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Senate

The Senate met at 9:30 a.m. and was called to order by the President pro tempore [Mr. THURMOND].

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Today's prayer will be offered by our guest Chaplain, the Reverend William K. Simmons, of Lexington, KY.

We are glad to have you with us.

PRAYER

The guest Chaplain, the Reverend William K. Simmons, offered the following prayer:

Let's pray together.

Almighty God, this body gathers today to conduct the business of the Republic. We pause to give thanks for Your blessing on our land and to seek Your continued care. Honor, we pray, the deliberations of these, selected by the people to represent them in guiding our Nation toward the goals of freedom, justice, and equality for all. Give each Member a sense of Your presence as he or she deliberates; may their judgments be those You can and will bless.

We also remember the families of these present. Care for them whether they be here or back home. Keep them safe within Your protective Spirit.

May we always be mindful that governance is a sacred pact between the government and its people. Let us not in this seat of power fail to hear them. Bless these Senators this day and inspire them to serve the people with wisdom and humility. Amen.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

The Honorable WAYNE ALLARD, a Senator from the State of Colorado, led the Pledge of Allegiance, as follows:

I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

RECOGNITION OF THE ACTING MAJORITY LEADER

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The able Senator from Colorado is recognized.

SCHEDULE

Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I announce that today the Senate will be in a period of morning business until 12 noon. Following morning business, it is hoped that an agreement can be reached regarding the consideration of the marriage tax penalty legislation. If an agreement is reached, Senators may expect votes throughout the day. If no agreement is reached, the Senate will remain in morning business, with Senators speaking for up to 5 minutes each. As previously announced, the Senate will consider the budget resolution conference report and the McConnell stock options bill prior to the Easter recess.

I thank my colleagues for their attention and yield the floor.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Nevada.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that during the period of morning business today Senators DORGAN and DURBIN be recognized for up to 15 minutes each. This would kind of balance out the time on both sides; that is, after the 2-hour block of time that has been set aside for others already.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLARD). Under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved.

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there shall now be a period for the transaction of morning business not to extend beyond the hour of 12 noon, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 5 minutes each.

Under the previous order, the time until 11:30 a.m. shall be under the control of the Senator from Kansas, Mr. ROBERTS, and the Senator from Georgia, Mr. CLELAND.

The Senator from Nevada is recognized.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, it is my understanding that Senator CLELAND and I have 2 hours reserved under the previous order in morning business. Is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is correct. Your time is reserved until 11:30 a.m.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I am going to begin my remarks. We had originally intended for Senator CLELAND to begin this dialog. But I am going to go ahead since he has been detained. Then he can follow me. I do not think that is going to upset the order at all.

I thank my good friend, the distinguished Senator from Georgia, for this continued initiative and for his leadership in continuing our bipartisan foreign policy dialog.

As I said back in February during our first discussion, our objective is to try to achieve greater attention, focus, and

● This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.



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mutual understanding—not to mention a healthy dose of responsibility—in this body in regard to America's global role and our vital national security interests. Our goal was to begin a process of building a bipartisan coalition, a consensus on what America's role should be in today's ever-changing, unsafe, and very unpredictable world.

This is our second dialog. We will focus today on how we can better define our vital national interests.

In doing our homework, both Senator CLELAND and I have been doing a lot of reading and pouring over quite a few books and articles and commentaries and reports and legislation and speeches and position papers and the like. If it was printed, we read it.

We have also been seeking the advice and counsel of everybody involved—in my case, the marine lance corporal about to deploy to Kosovo, to the very serious and hollow-faced old gentleman I visited at a Macedonian refugee camp, as well as foreign dignitaries and the military brass we admire and listen to as members of the Armed Services Committee, and all of the current and former advisors and experts and think tank dwellers and foreign policy gurus and intelligence experts. Needless to say, our foreign policy and national security homework universe is ever expanding and apparently without end. I hope I didn't leave anybody out.

We both now have impressive bibliographies that we can wave around and put in the RECORD and we can recommend to our colleagues to prove that our bibliography tank, as it were, is pretty full. We have very little or no excuse if we are not informed.

There was another book I wanted to bring to the attention of my colleagues. Its title is "Going for the Max." It involves 12 principles for living life to the fullest, written by our colleague and my dear friend, with a most appropriate and moving foreword from the Senate Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd Ogilvie. This is a very easy and enjoyable read with a very inspirational message.

Chapter 10 of MAX's book states—and this is important—that success is a team effort, that coming together is a beginning, keeping together is progress, and working together is a success.

That is a pretty good model for our efforts today and a recipe for us to keep in mind in this body as we try to better fulfill our national security obligations and to protect our individual freedoms.

Thank you and well done, to my distinguished friend.

Senator CLELAND, in his remarks, will quote Owen Harries, editor of the publication, the National Interest. He will point out the need for restraint in regard to exercising our national power. Editor Harris warned—and this is what Senator CLELAND will say—

It is not what Americans think of the United States but what others think of it that will decide the matter.

When we are talking about "matter," the "matter" in this case is stability and successful foreign and national security policy. I could not agree more. Senator CLELAND will go on to quote numerous statements from foreign leaders and editorials from leading international publications and commentaries from respected observers around the globe, from our allies and from the fence sitters and our would-be adversaries.

Sadly, I have to tell my colleagues that all were very critical of U.S. foreign policy. The basic thrust of the criticism, as described by Senator CLELAND—and he will be saying this. Again, I apologize that I started first. In the order of things, we are sort of reversing this. I am giving him a promo, if that is okay. At any rate, Senator CLELAND will state:

The United States has made a conscious decision to use our current position of predominance to pursue unilateralist foreign and national security policies.

Senator CLELAND is right. Dean Joseph S. Nye of the Kennedy School of Government and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs warns about the CNN effect in the formulation and conduct of our foreign policy; the free flow of information and the shortened news cycles that have a huge impact on public opinion, and placing some items at the top of the public agenda that might otherwise warrant a lower priority; diverting attention from the A list of strategic issues of vital national security. What am I talking about? What does this criticism really suggest?

We need to take the spin off. We need to take off our rose-colored, hegemonic glasses and take a hard look at the world and what the world thinks of us. I have a suggestion. It would only take Senators 10 minutes a day. Every Member of the Senate can and should receive what are called "Issue Focus Reports." These are reports on foreign media reaction to the world issues of the day. They are put out by the State Department. We at least should be aware of what others think of us and our foreign policy. Unfortunately and sadly, it is not flattering.

For instance, the February 24 Issue Focus detailed foreign commentary from publications within our NATO allies, those who comprised Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, headlines of 39 reports from 10 countries. If my colleagues will bear with me a moment, these are some of the headlines. This is the Issue Focus I am talking about. It is a very short read. Senators could have that or could have this report at their disposal every week. Again, these are leading publications—some liberal, some conservative, some supportive of the United States and some not. Just as a catch-as-catch-can summary, listen to the headlines:

Kosovo Unrest—A Domino Effect; Another War?; Wither Kosovo?; Holding Back The Tide Of Ethnic Cleansing; Losing The Peace; By The Waters of Mitrovica; West Won The

War, But Now Faces Losing The Peace; Holding Fast In The Kosovar Trap; Speculation On U.S. Domination In The Balkans; Whoever Believed In Multi-Ethnic Kosovo; Kosovo Calculations; The U.S. Is Playing With Fire; The West Is Helpless In Kosovo; Mitrovica, The Shadow Of The Wall Is Back; Military Intervention Against Serbia A Mistake; U.S. and Europe Are Also Clashing In Mitrovica; Kosovo Chaos Is A Trap For NATO; A Failure That Burns; The Difficult Peace.

It goes on and on.

This kind of reading would help us a great deal in understanding how others really think of us. The March 24 Issue Focus, based on 49 reports from leading newspapers and publications in 24 countries, assessed the U.S. and NATO policy 1 year after Operation Allied Force in the bombing of Kosovo. Summed up, the articles conclude it is time to ask some hard questions. Some unsettling headlines—again, this is a wide variety of publications from all ideologies and the whole political spectrum:

A War With No Results; No End To The Kosovo Tragedy; Europe's Leaders Warned Of A New Crisis; The West Fiasco In Kosovo; Halfway Results; A Year Later: Where Do We Stand; A Victory Gambled Away; No Sign Of Will For Peace; Making Progress By Moving Backwards In The Balkans.

Again, it goes on and on.

I don't mean to suggest that we should base our foreign policy on foreign headlines or perceived perception with regard to criticism in foreign countries. If we take the spin off, I think a case can be made that we are seeing a world backlash against U.S. foreign policy no matter how well-intentioned.

A timely article last month by Tyler Marshall and Jim Mann of the Los Angeles Times summarized it very well when they said:

The nation's prominence as the world's sole superpower leaves even allies very uneasy. They fear Washington—

By the way, I certainly include the Congress—

has lost its commitment to international order. America's dominant shadow has long been welcomed in much of the world as a shield from tyranny, a beacon of goodwill, an inspiration of unique values. But, ten years after the collapse of Communism left the United States to pursue its interests without a world rival, that shadow is assuming a darker character. In the State Department, it is called the hegemony problem, a fancy way of describing the same resentment that schoolchildren have for the biggest, toughest, richest and smartest kid in school.

The Marshall and Mann article goes on to say that America is suffering from a bad case of "me first," that during the administration years we have seen a lot of focus and it has been on new objectives, pressing American commercial interests, the championing of democracy—certainly nothing wrong with that—and then the intervention, militarily, to protect human rights. They state the goals that concern the foreign leaders are less than the manner in which they have been pursued, a manner that appears inconsistent and

sporadic and capricious. The article cites very serious backlash. Thirty-eight nations rallied to fight Iraq in 1991. Only Britain answers to the call today. Today, the French—our oldest ally—along with China, India, and Russia, have all discussed independently, or in consultation, ways to counter the balance of the enormity of American power.

Japan is making plans to develop an independent military capability. In Europe, pro-Americanism is on the wane. European leaders cut their teeth on the protests of the 1960s, not the American aid packages of the 1950s. The situation in Russia is especially perilous with Russians seeing secondhand treatment—by their definition—with the U.S. in regard to their continued economic morass, NATO expansion, Kosovo, and the American condemnation of Moscow's war against Chechnya.

Under the banner of the law of unintended effects, Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer opined the cost of our occupancy of Bosnia and Kosovo which has already cost tens of billions of dollars, drained our defense resources, and strained a hollow military which is charged with protecting vital American strategic interests in such crises areas as the Persian Gulf, the Taiwan Strait, and also the Korean peninsula. But he cited another cost, as he put it, more subtle and far heavier. He said that Russia has just moved from the democratically committed, if erratic, Boris Yeltsin to the dictatorship of the law, as promised by the new President, former KGB agent Vladimir Putin. I have his article. It is called "The Path to Putin." I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE PATH TO PUTIN
(By Charles Krauthammer)

In late February, as the first anniversary of our intervention in Kosovo approached, American peacekeepers launched house-to-house raids in Mitrovica looking for weapons. They encountered a rock-throwing mob and withdrew. Such is our reward for our glorious little victory in the Balkans: police work from which even Madeleine K. Albright, architect of the war, admits there is no foreseeable escape. ("The day may come," she wrote on Tuesday, "when a Kosovo-scale operation can be managed without the help of the United States, but it has not come yet.")

The price is high. Our occupations of Kosovo and Bosnia have already cost tens of billions of dollars, draining our defense resources and straining a military (already hollowed out by huge defense cuts over the last decade) charged with protecting vital American strategic interests in such crisis areas as the Persian Gulf, the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula.

But there is another cost, more subtle and far heavier. Russia has just moved from the democratically committed, if erratic, Boris Yeltsin to the "dictatorship of the law" promised by the new president, former KGB agent Vladimir Putin. Putin might turn out to be a democrat, but the man who won the

presidency by crushing Chechnya will more likely continue as the national security policeman of all the Russias.

What does that have to do with Kosovo? "Without Kosovo, Putin would not be Russian president today," says Dimitri Simes, the Russia expert and president of the Nixon Center.

The path from Kosovo to Putin is not that difficult to trace. It goes through Chechnya. Americans may not see the connection, but Russians do.

Russians had long been suffering an "Afghan-Chechen syndrome" under which they believed they could not prevail in local conflicts purely by the use of force. Kosovo demonstrated precisely the efficacy of raw force.

Russians had also been operating under the assumption that to be a good international citizen they could not engage in the unilateral use of force without the general approval of the international community. Kosovo cured them of that illusion.

And finally, Russia had acquiesced in the expansion of NATO under the expectation and assurance that it would remain, as always, a defensive alliance. Then, within 11 days of incorporating Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, NATO was launching its first extraterritorial war.

The Russians were doubly humiliated because the Balkans had long been in their sphere of influences with Serbia as their traditional ally. The result was intense anti-American, anti-NATO feeling engendered in Russia. NATO expansion had agitated Russian elites; Kosovo inflamed the Russian public.

Kosovo created in Russia what Simes calls a "national security consensus": the demand for a strong leader to do what it takes to restore Russia's standing and status. And it made confrontation with the United States a badge of honor.

The dash to Pristina airport by Russian troops under the noses of the allies as they entered Kosovo was an unserious way of issuing the challenge. But the support this little adventure enjoyed at home showed Russian leaders the power of the new nationalism.

The first Russian beneficiary of Kosovo was then-Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. But it was Prime Minister Putin who understood how to fully exploit it. Applying the lessons of Kosovo, he seized upon Chechen provocations into neighboring Dagestan to launch his merciless war on Chechnya. It earned him enormous popularity and ultimately the presidency.

One of Putin's first promises is to rebuild Russia's military-industrial complex. We are now saddled with him for four years, probably longer, much longer.

The Clinton administration has a congenital inability to distinguish forest from trees. It obsesses over paper agreements, such as the chemical weapons treaty, which will not advance to American interests one iota. It expends enormous effort on Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, places of (at best) the most peripheral interest to the United States. And it lets the big ones slip away.

Saddam Hussein is back building his weapons of mass destruction. China's threats to Taiwan grow. The American military is badly stretched by far-flung commitments in places of insignificance. Most important of all, Russia, on whose destiny and direction hinge the future of Eastern Europe and the Caspian Basin, has come under the sway of a cold-eyed cop, destroyer of Chechnya and heir to Yuri Andropov, the last KGB graduate to rule Russia.

Such is the price of the blinkered dogmatism of this administration. We will be paying the price far into the next.

Mr. ROBERTS. Charles Krauthammer points out in the article—and I

will read a little of it—that, basically, what the Russians thought was the path from Kosovo to Putin is not that difficult to trace. It goes through Chechnya.

Americans may not see the connection, but the Russians do. The Russians have been operating under the assumption that to be a good international citizen, they could not engage in the unilateral use of force without the general approval of the international community. Well, Kosovo certainly cured them of that illusion. Finally, Russia acquiesced in the expansion of NATO under the expectation and assurance that it would remain always a defensive alliance. I am not arguing the pros and cons of that, but simply the reaction in Russia. Russians were doubly humiliated because the Balkans had long been in their sphere of influence, with Serbia as their traditional ally. The result was an intense anti-American, anti-NATO feeling engendered in Russia, and NATO expansion had really agitated the Russian elites, and Kosovo inflamed the Russian public.

So Kosovo created what has been called a national security consensus. The demand for a strong leader to do what it takes to restore Russia's standing and status made the confrontation with the United States a badge of honor. I will tell you, in going to Moscow and talking with Russian leaders regarding the very important cooperative threat reduction programs that happened to come under the jurisdiction of my subcommittee, you get a lecture on Kosovo for a half hour even before you have a cup of coffee. So this article has some merit.

In regard to Mr. Krauthammer's article:

The first Russian beneficiary of Kosovo was then-Prime Minister Primakov. But it was Prime Minister Putin who understood how to fully exploit it. Applying the lessons of Kosovo, he seized upon the Chechen provocations into neighboring Dagestan to launch his merciless war on Chechnya. It earned him enormous popularity and ultimately the presidency.

We are now saddled with him for four years, probably longer, much longer.

We hope the man without a face—which is how some describe Putin—we hope we can work with him and build a positive relationship. I think under the law of unintended effects, this is a good example.

In China, obviously, the political wounds fester in the wake of the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade; the Taiwan issue, charges of espionage, and the criticism of human rights; and continued controversy over whether or not Congress will approve a trading status that will result in the U.S. simply taking advantage of trade concessions that the Chinese have made to us.

In Latin America, the lack of a so-called fast-track authority and U.S. trade policy is muddled. You can drive south into Central America and into trade relations with our competitors in the European Union. My friend from

Nebraska, Senator HAGEL, who will join us in about an hour, put it this way:

It worries me, first, because most of us are not really picking this up on our radar—this sense that we don't care about what our trading partners or allies think. It is going to come back and snap us in some ways. It will be very bad for this country.

Well, the criticism from the Marshall and Mann article becomes very harsh when they cite why the U.S. has become so aloof. I am quoting here:

*** a President who engages only episodically on international issues and too often has failed to use either the personal prestige or the power of his office to pursue key foreign policy goals. *** a Congress that cares little about foreign affairs in the wake of the Cold War and seems to understand even less. *** a poisonous relationship between the two branches of our Government putting partisanship over national interests *** an American public inattentive to world affairs and confused by all of the partisan backbiting now that the principal reference point—the evil of communism—has all but vanished as a major threat.

Indeed, that is a pretty harsh assessment. Aside from all the criticism and 20/20 hindsight—and it is easy to do that, trying to chart a well-defined foreign policy course is more complicated and difficult today than ever before. Both Senator CLELAND and I understand that. As chairman of the newly created Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, it seems as if we have a new emerging threat at our doorstep almost every day. I am talking about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue nations, ethnic wars, drugs, and terrorism.

Concluding our second hearing on the subcommittee this session, and again asking the experts, "What keeps you up at night?" the answer came back: "Cyber attacks and biological attacks" from virtually any kind of source, and the bottom line was not if, but when.

So it is not easy, but if we are worried about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we should also be worried about the proliferation of overall foreign policy roles, not to mention the role the U.S. should play in the world today.

Some may say events of the day will determine our strategy on a case-by-case basis. That seems to be the case. But I say that is a dangerous path, as evidenced by adversaries that did not or will not believe we have the will to respond.

Former National Security Adviser, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, put it this way in a speech at the Brookings Institution National Forum, and he said this in response to some questions:

The nature of our approach to foreign policy also changed from, I would say, from foreign policy as a continuing focus of the United States, which it had been for the 50 years of the Cold War, to an episodic attention on the part of the United States, and thus without much of a theme, and further to that, a foreign policy whose decisions

were heavily influenced by polls, by what was popular back home or what was assumed to be popular.

General Scowcroft went on to say:

So at a period when we should have been focusing on structures to improve the possibility that we could actually make some changes in the way the world operated, and some improvements, we have frittered away the time. I think never has history left us such a clean slate as we had in 1991. And we have not taken advantage of it.

One point on looking ahead from here. I think we have begun engaging on a fundamental transformation of the international system with insufficient thought.

We, NATO, President Clinton, the U.N. Secretary General, are moving to replace the Treaty of Westphalia, replacing the notion of the sovereignty of the nation-state with what I would call the sovereignty of the individual and humanitarianism. That is a profound change in the way the world operates. And we're doing it with very little analysis of what it is we're about and how we want this to turn out.

Evidenced by the Charles Krauthammer article.

Again I quote from the general:

In Kosovo, just for example, we conducted a devastating bombing of a country in an attempt to protect a minority within that country. And, as a result, we're now presiding over reverse ethnic cleansing. What's the difference between Kosovo and Chechnya?

That is a question not many of us want to ponder.

How many people must be placed in jeopardy to warrant an invasion of sovereignty? Where? By whom? How does one set priorities among these kind of crises?

And, events of the day, again dominated by the so-called CNN effect, ignore the same kind of core questions posed by General Scowcroft and reflected again in an article by Doyle McManus the Washington Bureau Chief of the Los Angeles Times: When should the United States use military power?

President Clinton has argued in the Clinton Doctrine that Americans should intervene wherever U.S. power can protect ethnic minorities from genocide. I would add a later UN speech seemed to indicate a backing off from that position.

How will the United States deal with China and Russia, the two great potentially hostile powers?

What is the biggest threat to our nation's security and how should the U.S. respond? Weapons of mass destruction head the list of course, but the President has added in terrorism, disease, poverty, disorder to the list.

I know about the Strategic Concept of NATO, when that was passed during the 50-year anniversary last spring in Washington. Those of us who read the Strategic Concept and all of the missions that entailed—moving away from a collective defense—we were concerned about that. We asked for a report as to whether that obligated the United States to all of these missions.

Finally, we received a report from the administration of about three pages. The report said we are not obligated and not responsible. If we are not

responsible for the Strategic Concept of NATO, what are we doing adopting it?

When the U.S. acts, should it wait for the approval of the United Nations, seek the approval of our allies, or strike out on its own?

However, my colleagues, the biggest question remains and it was defined well by retired Air Force Brigadier General David Herrelko who wrote in the Dayton Daily News recently:

"The United States needs to get a grip on what our national interests are, what we stand for and what we can reasonably do in the world before we can size our military forces and before we send them in harms way. We must hammer out, in a public forum, just what our national priorities are." He says, and I agree, we cannot continue adrift. Consider this retired military man's following points:

More Americans have died in peacekeeping operations (Lebanon, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia) than in military actions (Iraq, Panama, Grenada and Yugoslavia).

We have a president seeking United Nations approval for military intervention but skipping the dialogue with Congress.

I might add, the Congress skips the dialog with the President.

We commit our military forces before we clearly state our objectives.

We gradually escalate hostilities and we leave standing forces behind.

Some 7,000 now in Kosovo, and the peacekeepers. When there was no peace, they became the target.

General Herrelko ends his article with a plea: "We are starved for meaningful dialogue between the White House and the Congress."

I agree Mr. President and would add we are starved for dialogue here in the Senate as well and that is why we are here.

And, as Senator CLELAND has pointed out, our goal is not to achieve unanimity on each and every issue but to at least contribute to an effort to focus attention on our challenges instead of reacting piecemeal as events of the day take place.

And, goodness knows even if the foreign policy stadium is not full of interested spectators, we do have quite an array of players. LA Times Bureau Chief McManus has his own program:

Humanitarian interventionists, mostly Democrats and President Clinton with Kosovo being the prime example. Nationalist interventionists, mostly Republicans who would intervene in defense of democracy, trade and military security.

Realists, both Republicans and Democrats

I think Senator CLELAND would be in that category.

skeptical about intervention but wanting the United States to block any concert of hostile powers.

Minimalists, those who think the United States should stay out of foreign entanglements and quarrels and save its strengths for major conflicts.

Richard Haass, former foreign policy advisor in the Bush administration and now with the Brookings Institution, has defined the players in the foreign

policy program much along the same lines as Senator CLELAND did in his opening remarks during our first forum last month:

Wilsonians who wish to assist other countries achieve democracy;

Economists, who wish to promote trade, prosperity and free markets;

Realists, who wish to preserve an orderly balance of power without worrying too much what kind of states are doing the balancing;

Hegemonists who want to make sure the United States keeps its status as the only superpower;

Humanitarians, who wish to address oppression, poverty, hunger and environmental damage;

And, Minimalists, who wish to avoid spending time or tax dollars on any of these matters.

I'm not sure of any of my colleagues would want to be identified or characterized in any one of these categories but again the key question is whether or not the members of this foreign policy posse can ride in one direction and better define our vital national interests and from that definition establish priorities and a national strategy to achieve them.

Fortunately, as Senator CLELAND has pointed out, some very distinguished and experienced national security and foreign policy leaders have already provided several road maps that make a great deal of sense. What does not make a great deal of sense is that few are paying attention.

Lawrence Korb, Director of Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations, in a military analysis published in a publication called "Great Decisions" has focused on the Powell Doctrine named after retired Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell, citing the dangers of military engagement and the need to limit commitments to absolutely vital national interests. On the other hand, the sweeping Clinton Doctrine emphasizes a global policing role for the United States.

How do we reconcile these two approaches?

I am not sure there is only one yellow brick foreign policy road but there are several good alternatives that have been suggested:

First, I am going to refer to what I call the "Old Testament" on foreign policy in terms of vital national interests. This is the Commission on America's National Interests, 1996.

Second, a national security strategy for a new century put out by the White House this past December. If you are being critical, or suggesting, or if you have a different approach than the current policy, as I have been during my remarks, you have an obligation to read this. The White House put this out as of December of 1999.

Third, adapting U.S. Defense to Future Needs by Ashton Carter former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security in the first Clinton administration and currently professor of science and international affairs at Harvard.

We had him testify to this before the Emerging Threats Subcommittee just a month ago.

Fourth, defining U.S. National Strategy by Kim Holmes and Jon Hillen of the Heritage Foundation, a detailed summary of threats confronting us today with appropriate commentary about their priorities.

Fifth, transforming American Alliances by Andrew Krepinévitch of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

He has been of real help to us in regard to the Emerging Threats subcommittee, and also the full Committee on Armed Services.

Sixth, a highly recommended article "Back to Basics: U.S. Foreign Policy for the Coming Decade," by James E. Goodby, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former Ambassador to Finland and Kenneth Weisbrode, Director of the International Security Program at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

In this regard, Messrs. Goodby and Weisbrode have summarized the concerns of Senator CLELAND and myself very well when they said:

The most common error of policymakers is to fail to distinguish among our levels of interest, leading to an over commitment to higher level interests. In other words, strategic or second tier interests, if mishandled, can threaten vital interests. But, strategic interests, if well understood and acted upon, can support vital interests.

Goodby and Weisbrode do us a favor by following the example of others in prioritizing our vital national security interests:

First and vital, homeland defense from threats to well being and way of life of the American people. I can't imagine anyone would have any quarrel with that.

Second and strategic, I am talking about peace and stability in Europe and northeast Asia and open access to our energy supplies.

Third, and of lesser interest, although it is of interest, stability in South Asia, Latin America, Africa, and open markets favorable to the United States and to world prosperity.

The authors suggest how to accomplish these goals with what they call three essential pieces of foreign policy balance:

First, stability and cohesion in Europe and between the European Union and the United States; second, mature and effective relations among China, Russia, and the West to include first among all others, a regular forum to oversee the reduction of the risk of nuclear weapons; and third, systematic patterns of consultation and policy coordination of the States benefiting from the global economy and positive relations between those States and the developing world.

The authors also suggest the means to their ends by looking ahead and stressing the need for eventual NATO and Russian cooperation and stability, the need for a similar organization and effort between the United States and China, Japan, Russia, and Korea, and lastly, American support for the United Nations.

In a self-acknowledged understatement, they state this is going to be a hard and tedious task. This is not easy. But it is absolutely necessary.

Now, Mr. Goodby and Mr. Weisbrode are not critical per se, but they issue a warning and this is what we are trying to bring to the attention of the Senate. It is central to what Senator CLELAND and I are trying to accomplish with these foreign policy and national security dialogs.

The public perception and the private reality suggest worrisome disorganization and a certain degree of impatience with a foggy conceptual foreign policy framework. It is time to return to the basic elements of the American role in the world and to raise the public understanding of them.

American strategic planners and policymakers cannot afford to be arbitrarily selective about where and when to engage U.S. power. This would make our foreign policy aimless and lose the support of the American people.

They continue:

We should set out each of America's interests and how they best may be achieved with the cooperation of other powers. However, this cannot take place until the executive and legislative branches of government resurrect the workable partnership in foreign affairs that once existed but exists no more.

And Senator CLELAND, my colleagues, that is why we are here today and that is why we are involved in this forum. In my personal view, we are starved for meaningful foreign policy and national security dialog between the White House and the Congress and within the Congress. The stakes are high.

I recall well the meeting in Senator CLELAND's office between Senator CLELAND, myself, and Senator SNOWE, worried about our involvement in the Balkans. I had an amendment, we had an amendment; we passed both amendments, setting out guidelines that the administration would respond, saying that before we spend money in regard to the defense appropriations or in the authorization bill, hopefully we can establish a better dialog, trying to figure out what our role was in regard to our constitutional responsibilities, I say to my good friend, without having to come to the floor with appropriations bills and have an amendment and say you can't spend the money for this until you explain this. That is no way to operate.

It seems to me we can do a much better job. The stakes are high.

As Carl Sandberg wrote of Americans: Always there arose enough reserves of strength, balances of sanity, portions of wisdom to carry the Nation through to a fresh start with ever renewing vitality.

I hope this dialog and these discussions, all of the priority recommendations we have had from experts in the field, will help us begin that fresh start. We cannot afford to do otherwise.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a chart that outlines and prioritizes the vital national

security interests of the United States as recommended by the many experts and organizations I have discussed earlier in my remarks. This chart was pre-

pared by Maj. Scott Kindsvater, an outstanding pilot in the U.S. Air Force and a congressional fellow in my office.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFINING U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST			
Source	Vital Interests	Important Interests	Other Interests
"A National Security Strategy for a New Century"; The White House, 1/5/2000.	1. Physical security of our territory and that of our allies. 2. Safety of our citizens. 3. Economic well-being of our society. 4. Protection of critical infrastructures from paralyzing attack (energy, banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water systems, and emergency services).	1. Regions where we have sizable economic stake or commitments to allies. 2. Protecting global environment from severe harm. 3. Crises with a potential to generate substantial and highly destabilizing refugee flows.	1. Responding to natural and manmade disasters. 2. Promoting human rights and seeking to halt gross violations of those rights. 3. Supporting democratization, adherence to the rule of law and civilian control of the military. 4. Promoting sustainable development and environmental protection.
"Americans and the World: A Survey at Century's End," Foreign Policy, Spring 1999.	American public's foreign policy priorities—1.—Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. 2. Stop the influx of illegal drugs into U.S. 3. Protect American jobs. 4. Combat international terrorism. 5. Secure adequate energy supplies.—(American foreign policy leadership priorities)—1. Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. 2. Combat international terrorism. 3. Defend the security of U.S. allies. 4. Maintain superior military power worldwide. 5. Fight world hunger.		
"America's National Interests," Commission on America's National Interests; 7/1996.	1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons attacks on the United States. 2. Prevent the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Europe or Asia. 3. Prevent the emergence of a hostile major power on U.S. borders or in control of the seas. 4. Prevent the catastrophic collapse of major global systems: trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and environmental. 5. Ensure the survival of US allies.	(Extremely Important)—1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of the use of nuclear or biological weapons anywhere. 2. Prevent the regional proliferation of NBC weapons and delivery systems. 3. Promote the acceptance of international rules of law and mechanisms for resolving disputes peacefully. 4. Prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon in important regions, such as the Persian Gulf. 5. Protect U.S. friends and allies from significant external aggression. 6. Prevent the emergence of a reflexively adversarial major power in Europe or Asia. 7. Prevent and, if possible at reasonable cost, end major conflicts in important geographic regions. 8. Maintain a lead in key military-related and other strategic technologies (including information and computers). 9. Prevent massive, uncontrolled immigration across U.S. borders. 10. Suppress, contain, and combat terrorism, transnational crime, and drugs. 11 Prevent genocide.	Just Important—1. Discourage massive human rights violations in foreign countries as a matter of official government policy. 2. Promote pluralism, freedom, and democracy in strategically important states as much as feasible without destabilization. 3. Prevent and, if possible at low cost, end conflicts in strategically insignificant geographic regions. 4. Protect the lives and well-being of American citizens who are targeted or taken hostage by terrorist organizations. 5. Boost the domestic output of key strategic industries and sectors (where market imperfections may make a deliberate industrial policy rational). 6. Prevent the nationalization of U.S.-owned assets abroad. 7. Maintain an edge in the international distribution of information to ensure that American values continue to positively influence the cultures of foreign nations. 9. Reduce the U.S. illegal alien and drug problems. 10. Maximize U.S. GNP growth from international trade and investment.
"Adapting to U.S. Defence to Future Needs," Ashton B. Carter, Survival, Winter 1999–2000.	A-List: Potential future problems that could threaten U.S. survival, way of life and position in the world; possibly preventable—1. Danger that Russia might descend into chaos, isolation and aggression. 2. Danger that Russia and the other Soviet successor states might lose control of the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons legacy of the former Soviet Union. 3. Danger that, as China emerges, it could spawn hostility rather than becoming cooperatively engaged in the international system. 4. Danger that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will proliferate and present a direct military threat to U.S. forces and territory.	B-List: Actual threat to vital U.S. interests; deterrable through ready forces—1. Major-Theater War in NE Asia. 2. Major Theater War in Southwest Asia.	C-List Important problems that do not threaten vital U.S. interests—1. Kosovo. 2. Bosnia. 3. East Timor. 3. Rwanda. 4. Somalia. 5. Haiti.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUTCHINSON). The Senator from Georgia.

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I cannot express strongly enough what an honor it is to be on the floor of the Senate and listen to my distinguished colleague talk about the need for a meaningful dialog on a subject that often gets put down at the bottom of the list when it comes to public issues. I am reminded of a line from one of Wellington's troops after the battle at Waterloo, after the battle was won, that in time of war, and not before, God of the soldier, men adore; but in time of peace, with all things righted, God is forgotten and the soldier slighted.

Unfortunately, I think my dear colleague, Senator PAT ROBERTS, and I have sensed that the vital interests of the United States, the interests that cause us to go to war, the interests that compel us to fight for our vital national interests, these basic fundamental principles have been lost in the shuffle. Somehow they have been slighted and somehow the issue of foreign policy and defense has been shoved to the background. We have lost sight of the basis of who we are and what we are about as we go into the 21st century, which is why we have tried through this dialog to call attention to this issue.

We have some wonderful colleagues joining in our dialog, including my fellow Vietnam veteran, Senator KERREY, and Senator HAGEL, as well as Senator HUTCHINSON and Senator KYL.

For a few weeks, I wondered whether I was a little bit out of touch and wondered whether or not this dialog on American foreign policy and global reach was something that was out of touch with what was going on in the world. I went back home the last few days and in my own hometown paper in Atlanta I came across an article, a New York Times piece, Anti-Americanism Growing Across Europe.

Hello. Good morning. I realized that what I was seeing in a daily newspaper was what I was attempting to engage here in terms of a perspective on our global reach, a sense that we were overcommitted in the world and yet underfunded, a sense of mismatch between our ends and our means to achieve those ends. I realized we really were on target.

In my State, we say that even a blind hog can root up an acorn every now and then. I think my distinguished colleague and I from Kansas have rooted up an acorn.

We are on to something. That is a reason why I am strengthened in pursuing this dialog, and I am delighted we will have additional Senators entering into this dialog because unless we ourselves begin to define who we are as a nation, what we want out of our role as a nation, and where we want to go and how we exercise our power, unless we decide it, it will occur by happenstance. We will move from crisis to crisis. We will not have a plan and we will end up in places in the world where we know not of what we speak.

One of the quotes I have come across, one of the lines that continues to rein-

force my view of my own concern and caution about America's expanded role in the world, is from our first dialog back in February when Owen Harries, editor of the National Interests, summed up his views on the appropriate approach for the United States in today's world with the following comments: I advocate restraint because every dominant power in the last four centuries that has not practiced it, that has been excessively intrusive and demanding, has ultimately been confronted by a hostile coalition of other powers. Americans may believe that their country, being exceptional, need have no worries in this respect. I do not agree. It is not what Americans think of the United States but what others think of it that will decide the matter. Anti-Americanism is growing across Europe. The distinguished Senator from Kansas has accumulated, in a shocking way, some headlines from 40 or 50 newspapers among our allies and our friends, questioning our role, particularly in the Balkans, but questioning our exercise of power, as it were.

The foreign perspective is not one to which we generally devote much attention in the Congress, certainly after the cold war is over, but our attention to foreign affairs has been slight. We do not really devote much attention to foreign affairs and consideration of our foreign policy options unless we are threatened.

I am delighted Senator ROBERTS is sitting as the chairman of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee in the Armed Services Committee. He has his

eye on the ball, certainly an emerging ball in terms of threats to our country. I think the overall threat is that we do not realize one could occur now that the cold war is over.

I think, also, one of the emerging threats, from my point of view, is that we will overcommit and overexpand and overreact and, instead of being only a superpower working with others and sharing power, we will wind up imposing—by default, almost, in the power vacuums around the world—a pax Americana that cannot be sustained by the will of the people in this country—again, a mismatch between means and ends.

But it is important, as Mr. Harries suggests, to focus on this issue.

I have spent some time, over recent months, as has the distinguished Senator from Kansas, reviewing what foreign opinion makers and leaders are saying about the United States. While we may think, as I do, that our country has not made a clear choice about our global role, the view from abroad is very different. Many people think we have chosen the path we are now on.

A Ukrainian commentator, in the Kiev newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli, wrote in April of last year:

Currently, two opinions are possible in the world—the U.S. opinion and the wrong opinion. . . .

He said the U.S.

. . . has announced its readiness to act as it thinks best, should U.S. interests require this, despite the United Nations. And let those whose interests are violated think about it and draw conclusions. This is the current world order or world disorder.

That, from Kiev.

The influential Times of India editorialized in July of last year:

New Delhi should not lose sight of the kind of global order the U.S. is fashioning. NATO's policies towards Yugoslavia and the U.S.-led military alliance's new Strategic Concept are based on the degradation of international law and a more muscular approach to intervention. Such a trend is certainly not in India's interest.

So India has concluded: Why don't we go it alone? Why don't we develop ourselves as a nuclear power?

The President of Brazil was quoted on April 22 of last year in an interview with a Sao Paulo newspaper as to his views about the United States: While President Cardoso was generally sympathetic to the United States and supportive of good bilateral relations between our two countries, the President of Brazil nonetheless expressed certain misgivings about our approach to international relations.

He said:

The United States currently constitutes the only large center of political, economic, technologic, and even cultural power. This country has everything to exert its domain on the rest of the world, but it must share it. There must be rules, even for the stronger ones. When the strongest one makes decisions without listening, everything becomes a bit more difficult. In this European war, NATO made the decision, but who legalized it? That's the main problem. I am convinced more than ever that we need a new political order in the world.

I think I am correct that Jack Kennedy once indicated we would seek a world where the strong are just and the weak preserved. Because we are strong now, I think we have to have an inordinate sense of being just. But these are all voices from countries that have not traditionally been close to the United States. Let's look, then, at some of our NATO allies, nations with whom we presumably share the closest relationships and common interests.

In a commentary from February of last year in Berlin's Die Tageszeitung, a German writer observes:

There is a growing number of people with more and more prominent protagonists who are at odds with American supremacy and who are inclined to see the action of the State Department as a policy of interests. And Washington is offering no reason to deny the justification of these reservations. As unilateral as possible and as multilateral as necessary—that's the explicit maxim under which U.S. President Bill Clinton has pursued his foreign and defense policies in the last 2 years.

From Italy, an Italian general expressed the following view in the December 1999 edition of the Italian geopolitical quarterly LiMes:

The condition all the NATO countries as a whole find themselves in is closer to the condition of vassalage with respect to the United States than it is to the condition of alliance. NATO is not able to influence the policy of the United States because its existence in effect depends on it. No member countries are able to resist the American pressures because their own resources are officially at the disposal of everybody and not just the United States.

What evidence do our foreign friends cite for such concerns? The influential left-of-center Dutch daily NRC Handelsblad wrote last October:

The U.S. Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty does not just represent a heavy defeat for President Clinton. Far more important are the consequences for world order of treaties designed to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and hence boost world security. . . .

According to this newspaper in the Netherlands:

Unfortunately, the decision fits in with a growing tendency on the part of U.S. foreign policy to place greater emphasis on the United States' own room for maneuver and less on international cooperation and traditional idealism.

In a similar vein, the Times of London carried a commentary last November. It said:

The real fear is of an American retreat, not to isolationism, but to unilateralism, exacerbated at present by the post-impeachment weakness of President Clinton and his standoff with the Republican Congress. That's shown by the Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the stalling of free trade initiatives, and the refusal to pay arrears to the United Nations. The U.S. is seen as wayward and inward-looking.

While there are some exceptions, the majority of statements I looked at expressed the view the United States has indeed made the conscious decision to use our current position of predominance to pursue unilateralist foreign and national security policy.

When I first came to Washington 30-some-odd years ago as a young intern, I found out there could not be a conspiracy here. We are not that well organized. There cannot be a unilateralist conspiracy in the world by the United States—we are not that well organized. What has evolved is a sense in which we have moved from crisis to crisis and looked at power vacuums and said, "We need to be there."

I like the notion that General Shelton has about the use of American military power. He says:

We've got a great hammer, but not every problem in the world is a nail.

I do like President Kennedy's insight, too, that there is not necessarily an American solution for every problem in the world.

Yet we act as if there is. If one looks at the outcomes of recent American foreign policy debates, it is easy to see how those viewing us from a distance might come to such a conclusion. Since I have come to the Senate, the U.S. Government through the combined efforts of the executive and the legislative branches—what are, relatively speaking, nondiscussions, I might add—has made the following decisions: Withheld support from the international landmines treaty; rejected jurisdiction by the new international criminal court; been slow to pay off long overdue arrears to the United Nations; rejected the current applicability of international emissions standards set at Kyoto; rejected fast-track international trade negotiating authority for the President; rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, apparently committed to a national missile defense system which will violate the ABM Treaty; and established a principle of "humanitarian intervention" where national sovereignty can be violated without United Nations sanction under certain circumstances.

My purpose here is not to argue for or against any of these individual positions; for, indeed, I have supported some of them as, indeed, have virtually every Member of the Congress and the administration. But, as far as I know, not one of us has supported them all.

If the Republican congressional majority has been largely responsible for the actions rejecting multilateral commitments and entanglements in the national security sphere, it is my party, the Democrats, who has taken the lead in opposing international trade obligations, and the Democratic administration which has espoused the cause of humanitarian interventions in violation of national sovereignty. In short, the sum total of our actions has been far more unilateral than any of us would have intended or carved out for ourselves.

This is relatively incoherent, and I can see why other nations might view us as more organized than we are.

It is also very damaging to our national interest and is one of the major motives for our efforts to promote this development of a bipartisan consensus

through these floor debates. We have to get back to some basic understanding of who we are and what we are doing in the world.

As was discussed in our first dialog, there are certainly some leading voices among America's foreign policy thinkers who do, indeed, advocate a unilateralist course for America in the post-cold-war era, but not even that group actually believes we have actually embarked upon that course. Very few believe we are willing to invest sufficient resources today to even pursue the somewhat less demanding multilateralist approach which seems to have more support among our foreign policy establishment.

The direct danger to America from this mismatch between means and ends, between our commitments and our forces, between our aspirations and our willingness to pay to achieve them is one of the central concerns for our discussion today and one I will turn to later. However, I want to conclude these opening remarks with an observation about indirect consequences of this situation with respect to the credibility of American foreign policy abroad.

The chief of the research department of the Japanese Defense Agency's National Institute for Defense Studies wrote in March of last year:

(O)pinion surveys in the United States show that people are inclined to think that the United States should bear as little burdens as possible even though the country should remain the leader in the world. This thinking that the United States should be the world's leader but should not bear too much financial burden may be contradictory in context, but is popular among Americans. This serves as a warning to the international community that the United States might get at first involved in some international operations but run away later in the middle of the operations, leaving things unfinished.

Because we do not have a comprehensive strategy, because we do not talk to each other enough, because we do not have a proper dialog, particularly in this body, and because we move from crisis to crisis in our foreign policy and come up with different solutions for different situations without a clear understanding of who we are and where we are going, we are sending a mixed message to even our best friends.

To me, the case is clear: If we are to avoid misunderstandings at home and abroad, if we are to prevent unwanted and unintended conclusions and consequences, as the distinguished Senator from Kansas mentioned, about our objectives, we have to pull together and forge a coherent, bipartisan consensus to guide our country in the uncertain waters of the 21st century. Those who came before us and built this country into the grand land it is today, and those who will inherit it from us in the years ahead deserve no less.

I am honored to yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.

Mr. ROBERTS. Parliamentary inquiry: I believe I have 1 hour reserved

in morning business and that the distinguished Senator from Georgia has 1 hour; is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 hours under the control of both Senators.

Mr. ROBERTS. I inform my colleagues that Senator HUTCHISON of Texas and Senator HAGEL will be taking part, and I think perhaps Senator KERREY will be coming to the floor. Senator HAGEL will be arriving in about 9 minutes. If my distinguished colleague wants to summarize any other comments or perhaps go over the Commission on America's National Interests, I think now is the time to do so, if he is prepared to do that.

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I want to add some additional comments, if that is all right with my distinguished colleague.

Earlier, I spoke about the mismatch between the goals of American foreign policy and the means we employ in achieving them. Whether one espouses a unilateralist or multilateralist approach, or something in between, most of those with a strong interest in American foreign policy have major goals for that policy, whether in preventing the emergence of global rivals or in promoting the spread of democracy, whether in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction or in protecting human rights. Yet today we devote a little over 1 percent of the Federal budget for international affairs, compared to over 5 percent in 1962 in the middle of the cold war.

Of particular concern to me as a member of the Armed Services Committee, since the 1980s we have gone from providing roughly 25 percent of the budget for national defense to 18 percent today. We have reduced the active-duty armed forces by over one-third but have increased overseas deployments by more than 300 percent. I have often said we have, as a country, both feet firmly planted on a banana peel. We are going in opposite directions. That cannot last. We have a mismatch between our commitments and our willingness to live up to those commitments. We are sending a mixed message abroad.

What is the result of all of this? Newspapers reported that last November, for the first time in a number of years, the U.S. Army rated 2 of its 10 divisions as unprepared for war. Why were they unprepared for war? Because they were bogged down in the Balkans. That was never part of the deal going into the Balkans, that an entire U.S. Army division would be there for an indefinite period of time. No wonder these other two divisions were unprepared for war because they had elements in the Balkans doing something else—not fighting a war, but peace-keeping missions.

The services continue to struggle in meeting both retention and recruiting goals, and the service members and their families with whom I meet and who are on the front lines in carrying

out the policies decided in Washington are showing the visible strains of this mismatch between our commitments and our resources. They deserve better from us.

I hope other Senators had an opportunity to watch Senator ROBERTS' discussion of our national interests during our February 24 dialog. If not, I commend my colleagues' attention to those remarks as printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of that date.

In brief, he stated the opinion, which I share, that in the post-cold-war world, our country has had a hard time in prioritizing our national interests, leading to confusion and inconsistency. He went on to cite the July 1996 report by the Commission on America's National Interests, of which he was a member, along with our colleagues Senators JOHN MCCAIN and BOB GRAHAM and my distinguished predecessor, Sam Nunn.

Of particular relevance to our topic today of defining and defending our national interests, the Commission found:

For the decades ahead, the only sound foundation for a coherent, sustainable American foreign policy is a clear public sense of American national interests. Only a national-interest-based foreign policy will provide priorities for American engagement in the world. Only a foreign policy grounded in American national interests will allow America's leaders to explain persuasively how and why specific expenditures of American treasure or blood deserve support from America's citizens.

As my colleagues will note from the charts I have, the Commission went on to divide our national interests into four categories. They defined "vital interests" as those:

Strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.

And as Senator ROBERTS has discussed, and you can see on the chart, they found only five items which reached that high standard.

In addition to attempting to identify our national interests, the commission also addressed the key issue of what we should be prepared to do to defend those interests:

For "vital" national interests, the United States should be prepared to commit itself to fight, even if it has to do so unilaterally and without the assistance of allies.

But there is a lower priority than that.

Next in priority come "extremely important interests"—these are not vital; but they are extremely important—defined as those which:

... would severely prejudice but not strictly imperil the ability of the U.S. Government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation—

And for which: the United States should be prepared to commit forces to meet threats and to lead a coalition of forces, but only in conjunction with a coalition or allies whose vital interests are threatened.

Next, third, we have another set of interests. These are called "just important interests." They are not vital, not

necessary. These are important, which would have major negative consequences:

The United States should be prepared to participate militarily, on a case-by-case basis, but only if the costs are low or others carry the lion's share of the burden.

Finally, last, comes the most numerous but lowest priority category of "less important or secondary interests," which:

Are intrinsically desirable but that have no major effect on the ability of the U.S. government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.

My colleagues in the Senate, this is exactly the kind of exercise—of defining and differentiating our national interests, and of gauging the proper kind and level of response for protecting such interests—that we need to be engaging in if we are to bring coherence and effectiveness to our post-cold war foreign and national security policy. Everything is not the most important thing to do. Everything is not necessarily in America's vital interest to do. It is, in my judgment, what we must do in considering our policies, particularly toward the Balkans and now with a plan in Colombia to involve ourselves in a war against narcotraffickers in Colombia. We need to do several things. We need to ask ourselves: How vital are our interests in those areas? And what are we willing to pay to protect those interests?

What about the role of other countries, who, for reasons of history and geography, may have even greater national interests at stake?

Senator ROBERTS pointed out back in February the similarities between the Commission on America's National Interests list of "vital" interests and related compilations by other groups and individuals. I believe, for example, that the commission's definitions of "vital" and "extremely important" national interests are quite compatible with the relevant portions of the January 2000 White House "National Security Strategy for a New Century." The conflicts will lie in applying these general principles to specific cases. That is what Senator ROBERTS and I intend to do with the remaining sessions of these global role dialogs, including such applications as the role of our alliances and the decision on when and how to intervene militarily.

However, from my perspective, though we may have some implicit common ground as to our most important national interests and what we should be prepared to do in defending them, in the real world where actions must count for more than words and where capabilities will inevitably be given greater weight than intentions, the picture we too often give to the world—of unilateralist means and narrowly self-interested ends—and to our own citizens—of seemingly limitless aspirations but quite limited resources we are willing to expend in achieving them—is surely not what we should be doing.

Samuel P. Huntington writes in the March/April edition of *Foreign Affairs*:

Neither the Clinton administration nor Congress nor the public is willing to pay the costs and accept the risks of unilateral global leadership. Some advocates of American global leadership argue for increasing defense expenditures by 50 percent, but that is a nonstarter. The American public clearly sees no need to expend effort and resources to achieve American hegemony. In one 1997 poll, only 13 percent said they preferred a preeminent role for the United States in world affairs, while 74 percent said they wanted the United States to share power with other countries. Other polls have produced similar results. Public disinterest in international affairs is pervasive, abetted by the drastically shrinking media coverage of foreign events. Majorities of 55 to 66 percent of the public say that what happens in western Europe, Asia, Mexico, and Canada has little or no impact on their lives. However much foreign policy elites may ignore or deplore it, the United States lacks the domestic political base to create a unipolar world. American leaders repeatedly make threats, promise action, and fail to deliver. The result is a foreign policy of "rhetoric and retreat" and a growing reputation as a "hollow hegemon."

One of my favorite authors on war and theorists on war, Clausewitz, put it this way:

Since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction. Such an interaction could lead to a maximum effort if a maximum effort could be defined. But in that case, all proportion between action and political demands would be lost: means would cease to be commensurate with ends, and in most cases a policy of maximum exertion would fail because of the domestic problems it would raise.

I think we are maximally committed around the world. I think we have to review these commitments because I am not quite sure we have the domestic will to follow through on them or the budgets to take care of them. We do not want to risk failure.

Once again, I thank all of the Senators who have joined in today's discussion. I have benefitted from their comments, and encourage all of our colleagues of whatever party and of whatever views on the proper U.S. global role to join in this effort to bring greater clarity and greater consensus to our national security policies through these dialogs. Our next session will be on the role of multilateral organizations, including NATO and the United Nations, and is scheduled to occur just after the Easter break.

During the Easter break I intend to go visit our allies and friends in NATO, in Belgium, to go to Aviano to get a background briefing on how the air war in the Balkans was conducted, to go on to Macedonia and into Kosovo itself to see our forces there. That would be over the Easter break. I will go back through London to get a briefing from our closest ally, our British friends.

I hope to come back to the Senate in a few weeks with a more insightful view of what we should do, particularly in that part of the world, regarding our responsibilities.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.

Mr. ROBERTS. First, again, I thank my good friend, the distinguished Senator from Georgia, for this continued initiative and his leadership in what we think is a bipartisan foreign policy dialog. I hope it is successful.

We said back in February during our first discussion that our objective was to try to achieve greater attention, focus, and mutual understanding—not to mention a healthy dose of responsibility—in this body in regard to our global role.

I repeat again, in chapter 10 of the Senator's book that he has provided to every Senator, with a marvelous introduction by our Chaplain, the Senator stated that success is a team effort, that coming together is a beginning, keeping together is progress, and working together is success. That is a pretty good motto for our efforts today, as well as a recipe for our foreign policy goals.

I am very privileged to yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Nebraska, Mr. HAGEL. He is a recognized expert in the field of international affairs, and more especially, a strong backer of free trade. I seek his advice and counsel often on the very matters that we are talking about.

I am delighted he has joined us. I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator and my friend.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, first, let me acknowledge the leadership of my colleagues from Georgia and Kansas for bringing attention and focus to an area that does not often get appropriate focus. It is about international affairs—the connecting rods to our lives in a world now that is, in fact, globally connected.

That global community is underpinned by a global economy. There is not a dynamic of the world today, not an action taken nor a consequence of that action, that does not affect America, that does not affect our future. I am grateful that Senators CLELAND and ROBERTS have taken the time and the leadership to focus on an area of such importance to our country.

I point out an op-ed piece that appeared in Monday's *Washington Post*, written by Robert Kagan, and I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the *RECORD*.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the *RECORD*, as follows:

[From the *Washington Post*, Apr. 10, 2000]

A WORLD OF PROBLEMS . . .

(By Robert Kagan)

Call me crazy, but I think it actually would serve the national interest if George W. Bush spent more time talking about foreign policy in this campaign. Not to slight the importance of his statements on the environment and the census. But perhaps Bush and his advisers can find time to pose a simple, Reaganesque question: Is the world a safer place than it was eight years ago?

A hundred bucks says even James Carville can't answer that question in the affirmative—at least not with a straight face. A brief tour d'horizon shows why.

IRAQ

As the administration enters its final months, Saddam Hussein is alive and well and Baghdad, pursuing his quest for weapons of mass destruction, free from outside inspection and getting wealthier by the day through oil sales while the sanctions regime against him crumbles. The next president may see his term dominated by the specter of Saddam Redux.

THE BALKANS

You can debate whether things are getting better in Bosnia, or whether Kosovo is on its way to recovery or to disaster. And Clinton deserves credit for intervening in both crises. But Slobodan Milosevic is still in power in Belgrade, still stirring the pot in Kosovo and is on the verge of starting his fifth Balkan war in Montenegro. Milosevic was George Bush Sr.'s gift to Bill Clinton; he will be Clinton's gift to Al Gore or George Jr.

CHINA-TAIWAN

Even Sinologists sympathetic to the Clinton administration's policies think the odds of military conflict across the Taiwan Strait have increased dramatically. Meanwhile, the administration's own State Department acknowledges the steady deterioration of Beijing's human rights record. Good luck to Al Gore if he tries to call China policy a success.

WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

Two years after India and Pakistan exploded nuclear devices, their struggle over Kashmir remains the likeliest spark for the 21st century's first nuclear confrontation. If this is the signal failure of the Clinton administration's nonproliferation policies, North Korea's and Iran's weapons programs come in a close second and third. Even the administration's intelligence experts admit that the threat to the United States has grown much faster than Clinton and Gore anticipated. And where is the missile defense system to protect Americans in this frightening new era?

HAITI AND COLOMBIA

After nobly intervening in Haiti to restore a democratically elected president in 1994, the administration has frittered away the past 5½ years. Political assassinations in Haiti are rife. Prospects for stability are bleak. Meanwhile, the war in Colombia rages, and even a billion-dollar aid program may not prevent a victory by narco-guerrillas. When the next president has to send troops to fight in Colombia or to restore order in Haiti, again, he'll know whom to thank.

RUSSIA

Even optimists don't deny that the election of Vladimir Putin could be an ominous development. The devastation in Chechnya has revealed the new regime's penchant for brutality.

Add to all this the decline of the armed forces—even the Joint Chiefs complain that the defense budget is tens of billions of dollars short—and you come up with a story of failure and neglect. Sure, there have been some successes: NATO expansion and, maybe, a peace deal in Northern Ireland. Before November, Clinton could pull a rabbit out of the hat in the Middle East. But Jimmy Carter had successes, too. They did not save him from being painted as an ineffectual world leader in the 1980 campaign.

Bush maybe gun-shy about playing up foreign policy after tussling with John McCain in the primaries. But Gore is no McCain. He is nimble on health care and education, but

he is clumsy on foreign policy. Bush may not be a foreign policy maven, but he's got some facts on his side, as well as some heavy hitters. Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, Goerge Shultz and Richard Lugar, instead of whispering in W.'s ear, could get out in public and help build the case. John McCain could pitch in, too.

The offensive can't start soon enough. The administration has been adept at keeping the American people in a complacent torpor: Raising the national consciousness about the sorry state of the world will take time. And if Bush simply waits for the next crisis before speaking out, he will look like a drive-by shooter. Bush also would do himself, his party and the country a favor if he stopped talking about pulling U.S. troops out of the Balkans and elsewhere. Aside from such talk being music to Milosevic's ears, Republicans in Congress have been singing that neo-isolationist tune for years, and the only result has been to make Clinton and Gore look like Harry Truman and Dean Acheson.

Some may say it's inappropriate to "politicize" foreign policy. Please. Americans haven't witnessed a serious presidential debate about foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Bush would do everyone a service by starting such a debate now. He might even do himself some good. Foreign policy won't be the biggest issue in the campaign, but in a tight race, if someone bothers to wake the people up to the world's growing dangers, they might actually decide that they care.

Mr. HAGEL. Mr. Kagan is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He echoes what Senators ROBERTS and CLELAND have talked about; that is, the vital interests of our country in world affairs. He suggests that America's two Presidential candidates this year, Governor Bush and Vice President GORE, focus attention in the remaining months of this Presidential campaign on international issues. He lays out a number of areas in the world that are of vital consequence and concern to not only those particular regions but to the United States.

The point is, others are coming to the same conclusions and realizations as our friends from Georgia and Kansas: that international relations is the completeness of all of our policies—trade, national security, economy, geopolitics. It is, in fact, a complete policy.

We are living in a most unique time in history, a time when everything is possible. We live in a time when we can do more good for mankind than ever in the history of the world. Why is that? It deserves some perspective and some review.

Over the last 50 years, it has been the multilateral organizations of the world, beginning with the visionary and foresighted leadership of Harry Truman after World War II and a Republican Congress, working jointly to develop and implement multilateral policies and organizations such as the United Nations, such as what was born at Breton Woods, the IMF, the World Bank, trade organizations, multilateral peace, financial organizations—all are imperfect, all are flawed. But in the real world, as most of us understand, the choice is seldom between all good,

the easy choice, and all bad. Normally our foreign policy and every dynamic of that foreign policy, be it foreign aid, be it national security interests, be it geopolitical interests, falls somewhere between all good and all bad. It is a difficult position to have to work our way through.

With this weekend's upcoming annual meetings for the IMF and the World Bank and the number of guests who will be coming to Washington—I suspect not exactly to celebrate the IMF and the World Bank and the World Trade Organization and other multilateral organizations—it is important that we bring some perspective to the question that fits very well into the larger question Senators ROBERTS and CLELAND have asked; that is, is the world better off with a World Trade Organization, with a world trade regime, its focus being to open up markets, break down barriers, allow all nations to prosper? And how do they prosper? They prosper through free trade. Underpinning the free trade is individual liberty, individual freedom, emerging democracies, emerging markets.

We could scrap the World Trade Organization, 135 nations, and go back to a time, pre-World War II, that essentially resulted in two world wars, where there would be no trading regime. Those countries that are now locked in poverty have to go it on their own. That is too bad. We can scrap the World Trade Organization. While we are at it, have the IMF and the World Bank added to any prosperity in the world? Have they made mistakes? Yes.

Let's examine some of the underlying and most critical and realistic dynamics of instability in the world. We do know that when there is instability, there is no prosperity and there is no peace. What causes instability?

Let's examine what it is that causes instability. When you have nations trapped in the cycle of hopelessness and the perpetuation of that cycle because of no hope, no future, poverty, hunger, pestilence, what do we think is going to happen? History is rather complete in instructing us on this point: conflict and war. When there is conflict and war, is there an opportunity to advance the causes of mankind? No. Why is that? Let's start with no trading. There are no markets. Do we really believe we can influence the behavior of nations with no contact, no engagement, no trade? I don't think so.

As many of our guests who are arriving now in Washington, who will parade up and down the streets, burning the effigies of our President and the Congress and the World Trade Organization and the IMF and the World Bank—and I believe sincerely their motives are pure; that they wish to pull up out of abject poverty the more than 1.5 billion people in the world today, which is a worthy, noble cause—I think the record over the last 50 years is rather complete in how that has been done to help other nations over the last 50 years do that a little differently

than tearing down the multilateral institutions that have added to prosperity and a better life and a hope for mankind.

I will share with this body a couple of facts from the 1999 Freedom House survey. Most of us know of the organization called Freedom House. It issued its first report in 1978. This is what Freedom House issued on December 21, 1999: 85 countries out of 192 nations today are considered free. That represents 44 percent of the countries in the world today. That is the second largest number of free countries in the history of man. That represents 2.34 billion people living in free countries with individual liberties, 40 percent of all the people in the world. Fifty-nine countries are partly free, 31 percent of the countries. That represents 1.5 billion people living in partly free countries, 25 percent of the world's population.

What are the real numbers? Seventy-five percent of the countries, largest in the history of mankind, are living in either free or partly free countries. Forty-eight countries not free. That represents 25 percent of the population of the world.

What does that mean? Let's go back and examine about 100 years ago where the world was. At the turn of the century, no country on Earth, including the United States, had universal suffrage. Less than 100 years ago, the United States did not allow women to vote, and there were other human rights violations we accepted in this country. My point is, the United States must be rather careful not to moralize and preach to the rest of the world. Yes, we anchor who we are on the foundation of our democracy and equal rights, but it even took America 250 years to get as far as we have come.

So we should, if nothing else, at least be mindful of that as we dictate to other countries. Now, as we examine a number of the points that have been made this morning and will be made throughout the next few months about foreign policy, it is important for us to have some appreciation and lend some perspective to not only the tremendous progress that has been made in the world today, and the hope we have for tomorrow, and the ability and the opportunities we have to make the world better—and it is fundamentally about productive capacity, individual freedoms, trade, free markets, private investment, rule of law, rights, contract law, all that America represents, all that three-fourths of the world countries and population represent. It is solutions, creative solutions, for which we are looking.

Creative solutions will come as a result of imaginative and bold leadership. As I have said often when I have been challenged about America's role in the world and is America burdening itself with too much of a role—incidentally, what should our role be? That is a legitimate debate. But I have said this: America has made its mistakes.

But think of it in this context. If America decides that its burden is too heavy, whether that be in the area of contributions to the United Nations, to NATO, wherever we are around the world, as an investment, we believe in markets, in freedom, in opportunity, in less war, less conflict, a future for our children, for whatever reason, if we believe we are too far extended—and that is a legitimate question—and we will have an ongoing dynamic debate on the issue and we should remind ourselves of this—the next great nation on earth—and there will be a next great nation if America chooses to recede back into the cold, gray darkness of mediocrity—that next great, powerful nation may not be quite as judicious and benevolent with its power as America has been with our power. That is not the world that I wish my 7-year-old and 9-year-old children to inherit.

If there is an additional burden—and there is—for America to carry on to be the world's leader, for me, it is not only worthy of the objective to continue to help all nations and raise all nations' opportunities, but realistically, geopolitically, it is the only answer for the kind of world that we want not just for our children but for all children of the world.

So rather than tear down organizations and tear down trade regimes and tear down organizations that are focused on making the world better, we should ask our friends who are coming to Washington this week to give us creative solutions and be part of those creative solutions.

Mr. President, I am grateful for an opportunity to share some thoughts and hopefully make a contribution to what my friend from Georgia and my friend from Kansas have been about today and earlier in our session. This will continue throughout this year because through this education and this information and this exchange of thoughts and ideas we will fundamentally broaden and deepen the foundation of who we are as a free nation and not be afraid of this debate in front of the world. It is the debate, the borderless challenges of our time—terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the scourge of our time, illegal drugs—that must be confronted and dealt with as a body of all nations, all peoples. Understanding and dealing with these fundamental challenges and issues are in the common denominator, mutual self-interest of all peoples.

Again, I am grateful for their leadership. I yield the floor.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. L. CHAFEE). The Senator from Kansas is recognized.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for his very valuable contribution and for taking part.

How much time does the Senator from Texas need? We have approximately 25 minutes still remaining under morning business.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Up to 15 minutes, or if someone else is scheduled in, let me know.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I will soon yield to the Senator from Texas. She has been a champion on behalf of our men and women in uniform. She is a former member of the Armed Services Committee, now a very valued and influential member of the Appropriations Committee. These are the folks who have the obligation and responsibility to pay for a military that I believe today is stressed, strained, and somewhat hollow, unfortunately.

I think Senator HUTCHISON, probably more than any other Senator, has been very diligent expressing concern and alerting the Senate and the Congress and the American people as to our commitments abroad, what is in our vital national security interests, and the problems we have talked about regarding an overcommitment.

The Senator has come to me on repeated occasions when proposing amendments. Sometimes she has withdrawn them, and other times she has proceeded but always prompting a debate on the Senate floor where there literally has been none in regard to our military policy and when we commit the use of force. She has pointed out, I think in excellent fashion, the paradox of the enormous irony that we have in Bosnia where we are supporting a partitioned kind of society among three ethnic groups, or nationalities; whereas, just to the south, in Kosovo, our goal is to somehow promote a multi-ethnic society where the divisions are at least equal to that in Bosnia.

Senator HUTCHISON not only comes to the floor and expresses her opinion, but her opinion is based on facts and on actually being present in the area with which we are concerned. She has been a repeat visitor to Bosnia, Kosovo, and every troubled spot I can imagine, including Brussels and Russia. She does more than talk to officials. Senator HUTCHISON, when she goes on a co-del, not only talks to the briefing folks, but she actually goes out to the people involved and talks about their daily lives, their individual freedoms, their pocketbooks. She talks to these folks individually and gives us a healthy dose of common sense and reality when she is reporting on it. We are glad to welcome her to this debate. I yield the Senator 15 minutes.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the Senators for taking time on the Senate floor to discuss an issue which is not before us this very minute, but it is something that requires much more thought, much more long-term debate in the Senate.

I commend the leadership of these two distinguished members of the Armed Services Committee on a bipartisan basis. Certainly, both have served in our military quite honorably, and especially Senator CLELAND, who has given so much for our country. I say thank you for setting aside this time. I look forward to participating on future

occasions that you are setting aside for discussion of the big picture items.

I think one of the problems we face today is we haven't truly come to grips with what America's role in the world is in the post-cold-war era. The issues you are bringing forth are exactly what we should be setting out in order to have a policy in the post-cold-war era that allows the United States to take its rightful place and do the very best job we can for America and for our allies around the world.

It is an understatement to say that the United States is the world's only superpower. In pure military terms, we are a colossus. Our troops are in Japan, Korea, throughout Europe, and in the Middle East. We guard countless other nations. We keep tyrants in check from Baghdad to Pyongyang to Belgrade. No other nation has ever wielded such military power.

Leadership on this scale requires discretion, the confidence to know the right course, and the will to pursue it—the confidence to know when not to engage but to encourage others to do so.

True leadership is striking out on a right course of action grounded in a central philosophy of advancing the American national interests. Simply put, both our allies and our enemies must know what to expect from the United States of America. We must always be strong. We must rely upon diplomacy to maintain much of our leadership. But when diplomacy fails, global leadership may require the use of military force.

When and how should the United States use our military power?

There was a time when the answer was clear. During the cold war, we determined we should only use military force when our vital national interests were clearly threatened. In the cold war, there was a clear military focus on a threat we could easily identify. We knew that if we acted, the Soviets would react. There was a clarity.

Today, however, because we are the only superpower, we are often called upon to act when there is a crisis anywhere in the world. Leadership in this instance requires much more discipline than in the past.

In our political system, that discipline comes from the checks and balances that have been built into it.

The only clear authority our Constitution grants to the President in committing our forces to conflict is in the role of Commander in Chief to deploy troops. But equally clear in the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare war, to raise and support an Army, and to provide for the Navy.

Our framers couldn't have been more clear on this issue. They did not break with the monarchy in England to establish another monarchy in America. They feared placing in the hands of the President the sole power to commit to war and also implement that war. Yet, especially in the last 50 years, Presidents have sent our troops into conflict

without formal declaration of war that would be required by Congress, and not only for emergencies such as repelling sudden attacks that were envisioned by our founders.

Congress is being gradually excluded in its constitutional role in foreign policy. The consultation process is broken, and it must be fixed.

In a representative democracy such as ours, elected officials must stand up and be counted when the fundamental decisions of war and peace are made.

I believe it is important for Congress to reclaim its deliberate role intended by the Constitution. I have proposed limits on the duration and size of a force that can be deployed without congressional approval. I have proposed that the President be required to identify the specific objectives of a mission prior to its approval by Congress.

Too often operations such as those we have seen in Bosnia, and now Kosovo, become open ended with no milestone to measure success, no milestone to measure failure, and no exit strategy.

It is the hallmark of this administration for the United States to go into regional crises and displace friendly, local powers who share our goal and could act effectively on their own. In Kosovo, we fought and sustained an unsustainable government. We are trying to prevent the realignment of a region where the great powers have tried and failed many times to impose their will on ancient hatred and atrocities.

In fact, I am interested in working with others to see if we can address this issue. We must condition future peacekeeping funds on the requirement that the administration reconvene the parties to the Dayton peace accords that ended in the Bosnia conflict, and those involved in the Rambouillet talks that resulted in Kosovo, and other regional interests.

We must review the progress we have made and begin developing a long-term settlement based on greater self-determination by the governed and less wishful thinking by outside powers. This will probably involve tailoring the current borders to fit the facts on the ground. But this will create the condition for a genuine stability and reconstruction. When we take up further funding of Bosnia and Kosovo, I am not going to try to determine the outcome of these talks, but it is essential that we reconvene the parties to see where we are. For Heaven's sake, that is a modest proposal from the world's only superpower.

Years ago, President Nixon laid out principles on how our military forces should be used overseas. Based upon his principles, I offer the following outline for a rational superpower to try to bridge the ethical question:

First, we should acknowledge that bold leadership means war is the last resort—not the first. We cannot let our allies and our enemies suck us into regional quicksand. This is what happened in Bosnia and Kosovo. Our allies

refused to act on their own, insisting they could not take military action without a commitment of U.S. troops. That was not the case. Our European allies have sophisticated military forces. We should have been ready with backup assistance with heavy air and sea support, intelligence monitoring, supplies, and logistical coordination, but they did not need our combat leadership for a regional conflict that could be contained by their own superb ground forces.

Second, we should not get involved in civil conflicts that make us a party to the conflict. We learned this with tragic consequences in Somalia when we got in between warring forces trying to capture one warlord. Yes, Serbia has a terrible leader. And it was tempting to punish him with our military force. But look who pays the price with many innocent civilians in Serbia as well. Often these types of missions are ones in which our allies can do a better job because oftentimes it takes more money and it is less efficient for American troops to do peacekeeping missions.

When we commit 10,000 troops, it is not 10,000 troops. It is 10,000 troops on the ground and 25,000 troops in the surrounding perimeter to protect them. This is because American troops are always the target wherever they are, as they were in Somalia and as they have been in Kosovo. You are never going to hear me say we should not have the protection force. Of course, we are going to have the protection force if our troops are involved.

I have heard it said by many in our military who come home from overseas that if there is an incident, it is going to be against us.

I have heard our military people say if they are walking with other groups of military on parade, that people who are wishing to protest will let the Turks go by, the French go by, and the Brits go by. They wait for the Americans to hurl the epitaphs. We have to have a protection force. But that is not the case for many of our allies.

Third, why not help those who are willing to fight for their own freedom? The administration seems to see no option between doing nothing and bombing someone into the stone age. There are, too often, other options. These options that we ignore, and sometimes even oppose, include local forces willing to fight for their own freedom.

In Bosnia, for example, since 1991, we have maintained an arms embargo on the Muslim forces who wanted, and begged, to be able to fight for themselves. I met with them many times. I have been to Bosnia and that region seven times. I am going again next week. I am going to have Easter services with the great 49th Division, the reserve unit that is in control of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. Congress voted to lift the arms embargo and allow the Muslims to have arms to defend themselves, but the administration opposed it. For 3 years the Muslims and Croats were routed because

they could not fight. They didn't have the arms. But the Croats got the arms, they ignored the arms embargo, and they fought back. When they did, President Milosevic cut a deal.

I think we need to look at the option of helping people who are willing to help themselves rather than keep a fight artificially unfair.

Fourth, we should not even threaten the use of troops except under clear policies. One clear policy should be if the security of the United States is at risk. When should we deploy our troops? We need a higher standard than we have seen in the last 6 years. Look at the war in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. security interests were at stake. A madman, with suspected nuclear and biological weapons, invaded a neighboring country and threatened the whole Middle East. It could have realigned the region in a way that would have a profound impact on the United States and our allies and subjected the entire territory to chemical, biological, and perhaps nuclear weapons.

We, of course, should always honor our commitments to our allies. If North Korea invades the south, we are committed to helping our allies. We also have a responsibility toward a democratic Taiwan, which has been under constant intimidation from Communist China. We have the world's greatest military alliance, NATO, where we are committed to defend any one of those countries that might be under attack from a foreign power.

It is in the U.S. interest that we protect ourselves and our allies with a nuclear umbrella. Yes, we would use troops to try to make sure a despot didn't have nuclear capabilities.

These are clear areas of U.S. security interests. However, the United States does not have to commit troops on the ground to be a good ally. If our allies believe they must militarily engage in a regional conflict, that should not have to be our fight.

The United States does not have to commit troops to be a good ally. If our allies believe they must militarily engage in a regional conflict, that should not have to be our fight. We could even support them in the interest of alliance unity. We could offer intelligence support, "airlift," or protection of non-combatants. We do not have to get directly involved with troops in every regional conflict to be good allies.

When violence erupted last year in Indonesia, we got it about right. We stepped aside and let our good ally Australia take lead. We helped with supplies and intelligence, but it wasn't American ground troops facing armed militants.

Instead, we should focus our resources where the United States is uniquely capable; in parts of the world where our interests may be greater or where air power is necessary.

It is not in the long-term interest of our European allies for U.S. forces to be tied down on a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia or Kosovo while in some

parts of the world there is a danger of someone getting a long-range missile tipped with a germ warhead provided by Saddam Hussein and paid for by Osama Bin Laden.

A reasonable division of labor—based on each ally's strategic interests and unique strengths—would be more efficient and more logical.

What has been the result of our unfocused foreign relations? Qualified personnel are leaving the services in droves. In the past 2 years, half of Air Force pilots eligible for continued service opted to leave when offered a \$60,000 bonus.

The Army fell 6,000 short of the congressionally authorized troop strength last year. We used up a large part of our weapons inventory in Kosovo. We were down to fewer than 200 cruise missiles worldwide. That may sound like a lot, but it's just a couple of days worth in Desert Storm.

So let's be clear that if we do not discriminate about the use of our forces it will weaken our core capabilities. If we had to send our forces into combat, it would be irresponsible to send them without the arms they need, the troop strength they need, and the up-to-date training they must have. It takes 9 months to retrain a unit after a peacekeeping mission into warlike readiness.

As a superpower, the United States must draw distinctions between the essential and the important. Otherwise, we could dissipate our resources and be unable to handle either. To maximize our strength, we should focus our efforts where they can best be applied. That is clearly air power and technology. This will be the American responsibility, but troops on the ground where those operations fall short of a full combat necessity can be done much better by allies with our backup rather than us taking the lead every time.

Any sophisticated military power can patrol the Balkans, or East Timor, or Somalia. But only the United States can defend NATO, maintain the balance of power in Asia, and keep the Persian Gulf open to international commerce.

I thank the distinguished Senators ROBERTS and CLELAND for allowing Members to discuss these issues in a way that will, hopefully, help to solve them in the long term.

Mr. ROBERTS. Senator CLELAND and I thank the distinguished Senator from Texas for her contribution.

MEASURE READ FOR THE FIRST TIME—H.R. 1838

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I understand H.R. 1838 is at the desk, and I ask for its first reading.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the bill for the first time.

The legislative assistant read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 1838) to assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I now ask for its second reading, and I object to my own request.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The objection is heard.

The bill will be read the second time on the next legislative day.

Mr. ROBERTS. I yield the floor.

ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN

Mr. CLELAND. I understand Senate Resolution 286 expressing the sense of the Senate that the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations should hold hearings and the Senate should act on the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), introduced earlier today by Senator BOXER and 32 cosponsors, is at the desk, and I ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. ROBERTS. On behalf of the majority of the committee, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The objection is heard.

The resolution will go over under the rule.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.

Mr. GRASSLEY. If there is a 5-minute limit on morning business speeches, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 9 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The remarks of Mr. GRASSLEY pertaining to the introduction of S. 2404 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana is recognized.

Ms. LANDRIEU. I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Ms. LANDRIEU, Mr. GRAMM, and Mr. CRAIG pertaining to the introduction of legislation are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

Ms. LANDRIEU. I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to a period of morning business, with Members permitted to speak up to 10 minutes each, until the hour of 1:30 p.m. today, with time to be equally divided between the two leaders.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT—S. 2323

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 1:30 p.m. today the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 481, S. 2323, under the following limitations: 1 hour for debate on the bill, equally divided