actions of a former staff member are a principal reason to shut down the Foundation, and I do not believe that is or should be cited as a reason for doing so.

Mr. MCCAIN. Thank you, Senator STEVENS. Mr. President, I would also like to ask Chairman STEVENS if he would agree to include in the conference statement of managers on the FY 2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill a clear statement disavowing this report language regarding a now-former employee of the Foundation.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I would be happy to accept the Senator's suggestion that we include clarifying report language in the conference agreement.

Mr. MCCAIN. Thank you, Senator STEVENS.

Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to voice my strong support for the long-incoming supplemental appropriations request for Colombia included as part of this Foreign Operations bill. I believe that there are few requests more important to the security and well-being of this nation in the coming years than this one.

I believe that it is critical that we move quickly to pass the Foreign Operations bill and this emergency supplemental request for Colombia.

Some have argued that the Colombia proposal is simply too expensive. But I believe that this proposal represents the proper balance regarding what should—in fact must—be one of this nation's highest priorities: to stop the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States.

As we debate this proposal today, Colombia faces an unprecedented crisis.

Almost 40 percent of the country—an area itself the size of the entire nation of Switzerland—is under the control of the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia, FARC. The FARC is an alliance of some 20,000 drug traffickers and terrorists who threaten the stability not only of Colombia, but of the entire Andean region. And, as we all know, there are right-wing paramilitary groups in Colombia who also have ties to the drug trade.

Over 80 percent of the world's supply of cocaine is grown, produced or transported through Colombia, and large swaths of Colombia, now lawless or under FARC or paramilitary control, have become prime coca and opium producing zones.

These FARC rebels earn as much as two or even three million dollars per day from drug cultivators and traffickers who rely on their protection or—perhaps even more likely—who fear their retribution.

The FARC is currently holding hostage as many as 1,500 to 2,500 people, including at least 250 military prisoners and 250 police officers.

And, as the ability of the government of Colombia to govern large areas of their own country continues to disintegrate, the FARC narco-terrorists and paramilitaries continue to expand their base of operations and attack surrounding areas.

All this, and Colombia is facing its worst economic recession in more than 70 years: Real GDP fell by over 3 percent last year. Clearly, something needs to be done. And clearly, Colombia will need help.

The situation in Colombia is not simply a problem in a far away land. The events taking place in Colombia have direct and severe repercussions for the United States and the rest of the world.

Colombia is the source country for 80 percent of the cocaine consumed in the United States each year, and up to 70 percent of the heroin.

And the situation is getting worse, not better. Coca cultivation in Colombia has doubled in the past decade alone, and shows no sign of slowing.

In addition to undermining the democratic institutions in Colombia, the violence that has become endemic has forced over 500,000 people to flee Colombia; 65,000 have sought refuge in the United States.

According to the administration, illegal drugs account for over 50,000 deaths each year in the United States, and cost over \$100 billion a year in health care costs, accidents, and lost productivity. So the problem of narcotics production in Colombia is not just a problem in Colombia: To the flow of drugs from Colombia has very real, and very damaging effects, on our country.

Earlier this year, I joined many of my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee as we met with Colombia's President, Andres Pastrana. President Pastrana outlined a clear and comprehensive plan to address the drug trade, and to start solving the deeper problems within his country.

It is an ambitious plan, but one which I believe can be implemented, and can promote the peace process, strengthen democracy, and help revive Colombia's economy.

The Plan Colombia encompasses far more than the request we have before us. A combination of internal and external sources will be providing Colombia with most of the \$7.5 billion over three years that President Pastrana has deemed necessary.

The United States need provide but a piece of the overall plan. Working with President Pastrana, President Clinton has asked Congress to fund \$1.6 billion of that total. The two-year package will assist Colombia in combating the drug trade; help the country promote peace and prosperity; and deepen its democracy. This is a large package, but it is in our interest to provide it.

Without a major new effort, supported by the United States, the Colombian military and police simply lack the resources and ability to defeat the FARC and narco-trafficking forces.

Plan Colombia is focused on efforts to boost Colombia's interdiction and eradication capabilities, particularly in the south, including:

- Funds for special counter-narcotics battalions to push into coca-growing regions of Southern Colombia;

- Funds to purchase helicopters, desperately needed to provide the Colombian National Police access to the remote and undeveloped regions of the country where the narco-traffickers thrive;

- Funds to upgrade Colombia's interdiction capabilities, with aircraft and airfield upgrades, radar, and improved intelligence gathering;

- Funds for equipment to be used in increased eradication efforts;

- Funds to provide economic alternatives to coca growers; and,

- Funds for new programs to promote human rights, help the judicial system

and to crack down on money laundering.

As many of my colleague are aware, there is some concern about the human rights questions raised by this assistance package. This supplemental request, after all, provides military assistance to an army and a police force which, in the past, has had a less than Stellar record on human rights issues.

But it is my belief that the Leahy amendment, augmented by specific language that has been added to this legislation in committee, goes a long way towards meeting these concerns.

To begin with, any U.S. assistance to Colombian military and police forces will be provided in strict accordance with section 563 of the FY2000 Foreign Operations Act—the Leahy amendment.

In addition, this legislation contains new and specific provisions intended to guarantee the protection of human rights. Colombian military officers accused of human rights violations are to be tried in a civilian court, for example, not in the military courts which have, in the past, been far too lenient in how they treat these cases. There are also requirements that any Colombian military units trained by the United States as part of this antinarcotics effort be screened for human rights abuses.

In addition, the committee has also included language at my request relating to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the regions which, I believe, has greatly contributed to the culture of violence and lawlessness in Colombia.

I believe that any effective strategy to stabilize the region and reduce the influence of the criminals, drug traffickers, narco-terrorists, and paramilitaries must include the implementation of stringent controls on existing stockpiles and the destruction of surplus and seized stocks of small arms and light weapons.

The small arms and light weapons language calls for the creation of a serial number registry by the Department of State and by Colombia to track all small arms and light weapons provided to Colombia under this supplemental request, as well as the creation of a small arms and light weapons destruction initiative for the region. If any of the small arms and light weapons the United States supplies to Colombia as part of this assistance package are used in violation of human rights, this registry will allow us to track, to the unit, who was using these weapons and bring the responsible party to justice.

On the question of human rights then, I believe that although we must remain watchful, the package crafted by the Appropriations Committee does a good job in meeting the concerns that have been raised.

Let me take a minute here, however, to express my concern about one specific part of the committee recommendations that I hope is addressed

in conference: The lack of Blackhawk helicopters.

The President asked for \$388 million to fund 30 additional Blackhawk helicopters.

These helicopters fly faster, farther, higher and hold more people than the Huey II helicopters provided for by the committee.

In fact, I believe that the Blackhawk is critical to the terrain and mission in Colombia for several reasons:

- The Blackhawk can carry three times as many men as the Huey II; at high altitudes the advantage of the Blackhawk is even more pronounced; and the Blackhawk's maximum speed is 50 percent faster than the Huey II.

I believe that the drug war is a serious one, and that we should be devoting the best possible resources to this ongoing struggle.

I am not a helicopter expert, but the experts in the administration and elsewhere are telling us that the Blackhawk is the right equipment for the job. I do not think we should be second-guessing that decision with so much at stake.

Let me also talk for a moment today about one other aspect of this assistance package for Colombia that has come under some discussions: The issue of demand reduction versus supply reduction.

Let me say that I strongly believe that even as we provide the resources necessary to implement Plan Colombia that we must also attack the demand side of the drug problem in this country with a multi-pronged, concerted effort.

I support funding for domestic prevention and demand reduction programs, and I believe we must continue to provide domestic law enforcement with the tools they need to combat the drug trade within our borders.

But much of the demand-side, domestic effort can be accomplished by state and local governments.

What state and local governments cannot do is to keep drugs from entering this country in the first place. That task can only be accomplished by the federal government, which has control over our borders and over foreign policy.

In fact, of the \$18 billion in the Federal Government's counterdrug funding, 32 percent goes to domestic demand reduction, 49 percent to domestic law enforcement; 10 percent to interdiction along our borders; and only 3.2 percent to international counterdrug efforts.

Less than 4 percent for the one area that is clearly and unambiguously the one area in this fight that is the sole responsibility of the Federal Government.

Even with passage of this package of assistance to Colombia this figure will still be well under 10 percent.

So I say to my colleagues who believe more effort needs to be directed to domestic programs to address demand that they are right. More effort in this

area is needed. Our states should do more. Our cities should do more. But clearly more effort supporting our friends and allies in international efforts to curtail production, refinement, and transportation are needed too. And that is the one area where only the Federal government can act.

Only with assistance from the United States will the Government of Colombia be able to eradicate and intercept the tons of illegal narcotics that leave that country each year bound for our shores.

The ongoing narco-crisis in Colombia and the overall crisis of drugs in America represent an important threat to our nation's security and stability. The war against drugs is real, and should be treated with the same seriousness of purpose and resources as any other war.

The funding provided for the Colombia supplemental request in the Foreign Operations bill, although expensive, is clearly within our national interest. We face a crisis in this nation, and that crisis demands action.

I urge my colleagues to support the Colombia package in the Foreign Operations bill, and I yield the floor.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the foreign operations of the United States are all undertaken to promote the national interests of our country. They are all useful and important programs, and they deserve our support.

The national interests that they serve, however, are of varying importance. As George Orwell wrote in his novel "Animal Farm," "some are more equal than others." All our foreign operations programs are useful, but some are downright vital to our national security.

One element in this bill that is truly vital to our national security is severely underfunded. I will introduce shortly an amendment to address that severe problem.

The funding line to which I refer is known as "NADR." That does not refer to Ralph Nader. It does refer to "Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs." The 10 programs in this category are all on the front line of protecting our people from terrorism and from weapons of mass destruction.

Unfortunately, the funding in this bill for 7 of those 10 programs is 37 percent below the levels requested by the President. (And that ignores another \$30 million that was cut because the Foreign Operations Subcommittee concluded that a new counter-terrorism training center must be funded in the Commerce, Justice, State appropriation.) I submit that the national security requires that we provide substantially more of those requested funds.

Let me describe the programs that are treated so badly in this bill:

In the non-proliferation field, the Department of State's Export Control Assistance program helps foreign countries to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Recently customs agents in Uzbekistan stopped a shipment of radioactive contraband from Kazakhstan that was on its way to Iran, with an official final destination of Pakistan. Some press stories suggested that the shipment was really intended for a terrorist group affiliated with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, who would have used it to build a radiological weapon for use against Americans.

Those customs agents were trained by the United States. The equipment they used to detect the radioactive material was provided by the United States. In that case, the funding came from the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

But the Export Control Assistance program provides the same sort of assistance when Nunn-Lugar funds can not be used, and it helps other countries to enact the laws and regulations that they need in order to have effective export controls. The personal ties that are forged by this program with export control officials from other countries are equally crucial to improving other countries' export control performance.

This year, the Export Control Assistance program will enable the Department of Commerce to assign a resident export control attache to Russia. The Export Control Assistance program also sets up internal compliance programs in Russia's high-tech industries and trains the Russian personnel who staff those offices. These programs enable Russia to police itself and give us increased visibility into plants that are of particular concern from the non-proliferation standpoint.

Last year, Congress increased funding for this program from \$10 million to \$14 million. Indeed, the report on the bill before us takes credit for that increase. This year, the President asked for \$14 million, to maintain this vital level of effort, but the bill before us includes only \$10 million.

When the appropriators increased this program last year, they were right. This year, they should do it again. We need more export control assistance to help other countries keep nuclear materials out of the hands of their dangerous neighbors.

Earlier this month, the National Commission on Terrorism warned that it was "particularly concerned about the persistent lack of adequate security and safeguards for the nuclear material in the former Soviet Union." That is a cogent concern, and Export Control Assistance is one of the programs that helps to keep dangerous materials from crossing former Soviet borders.

By the way, the Foreign Relations Committee favors full funding of the President's request for this program. Indeed, at the suggestion of Chairman HELMS, we added \$5 million in our security assistance bill to support a new project in Malta.

Another non-proliferation program, the International Science and Tech-

nology Centers, provides safe employment opportunities for former Soviet experts in weapons of mass destruction who might otherwise be tempted to sell their skills to rogue states. This program not only helps those scientists. It also gives hope to, and helps to preserve discipline at, the institutes where those experts work.

The activities of this program are guided by a Governing Board headed by the Honorable Ron Lehman, a wonderful public servant who was Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration and director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Bush Administration.

Ron Lehman and I often disagree on policy matters, but we are in complete agreement on the need to help Russia to restructure its bloated, Soviet-era weapons complexes without leaving its weapons experts prey to offers from countries like Iran, Iraq or Libya. His program is doing some wonderful things, moreover. Since 1994, the Science Centers have supported over 840 projects, employing over 30,000 weapons experts at more than 400 former Soviet institutes.

Some of these projects led to the formation of viable commercial companies; others resulted in contracts with western companies to distribute new Russian products like medical devices or high temperature batteries. Around a fifth of Science Center funding now comes from Western companies and government agencies that employ former Soviet experts through this program.

Other projects have put weapons experts to work on public health, environmental remediation, and non-proliferation projects that provide real benefits to the former Soviet Union and its neighbors.

For example, the Russian Academy of Sciences, MINATOM, and the prestigious Kurchatov Institute recently completed a six-year project to map all the nuclear contamination sites in the former Soviet Union. Science Center funding was the lifeblood of that project.

The Science Centers also funded fourteen Y2K readiness projects that ensured the safety of nuclear power facilities and chemical and biological storage areas.

The International Science and Technology Centers are multinational. The U.S. Government provided only 31 percent of last year's Science Center funding, compared to 36 percent provided by the European Union. Japan, Norway and South Korea also participate in the program. But without our leadership, this program will fail.

The bill before us would give that program only a third of what was appropriated for this fiscal year. I know that the budget numbers for foreign operations are unrealistically tight. They always are. But if we cut the Science and Technology Centers program that much, we will endanger our national security.

It only takes a few experts in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons to provide dangerous materials or technology to a "rogue state." We should do everything in our power to make sure that economic desperation in Russia does not result in such a catastrophe.

The committee report on this bill states that it:

was disturbed to learn that, after at least 5 years of interaction between the State Department and Russian scientists, relations remain guarded.

I, for one, am not disturbed by that. Russia still has a nuclear weapons program, just as we do. There are bound to be security concerns that keep us at arm's length.

Unlike us, Russia may also have illegal chemical and/or biological weapons programs. There are military biological institutes to which we do not have access.

As a result, there is always a risk that non-proliferation assistance will be diverted to illegal military research, or that the funds we provide will keep afloat people or institutes involved in an illegal chemical or biological weapons program. That risk pales, however, compared to the risk of weapons proliferation if we leave those weapons scientists unable to put food on their table. So we must be "guarded," and we must do more.

The Science and Technology Centers program takes great care to minimize the risk of diversion. The General Accounting Office, after studying the Science Center's programs to employ Russia's former biological weapons experts, reported recently that the Center:

... has directly deposited grant payments into project participants' individual bank accounts, which prevents the institutes from diverting funds for unauthorized purposes. ... Program managers from the Science Center review programmatic and financial documents on a quarterly basis, and the Science Center requires a final audit of every project before it releases an overhead payment to an institute.

In addition, the U.S. Defense Contract Audit Agency has conducted internal control audits for 10 Science Center biotechnology projects through 1999.

Those precautions work. A few months ago, Science Center officials were warned by Russian scientists of a possible diversion of funds. That information was received and acted upon in a timely manner, and steps were taken to make sure that no diversion occurred.

The Science Centers program also takes steps to guard against proliferation. After all, that's the point of this assistance. We can be proud of the job that this program is doing to reduce the risk of proliferation of Russian materials and expertise.

When the GAO looked at Science Center biotechnology projects, they found that nearly half the recipients of project assistance were "former senior weapons scientists." On the average, the scientists devoted more than half

of the year to Science Center projects. Institute directors told the GAO that these projects "were crucial to their institute budgets."

The GAO also reports:

Prior to the funding of any U.S. collaborative research project, Russian institute officials must pledge that their institute will not perform offensive weapons research or engage in proliferation activities. According to a January 1999 State Department report, engaging in such inappropriate behavior would have an immediate and negative impact on any U.S. assistance.

Institute officials with whom we met consistently told us that they are no longer involved in offensive biological weapons activities and that they clearly understand the conditions of U.S. collaborative research assistance.

The GAO report continues:

Officials at three institutes we visited reported that, in the past, representatives of countries of proliferation concern had approached them seeking to initiate questionable dual-use research. Officials at the three institutes told us they had refused these offers because of a pledge made to U.S. executive branch officials as a condition of receiving U.S. assistance.

The pledge includes avoiding cooperation both with countries of proliferation concern or with terrorist groups.

State and Defense Department officials identified at least 15 former Soviet biological weapons institutes in which the United States has evidence that these programs have discouraged the institutes and scientists from cooperating with countries of proliferation concern such as Iran.

The Department of Defense informed Congress in a January 2000 report that the access gained through the collaborative research programs has provided "high confidence" that Biopreparat institutes such as Vector and Obolensk are not presently engaged in offensive activities.

Did everyone get that? This program is giving assistance to Russian biological weapons experts in order to keep them out of the clutches of rogue states. The GAO has found that it is succeeding in doing that. At the same time, we are guarding against the diversion of our funds to improper purposes. And the access we get to the institutes we assist—thanks to this program—has enabled the Defense Department to say that those institutes are clean.

Finally, we get useful research as an end product. If the executive branch gets the funding it wants, we will get help on defending against biological weapons. We will also help the Russians safeguard the dangerous pathogens that they keep for research purposes, thus guarding against their sale and reducing the risk of an accidental catastrophe.

The Foreign Relations Committee supports this program as well. Indeed, in our security assistance bill, we added \$14 million, so that the Science Centers could fund all of the deserving projects that have been proposed.

But the bill before us cuts \$25 million out of this fine program, leaving less than 45 percent of what the President requested, and barely a third of what the Foreign Relations Committee recommends.

The price of such cuts could be far more than the \$25 million in would-be savings. If we leave Russian weapons scientists underemployed, with time on their hands and not enough food on their tables, how will they resist an offer from Iran or Iraq?

When we talk about keeping these Russian scientists usefully employed, we're guarding against the spread of nuclear weapons and dreaded plagues. We're not talking about budget caps, but rather about life or death for millions of people.

I understand the need for efficient programs. But this program works. That GAO report did not need to make even one recommendation.

And when millions of lives are potentially at stake, we should do more than do less.

A third non-proliferation program is our contributions to KEDO, the Korean Energy Development Organization, pursuant to the Nuclear Framework with North Korea. Thanks to this agreement, North Korea has ceased reprocessing spent nuclear reactor fuel.

Indeed, recently the last of the spent nuclear fuel was safely canned, under IAEA supervision. That vastly lowers any North Korean ability to produce nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Framework Agreement has also led North Korea to let U.S. experts visit an underground site that we feared might be a nuclear plant. Our two visits showed that it was not a nuclear facility.

But there is a price for all these benefits, and part of that price is U.S. contributions of heavy fuel oil. Now, traditionally we have spent \$35 million a year on that. But other countries have not helped out as much as we expected—although South Korea and Japan are spending much more than we are, to build new reactors in North Korea that will not be readily used for bomb-making. In addition, as we all know, fuel oil costs a lot more than it used to.

Appropriators have refused to allocate more than \$35 million, however. Instead, last year, they kept this line at \$35 million and added a separate, unallocated line of \$20 million in the NADR account, which actually went to meet our KEDO obligations.

The bill before us again allots only \$35 million, but this time there is no additional line with \$20 million.

This money keeps the Nuclear Framework Agreement on track. That agreement keeps North Korea from using a handy source of fissile material to make nuclear weapons. It also provides a bit of stability on the Korean peninsula, which has led to a suspension of North Korea's long-range missile tests, to U.S.-North Korean negotiations on an end to those programs and to North Korea's missile exports, and now to the first summit ever between the leaders of North and South Korea.

Do we really want to put the Framework Agreement at risk, by failing to

fund it? Do we want to derail all the delicate negotiations that are ongoing with North Korea?

Perhaps the authors of this bill intend to fix this in conference, once everybody admits that we need to bust the budget caps on foreign operations. If so, I will be relieved. Maintaining KEDO and the Nuclear Framework Agreement gets to the heart of our national security, however, and I think we should make clear that we want this shortfall remedied.

Another important program in this funding category is our contributions to the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission. These funds are used primarily to procure and install the International Monitoring system, which serves United States national security interests by enabling the world to detect, identify, and respond to any illegal nuclear tests by other countries.

The International Monitoring System offers features that are of particular value to the United States. Its network of seismic stations will supplement those that the U.S. Government uses to monitor foreign nuclear weapons tests. Indeed, some of those stations will be in locations where we could not hope to get seismic coverage any other way.

The controlled and affiliated seismic stations will also afford regional coverage, rather than just long-range seismic collection. This will result in improved detection, as well as better geolocation of suspect events.

The International Monitoring System will include hydroacoustic collection in the world's oceans, ultrasound collection, and a large network of land-based atmospheric collectors to pick up telltale contamination in the air. Use of those additional monitoring techniques will increase the likelihood of getting multiple-source evidence of an illegal nuclear weapons test.

In addition, the data from the International Monitoring System will be widely available, and therefore usable for enforcement purposes. This is important.

Although the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty has not entered into force, signatories are bound—by international law and/or by custom—not to undermine the "object and purposes" of the treaty. We have a legal interest, therefore—and surely a security interest—in making sure that other countries do not engage in nuclear weapons tests.

How do you enforce a ban on nuclear weapons tests? That takes more than just monitoring. It requires exposure of the offending country and convincing other countries that a violation has occurred. Only then can we rally the world to threaten or impose penalties on the offender.

U.S. Government sources of information, as good as they are, often can not be used to create a diplomatic or public case against an offender. Our contributions to the CTBT Preparatory Com-

mission will help us to get the publicly usable information that is so vital to putting a stop to any cheating.

The report on this bill states that in the past, the President has requested more than was needed for this program. That is true. The executive branch asks for our share of the coming year's tentative budget, but we also work within the Preparatory Commission to scrub that budget, and it usually comes in a bit lower.

But does that mean we can safely cut 30 percent? Not on your life! The final U.S. obligation might be \$20 million, as opposed to the requested \$21.5 million. But \$15 million is simply out of the question. That would presume a \$25 million cut in the Preparatory Commission budget proposed by their Secretariat, which would mean an intolerable delay in fielding the monitoring system.

There may be some confusion because this program has been able to absorb budget cuts in the past. In those years, the State Department was able to apply previous-year funds to make up for the cuts. Virtually all the Fiscal Year 2000 funds, however, have already been obligated. Thus, a cut in Fiscal Year 2001 funding will be much more harmful than were previous cuts.

The report also states that the Preparatory Commission should reimburse the United States for services we have performed in setting up monitoring sites. That, too, is true, and we will be reimbursed. We will not be reimbursed, however, until the sites that we install have been certified as operational. That guards against shoddy work by other countries, and I don't think we want to give up that protection.

Certification has been achieved for one U.S.-installed site, and we will get \$500,000 in reimbursements in Fiscal Year 2001. That is already taken into account in the President's budget request. Several million dollars in reimbursement will be received in later years. Cutting the 2001 budget will jeopardize not only the work program for the monitoring system, but also any reimbursements for past or current work that depend upon achieving certification next year.

The bottom line is simple: either we pay for our share of nuclear test monitoring costs, or we delay significantly the work on a monitoring system that serves our own national security. If we want to catch any country that cheats and to expose that cheating, so that we can sanction a violator, then we must pay our bills.

Non-proliferation programs were not the only ones to be cut in this portion of the bill before us. The Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program and its Terrorist Interdiction program are vital to the security of United States diplomatic and military personnel overseas.

The first line of defense against attacks like those on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, or on the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, is not

ours. Rather, it is the security services of the host countries. All over the world, those countries need our assistance in border control and airport security. They need our training in spotting terrorist groups hiding behind legitimate charities, and in handling terrorist incidents—including future attacks that could use weapons of mass destruction. The Anti-Terrorism Assistance program does all of this.

Right now, the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program trains up to 2,000 people per year. There is so much demand for our training that we could help 3,000 a year, if only we had the funds and the facilities. An increase in training funds would make a real contribution to our security.

The State Department also runs a Terrorist Interdiction Program—known as TIP—that provides other countries the training and equipment needed for them to apprehend terrorists entering their countries. The TIP program enables countries to compare a person's travel documents to their own data-bases. It also works through INTERPOL to link these countries and promote information sharing. Finally, it trains immigration and customs workers in interview and screening techniques.

The State Department recently began a program to provide these important capabilities to Pakistan. We all know about Pakistan, the gateway to Afghanistan for Osama bin Laden and his buddies. Can anybody think of a better place to beef up border security, so that terrorists can be apprehended as they go to and from those Afghan training camps?

The first phase of the TIP program in Pakistan will be paid out of Fiscal Year 2000 funds. But the bill for the second phase will come due in Fiscal Year 2001. So will the first phase of a program in Kenya, which we know all too well has been used as a terrorist gateway to Africa, and site surveys in four more countries.

The proposed budget cut in the bill before us would force us to choose between Pakistan and Kenya. It is simply contrary to our national interest to force such a Hobson's choice.

These two anti-terrorist programs are utterly vital to our security. They make foreign security services more competent in protecting our own personnel, and they also foster ties that can be crucial in a crisis. We should be increasing these programs, and the President's proposed budget would do just that.

The bill before us would cut 22 percent of the funds requested. It would impose a 7-percent cut from this year's funding for these two anti-terrorist programs. This is simply unacceptable.

Finally, the Department of State's Small Arms program has underwritten successful arms buy-backs in Africa, notably in Mali. This is low-budget program is urgently needed in areas that are emerging from civil war and still awash in automatic weapons. A

little bit of support can go a long way to drain the supply of arms that otherwise end up going to drug-runners, bandit gangs, or renewed civil strife.

The President proposed \$2 million for this program. The bill before us would slice away half of that. This is, indeed, a low-budget program, but \$2 million is really the floor for a workable program. To take away half of that is to throw this effort into the basement.

The bill before us, Mr. President, leaves the Senate in a nearly untenable position. It is under the budget request by fully \$1.7 billion. This is no way to fulfill our obligations to world organizations or to maintain either international influence or our own national security. We must accept that there is no such thing as world leadership on the cheap.

I deeply wish that I could restore the funds that this bill cuts from the NADR account. The truth is, however, that we must wait for conferees to break the ridiculous cap on this whole bill.

With that in mind, the amendment that I am introducing simply states the sense of the Senate that the conferees should find the funds needed to make NADR whole.

We have been through this drill before. In due course, more funds for foreign operations will be found. The crucial question is how the conferees will allocate those funds. This amendment calls on the conferees to give priority to these important national security efforts.

I am pleased to report that this amendment is co-sponsored by Senators LUGAR, HAGEL, BINGAMAN, CONRAD, DOMENICI and LEVIN. I urge all of my colleagues to support it.

This amendment is not certain to succeed in conference—but it surely is the least we can do. The safety of our diplomats and military personnel overseas, and the safety of all of us from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, demand no less.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the Senate is now considering S. 2522, the foreign operations and export financing appropriations bill for fiscal year 2001.

The Senate bill provides \$13.4 billion in budget authority and \$4.5 billion in new outlays to operate the programs of the Department of State, export and military assistance, bilateral and multilateral economic assistance, and related agencies for fiscal year 2001.

When outlays from prior year budget authority and other completed actions are taken into account, the bill totals \$13.4 billion in budget authority and \$14.3 billion in outlays for fiscal year 2001.

The subcommittee is below its section 302(b) allocation for budget authority and at its section 302(b) allocation for outlays.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table displaying the budget committee scoring of this bill be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 2522, FOREIGN OPERATIONS APPROPRIATIONS, 2001:
SPENDING COMPARISONS—SENATE-REPORTED BILL

(Fiscal year 2001, dollars in millions)

	General purpose	Mandatory	Total
Senate-reported bill:			
Budget authority	13,384	44	13,428
Outlays	14,273	44	14,317
Senate 302(b) allocation:			
Budget authority	13,385	44	13,429
Outlays	14,273	44	14,317
200 level:			
Budget authority	15,306	44	15,350
Outlays	13,527	44	13,571
President's request:			
Budget authority	15,097	44	15,141
Outlays	15,329	44	15,373
SENATE-REPORTED BILL COMPARED TO:			
Senate 302(b) allocation:			
Budget authority	-1		-1
Outlays			
2000 level:			
Budget authority	-1,922		-1,922
Outlays	746		746
President's request:			
Budget authority	-1,713		-1,713
Outlays	-1,056		-1,056

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Totals adjusted for consistency with scorekeeping conventions. Prepared by SBC Majority Staff, May 18, 2000.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I urge adoption of this bill.

METHAMPHETAMINE LAB
CLEANUP/CHILD SOLDIERS

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I wanted to briefly discuss two important provisions regarding child soldiers and methamphetamine lab cleanup that are included in this supplemental spending package in the Foreign Operations bill before us.

Over the years, Iowa and many states in the Midwest, West and Southwest have been working hard to reduce the sale and abuse of methamphetamine. But meth has brought another problem that we must address: highly toxic labs that are abandoned and exposed to our communities.

We know that it can cost thousands of dollars to clean up a single lab. Fortunately, in recent years, the Drug Enforcement Agency has provided critical funds to help clean up these dangerous sites.

However, last year, the DEA funding was cut in half, despite evidence that more and more meth labs have been found and confiscated. Because of these cuts, in March, the DEA completely ran out of funding to provide meth lab cleanup assistance to state and local law enforcement.

Last month, the Administration shifted \$5 million in funds from other Department of Justice Accounts to pay for emergency meth lab cleanup. This action will help reimburse these states for the costs they have incurred since the DEA ran out of money. My state of Iowa has already paid some \$300,000 out of its own pocket for clean up since March.

However, we've got another five months to go before the new fiscal year—and the number of meth labs being found and confiscated is still on the rise.

The bill before us contains \$10 million I added in Committee to ensure that there will be enough money to pay for costly meth lab clean-up without

forcing states to take money out of their other tight law enforcement budgets.

If we can find money to fight drugs in Columbia, we should be able to find money to fight drugs in our own backyard. We cannot risk exposing these dangerous meth labs to our communities.

Mr. President, the Appropriations Committee also adopted an amendment I offered to provide \$5 million provision in the Colombia package to address one of the most alarming aspects of the drug conflict in Colombia—the use of child soldiers.

Human Rights Watch estimates that as many as 19,000 youths—some as young as eight—are being used by the Colombian armed forces, paramilitary groups and guerrilla forces. Up to 50 percent of some paramilitary units and up to 80 percent of some guerrilla units are made up of children. Children are used as combatants, guides, and informants. They may be forced to collect intelligence, deploy land mines, and serve as advance shock forces in ambushes. Guerrillas often refer to them as "little bees," because they sting before their targets realize they are under attack.

These children are forced to carry arms and are enticed by false promises or threats to their families. They are often tortured, drugged, sexually abused, and permanently traumatized by the horror and brutality of war. Children who are turned into soldiers lose their childhood.

They lose their innocence and their youth. They become instruments of destruction and atrocity. And the longer they remain under arms, the harder it is for them to heal and return to any semblance of a normal life.

Some of the funds included in the supplemental for Colombia are intended to support judicial reform, human rights protection and peace negotiations. Indeed, protecting human rights and rule of law is central to the overall success of Plan Colombia. The use of child soldiers is a serious human rights abuse prohibited by numerous international treaties and conventions, including ILO Convention 182 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor—and by the Colombian government itself. The International Criminal Court makes the recruitment or use of children under age 15 in military activities a war crime. I can think of no better use for these funds than to assist the demobilization and rehabilitation of child soldiers.

The current generation of children in Colombia is the fourth generation to grow up surrounded by conflict. The \$5 million in the Human Rights part of the Colombia package will help some of Colombia's children regain their fundamental right to life and peace. The money will be used by NGOs working to provide humanitarian assistance to affected children and their families. These NGO's will support programs providing counseling, education and reintegration services to former child