

America who wants to raise this money voluntarily if they had a choice. There is no other means of communicating with the American people but to buy network television advertising, and I have never seen the cost of advertising go down.

The New York Times estimates that the 2000 elections in the United States will cost \$3 billion. That is a 50-percent increase over 1996. Mr. President, \$600 million of that advertising, or 20 percent, will be spent directly on network television advertising. That is a 40-percent increase over what the networks absorbed only 4 years ago.

Isolating the Presidential campaign in 1996, President Clinton and Senator Dole spent \$113 million on television ads. Half of all the money they spent went to network television. This is done for a reason. It is not only the spiraling cost of network advertising far beyond the rate of inflation; far beyond the rate of increase of the cost of anything else in political campaigns is the networks themselves. They are the principal generating force in the rising cost of campaign finance.

They are part of the problem not in one dimension but in two. From Labor Day through election day in 1998, ABC, CBS, and NBC aired 73 percent fewer election stories than they did in the same period in 1994. The amount of advertising is going up and the cost is going up because candidates' ability to communicate with the American people through legitimate news stories is going down. It is not going down marginally; it is not going down significantly; it is going down overwhelmingly. There is a 73 percent reduction in the amount of legitimate news stories aired over the public airwaves to inform the American electorate.

What, Mr. Rather, Mr. Jennings, and Mr. Brokaw, are candidates for elective office in the Democratic and Republican Parties to do? The amount of legitimate free news stories to inform the electorate is in a state of collapse. The number of Americans reading newspapers is declining. There is a similar reduction in the amount of newsprint for legitimate news stories, and your rates are skyrocketing.

The result is clear: Costs of campaigns are soaring. Indeed, there is a solution. The most obvious solution is we could change the national campaign finance laws. For constitutional reasons, philosophical reasons, and political reasons I have suggested, that is not about to happen. I suggest the networks, therefore, look at themselves and their own ability unilaterally to reduce the cost of advertising on the public airwaves. After all, the public airwaves are not their own province. It is not something for which they paid and own exclusively. These are the public airwaves, licensed to ABC, CBS, and NBC, with a public responsibility to the American people, a responsibility they do not meet.

No other democracy in the Western world allows private corporations to

use the public airwaves exclusively for their own benefit charging candidates for national office what approach commercial rates to communicate with the people themselves. Use the people's airwaves, charge exorbitant rates to candidates for public office to communicate in a national election—it would not happen in Canada, and it does not happen in Britain, Germany, Italy, or France. It happens nowhere, but it happens here.

While we wait for this Congress to act, I challenge the network executives: Be part of the solution, not the principal cause of the problem. Act unilaterally until this Congress can act. But they do not.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Will the Senator from Nevada yield me an additional 5 minutes?

Mr. REID. According to Senator WARNER, we have 45 minutes. We have used 31. That will be appropriate. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from New Jersey be allowed to speak for another 5 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I thank the Senator for yielding.

One can recognize why the networks are in this extraordinary hypocrisy. They are for campaign finance reform. They are against spending in national political campaigns increasing. Indeed, we all share that concern, but they are also the principal beneficiaries.

In 1998, automotive ads were 25 percent of all national advertising. Retail sales were 15 percent. Political advertising was 10 percent of all revenues. They are offended at the cost of national political campaigns, but it is the third largest source of their funding.

Similarly, it is not a stable problem. Political ads are a rapidly rising, indeed, the largest increasing, source of network revenues, from 3 percent in 1990 to approaching 10 percent of all network revenues in the year 2000. What an extraordinary hypocrisy.

But it gets worse. They are for campaign finance reform, but they want the advertising revenues. What could be worse? The National Association of Broadcasters last year spent \$260,000 in PAC money and soft money, often supporting candidates who are against campaign finance reform, and hundreds of thousands of dollars lobbying to protect their right to use the public airwaves at retail costs for people who need to communicate with the American electorate.

I applaud Senator McCain and Senator Feingold for coming to this floor and fighting for campaign finance reform. I applaud my colleagues who have the courage to stand for it and fight for it. I always will. But changing the American political system in America to reduce money in the equation is not our fight; it is everybody's fight.

I could understand it if the networks were to be neutral, but to engage in

this headlong daily criticism of the process while they profit by it is inexcusable.

My friends in the networks, join the fight. Help us reform the system. Lead by example. Reduce the costs of the public airwaves for the public good. Allow candidates to communicate ideas without exorbitant costs. And meet your public responsibilities by dedicating more—not less—time to discussions of the issues. Make that a legitimate discussion of real choices before the American people—not horse races, an accounting simply of expenditures in races. Be positive, be responsible, and be part of the process of change.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GRAMS). The clerk will call the roll.

The senior assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001—Continued

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I express my gratitude to the distinguished ranking member and to the distinguished minority whip.

We are endeavoring to ascertain the remainder of the amendments that could be brought before the Senate in connection with this bill. There are strong initiatives on this side. We are going to put out a hotline on our side. We are urging Senators to contact the respective cloakrooms and to indicate—in the event they have a desire to have a matter covered on this bill by amendment—their desire to speak in relation to this bill or other procedural steps so that we can try to project the conclusion for this bill. We hope by 6 o'clock tonight is to get a unanimous consent request to lay down a list of amendments to be considered for the remainder of time on this bill.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support the request for our colleagues to contact the cloakrooms about their intentions relative to amendments and speaking on the bill. It will help us to organize the rest of the time we will need on the bill.

I particularly thank Senator REID. He has been working hard on our side. I know that kind of effort is being made also on the Republican side to see if we cannot come up with a finite list at the end of the day of amendments that Members intend to offer.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I think we have made progress. Sometimes it has been painfully slow. But this is a very big and important bill. We have a number of Senators on the minority side who expressed their desire to offer some amendments. We have a hotline

going out from our cloakroom asking that we try to develop a finite list of amendments. Once that is done, we will be in a better position to determine approximately how long it will take to complete this bill.

I should say to both managers of this bill that the minority is desirous of having this bill completed as quickly as possible.

As the managers of this bill know, in the past this bill has taken a long time. We are going to try to move it more quickly than in the past. But we still have a lot of amendments. But by the end of the day, I hope we will be in some kind of position to indicate to the managers of the bill how many amendments we have on this side. We hope the majority will tell us how many amendments they have.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I certainly appreciate the expression from our distinguished leader on the minority that it is the minority's desire to move this bill to completion. That is very reassuring.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, we have a pending unanimous consent request. We are not in a position at this time to agree to that. We are getting very close. As soon as that is possible, we will notify the manager of the bill and enter into that unanimous consent agreement to take care of some things tomorrow.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I assure our distinguished leadership on this side that Senator LOTT, I, and others believe very strongly that this bill is essential for the United States and essential for the men and women in the Armed Forces. I think considerable bipartisanship has prevailed up to this moment. I hope it continues and we can complete this bill.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, my staff just handed me some interesting statistics, since we have a moment. Over the last 10 years, we have averaged 5½ days on the Defense authorization bill and 116 amendments, on average. We are actually doing pretty well. We are making some progress. We may beat the average even. We never know.

Mr. REID. Especially considering the fact that we didn't start this bill until late yesterday afternoon. We have only been on this bill a little more than one day.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, a hotline will be going out to both cloakrooms. I thank my colleagues. We are still awaiting the arrival of Senator McCain, at which time we will proceed to the McCain-Levin amendment, which is described in detail in the unanimous consent request.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 3197

(Purpose: To authorize additional rounds of base closures and realignments under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and 2003 and 2005)

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The senior assistant bill clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Arizona (Mr. MCCAIN), for himself and Mr. LEVIN, Mr. ROBB, Mr. VOINOVICH, Mr. REED, Mr. DEWINE, and Mr. WYDEN, proposes an amendment numbered 3197.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

On page 530, after line 21, add the following:

SEC. 2822. AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT BASE CLOSURE ROUNDS IN 2003 AND 2005.

(a) COMMISSION MATTERS.—

(1) APPOINTMENT.—Subsection (c)(1) of section 2902 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) is amended—

(A) in subparagraph (B)—

(i) by striking “and” at the end of clause (ii);

(ii) by striking the period at the end of clause (iii) and inserting a semicolon; and

(iii) by adding at the end the following new clauses (iv) and (v):

“(iv) by no later than January 24, 2003, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 108th Congress; and

“(v) by no later than March 15, 2005, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 109th Congress.”; and

(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking “or for 1995 in clause (iii) of such subparagraph” and inserting “, for 1995 in clause (iii) of that subparagraph, for 2003 in clause (iv) of that subparagraph, or for 2005 in clause (v) of that subparagraph”.

(2) MEETINGS.—Subsection (e) of that section is amended by striking “and 1995” and inserting “1995, 2003, and 2005”.

(3) STAFF.—Subsection (i)(6) of that section is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking “and 1994” and inserting “, 1994, and 2004”.

(4) FUNDING.—Subsection (k) of that section is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph (4):

“(4) If no funds are appropriated to the Commission by the end of the second session of the 107th Congress for the activities of the Commission in 2003 or 2005, the Secretary may transfer to the Commission for purposes of its activities under this part in either of those years such funds as the Commission may require to carry out such activities. The Secretary may transfer funds under the preceding sentence from any funds available to the Secretary. Funds so transferred shall remain available to the Commission for such purposes until expended.”.

(5) TERMINATION.—Subsection (l) of that section is amended by striking “December 31, 1995” and inserting “December 31, 2005”.

(b) PROCEDURES.—

(1) FORCE-STRUCTURE PLAN.—Subsection (a)(1) of section 2903 of that Act is amended by striking “and 1996,” and inserting “1996, 2004, and 2006.”.

(2) SELECTION CRITERIA.—Subsection (b) of such section 2903 is amended—

(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting “and by no later than December 31, 2001, for purposes of activities of the Commission under this part in 2003 and 2005,” after “December 31, 1990.”;

(B) in paragraph (2)(A)—

(i) in the first sentence, by inserting “and by no later than February 15, 2002, for purposes of activities of the Commission under this part in 2003 and 2005,” after “February 15, 1991.”; and

(ii) in the second sentence, by inserting “, or enacted on or before March 31, 2002, in the case of criteria published and transmitted under the preceding sentence in 2001” after “March 15, 1991.”; and

(C) by adding at the end a new paragraph:

“(3) Any selection criteria proposed by the Secretary relating to the cost savings or return on investment from the proposed closure or realignment of a military installation shall be based on the total cost and savings to the Federal Government that would result from the proposed closure or realignment of such military installation.”.

(3) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS.—Subsection (c) of such section 2903 is amended—

(A) in paragraph (1), by striking “and March 1, 1995,” and inserting “March 1, 1995, March 14, 2003, and May 16, 2005.”;

(B) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively;

(C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4):

“(4)(A) In making recommendations to the Commission under this subsection in any year after 1999, the Secretary shall consider any notice received from a local government in the vicinity of a military installation that the government would approve of the closure or realignment of the installation.

“(B) Notwithstanding the requirement in subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall make the recommendations referred to in that subparagraph based on the force-structure plan and final criteria otherwise applicable to such recommendations under this section.

“(C) The recommendations made by the Secretary under this subsection in any year after 1999 shall include a statement of the result of the consideration of any notice described in subparagraph (A) that is received with respect to an installation covered by such recommendations. The statement shall set forth the reasons for the result.”; and

(D) in paragraph (7), as so redesignated—

(i) in the first sentence, by striking “paragraph (5)(B)” and inserting “paragraph (6)(B)”;

(ii) in the second sentence, by striking “24 hours” and inserting “48 hours”.

(4) COMMISSION REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS.—Subsection (d) of such section 2903 is amended—

(A) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting “or by no later than July 7 in the case of recommendations in 2003, or no later than September 8 in the case of recommendations in 2005,” after “pursuant to subsection (c).”;

(B) in paragraph (4), by inserting “or after July 7 in the case of recommendations in 2003, or after September 8 in the case of recommendations in 2005,” after “under this subsection.”; and

(C) in paragraph (5)(B), by inserting “or by no later than June 7 in the case of such recommendations in 2003 and 2005,” after “such recommendations.”.

(5) REVIEW BY PRESIDENT.—Subsection (e) of such section 2903 is amended—

(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting “or by no later than July 22 in the case of recommendations in 2003, or no later than September 23 in the case of recommendations in 2005,” after “under subsection (d).”;

(B) in the second sentence of paragraph (3), by inserting “or by no later than August 18

in the case of 2003, or no later than October 20 in the case of 2005," after "the year concerned,"; and

(C) in paragraph (5), by inserting "or by September 3 in the case of recommendations in 2003, or November 7 in the case of recommendations in 2005," after "under this part,".

(c) CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF INSTALLATIONS.—Section 2904(a) of that Act is amended—

(1) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (4) and (5), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph (3):

"(3) carry out the privatization in place of a military installation recommended for closure or realignment by the Commission in each such report after 1999 only if privatization in place is a method of closure or realignment of the installation specified in the recommendation of the Commission in such report and is determined to be the most-cost effective method of implementation of the recommendation;".

(d) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER BASE CLOSURE AUTHORITY.—Section 2909(a) of that Act is amended by striking "December 31, 1995," and inserting "December 31, 2005,".

(e) TECHNICAL AND CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS.—

(1) COMMENCEMENT OF PERIOD FOR NOTICE OF INTEREST IN PROPERTY FOR HOMELESS.—Section 2905(b)(7)(D)(ii)(I) of that Act is amended by striking "that date" and inserting "the date of publication of such determination in a newspaper of general circulation in the communities in the vicinity of the installation under subparagraph (B)(i)(IV)".

(2) OTHER CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS.—

(A) That Act is further amended by inserting "or realignment" after "closure" each place it appears in the following provisions:

- (i) Section 2905(b)(3).
- (ii) Section 2905(b)(5).
- (iii) Section 2905(b)(7)(B)(iv).
- (iv) Section 2905(b)(7)(N).
- (v) Section 2910(10)(B).

(B) That Act is further amended by inserting "or realigned" after "closed" each place it appears in the following provisions:

- (i) Section 2905(b)(3)(C)(ii).
- (ii) Section 2905(b)(3)(D).
- (iii) Section 2905(b)(3)(E).
- (iv) Section 2905(b)(4)(A).
- (v) Section 2905(b)(5)(A).
- (vi) Section 2910(9).
- (vii) Section 2910(10).

(C) Section 2905(e)(1)(B) of that Act is amended by inserting ", or realigned or to be realigned," after "closed or to be closed".

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, the amendment I propose today is one which we have attempted on several occasions in the past. It authorizes two rounds of U.S. military installation realignments and closures to occur in the years 2003 and 2005—in other words, BRAC, or Base Realignment and Closure.

I am pleased to join Senators LEVIN, ROBB, VOINOVICH, REED, DEWINE, and WYDEN as cosponsors.

We have heard for the last several years of the severe problems that exist in the military. We addressed one of those problems, food stamps, earlier in the proceedings on this legislation. We have heard in the Senate Armed Services Committee repeated testimony of plunging readiness and modernization programs that are decades behind schedule and quality-of-life deficiencies so great that we can't retain or recruit quality personnel necessary

to defend this Nation's vital national security interests.

Statistics are sometimes numbing but sometimes interesting also. The Air Force will be 2,000 pilots short by the end of next year, the Navy SEALs are losing two-thirds of their officer corps, and the Army is struggling to retain its captains. In the last few weeks, there was a well publicized study conducted by the Army which shows an unprecedented exodus of Army officers at the rank of captain from the U.S. Army.

The consequences of losing the majority of your junior officers at that rank are indeed disturbing and even alarming. Equipment is falling in disrepair. The Marine Corps spends more time fixing broken equipment than it does training on it. And the Air Force is discovering that its F-16 fleet is only safe to fly for 75 percent of its original planned service life. The Army is in need of new engines for its entire M-1 tank fleet.

Modernization of our military equipment has all but ceased for the very large and risky programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter, Comanche helicopter, and excessively expensive ship and submarine programs of questionable design and questionable requirement.

There is no doubt that many of the woes of our military can be addressed in areas other than the budget, but more judicious use of the military by the national command authority and reduced operational tempo will help with personnel retention.

Any person in the military will tell you today that our military personnel, both active duty as well as Guard and Reserve forces, are being deployed all too frequently at the expense of their lifestyles, their family lives, and ultimately their desires to continue to serve the country in the uniform of the military.

Streamlined training and greater attention to exercise management will result in less strain on our service members and their equipment. But ultimately we must pay for the last 7 years of chronic underfunding of our military. Finding these dollars at a time when we must also carefully attend to the health of our Social Security system and other much needed social benefits will be absolutely difficult.

It is against this backdrop that we should acknowledge the absolute requirement to close unneeded military bases. The armed services is carrying the burden of managing and paying for an estimated 23-percent excess infrastructure costing at least \$3.6 billion a year. Let me point out again, Mr. President, keeping these bases open is not without significant cost. In fact, about \$3.6 billion every year could be saved when these unnecessary bases are ultimately closed.

By the year 2003, these costs will grow to a total of over \$25 billion. If Congress allows the military to

streamline its infrastructure, these costs can be realized as real savings that can be used to address the military's readiness shortfalls. Many have heard strong testimony supporting further BRAC rounds from the service chiefs, all the service Secretaries, and the Secretary of Defense. Potential savings are dramatic. The savings in 1 year alone would more than pay for the proposed personnel pay benefits—including health care, buy over 36 new F-22 strike fighters for the Air Force, fully fund our Nation's ballistic missile defense program, or pay for 75 percent of the next generation aircraft carriers.

Savings over the next 4 years are conservatively estimated to reach \$25 billion. The annual net savings from previous BRAC rounds have grown from \$3 billion in 1998 to \$5.6 billion to \$7 billion a year by 2001. That is an important statistic because so many of the opponents of a base-closing round argue that money is not only not saved but spent because of the cleanup costs that are associated with base closings.

There are two points to be made. One is that these cleanups, although lengthy and difficult sometimes, depending on the type of operations that took place on that military base, have now been completed to a large degree, and the money is being saved. As I mentioned, between \$5.6 to \$7 billion will be saved next year. Also, it should disturb us if these bases are not cleaned up anyway, whether they are open or closed. It is an expense that probably will continue to grow. To say that we shouldn't close bases because of the cleanup costs then, I guess, using a certain logic, would mean we would want areas that are hazardous to ourselves and our children's health to remain unaddressed.

These savings are, as I said, real. They are coming sooner and they are greater than anticipated.

The GAO recently noted that in most communities where bases were closed, incomes were actually rising faster and unemployment rates were lower than the national average. In my own home State of Arizona there was great wailing and gnashing of teeth as Williams Air Force Base appeared on the base-closing list several years ago. It is now called Williams Gateway Airport and it is generating sizably more revenue for the community and the State of Arizona than it was when it was a military installation. That is true at bases throughout the Nation.

There is a provision in this bill that allows for the no-cost transfer of property from the military to the community in areas affected by closures. This amendment authorizes two additional rounds of base closure in 2003 and 2005. The amendment is similar to that introduced last year except the rounds are 2003 and 2005 instead of 2001 and 2003. Why did we change the date from 2001, which would then obviously mean it would take action well into the next administration? Due to the justifiable mistrust, particularly on this side of

the aisle, about this President's nonpoliticization of the process. There are credible arguments that the last base-closing round, as far as Kelly Air Force Base in Texas and McClellan up in Sacramento, were politicized.

Last year, when Senator LEVIN and I and others brought this amendment up, the distinguished chairman of the committee said: There will be immediately "acting" in the bowels of the Pentagon to somehow politicize this process. I say to my friend from Virginia, the distinguished chairman of the committee, they won't be acting in the bowels of the Pentagon, at least until the year 2003, under this proposal.

So we are talking about an evolution that would not take place. The round would not take place for 3 years, 3 years from now, and then obviously those recommendations would not be implemented until beginning with the final determination of the base-closing commission and approval by the President and the Congress.

Additionally, under this proposed legislation, privatization in place would be permitted only when explicitly recommended by the Commission, which I hope would prevent a recurrence of the kind of machinations, whether legitimate or not, that were conducted by the present administration, which has caused so much skepticism about the results of the last Base Closure Commission.

Finally, the Secretary of Defense must consider the total cost the final base closure rounds have on the Government, not just cost or savings to the Department of Defense. We can continue to maintain a military infrastructure that we don't need or we can provide the necessary funds to ensure our military can fight and win future wars. Our men and women are deployed and continuing to train and prepare for upcoming deployments, many to active combat regions. They are undermined, increasingly short on critical weapon systems, and are struggling to overcome a multitude of readiness deficiencies.

Recently, one of the Army divisions was declared in the lowest category of readiness. It struck home to a lot of us in this body who happen to still revere the great and wonderful Senator from Kansas, Mr. Dole, who was our majority leader, who served and sacrificed in the famous 10th Mountain Division. He, among others, was surprised when a division with that glorious and wonderful history was declared, for all intents and purposes, unfit to be deployed into a combat situation.

The cost associated with maintaining excess infrastructure represents real money that is not available for essential programs and for alleviating real defense programs.

Earlier this year, the Armed Services Committee met to discuss the need to add critical funds to the defense account for much needed modernization projects. I was amazed that although there were arguments for the need for

increased defense spending, no one could see that critical defense reforms such as further BRAC rounds were required. These rounds could provide long-term funding for modernization and readiness programs without risking other key programs.

We must finish the job we started by authorizing a new round of base closures. I urge my colleagues to join in support of this amendment and work diligently to put aside politics for what is clearly in the best interests of our military forces in our Nation.

We had kind of an unusual occurrence last year in that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in what was deemed by most observers as a rather unusual move, they testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that they had significant shortfalls in funding.

The committee asked for detailed responses as to what were those shortfalls in funding. The Army came up with some \$5.5 billion in unfunded requirements they thought were necessary. This comes from the uniformed heads of the services. The Army needed \$5.5 billion for programs ranging from Longbow Apache to night vision goggles, to UH-60 Blackhawk procurement. The list is very detailed and very long: The Navy needed about \$5.8 billion; the Marine Corps needed \$1.6 billion; the Air Force needed \$3.5 billion; the Special Operations Command needed \$260 million; the Army National Guard needed \$800 million; and the Air National Guard came in with a requirement for \$2.4 billion.

We are taking strides to improve funding for our military. But when you add all of this up, it comes to a very significant amount of money, about \$20 billion, that the military chiefs have submitted in written testimony to the Congress as to the needs of the individual services.

I have to be sort of candid. I am not sure we are going to come up with \$20 billion that the services need. We are increasing funding, and that is the first time in some years. But I do not see that in the realm of this \$20 billion, when you look at the additional costs which are already basically there without us being able to do anything about it—first, the funding for the new fighter aircraft, funding for the additional ships, planes, tanks, et cetera, that will be necessary to replace existing aging equipment and modernize our armed forces.

So here is \$20 billion the chiefs say they need. I do not see a huge increase of that size, frankly, in the future, as far as the Congress is concerned, nor, at least under this administration, do I see that sizable additional request.

Obviously, as I pointed out earlier, it would be a savings of some \$25 billion over a period of the next 4 years. The savings are conservatively estimated to reach about \$25 billion. I do not want to have any of my colleagues be misled. That would be the case if we had a base-closing commission that declared its decisions today. But if the

base-closing commission, in the year 2003, made its decisions, we could save over the following 4 years some \$25 billion. I want to make it clear.

Yes, there will be initial costs for cleanup of these bases. That is a sad fact—and at that time an unexpected—experience that we had. But I also argue, with the perspective of time, we have found there is now, as a result of the earlier base closings, annual net savings which are growing from \$3 billion in 1998 to \$5.7 to \$7 billion per year by next year.

I would be distressed if Yuma Marine Corps Air Station in Yuma were on the base-closing list. I would be distressed if Luke Air Force Base in Phoenix were on the base-closing list. I would be distressed if Davis Mountain Air Force Base in Tucson were on the base-closing list. I see my friend from Nevada here, one of the cosponsors of this amendment. I am sure he would be deeply distressed if Nellis Air Force Base in Reno were on the base-closing list. There is not, I believe, a Senator or very few Senators who would not feel the impact of a base-closing commission.

But I challenge the opponents of this amendment to find me one—I say one—credible military expert who resides outside of the Congress of the United States who will not say that we need to have a base-closing commission to decide on the elimination of unneeded infrastructure in the reform of bases that the military does not need.

I ask any of us to pick up the phone and call up Gen. Colin Powell; call up Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf; call up Cap Weinberger; call up Dick Cheney; call up Zbigniew Brzezinski; Call up anyone, anyone today, who is a person who has credentials as far as military readiness is concerned, and I think you would be hard pressed to find anything but the overwhelming majority—perhaps not totally but the overwhelming majority of opinion on this issue by credible military experts is that we have excess infrastructure in the form of too many bases which we do not need and which should be closed in order to use those funds for badly needed military requirements.

I apologize to this body, to keep going back to the plight of the service men and women in the military today. But we do have service men and women in the military on food stamps. We do have service men and women in the military in my own State residing in barracks that were built during World War II. We do have service men and women in the Marine Corps who are, for example, retreading military vehicle tires so they can get additional money in order to have ammunition with which to practice.

The stories go on and on.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCCAIN. I will be glad to yield to the distinguished chairman at any time, including now.

Mr. WARNER. At an appropriate time.

Mr. MCCAIN. Please go ahead.

Mr. WARNER. Since he and I joined together several years ago on a piece of legislation to initiate the BRAC process—you remember that, and I will not go into the chronology—I share with the Senator appreciation of the need for an assessment of our base structure. That should be made in the context of the demands of the armed services. There is no one—you just had an amendment that succeeded overwhelmingly in the Senate on food stamps. You begin to address these problems. I commend my old friend and colleague.

This comes to my mind. There is no one who is a stronger fighter for the prerogatives of the President of the United States. You fought hard here recently on an amendment which I had with Senator BYRD. I think you took the line we could be strapping the President of the United States.

Factually speaking, with no criticism towards President Clinton, there will be an election in this country and a new President elected in a few months. He will take office. Should we not accord him the courtesy to address this question, address it in the context of the needs that you have stated, address it in the context of a QDR, his own analysis of the military structure of the United States? Address it in the context of what his direction will likely be with respect to the Armed Forces of the United States?

My colleague, above all, and I are strong supporters of one particular candidate. He has spoken out very forcefully on the need to further strengthen our military. I think if we were to start the process now, it could in some ways impede or indeed thwart the next President's, what I consider, complete freedom to look at this issue.

My colleague was right. He was talking about the \$20 billion this could possibly generate. He was correct in assessing the needs of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others. Just moments ago we missed by a few votes a \$90 billion program for retirement, which was tough for those who had to go against it, but we had to resist that.

I am suggesting: What is the reason we should start now versus just allow the next President to frame this legislation in terms of his own needs and aspirations?

Mr. MCCAIN. Again, I thank the chairman for his leadership and the courage he has displayed on a number of occasions on a number of issues.

First, I respond to my friend from a practical standpoint. This amendment authorizes a base-closing commission. The President of the United States does not have to appoint the Commissioners and the President of the United States can reject the findings of the Commission. So I do not believe we are forcing the next President of the United States in that respect.

My second point is, it is well known the advisers, at least to the party on this side of the aisle, to the person we

believe will be the next President of the United States—George Shultz, Brent Scowcroft, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Robert Zoellick—

Mr. WARNER. And I suggest yourself.

Mr. MCCAIN. Addressing every one of those individuals, if the chairman and I picked up the telephone and said, "Do you think we should have a base-closing commission?" they would say yes. They would say yes.

I argue, even though I understand and appreciate and sympathize with the position of our nominee for President of the United States not to interfere too much with what goes on in the Congress, I believe he would be very supportive as well.

On the other side of the aisle, if it should occur that the nominee from the other side of the aisle were elected President of the United States, the fact is very well known the Vice President of the United States supports a base-closing commission as well and has voted on this floor for the appointment of a base-closing commission.

By the way, I want the Record to be very clear that I have the greatest respect and friendship for the Vice President of the United States.

It is the decision of the people of this country who will be the next President of the United States. I had respect for the Vice President and his involvement in military issues when he and I served together, as we did, in the Senate.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, he served on our committee with the Vice President.

Mr. MCCAIN. The Vice President of the United States, who is the nominee of the other party on the other side of the aisle, is also supportive of and would support a base-closing commission. I believe whoever will be President of the United States supports at this time authorizing further base-closing commissions. I believe the advisers to both individuals also support a base-closing commission, and if that commission were authorized, it still would not require the next President of the United States to act even in the appointment of commissioners, much less accepting the recommendations of that commission. I yield to the Senator from Virginia, if he has any additional comments.

Mr. WARNER. No, I think Senator MCCAIN answered my question. We both made our points. Mr. President, the time that I consumed will be chargeable to those in opposition to the McCain amendment. I shall eventually vote in opposition to the McCain-Levin amendment.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I simply conclude by saying I hope we can authorize this. It is important, not only because of the money we save which is critical for defense, but we as a body should understand that it does not enhance our reputation about our concerns about the needs of the military when we refuse to take what is a very logical step, and that is to approve a

base closure commission which would make recommendations which could be either accepted or rejected by the President of the United States and rejected by this body if this body, in its wisdom, decided those recommendations were invalid.

Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arizona yield me 10 minutes?

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Michigan whatever time he uses.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, once again, it is necessary for Senator MCCAIN and I and a number of colleagues he has specified to make an effort to authorize an additional two rounds of base closings. On this issue, the Congress simply can run but it cannot hide.

Every time we speak about the need for additional resources, be it for health care in the military for retirees or active duty people, whether it is for modern equipment, whether it is for a reasonable, decent cost-of-living allowance or a pay increase for our active duty people, whatever it is we talk about as being needed in our military, it seems to me to be a little bit hollow if we are not willing to make the savings that clearly are essential and can be made and are requested by our uniform military to help pay for those additional expenditures. We can run but we simply cannot hide from our responsibilities in this area.

The amendment would implement the recommendation of the Quadrennial Defense Review. We have heard a lot about Quadrennial Defense Review today and how important it is that review take place, and it is important. The recommendation of the Quadrennial Defense Review was that we have additional rounds of base closings. The National Defense Panel recommended additional rounds of base closings. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended additional rounds of base closings. The Secretary of Defense has made the same recommendation.

The way to respond to the need for resources for our military is to eliminate the expenditures which are not essential.

This amendment would authorize two base-closure rounds: one in 2003 and one in 2005. The first round would take place well into the next administration. The second round would take place in the administration after that.

The amendment Senator MCCAIN and I and others are offering would follow the base-closure process that was used previously in 1991, 1993, and 1995, with three main exceptions: First, because 2005—which is the second round under this amendment—will be the first year of a new administration, the schedule in 2005, which again would be the second round, would start and end about 2

months behind the schedule that would be used in 2003. The 2003 schedule would basically mirror the 1995 schedule, except that it would start and end about 2 weeks later than in 1995. We include a 2-month slip in the timetable of the whole process in 2005 to allow a new administration time to decide whether they want to have a base-closure process and to make its appointments to the commission.

As our friend from Arizona pointed out, this process we would authorize is simply that—we authorize the process. The President would decide whether or not to trigger the process by the appointments of the members of the base-closing commission and then would have a fail-safe mechanism to reject the recommendations of the commission.

The second exception to the general rules that were followed in the last rounds' process is this amendment also includes the language to address the problem of privatization in place for future BRAC rounds. It would allow the Secretary of Defense to privatize in place the workload of a closing military installation only when it is specifically recommended by the Base Closure Commission. That would address the issue which has been raised about the previous round when some thought that round was politicized when there was privatization in place, which was allowed. This cures that problem by saying no privatization in place unless the Base Closure Commission itself specifically recommends that course of action.

The third main difference between this and the previous rounds is that this amendment specifies we look at the costs and savings not just of the one agency but total costs and savings to the Federal Government. That is important so that we do not simply save money in one Federal Government pocket but cost money in another Federal Government pocket; that we look at the costs and the savings to the entire Government from a proposed closing when these recommendations are made and not just to the Department of Defense.

In 1997, the Congress mandated there be a report on base closures. Secretary Cohen, in compliance with that, issued a report in April of 1998. That report, which we insisted on, contains a convincing analysis of 1,800 pages of detailed backup material. It is responsive to those who said last year that we needed a thorough analysis before we could reach a decision on the need for more base closures.

What that report reaffirms is that the Department of Defense simply has more bases than it needs. Since 1989, we have reduced the total active duty military end strength by one-third, but even after four base-closure rounds, DOD's base structure in the United States has been reduced by only 21 percent. We have a disconnect. We have too much structure. There are too many bases and facilities which are op-

erating which we can no longer afford to operate and which must be consolidated.

Each of us in States that have faced those closures understand the short-term pain involved. We have lost all of our Strategic Air Command bases in Michigan. We understand what is needed in the aftermath to cushion the impact of those so-called realignments, which were closures, of our three SAC bases, but we succeeded. We are on our way back in all three areas.

The Department of Defense is telling us they have 23-percent excess capacity in current base structure. It seems to me we cannot hold our heads up and talk about the need of additional resources for the Department of Defense if we are not willing to close or at least put a process in motion which would fairly recommend the closure of some of this 23-percent excess capacity which the Department of Defense analysis says we have.

Mr. President, in relation to the excess capacity we have in our defense structure, the Department of Defense analysis concludes that we have 23 percent excess capacity in its current base structure. Just a few examples now of that excess capacity which I think are indefensible, again, particularly for those who are urging additional resources in the defense budget.

How do we justify the Army having reduced classroom training personnel by 43 percent while classroom space is only reduced by 7 percent? What we are doing by not allowing additional rounds of BRAC is telling the Army: You have to maintain all that classroom space even though you have no personnel to run it. So the classroom training personnel is reduced 43 percent; classroom space is only 7 percent reduced.

The Navy will have 33 percent more hangars for aircraft than it requires. We are telling the Navy—unless we allow these additional rounds of BRAC—you have to maintain those extra hangars even though you do not have the aircraft or the need for it.

The Air Force has reduced the number of fighters and other aircraft by 53 percent since 1989, while the base structure for those aircraft is 35 percent smaller. So they have to keep 18 percent more base structure than they need because we have been unable to show the political will to allow the military to do what they are pleading with us to allow them to do.

The chiefs come over here, the Secretary of Defense comes over here, year after year, and they say: We need additional rounds of base closures. So far, for the last few years at least, since the last round, we have been unwilling to show that political will to make those savings possible.

The report of Secretary Cohen has demonstrated some significant savings. People say: What about the savings? Can you really demonstrate savings? First of all, it seems to me, there is a commonsense demonstration that if

you have four stores and you are making a profit in three, you are going to close one of those stores.

So many of us always tell the Defense Department they ought to emulate the private sector more, to act a little bit more as a business, be a little bit more businesslike, to show some savings in order to make it possible for us to fund some other things needed in the defense budget.

The Department of Defense estimates—these are not ours, these are the Department of Defense estimates—that BRAC, so far, has saved us \$14.5 billion net. After 2001, when all of the four BRAC actions must be completed, what we call steady state savings, the savings will be \$5.7 billion per year. Those are not our estimates; those are the Department of Defense estimates: \$5.7 billion every year saved, starting after 2001, as a result of the four rounds we have had so far.

The CBO and the GAO reviewed the Department of Defense report. So our Budget Office and our General Accounting Office reviewed that report, and they agreed that base closure saves substantial amounts of money.

Based on the savings from the first four BRAC rounds, every year that we delay another base closure round, we deny the Defense Department, the taxpayers, and our Nation's defense about \$1.5 billion in annual savings we can never recoup.

Again, I know base closings can be painful. I know that probably as well as anybody because all three SAC bases, as I said, in my home State have been closed, and we are still working hard to overcome the economic blow to those communities. But we are working successfully. There is no question that the BRAC process is the fairest, most open, most objective way to close bases. Without it, we are not going to close bases. That is what history has shown.

Furthermore, in last year's bill we took steps to make the conveyance of BRAC property even easier for local communities. We have taken care of the objectionable part which surfaced last time when there was privatization in place which many thought had not been provided for by the Base Closure Commission but which the administration nonetheless allowed. We have cured that in this bill by saying the next Base Closure Commission must specifically authorize privatization in place for a closed facility or else it cannot occur.

Our forces need quality training. They need precision weapons. They do not need extra military bases. We just simply have higher priorities for our defense dollars than funding bases we no longer need.

As the Senator from Arizona said, we have paid a lot of attention, and should pay a lot of attention, to the chiefs' unfunded requirement lists. We should give, and do give, great weight to them. The Senator from Arizona listed the shortfalls the chiefs listed, totaling approximately \$20 billion.

There are a number of ways to fund those unfunded requirements. One is to use some of the surplus we have worked so hard to achieve by just simply adding to the budget for the Defense Department, to the so-called top line. But we are not limited to that approach, and it is a difficult approach.

Whether or not we pay down the national debt, whether or not we protect Medicare, whether or not we have a tax cut, or whether or not we spend some of that on education, there are very important competing interests for the surplus. We don't have to simply say: We will use the surplus and add money to the defense budget. We can find savings and reapply those savings to higher priorities. That is what past BRAC rounds are already doing for us, and that is what the BRAC rounds in this amendment will do for us in the future, if we are willing to do what the Secretary is asking us to do, not for himself but for his successors and, more importantly, for the men and women who will be serving under his successors.

Secretary Cohen said recently that his biggest disappointment as Secretary has been that the Department of Defense still has too much overhead and he has not been able to persuade his former colleagues, meaning us, to do what needs to be done to have more base closures. We all know Secretary Cohen. He was a colleague of most of us. I think every one of us trusted his judgment. We all know that BRAC affected him and his State when he served in this body, so this is not a request Secretary Cohen makes lightly. He knows what he is talking about and what he is asking of us.

We can't have it both ways. We can't say we want additional billions for health care, which we said today with the Warner amendment. We can't say we want additional billions for disability compensation, which was provided for in Senator REID's amendment. We can't talk about an additional pay raise for the military and all the other things we rightfully talk about and are concerned about and at the same time we maintain in place unneeded bases and structure. It is inconsistent. We can't have it both ways. It is an issue of political will and overcoming back-home concerns, understandable concerns but nonetheless overcoming those concerns to meet our long-term security needs.

Are we willing to do the necessary thing, the right thing to avoid the wasteful spending which is inherent when we maintain base structure we don't need, when we have reduced the size of our force by a third but our base structure by only 20 percent, and when we have classrooms and hangars that are no longer needed, a hundred other things that are no longer needed, because we don't have the political will to put in place an outside base-closing commission whose recommendations can be totally rejected if they are unfair by either the President or by us?

That is a reasonable amount of political will for which to ask in order to achieve the billions of dollars of savings that will be achieved by additional rounds of base closings.

I yield the floor and thank the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SESSIONS). The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we now have a unanimous consent request. Piece by piece we are working and succeeding in putting forth UC requests to keep this bill moving forward.

I ask unanimous consent that at 3 p.m. on Thursday, June 8, the Senate temporarily lay aside any pending amendments and Senator DASCHLE and/or his designee be recognized to offer his amendment re: HMO, and that there be 2 hours, equally divided, prior to the vote in relation to the amendment, with no second-degree amendments in order prior to the vote.

I further ask consent that during today's or tomorrow's session, Senator INHOFE be recognized for up to 10 minutes and Senator SNOWE be recognized for up to 30 minutes, each for general debate on the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I urge all Senators—we are trying to move towards a 6 o'clock deadline tonight with respect to first-degree amendments. We are making considerable progress on both sides.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I say to the manager of the bill, I have been working with our manager. We are working very hard to come up with a finite number of amendments. It is as the Senator indicated. The average number of amendments on this bill is about 111, and 5 and a half or 6 days on the bill. We would certainly hope to beat that record. But at the present time we are trying to get a list of amendments. We hope to have that sometime later tonight or the first thing in the morning.

Mr. WARNER. Let's continue to work toward 6 o'clock tonight. I think it is important we do so. So many Senators have plans, and we want to accommodate them.

Mr. REID. We will do our best.

Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, on behalf of the manager, I yield myself such time as I may need.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time which is utilized by the Senator from Oklahoma come from the side of the opponents of this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the understanding. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I wouldn't want anything I say to be misinterpreted by anyone as to how I am going to be voting on the defense authorization bill under consideration.

I am going to strongly support it, although it is strongly inadequate for the needs we are faced with right now. I am realistic enough to know that when we get into a rebuilding program, that is going to have to happen under a different administration than the administration we have had over the last 7½ years.

I was elected to the House of Representatives in 1986; my first term was 1987. It happened that a very smart young Congressman from Texas named Dick Armey made the decision that we were going to have to do something about excess infrastructure and devised a way, this smart guy who got his Ph.D. from the University of Oklahoma, to take politics out of the base realignment and closing process. I strongly supported him.

The first round voted on, I believe, in 1987, to be implemented in 1989, about which I spoke on the floor of the House and supported, was one that I felt this country did need. So for the first two of the four rounds we have already had, it was cherry-picking time. Yes, we closed bases and installations that resulted in a tremendous savings, and it was good.

The third and the fourth rounds didn't work out that way. We have to keep in mind that it had always been virtually impossible politically to close installations because of the politics involved. There are always Members of the House and Senate who don't want anything closed in their States. Consequently, this system that was devised, this BRAC process, was to take politics out. Everyone agreed, even though they didn't like the results, that there had to be a process free from politics to do that. It worked out for the first four rounds.

The last round that came through in 1995 was one where, among other things, the BRAC committee evaluated the air logistics centers. There are five of them in the United States, and each one was operating at that time at 50-percent capacity. Any logical business conclusion would demand that we close two of them and transfer the workload to the remaining three. I heard the distinguished Senator from Michigan talk about the process, about the fact that privatization in place is something that would be precluded in the next BRAC round, if he is successful in getting that authorized. I suggest that if somebody in the White House wants to violate the integrity of this process, it is not only privatization in place that will happen. He can find out some other way of doing it.

We are going to have, it now appears, one of two people as the next President of the United States. It will either be Vice President AL GORE or George W. Bush. In the case of Vice President GORE, let's remember what happened in the 1995 round. They made the recommendation to close two and transfer the workloads of the remaining three. They evaluated all five air logistics centers and determined that the two

least efficient ones were at McClellan Air Force Base in California and Kelly Air Force Base in Texas.

That being right before the election and both being in vote-rich swing States, the President and the Vice President went to McClellan and then to Kelly and said: Don't worry; even though they said that we are going to close your bases, we are not going to let that happen. We are going to—and just out of the air he grabbed a phrase—"privatize in place." Well, that made it very clear that if you really want to figure out a way to politicize the system, you can do it.

Who was it at that time who made the announcement out at McClellan in California and at Kelly in Texas? It wasn't President Clinton. It was Vice President AL GORE. I said when I began that one of those two individuals, GORE or Bush, is going to be the next President. I will fight to the bitter end, until at least the time we know who the next President is going to be, before I will vote to authorize future BRAC rounds in that one of the candidates, Vice President AL GORE, has already demonstrated that he will induce politics back into a system that is supposed to be free of politics. I think that has to be considered.

The second issue is, in this rebuilding process, I believe that if the next President of the United States is George W. Bush, having had personal conversations with him, he recognizes that we are in the same hollow force situation we were in in 1980 when Ronald Reagan became President and had to start a massive rebuilding program.

What is a massive rebuilding program today? The Joint Chiefs have all said, in testimony before our committee, with Senator LEVIN and myself present, that we need to have an additional \$140 billion over the next 6 years to reach the minimum expectations of the American people. What are the minimum expectations of the American people? It is to defend America on two regional fronts. This has been a concept most Americans think we can do today, and we cannot do that simultaneously.

So if we start this rebuilding process and it is going to be as significant as we think it is going to be, then we need to be looking at what our infrastructure needs will be then, not what they are today. If we have artificially lowered our force strength in this country to an artificially low level, we don't want to bring our infrastructure down to the same level because when we start to rebuild, we don't know what our infrastructure needs will be.

That is the whole point. We will know with the new administration, and we will be able to project in the future what that is going to be. The argument is used that we can't have it both ways and we need to have more money. That is true. I think we need to have a lot more money than we have right now. In fact, we have testimony from the service chiefs that, even with the bud-

et we have today, we are still inadequate to the degree of about \$11 billion-plus a year in order to start the rebuilding process and get to the point we just described.

Why would we be in a hurry to do this? When they talk about the fact that we are going to have savings, we know those savings aren't even going to take place in the best scenarios until, at the earliest, 2008. In fact, I will read out of a March 2, 2000, news article that quotes Bill Cohen. He said it will be somewhere between 2008 to 2015.

Now that is beyond the point, hopefully, that we have a crisis in this country. Our crisis is here today. There are a lot of people who would like to believe there is not a threat out there because the cold war is over. I look wistfully back to the days of the Cold War. At least we knew who the opposition was. We had two superpowers, and we had good intelligence on both sides. We knew what they had, and they knew what we had. We were able to address it. Today, we have all these rogue nations that all have weapons of mass destruction. We have countries that possess missiles that will reach to the United States of America, China, Russia, North Korea, and maybe others—warheads that could blow us up.

I come from Oklahoma, and I think most of the people realize it was just 5 years ago in April that we had the most devastating domestic terrorist attack in the history of America. It happened in Oklahoma. When you saw the pictures of that Murrah Federal Office Building, you saw parts of bodies that were stuck to the wall in that flaming building and the absolute devastation, and you stopped to realize that the smallest nuclear warhead known to man today is 1,000 times that powerful.

So here we are vulnerable, with no defense system at all on an incoming missile. Secondly, we are at one-half the force strength in 1991 during the Persian Gulf war. We have one-half of the Army divisions, one-half of the tactical air wings, one-half of the ships floating out there. Our force strength is down. At the same time, under this administration, we have had more deployments in the last 7 years than we had in the previous 40 years collectively. They have been in areas where we don't have national security interests. So we are taking these rare assets we have, and we are putting them into places such as Kosovo and Bosnia, where we should not have gone in the first place.

So facing that 1980 dilemma our rebuilding is going to have to start immediately for national security reasons. I would like to think that by 2008 we would be back where we were in 1986 after the rebuilding. I have no way of knowing that for sure, but let's hope that is the case.

Anyway, while the Senator from Arizona said it is not at all sure, he said, to be perfectly candid, that we are going to be able to save \$20 billion over

that period of time. There is one thing I suggest we are sure of, which is that the cost over the next 5 years is going to be \$2.6 billion. That means it is going to be negative during this time that we have to start the rebuilding process. Things, right now, are in a much more deplorable condition than America wants to believe.

As chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, I have had occasion to go to all the military installations around the world, and I don't like what I see. We have RPMs, real property maintenance accounts, that are supposed to be done immediately, taken care of, and they are not doing it. We have barracks in Fort Bragg where when it rains—and I was there when it rained—the roof has been leaking now for years. They are unable to fix that because they don't have the money to do it. Our troops are actually lying down over their equipment to keep it from rusting. It is a crisis.

You can go to the 21st TACOM over in Germany and look at our M-915 trucks. Many of them have over a million miles on them. They are spending as much in maintenance on each one over the next 3 years as it would take to buy a brand new truck. It is a crisis that we don't have the money to buy new trucks when we need them. It is not feasible to do it that way, but that is our only choice.

We don't have spare parts for airplanes. The cannibalized rate is higher than ever before. That means they bring in a crated F-100 engine to be put into an F-16, and in order to keep the F-16 there running with a fairly recent engine, they have to rob parts from this. It is highly labor intensive. Consequently, we are having a problem in retention that is not only with pilots, which is an all time low, but also the mechanics putting those parts in.

Our pilot retention in the Navy right now is below 20 percent. It costs between \$6 million and \$9 million to train each one of them. Yet over 80 percent of them are leaving and not taking the second full tour of duty. The mechanics fixing the planes are leaving, too. I have talked to these people, and they say this country has lost its sense of mission. It is not keeping its strength. We can't buy bullets for guns. Talk to the Air Force people who go out to the red flag exercises at Nellis in the desert. They have cut them down so they don't believe they are getting the necessary training to be combat ready and to compete.

Look at our modernization program. Now we have been cutting back on the Crusader Program, which the Army believes is the crown jewel—that thing we have to have for our launching capability on the ground. Look at our modernization program in airplanes. I was never more proud of a four-star general than I was the other day when he stood up and said America needs to know that the Russians now have the SU-34, an air-to-air, air combat vehicle

that is better than anything we have, including the F-15.

The average American would say we are fine and we have the very best of equipment. We used to, but we don't now. Look at the ranges we have now. We are faced with an issue of having to close—temporarily, I hope—the firing range on Vieques. That is going to have a dramatic effect on which installations to keep open. We won't have any place to have live fire training. We will lose such ranges as Cape Wrath in Scotland, Capo Teulada in southern Sardinia. Why? Because there is no justification to allow us to fire our artillery if we are not willing to do it on our own lands.

All of these things form a crisis. When I said I look back wistfully at the days of the cold war, it isn't just me. I was redeemed the other day at our subcommittee meeting when we had George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, there. This happened to be telecast live on C-SPAN. I said:

Right now, we are in the most threatened position that we have been in as a Nation in the history of this country since the Revolutionary War. Would you respond to that?

He said:

Absolutely correct. We are in the most threatened position.

It is because of the combined reasons of deployments, force strength and, of course, not having the national missile defense systems. All those will be elements of rebuilding. Who knows what our needs are going to be when we start this rebuilding. I hope the next President will be a Republican, and that we will be in a position to rebuild our defense system. When that happens, we don't know what the elements of that system are going to be.

Lastly—and I don't want to overdo the time here—we are asked this question by the distinguished Senator from Arizona: I challenge my colleagues to name any military expert who says we should not have another BRAC round.

You can name a lot of them.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan said in an article in the *Washington Post* on May 14, 1998, when we were having the same debate, that Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen is correct when he says that the Department of Defense needs the support of Congress to have a cost-effective national defense. But the Secretary is blaming Congress for problems that are not of its making. More importantly, Cohen is ignoring the administration's own complicity in creating funding difficulties for defense and vastly is exaggerating the potential problems that could occur if Congress fails to heed his advice. Cohen wants Congress to authorize two new rounds of base closures to free up an additional \$3 billion a year for buying badly needed new weapons. But what Cohen has not stated is that these savings would not begin until a decade from now.

I think that is the significant thing. These savings would set in after a pe-

riod of time that we would be going through this rebuilding process.

I hold him up as one expert who says we should not do a round at this time.

Another is the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Jim Jones, who said that he knew of no Marine installation he would recommend for closure. He said: We cannot give it away or we will never get it back.

I don't think anyone is going to say that Gen. Jim Jones is not a military expert. He has one of the most distinguished careers of any of them.

Adm. Jay L. Johnson, the CNO, said his view was "not far" from that of Jones. He said he is concerned about permanently losing training ranges, air space, and access to the sea.

The Chief of the Army, General Shinseki, said he would support some closures in the future but said that the Army needs to decide what its future force level is going to be before it can judge base consolidation with certainty.

We have three of the four chiefs of our services saying if we are going to do it we should wait and do it after we determine what our force strength should be in the future and not do it before that time.

For the combination of those reasons, there is certainly no rush to do it and do it in this bill. Certainly I would be willing to talk about this after the next administration comes in. It wouldn't make any difference anyway because the first round wouldn't be until 2003.

I think Dick Armey did a wonderful job back in 1987. I think it served a very useful purpose—particularly the first three BRAC rounds that we were able to accomplish. They saved a lot of money. We are now enjoying some of the savings. However, the amounts that we saved have far exceeded what we lost by the cleanup costs. I don't think those estimates would be any more accurate if we were to go through two new rounds.

Keep in mind that every succeeding round is going to yield fewer benefits than the round before. I certainly think the Senator from Rhode Island, with his background and experience, knows that if you are going to start a closing process, you pick off the cherries to start with and accumulate those savings.

I conclude by saying that we need to look at them in the next administration after we find out what our force strength is going to be, and after we find out what degree of rebuilding we will have to undergo in order to protect America and meet the minimum expectations of the American people.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. REED. Mr. President, I seek to be recognized under the time of Senator McCain.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am authorized to yield the Senator from Rhode Island whatever time he may need.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. President, I rise in support of this amendment to authorize two rounds of base closings in the years 2003 and 2005. I commend particularly Senator McCain and Senator Levin, the prime sponsors of this legislation.

We all realize that base closing is a very sensitive issue because it affects dramatically all of the communities that have military installations. My home State, as some States, has not been immune to base closings. We had a significant presence of the Navy in Narragansett Bay. That presence has been diminished over the last several years. But we still have a strong and vibrant naval presence in the form of the Naval War College, and the Naval Undersea Warfare Laboratory. All of these contribute significantly not only to our national defense but to our economy in Rhode Island.

We approach this understanding that it is a very sensitive issue. But it is an issue that we must address. It is an issue that requires determination at this point so we can, indeed, free up the resources that are necessary for the modernization of our services.

The reality is quite compelling that we have excess capacity in our military establishment in terms of infrastructure. We have reduced the force structure by 36 percent since 1989. Yet we only managed to reduce the infrastructure—the buildings and the facilities—by 21 percent. This mismatch is obvious. This mismatch causes us to continue to spend in maintenance and operational expenses hundreds of millions of dollars a year minimally for facilities that we don't need. As a result, I think we have to recognize that we should authorize another round of base closings. The Department of Defense estimates they are maintaining 23 percent of excess infrastructure which is sapping resources that they could use for a host of critical needs—modernization, training, and quality of life for servicemen and servicewomen throughout our military.

Indeed, we hear so often that one of the persistent complaints is that Government should be as business; that Government should be run as efficiently as business. No business would suggest that it reduce its personnel dramatically and not make comparable reductions in the infrastructure and the facilities that have been in place for more than 50 years, in many cases.

We still have the residue of the World War II buildup. There were so many posts put up because we had to at that point train millions of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and coastguardsmen to staff an Army that was many, many times larger than it is today and a Navy that was comparably larger. Yet those facilities are still on our rolls because we had been unable to effectively initiate base-closing rounds after our first few rounds.

We know that the base-closing process yields savings. It has been estimated by the Department of Defense that past closures will produce net savings of about \$14 billion by the end of the fiscal year 2001, and they estimate annual savings thereafter will be about \$5.7 billion. This is the result of decisions we already made, base-closing rounds that have already taken place, and the bases that have already been closed. That is a lot of money, particularly as we all are concerned about additional resources for defense.

Another way to look at that is to consider how much more difficult it would be to buy new platforms, to provide pay increases, and to enhance the quality of life through improved houses and through improved health care if we were still maintaining and spending billions of dollars on these facilities that have been closed.

The Department of Defense estimates that two additional rounds of base closings would generate annual savings of about \$23 billion after they are implemented. Again, those are significant resources that can be used for programs that we consider to be critical to the defense of the Nation and the well-being of our men and women in uniform.

Both the Congressional Budget Office and the GAO agree that the Department of Defense continues to maintain excess capacity and that base closings will result in substantial savings. These are objective analyses of the current situation with respect to bases in our country.

The argument has been made that, well, we go out and we close these bases, and all of the savings are just eaten up by environmental remediation. I remind everyone that the requirement to remediate the environment is not a function of closing the bases. It is an ongoing responsibility of the Department of Defense. It is mandated regardless of whether a base remains open or closed. It is part of our lore.

The Defense Department, as every other Federal entity and private entity, has responsibilities to restore degraded environment.

What happens in a base closing is, as part of the process not only to close the base but also to make the base useful for civilian pursuits and community economic development, this environmental cleanup is accelerated. One could argue that accelerated environmental cleanup simply discharges a duty that already exists and also, importantly, makes these facilities much more amenable to economic development and private benefit for the local communities, which is a plus, not a minus.

The issue before the Senate should be addressed, as we so often address it, in the context of advice we have received from individuals charged with the administration of our military policy. The Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries, and many others have com-

mented upon the desirability of the additional base closing rounds. In his testimony before the Armed Services Committee on February 8 of this year, General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs stated: We continue to have excess infrastructure, and any funds applied toward maintaining unneeded facilities diminish our capacity to redirect those funds towards higher priority modernization programs.

At the same hearing, Secretary of Defense Cohen requested funding to implement two more BRAC rounds, so that: scarce defense dollars will not continue to be spent on excess infrastructure; rather, on the vital needs of our Armed Forces.

Some of my colleagues argue that the base-closing process is appropriate, the need is there, but the base-closing process in 1994 was politically tainted; that politics and not sound defense policy dictated what would stay open, what would be closed, and the schedule for closures.

This amendment clearly obviates the potential for that by declaring that the base-closing rounds will take place in the year 2003 and in 2005. There will be a new administration. Any aspersions to the operations of this administration should have no effect whatever when we consider the legislation included in this amendment.

I believe we can go forward with the notion that if we act today, we will have a much firmer picture of our strategic challenges, our strategic posture by the year 2003, so that we will in fact be anticipating those strategic decisions by giving our military leaders, both civilian and military, the tools to implement their concepts to meet the new challenges, the new threats we see all around the world.

This issue, as I said, is difficult. It impinges on the communities we all represent. Anytime we authorize a base closing round, essentially we put all of our facilities in play. We all run the risk of losing a facility which is a vital part of our community, disrupting our community. But that is the very narrow view, a very parochial view.

The broader national view is that we need to eliminate the excess capacity. We need to free up resources for higher priority initiatives of the Department of Defense. We need, also, to move away from this essentially still World War II infrastructure to a much more reduced but more efficient logistical and facility base for the future of this new century. Until we are able to eliminate some of these older posts, some of these posts that were designed for and that were extremely important in World War II and throughout the cold war years, we will not have the resource to do what we have to do to face the future.

I suggest we adopt this amendment because it gives us the ability to fund higher priority functions. It gives us the ability to eliminate unnecessary facilities. We simply can't have it both

ways. We can't continue to argue for modernization, for enhancement of the quality of life for our troops, for additional training dollars, and still cling to facilities that are not needed, still insist that we maintain a World War II and cold war infrastructure as we face the challenges of this new century.

I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, give our defense leaders the tools to reduce their overhead as they have reduced the force structure, so that we have a more efficient, more effective military force for this new century.

I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. How much time do the proponents have?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eight minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 6 minutes to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. VOINOVICH. I rise today to support the amendment offered by my distinguished colleagues, Senator MCCAIN and Senator LEVIN.

Between fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001, defense spending in our Nation will increase by more than 6 percent, nearly three times the rate of inflation. Under normal circumstances, I would likely oppose legislation that would increase defense spending at such a rate. However, we have a crisis in the military right now with respect to readiness, recruitment, retention, procurement, modernization; and the crisis must be met immediately. I will support more money for defense.

Having said that, I believe in the long term the Defense Department must focus on those activities that will help bring down their overall costs. Part of the problem we run into in this body is our inability to admit that priorities can and should be established by the Department of Defense. We need to focus on ways in which the Department can cut back on some of its expenditures and use the moneys allocated more wisely. In other words, we need to get a bigger bang for our buck. We need to work harder and smarter, and we need to do more with less.

One of the ways we can do that is to eliminate those military facilities that no longer serve a useful purpose. I know that is not easy. We have experienced the pain of closing bases in Ohio with the closure of Newark Air Force Base, Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, and the Defense Electronic Supply Center. Even with the closures and the pain we went through, we understood that it was necessary if we were going to allocate resources where they were really needed in the Department of Defense.

According to a 1998 Department of Defense report, and as stated by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, our Armed Forces currently have 23 percent more military base capacity than is needed in this Nation. Think of that, 23 percent. Keeping this much extra capacity adds up. Right now, we spend billions of dollars annually. We will keep on spending that money until we

acknowledge that we have excess capacity and exercise the will to shut it down.

As difficult as this may sound, we have been through this process before. We know that. The Department of Defense reports that because of the base closings that have been conducted, we will have saved \$14 billion a year by the end of 2001. The projected net savings, annual savings, for the first four rounds have been estimated at nearly \$5.7 billion in fiscal year 2001, a savings that should occur annually. We have that money, and it has been reallocated.

This amendment initiates another two rounds of base closings in 2003 and 2005. In his testimony earlier this year before the Armed Services Committee, Secretary Cohen stated that if we initiate two more rounds of base closings, this will save about \$3 billion per year that we can use for some of the needs we have today in our Defense Department.

I am here today to urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I think there are those who say we ought not to do it at this time. I think we all know that if we don't get started now and start the procedure and do it today, do it this year, we are not going to be able to move forward in 2003 and 2005 when we project the base closings will occur.

I say again, I know this is a tough amendment to support for some of my colleagues, but for the good of our Nation I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today in strong opposition to this amendment that seeks to authorize two additional BRAC rounds in fiscal years 2003 and 2005.

I have been a steadfast opponent to future BRAC proposals. This Administration has proposed BRAC legislation for the last 3 years. Each year, this administration has asked us to address the same issue. Yet over the last three years, nothing has changed.

First, the estimated savings achieved by closing bases are just that—estimated; and second, the inconsistent application of the BRAC process—which this Administration so readily demonstrated after the 1995 round, will result in lost training areas or access to airspace or the sea space by our military forces. This will result in degraded force readiness and will be to the overall detriment of our Armed Forces.

Advocates of base closures allege that billions of dollars will be saved, despite the fact that there is no consensus on the numbers among different sources. These estimates vary because, as the Congressional Budget Office explains, BRAC savings are really “avoided costs.” Because these avoided costs are not actual expenditures and cannot be recorded and tracked by the DoD accounting systems, they cannot be validated which has led to inaccurate and overinflated estimates.

For example, as revealed by the General Accounting Office, land sales from

the first base closure round in 1988 were estimated by Pentagon officials to produce \$2.4 billion in revenue, however, as of 1995, the actual revenue generated was only \$65.7 million. That is about 25 percent of the expected value. And what was the real up-front cost to generate these so called savings? No one really knows.

This type of overly optimistic accounting establishes a very poor foundation for initiating a policy that will have a permanent impact on both the military and the civilian communities surrounding these bases.

I also want to address the issue of the up-front costs involved in the base closure process. This appears to be noticeably absent from the debate. The facts reveal that there are billions of dollars in costs incurred to close a base.

This includes over \$1 billion in Federal financial assistance provided to each affected community—a cost paid by the Federal Government, not through BRAC budget accounts, and therefore is not counted in the estimates. And more significantly, there is \$9.6 billion in environmental cleanup costs as a result of the first four BRAC rounds—a conservative figure according to a December 1998 GAO report—a number that will continue to grow.

The administration and proponents of additional BRAC rounds are quick to point out that reducing infrastructure has not kept pace with our post cold war military force reductions. They say that bases must be downsized proportionate to the reduction in total force strength.

However, this thinking is based on the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. Since the end of the cold war we have reduced the military force structure by 36 percent and have reduced the defense budget by 40 percent. But now I ask you how much are we employing that force?

Let me point out that although the size of the armed services has decreased, the number of contingencies that our service members have been called upon to respond to has dramatically increased—the Navy/Marine Corps team alone responded to 58 contingency missions between 1980 and 1989, and between 1990 and 1999 they responded to 192—a remarkable threefold increase!

During the cold war, the U.N. Security Council rarely approved the creation of peace operations. The U.N. implemented only 13 such operations between 1948 and 1978, and none from 1979 to 1987. Since 1988, by contrast, 38 peace operations have been established—nearly three times as many than the previous 40 years.

In hearing after hearing this year, the Armed Services Committee has heard from our leaders in uniform how our current military forces are being stretched too thin, and that estimates predicted in the fiscal year 1997 QDR underestimated how much the United States would be using its military. Clearly, the benefits of the peace dividend are not being realized.

So, we are seeing first hand that the 1997 QDR force levels underestimated how much our military force was intended to be used, that our military force is being called upon now more than what military strategies estimated, and that our forces are being stretched to cover a wide range of operations.

These force levels have to be revisited, and if the trend for current deployments remains true, I would expect that these force levels may have to be increased. So would we then go and buy back this property that we have given up in future BRAC rounds to build new bases—I think not.

Before we legislate defense-wide policy that will reduce the size and number of training areas critical to our force readiness, the Department of Defense needs a comprehensive plan that identifies the operational and maintenance infrastructure required to support the services national security requirements. The peacekeeping and humanitarian missions clearly require a greater force structure than expected.

It has become clear that we are committing more military forces—and more often—than we had planned or anticipated. There is no straight line corollary between the size of our forces and the infrastructure required to support them.

We must realize that once property is given up and remediated, it is permanently lost as a military asset for all practical purposes. In the words of the Chief of Naval Operations, “we cannot give it away or we will never get it back.”

In the full committee hearings and the subcommittee hearings that the Armed Services Committee held this past year, the Chief of Naval Operations and fleet commanders testified that the QDR established force levels are not sufficient to support their operational requirements. A report released earlier this year by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the submarine force levels needed to be raised from the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and I anticipate that the next QDR will support an increase in the “300 ship” Navy as well.

Therefore, given the elasticity in the QDR numbers, it would be premature and costly to base permanent BRAC decisions on estimates that we know are not being realized.

Finally, it would be hypocritical to say that opponents of additional BRAC rounds are politicizing the process. Politics weigh heavily on both sides of the debate. In December 1998, the General Accounting Office reported that of the 499 recommendations made by the four BRAC commissions, 48 were amended and removed from the closure list. And we are all well aware of the Administration’s “intervention” in the last round that resulted in the “privatization-in-place” of the McClellan and Kelly Air Force Base depots instead of their closure.

I want to protect the military’s critical readiness and operational assets. I

want to protect the home port berthing for our ships and submarines, the airspace that our aircraft fly in and the training areas and ranges that our armed forces require to support and defend our Nation. We cannot degrade the readiness of our armed forces by chasing illusive savings.

I reaffirm my opposition to legislation authorizing additional BRAC rounds and encourage my colleagues to join me to vote against it. I urge my colleagues to defeat this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, Senator INHOFE, I believe, desires some time, and then I will yield to Senator HATCH for 10 minutes.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, if I can respond to a couple of the statements of the Senator from Ohio and the Senator from Rhode Island, first of all, I know the Senator from Rhode Island is sincere when he says this would not take place until 2003; it would be a new administration. But we have to keep in mind that administration could very well be a Gore administration. It was Vice President Gore who was very instrumental in politicizing the system before. I think that is significant.

I would say also to my friend from Ohio, while there are savings that would be effected, the savings, according to Secretary Cohen, would not even start until 2008. By that time, we are hoping we will have been able to use every available dollar to get us out of the situation we are in right now. I think that is very significant. Our crisis is now. Our crisis is a rebuilding program for the next 4 to 5 years.

I yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, as somebody who lived through the last BRAC process, and lived through it in a very intensive way, I have to say the process did not work. Everyone lost: the taxpayers, the workers in Utah, as well as those in the losing states of California and Texas, and the Air Force's state of military readiness. The process was too politicized, as I elaborate upon in my later remarks. It was a pitiful exercise, in many respects.

There were some good things about it, I have to acknowledge, but most of it was not.

Utah had the Air Force's highest rated air logistics command in the nation, bar none. Nobody could compare with it. It was listed No. 1. It made the top of every chart. The workforce and its achievements were models of efficiency. But, after the President finished tampering with the BRAC results, we had to fight like dogs against raging wolves to prove repeatedly what the BRAC had already determined.

No sooner did we get through all that process—time after time appearing at hearings, appearing at major meetings considering BRAC, and considering what should be done, making our case over and over, and winning, winning,

winning—this administration came in and immediately undertook questionable steps to sully the BRAC process.

My experience gives me little confidence in this process. And it's not done yet: we won't have the process completed until late 2001, six years after the BRAC decision. I do not care who is in charge. When you politicize the base closing process, it just leads to the type of anquish I and my colleagues are expressing here today.

How can we forget the major problems between San Antonio and McClellan, both of which were installations important to their respective States but did not reach the high standards of Utah's Hill Air Force Base. If Hill Air Force Base had come in last, I would not be here arguing today, nor back then, to keep it alive.

Let's not forget that we need high military readiness—it is a deterrent that allows for peace through strength. But that means having a system that accentuates everything that is good about our military, like Hill Air Force Base. I would not back a base that was not doing the job.

But in this particular case, McClellan had been judged by the Air Force and the BRAC commission as deficient, as was the San Antonio Air Logistics Center at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. Yet, we wanted to help Kelly, if we could, because it had a high percentage of Hispanic workers. But the brutal facts showed that Kelly could not measure up. Neither did McClellan.

Then came the administration's misguided and downright wrongful attempts to save some of those jobs.

Mr. President, Ronald Reagan immediately comes to mind when I consider today's debate on BRAC . . . "Here we go again." We're being asked to engage in the same type of taxpayer deception that characterized the 1995 BRAC. We promise savings, and deliver nothing. All BRAC produces is a politicized outcome that makes a mockery of the independent commission process.

We need to remind ourselves why we sought a BRAC in the first place: It was because we did not feel Congress could be trusted. In fact, it was the President who couldn't be trusted. Let's look at some facts, facts especially painful to states which lost bases, and those that had to defend what they had won again, again and again. I refer to Utah's Ogden Air Logistics Center at Hill AFB—three times we had to compete for workloads that the BRAC awarded us, but which the President delayed sending to Utah.

The President intervened in the BRAC 95 process to secure California's 54 electoral votes in the 1996 election. My good friends from California—Senators BOXER and FEINSTEIN—publicly stated that they would get relief from the White House after BRAC decided to close McClellan Air Force Base in Sacramento. They succeeded, and at the cost of work that ought to have gone to Georgia and Utah, but which was delayed.

The President called the BRAC decision to close McClellan an "outrage", in a Rose Garden statement. He actually rejected the decision of his own independent commission. In its place, the President put great pressure on the Air Force to sully an already messy situation. He called this "privatization in place." He attempted to keep the jobs which were intended to be distributed to Utah, Oklahoma and Georgia in California by forcing a public-private competition that GAO rejected as unfair. It had the effect of leaving in California as many as 3,200 jobs for as long as six years after the BRAC decision, or conveniently after the year 2000 presidential election.

The BRAC monies designated to move jobs and equipment to Utah and elsewhere were mismanaged. They were spent to improve the very facilities at McClellan AFB that the BRAC had intended to close! This, the President and his gang thought, would make it easier for the base to attract private contractors to perform the privatized work in place.

The delay caused by this contrived competition cost the taxpayers an additional \$500 million, according to GAO, to sustain the bases' workloads in place, despite the decision of BRAC to ship the workloads to the other Air Force depots.

In May 1998, as many of you will remember, the Secretary of the Air Force was embarrassed by a memo written by his office urging that the Lockheed-Martin bid for the California work win the award. This behavior, to my mind, remains one of the most egregious violations of the Ethics Reform Act I have seen in my 24 years in the Senate. This act prohibits precisely the type of collusion in which the Secretary of the Air Force participated.

It was so outrageous that Secretary Bill Cohen, to his everlasting credit, removed the Secretary of the Air Force from the selection team that would oversee the public-private competition for the McClellan workload.

But this was not the end of the Clinton Administration's meddling; they directed the Air Force to deny the GAO, the congressional watchdog agency responsible for overseeing the expenditure of taxpayers' funds, access to the cost-data and other information used by the Air Force to put together competition for the McClellan workload.

As might be expected, the long-term effect of this mischievous meddling had a cost on readiness. Delays in workload transfer were directly responsible for a severe F-16 parts shortage in 1999. Also, there is a suspicious relationship between the delayed workload transfer and the KC-135 tanker problems early this year when the fleet was grounded because of a rear stabilizer malfunction, a problem akin to the cause of the Alaskan Airline aircraft off the California coast. My personal inquiry into the KC-135 issue demonstrated that if the entire KC-135 team responsible for

the repair of this part of the aircraft had been transferred to Utah in a timely way, as directed by the BRAC, the design flaw would probably never have occurred.

There is an answer to BRAC: let Congress endorse the decisions of the military services, without the filter of presidential intervention, whether by a BRAC-like commission or any other procedure. The military services know better than any other body the best and the worst of their installations, the ones that pay their own way, and the ones that drain the taxpayers' pockets. After my state's experience with the BRAC process, I am more inclined to trust this body to evaluate the services' recommendations.

I see that we have a very important guest. I will be happy to yield the floor at this time for Senator HELMS.

VISIT TO THE SENATE BY THEIR MAJESTIES KING ABDULLAH II AND QUEEN RANIA AL-ABDULLAH OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senate stand in recess for 7 minutes so the Senators may pay their respects to the Honorable King of Jordan and his lovely lady.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 4:56 p.m. recessed until 5:04 p.m.; whereupon the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. VOINOVICH).

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001—Continued

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

AMENDMENT NO. 3197

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the pending business is the amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona; am I not correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 33 minutes.

Mr. WARNER. It is my intention to yield back the time, I say to my colleagues. I will wait momentarily, and we can proceed to the vote. Has the vote been ordered, Mr. President?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have not been ordered.

Mr. WARNER. I ask for the yeas and nays on the McCain-Levin amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we jointly yield back all time. The vote may proceed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 3197. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. DOMENICI) and the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CRAPO) are necessarily absent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced—yeas 35, nays 63, as follows:—

The result was announced—yeas 35, nays 63, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 120 Leg.]

YEAS—35

Bayh	Kennedy	Moynihan
Biden	Kerrey	Reed
Bryan	Kerry	Reid
Byrd	Kohl	Robb
Chafee, L.	Kyl	Rockefeller
DeWine	Landrieu	Roth
Feingold	Leahy	Smith (OR)
Gramm	Levin	Thompson
Grassley	Lieberman	Voinovich
Hagel	Lincoln	Wellstone
Harkin	Lugar	Wyden
Jeffords	McCain	

NAYS—63

Abraham	Dodd	Lott
Akaka	Dorgan	Mack
Allard	Durbin	McConnell
Ashcroft	Edwards	Mikulski
Baucus	Enzi	Murkowski
Bennett	Feinstein	Murray
Bingaman	Fitzgerald	Nickles
Bond	Frist	Roberts
Boxer	Gorton	Santorum
Breaux	Graham	Sarbanes
Brownback	Grams	Schumer
Bunning	Gregg	Sessions
Burns	Hatch	Shelby
Campbell	Helms	Smith (NH)
Cleland	Hollings	Snowe
Cochran	Hutchinson	Specter
Collins	Hutchison	Stevens
Conrad	Inhofe	Thomas
Coverdell	Inouye	Thurmond
Craig	Johnson	Torricelli
Daschle	Lautenberg	Warner

NOT VOTING—2

Crapo Domenici

The amendment (No. 3197) was rejected.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to keep all Senators informed. We are making progress on this bill. We are still anxious to get indications from Senators with regard to their amendments. We are having very good cooperation on both sides. I will address that later this evening.

Under the existing order, I believe it is now the amendment of the Senator from Virginia. Am I not correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that this amendment be laid aside temporarily.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the disposition of the Wellstone amendment—that will now be the pending business as soon as I yield the floor. Is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. WARNER. Following the disposition of the Wellstone amendment, which is subject to a 30-minute time agreement, I ask unanimous consent

that Senator ROBERT SMITH be recognized to offer his amendment regarding security clearances on which there will be 30 minutes equally divided with no amendments in order prior to the vote in relation to the amendment.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I will object, unless I can be assured that I have an agreement to 1 hour equally divided. If I can be put in the order after Senator SMITH, I will not object.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I object. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I am trying to move things forward. Senator HELMS and I are working out language. I think we will have an agreement, but I thought I would start speaking on this amendment so we can move this forward.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, this is a sense-of-the-Senate amendment that deals with the importance of condemning the use of child soldiers in dozens of countries around the world. It is also about very important protocol that is being developed and the importance of building support for it and moving forward as expeditiously as possible on this question.

Today, there are 300,000 children who are currently serving as soldiers in current armed conflicts. Child soldiers are being used in 30 countries around the world, including Colombia, Lebanon, and Sierra Leone. Child soldiers witness and are often forced to participate in horrible atrocities.

I am talking about 10-year-olds being abducted, forced to participate in horrible atrocities, including beheadings, amputations, rape, and the burning of people alive. These young combatants are forced to participate in all kinds of contemporary warfare. They wield AK-47s and M 16s on the front lines. They serve as human mine detectors. They participate in suicide missions. They carry supplies and act as spies, messengers, or lookouts.

One 14-year-old girl abducted in January 1999 by the Revolutionary United Front, a rebel group in Sierra Leone, reported to human rights observers:

I've seen people get their hands cut off, a ten-year-old girl raped and then die, and so many men and women burned alive * * * So many times I just cried inside my heart because I didn't dare cry out loud.

Mr. President, no child should experience such trauma. No child should experience such pain.

Last year, I introduced a resolution expressing the sense of the Congress