

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet to conduct a markup on Thursday, March 2, 2000, at 10 a.m., in SD226.

COMMITTEE ON VETERANS AFFAIRS

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, the Committee on Veterans' Affairs would like to request unanimous consent to hold a joint hearing with the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs to receive the Legislative presentations of the Jewish War Veterans, Paralyzed Veterans of America, Blinded Veterans Association, and the Non Commissioned Officers Association. The hearing will be held on Thursday, March 2, 2000, at 9:30 a.m., in room 345 of the Cannon House Office Building.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, March 2, 2000 at 2 p.m. to hold a closed hearing on intelligence matters.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, March 2, 2000, at 10:30 a.m. on AOL/Times Warner Merger.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FORESTS AND PUBLIC LANDS

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Forests and Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, March 2 at 2:30 p.m. to conduct an oversight hearing. The subcommittee will receive testimony on the United States Forest Service's proposed regulations governing National Forest Planning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, March 2, 2000 at 9:30 a.m. in open session to receive testimony on the Defense Health Program in review of the Defense authorization request for fiscal year 2001 and the future years Defense program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER

Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Seapower Subcommittee, of the Committee on Armed Services, be author-

ized to meet during the session of the Senate on March 2, 2000, at 2 p.m. to receive testimony on shipbuilding procurement and research and development programs, in review of the Defense authorization request for fiscal year 2001 and the future years Defense program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

IRAQ

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I want to call to the attention of my colleagues an issue that is not being raised in the otherwise informative presidential primary campaigns. It is not a theoretical issue, nor is it an issue concerning budgetary decisions.

Rather, it is an issue which sends American pilots on combat missions almost daily. It is an issue which throughout the last decade has cost the lives of hundreds of American and thousands of soldiers and civilians of other nationalities. It is an issue which threatens the peace and security of some of our closest allies, and which, if not solved, could threaten the United States with weapons of mass destruction. It is an issue which starves and hold captive twenty-two million people in conditions of unparalleled terror of their government. It is an issue which we have failed to deal with decisively, and that failure calls into question our dedication to the freedom we prize so highly for ourselves.

The issue is the continuing rule of Saddam Hussein. Nine years after the United States led a coalition to eject Iraqi forces and liberate Kuwait, Saddam continues to brutalize his people, threaten his neighbors, and develop weapons of mass destruction—earlier versions of which he used on neighboring states, on Israel, and on his own people. The good news is that sanctions have weakened his military, and his political support base has shrunk to his immediate family. All of mountainous northern Iraq and large swathes of southern Iraq are free of his control. Nonetheless, he continues to rule the central part of the country and, as Jim Hoagland pointed out in today's Washington Post, Saddam is likely to outlast yet another American President.

The Administration will no doubt point to the restraining effect UN sanctions have had on Saddam's ability to threaten his neighbors. In truth, his regime would have been far more aggressive if sanctions and the no-fly zones guaranteed by U.S. and British airpower had not been in effect. But in choosing policy options against an outlaw like Saddam, restraint is a minimal objective.

For example, we and our allies in the former Yugoslavia are not seeking to restrain those accused of war crimes during the ethnic war there; we seek to catch them, lock them up, and get them to The Hague for trial. Saddam has killed far more than any of the wanted Yugoslavs, and he keeps on

killing today. Our rhetoric, including mine today, calls for the same response to Saddam.

But our real policy is merely to restrain him. The fact that the restraint has endured nine years is what the Administration shows as evidence of its success. But adhering to the policy of restraint is actually taking us farther from our stated goals. Support for the sanctions policy is eroding at the UN. This, along with rising oil prices and Iraq's rising oil production, have made Saddam a key global energy player once again. In addition, Saddam has had thirteen months to develop weapons of mass destruction without the inhibition imposed by outside inspections. Now, a new inspection regime has been voted by the Security Council. If Iraq eventually accepts it, I presume Dr. Blix and his new inspectors will do their best. Yet, they will never be as intrusive, and therefore as effective, as UNSCOM. In sum, the restraints which we have kept on Saddam for nine years are loosening. He is very close to being free of the handcuffs in which both we and his people have invested so much.

Restraining Saddam was always a minimal objective. It was a way to avoid the strategic risk many see in the bolder objective of acting in support of the Iraqi opposition to remove Saddam from power and achieve democracy. It is ironic that the minimal objective requires the continual application of U.S. military force, not just for a decade, but presumably forever. The bolder objective, once achieved, would bring U.S. military operations and basing in the Gulf countries to an end. I believe Congress has recognized the need for bold action. In passing the Iraq Liberation Act in October 1998, Congress expressed its frustration with the status quo and provided resources with which the Administration could support the Iraqi opposition in their efforts to remove Saddam from power.

In signing the Iraq Liberation Act, President Clinton affirmed that U.S. policy was not merely to restrain Saddam but to see him replaced. Unfortunately, the President's policy pronouncement has not been followed by action. The President and Vice President have encouraging words for Iraqis seeking to free their country, but their words are belied by the inaction of their Administration. Despite unprecedented unity, the Administration has provided only a small proportion of available resources to the Iraqi opposition, and this only on superficialities which will have no effect on opinion inside Iraq. The countries in the region all agree the U.S. is not serious about supporting Saddam's removal. If you don't believe me, call the ambassador of any Middle Eastern country and ask him or her if our actions and rhetoric match.

If the Administration actively sought Saddam's replacement, our allies in the region would know it and they would cooperate with us. But the Administration has not asked because the

truth is, beneath the rhetoric, we are clinging to the old policy of restraining Saddam. There are now signs that the consensus for even that is fraying. I would hate to think that the boldest hope of our national security establishment is that our policy will hold until noon on January 20 of 2001.

I admit to coming late to an understanding of the evil of the Iraqi regime and the imperative of fighting it. After Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, I voted against the Gulf War resolution. My distrust of the Bush Administration's statements regarding the need for the use of force in Iraq were colored by my own experiences in Vietnam. But Iraq is not Vietnam. And I have come to understand the brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime and the overwhelming requirement to support the efforts of Iraqis to replace it. I understand the threat the regime poses to his people, to his neighbors, and to the rest of the world. Most of all, this is about our commitment to freedom.

The long night of the Iraqi people will not be ended through a policy of merely retraining the Iraqi regime. Instead, we must work to match our words and our deeds to actively support the Iraqi opposition in their effort to remove Saddam Hussein and establish a democratic Iraq. When the people of Iraq obtain their freedom, it will transform the Middle East. It will create a new region in which brutality, poverty, and unnecessary armaments will be supplanted by security, prosperity, and creative diversity.

Mr. President, this goal is within our reach. But the difference between success and failure in this endeavor will be measured by our willingness to act in support of the people of Iraq.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.

SUDAN

Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, after going to the southern Sudan as a medical missionary and a surgeon 2 years ago, I came home with a realization that the unparalleled human disaster I went there to address was really, to my own surprise, inextricably linked to my role as a Senator. Yesterday, that realization was brought home again to me in the most horrific and despicable way.

As background, the Government of Sudan has, for over 16 years, carried out a war of unrivaled barbarity against its own people. Over 2 million people, mostly civilians, have died in bombings, intentional mass starvation, raids by militias on horseback, and what we call more conventional war. Slavery there today is common, so common that the raiding parties the Government of Sudan in Khartoum sponsors accept captive humans as their pay.

Yesterday, the regime in Khartoum struck once again, this time with old Soviet cargo planes that have been

crudely outfitted as bombers of a sort, where large antipersonnel bombs are simply pushed through large cargo doors.

The accuracy is poor. Yet the intent could not be clearer. I received a phone call yesterday morning around 10 o'clock. It was at 6:25 a.m. yesterday morning, minutes before the first wave of relief flights were to leave the United Nations relief operations in Lokichokio, Kenya, they received a phone call from Khartoum instructing them that no relief flights would be allowed into Sudan the entire day.

The Government of Sudan then proceeded with a full day of bombing raids on nine sites in areas of rebel control.

What were the strongholds the Government of Sudan hit in those raids yesterday? What decisive blow did they deliver to those rebels?

Well, there is one location that I know for sure was a civilian hospital. They bombed and destroyed a tuberculosis clinic and one of the only x-ray machines in the entire country. They hit the local marketplace. They hit a feeding center for the starving and displaced.

In three passes over the small bush town, they dropped five antipersonnel bombs. They killed or maimed civilians, many of them patients in the hospital, others in the marketplace, others in a feeding center for the starving.

All of these were known civilian centers and all were intentionally targeted. The Government of Sudan knows exactly what is in that town and in those hospitals, and they targeted them anyway.

Why do I mention this? How do I know this was a civilian target? It is because it was approximately 2 years ago that in this very hospital I was operating in southern Sudan in a small village called Lui. The TB clinic is adjacent to a small schoolhouse that was converted to a hospital. It is in a small outpost, and there is a little airstrip town there just north of the border approximately 100 or 110 miles. The press release I received today describing the incident in this hospital where I worked says:

Armed aircraft from Sudan's Islamic government dropped 12 bombs on the Samaritans First Hospital in Lui, the only hospital within a 100-mile radius. Eleven of the 12 bombs exploded at or near the hospital killing a number of people, critically wounding dozens, and damaging the hospital's children's and tuberculosis wards. More than 100 patients were being treated or housed at the hospital at the time of the bombing, where four American doctors are stationed. The bombing prompted many patients to flee, interrupting critical tuberculosis treatments needed to save their lives.

This release came to my office this afternoon.

Again, these senseless acts are militarily insignificant, I believe. The only purpose is to terrify and kill civilians and the doctors and the relief personnel who dare to provide life and comfort to them.

The most outrageous aspect of all of this is not that I have been there, that

I know this hospital well, that I was one of the very few physicians and early surgeons to come to that hospital, and it is not that this could have just as easily happened when I was there; it is that this is not an uncommon practice. It is a chosen tactic in the war that lurks on the edge of the world's consciousness.

Just 2 weeks ago, the same government dropped bombs on a town in the Nuba Mountains area, killing 21.

What was the critical rebel target that day? It was a group of schoolchildren under a tree—not child soldiers, but children trying to learn to read.

These are just two in a long and sickening history of intentionally bombing civilians by the Government of Sudan.

How long does the world intend to tolerate these outrages? How long will the regime in Khartoum benefit from their prowess in public relations in the capitals of Europe and the Middle East—and on Wall Street? If indiscriminately bombing children and the infirm doesn't serve as a call to action, then what will it take?

I am realistic about what the world is willing to do. Rage and indignation are expected. But it is about 16 years past due for the "international community" that responds so generously and decisively in many other places to act forcefully and with clear purpose in Sudan.

The world should be ashamed that it has gone on so long. I am ashamed the United States has not made this a greater priority. For a country that is willing to act decisively in Bosnia and Kosovo, we should be ashamed of the anemic level of action to stop this war in Sudan. As a country that is willing to invade another country—Haiti—to stop violence and injustice, we should be ashamed by the fact that we are willing to do so little in Sudan.

I am not suggesting that the United States or anybody else become militarily involved in Sudan. Even if that were politically popular here, it would not be something I would recommend. But the world should be ashamed that we have failed to use all reasonable tools at our disposal. Some of our closest allies in Europe and the Middle East would be especially ashamed for their receptivity toward the regime in Khartoum.

Yes, I am outraged and disgusted by the bombings of yesterday. I am outraged by the bombings of 2 weeks ago. I am outraged and disgusted by the past 16 years of brutality. I believe the administration and the world should share that outrage, and in some cases they do.

But outrage alone gets us no closer to bringing the war to a conclusion. It requires a credible, coherent, and forceful policy from the United States and from the world.

Our policy is only selectively forceful and, as a consequence, lacks coherence and credibility—both in Khartoum and in the capitals of the countries we