

other industrial nation. In a recent year, firearms killed no children in Japan, 19 children in Great Britain, 57 children in Germany, 109 children in France, 153 children in Canada—and 5,285 children in the United States.

Shame on the National Rifle Association, shame on the Republican Party, and shame on the United States Congress for tolerating figures like that. My fervent hope is that the Million Mom March will succeed where so many other efforts in recent years have failed, and that Congress at long last will be persuaded to act. The irresistible force of the Million Mom March is about to meet the immovable object of Congress—and I intend to do all I can to see that the immovable object of Congress finally moves.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I am proud today to recognize and welcome the visit to Washington, DC by a group of my fellow West Virginians for this Sunday's "Million Mom March."

The Million Mom March, coinciding with Mothers' Day, is a grassroots effort led by people across the country—Dads and Kids included—dedicated to educating our children and our nation about guns; both the dangers posed by their misuse and the tragic toll this misuse has taken on our country's youth, their friends, and their families. The people who attend this event here in Washington will have gathered in the parking lots of schools, churches, and synagogues across the country, and will have come here to let those of us in Congress know, in no uncertain terms, that we need to be doing more to protect our children.

I am pleased to say that among those relaying that message this weekend will be a delegation of Moms from West Virginia, many with their entire families in tow. As they point out, one difference many of these West Virginian Moms may have from others participating in this weekend's events is that they also have hunters in their own families. In fact, it would not surprise me at all to find out that more than a few of the folks marching were hunters themselves.

In West Virginia, we respect the rights of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms, and we consider parents and children hunting together to be a time-honored tradition. Yet our state legislature has already taken the responsible step of limiting possession and legal ownership of handguns to those 18 and older. Now the West Virginian Moms join with their counterparts from around the nation to demand that Members of Congress respond appropriately to the epidemic of American children killed and injured by accidents and crime involving guns.

Unfortunately, all too often when we in Congress discuss the misuse of guns, the debate turns into a pointless back-and-forth about whether we have too many gun laws, or too few. Rather than engage in that debate, I would just invite my colleagues to consider these staggering statistics:

One in 910 American children die because of the misuse of guns before the age of 20.

American children under the age of 15 are twelve times more likely to die from gunfire than children in 25 other industrialized countries combined.

Seventy-seven percent of murder victims aged 13–17 are killed by a firearm.

Last year:

4,205 children and teens were killed by gunfire;

2,562 were murdered by gunfire;

1,262 committed suicide using a firearm; and

306 died from an accidental shooting.

Each day:

Two children under the age of 5 are murdered;

Six children and youths under 20 commit suicide;

Ten children and youths under 20 are homicide victims; and

Twelve children and youth under 20 die from firearm misuse.

Between 1979 and 1997, gunfire killed nearly 80,000 children and teens in America—25,000 more than the total number of American soldiers killed in battle in Vietnam.

Firearms wounded an additional 320,000 children during this same period.

In that period, more than 25,000 children took their own lives with firearms, and nearly 10,000 died as a result of an accidental shooting.

In 1997, my home state of West Virginia lost 23 children younger than 20 to firearm misuse, up seven from the previous year. Nine were murdered, ten committed suicide, and three were the victims of accidents.

Mr. President, last year the United States Senate passed the Juvenile Justice bill. Among its provisions, this bill contained some courageous efforts to address the culture of crime and violence in which our children are being raised. The bill also featured some common-sense measures designed to make guns safer, and provisions to keep firearms out of the hands of criminals. The Senate also sought to close the so-called gun show loophole. Sadly, our seeming inability to have any discussion about guns has kept the conferees on this bill from reporting back to the respective houses with a version for final passage.

My purpose here today is to join the Million Moms in calling attention to the bottom line. We live in a society in which the lives of children are tragically at risk because of the virtually unfettered availability of guns. Our respect for the constitutional rights of gun owners should never overwhelm the love and caring we have for our children. I commend the Moms, from West Virginia and around the country, who come to remind us what our priorities should be.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has the floor.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2001—Continued

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I make a parliamentary inquiry. Are we now out of morning business and on the bill?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are on the military construction bill.

Mr. WARNER. Fine.

Mr. President, in the course of the deliberations before the Senate Appropriations Committee on this measure, the distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia, Mr. BYRD—former majority leader of the Senate; one who has served in the Senate 41 years—brought before that committee an amendment entitled the Byrd-Warner amendment dealing with the issue of the balance of power in the Constitution between the executive branch, the President, and the legislative branch, the Congress of the United States, as it relates to matters of foreign policy but, most particularly, as it relates to the matter—and perhaps the most important entrusted to both the President of the United States and the Congress—the most important matter of when the President, as Commander in Chief, sends beyond the shores of our great Nation men and women in uniform into harm's way in the cause of peace.

This week, those of us on the Republican side of the aisle had our weekly luncheon, as did our good friends and colleagues on the other side of the aisle. At our luncheon, Senator STROM THURMOND stood and asked if we could observe a moment of silence as he recounted the closing day of World War II, when hostilities ceased in Europe—the bloodiest of all wars, in which 292,000 men and women, wearing the uniform of the Armed Services of the United States, lost their lives.

You could have heard a pin drop in that caucus as that great soldier, as that great statesman, asked for remembrance of the veterans of those generations.

In a very humble way, I have a brief memory. At age 17, I joined the Navy. It was January of 1945. I was simply trained, as were thousands of other youngsters my age, because at that point in January, in the winter of 1945, both the war in Europe and the war in the Pacific were inconclusive. I simply was at training command, waiting for the invasion of Japan. I thank God that last battle in the Pacific never occurred, not only for myself but for millions of others who would have been involved.

I look back very humbly on the modest contribution I made in uniform, both in that war and again during the Korean war, where I served in the Marines for a brief period.

The military did far more for me than I did for the military. Today, that 17-year-old sailor as of 1945 is privileged to be the chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, a dream I thought would never be fulfilled.

I again reiterate, my service was modest. On both sides of the aisle, there are men who have served and show the scars of war, who understand the burden on the President of the United States as he sends forth troops into harm's way. I respect these individuals greatly for their knowledge, for having borne the pain in the field of battle, unlike myself. But I was there when others did.

The point of this is the gravity of the decision to send forth our people—the sons and the daughters of people from every village and town across this Nation.

I recount World War II. I then go to Korea, again, where I served as a young Marine officer. Over 50,000 men and women lost their lives in that conflict.

During the course of the Vietnam conflict, I was privileged to serve in the Navy as Undersecretary of the Navy and then as Secretary of the Navy. I was there 5 years, 4 months, and 3 days. Over 50,000 men and women lost their lives, not to mention the number of those wounded.

The point I make is, the last time this Nation declared war was World War II. Yet since that time we have sent men and women into harm's way, beyond our shores, over 100 times.

We never declared war in the Korean conflict. As a matter of fact, it was called the forgotten war. We never declared war in Vietnam, a war that not only brought tremendous casualties on the field of battle and a wrenching experience to the families—as each war does—but it divided this Nation. Indeed, it was the people of this Nation who rose up and, finally, through their elected representatives in Congress, provided the basis for the withdrawal of our troops from that conflict.

That is what this amendment is all about. It is a decision of power between the executive and the legislative branches. It is assuming the responsibility—the responsibility to join with the President or not join with the President—in sending those people beyond our shores. No greater responsibility rests upon a Member of Congress than that.

I have had the privilege to know Presidents. I have had the privilege to learn from my elder statesmen in this Chamber—foremost among them John Stennis, John Tower, Barry Goldwater, and “Scoop” Jackson, all of whom worked on the Armed Services Committee—of how Presidents of our great Nation face up to that decision to go or not to go.

Stennis used to tell the story that Lyndon Johnson told him. The President used to say to Stennis: When that phone rings at night, and there is a troubled spot in the world, and I have to make the decision, Do I or do I not send those troops? I always thought, Where is an aircraft carrier, an island of America? What is the nearest force structure of the U.S. to this conflict?

It is a big decision. Read the biographies of our Presidents. It is a tough

decision. Congress has an obligation to share with the President in the making of that decision. That is my point. That is what this amendment is about.

We have not really fully shared in that decisionmaking since World War II. Yes, we have the power to declare war under the Constitution. We also have the sole power over the purse—the power to decide whether that President can utilize the taxpayers' contribution each year in the operations of the United States.

Just this week, the Armed Services Committee concluded its bill—roughly \$309 billion—to provide for the Armed Forces of the United States. It is the biggest money bill that goes through here. It will be brought to the floor next week, hopefully.

That is what I am talking about—the power of the purse. Our committee authorizes, and the committee under the Senator from Alaska, Mr. STEVENS, and the distinguished cosponsor of this amendment, Mr. BYRD, then make the decisions on the appropriations against the authorization. That is what this amendment is about. It is about how we conduct the expenditure in this bill—\$2 billion-plus for Kosovo alone—how we go about spending the taxpayers' money for that. How does it directly relate to the safety and welfare of those brave men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who are marching through, or patrolling through, or standing watch night and day in Kosovo?

Mr. President, I first went to Kosovo in 1990 with then-leader Bob Dole. There was a group of four or five of us. I remember that trip very well. I remember that we exited rather speedily from Kosovo because there was a riot developing. So many people wanted to see the American Senators, wanted to tell the American Senators about the cruelty and the deprivation of human rights that was then, in 1990, being inflicted on the people of Kosovo—Kosovo being a part of Yugoslavia—being inflicted by Milosevic. Little did we know that war would soon spread through this region—first in Bosnia, and then it would erupt in Kosovo.

Well, we saw those people. We went by the famous field where, hundreds of years ago, the people of that region fought off the barbarian insiders and lost the battle. They still consider that the most hallowed ground in Kosovo. That region has been subjected to fighting and internal strife ever since. Even Hitler put some 21 divisions in there to try to control the Yugoslav region, and finally he told his generals to just contain them as best they could. He never could subvert that province because of the internal fighting. Throughout the occupation of the German armies, a continuous civil war raged among the various religious and ethnic factions in that region. The Germans just sort of turned their back on them. One German general said in a dispatch to Berlin about those who died in this civil war: “Less mouths to feed, less backs to clothe.”

What a desperate, desperate cauldron of humanity. I expect that at one time or another in our deliberations in this body on Bosnia and Kosovo, every Member has availed themselves of the history of this region. As many times as I have been there—I believe I was the first U.S. Senator to go into Sarajevo in September of 1992, at the height of the fighting of the civil war in that town. I remember the French, who were controlling such security as was available, just in an airport where we were trying to bring in Red Cross supplies and food, put me in an armored vehicle and drove me around the town. We looked out through a little slit and firing was going on.

A French colonel and a former Foreign Legionnaire said, “I have fought in battles all over the world, and I cannot understand this one.” The Croats, Bosnians, Serbians were fighting each other. He said, “If you saw them in a room, you could not tell the difference. Most are well-educated people.” He said, “In all my years of combat in far-flung places of the world, I have never seen the violence that these people can inflict on one another. I have never seen anything like it.”

That violence raged for years, until the U.N. and then NATO forces finally came in and stabilized peace in that region. The war in Kosovo, we know well. We did everything we could at the diplomatic table. There were negotiations and valiant efforts by many. Not only the U.S., but, indeed, many nations tried to deal with Milosevic and to avoid the fighting. The rest is history. For 78 days, an air war was conducted in which the United States of America flew roughly 70 percent of the missions. Five or six other nations had their fighters, and they did the best they could. It was a consortium of nations.

Why did the U.S. have the largest burden? Very simply, we had the most modern equipment. It was a high-tech war. We employed every bit of high-tech equipment that we knew how to employ to protect the lives of the aviators. That was the correct decision. We gave as much as we could to our allies, but their planes simply weren't equipped with the high-tech guidance systems, radar systems, and other detection systems to defend themselves. So we flew the bulk of the missions. NATO is still without adequate airlift. We supplied the cargo planes, the troop carriers, in large measure. In that remote location in the airfields that ring Kosovo—Italy had a dozen airfields, and how valiant that country was in that battle. They turned over much of their civil aviation, air space, and airfields to allow the U.S. and allies to operate their aircraft around the clock.

Back to this amendment. The amendment is in two parts. I will refer to it as part 1 or 2. First, it is a contribution that I made some 2½ months ago, following my most recent trip to Kosovo. I went into that region, I think for the fifth or sixth time, and I went to the headquarters of the KFOR commander,

a fine German officer, well-trained. He had a modest office. We were joined by Ambassador Kouchner, who was given by the U.N. the primary responsibility for trying to rebuild Kosovo following the termination of the conflict. This was January. I remember it well. There were 1 or 2 light bulbs sort of hanging from the ceiling, and they were constantly flickering. Down the hall was a toilet that was inoperative because there wasn't enough power. You had to flush it by taking a big bucket of water and pouring it in.

I bring this up because Ambassador Kouchner said to me repeatedly in the hour or so I was there, as the lights were flickering, "We don't have enough money from our allies that fought this war and others who made the commitment to get adequate power." He said, "Half of the city of Pristina"—that is where we were, Pristina—"is freezing tonight because of the inadequacy of the power, inadequacy of the housing, inadequacy of everything, food and the like." That was in January. That is not an American; that is a Frenchman.

The general who commented on the lights said, "This is the best building in town. We are doing our best; we are going to make it through." This was the headquarters of all the KFOR, all the troops. Up to 30 nations had contributed troops to try to bring about a measure of stability.

The consequence of that trip and going out to visit our troops in a far region—the whole area was divided into various regions: The American sector, the French sector, the British sector. I visited our troops in the American sector. I watched these young men from places all across the United States, heavily dressed in their flack suits and protective vests, cold as the dickens, carrying weapons, but going around to try to maintain order in these war-ravaged communities. There was the Serb section in the town and the Albanian section.

There was an indivisible line between them. You couldn't see it. But everybody knew you didn't step across it. There was very little, if any, contact between two factions.

I visited other American soldiers—two and three stationed out to guard a church. Our soldiers then and today are doing all kinds of tasks at personal risk, for which in large measure they weren't trained. They do not teach us in boot camp how to solve marital disputes or how to solve disputes between shop owners who are arguing.

These wonderful persons in uniform are drawing on a lifetime of American experience with their families and their homes and their towns to perform tasks that are far beyond any training the military gives. But they are doing it. They have done it, and they continue to do it, and do it very well.

At the end of the war, there were commitments in which the various allies came in and said we will send so many million dollars; we will send so many police; we will send so many

building supplies; we will do this and we will do that. Bernard Kouchner, the man in charge, simply said it is not being done.

So I came back home and concocted an amendment in consultation with quite a few of my colleagues. I went about it very deliberately. I consulted on two occasions at the White House in constructive meetings. The administration wasn't at all supportive of this venture; that is, on the face of the draft that I had. But I had other people within the administration and elsewhere telling me privately: JOHN, if you do this, I think you will get the attention of the allies and they will begin to fulfill the commitments they made. Whether they are dollar commitments, commitments for police, or other commitments; they will do it.

I came to the floor of the Senate on Monday. I had quite a few cosponsors: The distinguished Senator STEVENS, the distinguished Senator INOUE, members of the Appropriations Committee, and a great number of the Armed Services Committee. There was nothing to file the amendment against. But my intentions were that at such time as the Kosovo supplemental came through, I would put it on and have it printed in the RECORD.

This thing reverberated around the world, known as the Warner amendment. I take no great pride of authorship. But they had to name it something. But, suddenly, the allies began to get the message that we mean business in the Congress of the United States. We mean business. They began to account for what they had done. They began to expedite their dollars. They began to expedite the building materials. They began to expedite in some ways sending police, although they are still far behind the goals. Now, some 2½ months later, I have just been advised as late as yesterday by a constant stream of U.N. and E.U. officials through my office. I thank them. They quietly thanked me and those who supported me for bringing this matter out in the public and making known the need of the allies to step up.

The House of Representatives, Mr. KASICH, called me one day with great respect and said: JOHN, I think your amendment is a good one. Would you agree if I brought it up on the House floor just as it is? I said: Fine. Give it a try.

There was quite a debate in the House of Representatives on that amendment. I will put it in the RECORD later today. But it was only defeated by a very few votes with basically 200 on each side. By a very few votes did it go down, largely because a number of Members had not really had a chance to think it through.

But this amendment, which is couched as the Byrd-Warner amendment today, simply says the following: That the allies made certain commitments that, in the judgment of this Senator and such others who support those commitments, have not been kept in a timely way.

We have about 15 percent of the troops there. I want to make this clear. Other nations have 85 percent of them.

As a consequence, our troops and the troops of other nations could be there indefinitely. There is no one—I defy anyone—who can come to this floor and give with any precision the dates on which the infrastructure of that nation, and particularly its judicial system, a police system, and other necessary infrastructure, can enable the troops of this Nation and others to go home.

It seems to me they needed a wake-up call. That is precisely what this amendment does that I partly drew up. It simply says to our President: Respectfully, Mr. President, of this \$2 billion coming through, you can utilize a certain percentage right away to reimburse the Department of Defense for expenditures it has already made for the Kosovo operation for this fiscal year to replenish the funds taken out of the Department of the Army, largely, but some out of the Navy, some out of the Air Force, but 25 percent we hold back—that is all, 25 percent of \$2 billion we hold back—until you can certify that you have examined, first, the commitments of our allies, and then, second, the extent to which they have completed their commitments. I have been told on good authority that in all probability the President can make that certification largely with what has occurred in the 2½ months since this Warner section of this thing has been made public.

So my amendment in large measure has met its goal.

I thank the many people who have helped me and stood by the purpose of this amendment. But had the President not been able to certify, I said the other 25 percent of the money would then be used to bring our troops home because this Nation has fulfilled its commitment and did its best certainly in the combat phase of this. Certainly in the year almost after the combat phase, we have done it. Now let the Europeans and other nations pick up.

If there is one thing in this bill I will bring to the floor next week for the colleagues of the Armed Services Committee, the most serious thing facing us today in the military is the retention of the middle-grade personnel, enlisted and officer, because of the constant deployment of these individuals all over the world away from their families. We are not today able to retain sufficient numbers to keep this military of ours, this magnificent military of ours, strong in the future. It is not the shortage of dollars. It is not the shortage of equipment in large measure, although spare parts is a problem. It is the fact that these men and women in the uniform of our Nation are constantly being sent away on ships, flown away in airplanes, and many times with very short notice so that the remaining spouse has to pick up the responsibilities as that serviceperson goes overseas.

I just think to keep an indefinite commitment in this region without any participation by the Congress of the United States is wrong. We should speak to that, and that is what my portion does. It simply says 25 percent is to be used to bring home the troops if you can't make the certification. But if the Congress wishes, it could meet and say: Even though you could not make the certification, Mr. President, we think you should continue the policy as you have laid it out despite the inability of making the certification, despite the fact that our allies have not made their commitments. That amendment simply says we should be involved. That is what the Constitution requires. We should be involved. We cannot come in here year after year, month after month, and just stamp these appropriations with an "aye" vote and then run out of the Chamber. We have to face up to this amendment. This amendment makes us face up to it.

That is my principal contribution. I join my distinguished colleague and friend, Senator BYRD, in his portion. I see my distinguished colleague from South Carolina who worked on this and voted for it in the Appropriations Committee. I shorten my remarks so the Senator may address the Senate.

The thrust of the Byrd amendment is not "cut and run," not that we are trying to undermine NATO, that we are turning our back. It is simply saying to the Congress of the United States and to the next President, give Congress a plan and show we can pull out just the combat elements of our troops, leaving the intelligence, leaving the logistics, leaving other segments of the military to help the remaining troops of the many nations—not cut and run. Bring out the combat troops. Show Congress a plan.

Those troops, in our judgment, should be out by July 2001. Is that too much to ask, 14 months hence? That is not cut and run. That is not undermining anybody. That is not sending a signal to Milosevic that the United States is turning its back. It is saying to the men and women of our Armed Forces, to this Nation, that we have done our share. It is time for us to pick up the combat share to the extent it is still necessary. And then, if it is in the infinite wisdom of this body that we should not make any changes, we should not come home with the combat elements. All we have to do is stand up and send a message, a sense of the Congress, we think we should stay. That would add far greater strength to the conviction of the American participation than this year after year after year of idly voting on an appropriations bill and not discussing it.

I respect my dear colleague from West Virginia. How many times he has been on this floor reminding Members of our responsibilities? Many, many times. This is an amendment that simply says: Congress, the hour has arrived where you have to stand up and

be counted if we will continue for an indefinite time the missions in Kosovo.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a Dear Colleague letter.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, DC, May 11, 2000.

DEAR COLLEAGUE: On May 9, the Senate Committee on Appropriations, by a bipartisan vote of 23 to 3, adopted a major policy provision relating to the ongoing role of the United States military in the Kosovo peacekeeping operation.

The Senate is expected to quickly take up the FY 2001 Military Construction Appropriations Bill, which contains the Kosovo language. As the authors of this provision, we take this opportunity to provide you with our analysis of the language and a fact sheet on the provision.

We are particularly concerned about the possibility of misconceptions or misinterpretations of the provision. The Byrd-Warner language goes directly to the institutional and constitutional responsibilities of Congress. It does not require the withdrawal of U.S. military troops from Kosovo. To the contrary, the language makes specific provisions for Congress to vote, under expedited procedures, if the next President seeks to continue U.S. military involvement in the Kosovo peacekeeping operation beyond July 1, 2001.

The provision has three main objectives. First, it terminates funding for the continued deployment of U.S. ground combat troops in Kosovo after July 1, 2001, unless the President seeks and receives Congressional authorization to keep troops in Kosovo.

Second, the provision requires the President to develop a plan, in consultation with our European allies, to turn the ground combat troop element of the Kosovo peacekeeping operation entirely over to the Europeans by July 1, 2001. Assuming the President is successful in developing such a plan, there should be no need for funding the continued deployment of U.S. ground combat troops in Kosovo beyond July 1, 2001.

Third, related to current operations in Kosovo and to signal to the Europeans the need for them to fulfill their commitments for implementing peace and stability in Kosovo, the provision withholds 25 percent of the emergency supplemental funding for military operations Kosovo attached to the Military Construction bill pending certification by the President that our allies are making adequate progress in meeting the commitments they made to the Kosovo peacekeeping process. If the President cannot make the certifications by July 15 of this year, the funding held in reserve can only be used to withdraw U.S. forces from Kosovo unless Congress votes otherwise.

This last provision has been compared to an earlier proposal by Senator Warner, a version of which was narrowly defeated in the House. That language, however, has been modified to address a major concern expressed during the House debate; namely, that failure by the President to certify the requisite level of allied contributions would automatically trigger the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Kosovo with no opportunity for Congress or the President to intervene.

The Byrd-Warner language included in the Senate Military Construction Bill addresses that issue by including a provision for Congress to vote, under expedited procedures, to lift the troop withdrawal requirement on use of the funds held in reserve, thus disarming

the automatic trigger. Moreover, the allies appear to have gotten the message. They have in the past two months increased their contributions, and the President is expected to be able to make the required certification by July 15.

The larger issue addressed by the Byrd-Warner provision is that of the responsibility of Congress to exercise its constitutional duty. It was no accident that the founding fathers vested in Congress alone the power of the purse. Yet, we are seeking in Kosovo, as we have seen in so many other peacekeeping operations, a bastardization of that process. Instead of Congress appropriating funds for expenditure by the Executive Branch, the Executive Branch is spending funds first and asking Congress after the fact to pay the bills.

Setting aside for a moment the foreign policy implications of the Kosovo peacekeeping operation, the Senate has a duty to vigilantly guard the rights bestowed on Congress by the Constitution. No such right is more central to the separation of powers on which our system of government is built than the vesting in Congress alone the power of the purse.

Provisions to put Congressional check reins on funding appropriated to implement U.S. foreign policy initiative are often criticized as micromanaging the Administration. Language dealing with troop drawdowns is subject to the additional criticism of endangering U.S. troops and emboldening foreign despots. The Byrd-Warner provision is carefully and deliberately designed to avoid those pitfalls.

First, the language offers guidance to the President; it does not dictate an outcome. Because the United States bore the lion's share of the air offensive against Yugoslavia, we believe that the Europeans should be responsible for the ground element of the Kosovo peacekeeping mission. The Byrd-Warner provision offers a road map to achieve that outcome by July 1, 2001. If the next President disagrees with our position, the language provides a mechanism, in the form of a joint resolution to be voted on under expedited procedures, for him to seek and receive congressional authorization to continue the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo beyond July 1, 2001.

The provision specifically exempts from the restriction on U.S. ground combat troops in Kosovo such U.S. military missions as support for NATO headquarters in Kosovo, intelligence support, air surveillance, and related activities. The United States can continue to assist NATO in Kosovo, with the exception of providing U.S. ground combat troops for the mission.

According to Administration estimates, the other NATO and non-NATO countries participating in the Kosovo peacekeeping operation are currently contributing about 85 percent of the total force structure. The Byrd-Warner provision provides ample time for those nations and others to augment their deployments of ground combat troops to Kosovo. In no way does this language undercut the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo or provide encouragement to Slobodan Milosevic. If anything, it will give the Europeans the opportunity to demonstrate to the world the strength and unity of their opposition to Milosevic's brand of tyranny.

The time frames outlined in this provision are deliberate. Our intention is to shift long range decisionmaking on the role of the United States in Kosovo away from the politically charged atmosphere of an election year and into the next Administration. This language allows the next President, whoever is elected, to deal decisively with Kosovo and

prevents the U.S. from drifting, through inaction, into an indefinite and likely prolonged commitment of U.S. personnel and resources in yet another foreign peacekeeping operation.

To promote continuity between Administrations, and to ensure that the next Administration does not put off dealing with Kosovo until it is too late to plan effectively, our provision requires the current President to submit, by September 30, 2000, an interim plan for the U.S. to transition its ground combat troops out of Kosovo, and the next President to submit a final plan by May 1, 2001.

Should the Byrd-Warner language result in a drawdown of U.S. ground troops from Kosovo, the language provides for a "safe, orderly, and phased" withdrawal of troops, and leaves the planning of that withdrawal up to the President. Any troop drawdown would be managed by the generals, not the Congress.

We urge you to carefully consider the language of the Byrd-Warner provision, and we welcome your support. Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Christina Evans of Senator Byrd's staff at 224-3088 or Judy Ansley of Senator Warner's staff at 224-4928.

Sincerely,

ROBERT C. BYRD.
JOHN WARNER.

FACT SHEET: BYRD-WARNER KOSOVO
AMENDMENT

More than 5,500 U.S. troops are participating in the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo despite the fact that Congress has never authorized, nor even formally debated, U.S. involvement in Kosovo since the Senate, on March 23, 1999, authorized air strikes against Yugoslavia.

Congress has a constitutional responsibility to address policy issues involving the deployment of U.S. troops overseas in instances, such as Kosovo, in which American men and women are being sent into potentially dangerous situations.

By tacitly endorsing, through emergency supplemental funding measures, Executive Branch decisions to deploy U.S. troops overseas without congressional authorization, Congress is effectively abrogating its responsibility under the Constitution.

This amendment terminates funding for the continued deployment of U.S. ground combat troops in Kosovo after July 1, 2001, unless the President seeks and receives congressional authorization to continue such deployment.

In recognition of the fact that the United States military bore the brunt of the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia, the amendment also requires the president to develop a plan to turn the ground combat troop element of the Kosovo peacekeeping operation entirely over to the Europeans by July 1, 2001.

The timing is a key element of the amendment. First, it shifts the responsibility of determining future U.S. involvement in Kosovo from the current Administration, which will be out of office within months, to the next Administration, which will inherit the Kosovo peacekeeping mission. Second, the amendment provides ample time for the next Administration to either develop a plan to hand off the Kosovo ground combat troop mission to the Europeans or make its case to Congress to keep U.S. ground combat troops in Kosovo.

If the next President sees a compelling need to keep U.S. ground troops in Kosovo beyond July 1, 2001, the amendment requires him to seek congressional authorization. If Congress, acting under expedited procedures,

does not authorize the continued deployment of U.S. troops in Kosovo, funding would be terminated after July 1, 2001.

As an intermediate goal, the amendment withholds 25 percent of the FY 2000 supplemental appropriations for military operations in Kosovo pending certification by the President that the Europeans are living up to their commitments, including provision of at least 33% of the commitment for monetary reconstruction assistance, 75% of the commitment for humanitarian assistance, 75% of the commitment for Kosovo government administration monetary assistance, and 75% of the commitment for civilian police.

If the President cannot make such a certification by July 15, 2000, the money being held in reserve could only be used to withdraw troops from Kosovo unless Congress, acting under expedited procedures, votes otherwise.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. L. CHAFEE). The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, let me first commend the chairman of our Armed Services Committee. He has been to war twice. He served as our Secretary of the Navy. He has a conscience with respect to the GIs now deployed in Kosovo. That is the reason I rise this afternoon.

My chairman, ranking member, and former majority leader, the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Mr. BYRD, has a little bit of laryngitis. He is feeling well. He is at the committee markup right now with respect to the Labor, Health and Human Resources bill in appropriations over in the Hart Building. He wanted someone to be able to respond. I understood the opposition to this particular amendment were on their way to the floor. That is why I came. Maybe the better part of wisdom would be to say thank you and there is no debate, and when we get in one, then Senator BYRD can speak for himself.

However, I share that concern for our troops, their morale and the deployment of a so-called peacekeeping mission. There isn't any peace. There isn't any policy. All we have to do is look at the record. The record shows best that we debated airstrikes and we were split down the middle, 58-41, March 23, under the Biden amendment. We had the McCain amendment deploying armed forces in Kosovo, saying let's go to war. That was May 4, 1999. It was tabled by a motion of 78-22.

The record shows, at best, we have a lukewarm endorsement, maybe favoring some airstrikes, but against taking the life of a GI. That is the military policy right now. With respect to diplomacy, the policy is one of a so-called multiethnic society, as I remember Secretary Albright saying.

I visited Kosovo shortly after the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee did this year. I was never briefed on the importance of a multiethnic society . . . maybe the region should be partitioned. But that isn't the policy of the United States. I tried to verify the multiethnic policy with all of our experts deployed there—

the Army generals, the Navy admirals, and everyone else. I could find no support for any kind of multiethnic society in light of what was going on on the ground.

Here we have another Vietnam, not in the sense of deploying more and more troops, but actually having a military deployment in an impossible situation. Don't go forward, don't go backward, just stay there; we will send movies. It is sort of embarrassing to see our military hunkered down like chickens in a hailstorm at Camp Bonsteel and everybody bragging that we have wooden buildings and catwalks through the snow and we can get hamburgers at McDonald's. That is not for the GI, the one who volunteers to serve in the military. He is looking to be trained and go to battle for our national security.

To address these conditions that continue and languish is a reason I am confident Senator BYRD introduced his amendment, which is part of our bill. And certainly it is my feeling, likewise, that we have a responsibility here.

The other day we had the 25th anniversary of Vietnam. The Secretary of Defense said, almost 25 years later, it was a mistake. Are we going to have to wait 25 years to resolve Kosovo? Bosnia was to last 1 year. That policy has been going on for 5, 6 years now.

We just cannot willy-nilly go along with mixed policies. Of course, the clarion call for the Kosovo initiative was ethnic cleansing. At the time they were briefing us, they had 100,000 Albanians living peacefully in Belgrade. Milosevic lived down the street. Heavens above, this was not the Holocaust. Everybody confuses ethnic cleansing with enemy cleansing. When you start bombing somebody and you make that the enemy, an outright open warfare, then the other side has got the right, title, and interest to clear the area of any on the side of the enemy. More ethnic cleansing occurred after the bombing than before the bombing. Actually, it was enemy cleansing because Milosevic is a cagey fellow and a scoundrel and we all know it. He says to himself, whoopee, now I can go in there and get rid of the real Albanians that have been giving me problems down there in Kosovo. And he did it.

That is exactly what was happening. The talk now is trying to deal with, ex post facto, a million refugees spilling over into Macedonia, down into Albania and back up into Montenegro and elsewhere. But the real spilling over and the cleansing was enemy cleansing. We are trying to talk about war and victory, trying to give dignity to a mistake.

No. 1, it was a flawed policy from the word go. We came in where there weren't any guys with the white hats. It wasn't the good guys versus the bad guys. Anybody who knows anything about Kosovo and this part of the world knows that both sides are really something else. I would not want an American to go to battle for either side. I

say that advisedly because it has been proven. When we went there earlier this year, what did we learn? Yes, there was violence upon violence upon violence. It was continuing. And 95 percent of the violence was being inflicted by Albanian on Albanian.

It is interesting to me to see here, recently, in *The Economist*, that:

The war has done nothing to bring the two sides together. On the contrary, it has intensified ancient animosities.

Then going down it says:

At present, the Albanians can look to NATO for their security and to the U.N. for their administration, while many of them traffic in drugs and other contraband and generally profit from the legal limbo in which they live.

Peacekeeping? Where is the peace? Where is the peace? We are now saying we have a deployment for peacekeeping. It is an enforced cease-fire.

I was briefed by the brass in Kosovo. They said both sides ran out of targets. We hit all the targets we wanted to hit. We were even going up there knocking out the Chinese Embassy.

Of course, Milosevic had gotten rid of everything and cleansed everything he possibly could. What a wonderful war. We won. Now we want to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Come on, don't give us that.

We were there in the little town of Urosevac. The President visited that town at Christmas time. They had a big show. They had 400-some troops, and they all were hunkered down in the city hall. You could tell the 65,000 or 70,000 residents of the town were not friendly. We drove around and they glowered at us. They were in charge. We were not in charge of the town the President was in. We were not in charge of anything, really, in Kosovo. We have deployments here with walls around them, fences and everything else. We do not wander down the street or outside the compound.

Similarly, in Mitrovica, we have a GI at one end of the block, a GI at the other end of the block, and a GI in the middle of the block on a 24-hour, three times eight, 24-hour routine, guarding people going to the grocery store.

It's public knowledge what the reporter says in *The Economist* about this thing not working:

The war has done nothing to bring the two sides together. On the contrary, it has intensified ancient animosities.

There are the soldiers in the peacekeeping force, having to spend 6 months away from their families. People hate to waste time. We, in the Senate, we love wasting time. There is nothing to do tomorrow and nothing on Monday. We cannot wait for November and the Presidential election to be over with so we can all go back to work. But the normal attitude is not to waste time and, you see, that is exactly what is happening in Kosovo.

I finally understood about the Albanians when I was in London and I met with one of the leaders of Parliament. He said the Albanians are bringing 14-

and 15-year-old girls to Portsmouth and forcing them into prostitution. They have drugs all over England now. He said: It's the worst threat and problem that we have here in England. He said: I never thought I would ever say anything good about Milosevic, but I can sort of understand his problem.

That is not to say Milosevic is a good guy, or the Albanians are all bad. But you generally get a feel for what is out there and what is going on when responsible people tell you: Look, all the Afghanistan drugs are coming up through Kosovo, and into Europe. Instead of keeping the peace, we are keeping the flow of drugs.

The GI with any common sense is saying to himself: Where is this peace we have here? We have one fellow who murdered another one but we had to let him go in 48 hours because we only had 93 slots in the prison and the United Nations had not supplied a police force. The United Nations had not supplied a court system. The United Nations had not put up their money for a prison system.

So we go right to the ultimatum. If this is diplomacy, let me quote none other than our friend, the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger:

Rambouillet was not a negotiation—as is often claimed—but an ultimatum. This marked an astounding departure for an administration that had entered office proclaiming its devotion to the UN Charter and multilateral procedures.

And on and on.

The transformation of Alliance from a defensive military grouping into an institution prepared to impose its values by force occurred in the same month that three former Soviet satellites joined NATO.

That is none other than Kissinger himself. In that light, I am glad we did not send Secretary Albright to Northern Ireland. We sent Senator George Mitchell instead. But under the Albright policy, you either agree by 12 o'clock midnight or we go bombing. Come on. This thing is afoul, amiss, and a mistake, and we don't have to wait for 25 years to know it. Those are my words, the words of the Senator from South Carolina, and not the words of the Senator from West Virginia. He will be glad at the first of the week—I am confident he will be in good shape again. He will explain it, no doubt, to everyone's satisfaction.

We all agree on one thing. With GIs deployed on account of our mistakes, we are going to give them every dollar necessary, every benefit, every support we possibly can.

We cannot possibly continue day in and day out in limbo with a flawed policy and act like it is a policy. It is a nonpolicy and a flawed policy and a mistaken policy. We have to somehow bring it to a head.

How do we do that in a deliberate, tactful manner? What we say is: Look, get these countries of the U.N. to support it.

Of course, we learned at the briefings that the Greeks were not for it in their

sector. They did not like it. The French, are *comme ci comme ça*. The Soviets never were for it, and they do not adhere to us. NATO responds to Moscow. The Brits are pulling out. In one place they pulled out, 3 hours later a church was burned.

I asked our British friends what their reason for pulling out was and they said they were too stretched. We are stretched, too. We have nine peacekeeping missions. We have Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Congo, and East Timor. There are four more we are going to be asking for. The GIs are given a policeman's duty in a totally hostile place where one cannot take sides and one has to defend oneself and not act like an authority on keeping the peace but, by gosh, keep out of trouble.

We are not in charge in Kosovo, nor is the U.N., nor is NATO. We have invaded a sovereign country without a full debate. We made that mistake in Vietnam. We have the feeling of responsibility. I understand the distinguished Senator from Arizona is very much in favor of Kosovo. I could have saved him 4 or 5 years in prison if I knew at the time I got to the Senate in 1966 that McNamara felt Vietnam was a mistake.

Come on. Are we going to continue just because we do not want to send a message to Milosevic? Do my colleagues really think that Milosevic does not know what is going on? He has already removed the opposition authorities in Montenegro. If he went in there tonight, what would we do? Nothing. He is corralling his support. Read this week's *Time* magazine about what the Air Force did not hit. I wish my colleagues would get a copy and read it because it reports we were misled in that particular briefing about how we destroyed so many tanks, so many planes, so many targets; we just ruined the country.

Our distinguished friend, the Secretary of State, said: Give peace a chance; it takes time to get the roads and the bridges and industry and the hospitals and the air fields all repaired.

I remember a visit I had when I first came to the Senate. I was at the Connaught in London having dinner with Martin Agronsky who had been behind the lines in Northern Ireland for a 3-week period. He came out in despair. He said: That crowd is never going to get together.

Fortunately, under the leadership of President Clinton and Senator Mitchell, there was a break last Friday, and, finally, the IRA says they are going to disarm, and it looks like it might work.

For 30 years, they have had the infrastructure—the roads, the bridges, the hospitals, the universities. I have been to Northern Ireland. Some sections of Belfast have better housing than my hometown. With all that infrastructure, the British troops are still deployed years and years later.

Is that the policy of the United States of America with our GIs? That

is why we rise this afternoon and are ready, willing, and able to draw some lines that are understandable that will develop into a firm policy.

If the U.N. wants to get in there, fine, but if they are not going to support it, then we have a problem. I will never forget the story about Vaclav Havel saying he hoped Secretary Albright could come back to the Czech Republic, her native land, and succeed him as President. He said the one difficulty was that 75 percent of the people of the Czech Republic opposed "Madeleine's war."

Take a rollcall. Go up to the U.N. See how enthused they are about the non-policy.

Quit giving this patina of deliberation and positivity by doing nothing and keeping the troops out there and praying like we all do that no one gets assaulted or loses a life at Bonsteel. We have an impossible situation. It is not going to get better in the foreseeable future. We ought to bring it to a head and certainly let the next President, whomever that is, have a 6-month period to review the mistake we made and say: Wait a minute, it was not a mistake.

I do not mind if they are right and I am wrong. I can tell my colleagues right now though, unfortunately, I think I gave the right vote when I opposed the Biden amendment.

I appreciate the leadership and the conscientious approach the distinguished Senator from Virginia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has given this responsibility. We are not trying to embarrass the President. We are not trying to take a political position. On the contrary, I have my GIs out there. I saw what happened in Vietnam, and I saw what happened in Somalia. If it had not been for the Byrd amendment, we could possibly still be there.

This is a similar call to arms politically for us to set the policy and do so in a judicious way. We all know they want to try to subvert it; they do not want to talk about it. With this crowd in Washington, you have to be on message: Let's not talk about it because it might get on to the weekend shows, and if it gets on to the weekend shows, it might send the wrong message to Milosevic. Bah humbug to Milosevic. I am trying to send a message to those fellows at Bonsteel. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague from South Carolina. I remember when I first came to the Senate 22 years ago, two-thirds of the Senate or more had the opportunity to serve in uniform. Today, there are fewer. I cast no aspersion against those who do not. It is just a generational thing.

Listening to my dear friend from South Carolina, I know he draws on his experiences in the army in World War II as a young officer in the battle to free Europe when he had the responsi-

bility of life. No one else but him, as an officer, had the responsibility for those young men under his command.

This type of amendment we discussed—certainly I have and others—with many veterans who have worn the uniform of this country and many who are on active duty today.

The distinguished Senator said he has seen war. I saw it in the continental limits in World War II, and then I had a brief tour in Korea as a ground officer with an air wing. I saw the others who had to fight it, but I never put myself in the category of a combat soldier. I have always said my orders did not take me there, but they took the Senator there and he saw it.

I know in the course of this debate, the issue will be raised: We may be putting the young men and women in the Armed Forces in jeopardy as a consequence of this amendment, even the act of filing it and debating it.

I want to get into that. I am sure the Senator will rejoin in this debate if and when that happens.

I see our distinguished colleague here, who is a naval veteran, who is about to speak. I do not know if it is on this matter or on another matter. It is not on this matter.

But I am willing to join in that debate. When 23 members of the Appropriations Committee voted "yea" to put this in—and the distinguished Senator from South Carolina can correct me—but of that group who voted "yea," the following have been privileged to wear the uniform of our country: Senator COCHRAN, Senator SPECTER, Senator GORTON, Senator BURNS, Senator BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Senator DANIEL INOUE, Senator ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, Senator HERBERT KOHL, and Senator STEVENS, the chairman. They are veterans.

Let us debate it, but let us debate it with great care.

The letter which I put in the RECORD from Senator BYRD and myself states our point of view. This letter is just going out to Members, but already the following cosponsors, who likewise were veterans, have signed on: Senator ROBERTS, Senator STROM THURMOND, Senator INHOFE, Senator ROBERT SMITH, and Senator SESSIONS. So a goodly number of those who have been privileged to wear the uniform of our country have joined behind this.

We would not have done it, I say to the Senator, if we had had a moment's concern we were increasing the risk to our people. They are at risk today. They will be at risk tomorrow and the next day. And as we are drifting into this endless—endless—commitment, they are at risk every single day.

This amendment simply says: Congress, either join with the President or state your case and bring them home. That is the purpose of this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate

now proceed to a period of morning business, with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each, with the following exceptions: Senator HARKIN for up to 20 minutes, Senator HELMS for up to 10 minutes, and Senators ROBERTS and CLELAND in control of 60 minutes total.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order for me to make my presentation seated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The remarks of Mr. HELMS pertaining to the submission of S. Res. 306 are located in today's RECORD under "Submission of Concurrent and Senate Resolutions.")

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized.

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, are we in morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.

DAMS IN WASHINGTON AND OREGON

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, the Vice President of the United States is flying to Oregon this evening, or tomorrow morning, for a visit to that State. On the last five or six occasions on which he has visited the State of Washington, I have inquired of him, as politely as possible, as to his intentions with respect to the future of four dams on the Snake River. This inquiry is of significant importance to the people of the State of Washington, as well as the people of the State of Oregon. The answer from the Vice President is peculiarly important because of the disarray of the present administration. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has recommended that the dams come down, be removed, for salmon recovery. The Corps of Engineers, almost a year ago, was ready to recommend that the dams stay in place and that we deal with salmon recovery in another productive fashion. That recommendation was vetoed by the White House and removed physically from the Corps of Engineers' report.

More recently, the National Marine Fishery Service has said that we don't know enough to decide whether or not we should remove the dams and that the decision may be at least 5 or 10 years away. The Governor of Oregon has recommended that the dams come down. The Governor of Washington, also a Democrat, has opposed that recommendation. As you know, Mr. President, so have I, in the most vehement possible terms. Of all of the proposals for salmon recovery, dam removal is, first, the most ineffective and, second, of the most marginal utility with respect to the recovery of the salmon resource in the Pacific Northwest.

At a capital expenditure of \$1 billion to \$2 billion, and annual losses of at