

speaks volumes about North Korea's ability to wear down and outflank U.S. negotiators.

For years it was the Clinton Administration's policy that it would end the U.S. embargo of North Korea only in connection with a binding agreement in which North Korea promised to end missile proliferation. The prospect of ending the embargo was the principal inducement that the U.S. negotiators had to offer the North Koreans for such a deal.

But on August 31, 1998, North Korea test fired a three-stage long range Taepo Dong missile across Japan, and the Japanese became very angry. So angry, in fact that they threatened to end their financial support of the Agreed Framework with North Korea—the 1994 agreement in which the Clinton Administration promised to give North Korea two advanced nuclear reactors worth approximately \$5 billion in exchange for a "freeze" of North Korea's nuclear program.

The Clinton Administration became so alarmed about the risk of Japanese withdrawal from the Agreed Framework that it made the prevention of any more missile tests by North Korea its highest priority. Over the next year, the Administration negotiated diligently, and on September 12, 1999, it announced that North Korea had agreed to a temporary moratorium on further missile tests. In exchange for the moratorium, the Clinton Administration pledged that it would end the U.S. embargo of North Korea.

The Administration had, in other words, given away its leverage on the issue of missile proliferation for a temporary deal on missile testing. The U.S. negotiators charged with getting an agreement ending North Korean proliferation were left with no meaningful inducements to offer the North Koreans.

The Clinton Administration did not immediately end the embargo. For nine months, it held off doing so in the hope that a promised "high level visitor" from North Korea would come to the United States to formalize the moratorium on missile testing. No such visitor ever materialized, and the moratorium was never formalized, but on June 19, 2000, the Administration relented and ended the embargo anyway. In exchange, the North Koreans agreed to participate in another round of talks about missile proliferation.

The U.S. negotiators went to the talks with no meaningful inducements to offer, so the North Koreans boldly requested one: they offered to stop missile proliferation in exchange for \$1 billion per year in cash from the United States.

The U.S. negotiators rejected this offer out of hand, but the North Korean request illustrates a broader truth: now that the Clinton Administration has effectively normalized economic relations with North Korea, it will have to come up with some other massive bribe in order to make progress on missile proliferation. Such a bribe can only help shore up the North Korean regime and strengthen its grip on power.

The North Korea Nonproliferation Act tries to overcome this dilemma by restoring the linkage between normalized economic relations with the United States and good behavior by North Korea with regard to proliferation. The bill does not reverse the Administration's decision to end the embargo, but it would require reimposition of the embargo in two circumstances: (1) if North Korea violates the missile testing moratorium, or (2) if it pro-

liferates to a state sponsor of terrorism or a country that has tested long range missiles built with North Korean goods or technology.

The legislation provides the President a national interest waiver that he may exercise to promptly terminate the embargo of North Korea if it is reimposed pursuant to this legislation.

The effect of the legislation, therefore, is to underscore to the North Koreans that they cannot continue to proliferate dangerous weapons technologies to the world's most odious governments without paying a price in their relationship with the United States.

I am pleased to be joined in offering this legislation by some of the leaders within the Congress on the issue of proliferation: Congressman ED MARKEY (D-MA), co-chair of the House Nonproliferation Task Force, Congressman JOE KNOLLENBERG (R-MI), and Congressman FRANK PALLONE (D-NJ).

SUMMARY OF H.R. 4860

NORTH KOREA NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000

1. Reports to Congress.—The President shall submit a report to Congress every six months identifying all instances in which there is credible information that North Korea has—

(a) taken an action inconsistent with North Korea's obligations under—

(1) the agreement with the United States of September 12, 1999, to suspend launches of long range missiles, or

(2) any future international agreement in which North Korea agreed to limits on its testing, deployment, or proliferation of missiles or missile technology; and

(b) transferred to a foreign country, on or after the date of enactment, goods, services, or technology listed on a nonproliferation control list (i.e., NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, CWC, and Wassenaar control lists).

2. Discretionary Reimposition of Sanctions.—The President is authorized to reimpose any or all of the restrictions on commerce with North Korea that were in place under the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Department of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations prior to September 12, 1999, if a semi-annual report to Congress under this Act indicates that there is credible information that, on or after the date of enactment, North Korea transferred to a foreign country goods, services, or technology listed on a nonproliferation control list (i.e., NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, CWC, and Wassenaar control lists).

3. Mandatory Reimposition of Sanctions.—In addition, the president shall reimpose all of the restrictions on commerce with North Korea that were in place under the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Department of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations prior to September 12, 1999, within 10 days of submitting a semiannual report to Congress under this Act indicating that there is credible information that North Korea has—

(a) taken an action inconsistent with North Korea's obligations under—

(1) the agreement with the United States of September 12, 1999, to suspend launches of long range missiles, or

(2) any future international agreement in which North Korea agreed to limits on its testing, deployment, or proliferation of missiles or missile technology; or

(b) transferred, on or after the date of enactment, goods, services, or technology listed on a nonproliferation control list (i.e., NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, CWC, and Wassenaar control lists) to—

(1) any country listed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, or

(2) any country that has tested a long-range missile incorporating goods or technology knowingly transferred to such government by North Korea.

4. Determination that North Korea Did Not Knowingly Act.—In the case of any action by North Korea that otherwise would require the President to reimpose restrictions on commerce with North Korea, that requirement shall cease to apply if the President determines and reports to Congress that there is substantial doubt that North Korea knowingly took that action.

5. National Interest Waiver.—In any instance in which the President was required by this Act to reimpose restrictions on commerce with North Korea, he may, not less than 30 days after reimposing such restrictions, and following consultation with Congress, waive the continued imposition of such restrictions if he determines and reports to Congress that such waiver is important to U.S. national security interests of the United States.

6. Authorities of the President if North Korea Enters a Binding International Agreement Regarding Missile Proliferation.—If North Korea enters a binding international agreement that satisfies United States concerns regarding the transfer by North Korea to other countries of missiles and missile technology, the President is authorized to—

(a) support the commercial launch in the United States or other countries of satellites for North Korea; and

(b) waive sanctions that are in place against North Korea pursuant to U.S. missile technology and other nonproliferation legislation.

TRIBUTE TO DR. PATRICIA GABOW ON RECEIVING THE 2000 DR. NATHAN DAVIS AWARD

HON. SCOTT McINNIS

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 18, 2000

Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Speaker, it is a privilege and an honor to have this opportunity to pay tribute to Patricia A. Gabow, MD, for receiving the 2000 Dr. Nathan Davis Award presented by the American Medical Association. Dr. Gabow's work as CEO and Medical Director of Denver Health has earned her recognition as one of our nation's most committed proponents for the medically underserved and deserves the praise and recognition of this body.

If ever there were a person who embodied the spirit and service of the medical profession, it is Dr. Gabow. Dr. Gabow received her medical degree from the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine. She began her medical career in Denver in 1973, when she joined the staff of Denver Health and Hospitals as Chief of the Renal Division. Throughout her medical career, Dr. Gabow has received worldwide recognition as an authority on renal disease, however it is her leadership in developing health care programs for Colorado's underserved that have made her worthy of this eminent award.

Perhaps one of her most prestigious accomplishments was when Dr. Gabow assisted the Denver Health Medical Center overcome a \$36 million deficit to expand their services to Medicaid patients, namely the underserved children of the community. This triumph nearly doubled the amount of Medicaid recipients served at a time when other health care facilities were struggling to assist other patients.

Not only has Dr. Gabow helped foster strong care giving facilities, but she has also been influential in community health programs, AIDS prevention and treatment, and infectious disease control, just to name a few.

As Dr. Gabow celebrates her award, Mr. Speaker, I salute her dedication to public service. My thanks to her on a job well done. Congratulations!

MEMORIAL DAY SPEECH BY MIKE CARONE, KOREAN WAR VETERAN

HON. DONALD A. MANZULLO

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 18, 2000

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, on Memorial Day 2000, a constituent and Korean war veteran, Mr. Mike Carone, gave the following speech during ceremonies in McHenry, Illinois:

On June 25 of this year, it will be 50 years since Truman's police action—the Korean War—began. It lasted three years, until July 27, 1953, when an armistice was affected by President Eisenhower.

It was a United Nations action that included 20 countries. We were a major participant with seven Army divisions, four Army regiments and one Marine division on the ground with participation from both Navy and Air Force. One-and-a-half million Americans served in Korea during the three years of the war, and 200,000 of them engaged in combat during that period.

It signaled the beginning of the end of communist expansion in Asia and the end of the Cold War because we actively resisted and stood our ground. The United Nations, including the South Korean Army, lost one-quarter million lives. Thirty-six thousand American lives were lost in combat, of which over 4,000 were Marines. Total United Nations wounded totaled over one million. Over 100,000 Americans were wounded in action, of which 24,000 were Marines.

Today, there are still 8,100 Americans missing in action.

Hardly a police action.

I dare say there is hardly a page or even a paragraph written about the Korean War in the history books our children read.

I was getting out of Marine boot camp at Parris Island when it started and remember the drill instructors trying to find out where Korea was at. Korea was called the "Forgotten War" because it started five years after the Second World War and our country was in a peacetime mode. World War II vets came home, got a job, got married, bought a house and car and had babies. But the Russian and Korean communists, with approval of the Chinese communists, were not in a peacetime but an aggressive expansionist mode and invaded South Korea.

Our country at that time was war-weary and, after the Korean War started, wanted it to end quickly so they (we) could forget it. That wasn't the communist plan, and the Chinese entered the war with infinite human resources. Over 1,000,000 communist forces lost their lives, and they failed to expand communism in Asia.

I was a machine gunner in ACO 1st Battalion 5th Regiment of the 1st Marine Division from January 1951 to January 1952 and earned four Battle Stars. Many Marines were killed and wounded during that year. It was and is Marine Corps tradition that our dead and wounded are never left behind—sometimes at the cost of the living.

I remember when our battalion would be relieved for a few days rest, sometimes every

one-and-a-half to three months. We would assemble in formation, and the names of those killed-in-action during the previous engagement would be read. Sometimes it took 10 minutes, and other times it would take 45 minutes to read the list. Then the bugler would sound taps to honor the dead as we will do later today.

I, like many Korean War veterans, eventually returned to civilian life, got a job, got married, went to college, bought a house, had kids and tried to put the war experiences behind us but could never forget our buddies who were killed or later died of their wounds.

Thirty years after the Korean War, I could no longer suppress those memories and became active in veteran organizations and attempted to find those Marines that I served with in the Korean War. I have found some of them, we talked about those war experiences we shared and tried to put to rest those memories.

Today, 49 years after the Korean War, those war experiences have dimmed, but I shall never forget those I knew who gave their lives in many of the battles in that far-away land so long ago.

In conclusion, let us never forget those who gave their lives in that forgotten war who were never forgotten by their families and buddies, and that they be remembered by us along with all the American veterans who gave their lives in all the wars our country fought in defense of our freedom.

INTERNET GAMBLING PROHIBITION ACT OF 2000

SPEECH OF

HON. RON PAUL

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 17, 2000

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000 for several reasons. The bill threatens Internet privacy, invites Federal Government regulation of the Internet and tramples States' rights.

H.R. 3125 establishes a precedent for Federal content regulation of the Internet. By opening this Pandora's box, supporters of the bill ignore the unintended consequences. The principle will be clearly established that the Federal Government should intervene in Internet expression. This principle could be argued in favor of restrictions on freedom of expression and association. Disapprove of gambling? Let the government step in and ban it on the Internet! Minority rights are obviously threatened by majority whims.

The bill calls for Federal law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to expand surveillance in order to enforce the proposed law. In order to enforce this bill (should it become law), law enforcement would have to obtain access to an individual's computer to know if one is gambling online. Perhaps Internet Service Providers can be enlisted as law enforcement agents in the same way that bank tellers are forced to spy on their customers under the Bank Secrecy Act? It was this sort of intrusion that caused such a popular backlash against the "Know Your Customer" proposal.

Several States have already addressed the issue, and Congress should recognize States' rights. The definition of "gambling" in the bill appears narrow but could be "reinterpreted" to

include online auctions or even day trading (a different sort of gambling). Those individuals who seek out such thrills will likely soon find a good substitute which will justify the next round of federal Internet regulation.

AN ETHICAL QUESTION FOR HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CORPORATIONS

HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 18, 2000

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, today I speak about the question: should hospitals and medical corporations be held to a higher standard of ethics and social responsibility than other corporations? To answer this important question I refer to the Constitution of the United States. In the Preamble we read that the basis of this great country rests in part in the words "promote the general Welfare." This is the essence of what we are about and what should be considered in all moral and ethical arguments concerning public policy. I will use this premise in my answer to the question: Should hospitals and medical corporations be held to a higher standard of ethics and social responsibility than other corporations?

From the earliest written history the role of the "healer"—or medical doctor in our modern terms had a special role. The Code of Hammurabi, which was practiced in Sumeria and Babylonia, clearly stipulated the physical penalties to be inflicted on the "healer" in cases of failed surgery. For example the Code states, "If a doctor operates on the eye of a gentleman, who loses his eye as a consequence, the hands [of the doctor] shall be cut off." This is a clear statement of medical responsibility and its consequences.

This is indicative of the value of human life and special responsibility of physicians. The Hippocratic Oath, taken by medical doctors at the end of their medical studies, states existence of a special relationship between the patient and the physician. In previous times, the physician was held in great respect, not because of the economic status, but because of the respect for the learned arts that the physician was trained in. This is the basis of the unique relationship between the patient and the "healer."

I am greatly concerned that in recent times this special relationship between the patient and the physician has radically changed. For example, I cite the concept of a distributive ethic which is widely promoted and used by health maintenance organizations. The distributive ethic may be stated as the principle to provide the greatest good for the greatest number of patients within the allotted budget. The problem is that it is not possible to simultaneously provide optimal care for an individual patient and for the entire group of patients at the same time. This is an example of the change in the relationship between the patient and the physician that has occurred with the development of our new business models to deliver health care; i.e. HMO's.

An example of the business practices of HMO's that are in conflict with the former respectful, sacred relationship between the patient and the healer is the use of a fixed sum of money for the annual care of a group of patients. If the physician can reduce the referrals