

In my own state of Maine, fishing is a vital part of our economy and our way of life. The commercial fishing industry is made up of proud and fiercely independent individuals whose goal is simply to preserve their business, family income, and community. My legislation would afford fishermen the same protection of business reorganization as is provided to family farmers.

There are many similarities between the family farmer and the family fisherman. Like the family farmer, the fisherman should not only be valued as a businessman, but also for his or her contributions to our way of life and our economy. Like farmers, fishermen face perennial threats from nature and the elements, as well as laws and regulations which unfortunately threaten their existence. Like family farmers, fishermen are not seeking special treatment or a hand-out from the federal government, they seek only the fighting chance to remain afloat so that they can continue in their way of life.

Although fishermen do not seek any special treatment from the government, they play a special role in seafaring communities on our coasts, and they deserve protections granted others who face similar, often unavoidable, problems. Fishermen should not be denied the bankruptcy protections accorded to farmers solely because they harvest the sea and not the land.

I have proposed not only to make Chapter 12 a permanent part of the bankruptcy code, but also to apply its provisions to the family fisherman. The bill I have proposed mirrors Chapter 12 with very few exceptions. Its protections are restricted to those fishermen with regular income who have total debt less than \$1.5 million, the bulk of which, eighty percent, must stem from commercial fishing. Moreover, families must rely on fishing income for these provisions to apply.

These same protections and flexibility we grant to farmers should also be granted to the family fisherman. By making this modest but important change to the bankruptcy laws, we will express our respect for the business of fishing, and our shared wish that this unique way of life—that embodies the state of Maine—should continue.

Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 12:30 p.m. having arrived, the Senate will

now stand in recess until the hour of 2:15 p.m.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 12:31 p.m., recessed until 2:15 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. INHOFE).

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair, acting as a Senator from the State of Oklahoma, suggests the absence of a quorum.

The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be able to speak for 5 minutes as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

KOSOVO POLICY

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to speak to a resolution that has been introduced this morning regarding Congress taking an action about our troops in Kosovo and the whole escalation of the operation in Kosovo. The text of the resolution is that we would give the President all of the authority to use whatever force, take whatever steps he sees as necessary.

I certainly think we should have a debate on this whole issue of Kosovo. I think it is certainly something that Congress is going to need to weigh in on. But I think it would be vastly premature to take an action before the President has laid out a plan. The President has not asked us for "all force." The President has not asked us, actually, for anything except funding on an emergency basis to make sure we have the ability to fund the operation that is going on in Yugoslavia without taking away from other national security interests. I am going to support the President in that request. The last thing I want to do is have our troops in harm's way, along with our allies', and run out of money or run out of equipment or have any of our national defense personnel anywhere else in the world be shortchanged. We are not going to let that happen.

When the President gives us the specificity that is required for the appropriation, I think there will be a resounding vote in Congress to give our troops and our military the leeway they need to spend the money to have the equipment they need to do this job. But I cannot imagine having a carte blanche given to an operation that clearly is escalating a mission and we have not seen a plan. We have not seen a plan. We have not seen a timetable. We have not seen a cost estimate for the long term. So I hope we will take a step back here, and rather than voting on the resolution that was put forward today we would be talking among our-

selves, that we will be debating at whatever point is the right one, and that we would be having op-eds in newspapers, which I think certainly have added to the body of opinion on this issue. But Congress should not micromanage this war. The President should come to us and say what he needs, what he is going to do with the money, what kind of plan we have, what kind of troop commitment are we talking about, what is it going to do to the rest of our national defense operation. We need to have a full plan.

One of the things that has concerned so many of us is that perhaps we started an operation before we had a contingency plan. Perhaps we started the operation before we knew what we would need for the long term, before we knew the goal. I think the mission has actually changed several times.

We obviously have had a different result from this operation than we had hoped. There is no question about that. Whether this is a success is yet to be determined, and I do not think we should be jumping in, saying it has not been a success. But I think it is time for us to let the President take the lead, to let him come to us with his requests. He is the one who is supposed to be executing this operation. I do think it would be a mistake for Congress to put the cart before the horse. I do not think we should micromanage. I do not think we should tell the President what to do. I do not think we should put our opinions on top of his. And most certainly, when I hear our NATO allies saying they would not consider ground troops, the last thing I think we should do is encourage ground troops. I think the case has not been made, the base has not been laid, and our allies are not in support.

So I think we need to take a step back. We need to be getting the administration to give us briefings at every point, asking our opinions. Let's debate this, let's talk about what kind of commitment we want to make. But I will not vote for troops on the ground in this operation as a carte blanche, a blank check, before I know what we are going to do. What will our responsibility be? What will our allies' contribution be? What is the timetable? What is the mission? Is it achievable, and what is it going to cost? And what is it going to do to the rest of our national defense?

These are questions that must be asked. We must get answers. We must have a full briefing. For Congress to have a vote before we have all of that would be irresponsible.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRAPO). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning business for up to 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

KOSOVO

Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I will address what is obviously the issue most pressing on us as a nation and certainly on the Western World. That is, of course, the issue of Kosovo and the war that is being pursued there.

First, I think it is important to understand that we as a nation are obviously the sole major superpower in the world and that we have, as a nation, a significant obligation to use our strength in order to promote the betterment of the world and to promote interests around the world which assist our national policy. We should not disengage from the world, we should not be isolationist—just the opposite; we have an obligation to reach out and use our great wealth and our great good luck and our great good fortune to benefit as many people around the world as we can.

But I think we must also be sensitive to the fact that we can't be everywhere all the time and that when we ask American troops, men and women, to put their lives on the line, we have to be very specific as to why we are doing it and what the purpose of that effort is, because that, of course, is the most extreme request we can place on any American.

We should have a process of putting forward a plan, a test, if you will accept it, as to why we engage with American force. I have always felt that test should have three elements. I have spoken about it before.

The first is, is there a definable American interest? In many instances this could be international interests which impact us significantly, such as the gulf war, where European oil was at risk. But is there a definable American interest which is specific enough and which can be justified and which can be explained, quite honestly, in these terms: If an American service person loses his or her life, could you go to the parent of that person, could you go to the wife of that person, could you go to the child of that person, and tell them why the loss of their life was important to America? Could you explain our purpose in terms that would satisfy a grieving parent, wife, or child that their son or daughter had died in a cause which assisted America? That is the first and most important test.

The second test is, is the engagement of American troops going to be able to resolve the situation, or is the situation so complex, so convoluted, and so historically intertwined that it probably can never be resolved or never even be, for any extended period, pacified?

The third is, is there a plan for getting out? Before you get into something, you ought to know how you are

going to get out of it or at least have some concept of how you are going to get out of it. That is absolutely critical.

Those are the tests for our engagement.

We are now engaged in a war in Kosovo. Unfortunately, in my opinion, none of those tests was met before we made the decision to go forward. This administration could not explain, and has certainly not explained very well, why we decided to step off on this route of military action.

The initial statement was that we were doing it in order to bring Milosevic into negotiations, in order to bring the Yugoslav Government into negotiations to try to settle the situation in Kosovo, because a number of people had been killed in Kosovo, hundreds maybe, although the number that had actually been reported was somewhat less than that, and because we were concerned that there would be a great dislocation of population in the Kosovo—or the administration was concerned that there would be a great dislocation of population in the Kosovo province of Serbia if we did not take action to try to force Milosevic to agree to the settlement as had been outlined at Rambouillet.

That was the initial purpose of the use of air power against Serbia, and against Yugoslavia, or Yugoslavia and Kosovo and Serbia. The purpose, therefore, was never to go in to occupy and to win a war against Yugoslavia. That was never the original purpose as presented by this administration.

One has to wonder, what was our national interest in that region in Kosovo? A legitimate case could be made that humanitarian interests are a national interest. But actually what was happening in Kosovo, although severe and brutal and being shown on TV, was nothing—absolutely nothing—compared to what was happening in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and a number of former republics, in fact, of the former Soviet Union, where literally millions of people died in Africa as a result of internal civil war.

Remember, this was a civil war situation. Kosovo was a province of Yugoslavia, which was an independent state, and is an independent state.

So there is the issue of humanitarian interests, although they hardly raised it to the level that justified use of American force when we weren't using American force to settle matters in Ethiopia, in Somalia, in Sudan, in Sri Lanka, or Azerbaijan, or Georgia.

So you had to ask, what was in the national interest? Quite honestly, prior to this process—this is all prior to the actual air campaign—I never believed, and I don't think the President ever made clear, because he really couldn't, that there was a dramatic American national interest in Kosovo. In fact, the irony of this situation is that NATO is now using all its force against a region—Albania and Kosovo—and claiming that that region is strategi-

cally important, when throughout the cold war when NATO was at its peak—at its absolute peak—of deterrence and purpose, when it had specific purpose, which was to deter East European and Soviet aggression in Albania, which was behind the Iron Curtain, which was an Eastern European country, it was never even considered a factor of threat. Other nations were—East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Russia, Soviet Russia—during the cold war.

But Albania was never a factor, because it was such a poor and desperate nation; it had no strategic impact at all. But suddenly it becomes a nation of strategic impact to us. Suddenly Kosovo, a subprovince of Yugoslavia, becomes a nation of strategic impact to us. It is hardly explainable to the American people. It must be found against other strategic events which precipitated the bombing. And what impact do those have? And what is the significance? I think the answer to that is yes, the unintended consequence of this bombing is that we have created significant strategic and national concerns which weren't there before we started the bombing but are certainly there now.

Let's name three of them.

First, of course, is the humanitarian issue. The huge number of refugees, to whom our heart goes out, and to whom we obviously have some responsibility for carrying forward—and I will get back to that in a second—clearly we now have a strategic and national concern about doing something to care for those refugees. That should have been anticipated before we started the bombing. But it obviously was not by this administration. So we created an event there.

The second event, which is maybe even more significant, which absolutely is more significant, was an unintended consequence which this administration clearly didn't expect and can't even represent that it marginally expected, and which has occurred; that is, that we have managed, through this bombing activity and this military action of NATO against the Kosovo region, potentially to be expanded to a greater Serbia—we have managed to dramatically undermine and, in my opinion, destabilize the process of evolution towards democracy in Russia, and certainly the process that Russia was moving towards engaging with the Western nations in a constructive way, including being a partner for peace ancillary to NATO. We have as an unintended consequence managed to invigorate the nationalist spirit within the political system of Russia, which was already under great strain, and a fledgling democracy which is absolutely critical to the future peace of this world and to the prospective activities of us as a nation as we move into the next century. A democracy in which we had invested a great deal has been placed at some jeopardy as to its relationship with us in the West, and we