

Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GOSS), the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate very much the distinguished gentleman from Georgia, the honorable JOHN LEWIS, the dean of the delegation, and the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. KINGSTON) and the other members of the Georgia delegation, affording us this time to speak about Senator PAUL COVERDELL. The Rules of the House do not permit us to refer to the other body or Members of the other body, and we seldom do speak about them. This is exceptional, because PAUL COVERDELL was really an exceptional person. I think he did touch our lives. Certainly those of us who live in Florida who have to fly through Atlanta understand very well the meaning of having the Atlanta airport there.

What I wanted to talk a little bit about today is the loss to Nancy and his family, to the State of Georgia, and to our country. I think it is pretty much of an incalculable loss, and it is obviously very painful if we have listened to the speakers who have gone before.

We are going to miss PAUL COVERDELL deeply, and we are going to miss him for a very long time to come, not only as a person, but for the skills he brought to the art and science of crafting legislation and people persuasion here in these hallowed halls of the United States Congress.

To me, he had several distinctive hallmarks. They were honor and decency, things that count for a lot here. And effectiveness and accomplishment, of course, the way we are measured. Those of us who were privileged to work with him knew of this literally unrelenting energy. He was a man who could tire out the most hard working of us. He certainly had the intellect to challenge us as well. We all admired his ability, as we have heard testimony to, to find common sense solutions that seemed to work for all sides in a given debate. Those are wonderful people skills. As the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. BISHOP) said in his testimony on the floor, that unquestioning integrity was also another PAUL COVERDELL trademark. That is very high praise.

I well recall his commitment to fighting the war on drugs, just one of the many things he did here, and to his finding a way to get the money to pay for fighting the war on drugs, which is the harder part. His contribution to that was characteristically second to none; and more importantly, he was successful. And that success is now being employed on the front lines in Colombia and in other meaningful ways, and that will affect America as well and those who are concerned about the scourge of drugs on our youth and on our quality of life in this country.

So, Mr. Speaker, I would like to say for my wife and myself and other

neighbors in the neighboring State of Florida, we send our condolences, our keen sympathy, and our love to Nancy and the people of Georgia. PAUL COVERDELL was a man who gave so much. He was taken too soon.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my condolences to the family and staff of Senator PAUL COVERDELL.

I admired and appreciated Senator COVERDELL's commitment to stopping the flow of illegal drugs across our borders and his tireless efforts to expand educational opportunity in America. Senator COVERDELL demonstrated the effectiveness of quiet, but persistent, leadership. He has been hailed as a workhorse and, indeed, his dedication to public service is an example to every official at every level of Government who works for the public good.

My former chief of staff, Ziad Ojakli, is the chief of staff in the Senator's leadership office. On behalf of all of us who are friends of Z and have worked with him over the years, I wish to convey our deepest sympathy to the family, friends and staff of Senator PAUL COVERDELL. They are in our prayers.

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, on behalf of my colleagues in the Georgia delegation, Mr. LEWIS, Mr. NORWOOD, Mr. ISAKSON, Ms. MCKINNEY, Mr. LINDER, Mr. BISHOP, Mr. BARR, Mr. CHAMBLISS, Mr. DEAL and Mr. COLLINS, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

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#### GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H. Res. 558, the resolution just adopted.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FOSSELLA) Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

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#### RUSSIAN-AMERICAN TRUST AND COOPERATION ACT OF 2000

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 555 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

#### H. RES. 555

*Resolved*, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 4118) to prohibit the rescheduling or forgiveness of any outstanding bilateral debt owed to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation until the President certifies to the Congress that the Government of the Russian Federation has ceased all its operations at, removed all personnel from, and permanently closed the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba. The bill shall be considered as read for amendment. The amendment recommended by the Committee on International Relations now printed in the bill

shall be considered as adopted. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, as amended, and on any further amendment thereto to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate on the bill, as amended, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on International Relations; (2) an amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the Congressional Record pursuant to clause 8 of rule XVIII, if offered by Representative Gejdenson of Connecticut or his designee, which shall be considered as read and shall be separately debatable for one hour equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent; and (3) one motion to recommit with or without instructions.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. GOSS) is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MOAKLEY), my colleague and friend, pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate on this subject only.

Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 555 provides for House consideration of H.R. 4118, The Russian-American Trust Cooperation Act. The modified closed rule provides 1 hour of general debate, equally divided between the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on International Relations. In addition, the rule makes in order a minority substitute and one motion to recommit, with or without instructions; in other words, 2 bites at the apple. I am aware of no Members who sought to offer amendments to the bill. Indeed, the only amendment offered during committee consideration that I know of has been actually incorporated into the bill.

Recognizing the time constraints in the floor calendar during this time of year and the relative simplicity of this bill, this is a fair and balanced rule, in my view, and I urge its support.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4118 is relatively straightforward as a piece of legislation, but it is enormously important from a national security perspective. Let me explain. Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4118 prohibits the U.S. Government from restructuring or rescheduling any of Russia's debt with the United States until the President certifies that the Russian government has ceased operating its intelligence eavesdropping facility which happens to be located nearby in Lourdes, Cuba.

I know that many Members have passionate feelings about Cuba; but to me, this has little to do with U.S. policy towards Cuba; it has everything to do with protecting American citizens and our national security. It is absolutely inconceivable to me, and I think to most Americans, that the United States would provide aid and loans to Russia at a time when, according to press reports, the Russian government pays Cuba hundreds of millions of dollars a year to operate a facility it uses

to eavesdrop on the United States and on our business and what is going on here.

For years now, the defense and intelligence community has been pointing out the danger posed by the Lourdes' listening facility. Relying solely on open-source information and press reporting, and I want to reiterate that point, all of this is based on open-source and media reports, the site at Lourdes is of concern for the following reasons: first, the Russian government allegedly pays up to \$300 million each year in rent to the Cuban government for the facility. Second, the Russian government has reportedly invested over \$3 billion, that is B, billion, for the operation and modernization of this huge intelligence base. Third, the Russian government, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, has apparently significantly stepped up its intelligence collection activities against the United States from its Lourdes base, and this is, of course, before the currently elected president of Russia, Mr. Putin, was elected and it is well known that Mr. Putin comes out of the intelligence community as a former KGBer; and I do not know what his view is on the subject of Lourdes, and I suspect it is time we find out.

Reportedly in recent years, Russian intelligence agencies have funded major facility and equipment upgrades and enhancements at the Lourdes site. Finally, the experts familiar with the Lourdes facility, including Russian defectors and former U.S. Government officials, assert that the Lourdes site is being used by the Russian government to collect personal information about American citizens and proprietary information about U.S. corporations.

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Clearly, this capability offers the means to conduct cyberwarfare against the United States and its people. That is something most Americans understand and do not want to have happen.

Given the obvious national security implications, I am deeply puzzled by the Clinton-Gore administration's adamant opposition to this bill. It seems we have a very clear case where the Russians, with the assistance from Cuba, are engaged in activity in direct conflict with U.S. national security.

Through the leadership of the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) and others, we have found a way to apply real pressure to Russia to cease its activities at Lourdes. Yet, I understand the Clinton-Gore administration is opposed.

I would submit that their opposition to this bill is an example in a very long list that makes the Clinton-Gore administration's disdain for security policy appear again one more time before us, inexplicable as it is.

The Clinton-Gore administration, and in particular, Vice President Gore, who spearheaded administration policy toward Russia through the Gore-

Chernomyrdin Commission, has repeatedly claimed that it had achieved a special relationship of trust with Russian, referring to them as partners.

I want to quote from the minority views that accompany this bill, because it contains truly amazing statements from the Clinton and Gore administration and its allies in Congress.

The minority suggest that "the extent to which Lourdes may target U.S. individual or corporate communications is uncertain." We know it is there. We are just not really sure how much they are listening to or what they are getting, I guess is what that means.

Further, the minority suggests that allowing the Russians to eavesdrop on the United States to the Lourdes facility is a way of "guaranteeing a certain level of political trust between Russia and the United States.

These statements remind me of many times that President Clinton has told the American people that our children could sleep peacefully at night because there were no nuclear missiles pointed at the United States. That is a very nice sentiment, it is a great statement and I wish it were true, but it is not. It gives the American people a false sense of security.

I think likewise the many press reports and the testimony by the Russian defectors and the others contradict the reassurances in the minority reports that the Lourdes site is nothing to be concerned about. I think it is something to be definitely concerned about.

I think the American people deserve better than those kinds of assurances, which cannot be backed up. I encourage my colleagues to support this bill. I think that the Republican government needs to understand and be made accountable that it has to honor its financial obligations, and that the Lourdes site must be shut down if it hopes to truly build a relationship of real trust between our two peoples.

Finally, I encourage my colleagues to send a very strong signal to the Clinton-Gore administration that the American people will no longer stand for their culture of disdain for security, whether it is the State Department laptops, bugging at the State Department, Los Alamos, or the many things we have been reading about. It is clear that lack of good security has been a hallmark of this administration from day one, and it is not acceptable. It is expensive, it is painful, and it is affecting our national security in a negative way.

I encourage my colleagues to support this fair rule and the underlying bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the bill for which this rule provides consideration addresses some very valid security concerns in Cuba. However, Mr. Speaker, I think they could be addressed in a better way.

I believe the best way to engage Cuba is first to lift the food and medicine embargo, and then to open up trade and commercial dialogue. In all likelihood, the approach this bill takes will not adequately address American security concerns. Instead, it will further isolate Cuba, which will make it even more susceptible to outside influences other than ours.

My colleagues say that the way to improve human rights in China is to expand trade, an open dialogue. I say we should do the same in Cuba.

Mr. Speaker, when I was in Cuba just a few months ago our chief of mission, which would be our ambassador if we recognized Cuba, told me that her diplomats never have any face-to-face discussions with Cuban officials. They just do not talk. It is much harder to stay enemies with someone that you actually talk with.

The United States is the last country on Earth that still is not talking to Cuba. I suspect that this adds to our problems greatly, because, Mr. Speaker, as many of my colleagues probably know, the Cold War actually ended 9 years ago. Russia is no longer the Soviet Union. In fact, it is no longer Communist.

The debt restructuring is very important to the stability of Russia. A Russian default could upset any attempt at Russian economic reforms. That is something we want to avoid at all costs, because it could eventually threaten our own national security.

This is not leadership. We are not showing our strengths by withholding debt relief to Russia. We need to stand by our commitments and assist Russia as it works to become a true democracy with a market economy, but strangled by this debt, they will never get there.

This bill holds the debt hostage to our outdated Cold War policy. Mr. Speaker, that could have very, very serious ramifications.

Mr. Speaker, I would be the first one to say that we have to address surveillance issues. The United States communications are sacred. They should be protected. But if we are concerned about the types of security threats coming from Cuba, I think we should talk to people in Cuba the way we talk to everybody else. Why should they be any exception?

There are some who believe we should continue to isolate Cuba. They believe we should refuse food, we should refuse medicine. We should refuse any conversation with our neighbors to the south, regardless of the effect on the Cuban people or American businesses.

Mr. Speaker, we have tried isolating Cuba for 40 years. It is not working. This bill is well-intentioned, but might risk making things worse. Let us open the policy up. Let us send our diplomats in. Let us get talking. That is how we protect ourselves and everyone else. That is how we should protect ourselves here.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would point out that this bill asks Russia to stop renting the facility, and have it shut down that way. So we are dealing and focusing on Russia, not on Cuba in this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. DIAZ-BALART), my colleague and a member of the Committee on Rules.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Sanibel, Florida, for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the rule, as well as the underlying legislation. I commend the gentleman from New York (Chairman GILMAN) and the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss), and especially my colleague, the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN), the author of the legislation, for their hard work in bringing forth this important bill to prohibit rescheduling of debt to Russia until it removes its intelligence personnel and closes the personnel base, the spying facility, in Cuba.

Almost a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a Communist dictator continues to oppress and brutalize a country only 90 miles from our shores, denying the people of Cuba the most basic freedoms, including the freedom of speech, the right to assemble, the right to democratic elections, the right to participate in political parties and labor unions, the right to a free press; in other words, Mr. Speaker, the right of self-determination and the rule of law.

Cuba is going to be free, it is inevitable. But I think it is without any doubt in the national interests of the United States for Cuba to be free as soon as possible. I think it is important that we touch upon just a few of the reasons why.

We in Congress have the ability to receive research from many so-called think tanks. Obviously, they are institutions of research. One of the most respected, I believe, and certainly well-informed of those research institutes is the William Casey Institute of the Center for Security Policy.

In a recent report, they wrote, "American advocates of normalization contend that Cuba no longer poses any threats to the United States, and that the U.S. embargo is therefore basically an obsolete and harmful relic of the Cold War. Unfortunately, this view ignores the abiding menacing character of the Cuban dictatorship.

"This is all the more remarkable given the emphasis Secretary of Defense William Cohen, among other Clinton administration officials, has placed on asymmetric threats, the very sort of threats that Castro's Cuba continues to pose to American citizens and interests."

The Russian intelligence-gathering facilities in Cuba, which is what this legislation is dealing with, specifically,

the vast signal intelligence facilities operated near Lourdes by Havana's and Moscow's intelligence services, permit the wholesale collection of sensitive United States military, diplomatic, and commercial data, and the invasion of millions of Americans' privacy.

The Cuban regime, with Russia's help, has the capability to conduct sustained and systematic information warfare against the United States. A stunning example of the potentially devastating consequences of this capability that this legislation is dealing with was recently provided by former Soviet military intelligence Colonel Stanislav Lunev.

As one of the most senior Russian military intelligence officers to come to this country, Lunev revealed that in 1990 the Soviet Union acquired America's most sensitive Desert Storm battle plans, including General Schwarzkopf's famed "Hail Mary" flanking maneuver, prior to the launch of the U.S. ground war in the Persian Gulf.

Moscow's penetration of such closely-guarded American military planning via its Cuban facility, which this legislation is dealing with, may have jeopardized the lives of literally thousands of U.S. troops in the event that the intelligence had been forwarded to Saddam Hussein at that time by Soviet premier Gorbachev.

By the way, Moscow pays over \$200 million a year to this day to the Castro regime for the intelligence-gathering post, for the Russian intelligence-gathering post 90 miles from the shores of the United States. Even though they get a lot of money from the U.S. taxpayer, Mr. Speaker, the Russians turn around and pay over \$200 million a year to Castro for the intelligence facility that the Russians maintain in Cuba.

Recent news reports have brought forth that the same types of concerns that existed during Desert Storm due to the intelligence-gathering operations in Cuba that this legislation is dealing with, the same types of concerns that existed during Desert Storm due to the intelligence-gathering operations in Cuba that the Russians maintain and the intelligence-gathering operations that Castro maintains with the help of the Russians, these same concerns remained during our recent operations in Iraq and in Kosovo.

Drug trafficking, money-laundering, assistance to narcoterrorists in Colombia and elsewhere, harboring murderers and many other fugitives from U.S. justice, those are but a few of the actions of the Cuban dictatorship which point out why a free and democratic Cuba as soon as possible is definitely in the national interests of the United States, as well, obviously, as in the national interests of Cuba.

But the intelligence post that we are dealing with today specifically, and that is the issue today brought forth by the legislation of the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN), is certainly another very good reason.

In conclusion, I urge both the adoption of the rule and the underlying bill, for which I commend my colleagues, and especially the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) for bringing forward.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MCGOVERN).

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for yielding me the time.

Mr. Speaker, as the distinguished dean of the Massachusetts delegation noted, H.R. 4118 raises legitimate security issues. However, the bill puts forth the worst possible recommendation on how to deal with these issues.

Mr. Speaker, the Cold War is over. We are now in an era of engagement. Unfortunately, the sponsors of this bill want to link our policy with Russia to the failed U.S. policies towards Cuba. This bill would undermine U.S. leadership on engagement with Russia. It would cripple U.S. leadership in the Paris Club, that negotiates debt forgiveness and rescheduling of debt for Russia. It would place Russia's shaky economy in an even more precarious situation.

Why? Because the sponsors of this bill reject U.S. engagement with Cuba. If we had relations with Cuba, the United States could negotiate directly with the Cubans and the Russians about how to resolve the security issue.

Even worse, this bill will actually create new security problems for the United States. The United States maintains many listening stations around the world. We enjoy a significant advantage over Russia. Why do we want to bring public attention to these intelligence matters?

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H.R. 4118 is part of the same effort that would deny Americans the right to travel to Cuba, and that would deny our farmers the ability to finance the sale of food and medicine to the people of Cuba. Sadly, the leadership of this Congress has, in a back room deal, refused to allow this House to work its will on that issue.

It is also part of the effort to block all efforts to pursue a new policy towards Cuba, one that engages the Cuban people, in order to ensure a peaceful transition to democracy.

This bill is a lose-lose proposition for American interests. I urge my colleagues to oppose H.R. 4118.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is my great honor to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), the distinguished chairman of the House Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I support the adoption of this rule for consideration of H.R.

4118, the Russian-American Trust and Cooperation Act of 2000.

This measure addresses a very serious situation, a situation that confronts our Nation with regard to espionage being conducted against our American Armed Forces, against our citizens, and against our companies from an expansive intelligence facility located in Cuba.

This measure also addresses a very serious situation with regard to the financial support that the Communist regime of Fidel Castro receives from the Russian Federation for the use of that intelligence facility.

In brief, this measure prohibits any further debt relief for the Russian government on the debts it owes to the United States until it closes down that espionage facility in Cuba; but the bill does contain a provision, adopted with bipartisan support in our Committee on International Relations, that grants the President limited waiver authority in the application of the requirements of this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the expeditious work done by my colleague and the other members of the Committee on Rules to bring this bill to the floor.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, as my colleagues probably know, there is a Democratic Caucus going on, so I do not have any of my speakers here, so I will let the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GOSS) take over.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am privileged to yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. GOODLING), chairman of the Committee on Education and the Workforce.

(Mr. GOODLING asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the rule for H.R. 4118, the Russian-American Trust in Cooperation Act of 2000, introduced by the gentlewoman from Florida (Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN). While the Cold War may have ended 10 years ago, the threat of Russian espionage remains alive and well on the island of Cuba.

Few Americans may know that the Russian government still maintains an agreement with the Castro regime that allows the Russians to operate an intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba, the largest espionage complex outside the former Soviet Union. With over 1,500 Russian engineers, technicians and military personnel, the Russian government is able to monitor communications activity in the United States and gather personal information about U.S. citizens. In fact, this facility enabled the Russians to intercept sensitive information about U.S. military operations during the Gulf War.

Now we have received startling news from our own intelligence that the Russian government is increasing its presence at Lourdes. It has been reported that the Russians have spent

more than \$3 billion to modernize and expand the Lourdes facility.

Our government must respond immediately and forcefully by prohibiting the forgiveness of bilateral debt owed to the U.S. by the Russian Federation and instruct our representative to the Paris Club of official creditors to vote against the rescheduling or forgiving of such debt until the President certifies that the Russian government has stopped all operations, removed all personnel, and permanently closed the Lourdes facility. The bill would provide the President a waiver if he certifies that doing so is in the national interest of the United States and that the Russian government is in compliance with multilateral and bilateral nonproliferation and arms limitation agreements.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), the distinguished chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, for moving this important bill to the floor.

I urge my colleagues to support the efforts of the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) and the gentleman from New York (Chairman GILMAN).

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is indeed a privilege to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN), the chairman of the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank, first of all, the gentleman from Florida (Chairman GOSS) of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for his support and, indeed, his enthusiasm for this bill. He is a staunch defender of U.S. national security interests and has been an unwavering ally in our efforts to curtail the threat posed by the Russian espionage facility at Lourdes, Cuba.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the distinguished gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), the chairman of the Committee on International Relations, for his leadership and assistance in moving this bill through the committee process.

As has been explained, Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4118, a bill that I introduced in March of this year, documents several things. First, it documents the threat that is the Lourdes facility. Secondly, it documents the need for the legislation, and that is that the Russian Federation continues to have contempt for its financial obligations to the U.S. Thirdly, it provides a solution, that is, the prohibition of debt rescheduling and forgiveness.

H.R. 4118 documents the billions of dollars that the Russian Federation has spent and continues to spend in the leasing, the upgrading, and operation of its Lourdes post, providing much-needed financial support to the Castro regime to help keep it afloat. It underscores also the continued relation between the Russian intelligence service

and the Castro tyranny by citing reports of a high-ranking Russian military delegation traveling to Cuba in December 1999 to discuss the continuing operation of Lourdes.

It refers to open sources which classify the Lourdes facility as the greatest single overseas asset for Russian intelligence, with 1,500 Russian engineers, technicians, military personnel, as well as tracking dishes and satellite systems, all tasked with intercepting computer communications, telephone calls, and faxes, as well as with the capacity to engage in cyberwarfare against the U.S.

The bill cites reports confirming the use of Lourdes to steal U.S. commercial and trade secrets as well as to collect personal information on American citizens in the private and government sectors.

H.R. 4118 is a focused bill which addresses specific policy issues, and this rule reflects this.

It enjoys the support of the majority leader and the majority whip, who are cosponsors of this measure; of the gentleman from New York (Chairman GILMAN) of the Committee on International Relations; and of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GOSS), the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, who, as we have seen, is managing debate on the rule.

The bill has Democrat cosponsorship and was passed in the committee on a voice vote with minority support. It was reported out as amended by compromised language offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), the ranking member of the Committee on International Relations.

I thank the Committee on Rules for reporting this rule. I ask my colleagues to vote in favor of the rule so that we can move forward with consideration of H.R. 4118, a bill which seeks to utilize the withholding of debt forgiveness and rescheduling to curb Russian behavior running contrary to our U.S. national security concerns.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GOSS) if he has any remaining speakers.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to advise the gentleman from Massachusetts, through the Chair, that we have no requests for further speakers. I am going to make a brief closing remark after the gentleman yields back.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I await the remarks of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GOSS).

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I simply would put it this way. If we had an aircraft carrier parked off any part of the United States that was bristling with antennas and flying a foreign flag, people would want to know what was going on.

When there was evidence that that aircraft carrier was being used to obtain information that we regard as private information, our personal communications, our telephone calls, so forth, I know most Americans would want the United States Government to take action. That is not a far cry from the situation we are looking at.

The largest intelligence gathering facility is, in fact, at Lourdes, Cuba; and there is no doubt it is being used. Russians are having a hard time making ends meet. Yet they are still willing to put \$300 million a year, or something thereabouts, into renting this facility; so presumably, they are getting at least that much back in their dividend, and that is undoubtedly at our expense.

It is worth noting that this weekend we are going to be renegotiating the debt. The Russians are going to be asking us one more time, could we do them a favor. I do not think most Americans want us to be paying our tax dollars to the Russians to spy on us, to take our secrets. That is what this bill seeks to stop.

My colleagues can remember the uproar we had just last week here when the Xinhua news agency for the People's Republic of China proposed to build a building that had line-of-sight capability on the United States Pentagon, the seat of the defense operations. There was huge uproar. That has been stopped because of the concern of spying.

Well, if we are able to stop something that simple, certainly we ought to make an effort to stop something as meaningful as what is going on at Lourdes. Nobody wants Big Brother reading their mail or looking over their shoulder or spying at them especially when Big Brother is not American; and, as all Americans know, we do not spy on ourselves in this country. So if we are being spied on, it is by somebody else, and we should stop it.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the support of the rule.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 555, I call up the bill (H.R. 4118) to prohibit the rescheduling or forgiveness of any outstanding bilateral debt owed to the United States by the government of the Russian Federation until the President certifies to the Congress that the Government of the Russian Federation has ceased all its operations at, removed all the personnel from, and permanently closed the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FOSSELLA). Pursuant to House Resolution 555, the bill is considered read for amendment.

The text of H.R. 4118 is as follows:

H.R. 4118

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

**SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

This Act may be cited as the "Russian-American Trust and Cooperation Act of 2000".

**SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Government of the Russian Federation maintains an agreement with the Government of Cuba which allows Russia to operate an intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.

(2) The Secretary of Defense has formally expressed concerns to the Congress regarding the espionage complex at Lourdes, Cuba, and its use as a base for intelligence activities directed against the United States.

(3) The Secretary of Defense, referring to a 1998 Defense Intelligence Agency assessment, has reported that the Russian Federation leases the Lourdes facility for an estimated \$100,000,000 to \$300,000,000 a year.

(4) It has been reported that the Lourdes facility is the largest such complex operated by the Russian Federation and its intelligence service outside the region of the former Soviet Union.

(5) The Lourdes facility is reported to cover a 28 square-mile area with over 1,500 Russian engineers, technicians, and military personnel working at the base.

(6) Experts familiar with the Lourdes facility have reportedly confirmed that the base has multiple groups of tracking dishes and its own satellite system, with some groups used to intercept telephone calls, faxes, and computer communications, in general, and with other groups used to cover targeted telephones and devices.

(7) News sources have reported that the predecessor regime to the Government of the Russian Federation had obtained sensitive information about United States military operations during Operation Desert Storm through the Lourdes facility.

(8) Academic studies assessing the threat the Lourdes espionage station poses to the United States cite official United States sources affirming that the Lourdes facility is being used to collect personal information about United States citizens in the private and government sectors, and offers the means to engage in cyberwarfare against the United States.

(9) It has been reported that the operational significance of the Lourdes facility has grown dramatically since February 7, 1996, when then Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, issued an order demanding that the Russian intelligence community increase its gathering of United States and other Western economic and trade secrets.

(10) It has been reported that the Government of the Russian Federation is estimated to have spent in excess of \$3,000,000,000 in the operation and modernization of the Lourdes facility.

(11) Former United States Government officials have been quoted confirming reports about the Russian Federation's expansion and upgrade of the Lourdes facility.

(12) It was reported in December 1999 that a high-ranking Russian military delegation headed by Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel-General Valentin Korabelnikov visited Cuba to discuss the continuing Russian operation of the Lourdes facility.

**SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON BILATERAL DEBT RESCHEDULING AND FORGIVENESS FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President—

(1) shall not reschedule or forgive any outstanding bilateral debt owed to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation, and

(2) shall instruct the United States representative to the Paris Club of official creditors to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose rescheduling or forgiveness of any outstanding bilateral debt owed by the Government of the Russian Federation,

until the President certifies to the Congress that the Government of the Russian Federation has ceased all its operations at, removed all personnel from, and permanently closed the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.

**SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE CLOSING OF THE INTELLIGENCE FACILITY AT LOURDES, CUBA.**

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 120 days thereafter until the President makes a certification under section 3, the President shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report (with a classified annex) detailing—

(1) the actions taken by the Government of the Russian Federation to terminate its presence and activities at the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba; and

(2) the efforts by each appropriate Federal department or agency to verify the actions described in paragraph (1).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The amendment printed in the bill is adopted.

The text of H.R. 4118, as amended, is as follows:

H.R. 4118

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

**SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

This Act may be cited as the "Russian-American Trust and Cooperation Act of 2000".

**SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Government of the Russian Federation maintains an agreement with the Government of Cuba which allows Russia to operate an intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.

(2) The Secretary of Defense has formally expressed concerns to the Congress regarding the espionage complex at Lourdes, Cuba, and its use as a base for intelligence activities directed against the United States.

(3) The Secretary of Defense, referring to a 1998 Defense Intelligence Agency assessment, has reported that the Russian Federation leases the Lourdes facility for an estimated \$100,000,000 to \$300,000,000 a year.

(4) It has been reported that the Lourdes facility is the largest such complex operated by the Russian Federation and its intelligence service outside the region of the former Soviet Union.

(5) The Lourdes facility is reported to cover a 28 square-mile area with over 1,500 Russian engineers, technicians, and military personnel working at the base.

(6) Experts familiar with the Lourdes facility have reportedly confirmed that the base has multiple groups of tracking dishes and its own satellite system, with some groups used to intercept telephone calls, faxes, and computer communications, in general, and with other groups used to cover targeted telephones and devices.

(7) News sources have reported that the predecessor regime to the Government of the Russian Federation had obtained sensitive information about United States military operations during Operation Desert Storm through the Lourdes facility.

(8) Academic studies assessing the threat the Lourdes espionage station poses to the United

States cite official United States sources affirming that the Lourdes facility is being used to collect personal information about United States citizens in the private and government sectors, and offers the means to engage in cyberwarfare against the United States.

(9) It has been reported that the operational significance of the Lourdes facility has grown dramatically since February 7, 1996, when then Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, issued an order demanding that the Russian intelligence community increase its gathering of United States and other Western economic and trade secrets.

(10) It has been reported that the Government of the Russian Federation is estimated to have spent in excess of \$3,000,000,000 in the operation and modernization of the Lourdes facility.

(11) Former United States Government officials have been quoted confirming reports about the Russian Federation's expansion and upgrade of the Lourdes facility.

(12) It was reported in December 1999 that a high-ranking Russian military delegation headed by Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel-General Valentin Korabelnikov visited Cuba to discuss the continuing Russian operation of the Lourdes facility.

**SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON BILATERAL DEBT RESCHEDULING AND FORGIVENESS FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

(a) **PROHIBITION.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President—

(1) shall not reschedule or forgive any outstanding bilateral debt owed to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation, and

(2) shall instruct the United States representative to the Paris Club of official creditors to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose rescheduling or forgiveness of any outstanding bilateral debt owed by the Government of the Russian Federation,

until the President certifies to the Congress that the Government of the Russian Federation has ceased all its operations at, removed all personnel from, and permanently closed the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.

(b) **WAIVER.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The President may waive the application of subsection (a)(1) with respect to rescheduling of outstanding bilateral debt if, not less than 10 days before the waiver is to take effect, the President determines and certifies in writing to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that—

(A) such waiver is necessary to the national interests of the United States; and

(B) the Government of the Russian Federation is substantially in compliance with multilateral and bilateral nonproliferation and arms limitation agreements.

(2) **ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT.**—If the President waives the application of subsection (a)(1) pursuant to paragraph (1), the President shall include in the written certification under paragraph (1) a detailed description of the facts that support the determination to waive the application of subsection (a)(1).

(3) **SUBMISSION IN CLASSIFIED FORM.**—If the President considers it appropriate, the written certification under paragraph (1), or appropriate parts thereof, may be submitted in classified form.

(c) **PERIODIC REPORTS.**—The President shall, every 180 days after the transmission of the written certification under subsection (b)(1), prepare and transmit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report that contains a description of the extent to which the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (b)(1) are being met.

**SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE CLOSING OF THE INTELLIGENCE FACILITY AT LOURDES, CUBA.**

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 120 days thereafter until the President makes a certification under section 3, the President shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report (with a classified annex) detailing—

(1) the actions taken by the Government of the Russian Federation to terminate its presence and activities at the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba; and

(2) the efforts by each appropriate Federal department or agency to verify the actions described in paragraph (1).

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 555, the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN) and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) each will control 30 minutes of debate on the bill.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks on H.R. 4118.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that, at the conclusion of my remarks, the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN), the Chair of the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, be permitted to control the balance of the time on this side.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the measure we are considering in the House today, H.R. 4118, the Russian-American Trust and Cooperation Act, speaks to the twin issues of Russian electronic espionage conducted against our United States Armed Forces, against our companies and our citizens, and the Russian government's financial support for the Communist regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba, support that is provided by means of the hundreds of millions of dollars of annual rent paid for the use of a site in Cuba to conduct such espionage against our Nation.

Mr. Speaker, there are at least two fundamental questions that we need to address in this measure: first, why is the Russian government conducting such an expansive campaign of espionage against the United States at a time when we are supposed to be building a new relationship in this post-Cold War world?

Second, how does the Russian government explain that they have the fi-

nancial means to turn over to the Castro regime every year Russian oil and commodities estimated to be worth as much as \$300 million that it could otherwise sell to raise its own revenues, while at the same time Russia is claiming to the United States Government and its other creditors that it cannot afford to pay its debts to them?

□ 1645

Mr. Speaker, I suspect that many of our colleagues are not aware of the Russian track record with regard to meeting its debt obligations of the last 8 years. Permit me to take a moment to suggest a review of our committee's report on this bill, which lays out that track record in some detail, and let me summarize it in this manner:

Where the Russian government felt it could get away with not paying its debts, it did so; and that is particularly true with regard to its private, commercial creditors who, after years of Russian refusal to make payments, were earlier this year forced to write off over \$12 billion in Russian debts. Twelve billion dollars as a matter of write-off.

Where the Russian government could not readily ignore its obligations, such as its debts to governments, including the United States, it sought out and won multiple reschedulings. Russia's debts to the United States Government have been rescheduled five times since 1993.

While Russia has manipulated its creditors, private and public, it has found the means to provide an estimated \$2 billion in financing every 7 years to pay the Castro regime for the use of its espionage facility in Cuba. Over the past year, Russian officials have begun stating they expect the United States and their other official creditors to simply forgive a large part of their debt.

That is a far cry from the statements of Russian officials in 1992 and in 1993, when they laid claim to the former Soviet regime's assets around the world, embassies, gold stocks, foreign bank accounts, and solemnly vowed to take on the payment of that regime's debts. It now appears that the assets proved welcome but the debts were inconvenient. And as we see in so many other situations, the Russian government now wants to avoid its commitments. My colleagues, I leave it to other Members who are here today to speak to the character of espionage that is conducted by the Russian government from its Cuban facility.

It is a major concern for my colleagues when we learn the following: That sophisticated Russian listening devices have been placed in our State Department headquarters itself; that the number of Russian spies sent to the United States has risen sharply in recent years; and when we hear our FBI Director Louis Freeh state that Russian intelligence agencies present, "A very formidable, very ominous threat to this country, to the infrastructure and to our economy."

My colleagues, this measure is quite direct in its intent. If the Russian government wants further debt relief from our Nation, then it should close down its espionage facility in Cuba and stop supplying the hundreds of millions of dollars of support that that facility's operation provides to Fidel Castro.

A bipartisan amendment to the bill adopted by our Committee on International Relations provides the President with the authority to waive that prohibition for purposes of debt rescheduling for the Russian government, but not for any debt forgiveness, if he can certify that that is in the national interest of our Nation.

By passage of this measure, the House will make it clear to our own policymakers that it is time to strongly focus on this issue. If we are to have a new relationship with Russia, and if the Russian government seeks the support of our Nation, such as continued debt relief, then it is time that it hears clearly from our government about those actions that we do not appreciate; that supporting the Castro regime and spying on American citizens and our companies is not appreciated.

Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this measure.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

It is interesting that we are now going to drive our Russia policy, a country that has a significant nuclear arsenal, and that we are trying to get to transition to a full democracy, we are going to drive the Russian policy from Havana. If this was the free market, it would be as if we were going to Edsel to design Fords and to Beta to run the Sony business empire.

The Cuba policy has not worked. It does not work today. It leaves us looking foolish. We give PNTR to China; we will not sell food and medicine to Cuba. And now what we are going to try to do for the first time, as I understand it, is we are going to try to tie up our financial relations, in hopes to rebuild a Russia in the post-Soviet era, we are going to tie it all to what happens in Havana. Now, the Bush administration, the previous Republican administration, apparently never saw this facility as an obstacle to either American or multilateral assistance to Russia.

When we take a look at what we have here, we have a process where a delegation in this Congress, that is set on continuing a failed policy, now wants to weld the failed policy against Cuba to a policy of trying to deal with Russia in the post-Soviet era. It seems to me that this is not in America's best interest.

There are clearly debates we can have about the listening facility in Cuba. Some would argue it helps both sides when we have these mutual listening facilities, to make sure that international arms agreements are monitored by the sides, giving people a

level of comfort. But even putting that aside, what we want to do here with this legislation is we will prevent the United States from its participation in Paris Club activities because we think this is one more nail in Fidel Castro's coffin. Well, for 40 years we have tried these plots. We have cut off food, we have cut off medicine, we have cut off trade, we have provided embargoes while we have opened up relations with China.

In China, we are told, by the way, that a completely undemocratic system that locks people up even who join exercise clubs, that this new commercial relationship will bring about democratic change and democratic institutions. It is the way to move forward. In Cuba we are told that 40 years of isolation is not enough; that if we can just isolate Cuba a little longer, this policy will work.

Well, my colleagues, it does seem time to bring back Edsel, the car Edsel, and the Beta format for Sony. This policy makes no sense for America's national interest. It is in our interest to make sure that the Russians repay their Soviet-era debt. If the United States uses this legislation to end the rescheduling of debt, what will happen? Well, if the Soviets choose to not repay the debt at that point, what is the damage to Russia? The damage is to America's creditors. We do not get the money back.

So it seems to me that this is bad from an arms control perspective; it is bad from trying to work with Russia to get it through the stage in the post-Soviet era; it seems to make no sense at all to tie a failed Cuban policy to Russia; and it is clearly a mistake for the United States to disrupt our relations in the Paris Club. I would hope, Mr. Speaker, that we would recognize that we need a new policy.

I know, Mr. Speaker, there are a large number of Republicans and Democrats who now see the need for a new policy in trying, frankly, to engage Cuba. Because it seems to me that when we have the better product, and when we show it to the other side, we do not undermine the United States, we undermine Cuba.

I can tell my colleagues that my parents fled the Soviet Union. We came to the United States. And in those early days, when we had the first visits by Soviet leaders, my mother and father said to me, Krushchev probably believes that he is being shown a Potemkin village; that when Krushchev came to the United States and saw grocery stores full of food and nice homes, she was convinced, and she was probably right, that Krushchev probably thought there was this barren wasteland beyond what he was being shown. By the time of Gorbachev, and even Brezhnev before him, they recognized ours was a great success and theirs was a horrendous failure.

Let Americans of Cuban descent and others easily travel to Cuba. Let the Cuban people see what freedom is all

about. Let us not fear contact with the Cuban dictatorship. Every time an American in a free America has contact with Cuba, it undermines totalitarianism. Let us get rid of this policy that has hurt America's interest for 40 years.

And let us take a look for just one more moment to explain how silly some of what happens is. In my district there is a gentleman who exports hardwoods; and at one point several years ago, he shipped a shipment of hardwoods, oak, white oak, from eastern Connecticut to Japan. The Office of Foreign Control Authority grabbed all of his bank accounts. Why? It turned out the Cuban government owned a piece of the holding company in Japan, and we were taking his bank accounts away under the Trading With the Enemies Act.

We have created this insanity which more than isolating Cuba has isolated the United States and the world community. Every one of our democratic governments sees this as a policy that does not work. Let us try something new. Let us find a way to make sure the Cuban people understand that Americans care about the Cuban people; it is the type of government they have that we are against. Let us get rid of the hypocrisy of giving PNTR to China while we will not sell food and medicine to Cubans. Let us not tie our Russia policy to a failed policy in Cuba.

This is not going to change what happens in Cuba; it is not going to change what happens in Russia. It is just one more attempt to try to drive, I guess, all of our foreign policy out of how we see a failed policy in Cuba and continue it elsewhere around the globe. Reject this bill. It will not do much at the end of the day. It is just a bad idea.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the threat posed by Russia's facility at Lourdes is not new. The Freedom Support Act of 1992 clearly underscored the dangers to U.S. national security, as did ensuing legislation.

Secretary of Defense Cohen stated in a May 1998 letter to the Congress, "I remain concerned about the use of Cuba intelligence activities directed against the United States." And he further emphasized his concerns with the signals intelligence facility at Lourdes and what benefits the Cuban government may reap from this facility.

This latter statement sums up the dual threat that the Lourdes facility poses related to Russia's specific actions as well as the financial resources it affords the Cuban dictatorship through its yearly payments of \$200 million to \$300 million to the Castro regime for Lourdes.

However, after 8 years of talks, 8 years of providing the Russian Federation with billions of dollars in U.S. aid

of one sort or another, 8 years of rescheduling the Russian debt at different intervals, what has happened is that Lourdes remains a serious problem. In fact, evidence suggests that there has been an increase, not a reduction, of the threat posed by the Lourdes facility.

□ 1700

Coinciding with a February 7, 1996, order by then Russian President Yeltsin demanding that the Russian intelligence community increase its gathering of U.S. and other Western economic and trade secrets, multiple open sources confirm that the Russian Federation began a multi-billion dollar upgrade and expansion of the Lourdes facility, which included, according to open sources and public statements by former U.S. officials and Russian and Cuban defectors, the addition of satellite dishes, voice recognition facilities, more sophisticated computers for intercepting specific telephone numbers, faxes, and computer data, and the means by which to engage in cyberwarfare against the United States.

In fact, the ongoing sophisticated and organized cyberattacks that the Pentagon's military computer systems were subjected to in early 1999 came from a company routing through Russian computer addresses. These attacks have been occurring since 1998 and are believed to be stemming from the Lourdes facility.

Other public sources and reports refer to the jamming of U.S. FAA transmissions as an example of how Lourdes is used for cyberwarfare, which directly threatens the lives of all Americans.

On November 5, 1998, a Moscow publication reported that the Lourdes espionage facility provide between 60 and 70 percent of all intelligence data about the United States, including highly sensitive military information about our own Armed Forces. Such a penetration of closely guarded American military planning jeopardizes the lives of thousands of our men and women in uniform.

The use of Lourdes, however, according to academic studies and news reports quoting officials and unofficial sources, is not limited to secret U.S. military operations. Its targets include the interception of sensitive diplomatic, commercial, and economic traffic as well as private U.S. telecommunications. And these targets coincide with the previously mentioned mandate by Russian President Yeltsin that the focus of Russian intelligence had to be commercial and industrial espionage against the U.S. in particular.

According to surveys of the American Society for Industrial Security, commercial espionage bleeds the U.S. economy of at least \$24 billion a year. However, nothing is being done to address Russia's active participation in a practice which has such devastating costs for American companies.

The economic traffic intercepted by Lourdes includes Federal Reserve deliberations, planned U.S. mergers and acquisitions, competitive bidding processes, data which could be used to bank-roll Russian global operations to the detriment of American equities.

The disdain for U.S. security extends into the private realm, as revealed by the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in August 1996, who stated, "Lourdes is being used to collect personal information about U.S. citizens in the private and government sectors."

Still, the threat does not end there. Cuban engineers and officials of Cuba's Ministry of the Interior, which is Castro's intelligence service, who have defected to the United States in the last 5 years have stated that information on the U.S. obtained through the Lourdes espionage facility is offered by the Russians as a gift or is sold to regimes in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and China.

There are daily mail runs between the Lourdes facility and a Cuban intelligence office nearby. These are often used to exchange information and provide the Castro regime with valuable U.S. political and commercial data. According to defectors, this data is used by Cuban spies to target specific individuals and American companies in an attempt to undermine U.S. policy.

As the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on International Relations, has stated, the Russians have made a mockery of the debt rescheduling process; and they have ridiculed and scoffed at the United States for our continued willingness in recent years to look the other way, even when there is overwhelming evidence that Russia uses its alleged limited resources to indeed expand its espionage activities against the U.S. and to provide much-needed funds and information to the enemies of our country.

U.S. willingness to reschedule Russian debt while ignoring the threat posed by the Lourdes espionage facility has not only given the Russian Federation the impression that it can undermine U.S. national security with impunity, but it has sent a signal to the Castro regime that a foreign presence in Cuba which threatens the safety of the American people will be tolerated and indeed even encouraged.

For this reason, the Cuban dictatorship is affording China's military and intelligence services the opportunity to build their own listening post near Lourdes. It has engaged with Chinese Government technical experts who are assisting the Castro regime with informatics and communications. This will assist the Cuban Foreign Service in what Castro officials term their worldwide struggle against the U.S. by increasing their Internet capabilities.

H.R. 4118, Mr. Speaker, a bill which I introduced in March of this year with several of our colleagues is a critical step in addressing the threats posed by

Lourdes and sends an unequivocal message to the Russian Federation that here in the United States we will no longer allow ourselves to be manipulated into debt rescheduling for a country which demonstrates a blatant disregard for U.S. security and the safety of our American people.

Russia cannot continue to claim poverty and ask for debt restructuring from the U.S., whether bilaterally through the Paris Club or at the upcoming Economic Summit in Japan, all the while providing \$200 million to \$300 million a year in rental payments to the Castro regime. The claims by the Russian Federation fall flat in the face of logic.

If Russia has hundreds of millions of dollars for upgrades to the Lourdes espionage facility, if Russia has hundreds of millions of dollars to build an additional espionage base for the Castro regime at Bejucal nearby, then it has funds to cover its Ex-Im Bank exposure of over \$2.2 billion or its \$1.9 billion in outstanding loan guarantees under the Commodity Credit Corporation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture or any of its debt to the U.S.

This cannot and must not continue. H.R. 4118 affords us the necessary leverage to correct this situation. It holds the Russian government accountable for its actions. It prohibits the forgiveness and rescheduling of Russian debt to the United States until the Russian Federation discontinues its operations and closes its Lourdes facility.

While it does provide for a national security waiver by the President, the waiver applies only to debt forgiveness and requires certification and reporting to us in the Congress.

I ask my colleagues to act. The time is now to protect our secrets, our security, and the American people. I urge my colleagues to vote for H.R. 4118.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. WATERS), I yield myself such time as I may consume to just say that the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) would make a better case if she argued that the Castro government was a threat to the people of Cuba where they do not have full freedom and they do not have a lot of things that they ought to have.

It is a little hard to convince us that we are somehow threatened in the United States by Castro. And for all the listening the Russians have done from the Cold War to today, the United States is the singular superpower; and that the policy the gentlewoman supports has failed to have an impact on the Castro government for 40 years.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentlewoman from Florida.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I believe that if the gentleman reads the bill, it is very clear. We are talking about the threat that is posed by the



Russian listening post in Cuba. It happens to be stationed in Cuba. It could be stationed anywhere else. It is a threat to the U.S. security, and I am not the only one to say it.

My colleague can ask Secretary Cohen whether he believes that the intelligence facility of the Russians, and that is the topic of concern here, is a threat to the U.S. national security or not.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentlewoman for her comments. But the reality is what she is trying to do is make our failed Cuba policy control our Russia policy. That is a mistake.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. WATERS).

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the time that has been allotted to me by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON).

I would continue his discussion and help to point to the fact that we know that the gentlewoman on the opposite side of the aisle and many others will have ongoing criticism of Castro and his policies, and it will surface on every issue possible. We know that this is a single issue with some of our colleagues; and they are determined that, whenever they have the opportunity, they are going to try and use it to once again point to what they would consider the failed policies of the Cuban government.

However, we cannot allow those kind of arguments to get in the way of our Government's ability to provide security for the people of the United States of America. The security of the American people is the first priority in our relationship with Russia.

I would like to just read to my colleagues part of a Statement of Administration Policy that will make this very clear. The administration sent us a document which says:

"We share congressional concerns about the Lourdes facility and its intelligence collection activities. However, this legislation is not likely to be an effective lever on Russian actions. The United States, like Russia, maintains a number of signals intelligence facilities around the world. One important function of such facilities for both countries is to collect information to verify arms control agreements. Successive administrations have steadfastly resisted attempts to define national technical means of verification or to circumscribe the location and use of such systems. Such a hindrance would run counter to fundamental U.S. national security interests and, in particular, to their ability to conduct arms verification. Legislation like this bill may rebound adversely to the United States by inviting Russia and other countries to pursue similar charges against U.S. facilities they characterize as threatening. Additional explanation or information relating to facilities such as Lourdes can be provided in classified briefings."

Basically what the administration is telling us is to butt out of their ability to negotiate in the best interest of this country.

We all have our peeves. We all have our dislikes. But we cannot create foreign policy on the floor of this Congress one by one based on our own narrow interests.

I will grant my colleagues and I will not try to take away from any Member their feelings about Cuba or any other country that they wish to talk about. But I would ask them to restrain from trying to dictate foreign policy and tie the hands of this Government when it gets before the Paris Club to negotiate debt relief.

I was on the floor of this Congress just a few days ago where we all agreed that we were going to do debt relief. We have given the signal to our Government which direction we want to go in. We are leaders in this world; and we have got to go to the Paris Club, and we have got to negotiate for debt relief, and we have got to have Russia's interest at heart when we do that.

Now, make no mistake about it, yes, we have facilities. God knows where our facilities are. We spy where we have to spy. We look into what we have to look into. And that is why we have such a large intelligence community.

So let us not mix up our dislike for Castro and our effort to want to continue the embargo with this bill that we have before us. This is not in the best interest of this country. I ask my colleagues to vote against it.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, before I yield to my colleague from California, I yield myself such time as I may consume to remind our colleagues on the other side that perhaps they could read the bill, and they would find out that we are not talking about the embargo, we are not talking about trade sanctions. And, yes, we do have many listening facilities, I would say to my friend from California, in the world that we are not asking anyone for debt forgiveness and rescheduling of our debt.

The difference is that in this bill we say Russia wants rescheduling of their debt, and we believe that U.S. taxpayers should have assurances that their monies are being used wisely. I think our national security is a very important consideration, and that is why we are putting these safeguards in any negotiations with the Russians about rescheduling of the debt.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, first of all, we are not talking about forgiveness here as much as rescheduling, which is again in our interest. If they default at some point, that hurts us, the lenders.

Additionally, does the gentlewoman think that our present policy with Cuba has diminished Russian influence there or increased it? It seems to me, if

they want to diminish Russian influence in Cuba, bring down the embargo and there will be less room for it.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, this bill is not about diminishing any power. This bill says national security is important to us in the United States. This bill also says that Russia owes billions of dollars to the United States, that we have a right to protect U.S. taxpayers' money by putting conditions on the forgiveness. We do have listening posts throughout the world and we are not asking anyone else to forgive our debt.

□ 1715

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROHRABACHER) who understands that this bill deals with national security and the protection of the U.S. taxpayer.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4118. I am an original cosponsor of this bill. Let us get down to some basics. I know there is a major attempt by some when discussing this bill to try to refocus the debate on something that has nothing to do with this bill, and, that is, a general policy towards Cuba. We are not discussing a general policy towards Cuba. Any attempt to focus on a general policy towards Cuba is nothing more than an effort to get people not to confront the common sense alternative and the common sense policy that is being advocated in H.R. 4118.

I would ask anyone reading the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD or listening to the debate or my colleagues on either side of the aisle to ponder this question: Does it make sense for us to offer debt relief to a country, to a regime, namely, Russia, if Russia is using the economic resources that we are then making available to them through that debt relief to finance a facility that is aimed at undercutting American security, at a facility that is aimed at gathering intelligence that will put America's military personnel in jeopardy? Does that make sense? Does it make sense for us to do a favor for someone, the Russians, giving them resources so they can spend more money to put American lives in jeopardy?

If that does not make any sense, then you should support H.R. 4118, because it makes no sense to help finance someone who is putting their money into a facility that is aimed at gathering intelligence that puts the lives of American military personnel at risk. That is as simple as it gets. I do not understand how anybody can argue on the other side, except, of course, to try to talk about the general Cuba policy to deflect a reasonable discussion on the issue.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, does the gentleman realize that one of the highest priorities of this country is to reduce and control arms in Russia? Does

the gentleman realize that we have spent a considerable amount of time and we have already rescheduled debt in the interest of helping to get rid of dangerous weapons in Russia and making this world a safer place? Does the gentleman realize that is the top priority?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Reclaiming my time, that may be a stated goal of the administration, but obviously this is the difference between goals and what reality, what comes from those goals and what is a result of the goals, in seeking the goal. Yes, we have a goal of lots of wonderful things for Russia. As long as we act like a bunch of saps, as long as we act like we can be taken advantage of, giving debt restructuring while they are doing things in a belligerent way to the United States, and providing resources for an intelligence facility in Cuba, providing hundreds of millions of dollars of resources to an intelligence facility in Cuba that puts the lives of American military personnel at risk is a belligerent act on the part of the Russian government towards the United States.

We should not reward this type of belligerence by restructuring their debt. There is no moral equivalence between an American intelligence post and that of Russia. There is no moral equivalence between a Communist dictatorship in Cuba and other democratic societies. We should not be restructuring the debt of a country that is belligerent towards us and using their money to put the lives of American military personnel at risk.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. MENENDEZ) with whom I have some differences on this particular issue, but I am so often together with him that I am very happy to yield to him.

(Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished ranking member of the committee for yielding time, even though I find this one of those occasions where I have to disagree with him.

Mr. Speaker, I know that there are people in the House who would want to paint this bill strictly about U.S.-Cuba relations. They believe it is a good time to do that. They believe it is propitious because of the set of circumstances that exists in the country and it would be easy to do so. But in my mind what this bill is about, it is about ending Cold War investments that Russia is still spending in Cuba.

I know everybody talks about let us end our Cold War mentality. Let Russia end its Cold War mentality. If any people need peace dividends more than even our citizens do, it is the Russian citizens. And clearly, the expenditures of moneys that they expend at the Lourdes spy station is in fact not a peace dividend to the people of Russia but is in fact totally unnecessary for

the purposes that they have. The Russian government's continued operation of its intelligence gathering facility at Lourdes, Cuba is used to spy not just against military and political targets but, many observers believe, against commercial and technological interests in America. Public reports reveal that Russia has, in fact, expanded and modernized the Lourdes facility in recent years. So it is not only just having something that it had, it is expanding it. And we continue to assist Russia.

I have been one of those who have believed that in fact we have to assist Russia, and I have cast my votes on behalf of assisting Russia. But, my God, do we have to assist Russia to expand their spy facilities at Lourdes against the national interests of the United States, against the national security of the United States? I think not.

Now, Russian government revenues are estimated to total about \$20 billion annually. The \$200 million or more in yearly rent paid to the Cuban regime for use of the Lourdes site, therefore, represents a significant amount of the Russian government's annual revenues. And it is an affront to be asked to support yet another rescheduling of Russia's government debt to the United States and other governments or outright forgiveness of all or part of that debt when Russia spends an estimated 1 percent of its budget to spy on American citizens from this facility alone in Cuba, just from this facility alone.

Mr. Speaker, it is long past time that the Russian government close this spy facility which represents a clear threat to the country. I certainly urge support of the gentleman's legislation. I believe it is in the national interests of the United States to do so.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, following the very eloquent words of the minority whip, I am honored to yield 5 minutes to another great patriot, the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. DELAY) our majority whip.

Mr. DELAY. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida giving me the time, and I congratulate her on bringing this bill to the floor. It is a very meaningful piece of legislation that I hope the American people will pay some attention to.

Mr. Speaker, Members should support this bill and demand accountability in our relations with Russia. The simple fact that American taxpayers are targeted by a Russian intelligence facility on Cuban soil demonstrates the predictable fruits of this administration's flawed and failed foreign policy and its alarming disregard for our national security.

The Vice President has positioned himself as the architect of our relationship with Russia. He brags about it. Those policies have been a dismal failure. Our relations with Russia have fallen to the lowest ebb than at any time since the Cold War.

It is this administration's insane contention that Russian spying from

this facility in Cuba enhances our relationship because it fosters trust. The fact that this facility remains open shows this administration's empty commitment to national security. American foreign policy should be negotiated from a position of strength, not the capitulation of appeasement.

This administration has tossed good dollars after bad to prop up failing, inefficient and corrupt institutions in Russia. For years, keeping Boris Yeltsin in office was seemingly our sole goal. The administration propped up Yeltsin at all costs as he and his cronies ransacked the government while they lined their own pockets.

Sound relations with Russia must begin with accountability. Unfortunately, the administration still has not embraced this fundamental concept. Their answer is to blindly pour more money at the problem. Clinton and GORE want to either restructure or forgive billions of dollars that Russia owes the United States.

We cannot forget that Russia's vast potential is not bound up in the destiny of any one man or one faction. Rather, success lies with the growth of those institutions that allow democracy to take root. Without the proper foundation, the Russian people will never know the blessings of a stable democracy.

Until that day comes, we must remain vigilant, and this cutting-edge spy facility is a bad sign. Many Americans will be shocked to learn that at the same time this administration is ready to write off billions of dollars that Russia owes the United States, the Russians are subsidizing Fidel Castro's evil regime with hundreds of millions of dollars.

Russia leases an intelligence gathering facility at Lourdes, Cuba. The committee reports that this annual payment may consume as much as 1 percent of Russia's entire budget. Money, of course, is fungible. Money sent to Russia for a high purpose can be misapplied to fund inappropriate activities. Intelligence gathered from this site may well be shared by Russia with regimes hostile to America. The simple cost of operating this facility alone directly benefits the most dangerous regime in our hemisphere.

We should not ask the American taxpayer to subsidize a hostile facility that is targeting the Nation from the foot of our continent. This is a regime that does evil to its people. The Russian lease for the Lourdes espionage center is an important source of hard currency for Fidel Castro.

It is strongly against our national interests to have an espionage facility actively stealing our vital national secrets, pilfering economic information, and collecting private information about individual Americans. This is simply wrong and we should not be paying for it.

Members should demand that Russia be given no economic support until this facility is out of business. They can do that by supporting this bill.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I would just like to say that we need to focus on what we are trying to do here. We are trying to run our Russia policy through Havana. If you want to reduce Russian influence in Cuba, then bring down the embargo. The reason that Cuba does so much with Russia is it does not have other alternatives. Our present Cuba policy has failed for 40 years. The idea that we come down to the floor and make all these great new charges and somehow it is going to make this failed policy work is mindless.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. POMEROY).

Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and want to follow along on his comments. As the preceding speaker, the majority whip indicated, this is not really about Russia, it is about Cuba. How I wish we could have an opportunity to discuss the full range of issues about Cuba, because the majority whip has stood singularly to stop this floor from the consideration of overturning the outdated, ineffective sanctions on the sale of food and medicine to Cuba, and he will not even let that proposal come up as proposed by the gentleman from Washington (Mr. NETHERCUTT) for full consideration of the House.

So that part of the Cuba question never comes to the floor. It is only this part, the piling-on part, the continuing of the outdated sanctions part, all inconsistent with this theme, that comes to the floor for consideration.

As to the issue before us, it is very, very bad business. Last week we marked up a foreign operations appropriations bill. The fact of the matter is we know that extension of taxpayer aid to other countries is at an all-time low relative to the size of our economy, at least in the context of recent history. So we have to have private economic opportunity flowing across the world and in the global marketplace. It will be a critical part of bringing developing countries along.

□ 1730

If any action by this Congress would push Russia into defaulting upon its debt, the ramifications would be felt far beyond Russia. They would be felt in countries like Brazil, struggling to get their economic house in order. They would be felt in countries like South Korea and Malaysia and elsewhere, as the market would contract and pull investment capital out of those developing countries.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot really think of a more unfair, unbalanced debate as what this bill introduces today, nor can I think of much that would do more to stop global development in these Third World countries and other developing countries all in the name of misguided Cuban policy.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is remaining?

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FOSSELLA). The gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) has 3½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) has 11½ minutes remaining.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time and encourage the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) to use up his time.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out to my colleagues particularly on the other side of the aisle that the Bush administration, and this facility existed throughout the entire Bush administration, did not try to interfere with international rescheduling of Russian debt or any other actions based on this that I know of and that anybody has been able to present to me.

During the Bush administration, this facility was there. They certainly did not interfere with debt, and the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN), although it is again a bill that I thought made no sense. But the President already has the authority under Helms-Burton to withhold, I think, an equal amount of money from Russia, if the President so chooses. So what we have here again is it is all driven by how do we stop Cuba, how do we stop Cuba.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEJDENSON. I yield to the gentlewoman from Florida.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, the rescheduling has started since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Clinton administration has been rescheduling the debt time and time again with no protection for the U.S. taxpayers.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, in the last 2 years of the Bush administration, they had this same \$3.1 billion of Soviet-era debt sitting around. There was several years of end to the Soviet Union. You have Helms-Burton. The fundamental problem is we have a policy that has not worked for 40 years. If we want to reduce Russian influence in Cuba, let Americans in.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. JACKSON-LEE).

(Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair would remind Members that it is not permissible to use wireless telephones or other personal electronic devices on the floor. Such devices should be disabled while in the Chamber.

Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-

LEHTINEN) is a colleague and a beloved associate here in this House.

Let me say that I am against oppression and certainly recognize that we need to join together in a bipartisan manner to address many foreign policy issues. But this legislation clearly ties the hand of the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief.

We did not do it for previous administrations, and we should not do it now. Frankly, this is debt created in Russia during Communist times. I am a Member of the Committee on Science, and we realized that the Russian government is part of the international space station.

They could not pay their bill. But we recognized in the interests of international friendship, collegiality and working together on an important initiative that this issue of the space station, we should not penalize Russia because of having fallen on hard times.

This is what this legislative initiative does. It penalizes Russia because it has fallen on hard times, and it penalizes the Commander in Chief who is attempting to create peace. What would anyone say if we passed legislation dealing with peace proceedings that I agree with, and since I am on the floor of the House, I do not know the status of it, that kept the President from acting to develop a Middle East peace agreement because we did something negative to negate those negotiations?

This legislation will negate the negotiations of helping Russia. I believe if we have concerns with the Cuban government, we need to deal with it in a sense of having widespread discussions, working with concern to the issues of those who are for Cuba or against Cuba.

Mr. Speaker, I do not believe this particular legislative initiative does this country well in terms of its national and international responsibility as a world power creating peace and not war, to pass this legislation would undermine our relationships with Russia. We do not solve the problems that I believe my friends are attempting to solve.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I will close at this point, and just rise to say that in no other part of our society would we continue to press a failed policy. Ford Motor Company dropped Edsel pretty quickly. Sony made a valiant effort to have Beta change the format, but once it was clear it did not work, they abandoned it.

Mr. Speaker, for some reason, we have continued this Cuba policy for 40 years. We have Helms-Burton that isolates us globally, and the President has to continue to waive. In that language, there is already legislation. There is language that would give the President more ability to act if he was so inclined to on this issue.

America's interests are not served by trying to drive all of our foreign policy through Havana. The United States interests in dealing with Russia, with its large nuclear force is far more important to American security than trying to even topple the government of Castro.

I would like to see Castro gone. I would like to see a democracy there. I would like to see the people of Cuba living a better standard of living. I would like to see American farmers selling the food crops and American pharmaceuticals selling them the medicine they need to give their people a better life. I would like to see an end to this policy which for 40 years has only isolated America and not isolated Castro.

Ladies and gentlemen of this Chamber, we know why we are here. This is not about Soviet-era debt and the rescheduling of it at the Paris Club, if America, and this is kind of an esoteric debate for many people, if we fail to fulfill our responsibilities of the Paris Club, if this legislation passes and would go into effect, it would remove our ability to help the poorest of the poor countries, in doing away with their debt and trying to help them alleviate poverty.

There are so many issues that America is involved in. So much of the agenda, what happens in the world, is critical to this country, but yet we continue to try to drive all of that foreign policy, all of our interests through Havana. It has not worked for 40 years, and if you keep it up for another 40, it still is not going to work.

The strongest tool in a democracy's arsenal is contact. The more contact of Cuban-Americans and other Americans with the people in Cuba, the more pressure there would be on Castro for change.

Reject this proposal. Let us start looking for a rational, bipartisan policy and not continue down this path.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), who is the esteemed chairman of the Committee on International Relations.

(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) says what we need is contact; this is the wrong kind of contact. We are talking about Russian espionage, and let me note the nature of Russian espionage that is carried out against our country.

The Sunday Times newspaper of London stated in a report on January 26, 1997 that the Lourdes base, the largest spy facility outside of Russia, is staffed by about 1,500 Russians. Intelligence reports, using satellites and high speed computers, they pick up millions of microwave transmissions every day and communicate with Russian spies operating on the American continent.

Mr. Stanislav Lunev, a former colonel in the Russian GRU military, has said the following, and I quote, "the strategic significance of the Lourdes facility has grown dramatically since the secret order from Russian Federation President Yeltsin of 7 February 1996 demanding that Russian intelligence community step up the theft of American and other western economic and trade secrets. It currently represents a formidable and ominous threat to the U.S. national security, as well as the American economy and infrastructure."

Mr. Speaker, one other report is *Izvestiya*, the Russian newspaper, November 1998, the Russian intelligence facility in Lourdes, Cuba "provides between 60 percent and 70 percent of all Russian intelligence data about the United States."

These are the kind of contacts we are concerned about, not the diplomatic contacts. We are concerned about Russian espionage against our Nation.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to close on the bill with the remaining time, and I would like to thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), as well as the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), who has always been very cooperative in our Committee on International Relations, and we have enjoyed bipartisan support on a myriad of issues, including this one, in spite of the tone and tenor and rhetoric of the debate on the floor.

It is a bipartisan bill. This bill is not about the trade embargo. It is not about economic sanctions. It is about Russian espionage. It is about protecting U.S. national security. It helps prevent the theft of political diplomatic and commercial secrets. It protects the American people.

It protects the taxpayers from bearing the burden once and again of Russia's failure to pay its debt, and it upholds congressional priorities regarding fiscal responsibility and exerts congressional oversight over foreign policy priorities.

I will continue to work on my good friend, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) and have the gentleman see the light about what this bill does, and what, in fact, it does not do.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 4118, the Russian-American Trust and Cooperation Act of 2000. I am proud to be an original cosponsor of this measure, which was introduced by my good friend from Florida, Representative ROS-LEHTINEN, in March of this year. The point of this bill is clear: United States taxpayers should not have to subsidize espionage activities directed against them, or help to fund the repressive Castro dictatorship.

Right now, more than 1,500 Russian engineers, technicians, and military personnel are stationed at an intelligence base in Lourdes, Cuba where they are using tracking dishes, satellites, and other equipment to intercept

telephone calls, faxes, and computer communications within the United States. This espionage facility—the largest operated by Russia outside the former Soviet Union—was used to obtain sensitive military information during Operation Desert Storm, and is now being used to collect personal information about U.S. citizens. The Russian government has spent more than \$3 billion to modernize and operate that base.

The Lourdes spy base is also a large source of revenue for the Castro regime. The Government of Russia pays Fidel Castro somewhere between \$100 to \$300 million per year to lease the facility.

The bill before us today makes clear that the United States does not want to underwrite this highly improper and destructive activity. The bill prohibits the President from forgiving any bilateral debt owed by Russia to the United States until he can certify that Russia has closed down the Lourdes spy base. It also requires that the President report to Congress on actions taken by Russia to terminate its activities at Lourdes, and on U.S. efforts to verify those actions. The bill also grants the President authority to waive the debt forgiveness prohibition if he determines that such waiver is in the national interest of the United States.

If the government of Russia wants the United States to forgive its debts, then it should first stop squandering its limited resources on efforts to spy on U.S. citizens, and to prop up the bankrupt dictatorship in Havana. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.

Pursuant to House Resolution 555, the previous question is ordered on the bill, as amended.

The question is on engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT OFFERED BY MR. GEJDENSON

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from Connecticut opposed to the bill?

Mr. GEJDENSON. Yes, I am, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. GEJDENSON moves to recommit the bill H.R. 4118 to the Committee on International Relations with instructions to establish a bipartisan national commission to study and report to the President on the exercise of the presidential waiver in section 3(b)(2) of the bill with regard to United States national interests in the context of other possible actions (including changes in United States policy toward Cuba) and provide that the restriction contained in section 3(a) of the bill on rescheduling or forgiving debt owed by the Government of the Russian Federation to the United States shall become effective only after the date on which the commission submits such report to the President.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion to recommit.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Speaker, I would just say to my colleagues I will not use my entire 5 minutes, but say to the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN), who I get along with very well, and we have worked together on many issues, she said she wanted to let the light in.

Mr. Speaker, I am giving her a chance here with this motion to recommit to let the light in. What this motion simply does it creates a bipartisan commission to take a look at the best way to take care of our interests in this area.

I think it is clear that if we want to diminish Russia's interests in Cuba, if we want to increase America's interests in Cuba, if we want to increase American national security, then we will vote for this commission to give us a chance to examine the policy, to figure out what is really best for the United States. For 40 years we have not made progress, but only to isolate America.

Let us end the isolation. Let us let the light in. Support this motion to recommit. It is a bipartisan study. The leadership of this Congress is Republican. My colleagues have plenty of voice. Let us not keep us in the dark, let America see where the light is and it is in a new Cuba policy.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak against the motion.

Mr. Speaker, this motion, in effect, kills the bill. If my good friend from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) was so enamored of this amendment, he should have offered it in the committee stage, and he did not.

The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON) crafted the waiver he seeks to amend. It is his very language that is in the bill, now he is amending that. This is not a Cuba study commission bill.

The other side wants to hide. They want to ignore. They want to confuse the very real and imminent and growing threat posed by the Lourdes facility, and that is, in fact, what this bill does.

It is not about sanctions. It is not about U.S. Cuba policy. It is about Russian espionage, and it is about protection of the U.S. taxpayer.

□ 1745

A very similar proposal that my good friend, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), is proposing today was soundly defeated just a few short weeks ago in the Senate, after it became abundantly clear that such a commission is nothing more than a waste of the taxpayers' money; that it would be a waste of time and effort given that it duplicates the role that we exert in the U.S. Congress through hearings, through briefings, through meetings, legislation on this issue.

Ironically, this proposal even infringes upon the existing authority of the President and the executive agencies which on a regular basis make modifications to export controls and

other regulations that guide U.S. policy toward any government, especially the Castro regime.

However, what is astonishing about this attempt is the apparent willingness of the minority to appease the brutal tyrant who rules Cuba with an iron grip, the willingness of the minority to sacrifice the safety, the privacy, and security of the American people. I know the minority does not want that. Our constituents expect us to defend their interests, to defend their hard-earned dollars, and we should not be using it for the purpose of appeasing a dictator who is a declared enemy of the United States. It is inconceivable to see my colleagues on the other side go to this extreme.

We have had many blue ribbon committees and commissions studying the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations and other issues. In fact, right now in Havana is a delegation, and they will be reporting back to the Committee on Ways and Means in a few months about lifting sanctions and other issues. The Council on Foreign Relations headed by Bernie Aaronson had this similar proposal just a few months ago. We have had countless commissions and countless task forces and blue ribbon groups studying this ad nauseam, and I do not think that the taxpayers want to see their funds used and manipulated in this way.

Mr. Speaker, I yield the remaining time to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. MENENDEZ) to speak on this motion.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I have to oppose the motion to recommit of the distinguished gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), and the reason I do so is I do not believe that this body should delegate to any entity its powers and its rights to have a bipartisan commission on any issue.

We are the representatives elected by the people of the United States to make crucial policy decisions, including decisions in foreign policy; not some unelected group of individuals chosen maybe because of their economic interests in this issue. And the fact of the matter is I do not believe that we should abrogate our powers and our responsibilities as legislators to any unelected commission to determine foreign policy. Let us have a commission on the Middle East; let us have a commission on a whole host of other places in the world. The fact of the matter is that would not be the course of events that we should pursue, and I urge my colleagues to reject the motion to recommit.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remaining time to the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN), the chairman of the Committee on International Relations.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms.

ROS-LEHTINEN) for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to recommit with instructions because I do not believe that it is germane to the underlying bill. This measure addresses a very real threat to American security and privacy posed by the operation of a sophisticated Russian eavesdropping facility in Cuba. These days our papers are filled with articles that debate Internet privacy. I wonder how many Americans are aware that the Russians are operating an electronic spy center in our own backyard violating the very privacy of communications in our Nation each and every day.

I regret that our good friend, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. GEJDENSON), has offered this motion which seeks to divert attention to a separate issue, our U.S.-Cuba relations. Let us stick to the subject before us. This bill is about Russian debt relief and Russian espionage. Let us not try to look away from this issue by way of the motion to recommit.

I remind our colleagues this is Russian espionage. Vote against the motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FOSSELLA). All time having expired, without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.

The motion to recommit was rejected.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 275, nays 146, not voting 13, as follows:

[Roll No. 414]

YEAS—275

Aderholt	Blunt	Coble
Andrews	Boehlert	Coburn
Archer	Boehner	Collins
Armey	Bonilla	Combest
Bachus	Bono	Condit
Baker	Borski	Cook
Ballenger	Boyd	Cooksey
Barcia	Bryant	Costello
Barr	Burr	Cox
Barrett (NE)	Burton	Crane
Bartlett	Buyer	Crowley
Bass	Callahan	Cubin
Bateman	Calvert	Cunningham
Bentsen	Camp	Danner
Bereuter	Canady	Davis (FL)
Berkley	Cannon	Davis (VA)
Biggert	Capps	Deal
Bilbray	Castle	DeFazio
Bilirakis	Chabot	DeLay
Bishop	Chambliss	DeMint
Bliley	Chenoweth-Hage	Deutsch

Diaz-Balart	Kingston	Roukema
Dickey	Knollenberg	Royce
Doolittle	Kolbe	Ryan (WI)
Doyle	Kuykendall	Ryun (KS)
Dreier	LaHood	Salmon
Duncan	Lampson	Sandlin
Dunn	Largent	Sanford
Ehlers	Latham	Saxton
Ehrlich	LaTourette	Scarborough
Emerson	Leach	Schaffer
English	Lewis (CA)	Sensenbrenner
Etheridge	Lewis (KY)	Sessions
Everett	Linder	Shadegg
Ewing	Lipinski	Shaw
Fletcher	LoBiondo	Shays
Foley	Lucas (KY)	Sherwood
Forbes	Lucas (OK)	Shimkus
Fossella	Manzullo	Shows
Fowler	Martinez	Shuster
Franks (NJ)	Mascara	Simpson
Frelinghuysen	McCarthy (NY)	Sisisky
Galleghy	McCollum	Skeen
Ganske	McCrery	Skelton
Gekas	McHugh	Smith (MI)
Gephardt	McInnis	Smith (NJ)
Gibbons	McIntyre	Smith (TX)
Gilchrest	McKeon	Souder
Gillmor	Menendez	Spence
Gilman	Metcalf	Stabenow
Goode	Mica	Stearns
Goodlatte	Miller (FL)	Stenholm
Goodling	Miller, Gary	Strickland
Gordon	Moore	Stump
Goss	Moran (KS)	Stupak
Graham	Moran (VA)	Sununu
Granger	Morella	Sweeney
Green (TX)	Myrick	Talent
Green (WI)	Nethercutt	Tancredo
Greenwood	Ney	Tauzin
Gutknecht	Northup	Taylor (MS)
Hall (OH)	Norwood	Taylor (NC)
Hall (TX)	Nussle	Terry
Hansen	Ortiz	Thomas
Hastings (WA)	Ose	Thornberry
Hayes	Oxley	Thune
Hayworth	Packard	Thurman
Hefley	Pallone	Tiahrt
Hergert	Pascarell	Toomey
Hill (MT)	Paul	Traficant
Hobson	Pease	Turner
Hoeffel	Peterson (MN)	Upton
Hoekstra	Peterson (PA)	Vitter
Holden	Petri	Walden
Holt	Phelps	Walsh
Hooley	Pickering	Wamp
Horn	Pitts	Watkins
Hostettler	Pombo	Watts (OK)
Hulshof	Porter	Weldon (FL)
Hunter	Portman	Weldon (PA)
Hutchinson	Pryce (OH)	Weller
Hyde	Quinn	Wexler
Isakson	Radanovich	Weygand
Istook	Ramstad	Whitfield
Jenkins	Regula	Wicker
Johnson, Sam	Reynolds	Wilson
Jones (NC)	Riley	Wise
Kasich	Rogan	Wolf
Kelly	Rogers	Wu
Kennedy	Rohrabacher	Young (AK)
Kildee	Ros-Lehtinen	Young (FL)
King (NY)	Rothman	

NAYS—146

Abercrombie	Cramer	Hilliard
Ackerman	Cummings	Hinchev
Allen	Davis (IL)	Hinojosa
Baird	DeGette	Houghton
Baldacci	Delahunt	Hoyer
Baldwin	DeLauro	Inslee
Barrett (WI)	Dicks	Jackson (IL)
Becerra	Dingell	Jackson-Lee
Berman	Dixon	(TX)
Berry	Doggett	Jefferson
Blagojevich	Dooley	John
Blumenauer	Edwards	Johnson (CT)
Bonior	Engel	Johnson, E. B.
Boucher	Eshoo	Jones (OH)
Brady (PA)	Evans	Kanjorski
Brown (FL)	Farr	Kaptur
Brown (OH)	Fattah	Kilpatrick
Capuano	Filner	Kind (WI)
Cardin	Ford	Klecza
Carson	Frank (MA)	Klink
Clay	Frost	Kucinich
Clayton	Gejdenson	LaFalce
Clement	Gonzalez	Lantos
Clyburn	Gutierrez	Larson
Conyers	Hastings (FL)	Lee
Coyne	Hill (IN)	Levin

Lewis (GA)	Neal	Scott
Lofgren	Oberstar	Serrano
Loewen	Obey	Sherman
Luther	Olver	Slaughter
Maloney (CT)	Owens	Snyder
Maloney (NY)	Pastor	Stark
Markey	Payne	Tanner
Matsui	Pelosi	Tauscher
McCarthy (MO)	Pickett	Thompson (CA)
McDermott	Pomeroy	Thompson (MS)
McGovern	Price (NC)	Tierney
McKinney	Rahall	Towns
McNulty	Rangel	Udall (CO)
Meehan	Reyes	Udall (NM)
Meek (FL)	Rivers	Velazquez
Meeks (NY)	Rodriguez	Visclosky
Millender-	Roemer	Waters
McDonald	Roybal-Allard	Watt (NC)
Miller, George	Rush	Waxman
Minge	Sabo	Weiner
Mink	Sanchez	Woolsey
Moakley	Sanders	Wynn
Mollohan	Sawyer	
Nadler	Schakowsky	

NOT VOTING—13

Baca	Hilleary	Smith (WA)
Barton	Lazio	Spratt
Boswell	McIntosh	Vento
Brady (TX)	Murtha	
Campbell	Napolitano	

□ 1810

Ms. SANCHEZ and Mrs. MINK of Hawaii changed their vote from "yea" to "nay."

Mr. PHELPS and Mr. CROWLEY changed their vote from "nay" to "yea."

So the bill was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. BRADY of Texas. Mr. Speaker, on roll-call No. 414. I was inadvertently detained and was not recorded. Had I been present, I would have voted "yea."

□

APPOINTMENT ON CONFEREES ON H.R. 4577, DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND EDUCATION, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2001

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 4577) making appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes, with a Senate amendment thereto, disagree to the Senate amendment, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MOTION TO INSTRUCT OFFERED BY MR. OBEY

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct conferees.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FOSSELLA). The Clerk will report the motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. OBEY moves that the managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the bill, H.R. 4577, be instructed to insist on no

less than the \$42,674,645,000 in the Senate amendment for the Department of Education which provides an increase of \$179,999,000 over the President's budget request; no less than \$7,353,141,000 in the Senate amendment for the Individuals with Disabilities Act to help fulfill the commitment the House of Representatives made on May 3, 2000 in adopting H.R. 4055, the IDEA Full Funding Act of 2000; no less than \$8,692,000,000 in the Senate amendment for the Pell Grant Program to provide a maximum Pell grant award of \$3,650; no less than \$6,267,000,000 in the Senate amendment for the Head Start Program which provides the President's budget request; no less than \$817,328,000 in the Senate amendment for the Child Care Development Block Grant which provides the President's budget request for fiscal year 2001; and no less than \$20,512,735,000 in the Senate amendment for the National Institutes of Health which provides an increase of \$2,723,399,000 over the President's budget request; and to insist on disagreeing with provisions in the Senate amendment which deny the President's request for dedicated resources to reduce class sizes in the early grades and for local school construction and, instead, broadly expands the Title VI Education Block Grant with limited accountability in the use of funds.

Mr. OBEY (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the motion be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

□ 1815

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. FOSSELLA). The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. OBEY) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PORTER) each will control 30 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. OBEY).

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this motion to instruct is very simple. It says that the conferees should bring back a Labor-HHS-Education conference report that provides the increased funding in the Senate bill for the Department of Education in total and for several key programs such as special education, Pell grants, Head Start, child care, the National Institutes of Health.

The Senate provides a total of \$42.6 billion for the Department of Education. That is \$3.1 billion over the bill passed by the House. This motion instructs the conferees to provide at least every single one of the dollars that the Senate has added.

Included within the overall total is \$7.3 billion for special education authorized under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act.

Mr. Speaker, let me simply say that this motion to instruct with respect to special education would result in an increase of \$803 million in additional spending over the House bill for that item.

I would point out when the House adopted on May 3 of this year H.R. 4055, the IDEA Full Funding Act of 2000, it promised to provide an increase of \$2