

Pearson Fellow in my office, be permitted the privilege of the floor while I deliver this statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

REMOVAL OF INJUNCTION OF SECRECY—TREATY DOCUMENT NO. 106-23

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of the distinguished majority leader, as in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that the injunction of secrecy be removed from the following convention transmitted to the Senate on March 23, 2000, by the President of the United States: International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), Treaty Document No. 106-23.

I further ask that the convention be considered as having been read the first time; that it be referred, with accompanying papers, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed; and that the President's message be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The message of the President is as follows:

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to acceptance, I transmit herewith the revised International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), adopted at the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations at Rome on November 17, 1997. In accordance with Article XIII of the existing IPPC, the revised text will enter into force for all contracting parties 30 days after acceptance by two-thirds of the contracting parties.

The revisions are designed to bring the IPPC into line with modern practices and concepts, and to establish new mechanisms to promote the development and adoption of international phytosanitary standards.

It is my hope that the Senate will give prompt and favorable consideration to this Convention, and give its advice and consent to acceptance by the United States, subject to the two proposed understandings set forth in the accompanying report, at the earliest possible date.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 23, 2000.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed in morning business for such time as I may require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

KOSOVO AMENDMENT

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on March 9, I advised the Senate of my intention to offer an amendment on Kosovo to the supplemental, assuming that legislation comes up. If not, I will consider other avenues of legislation to incorporate the basic structure of this amendment.

I have been joined in this effort by a thoughtful and well-respected number of my colleagues; indeed, the distinguished Senator from Alaska, who just departed the floor, and the distinguished Senator from Hawaii.

I placed a draft copy of the amendment in the RECORD at that time and invited comment and constructive criticism. I am so pleased to report that has happened in abundance.

I am here today to report to the Senate there has been an increasing interest in this amendment—positive, in most instances. I will refer to one bit of very constructive criticism momentarily.

We have taken into consideration the views of many. I will be putting in today's RECORD an amendment which shows certain modifications, technical modifications, which I hope will meet some of the very fine constructive ideas I have received.

To summarize, the amendment would require our European allies to fulfill a certain percentage of the commitments they have made to provide assistance and police personnel to Kosovo before the entire \$2 billion contained in the supplemental for United States military operations in Kosovo would be made available.

The amendment would allow for the provision of 50 percent of the money—over \$1 billion—immediately for the use of the Department of Defense. But the remainder would be dependent on a certification by the President of the United States that our allies had provided a certain percentage of their commitments of assistance to Kosovo.

If the President is not able to make that certification by June 1, then the remaining \$1 billion could be used only to conduct the safe, orderly, and phased withdrawal of our troops from Kosovo—not a cut and run; not a fixed timetable; I repeat, a safe and orderly phased withdrawal.

Again, I have been pleased by the response that has been generated by this amendment. It is clear, we have already achieved our first goal of focusing attention on this very serious problem in Kosovo.

Actions on the part of our allies are being taken at an accelerated rate, and much more detailed information on such actions, past and present, are becoming available daily.

For example, this past week I received letters from Lord Robertson, the Secretary General of NATO, and Dr. Bernard Kouchner, the head of the UN Mission in Kosovo, outlining the increased efforts of burdensharing of certain allies.

According to the letter I received from Dr. Kouchner—I would like to quote a paragraph—I quote:

I very much appreciate the efforts that you have made so far which have been instrumental in improving our budget situation. Existing donor pledges have now been honored. The next challenge will be to get new donor pledges and to ensure that the pledges for the reconstruction budget of 17 November 1999 do materialize.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letters from Lord Robertson and Dr. Kouchner be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks, with certain other documents that I will attach, and letters.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibits 1 and 2.)

Mr. WARNER. In addition, I had the opportunity to meet yesterday with Ambassador Guenter Burghardt, the European Commission representative in Washington, who provided me with valuable information on the contributions of the EU, particularly their efforts to streamline their process for providing assistance.

Several weeks ago, it was very difficult to get accurate information on what had been pledged by our allies—not that they were withholding it; people just could not find it, in many instances, and put it into writing—and almost impossible to get data on what had actually been supplied to Kosovo.

Now we are clearly making progress on this front, but more remains to be done.

I asked for constructive criticism. And within the hour, by pure coincidence, because I planned to deliver these remarks, came a letter from our former distinguished majority leader, and my very close friend and mentor, Senator Robert Dole.

I ask unanimous consent to print a letter from Senator Dole in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 3.)

Mr. WARNER. Senator Dole wrote:

Accordingly, I would urge you to consider, at a minimum, allowing a Presidential waiver authority based upon compelling national security needs.

That sort of thing is often done. We carefully considered that. But after consultation with my cosponsors and many others, we decided not because it would make the amendment so weakened that it loses its purport. Therefore, I say respectfully to my former leader that that I cannot do. However, he has made other suggestions. And by pure coincidence and timing, they have been incorporated in the revised amendment, which I will file as a part of these remarks.

For example, he said:

That said, I believe in principle that you are entirely right to try to hold the Administration's feet to the fire to ensure that the United States continues to lead, while at the same time preventing it from shouldering an inordinate share of the international burden in the Balkans. The devil is in the details, however, and I am concerned that some of the targets identified in your amendment simply cannot be met, and that the European powers are being held to a higher standard than the United States. For example, is it realistic for the United States and/or Europeans to be required to disburse 33 percent of the funds needed for Kosovo reconstruction by June 1, 2000?

Prior to receiving this letter, we had made technical changes from "disbursed" to "obligated or contracted

for." This gives the flexibility that is needed to obviate the problems raised by Senator Dole and others.

These technical changes, if I may enumerate them, give added flexibility to the President of the United States in making this very important certification. We have not, in my judgment, diminished in any way the strength of this amendment, but it has given added flexibility. No. 1, it makes it clear that the performance we are seeking on the part of the allies is to be evaluated, as we put in our amendment, "on the aggregate." Performance of one nation which falls short, one nation which may not be able to make it, will not prevent the President from making the required certification. No. 2, we require that reconstruction and humanitarian assistance must be, as I said, obligated or contracted for. That point we covered in the recitation of Senator Dole. This is in recognition that even if the money has been set aside for Kosovo, some of these projects "spend out" at a slow rate.

These are the types of constructive changes that have come to my attention and we have incorporated them. We are still working on this. As I say, I have also been engaged in discussions with a number of administration officials over the past 2 weeks.

Last Friday, I had a productive meeting with the National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, on the eve of his departure on this important trip the President is now undertaking. We were joined by OMB Director Jack Lew and Under Secretary of Defense, Walter Slocombe. As a result, of some of the technical information relayed to me at that meeting—it was a very good meeting—I have redrafted my amendment to take into account some of the concerns that were raised. While I think it is fair to say the redraft which I and my cosponsors have agreed to will not satisfy all the concerns of the administration, I believe our consultations are making progress.

I ask unanimous consent to print the latest version of my amendment in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 4.)

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the bottom line for the United States and for the other nations involved in KFOR—that is the entire military operation in Kosovo—is the current safety and well-being of our troops being deployed there—U.S. troops and those of some 35 other nations are involved and the formulation of a timetable, safety first, but the formulation of a timetable. We can't do it right now, but if the purport of this amendment is met, we will be able in the reasonable future to formulate a timetable for the establishment of the infrastructure, both economic and security, which will allow for the safe return of our troops and those of other nations to their respective homes.

Today, I had the opportunity to meet in my office with the Italian Minister

of Defense, for example. He shares the common goal of this amendment.

We are now one day away from the 1-year anniversary of the start of the NATO war on behalf of Kosovo, on behalf of human rights. The world could not have stood by idly and watched the killing and the rape and the pillaging of that nation and done nothing. It was a challenge to figure out what to do. On a number of occasions, I consulted with General Clark. Indeed, I was with him in part of that campaign, watching the operations he directed, and directed very skillfully. We could not have done nothing.

This is an appropriate time for reflection and assessment. What have we accomplished and what remains to be done? Clearly, the large-scale ethnic cleansing has stopped and hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanian refugees have returned to their homes. For this, NATO should be proud of their military action.

But what better way to express our pride in their successful accomplishment of that military mission than for the United States, in concert and partnership with its allies, to come forward in a timely manner and meet the commitments to solidify the military gains? None of us are totally satisfied. A regrettable chapter relates to the Serbian people who lived in those areas, many of whom have left after the cessation of the 78-day campaign. But I think the KFOR troops are doing their best to provide equal protection and that we are continuing to address that situation because we have to have an evenhanded policy. Human rights, to be successful, has to be implemented evenhandedly.

Yes, the fighting has stopped. Unfortunately, the violence continues. Recent events in Mitrovica and in the vicinity of the Presevo Valley are cause for great concern. Bottom line, until there is an economic structure in place, together with a security structure, we will not see substantial progress in creating peaceful, civil society in Kosovo. Until that happens, under the administration's current plan, U.S. troops could remain indefinitely in Kosovo.

Earlier this week, General Reinhardt, the commander of KFOR, said—and I believe I am quoting him accurately—that he believed KFOR troops would be in Kosovo for up to a decade. To make such a declaration at this time, I say, with respect to this fine professional military officer whom I have met—I met him in Pristina about a month ago, right in his office—I repeat, to make such a declaration at this time I find unacceptable. This is one of the motivating factors behind the amendment I have proposed. We cannot let General Reinhardt or anyone else set a timetable of a decade. We need to see more progress on the civil implementation side.

The U.N., the E.U., and the OSCE must move more swiftly to fulfill their responsibilities for rebuilding Kosovo,

and our European allies must provide the assistance and personnel they have promised to provide if these goals are to be achieved. Time is of the essence.

The amendment I and others have placed before the Senate is but one approach to deal with the situation in Kosovo. I know other colleagues have their own approaches on this issue, not necessarily dissimilar. We share common goals. In particular, I commend Senator ROBERT BYRD, who has proposed a concept for rapid turnover of the KFOR mission to the European allies.

I now ask unanimous consent that the editorial by Senator BYRD be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 5.)

Mr. WARNER. It outlines in full his concepts, which are very interesting. I have been on the Senate floor with Senator BYRD so many times. He is a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. No one takes to heart more dearly the welfare of the men and women of the Armed Forces and their families than Senator BYRD. He is concerned about their welfare as am I. We have joined together at a meeting in the White House, I think some 3 weeks ago, to discuss this very subject.

He spoke up with great courage and determination to the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense. It was quite an interesting meeting. What we cannot allow to happen is for the current situation in Kosovo to drift on for a decade. I say no. There are problems. Those problems are surmountable if we work together. They must be addressed. They must be addressed in a timely manner.

I hope the amendment in its present form, revised, will contribute to this goal. I, once again, encourage my colleagues and others to come forward with any constructive suggestions they may have. I continue to say that this Senator—I think I can speak for my cosponsors—is going to stand firm, firm in furtherance of the goals of human rights in Kosovo, in furtherance of remaining as a vital partner of NATO, in furtherance of creating a record to show that NATO can handle peacekeeping missions. To do that, we need more timely assistance from those who have committed to provide the infrastructure of economics and security.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

EXHIBIT No. 1

SECRETARY GENERAL, NATO,

Bruxelles, March 15, 2000.

Senator JOHN WARNER,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee,
Russell Senate Office Building, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

MY DEAR JOHN: I am glad we had the chance to talk by phone yesterday. As I noted, I share your concern that the Allied nations need to react more swiftly and forcefully to the current challenges in Kosovo. I have been pressing hard to ensure that nations provide additional forces for KFOR.

Dire press reports notwithstanding, progress has in fact been made. Let me give you an update on what steps are being taken.

On force levels for Kosovo, the European Allies are now stepping up their contributions.

Italy has agreed to provide a manoeuvre battalion of two companies for a limited time period.

France is putting under NATO command two companies that had already been dispatched to Kosovo on short notice under national authority, and is adding one further company. Together, these three companies will form a new French manoeuvre battalion.

This still leaves a shortfall of three companies relative to the needs in theatre as identified by the Supreme Allied Commander, General Clark, and the KFOR Commander General Reinhardt. I have been in direct contact with several Allied governments, and General Clark and the Military Committee Chairman Admiral Venturoni have been in touch with Chiefs of Defense. As a result of these contacts, a further five countries have indicated that they are seriously considering sending additional forces to Kosovo.

Even before the addition of these forces, European nations are contributing a majority of the forces on the ground in Kosovo. The following figures relate to forces to theatre on 13 March. While these figures fluctuate by small amounts on a daily basis, the overall ratio of forces has been fairly constant for some time.

EU nations makes up 60.3 percent of all the forces in Kosovo.

European nations—leaving aside Russia and the CIS states—make up 69.2 percent of the forces in Kosovo.

Adding in Russia and the other CIS states, European nations account for 80 percent of all the forces in theatre.

The remainder is made up by Argentina, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Canada and, of course, the United States, for a total of 38 nations contributing to KFOR.

On the civil implementation side, there has also been some notable progress:

The European Union has started to disburse 45 million Euro (\$43.6 million) of the 360 million Euro (\$349 million) pledged to UNMIK for the year 2000. Several NATO members states have also increased their financial contributions to both UNMIK and the KPC.

Germany, Italy and Turkey have strengthened their civil police contingents to Kosovo, and the United Kingdom has agreed to provide additional judiciary officials.

Let me emphasize in providing you this data that I am only reporting to you what I have been told as Secretary General. Implementation is key, and I will continue to press hard to make sure that nations follow through both on their KFOR contributions and on civil implementation.

With these points in mind, I have to convey to you my firm belief that it would be wrong for NATO right now to have a reduction or limitation on the U.S. commitment, just as the situation in Kosovo is becoming more challenging and the European Allies, who are already carrying a large load, are beginning to do even more.

This is particularly true when looking at the situation in the Presevo Valley, which is

adjacent to the U.S. sector in Kosovo. I hope the U.S. will play a strong role in heading off a potential crisis there. The U.S. forces did a superb job today in raiding a number of support bases in Kosovo for extremists operating in southern Serbia. We need that kind of effective military presence to continue.

On a related point, I understand your concerns for not deploying American forces away from these Southeastern trouble spots to help reinforce other Allies in Mitrovica. But I would not want to see the U.S. position cast in stone as a means of justifying lack of routine responsiveness to the operational commander. Such a position would be at odds with the principle of unity of command, which is essential to the effective of NATO forces in multinational operations over the long term.

I appreciate your ongoing concern for the success of the KFOR operation. I am working very hard to ensure that the European Allies hold up their end of the bargain—in both the military and the civil implementation areas—and am counting on you and your colleagues to help maintain the valuable U.S. contribution.

All the very best.

GEORGE.

EXHIBIT No. 2

U.N. INTERIM ADMINISTRATION,
MISSION IN KOSOVO,
Pristina, March 18, 2000.

Hon. JOHN WARNER,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR: Let me first of all thank you whole heartedly for your unfettered support and assistance as Chairman of the Armed Services Committee: the kind of tough questioning that took place as a result of your interventions have been instrumental in helping UNMIK achieve some of its objectives.

I want to give you an update on the situation regarding the Kosovo Consolidated Budget, which is now in considerably better shape than it was earlier in the year. Donor pledges made at the end of last year have now crystallized into cash in the bank. Recently the Kosovo Budget has received contributions from the United States, the UK, France, Japan, and the European Union. As you will see from the attached tables, it is now estimated that the budget has sufficient cash to carry us through the summer. Furthermore our revenue collection is now improving. In particular, the European Union has already paid in some of its contributions, and clear and rapid procedures are in place for the remaining of the Union's contributions to be paid in (another more than Euro 55 Millions will be transferred to the Kosovo Budget in the next three months). Further, and as planned, the Union will contribute over Euro 240 Millions for reconstruction in 2000.

I would however also stress that there were never sufficient pledges to cover the whole of the needs for the year 2000. there is still an uncovered gap of about 35 million DEM, as per attached table, and any assistance you

can extend to us to cover that gap will be deeply appreciated by this mission.

I very much appreciate the efforts that you have made so far which have been instrumental in improving our budget situation. Existing donor pledges have now been honored. The next challenge will be to get new donor pledges and to ensure that the pledges for the reconstruction budget of 17 November 1999 do materialize.

I look forward to a continued dialogue with you, and I hope to see you soon.

Sincerely,

BERNARD KOUCHNER,
Special Representative of
the Secretary General.

KOSOVO CONSOLIDATED BUDGET 2000 BUDGET UPDATE

BACKGROUND ON THIS WEEK'S UPDATE

Attached are documents that detail donor pledges and domestic revenue. Tables 1, 2, and 3 review donor pledges to date. Table 4 projects cash flow through mid-June 2000. Tables 5 through 9 review revenue estimates and actual collections. Table 10 reviews budget 2000 revenue estimates and summarizes donor support.

Noteworthy items are:

Donor pledges have started to arrive.—Since the last report we confirm that roughly DM 76.9 million of donor pledges for budgetary support are either in our account or en-route, including (see Table 2):¹ United States—DM 24.2 million; Great Britain—DM 15.9 million; France—DM 3.5 million; Japan—initiated transfer of DM 13.7 million; European Union—initiated transfer of DM 19.6 million. A further £35 million is expected shortly.

Cash Needs.—The recent influx of cash will allow the Kosovo Consolidated Budget to continue functioning until mid-June (see Table 4). Kosovo's cash requirements will be met through September 2000 upon receipt of the European Union's pledge of £35 million.

Revenue collections improve.—The last two weeks witnessed a 55 percent increase in collections (from DM 5.8 year-to-date to DM 9.8 million). Two factors appear to drive this increase. First, sales and excise tax collection at the Montenegro Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) has become operational, collection over DM 756,684 in the last two weeks. Collections at the ABL has the direct effect of capturing lost revenue through that crossing, and an indirect effect of re-diverting trucks back to previously established border points for collection. Second, customs collections are slightly higher because vehicle registration requires proof of customs payment on imported cars. The former is expected to continue, while the latter is a short-run effect that will dissipate. (See Table 7.)

Pledge shortfall.—There still remains a pledge shortfall of DM 38.5 million, based on revised revenue estimates (see Table 10, Part 2).

TABLE 1.—KOSOVO CONSOLIDATED FUND BUDGETARY ASSISTANCE DONOR GRANTS FISCAL YEAR 2000

Donor	Pledged	Currency	Approx DM equivalent	Date received	Cash received (DM)		
					Budget support	Targeted support	Intended program
Netherlands	15,000,000	USD	28,686,300	13 Dec	28,686,300	DM	Budget Support
USA	5,000,000	USD	9,685,000	22 Dec		9,685,000	KPC ¹
EU	5,000,000	EU	9,779,150	29 Dec	9,779,150		Budget Support
USA	3,000,000	USD	5,692,170	14 Jan		5,692,170	Civil Registration ¹
Canada	1,000,000	CAD	1,296,913	14 Jan		1,296,913	District Heating
GTZ	1,700,000	DEM	1,700,000	28 Dec		1,700,000	District Heating
EU	120,000	EU	234,699	29 Dec		234,699	Peja/Klina Water ¹

¹Total pledges received to date are DM 79.6 million, which includes the previously reported amount of DM 2.7 from Canada.

TABLE 1.—KOSOVO CONSOLIDATED FUND BUDGETARY ASSISTANCE DONOR GRANTS FISCAL YEAR 2000—Continued

Donor	Pledged	Currency	Approx DM equiv- alent	Date received	Cash received (DM)		
					Budget support	Targeted support	Intended program
WB	1,000,000	USD	1,875,915	6 Jan	1,875,915		Budget Support
Germany ²	3,089,963	DEM	3,089	10 Dec		3,089,963	KPC Salaries ¹
Germany ²	3,089,963	DEM	3,089	10 Dec		3,089,963	Civil Registration ¹
Germany ²	3,089,693	DEM	3,089	10 Dec	13,389,839		Budget Support
Netherlands	2,750,445	EU	5,379,404	9 Dec		5,379,404	Bulldozers ¹
EU	2,761,000	EU	5,400,046	15 Dec		5,400,046	Electricity Salary
Ireland	200,000	USD	372,508	6 Dec		372,508	District Heating
1999 total			89,671,870		53,731,204	35,940,666	

¹Limited or no expenditures in this sector in Fiscal Year 1999. Balance will be carried forward to Fiscal Year 2000 for expenditures processed after 1999 fiscal year end.

²Grants received from Germany increased by DM 588,765 this report, reflecting an appreciation in USD against this DM.

TABLE 2.—KOSOVO CONSOLIDATED FUND BUDGETARY ASSISTANCE DONOR GRANTS FISCAL YEAR 2000

Donor	Pledged	Currency	Approx DM equiv- alent	Date received	Cash received (DM)		
					Budget support	Targeted support	Intended program
EU	72,120	EU	141,054 DM	3 Jan		141,054 DM	Heating Repairs
EU	35,000,000	EU	68,453,000 DM				Budget Support
EU	10,000,000	EU	19,600,000 DM	10 Mar	19,600,000 DM		Budget Support
EU	20,000,000	EU	39,200,000 DM				Import Costs—Electricity
USA ¹	10,000,000	USD	20,200,000 DM	7 Mar	20,200,000 DM		Budget Support
USA	2,000,000	USD	3,959,180 DM	22 Feb	3,959,180 DM		Budget Support
UK	5,000,000	GBP	15,950,000 DM	7 Mar	15,950,000 DM		Budget Support
UK	2,000,000	USD	3,927,427 DM	19 Jan		3,927,427 DM	Civil Registration
Switzerland	1,970,000	USD	3,703,600 DM				
Japan	7,300,000	USD	13,724,000 DM	10 Mar	13,724,000 DM		Budget Support
Canada	2,000,000	CAD	2,719,202 DM	9 Feb	2,719,202 DM		Budget Support
Canada	3,000,000	CAD	3,890,739 DM				Budget Support
World Bank	5,000,000	USD	9,400,000 DM				Budget Support
France	12,000,000	FF	3,482,538 DM	22 Feb	3,482,538 DM		Budget Support
Italy	375,000	DM	375,000 DM	13 Jan		375,000 DM	Pristina Hospital
Italy	2,000,000,000	LIT	2,020,202 DM				Budget Support
Sweden	60,000.00	DM	60,000 DM	14 Jan		60,000 DM	
EU	45,600.18	DM	45,600 DM	7 Jan		45,600 DM	Building Refurbishment
Germany	25,000.00	DM	25,000 DM	9 Feb		25,000 DM	Heating Repairs
Germany	25,000.00	DM	25,000 DM	9 Feb		25,000 DM	Heating Repairs
2000 Total			210,901,543 DM		79,634,920 DM	4,599,081 DM	

¹US contribution adjusted to reflect inadvertent double counting of \$5 million contributed to IOM.

EXHIBIT No. 3

WASHINGTON,
March 22, 2000.

Hon. JOHN WARNER,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR JOHN: To follow up on our recent conversation, I would like to share a few further thoughts regarding the Administration's proposed supplemental spending bill for the Balkans.

You and I have worked together on Balkan issues for many years and have more often than not agreed on the policy direction that should be taken. We have frequently shared a critical view of the Clinton Administration's policies and their implementation. In addition, we have always agreed that the President of the United States has the ultimate responsibility to carry out U.S. foreign policy according to our national security objectives, which include a strong and effective NATO.

As you know, my support for U.S. military and other operations in the Balkans is based on the firm belief that democratization and stability in the region must be achieved, and that the U.S. troop deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo are vital to these goals. To this end, I am concerned that, as drafted, the amendment that you are introducing to the Administration's supplemental bill would, based solely upon the action or inaction of a third party (our European allies), prohibit the President from maintaining a U.S. troop presence—even though he may have determined this presence to be in our country's national interest. In my view, this legislative restriction would tie the hands of the President in a sphere of power that clearly lies within the prerogative of the executive branch of the U.S. government. Accordingly, I would urge you to consider, at a minimum, allowing a Presidential waiver authority based upon compelling national security needs.

Second, I am concerned that your amendment could, albeit unintentionally, ad-

versely affect our role in NATO and our relations with our Alliance allies. Our credibility within NATO and our strong bilateral relations with each of our allies in the Alliance could be damaged by policies that link our presence in the Balkans to extraneous factors, as opposed to our national and collective European security objectives.

That said, I believe in principle that you are entirely right to try to hold the Administration's feet to the fire to ensure that the United States continues to lead, while at the same time preventing it from shouldering an inordinate share of the international burden in the Balkans. The devil is in the details, however, and I am concerned that some of the targets identified in your amendment simply cannot be met, and that the European powers are being held to a higher standard than the United States. For example, it is realistic for the United States and/or the Europeans to be required to disburse 33 percent of the funds needed for Kosovo reconstruction by June 1, 2000?

In my view, the Congress and those of us who support stronger U.S. leadership in the international arena should focus more on exerting direct pressure on the Administration to implement policies that promote democratization, political stability, and security in the Balkans. The issue, it seems to me, is not so much whether our troops are deployed in the region, but what they are actually doing on the ground. While the United States and its allies can point to a number of successes in Bosnia and Kosovo, severe problems remain. At times, it even seems as though we are taking steps backwards. For example, I wholly disagree with the Administration's failure to support General Clark's recent effort to deploy U.S. troops in Mitrovica. The troops putatively in charge of that sector of Kosovo have clearly failed to perform their mission to create a stable security environment. While their actions have not put them in the league of their predecessors in Bosnia's now infamous UNPROFOR, continuation on their current course will almost

certainly lead to a de facto partition of Kosovo—a highly destabilizing situation that would put our troops at even greater risk. A resumption of large-scale conflict may then follow. I would therefore urge you and others in the Congress to do your utmost to ensure that the Pentagon takes stronger action to get this situation in hand as quickly as possible.

A second example can be found in Bosnia, where the U.S.-led equip-and-train program for the Federation forces has floundered. As you know, in 1996, the Administration secured Senate majority support for the U.S. troop deployment in Bosnia based on President Clinton's written commitment to equip and train the Federation forces. In the past four years, the United States has done far too little to honor this commitment. When the war in Bosnia ended, an Administration-commissioned assessment determined that, to maintain adequate defenses, the Federation needed equipment that would cost an estimated \$800 million to \$1 billion. To date, only \$250 million in equipment and training has been provided to the Federation. Of this, the U.S. contribution was only \$100 million in Congressionally mandated drawdown authority. Beyond these initial sums, the Administration has neither proposed nor sought significant funding for the program. In my view, the Congress should provide additional drawdown authority for the purchase of the major equipment and provision of the training that remain necessary for Bosnia to be able to defend itself. It should also immediately increase FMF funding so that the equipment we have provided thus far can be adequately maintained.

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to share my views. I wish you every success as you continue your leadership in the Senate.

Thank you.
Sincerely,

BOB DOLE.

EXHIBIT NO. 4

On page , between lines and , insert the following:

SEC. (a) Of the amounts appropriated in this Act under the heading "OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRANSFER FUND" for military operations in Kosovo, not more than 50 percent may be obligated until the President certifies in writing to Congress that the European Commission, the member nations of the European Union, and the European member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have, in the aggregate—

(1) obligated or contracted for at least 33 percent of the amount of the assistance that those organizations and nations committed to provide for 1999 and 2000 for reconstruction in Kosovo;

(2) obligated or contracted for at least 75 percent of the amount of the assistance that those organizations and nations committed for 1999 and 2000 for humanitarian assistance in Kosovo;

(3) provided at least 75 percent of the amount of the assistance that those organizations and nations committed for 1999 and 2000 for the Kosovo Consolidated Budget; and

(4) deployed at least 75 percent of the number of police, including special police, that those organizations and nations pledged for the United Nations international police force for Kosovo.

(b) The President shall submit to Congress, with any certification submitted by the President under subsection (a), a report containing detailed information on—

(1) the commitments and pledges made by each organization and nation referred to in subsection (a) for reconstruction assistance in Kosovo, humanitarian assistance in Kosovo, the Kosovo Consolidated Budget, and police (including special police) for the United Nations international police force for Kosovo;

(2) the amount of assistance that has been provided in each category, and the number of police that have been deployed to Kosovo, by each such organization or nation; and

(3) the full range of commitments and responsibilities that have been undertaken for Kosovo by the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the progress made by those organizations in fulfilling those commitments and responsibilities, an assessment of the tasks that remain to be accomplished, and an anticipated schedule for completing those tasks.

(c) If the President does not submit to Congress a certification and report under subsections (a) and (b) on or before June 1, 2000, then, beginning on June 2, 2000, the 50 percent of the amounts appropriated in this Act under the heading "OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TRANSFER FUND" for military operations in Kosovo that remain unobligated (as required by subsection (a)) shall be available only for the purpose of conducting a safe, orderly, and phased withdrawal of United States military personnel from Kosovo, and no other amounts appropriated for the Department of Defense in this Act or any Act enacted before the date of the enactment of this Act may be obligated to continue the deployment of United States military personnel in Kosovo. In that case, the President shall submit to Congress, not later than June 30, 2000, a report on the plan for the withdrawal.

EXHIBIT NO. 5

[From the New York Times, Mar. 20, 2000]

EUROPE'S TURN TO KEEP THE PEACE

(By Robert C. Byrd)

A year ago, American and NATO warplanes began 78 days of air assaults that halted the

murderous assault of Slobodan Milosevic on the Kosovar Albanians. If the United States has learned anything in the nine months of peacekeeping that followed, it should be that once again we are proving to be a lot better at waging war than we are at managing peace. Kosovo today appears to be on the verge of unraveling.

American and NATO peacekeepers skirt danger daily. Reconstruction has been negligible. Mr. Milosevic remains firmly in control in Serbia and, by most reckoning, is stepping up his effort to foment trouble along the border between Serbia and Kosovo. In the latest eruption of violence, ethnic Albanian insurgents have begun attacking Serbs across the border in Serbia.

The administration's response to this deepening crisis? Stern words to the Albanians, urgent pleas to our allies for more troops and money, and a request to Congress for a supplemental \$2 billion to continue American peacekeeping business as usual in Kosovo.

Is that really the best we can do?

I see three options we can practically consider at this juncture.

We can stay the course, reacting to events as they occur and hoping for the best as we settle into a semi-permanent role of soldiers on patrol and cops on the beat. We can pick a date and simply pull American troops out of Kosovo. Or Congress can give the administration unequivocal direction and a reasonable period of time—say three months—to craft a framework for turning the Kosovo peacekeeping operation over to our European allies. Congress can then examine the plan, gauge the progress being made, and vote either to stay or to go.

It is my firm belief that the United States should take steps to turn the Kosovo peacekeeping operation over to our European allies. NATO undertook the Kosovo mission with an understanding that Europe, not America, would shoulder the peacekeeping and reconstruction duties. The United States, with its outstanding military forces and weaponry, effectively won the war; the European allies were to keep the peace.

But now, as the United Nations interim administration in Kosovo teeters on the brink of bankruptcy, NATO allies are squabbling over the need for military reinforcements, and the international police that were supposed to help bring law and order remain undermanned, underfinanced, and unable to cope.

If Congress agrees to the administration's request for additional financing for Kosovo, it should be with the clear understanding that the money is tied to a plan for establishing an all-European peacekeeping force. The plan should have benchmarks, like numbers of European troops to be added to the forces by particular dates, and Congress should have an opportunity to vote on whether to keep troops in Kosovo if those benchmarks are not being met.

Removal of American troops from Kosovo need not be abrupt and need not mean that the United States is turning its back on the victims of Slobodan Milosevic. We can continue to support humanitarian relief and can provide support in military logistics, communications, intelligence and effective command.

It is just possible that the Europeans will excel at peacekeeping duties in Kosovo if ever they are allowed to emerge from the overwhelming shadow cast by the United States. Unfortunately, we will never know if we do not tie further American investment in Kosovo to a rock-solid plan to turn the peacekeeping operation over to them—sooner rather than later.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

AGAINST LIFTING THE TRAVEL BAN ON LIBYA

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, on Wednesday of this week, a team of State Department officials departed for Libya as part of a review of the travel ban that has been in effect since 1981.

State Department officials will be in Libya for 26 hours in the next few days, visiting hotels and other sites. They will then prepare a recommendation for the Secretary to help her determine if there is still "Imminent danger to . . . the physical safety of United States travellers," as the law requires in order to maintain the ban.

Because of the travel ban, American citizens can only travel to Libya if they obtain a license from the Department of the Treasury. In addition, the State Department must first validate a passport for travel to Libya.

The travel ban was imposed originally for safety reasons and predates the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. But lifting the ban now, just as the two Libyan suspects are about to go on trial in the Netherlands for their role in that atrocity, will undoubtedly be viewed as a gesture of good will to Colonel Qadhafi.

Indeed, just after the State Department announced that it would send this consular team, a Saudi-owned daily paper quoted a senior Libyan official as saying the one-day visit by the U.S. Team was a "step in the right direction."

The official said the visit was a sign that "the international community was convinced that Libya's foreign policy position was not wrong and there is a noticeable improvement in Libya's relations with the world."

I have been in contact with many of the families of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103, and they are extremely upset by the timing of this decision. The families want to know why the Secretary of State is making this friendly overture to Qadhafi now—just six weeks before the trial in the Netherlands begins. They question how much information the State Department will be able to obtain by spending only 26 hours in Libya. They wonder why the Department cannot continue to use the same sources of information it has been using for many years to make a determination about the travel ban.

These courageous Americans have waited for justice for eleven long years. They feel betrayed by this decision. They have watched with dismay as our close ally, Great Britain, has rushed to reestablish diplomatic relations with Libya, before justice is served for the British citizens killed in the terrorist bombing. The State Department denies it, but the families are concerned that the visit signals a change in U.S. policy, undermines U.S. sanctions, and calls into question the Administration's commitment to vigorously enforce the Iran Libya Sanctions Act. That Act requires the U.S. to impose sanctions on foreign companies which