

Take a look a little more closely at the tax cut that would be happening here under the proposals we have seen from George W. Bush. We see basically the average tax cut for the lowest 20 percent of Americans ends up this year being worth about \$18. If you happen to be in the top 1 percent, it is worth over \$4,000. As you look at these, you understand this is a clear choice.

I want to go back to one point made by the Senator from Nevada. I think it is an important one. Last week it wasn't the Democratic Party, it wasn't the Republican Party, it was the American Academy of Actuaries that analyzed the George W. Bush proposal for Social Security. This is a group that is supposed to know their business when it comes to analyzing what policy changes would mean.

Here is what they said in their release of October 27: Bush's plan on Social Security would signal a return to Federal budget deficits around 2015.

How could that be good for America? How could it be good for us to go back to a deficit situation, adding to our national debt and drawing more money out of the economy to pay interest on it, raising interest rates, creating an inflationary spiral?

They went on to say:

Texas Governor George W. Bush's plan to cut taxes and divert Social Security payroll taxes to establish individual accounts would make it all but impossible to eliminate the publicly held national debt.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator asked to be advised when he had 10 minutes remaining. There are 10 minutes remaining.

Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Chair.

The program is a pay-as-you-go system, meaning most of the payroll taxes collected now are disbursed to recipients. We say, If we draw money out of Social Security, and we know we need to have it, how do you replace it? He was asked repeatedly in the third debate: Governor Bush, how do you replace the \$1 trillion you take out of Social Security? He cannot answer the question because the hard answer to that question is the only way to replace it is to take one of three options: Reduce Social Security benefits; raise the payroll tax on Social Security; or somehow extend the retirement age beyond 67.

I do not think any of those is a popular option. I hope we never have to face them, but if Governor Bush is going to propose massive changes in Social Security, then he has to face the music and explain it to the American people before the election.

I would like to address a separate issue, but one equally important in this debate over the next President of the United States.

U.S. OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, the pace of U.S. deployments and the use of force overseas has been a hot issue in policy debates in Congress and on the

campaign trail. Presidential candidate, Governor George W. Bush, says that he will put an end to the Clinton Administration's "vague, aimless and endless deployments;" that he would replace "uncertain missions with well-defined objectives."

So the question is: Has the President improperly committed our forces overseas in major missions and at an unprecedented rate compared to his predecessors? I don't think so. I want to take some time today to look at the deployments in question and at deployment statistics. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the lists of deployments, so Americans can judge for themselves if they think there were missions that the military should not have undertaken.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 1.)

Mr. DURBIN. I want to look at why a deployment of between 10,000 and 30,000 soldiers to the Balkans, or deployments of several thousand military personnel at a time for disaster relief or humanitarian aid could disrupt a military that has a combined force of about 2.2 million active and reserve personnel.

The hardships suffered by our men and women in uniform are painfully real and should not be understated. I salute the sacrifices our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are making everyday to defend our national security. Many of these hardships have arisen because the world has changed drastically and so has our military.

Our military has changed from a post-World War II forward-based force to much more of a projection force. When we talk about deployments going up, we are talking about times when we send our forces away from their home bases and their families. After World War II, we had a half million troops stationed in Europe, but with their families, if they had families. Those troops were not considered "deployed," because they were based there. So when people talk about a massive increase in deployments, they are generally not counting those who are stationed in overseas bases.

That is how having 10,500 soldiers in the Balkans today can be considered and counted as a major deployment, but stationing a half million troops in Europe from the end of World War II through the 1980s is not even counted as a deployment by classic definition.

Our military has also changed drastically. It used to be a force of mainly single, young men. Today, our forces are filled with married men and women, many of whom also have children. So deploying them on repeated missions overseas, along with frequent job changes, as well as being overworked at their home bases, creates serious hardships for family life.

I submit today that many of the problems encountered by our men and women in uniform are related to the ways our military is organized and

managed, based on the assumptions developed following our experience in World War II. I recommend to my colleagues an excellent, thoughtful paper, entitled "It's The Personnel System," by John C. F. Tillson of the Institute for Defense Analysis. His paper explores the personnel and organizational assumptions that underlie the military, as well as the intersection of deployment tempo, personnel, or job-changing tempo, and operating tempo at home bases.

These are complex problems that require serious thought. I think it is very sad that these issues would be reduced to a conclusion that the United States must pull out of our leadership role in the world instead of addressing those problems head-on.

What are those unending missions that the Clinton Administration has gotten us into? Most of them were inherited from the Bush administration or Ronald Reagan's administration, or even earlier ones.

Of the 100,000 troops currently deployed long-term away from home, only 10,500 or a little over 10 percent are deployed by the Clinton Administration—to the Balkans. The rest of the major long-term deployments were inherited, including deployments in Japan, the Korean peninsula, the Persian Gulf, and Navy deployments in the Western Pacific and the Mediterranean, as well as the mission that went wrong in Somalia. The only other major mission that the Clinton Administration took on that it did not inherit was to Haiti; and contrary to what Governor Bush said during the second Presidential debate, that mission is over.

I have seen many figures bandied about claiming that the Clinton Administration has used force at a much greater pace than Presidents Bush and Reagan before him. Where do these claims come from?

For example, an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal on October 18th by Mackubin Thomas Owens from the Naval War College and the Lexington Institute, says that:

Deployments have increased three-fold during the Clinton years.

He further stated:

These deployments have included some combat missions, but have consisted primarily of open-ended peacekeeping and humanitarian operations—48 missions, to be precise, from 1992 to 1999.

Apparently, a 1999 Congressional Research Service report, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–1999*, was used to substantiate these claims. Specifically, the CRS report shows that during the Reagan and Bush administrations there were 17 and 16 uses of force overseas respectively. This compares to 49 uses of force overseas during the first 7 years of the Clinton administration.

Unfortunately, reading the CRS report this way is a gross misrepresentation of the facts and an absurd misuse of the CRS report, which was intended

only to be a compendium or rough survey of the range of uses of force. CRS and its fine analysts should not be blamed for the poor analysis of others who used the report as a source.

For instances of use of force in recent years, the CRS report is just a list of times when the President and Defense Secretary reported to Congress consistent with the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the report notes that the instances of use of force listed vary greatly in size and significance. The degree to which each President reports to and consults with Congress on war powers matters varies greatly. The Clinton Administration has reported to Congress diligently. To simply add up each instance without reading and analyzing them inevitably leads to a gross misinterpretation of the facts and to conclusions that cannot survive serious scrutiny.

Let me provide that scrutiny using CRS' numbers.

Of the 49 instances of use of force cited in the CRS report, 14 were either evacuations of U.S. citizens from Third World countries or minor increases in security at U.S. embassies. This is hardly the troop deployment depicted by the critics of the Clinton administration. Moreover, 24 other uses of force were merely continuing operations or simply status reports about continuing operations, 5 of those separate entries for status reports on peacekeeping operations in the Balkans.

There are 7 separate citations regarding air attacks on Iraqi ground targets after the Gulf War.

The analysis suggests the numbers have been misused. Frankly, it raises a question of whether or not the military has been used effectively over the past 8 years. I certainly think it has.

There were 4 entries regarding the deployment of troops in Haiti—3 of which were reporting on the number of troops coming home! But those "counted" as uses of force by the Clinton Administration. So did reductions in US forces from Bosnia.

The largest deployment under President Clinton—some 30,000 troops to Bosnia for peacekeeping missions—is dwarfed by the 600,000+ troops sent to the Persian Gulf during Desert Shield/Storm under President Bush, yet the deployment to Bosnia counts for 15 entries in the CRS report, and the entire Gulf War, only one. The invasion of Grenada with 8,800 US troops has but a single entry.

The entries for the Clinton years included many instances of rescuing American citizens or humanitarian aid. Yet there were very few such instances for the Reagan-Bush years. It seems unlikely that hardly any U.S. citizens needed rescuing during those years, so I suspect such entries are simply missing.

How do we make sense of these numbers?

If we sort out all the multiple entries for the same deployment, as well as the

minor deployments for embassy security and evacuations, it becomes clear that the number of distinct uses of force by the Clinton Administration is not that different from the Bush or Reagan years.

Deconstructing the CRS instances of use of force to include only distinct uses of force, we find that: over 8 years, there were 16 distinct uses of force by President Reagan, the major one the invasion of Grenada; 13 uses of force over the 4 years of the Bush Administration, the major ones being Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Somalia; and 13 uses of force for 7 years of the Clinton Administration, the major ones being Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo.

The misuse of the CRS report was an egregious distortion of the Clinton Administration's record. To set the record straight, I asked the Defense Department what its numbers show.

First, I should note that there is no uniform method for counting deployments at the Defense Department; some count training and exercises as deployments, and some count domestic missions, like fighting the fires in the West or helping with Hurricane Andrew clean-up.

In March 1999, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen sent a report to Congress entitled, "U.S. Military Involvement in Major Smaller-Scale Contingencies Since the Persian Gulf War." In that report, Secretary Cohen notes that:

... since the end of the Persian Gulf War in February 1991, U.S. military forces have conducted or participated in approximately 50 named, overseas SSCs [small-scale contingencies] involving the deployment of 500 or more military personnel at any one time. This includes three crisis response/show of force operations, three limited strike operations, ten noncombatant evacuation operations, four no-fly zone enforcement operations, three maritime sanctions enforcement operations, six migrant operations, ten peace operations, ten humanitarian assistance operations, and one operation to provide emergency overseas assistance to other U.S. government agencies.

I asked the Defense Department for more detail, so DoD also sent me supporting data for the Secretary's report, showing 60 contingencies from 1980–1999—26 from 1980–1992, the Reagan-Bush years, and 34 during the Clinton Administration. Instead of 50 since February 1991 mentioned in the Secretary's report, it lists 44 contingencies since then.

The 34 contingencies during the Clinton Administration are those missions that have a "name," like "Avid Response" or "Sustain Hope." The sources of this information are the reports to Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution, just like the CRS report. However, the data doesn't suffer from repetition, since it only uses named missions, so multiple reports were consolidated. These contingencies also include many instances of rescuing Americans or humanitarian aid missions.

However, almost all the data from 1980–1991 uses that same CRS report,

Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–1999, as its source, which may suffer from undercounting smaller deployments for that time period. I would like to ask the Defense Department today to look at its own internal data for the period on which it relied on the CRS report.

I also asked the Army to provide me with deployment data, which I would like to submit for the RECORD. The Army lists 38 deployments since 1989, including humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuations, and domestic disaster relief in Florida, Hawaii, California, Midwest floods, and Western fire-fighting.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a document entitled "Major Overseas Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations" and another entitled "Operational Deployments" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

MAJOR OVERSEAS SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

[Involving the deployment of 500 or more U.S. Armed Forces personnel—March 1991–February 1999]

Location	Operation	Dates
CRISIS RESPONSE/SHOW OF FORCE		
Kuwait	Vigilant Warrior	Oct–Dec 94.
	Vigilant Sentinel	Aug–Dec 95.
Iraq	Desert Thunder	Oct 97–Nov 98.
LIMITED STRIKE		
Bosnia	Deliberate Force	Aug–Sep 95.
Iraq	Desert Strike	Sep 96.
	Desert Fox	Dec 98.
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS		
Liberia	ITF Liberia	Oct 92.
Rwanda	Distant Runner	Apr 94.
Liberia	Assured Response	Apr–Aug 96.
Central African Republic	Quick Response	May 96.
Zaire	Guardian Retrieval	May–Jun 97.
Albania	Silver Wake	Mar–Jul 97.
Sierre Leone	Noble Obelisk	May–Jun 97.
Cambodia/Thailand	Bevel Edge	Jul 97.
Indonesia	Bevel Incline	May 98.
NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT		
Iraq	Northern Watch	Aug 92–present.
Persian Gulf	Southern Watch	Aug 92–present.
Bosnia	Deny Flight	Apr 93–Dec 95.
	Deliberate Guard	Dec 96–Apr 98.
MARITIME SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT		
Adriatic Sea	Maritime Monitor	Jun–Dec 92.
	Maritime Guard	Dec 92–Jun 93.
	Sharp Guard	June 93–Sep 96.
	Decisive Enhancement	Dec 95–Dec 96.
MIGRANT OPERATIONS		
Cuba (Guantanamo)	Safe Harbor	Nov 91–Jun 93.
Cuba (Haitian/Cuban)	Sea Signal	May 94–Feb 96.
Caribbean (Haitian)	Able Vigil	Aug–Sep 94.
Panama (Cuban)	Safe Haven	Sep–Feb 95.
Cuba (Cuban)	Safe Passage	Jan–Feb 95.
Guam (Kurds)	Pacific Haven	Sep 96–Apr 97.
PEACE OPERATIONS		
Sinai	Multinational Force & Observers	Apr 82–present.
Macedonia	Able Security (UNPREDEP)	Jun 93–present.
Somalia	Continue Hope (UNOSOM II)	May 93–Mar 94.
	United Shield	Dec 94–Mar 95.
Haiti	Uphold Democracy (MNF/USSTGP)	Sep 94–present.
	Restore Democracy (UNMIH)	Mar 95–Apr 96.
Bosnia	Joint Endeavor (JFOR)	Dec 95–Dec 96.
	Joint Guard ² (SFOR)	Dec 96–Jun 98.
	Joint Forge ³ (SFOR/FOF)	Jun 98–present.
Kosovo	Eagle Eye	Oct 98–Mar 99.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS (OVERSEAS)		
Iraq	Provide Comfort	Apr 91–Dec 96.
Bangladesh	Sea Angel	May–Jun 91.
Former Soviet Union	Provide Hope	Feb 92–Apr 92.
Bosnia	Provide Promise	Jul 92–Feb 96.
Somalia	Provide Relief	Aug 92–Dec 92.
	Restore Hope	Dec 92–May 93.
Zaire	Support Hope	Jul–Oct 94.
Rwanda/Zaire	Guardian Assistance	Nov–Dec 96.

MAJOR OVERSEAS SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS—Continued

[Involving the deployment of 500 or more U.S. Armed Forces personnel—March 1991–February 1999]

Location	Operation	Dates
Central America	Strong Support	Oct 98–Mar 99.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS OVERSEAS IN SUPPORT OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES		
Tanzania/Kenya	Resolute Response	Aug 98–present.

OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS SINCE 1989 AND ONGOING

MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVER (MFO)

Peacekeeping—Sinai. Established by Protocol 26 Mar 79 to Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. MFO assumed duties Apr 82. MFO is a peacekeeping operation under the auspices of the U.N. MFO operates checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols & observation posts to observe, report and periodically verify the implementation of the Peace Treaty. U.S. participation consists of an Infantry Battalion & the 1st Support Battalion. Soldiers on individual permanent change of station order man to Support Battalion, while battalion-sized task forces of approx. 530 personnel, rotate about every six months.

JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) BRAVO

Regional Cooperative Security—Honduras. Conducts and supports joint, combined and interagency operations to enhance regional security and stability in the U.S. Southern Command Joint Operations Area. Established in Aug 84, at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras, the task force coordinates the presence of U.S. forces in Belize, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica.

JUST CAUSE

Limited Conventional Conflict—Panama. In December 1989, the National Assembly of Panama declared that a state of war existed with the U.S. On 20 December 1989, U.S. forces launched attacks. Objectives were to protect U.S. lives and key sites and facilities; capture and deliver Noriega; neutralize Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) forces and command and control; support establishment of U.S.-recognized government in Panama; and restructure the PDF.

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

Regional Conventional Conflict—Persian Gulf. Restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty by military force from Saddam Hussein. The ensuing war and economic embargo decimated Iraq's military infrastructure, severed communication and supply lines, smashed weapons arsenals and destroyed morale.

DESERT FALCON

Force Protection—Saudi Arabia/Kuwait. Began 1991. Air and missile defense of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. JFCOM and EUCOM provide Patriot Air Defense Task Forces (750 soldiers) on a rotational basis for contingency employment in the Central Command area of responsibility. Task forces rotate approximately every four to six months and every third rotation is a U.S. Army Europe responsibility.

SEA ANGEL

Humanitarian Assistance—Bangladesh. Supported international relief and rescue effort and deployment forces to Bangladesh in order to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

PROVIDE COMFORT

Humanitarian Assistance—Northern Iraq. Establish a Combined Task Force, at the conclusion of the Gulf War, to enforce the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq and to support coalition humanitarian relief operations for the Kurds and other displaced Iraqi civilians.

JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) LIBERIA

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations—Liberia. Protection and evacuation of American citizens and designated third country nationals in support of a State Department evacuation directive that reduced the number of at risk American citizens.

RESTORE/CONTINUED HOPE

Humanitarian Assistance—Somalia. Military transports supported the multinational UN relief effort in Somalia. Restore Hope—Dec. 92–May 93: Deployed large U.S. and multinational U.N. force to secure major airports, seaports, key installation and food distribution points, and to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, with security for convoys and relief organizations and those supplying humanitarian relief. Continue Hope—1993–1994: Provided support to UN Operation In Somalia (UNOSOM II) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations by provided personnel, logistical, communications, intelligence support, a quick reaction force and other elements with 60 Army aircraft and approx. 1,000 aviation personnel.

SOUTHERN WATCH

Sanctions Enforcement—Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. Multinational, joint operation with forces deployed throughout SWA. CENTCOM forward-deployed HQ, JTF-SWA, is located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The mission is to enforce the No-Fly Zone in Southern Iraq. ARCENT maintains a forward presence in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar in support of OSW. ARCENT began its support of OSW in Apr. 91. During the Jan-Feb 98 crisis, CENTCOM activated another forward HQ, C/JTF-KU, to command and control the operational forces deployed to Kuwait and maintain a forward presence HQ in Kuwait.

PROVIDE PROMISE

Humanitarian Assistance—Balkans. Humanitarian relief operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, entailing airlift of food and medical supplies to Sarajevo, airdrop of relief supplies to Muslim-held enclaves in Bosnia and construction of medical facilities in Zagreb.

HURRICANE ANDREW

Domestic Disaster Relief—Florida and Louisiana. U.S. military provided disaster relief to victims of Hurricane Andrew, which ravaged portions of South Florida and Morgan City, LA.

TYPHOON INIKI

Domestic Disaster Relief—Hawaii. U.S. Army provided disaster relief to victims of Hurricane Iniki which battered the island of Kauai, Hawaii, with winds up to 165 miles per hour in September 1992.

JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) LOS ANGELES (LA RIOTS)

Domestic Civil Support—California.

PROVIDE HOPE

Humanitarian Assistance—Former Soviet Union. Delivery of food and medical supplies to 11 republics of the former Soviet Union, using military airlift, as well as sealift, rail and road transportation. Personnel provided surplus Army medical equipment to hospitals and delivered, installed and instructed medical personnel on the use of the equipment.

DENY FLIGHT

Sanctions Enforcement—Bosnia. NATO enforcement of a No-Fly Zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina from April 1993 to December 1995. U.S. soldiers deployed to Brindisi, Italy to support Operation Deny Flight. During operation CPT Scott O'Grady was shot down and was rescued by the combined efforts of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines.

MIDWEST FLOODS

Domestic Disaster Relief—Midwestern States.

ABLE SENTRY

Peacekeeping—Macedonia. Part of the UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) force and responsible for surveillance and patrol operations for the FYROM border and force protection. The UN mandate for the UNPREDEP force expired without renewal on 28 Feb 99. In late Mar 99, TFAS transferred 3 of 4 outposts to the FYROM Army. Refugees from Kosovo were beginning to come across the border into Macedonia in large numbers. On 31 Mar 99, while engaged in routine activities inside the FYROM, a three man 1-4 CAV patrol came under fire and was abducted.

SHARP GUARD

Sanction Enforcement—Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Enforced compliance with the U.N. sanctions against the former Republic of Yugoslavia to help contain the conflict in the region and to create conditions for a Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. U.S. military operations were amended by law (Nunn-Mitchell Act) to exclude enforcement of the arms embargo against Bosnia. U.S. forces continued to provide air deconfliction and command and control to NATO.

WESTERN U.S. FIRES

Domestic Disaster Relief—Western United States.

VIGILANT WARRIOR

Show of Force—Kuwait. In October 1994, when Iraq began moving ground forces toward Kuwait, the President ordered an immediate response. Within days, the USCENAF Commander and staff deployed to Riyadh, SA and assumed command of JTF-SWA. Operation involved "plus up" of air assets to more than 170 aircraft and 6,500 personnel. Objectives were to prohibit the further enhancement of Iraqi military capabilities in southern Iraq, to compel the redeployment of Iraqi forces north of the 32d parallel and to demonstrate U.S. coalition resolve in enforcing U.N. resolution. Iraq recalled its troops and crisis passed.

SUPPORT HOPE

Humanitarian Assistance—Rwanda/Zaire. Establishment of refugee camps and provision of humanitarian relief to Rwandan refugees in Eastern Zaire following the genocide in Rwanda.

SEA SIGNAL

Migrant Operations—Cuba. Establishment of Joint Task Force—160, a combined service task force that managed migrant caps for Haitians initially, and later Cubans as well, at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. U.S. military personnel oversaw housing, feeding and medical care for over 20,000 Haitians and 30,000 Cubans. Majority of Haitians migrants were safely repatriated following the restoration of President Aristide (Operation Uphold Democracy). Cuban migrants at Guantanamo prior to the change in migration policy in May 1995 were eventually brought into the U.S.

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

Peacekeeping Operations—Haiti. Movement of forces to Haiti to support the return of Haitian democracy. Most of the force was airborne when Haitian officials agreed to peaceful transition of government and permissive entry of American forces in Sep 94. U.S. transferred the peacekeeping responsibilities to U.N. functions in Mar 95.

U.S. SUPPORT GROUP HAITI

Humanitarian Assistance—Haiti. Southern Command conducted civil and military operations in Haiti by exercising command and

control and providing administrative, medical, force protection and limited logistical support to deployed-for-training units conducting humanitarian and civic assistance projects. Forces were initially deployed under the authority of Operation Uphold Democracy to restore Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power. In Mar 95, Operation Uphold Democracy continued as USSPTGRP-Haiti. HQDA provided approx 60 soldiers on six month rotation and a 150 man infantry company for security operations. Mission ended Jan 00.

VIGILANT SENTINAL

Show of Force—Kuwait. In August 1995, Hussein tested U.S. resolve by moving a significant military force close to his country's border with Kuwait. Included protecting the physical security of U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf and on the Arabian Peninsula, deterring aggression, countering threats to the peace and stability of the Gulf region and maintaining U.S. access to key oil resources.

JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD/JOINT FORGE

Peacekeeping—Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. deployed forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina in Dec 95 to monitor and enforce the Dayton Peace Agreement (now the General Framework Agreement for Peace or GFAP). Operation renamed Joint Guard in FY97. Joint Forge (OJF) is NATO's follow-on operations to Operation Joint Guard. OJF is the operational plan to the Supreme Allied Command Europe for Stabilization of the Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the general framework for peace, the Army's mission is to provide continued military presence to deter renewed hostilities, to continue to promote a self-sustaining, safe and secure environments and to stabilize and consolidate the peace in Bosnia. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) supports the Dayton peace Accords through reconnaissance and surveillance patrols, monitoring border crossing points per UN Security Council Resolution 1160, enhancing security for displaced persons and refugees and professionalizing the military. Task Force Eagle (TFE) Multinational Division, North (MND(N)) is the U.S. lead division of the SFOR.

ASSURED RESPONSE

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations—Liberia. U.S. deployed forces on 7 Apr 96 to conduct evacuation of U.S. and foreign national citizens from Liberia. Joint Special Operations Task Force deployed additional security forces to the U.S. embassy in Monrovia and evacuated over 2,000 personnel including over 400 U.S. citizens.

TAIWAN MANEUVER

Show of Force—Taiwan.

DAKOTA FLOODS

Domestic Disaster Relief—Western United States.

DESERT THUNDER I AND II

Show of Force—SWA. Provided military presence and capability during negotiations between the UN and Iraq over weapons of mass destruction. In late 1997 and early 1998, Iraq demonstrated an unwillingness to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors. In Feb and Mar 98 troops were deployed to SWA in response to Saddam Hussein's defiance of UN inspectors. During this large scale contingency deployment of Allied Forces into the theater in the spring of 1998, the size of U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT), Third U.S. Army increased while at the same time relocated their HQ from the Eastern Province to its present location in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

STRONG SUPPORT/HURRICANE MITCH

Humanitarian Assistance—South America. On 5 Nov 98, Secretary of Defense ordered de-

ployment of forces to support relief operations in Southern Command. Hurricane Mitch caused extensive flooding and mud slides. The countries most seriously affected were Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador, with over two million displaced people and significant infrastructure damage. Deployed forces provided aviation, logistics, emergency evacuation, engineer assessment, road repair, communications and medical care. Deployed forces reached a peak of 4,000+ in Dec 98. Operations continued until mid-April 1999. Ongoing work was continued under USAR & NG New Horizon exercises beginning in mid-Feb 99.

DESERT FOX

Sanctions Enforcement—Kuwait. Bombing campaign in Iraq. Operation DESERT FOX was launched in response to Iraq's repeated refusals to comply with UN Security Council resolutions. Two task forces from Exercise Intrinsic Action were operationalized.

ALLIED FORCE (JOINT TASK FORCE-NOBLE ANVIL/TASK FORCE HAWK)

Limited Conventional Conflict—Kosovo. Joint Task Force-Noble Anvil was the U.S. portion of NATO's Operation Allied Force (the air operations directed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Headquarters were in Naples, Italy. In Jun 99, JTF-NA became the U.S. share of Operation Joint Guardian, NATO's Kosovo peace implementation operation and exercised U.S. command of Task Force Hawk in Albania and Task Force Falcon in Kosovo. JTF-NA was disestablished on 20 Jul 99. In Apr 99, U.S. Army Europe deployed a task force of approximately 2,000 V Corps soldiers to Albania as part of Operation Allied Force. Task Force Hawk provided NATO with a deep strike capability out of Albania into Kosovo. Additional combat, combat support and combat service support units increased the task force to about 5,000. TF HAWK consisted of Apache helicopters, MLRS artillery, force protection assets and necessary support and command and control elements. With end of hostilities on 10 Jun 99, TF Hawk furnished forces to TF Falcon to support the U.S. portion of Operation Joint Guardian. Until end of Jun 99, TF Hawk also provided limited support of, and security for, Operation Shining Hope (the U.S. military effort to establish and sustain Kosovar refugee camps in Albania).

JOINT GUARDIAN (TASK FORCE FALCON)

Peacekeeping Operations—Kosovo. U.S. portion of NATO's Operation Joint Guardian, the Kosovo Peace Implementation Force (KFOR). Task Force Falcon is responsible for Operation Joint Guardian operations in the U.S. designated sector of southeastern Kosovo. On 9 Jun 99, 1st Inf Div (M) assumed responsibility for the U.S. portion of KFOR. TFF's Army elements entered Kosovo from the FYROM on 13 Jun 99 and established control over its assigned areas and established security checkpoints. TFF's major subordinate units include a BDE HQ, one mechanized task force, one armor task force, one light battalion (from the 82d ABD) and numerous combat support and combat service support units.

OPERATION STABILISE/U.S. SUPPORT GROUP EAST TIMOR

Peacekeeping—East Timor. U.N. resolution 1264, 15 Sep 99, authorized establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure to restore peace and security in East Timor. Soldiers were located in Darwin, Australia and in Dili, East Timor and performed critical tasks in the medical, intelligence, communications and civil affairs arena. INTERFET (International Force East Timor) is the Australian-led multinational peacekeeping force. U.S. Support Group-East

Timor (USGET) provides Continuous Presence Operations. U.S. Army Pacific directed to support effort with staff augmentees; a logistics support detachment; periodic engineer and medical civic-action projects.

FOCUS RELIEF

Peacekeeping—Nigeria/Sierra Leone. Part of the National Command Authority's decision to provide bilateral assistance to Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal to augment training and provide equipment for battalions scheduled to deploy for peacekeeping duties with the U.N. Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone.

WESTERN FIRES

Domestic Disaster Relief—Montana and Idaho. Active duty soldiers deployed to Montana and Idaho to assist with and support firefighting efforts.

Mr. DURBIN. As a point of comparison, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), under contract from the Defense Department, completed a study in February 1998 entitled, Frequency and Number of Military Operations. Contained within the study are a number of databases detailing the deployment of U.S. forces overseas. One data set from an earlier IDA study covering U.S. military overseas deployments from 1983-1994 showed that President Reagan averaged 9 deployments per year, President Bush averaged 9.5 deployments per year, while Clinton averaged 5.5 deployments per year.

Another data set from Defense Forecasts, Inc. listed U.S. Air Force deployments from 1983-1996. It showed the following number of average annual Air Force deployments: 19 per year under President Reagan, 37 per year under President Bush, and 27 per year under President Clinton.

For all those critics of the pace of the use of military force under President Clinton, I would like to ask, which missions of those in the lists I have submitted for the RECORD should this country not have done? Governor Bush mentioned only one in the second Presidential debate—the mission to Haiti.

Of the missions listed in the table from the Defense Secretary's report, which should we have skipped? Should we have said no to the 9 missions evacuating noncombatants and Americans in trouble? Should the United States have said "sorry we can't help" to those in the 9 humanitarian assistance missions? Should the military have been prevented from helping stem the flow on illegal immigrants or not helped give safe haven to the Kurds, as in the 6 missions listed under "migrant operations"? How about enforcing the no-fly zone and the sanctions against Iraq, or perhaps the shows of force and limited strikes to keep Iraq in check?

Looking at the Army's list, perhaps critics would like to show where the Army was over-reaching? Was it when it helped the residents of my state of Illinois and of Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota during the massive flooding in 1993? Maybe we shouldn't have asked soldiers to help put out the fires all over the West last August? Maybe we shouldn't have helped the victims of Hurricane Mitch in Central America in

1998, or perhaps we should have turned down the humanitarian mission to the survivors of the Rwandan genocide in 1994? Some say we shouldn't have even tried to restore democracy in Haiti.

When I read these lists, it makes me proud of what our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have done for our country and for the world, at great cost to themselves and their family lives.

Clearly there is a national consensus that we have been over-working our troops and we need to look deeply into what assumptions and management systems we need to change to fix these problems—rather than decide that we must pull back from the world and from the vital national security missions those men and women have been so ably undertaking.

But where on these lists are those "vague, aimless and endless deployments" that Governor Bush referred to? Which "uncertain missions" would he "replace with well-defined objectives"?

There's only one major long-term peacekeeping mission on those lists, and that's the U.S. mission to the Balkans—the only major deployment still in place that President Clinton did not inherit from Governor Bush's father.

Governor Bush has called for a U.S. withdrawal from the Balkans and for a "new division of labor" between the United States and its NATO allies—this at a time when the U.S. strategy is bearing fruit with the fall of the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, and when United States forces make up less than 15 percent of the troops on the ground in the Balkans.

Bush's intent to reduce the United States' role in Europe and NATO has been greeted with alarm and dismay across Europe.

Following two world wars, history has shown us the importance of the U.S. role in keeping peace and promoting stability in Europe; of stopping racist, ultra-nationalist dictators. After the United States and Europe alike spent years wringing its hands about the ultranationalist policies that ripped Yugoslavia to shreds, the United States led to step in and stop the ethnic cleansing. Was that the wrong policy? Should we have just watched while Southeastern Europe went to pieces? It was painful and messy, and it took time, but I think we did the right thing. The new leaders in Croatia, and now, I hope, in Serbia, are ready for a new, democratic path.

Our experience with the Kosovo campaign showed just how important American leadership and American defense capability is to the NATO alliance. Europe has said it's ready to do more to beef up its defense and peacekeeping capabilities, but it's a long way from being able to undertake a Kosovo-like campaign without the United States. That reality became painfully clear to European leaders during the Kosovo campaign, and they have determined to do something about it.

Just a few years ago, I was proud to vote in the United States Senate to enlarge NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. This enlargement was to help integrate the states that had thrown off the yoke of the Warsaw Pact into Western European institutions. It helped to cement democracy and give those countries a stake in the defense of Europe. I want to see more East European countries join NATO, particularly the long-suffering Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. I am afraid that will not happen if the United States pulls back from its commitment to NATO.

After the United States led Europe and NATO to stop the Yugoslavian wars, are we to pull back? After the United States led NATO to expand the fold of democratic, market-oriented states committed to Europe's defense, are we to leave?

I believe the answer to those questions is a resounding no.

It is time to address the hardships of those in the military as the management issues that they are and stop claiming that the United States can no longer handle vital national security missions like our involvement in the Balkans because of those hardships.

Let's stop hiding behind the many differing deployment statistics and debate policy. This Administration has kept our commitment to NATO and to Europe, while it has continued to contain Saddam Hussein, and protected our vital interests in protecting Japan, South Korea, and the Taiwan Strait. Those aren't "vague, aimless, or uncertain" missions. These missions are at the heart of our national security and our leadership role in the world today.

I close by pointing to one particular thing that has come up in the last 2 weeks in the Presidential campaign. For months, Governor Bush's senior foreign policy advisers have been complaining that the U.S. military is overextended and engaged in too many peacekeeping operations. It is this last deployment in the Balkans that has drawn Governor Bush's ire, even though the 10,000 troops represent, as I said earlier, less than 1 percent of the U.S. military.

Recently, Governor Bush's foreign policy adviser, Condoleezza Rice, called for withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Balkans as a "new division of labor" under which the United States would "handle a showdown in the Gulf, mount the kind of force needed to protect Saudi Arabia and deter a crisis in the Taiwan Strait," while Europe would be asked to do peacekeeping on its own.

I have always been in favor of burden sharing, and I believe the Europeans and every other group across the world who need our assistance should not only pay for that and defer the costs to American taxpayers but put the lives of their young men and women on the line.

I believe it is naive of Governor Bush to suggest that America's commitment

to NATO is just a statistical commitment. America's commitment to NATO makes it work, and the suggestion that Governor Bush, if he had the chance, would diminish the American role in NATO, has raised concerns all across Europe because for over 60 years now, NATO has been a source of stability and pride and defense for our European allies.

The U.S. involvement is much more than just bringing men and women to the field. It is a symbol of the force and commitment of the United States. I am proud of the fact, as I stand here, that in modern times the United States has never engaged in these military conflicts hoping to gain territory or treasure. We are there for what we consider the right reasons: to protect democratic values, to provide opportunity for the growth of business opportunities, and free trade. That has basically been the bedrock of our policy in NATO for many years and will continue to be. I hope we can continue to make that commitment in years to come.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. DURBIN. I ask for 3 additional minutes under the time allotted on the Democratic side.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 3 minutes.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I close this segment by saying if we are going to maintain the superiority of the United States in the world, we must maintain a military force second to none, and that is a fact. For those who suggest we have somehow diminished our power, I suggest to them: Which military would you take in place of the United States? It is not just our technological advantage—that is amazing—what is amazing is the commitment of the men and women in this military to this country and to the defense of our values. I am proud of the fact that as a Member of Congress, in the House and the Senate, I have been able to support this buildup of military strength, which has meant we have conquered communism, we have allowed countries to see their freedom for the first time in decades, and we have built alliances, like NATO, into the envy of the world.

For those who suggest the American military is somehow understaffed, overmanned, underutilized, overutilized—whatever the criticism may be—I do not think that is a fact. I also think those who want to rewrite the history of the last 50 or 60 years and try to define a new role for NATO are causing undue concern among our allies in Europe. NATO is important. I know this because of my own experience dealing with the Baltics.

My mother was born in Lithuania. I followed the arrival of democracy in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. I know they are concerned about their future and security. They are counting on NATO. They are praying for the day when they can become part of it.

When Governor Bush suggests we are somehow going to diminish America's

role in NATO, it raises serious questions not only in the United States but around the world. It goes back to the point I made earlier: If being the President of the United States and Commander in Chief of our forces was an easy job then many people could fill it. If it is a tough job demanding experience and good solid judgment, then I think the American people should best look to someone involved in that. Vice President GORE has tried to stand not only for the strength of NATO in the past but in the future. I believe as leader, if he is elected on November 7, he will continue in that proud tradition.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Iowa, Mr. HARKIN.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized for 10 minutes.

EDUCATION BUDGET

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I have now served on the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Subcommittee. I have been on that committee 15 years. Each year when we pass the budget for education and health, there are always tough negotiations, but we always manage to get through it and we get it to the President and move ahead.

This year we had some long and tough negotiations on our bill. The first part of the year, the majority leader of the Senate said education was going to be their priority. Yet here we are at the end of the year—actually at the beginning of the new fiscal year; we are a month into the new fiscal year—and we still do not have our education budget through yet. It is going to be the last bill through.

We have been working very hard over the last several weeks to bring this bill to its final conclusion. First of all, the chairman of our appropriations subcommittee, Senator SPECTER, worked very hard this year to get it through our committee and to get it through the Senate. Then we went to conference, and we have been locked in conference now for the better part of 3 months, most of it over the last month working out these differences, as we do on bills.

Last night, Sunday night, we met for what was supposed to be our final negotiating process on the education budget. We started meeting last night after our vote in the Senate, so that must have been around 8 or 9 p.m. We met until almost 2 a.m. There were tough negotiations. Senator STEVENS, as chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Congressman BILL YOUNG from Florida on the House side, Congressman PORTER, Congressman OBEY, the ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee and on the subcommittee that deals with education, and I and, of course, the Director of OMB, Mr. Lew, was there also.

As I said, we had tough negotiations, but we had it down to about four or five issues, finally, and we hammered them out.

Finally, at about 1:30 a.m. this morning, we reached our agreement. As is usually true of any agreement or compromise, there are things in the compromise that I do not like. I am sure there were things in there Senator STEVENS does not like. There are items in there that Congressman PORTER, a Republican from the House, and Congressman OBEY do not like. Together we decided this was the best package we could do, and we all shook hands on it.

Today, thinking we had finally reached an agreement on this important education bill, I find out that Majority Whip DELAY has turned his thumbs down on it, and so did Majority Leader ARMEY turn his thumbs down on it. Evidently, Speaker HASTERT has said the same thing.

What are we doing here? Why do we even have committees? Why don't we just let Speaker HASTERT and Congressman DELAY and Congressman ARMEY deal with everything?

The reason we have the committees is because people such as Senator STEVENS know these issues. He has been working on these issues for years. And Congressman PORTER and Congressman YOUNG and Congressman OBEY and Senator SPECTER and myself, we know these issues. We know the ins and outs of these issues. We have been working on them a long time.

I am not on the Commerce-State-Justice Committee, so I could not negotiate on that because I do not know all the ins and outs of it, and neither does Congressman DELAY or Congressman ARMEY or Congressman HASTERT know that. Yet they turned thumbs down on this deal we struck last night.

Senator STEVENS worked long and hard to reach this agreement. I am sure he was not happy with everything that was in it, just as I was not. But Senator STEVENS dealt in good faith. We gave our word. We shook hands on it. So did Congressman BILL YOUNG. I have worked with Congressman YOUNG for 15 years—and Congressman PORTER and Congressman OBEY. We reached our agreements. We walked out of the room at 1:30 a.m. And today, Congressman DELAY and Congressman ARMEY say: No.

I do not know. I feel very badly for Senator STEVENS and the others who worked very hard on this, gave their word, shook hands. We had the agreement.

What is at stake here? Is this all just an inside ball game, that it shouldn't bother anybody outside the beltway? Here is what is at stake.

In education: Pell grants, some of the largest increases ever in Pell grants; Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, giving money out to the States to help pay for the education of kids with disabilities; class size reduction, hiring more schoolteachers to reduce class size; school modernization so we can

get money out to our schools so they can repair and fix up their schools. The average age of our schools in America is 42 years. They need to be fixed up. We had money for that.

In health care, medical research: All the money for NIH for medical research; all the money for our community health centers that are doing so much to help our uninsured people in this country with health care; an important cancer-screening program for breast and cervical cancer for women.

Child care: One of the biggest increases that we have ever had for child care.

These issues are too important to be playing politics at this late moment. That is what is happening on the House side—pure politics.

Again, I hope this is just a temporary setback. Congressman ARMEY, Congressman DELAY, and Speaker HASTERT are talking about things that they do not understand. I am hopeful they will meet with Congressman YOUNG and Senator STEVENS, who understand that we had an agreement. Not everyone liked it, but it was a good agreement. It was one that we could live with, and one that I felt the President could sign.

So these issues are much too important for our Nation's future, for our kids' future, for the health of women—too important for these kinds of partisan games this late in the year.

I just want to take this time to urge our friends on the House side to not play games with this important education bill. We have to get this money out. We are already a month into our fiscal year. Our colleges, our school boards, our State departments of education need to know, need to have this money out there, so we can continue to hire teachers and reduce class size and modernize our schools.

We need to get the money out there for breast and cervical cancer screening for women all over America. What we do not need is the kind of interference that we have had by Congressman DELAY and Congressman ARMEY and Congressman HASTERT on the House side.

Now is the time to pull together, as we did last night. This was a true bipartisan effort. Republicans in the House, Democrats in the House, Republicans in the Senate, and Democrats in the Senate worked together and we got an agreement. That is the way this place should work. Senator STEVENS led it on the Senate side, Congressman YOUNG on the House side. We got our agreements. It is too bad we see this last minute kind of partisan bickering from the House leadership.

Again, I am hopeful this is a temporary setback. Let's get our education bill done. Let's get it to the President so he can sign it, so we can move ahead with the necessary task of educating our kids in this country. It is, indeed, a sad day today when we see what happened in education.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, before I yield to the Senator from Louisiana