

“National Correctional Officers and Employees Week.”

## SENATE RESOLUTION 33

At the request of Mr. MCCAIN, the names of the Senator from California (Mrs. FEINSTEIN), and the Senator from California (Mrs. BOXER) were added as cosponsors of Senate Resolution 33, a resolution designating May 1999 as “National Military Appreciation Month.”

## SENATE RESOLUTION 34

At the request of Mr. TORRICELLI, the names of the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. LIEBERMAN), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. BREAUX), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. CAMPBELL), and the Senator from Maryland (Mr. SARBANES) were added as cosponsors of Senate Resolution 34, a resolution designating the week beginning April 30, 1999, as “National Youth Fitness Week.”

## SENATE RESOLUTION 59

At the request of Mr. LAUTENBERG, the name of the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. CONRAD) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Resolution 59, a bill designating both July 2, 1999, and July 2, 2000, as “National Literacy Day.”

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 27—ESTABLISHING THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD NATO'S WASHINGTON SUMMIT

Mr. LUGAR (for himself, Mr. ROTH, Mr. LOTT, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. VOINOVICH, and Mr. HAGEL) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

## S. CON. RES. 27

Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will celebrate its fiftieth anniversary at a historic summit meeting in Washington, D.C., commencing on April 23, 1999;

Whereas NATO, the only military alliance with both real defense capabilities and a transatlantic membership, has successfully defended the territory and interest of its members over the last 50 years, prevailed in the Cold War, and contributed to the spread of freedom, democracy, stability, and peace throughout Europe;

Whereas NATO remains a vital national security interest of the United States;

Whereas NATO is currently conducting military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to further the objective of a lasting peace in Kosovo;

Whereas NATO enhances the security of the United States by embedding European states in a process of cooperative security planning, by preventing the destabilizing re-nationalization of European military policies, and by ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role for the United States in European security affairs;

Whereas the enlargement of NATO, a defensive alliance, threatens no nation and reinforces peace and stability in Europe, and provides benefits to all nations;

Whereas Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area” is eligible to be granted NATO membership;

Whereas the July 1998 communique of the NATO Summit in Madrid reaffirmed that “NATO remains open to new members under Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty” and stated that “the Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership”;

Whereas the accession to NATO by Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary will strengthen the military capabilities of NATO, enhance security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and thereby advance the interests of the United States and NATO;

Whereas Congress has repeatedly endorsed the enlargement of NATO with bipartisan majorities;

Whereas the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, a multinational body composed of delegations from the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty, has called for NATO to welcome new members through the adoption of Resolution 283 of 1998, entitled “Recasting Euro-Atlantic Security: Towards the Washington Summit”;

Whereas additional democracies of Central and Eastern Europe have applied for NATO membership;

Whereas the enlargement of NATO must be a careful, deliberate process with consideration of all security interests;

Whereas the selection of new members should depend on NATO's strategic interests, potential threats to security and stability, and actions taken by prospective members to complete the transition to democracy and to harmonize policies with NATO's political, economic, and military guidelines established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement;

Whereas NATO must consider and debate the qualifications and potential ramifications of new members on a country-by-country basis;

Whereas the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO is an important step in the post-Cold War era toward a Europe that is truly whole, undivided, free, and at peace and must be complemented by the extension of NATO membership to other qualified democracies of Central and Eastern Europe;

Whereas extending NATO membership to other qualified democracies will strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability, deter potential aggressors, and thereby advance the interests of the United States and its NATO allies;

Whereas, because participation in missions under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty is not obligatory and each NATO member is free to make an independent decision regarding participation in those missions, the United States and other NATO members are able to decide on the basis of their interests and an independent assessment of the situation whether to participate;

Whereas NATO's continued success requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to common threats;

Whereas, building on its core capabilities for collective self-defense of its members, NATO will ensure that its military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and force goals promote NATO's capacity to project power when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO members;

Whereas the members of NATO face new threats, including conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from historic, ethnic, and religious enmities, the potential for the reemergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe, rogue states and nonstate actors possessing weapons of mass destruction, and threats to the wider interests of

the NATO members (including the disruption of the flow of vital resources);

Whereas this will require that NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts; and

Whereas the principal effect of upgraded capabilities for NATO members to operate “out of area” with force improvements for power projection will be to make NATO members more effective American partners in supporting mutual interests around the globe: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That (a) Congress—*

(1) regards the political independence and territorial integrity of the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe as vital to European peace and security and, thus, to the interests of the United States;

(2) endorses the commitment of the North Atlantic Council that NATO will remain open to the accession of further members in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

(3) believes all NATO members should commit to improving their respective defense capabilities so that NATO can project power decisively within and outside NATO borders in a manner that achieves transatlantic parity in power projection capabilities and facilitates equitable burdensharing among NATO members; and

(4) believes that NATO should prepare more vigorously to defend itself against future threats and to expand its primary defensive focus beyond its previous concentration on threats to the east.

(b) It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the North Atlantic Council should pace, not pause, the process of NATO enlargement by extending the invitation of membership to those states able to meet the guidelines established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement and should do so on a country-by-country basis;

(2) the North Atlantic Council in the course of the 1999 Washington Summit should initiate a formal review of all pending applications for NATO membership in order to establish the degree to which such applications conform to the guidelines for membership established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement;

(3) the results of this formal review should be presented to the membership of the North Atlantic Council in May 2000 with recommendations concerning enlargement;

(4) NATO should continue to assess potential applicants for NATO membership on a continuous basis; and

(5) the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense should fully use their offices to encourage the NATO allies of the United States to commit the resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts, thus making them effective American partners in supporting mutual interests.

## SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this concurrent resolution:

(1) DEMOCRACIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE.—The term “democracies of Central and Eastern Europe” means those nations that have applied or have registered their intent to apply for membership in NATO, including Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

(2) NATO.—The term “NATO” means those nations that are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(3) NATO MEMBER.—The term “NATO member” means any country that is a party to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(4) NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.—The term “North Atlantic Treaty” means the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964).

#### NATO SUMMIT

• Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, later this week NATO will honor its 50th anniversary at a Summit here in Washington, D.C. The leaders of the 19 NATO member nations and the heads of state of many Partnership-for-Peace participants will participate in meetings to discuss the successes of the NATO Alliance and its future in the post-Cold War world.

The more distant we become from the days of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, the clearer it becomes that we have entered a new era. But dangers still abound in post-Cold War Europe. The ongoing conflict in Kosovo is a stark reminder that threats to the security of NATO's members still exist. The revolutions of 1989 not only led to the collapse of communism but also to the end of the peace orders established after two world wars. What is at stake today is order and stability in Europe as a whole. And that is why American interests are involved.

Mr. President, NATO cannot by itself solve all of Europe's problems. But without a stable security framework, we run the risk that reform and democracy in Eastern Europe will not persist but will instead be undercut by destructive forces of nationalism and insecurity. The failure of democracy in the East could not help but have profound consequences for democracy in the continent's western half as well.

The resolution that I submit today on behalf of Senators ROTH, LOTT, LIEBERMAN, DEWINE, VOINOVICH, and HAGEL sets forth three goals for the United States to achieve in discussions over the future of the NATO Alliance: (1) the enforcement of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty to remain open to the accession of additional members and a formal review of all applications for memberships; (2) expansion of the primary focus beyond threats from the east; and (3) the upgrading of our allies' ability to project power and to operate “out of area.”

NATO's “open door” policy toward new members established by Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, has given countries of Central and Eastern Europe the incentive to accelerate reforms, to peacefully settle disputes with neighbors, and to increase regional cooperation. Hopes of future membership in NATO has been a tremendous driving force of democratization and peace in Eastern and Central Europe including former Warsaw Pact nations.

To retract the “open-door” policy, as some have suggested, would risk undermining the tremendous gains that have been made across the region. The re-

sult of a “closed-door” policy would be the creation of new dividing lines across Europe. Those nations outside might become disillusioned and insecure and thus inclined to adopt the competitive and destabilizing security policies of Europe's past.

NATO's decision to enlarge in stages recognizes that not all new democracies and applicants in Europe are equally ready or willing to be security allies. Some states may never be ready.

The selection of future NATO members should depend on: (1) a determination by NATO members of their strategic interests; (2) NATO's perception of threats to security and stability; and (3) actions taken by prospective members to complete their democratic transitions and to harmonize their policies with NATO's political aims and security policies.

To reinforce the benefits of Article X, I believe a comprehensive review of the qualifications of the nine current applicant countries should be conducted under the guidelines laid out in the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement. A review of this type would further demonstrate that NATO is actively considering a continuation of the enlargement process. Some believe that the Alliance is not interested in further enlargement; a formal review of the type I am suggesting would go far in reassuring NATO and non-NATO states of the Alliance's plans. Furthermore, a review would provide NATO aspirants with additional incentive to continue democratic, economic and military reforms. This is in the national security interests of the United States and NATO and should be encouraged.

These actions would also serve to clarify the security expectations of non-NATO members. It would make clear that it is the intention of the United States that NATO remain a serious defensive military alliance and not slip into a loose collective security society. It would suggest that enlargement will be a careful, deliberate process, with consideration of all security interests. Finally, it would draw again on the principle of reciprocity, both to encourage prospective members to align themselves with NATO's values and policies and to signal that threats levied against would-be members will be counterproductive.

A second goal enunciated in this resolution concerns the need to broaden NATO's focus. For nearly 50 years, NATO was oriented and organized to defend and respond to an attack from the East. An invasion by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces was the primary threat facing the Alliance. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, new threats have replaced the nightmare of Soviet armored divisions crashing through the Fulda Gap. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue states, terrorism, ethnic strife, and other potentially destabilizing elements now threaten the Alliance.

It is a basic American interest that the Alliance not only enlarge to help

stabilize Eastern Europe but that enlargement be part and parcel of a broader transformation that turns Europe into an increasingly effective strategic partner of the United States in and beyond the continent.

I believe this includes an improvement in the ability for NATO to operate outside the borders of its members. This is not a new mission. The potential for these types of endeavors has been present since NATO's inception. The true core of NATO has always been collective defense, but Article 4 of the Washington Treaty suggests that NATO will consult and can act if the security of any of the Parties is threatened. This interpretation was reinforced by John Foster Dulles in May 1949 during Senate consideration of the Washington Treaty. Secretary of State Dulles testified that the occasions for consultation under Article 4 are not merely attacks in the Atlantic area dealt with by Article 5, but threats anywhere to any of the parties since the parties have interests and possessions throughout the world. So we are not talking about new NATO responsibilities; these types of actions were considered by the members of the Alliance and are supported by language in the treaty ratified by the Senate in 1949.

It is important to remember that participation in non-Article 5 missions is not obligatory and each NATO member is free to make an independent decision regarding participation in those missions. The United States and other NATO members are able to decide on the basis of their interests and an independent assessment of the situation whether to participate. This is as it should be.

A third goal set forth in this resolution deals with NATO members' capabilities. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have altered the strategic and military landscape in which NATO forces will operate in the future. The potential for massive tank battles over the plains of Central Europe has been reduced. Instead military strategists believe the conflicts of the 21st century will require NATO members to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts.

NATO developed a truly credible capability to defend itself from threats emanating from Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. But our allies have not moved far enough or fast enough to improve their capabilities to defend against newly emerging threats. In many cases these threats cannot be readily distinguished as either Article 5 or Article 4.

Today NATO faces threats to its southern borders and forces. For example, Turkey's borders are directly threatened by rogue states to its south. NATO has a credible plan to reinforce Turkey in the event of hostilities. Unfortunately, this plan relies heavily on