appeared for a deposition held in the conference room of the Office of Independent Counsel on August 26. She was interviewed pursuant to her immunity agreement with independent counsel and FBI agents on September 5. She was also interviewed—excuse me; that was September 3. She appeared and listened to tapes with the FBI present on many occasions during the period September 3 through September 6. She appeared and was interviewed by special counsel, independent counsel, on September 7 and September 5 and September 6.

So it raises a question as to whether or not the desire to interview Monica Lewinsky stems from a desire to resolve conflicts that she has with other people, because certainly these occasions gave the lawyers for the independent counsel an opportunity to do so.

I would simply submit that within the bounds of ethical behavior, I am sure, because I respect the professionalism of the House managers, but I would suspect that one of the reasons they want to inquire of Ms. Lewinsky is not to resolve discrepancies and disputes, it is to perhaps challenge her testimony when it is helpful to the President and perhaps bolster her testimony when it is not helpful to the President. The House managers are not neutral investigators, they are neutral interrogators.

It raises questions about what the managers' true purpose is in calling Vernon Jordan and Betty Currie forward as witnesses, what they want to inquire about if they conduct an interview of them. I suggest that this is also a bit of a fishing expedition, looking for evidence that will be damaging to the President.

We are not afraid of witnesses, but we do want fairness, and we don't think it is fair in this process. If you are going to have a real trial, then we want to have a real defense, and to have a real defense requires real discovery and real opportunity to have access to documents and witnesses and evidence that has been in the custody and the control of the House of Representatives, that has never been made available to us, that is in the custody and control of the Office of Independent Counsel, that has not been made available to us.

I suggest, as we have seen from the statements made by the managers to this body yesterday and today about Vernon Jordan suggesting—actually suggesting that he did not tell the truth when he testified numerous times before the grand jury, which is an outrageous suggestion, and suggesting, which happened today—implying that he destroyed evidence, which not even the independent counsel had suggested, they seek to do nothing more than to attack, attack, attack the best friend of the United States, the President of the United States, and his personal secretary.

That is the reason they want to talk to these people. I think it is an improper reason. It is wanting to win too much. I don't think the U.S. Senate should be part of it.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators HAGEL, ABRAHAM, and HATCH to the House managers:

White House counsel has indicated their opposition to calling witnesses, asserting that calling witnesses would not shed light on the facts and would unnecessarily prolong the proceedings. But it is the responsibility of the Senate to find the truth. And if any Senators reasonably believe that hearing witnesses would assist in finding the truth, why shouldn't they be called?

Mr. Manager MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

''Methinks thou doth protest too much.'' I think that is what White House counsel has been doing. I don't know why, but they, frankly, don't want witnesses. They don't want what you normally have in a trial. We can paint this with any kinds of colors you want to have, but a trial without witnesses, when it involves a criminal accusation, a criminal matter, is not a true trial; it really isn't. It is not what I think of, and I guarantee it is not what any of my friends sitting over here who have been counsel, prosecutors and defense lawyers, think of. It is remotely conceivable, but certainly not where you have had the inferences and the conclusions that we draw logically from the entire sequence of events that are painted from the very day when the President got word of Monica Lewinsky being on the witness list, and all the way through his testimony in the Jones case, all the way through the grand jury testimony, when they challenge every inference that you should logically draw from the record, and then suggest that, oh, but we should not have anybody in here; so you who are going to judge ultimately whether our representations are persuasive or not about those inferences, whether you should be able to judge—and I think you should—what the witnesses actually are saying.

I will give you one illustration. I don't know how many times—two or three times—I put up here on the board, or I have said to you—and I know a couple of my colleagues said to you—that during the discussion with regard to the affidavit that Monica Lewinsky had in front of the grand jury, she explicitly said: No, the President didn't tell me to lie, but he didn't discourage me either. He didn't encourage me or discourage me.

You need to have her say that to you. They have even been whacking away at that, confusing everything they can, talking about the job searches at the same time they are talking about the affidavit, what she said here, there, or anywhere else. Witnesses are a logical thing. There are a lot of conflicts that are here.

When we get to the point—which we presume we will get that opportunity to do—to argue our case on why we should have witnesses, maybe Monday or perhaps Tuesday—I think that even though you have a motion to dismiss, we will get that chance—we will lay out a lot of these things. There are a lot of them out there. But the point is, overall, you need to have the witnesses to judge what any trier of fact judges about any one of these.

I would be happy to yield to Mr. GRAHAM or Mr. ROGAN if they wish—neither one. That is fair enough.

Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, it now approaches the hour that we had indicated we would conclude our work on Saturday. There may still be some questions that Senators would like to have offered. I have talked to Senator DASCHLE.

One suggestion made is that maybe on Monday we would ask that questions could be submitted for the RECORD in writing. I think that is a common practice. We don't want to cut it off. At this point, I would not be prepared to do that. But I would like to suggest that we go ahead and conclude our business today, and if there is a need by a Senator on either side to have another question, or two or three, we will certainly consult with each other and see how we can handle that, perhaps on Monday, and even see if it would be appropriate to prepare a motion with regard to being able to submit questions for the RECORD, which would be answered. We would not want to abuse that and cause that to be a protracted process.

In view of the time spent here—in fact, we have had around 106 questions, and we are about 10 hours into this now—I think we should conclude for this Saturday. We will resume at 1 p.m. on Monday and continue in accordance with the provisions of S. Res. 16. I will update all Members as to the specific schedule when it becomes clear.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that in the RECORD following today's proceedings there appear a period of morning business to accommodate bills and statements that have been submitted during the day by Senators. I thank my colleagues for their attentiveness during the proceedings.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. MONDAY, JANUARY 25, 1999

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

Mr. HARKIN. I object.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I seek recognition.

The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the motion to adjourn.

The motion was agreed to.

Thereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Monday, January 25, 1999, at 1 p.m.

(The following statements were submitted at the desk during today's session:)

LEADER'S LECTURE SERIES

● Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, in the past several months, through the Leader's Lecture Series, we have been honored to hear from some of America's most outstanding leaders. Speaking just down the hall in the stately Old Senate Chamber, these distinguished guests have shared recollections and observations of life in the Senate, in politics, in this great country. Their imparted wisdom allows us not only to add to the historical archive of this institution, but also to gain perspective on our own roles here. As sponsor of the series and a student of recent history, I am especially appreciative of their participation.

At the conclusion of each Congress, the Senate will publish the collected addresses of these respected speakers and make them available to the public. But their words should be recorded prior to that time. For this reason, Mr. President, I now request that the presentations of our most recent lectures—former President George Bush, who was here Wednesday night, and Senator ROBERT BYRD of West Virginia, who spoke in the fall—be printed in the RECORD.

The material follows:

REMARKS BY U.S. SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD: THE SENATE'S HISTORIC ROLE IN TIMES OF CRISIS

Clio being my favorite muse, let me begin this evening with a look backward over the well traveled road of history. History always turns our faces backward, and this is as it should be, so that we might be better informed and prepared to exercise wisdom in dealing with future events.

''To be ignorant of what happened before you were born,'' admonished Cicero, ''is to remain always a child.''

So, for a little while, as we meet together in this hallowed place, let us turn our faces backward.

Look about you. We meet tonight in the Senate Chamber. Not the Chamber in which we do business each day, but the Old Senate Chamber where our predecessors wrote the laws before the Civil War. Here, in this room, Daniel Webster orated, Henry Clay forged compromises, and John C. Calhoun stood on principle. Here, Henry Foote of Mississippi pulled a pistol on Thomas Benton of Missouri. Senator Benton ripped open his coat, puffed out his chest, and shouted, ''Stand out of the way and let the assassin fire!'' Here the eccentric Virginia Senator John Randolph brought his hunting dogs into the Chamber, and the dashing Texas Senator, Sam Houston, sat at his desk whittling hearts for ladies in the gallery. Here, seated at his desk in the back row, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner was beaten violently over the head with a cane wielded by Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina, who objected to Sumner's strongly abolitionist speeches and the vituperation that he had heaped upon Brooks' uncle, Senator Butler of South Carolina.

The Senate first met here in 1810, but, because our British cousins chose to set fire to the Capitol during the War of 1812, Congress was forced to move into the Patent Office Building in downtown Washington, and later into a building known as the Brick Capitol, located on the present site of the Supreme Court Building. Hence, it was December 1819 before Senators were able to return to this restored and elegant Chamber. They met here for 40 years, and it was during that exhilarating period that the Senate experienced its ''Golden Age.''

Here, in this room, the Senate tried to deal with the emotional and destructive issue of slavery by passing the Missouri Compromise of 1820. That act drew a line across the United States, and asserted that the peculiar institution of slavery should remain to the south of the line and not spread to the north. The Missouri Compromise also set the precedent that for every slave state admitted to the Union, a free state should be admitted as well, and vice versa. What this meant in practical political terms, was that the North and the South would be exactly equal in voting strength in the Senate, and that any settlement of the explosive issue of slavery would have to originate in the Senate. As a result, the nation's most talented and ambitious legislators began to leave the House of Representatives to take seats in the Senate. Here, they fought to hold the Union together through the omnibus compromise of 1850, only to overturn these efforts by passing the fateful Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854.

The Senators moved out of this room in 1859, on the eve of the Civil War. When they marched in procession from this Chamber to the current Chamber, it marked the last time that leaders of the North and South would march together. The next year, the South seceded and Senators who had walked shoulder to shoulder here became military officers and political leaders of the Union and of the Confederacy.

This old Chamber that they left behind is not just a smaller version of the current Chamber. Here the center aisle divides the two parties, but there are an equal number of desks on either side, not because the two parties were evenly divided but because there was not room to move desks back and forth depending on the size of the majority, as we do today. That meant that some members of the majority party had to sit with members of the minority. It did not matter to them. The two desks in the front row on the center aisle were not reserved for the majority and minority leaders as they are now, because there were no party floor leaders. No Senator spoke for his party; every Senator spoke for himself. There were recognized leaders among the Senators, but only unofficially. Everyone knew, for example, that Henry Clay led the Whigs, but he would never claim that honor. Clay generally sat in the last row at the far end of the Chamber.

The Senate left this Chamber because it outgrew the space. When they first met here in 1810 there were 32 Senators. So many states were added over the next four decades that when they left in 1859, there were 64 Senators. Yet, while the Senate had increased in size, it was essentially the same institution that the Founders had created in the Constitution. Today, another century and four decades later, and having grown to 100 Senators, it is still essentially the same institution. The actors have changed; the issues have changed; but the Senate, which emerged from the Great Compromise of July 16, 1787, remains the great forum of the states.

This is so, largely, because as a nation, we were fortunate to have wise, cautious people draft and implement our Constitution. They were pragmatists rather than idealists. James Madison, particularly, had a shrewd view of human nature. He did not believe in man's perfectability. He assumed that those who achieved power would always try to amass more power and that political factions would always compete out of self-interest. In *The Federalist Papers*, Madison reasoned that ''in framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and, in the next place, oblige it to control itself.'' Madison and other framers of the Constitution divided power so that no one person or branch of government could gain complete power. As Madison explained it: ''Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.''

However, ambition has not always counteracted ambition, as we saw in the enactment by Congress of the line item veto in 1996. Just as the Roman Senate ceded its power over the purse to the Roman dictators, Sulla and Caesar, and to the later emperors, thus surrendering its power to check tyranny, so did the American Congress, the Senate included. By passing the Line Item Veto Act the Congress surrendered its control over the purse, control which had been vested by the Constitution in the legislative branch.

This brings me to the first point that I would like to leave with you this evening. It is this: the legislative branch must be eternally vigilant over the powers and authorities vested in it by the Constitution. This is vitally important to the security of our constitutional system of checks and balances and separation of powers. George Washington, in his Farewell Address of September 17, 1796, emphasized the importance of such vigilance:

''It is important likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in those intrusted with its administration to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department, to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. . . . The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal against invasions of the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern. . . . To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them.''

Each Member of this body must be ever mindful of the fundamental duty to uphold the institutional prerogatives of the Senate if we are to preserve the vital balance which Washington so eloquently endorsed.

During my 46 years in Congress, and particularly in more recent years, I have seen an inclination on the part of many legislators in both parties to regard a chief executive in a role more elevated than the framers of the Constitution intended. We, as legislators, have a responsibility to work with the chief executive, but it is intended to be a two-way street. The Framers did not envision the office of President as having the attributes of royalty. We must recognize the heavy burden that any President bears, and wherever and whenever we can, we must cooperate with the chief executive in the interest of all the people. But let us keep in mind Madison's admonition: ''Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.''

As Majority Leader in the Senate during the Carter years, I worked hard to help President Carter to enact his programs. But I publicly stated that I was not the ''President's man''; I was a Senate man. For example, in July 1977, I opposed President Carter's plan to sell the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) to Iran. Iran was then a military ally of the United States, but I was troubled over the potential security risks involved and the possibility of compromising