

cleansing—these are the monuments to Milosevic's triumphs.

They are also, let's remember and admit, the result of eight long years of Western weakness. When will they ever learn?

Appeasement has failed in the 90s, as it failed in the 30s. Then, there were always politicians to argue that the madness of Nazism could be contained and that a reckoning could somehow be avoided. In our own day too there has never been a lack of politicians and diplomats willing to collaborate with Milosevic's Serbia. At each stage, both in the thirties and in the nineties, the tyrant carefully laid his snares, and naive negotiators obligingly fell into them.

For eight years I have called for Serbia to be stopped. Even after the massacre of Srebrenica I was told that my calls for military action were mere "emotional nonsense," words which, I think, only a man could have uttered.

But there were also good reasons for taking action early. The West could have stopped Milosevic in Slovenia or Croatia in 1991, or in Bosnia in 1992. But instead we deprived his opponents of the means to arm themselves, thus allowing his aggression to prosper.

Even in 1995, when at last a combination of airstrikes and well-armed Croat and Muslim ground forces broke the power of the Bosnian-Serb aggressors, we intervened to halt their advance onto Banja Luka, and so avoid anything that might threaten Milosevic. Even then, Western political leaders believed that the butcher of Belgrade could be a force for stability. So here we are now, fighting a war eight years too late, on treacherous terrain, so far without much effective local support, with imperfect intelligence, and with war aims that some find unclear and unpersuasive.

But with all that said—and it must be said, so that the lessons are well and truly learned—let there be no doubt: this is a war that must be won.

I understand the unease that many feel about the way in which this operation began. But those who agonize over whether what is happening in Kosovo today is really of sufficient importance to justify our military intervention, gravely underestimate the consequences of doing nothing. There is always method in Milosevic's madness. He is a master at using human tides of refugees to destabilize his neighbors and weaken his opponents. And that we simply cannot now allow. The surrounding countries just can't absorb two million Albanian refugees without provoking a new spiral of violent disintegration, possibly involving NATO members.

But the over-riding justification for military action is quite simply the nature of the enemy we face. We are not dealing with some minor thug whose local brutalities may offend our sensibilities from time to time. Milosevic's regime and the genocidal ideology that sustains it represent something altogether different—a truly monstrous evil; one which cannot with safety be merely checked or contained; one which must be totally defeated and be seen by the Serbs themselves to be defeated.

When that has been done, we need to learn the lessons of what has happened and of the warnings that were given but ignored. But this is not the time. There has already been too much media speculation about targets and tactics, and some shameful and demoralizing commentary which can only help the enemy. So I shall say nothing of detailed tactics here tonight.

But two things more I must say.

First, about our fundamental aims. It would be both cruel and stupid to expect the Albanian Kosovans now to return to live under any form of Serbian rule. Kosovo must

be given independence, initially under international protection. And there must be no partition, a plan that predictable siren voices are already advancing. Partition would only serve to reward violence and ethnic cleansing. It would be to concede defeat. And I am unmoved by Serb pleas to retain their grasp on most of Kosovo because it contains their holy places. Coming from those who systematically leveled Catholic churches and Muslim mosques wherever they went, such an argument is cynical almost to the point of blasphemy.

Second, about the general conduct of the war. There are, in the end, no humanitarian wars. War is serious and it is deadly. In wars risk is inevitable and casualties, including alas civilian casualties, are to be expected. Trying to fight a war with one hand tied behind your back is the way to lose it. We always regret the loss of the lives. But we should have no doubt that it is not our troops or pilots, but the men of evil, who bear the guilt.

The goal of war is victory. And the only victory worth having now is one that prevents Serbia ever again having the means to attack its neighbors and terrorize its non-Serb inhabitants. That will require the destruction of Serbia's political will, the destruction of its war machine and all the infrastructure on which these depend. We must be prepared to cope with all the changing demands of war—including, if that is what is required, the deployment of ground troops. And we must expect a long haul until the job is done.

Mr. McCAIN. Those are Margaret Thatcher's remarks. They were delivered at the Institute for Free Enterprise on the 20th anniversary of her becoming Great Britain's Prime Minister.

I hope that all of my colleagues before voting tomorrow will read her remarks—Brent Scowcroft, Lawrence Eagleburger, and virtually every person who has held a position of authority on national security matters, both Republican and Democrat, for more than two decades.

Mr. President, the hour is late. I will move to the closing remarks in just a moment.

We have had a good debate today. I wish it had been longer. I think it should go on for several more days. But it won't.

Tomorrow we will have a tabling motion which may be one of the more bizarre scenarios that I have seen in my 13 years here in the Senate, with an administration lobbying feverishly to defeat a resolution which gives it more authority. I have never seen that before in my years in the Senate.

I believe we could have carried this resolution if the administration had supported it. I can only conclude that the reason for it is that the President of the United States is more interested in his own Presidency than the institution of the Presidency. Mr. President, that is indeed a shame.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business, Friday, April 30, 1999, the federal debt stood at \$5,585,839,850,171.61 (Five trillion, five hundred eighty-five billion, eight hundred thirty-nine million, eight hundred

fifty thousand, one hundred seventy-one dollars and sixty-one cents).

One year ago, April 30, 1998, the federal debt stood at \$5,499,895,000,000 (Five trillion, four hundred ninety-nine billion, eight hundred ninety-five million).

Fifteen years ago, April 30, 1984, the federal debt stood at \$1,486,116,000,000 (One trillion, four hundred eighty-six billion, one hundred sixteen million).

Twenty-five years ago, April 30, 1974, the federal debt stood at \$472,852,000,000 (Four hundred seventy-two billion, eight hundred fifty-two million) which reflects a debt increase of more than \$5 trillion—\$5,112,987,850,171.61 (Five trillion, one hundred twelve billion, nine hundred eighty-seven million, eight hundred fifty thousand, one hundred seventy-one dollars and sixty-one cents) during the past 25 years.

GENERAL HAWLEY'S COMMENTS ON READINESS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, last week the Air Force General in charge of the Air Combat Command provided some valuable observations for the Senate to consider as we contemplate funding another protracted military operation.

General Richard Hawley observed that the current build up in Europe has weakened our ability to meet our other global commitments. General Hawley added that the air operation in Kosovo would require a reconstitution period of up to five months.

The General will be retiring in June, and has spoken out on how this war in Kosovo will weaken the readiness of the Air Force. I hope Senators will consider his concerns, and I ask unanimous consent that the General's remarks on military readiness reported in the April 30th Washington Post be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 30, 1999]

GENERAL SAYS U.S. READINESS IS AILING
(By Bradley Graham)

The general who oversees U.S. combat aircraft said yesterday the Air Force has been sorely strained by the Kosovo conflict and would be hard-pressed to handle a second war in the Middle East or Korea.

Gen. Richard Hawley, who heads the Air Combat Command, told reporters that five weeks of bombing Yugoslavia have left U.S. munition stocks critically short, not just of air-launched cruise missiles as previously reported, but also of another precision weapon, the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) dropped by B-2 bombers. So low is the inventory of the new satellite-guided weapons, Hawley said, that as the bombing campaign accelerates, the Air Force risks exhausting its prewar supply of more than 900 JDAMs before the next scheduled delivery in May.

"It's going to be really touch-and-go as to whether we'll go Winchester on JDAMs," the four-star general said, using a pilot's term for running out of bullets.

On a day the Pentagon announced deployment of an additional 10 giant B-52 bombers to NATO's air battle, Hawley said the continuing buildup of U.S. aircraft means more

air crew shortages in the United States. And because the Air Force tends to send its most experienced crews, Hawley said, the experience level of units left behind also is falling. With NATO's latest request for another 300 U.S. aircraft—on top of 600 already committed—Hawley said the readiness rating of the remaining fleet will drop quickly and significantly.

His grim assessment underscored questions about the U.S. military's ability to manage a conflict such as the assault on Yugoslavia after reducing and reshaping forces since the Cold War. U.S. military strategy no longer calls for battling another superpower, but it does require the Pentagon to be prepared to fight two major regional wars at about the same time.

As the number of U.S. planes involved in the conflict over Kosovo approaches the level of a major regional war, the operation is exposing weaknesses in the availability and structure of Air Force as well as Army units, engendering fresh doubts about the military's overall preparedness for the world it now confronts. If another military crisis were to erupt in the Middle East or Asia, Hawley said reinforcements are still available, but he added: "I'd be hard-pressed to give them everything that they would probably ask for. There would be some compromises made."

The Army's ability to respond nimbly to foreign hot spots also has been put in question by the month it has taken to deploy two dozen AH-64A Apache helicopters to Albania. While Army officials insist the helicopter taskforce moved faster than any other country could have managed, the experience appeared to highlight a gap between the Pentagon's talk about becoming a more expeditionary force and the reality of deploying soldiers.

Massing forces for a ground invasion of Yugoslavia, officials said, would require two or three months. Because U.S. military planners never figured on fighting a ground war in Europe following the Soviet Union's demise, little Army heavy equipment is prepositioned near the Balkans. Nor are there Army units that would seem especially designed for the job of getting to the Balkans quickly with enough firepower and armor to attack dug-in Yugoslav forces over mountainous terrain.

"What we need is something between our light and heavy forces, that can get somewhere fast but with more punch," a senior Army official said.

Yugoslav forces have shown themselves more of a match for U.S. and allied air power than NATO commanders had anticipated. The Serb-led Yugoslav army has adopted a duck-and-hide strategy, husbanding air defense radars and squirreling away tanks, confounding NATO's attempts to gain the freedom for low-level attacks to whittle down field units. Yugoslav units also have shown considerable resourcefulness, reconstituting damaged communication links and finding alternative routes around destroyed bridges, roads and rail links.

"They've employed a rope-a-dope strategy," said Barry Posen, a political science professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Conserve assets, hang back, take the punches and hope over time that NATO makes some kind of mistake that can be exploited."

Hawley disputed suggestions that the assault on Yugoslavia has represented an air power failure, saying the full potential of airstrikes has been constrained by political limits on targeting.

"In our Air Force doctrine, air power works best when it is used decisively," the general said. "Clearly, because of the constraints, we haven't been able to see that at this point."

NATO's decision not to employ ground forces, he added, also has served to undercut the air campaign. He noted that combat planes such as the A-10 Warthog tank killer often rely on forward ground controllers to call in strikes.

"When you don't have that synergy, things take longer and they're harder, and that's what you're seeing in this conflict," the general said.

At the same time, Hawley, who is due to retire in June, insisted the course of the battle so far has not prompted any rethinking about U.S. military doctrine or tactics, nor has it caused any second thoughts about plans for the costly development of two new fighter jets, the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter. Despite the apparent success U.S. planes have demonstrated in overcoming Yugoslavia's air defense network, Hawley said the next generation of warplanes is necessary because future adversaries would be equipped with more advanced anti-aircraft missiles and combat aircraft than the Yugoslavs.

If the air operation has highlighted any weaknesses in U.S. combat strength, Hawley said, it has been in what he termed a desperate shortage of aircraft for intelligence-gathering, radar suppression and search-and-rescue missions. While additional planes and unmanned aircraft to meet this shortfall are on order or under development, Hawley said it will take "a long time" to field them.

In the meantime, he argued, the United States must start reducing overseas military commitments. He suggested some foreign operations have been allowed to go on too long, noting that the U.S. military presence in Korea has lasted more than 50 years, and U.S. warplanes have remained stationed in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, flying patrols over Iraq, for more than eight years.

"I would argue we cannot continue to accumulate contingencies," he said. "At some point you've got to figure out how to get out of something."

The Air Force blames a four-fold jump in overseas operations this decade, coming after years of budget cuts and troop reductions, for contributing to an erosion of military morale, equipment and training. The Air Force has tried various fixes in recent years to stanch an exodus of pilots and other airmen in some critical specialties.

It has boosted bonuses, cut back on time-consuming training exercises and tried to limit deployment periods. It also has requested and received hundreds of millions of dollars in extra funds for spare parts.

Additionally, it announced plans last August to reorganize more than 2,000 warplanes and support aircraft into 10 "expeditionary" groups that would rotate responsibility for deployments to such longstanding trouble zones as Iraq and Bosnia.

But Hawley's remarks suggested that the growing scale and uncertain duration of the air operation against Yugoslavia threaten to undo whatever progress the Air Force has made in shoring up readiness. Whenever the airstrikes end, he said, the Air Force will require "a reconstitution period" to put many of its units back in order.

"We are going to be in desperate need, in my command, of a significant retrenchment in commitments for a significant period of time," he said. "I think we have a real problem facing us three, four, five months down the road in the readiness of the stateside units."

ON NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, a month ago, April 7, as the war in Yugoslavia began to assume its present

form, President Clinton spoke to the U.S. Institute for Peace. It was an important statement about the nature of conflict in the years to come. "Clearly," he stated, "our first challenge is to build a more peaceful world, one that will apparently be dominated by ethnic and religious conflicts we once thought of primitive, but which Senator MOYNIHAN, for example, has referred to now as post-modern." I am scarcely alone in this; it has become, I believe, a widely held view. A recent article in *The Wall Street Journal* began by asking: "Does Kosovo represent the future or the past?" The distinguished Dean of the John F. Kennedy School had an emphatic answer.

... Joseph Nye, a Clinton Pentagon alumnus, forecasts a brave new world dominated by ethnic conflicts. There are thousands of ethnic groups that could plausibly argue they deserve independence, he estimates, making it imperative for the U.S. to decide where it should intervene. "There's potential for enormous violence," he says.

In this spirit, just yesterday, *The Times* spoke of "The Logic of Kosovo."

With the cold war over, the country needs to devise a new calculus for determining when its security is threatened and the use of force is warranted. Kosovo is a test case. If the United States and its NATO allies are prepared to let a tyrant in the Balkans slaughter his countrymen and overrun his neighbors with hundreds of thousands of refugees, other combustible regions of Europe may face similar upheavals.

Almost a decade ago the eminent scientist E. O. Wilson offered a perspective from the field of sociobiology. Once "the overwhelmingly suppressive force of supranational ideology was lifted," ethnicity would strike. "It was the unintended experiment in the natural science mode: cancel one factor at a time, and see what happens." For "coiled and ready ethnicity is to be expected from a consideration of biological evolutionary theory."

Throw in television and the like, and surely we are in a new situation. Just as surely, it is time to think anew.

The first matter has to do with the number of such potential conflicts. Here it is perhaps the case that the United States bears a special responsibility. For it is we, in the person of President Woodrow Wilson, and the setting of the Versailles Peace Conference who brought to world politics the term "self-determination." It is not sufficiently known that Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, of Jefferson County, New York, had the greatest foreboding. Hence this entry in his diary written in Paris on December 30, 1918.

"SELF-DETERMINATION" AND THE DANGERS
DECEMBER 30, 1918

The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of "self-determination", the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress, and create trouble in many lands The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized.