

changed the current level of budget authority, outlays, and revenues.

Sincerely,

BARRY B. ANDERSON
(For Dan L. Crippen, Director).

Enclosures.

TABLE 1.—FISCAL YEAR 1999 SENATE CURRENT LEVEL REPORT, AS OF CLOSE OF BUSINESS, JUNE 16, 1999
(In billions of dollars)

	Budget resolution S. Res. 312 (adjusted)	Current level	Current level over/under resolution
ON-BUDGET			
Budget Authority	1,465.3	1,465.7	0.4
Outlays	1,414.9	1,415.2	0.2
Revenues:			
1999	1,385.9	1,359.1	0.2
1999-2003	7,187.0	7,187.7	0.7
Deficit	56.0	56.1	(¹)
Debt Subject to Limit	(²)	5,493.1	(³)
OFF-BUDGET			
Special Security Outlays:			
1999	321.3	321.3	0.0
1999-2003	1,720.7	1,720.7	0.0
Special Security Revenues:			
1999	441.7	441.7	(¹)
1999-2003	2,395.6	2,395.5	-0.1

¹ Less than \$50 million.

² Not included in S. Res. 321.

³ Not applicable.

Note.—Current level numbers are the estimated revenue and direct spending effects of all legislation that the Congress has enacted or sent to the President for his approval. In addition, full-year funding estimates under current law are included for entitlement and mandatory programs requiring annual appropriations even if the appropriations have not been made. The current level of debt subject to limit reflects the latest information from the U.S. Treasury.

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

TABLE 2.—SUPPORTING DETAIL FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1999 ON-BUDGET SENATE CURRENT LEVEL REPORT, AS OF CLOSE OF BUSINESS, JUNE 16, 1999
(In millions of dollars)

	Budget authority	Outlays	Revenues
Enacted in previous sessions:			
Revenues			1,359,000
Permanents and other spending legislation	919,197	880,664	
Appropriation legislation	820,578	813,987	
Offsetting receipts	-296,825	-296,825	
Total previously enacted	1,442,950	1,397,826	1,359,099
Enacted this session:			
1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-31)	11,348	3,677	
Pending signature:			
1999 Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act (H.R. 435)			5
Entitlements and mandates:			
Budget resolution baseline estimates of appropriated entitlements and other mandatory programs not yet enacted	11,393	13,661	
Totals:			
Total Current Level	1,465,691	1,415,164	1,359,104
Total Budget Resolution	1,465,294	1,414,916	1,358,919
Amount remaining:			
Under Budget Resolution			
Over Budget Resolution ..	397	248	185

Note.—Estimates include the following in emergency funding: \$34,226 million in budget authority and \$16,802 million in outlays.

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, since I have a few minutes, I will speak about the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

There was a piece in today's Washington Post which caught my eye, written by Mr. Paul Nitze, a former arms control negotiator and ambassador-at-large in the Reagan administration. It was coauthored by another gentleman. They made this point:

Approval of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by the Senate is essential in order for the United States to be in the strongest possible position to press for the early enforcement of this vital agreement. Failure to act will undercut our diplomatic efforts to combat the threat from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I admit, I am not an expert in this area. I am not on the relevant committees, but I take a great interest in the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems for nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons known to mankind, the most destructive weapons that have ever been developed on this Earth. There are numerous reasons why nations in this world seek to develop nuclear weapons. They are considered by some nations as a measure of their standing and prestige in the world. Others view them as the ultimate insurance policy. But, in fact, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the sheer number of nuclear weapons make this a pretty unsafe world.

The proposition has been, going back to President Eisenhower's time, that we ought to achieve a treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons. In May of 1961, President Eisenhower said:

Not achieving a test ban would have to be classed as the greatest disappointment of any administration, of any decade, of any time, and of any party.

President Kennedy's speech at American University 36 years ago addressed the need for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He said:

A test ban would help check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas.

We must check the spiraling arms race. Since the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, the leaders of this Nation have worked and labored with other countries to fashion an agreement that would ban further testing of nuclear weapons.

Imagine their satisfaction if they could know that today 152 nations have signed such an agreement, including China and Russia. Although 152 nations have signed such an agreement, we have not yet acted on that agreement in the Senate, and it is my profound hope that sometime in the near future, in the next weeks or the next couple of months, in this summer of 1999, that the Senate will review, debate and vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

I have spoken a couple of times in this Chamber on this issue. I am not critical of anyone. There are strongly held views. I do not even know how the vote would go if we had this vote. But I feel very strongly we should have this debate and vote.

I have in this desk a reminder of the danger that existed in this country during the cold war that just ended with the old Soviet Union. I ask unanimous consent to show it to my colleagues.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this is a vial filled with chopped up copper. This copper came from the wiring of a nuclear submarine the Soviet Union used to operate on the high seas with missiles and warheads pointed at the United States. This submarine is gone. Its wiring has been chopped up. It was done so under an arms control agreement. We did not sink it. It was dismantled under an arms control agreement.

We must continue to work in every way to make progress in nonproliferation agreements and test ban treaties, and one of those steps of progress, I hope, with the cooperation of all our colleagues, will be to debate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the next week, 2 weeks, month or 2 months, in the summer of 1999.

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise to support Senate consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to request unanimous consent that a June 21, 1999, Washington Post article written by Paul H. Nitze and Sidney D. Drell, be printed in the RECORD following my remarks. This article advocates the prompt ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.

(See Exhibit 1.)

Mr. AKAKA. The United States initially led the global effort to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation when we signed this treaty on September 24, 1996; however, since that time, the Senate has not taken the necessary steps towards ratification. Without the Senate's expeditious approval of this treaty, the United States will be unable to assume a leadership position at the CTBT review conference this September. We will also be undercut in our efforts to urge other countries to ratify this agreement.

Both Ambassador Nitze and Mr. Drell have a long and distinguished history of service to both Republican and Democratic presidents. President Reagan awarded Ambassador Nitze the Presidential Medal of Freedom. They both believe that America needs to lead the international effort to halt nuclear proliferation by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I urge my colleagues to read this important article. As the authors note, "failure to ratify the CTBT would have to be regarded as the greatest disappointment of any Senate, if any time, of any party."

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Washington Post, June 21, 1999]

THIS TREATY MUST BE RATIFIED

[By Paul H. Nitze and Sidney D. Drell]

For more than five decades, we have served in a variety of foreign policy, national security and intelligence positions for both Republican and Democratic administrations. A common thread in our experience is that our national interest is best served when America leads. When America hesitates, opportunities to improve our security and lost, and our strategic position suffers. This year, America has an opportunity to lead a global

effort to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

This fall, a review conference will meet to discuss ways to bring the CTBT into effect even if it has not been approved by all 44 nuclear-capable nations (i.e., those states with nuclear reactors for research or power). The United States was the first nation to sign the CTBT in September 1996; 151 nations have now followed that lead. The U.S. Senate, however, has refused to consider ratification of the treaty, and only those nations that have ratified it will have a seat at this fall's conference. Approval of the CTBT by the Senate is essential in order for the United States to be in the strongest possible position to press for the early enforcement of this vital agreement. Failure to act will undercut our diplomatic efforts to combat the threat from the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The president rightly has referred to the CTBT as the "longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control." President Eisenhower was the first American leader to pursue a ban on nuclear testing as a means to curb the nuclear arms race. Today, such a ban would constrain advanced and not-so-advanced nuclear weapons states from developing more sophisticated and dangerous nuclear weapons capabilities.

This is particularly important in South Asia. Last year, both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, threatening a dangerous escalation of their nuclear arms competition. Both countries now have expressed a commitment to adhere to the CTBT this year. U.S. ratification would remove any excuse for inaction on the part of these nations and would strengthen their resolve.

The CTBT also fulfills a commitment made by the nuclear powers in gaining the agreement of 185 nations to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1995. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the worldwide effort to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce nuclear danger.

We strongly embrace President Reagan's vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. The administration needs to engage Russia on deep reductions in nuclear forces, despite the disruption in our bilateral relations resulting from the crisis in the Balkans. In the meantime, the United States will be able to maintain the safety and reliability of its own stockpile through the Department of Energy's science-based stockpile stewardship program. Our confidence in this program underpins our judgment that there is no technical reason why the CTBT is not the right thing to do.

President Reagan's maxim—trust but verify—is still true today. With the CTBT, the United States will gain new tools to assess compliance with a ban on nuclear testing—including the right to request a short-notice, on-site inspection if we had evidence that a test might have occurred. Combined with the treaty's extensive international monitoring regime and our own intelligence resources, the CTBT is effectively verifiable.

The Senate has an obligation to review expeditiously major treaties and agreements entered into by the Executive so that the world can be sure of America's course. When President Reagan signed the INF Treaty in December 1987, which eliminated an entire class of missiles, hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began within weeks, and the Senate voted to approve the treaty within six months. In comparison, the CTBT was signed by President Clinton more than 2½ years ago but still awaits its first hearing.

In May 1961, President Eisenhower said that not achieving a nuclear test ban "would have to be classed as the greatest disappoint-

ment of any administration—of any decade—of any time and of any party." Similarly, failure to ratify the CTBT would have to be regarded as the greatest disappointment of any Senate, of any time, of any party. We urge the Senate to ratify the CTBT now.

Paul H. Nitze is a former arms control negotiator and was an ambassador-at-large in the Reagan administration. Sidney D. Drell is an adviser to the federal government on national security issues.

WHY I OPPOSE THE STEEL QUOTA BILL

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise today in strong opposition to both cloture on the steel quota bill, and to the bill itself.

I oppose this dangerous and misguided legislation for three reasons.

First, the steel quota bill is really a phony bill of goods. It does not do what it promises. It will not restore the vitality of troubled elements of the U.S. steel industry. That's because foreign imports have little to do with the problems facing the American steel industry.

Why? Because the American steel industry is much more efficient than at almost any time in our past history. Fewer steel workers are producing more steel today than they were 10 years ago. In 1987, when the domestic industry produced 77 million short tons, 163,000 workers were employed in the steel industry. In 1997, 10 years later, when the domestic industry produced 106 million tons, employment was 112,000 workers. During that 10 year span, our steel mills made 29 million more tons with 51,000 fewer workers.

Using the logic behind this quota legislation, the more efficient our steel industry becomes, the more it requires protection from foreign imports. But in fact, the opposite is true. The more protection an industry gets, the more inefficient it becomes. That is not good for our economy, or for American consumers. During the next few years, we may see steel employment fall even further, perhaps by as much of 5,000 workers per year, as inefficient integrated mills are closed. New, more efficient minimills will take up any slack. All of this will happen whether or not steel quotas are imposed.

Who will really benefit from the quota bill?

According to the Institute For International Economics, one of this country's most distinguished and highly regarded think tanks, few steel workers will benefit. But steel importers and profitable, efficient steel makers will win big.

The Institute's report states:

The annual costs to American households for each steel job saved would exceed \$800,000. But steel workers would receive less than 20 percent of this huge sum; lucky firms would collect more than 80 percent of the jackpot. . . . Quotas will enrich lucky steel importers (often those with the best political connections) and efficient steel producers (they are doing well enough already—11 of the 13 largest mills earned more than \$1 billion in 1998). . . .

The United States Senate should not help enrich a few lucky importers. It should not give windfalls to companies earning a billion dollars a year.

I have the deepest concern for any American who loses his or her job for any reason. It is a terrible, wrenching thing to lose a job. It affects families as well as communities. We must help where we can, through programs like trade adjustment assistance, that help displaced workers through job retraining and placement assistance. But the one thing we must not do is react in haste, in a way that will kill far more jobs than it will ever save, and in a way that will reward healthy companies with windfall profits.

The second reason I oppose the steel quota bill is that it flat-out violates our WTO international trade obligations.

There are some who claim this is not the case. But, I want to read the exact words of Article 11 of the GATT. This rule is part of the WTO rules that we and 133 other nations are committed to observe:

No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.

We helped write that law. We demand that our trading partners observe it. We defend it when other countries try to keep our goods out of their markets. And most of the time, we win these cases.

Now, I'm not a lawyer. Maybe that's my problem. Perhaps I'm not clever enough to figure out where Article 11 says that quotas are OK. It seems pretty clear to me. It says that you can't have restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges. But Article 11 goes even farther than banning quotas. It says that you can't have any type of government measure that leads to the imposition of a quota.

One important panel decision, the GATT panel on Semiconductors, affirmed this broad interpretation in 1988. It said that Article 11, unlike other GATT provisions, does not refer solely to laws or regulations. It has an even broader application, and refers to all "measures" that restrict exports.

There are some exceptions to Article 11's broad ban on any measures restricting exports. But the most relevant of these exceptions, the so-called Safeguard exception, does not apply because there is no proof that our domestic steel industry has suffered serious injury from import competition. Moreover, safeguard actions usually involve imposing increased customs duties, rather than quotas. Yes, there has been illegal dumping of steel by some countries into the United States. But the surge of that dumped steel has largely been stopped. And even during the highest point last year of the so-called