

In addition to our service men and women, there are also other Americans in harm's way in the war zone, performing above and beyond the call of duty. I am talking about employees of the State Department. I am talking about other groups of people over there, serving, doing their utmost, who are in equally dangerous situations. At some future point I believe they also deserve due recognition in the same way as our military. We support our Americans. We deeply support our fellow Americans serving in the Balkans. I am very pleased the House has acted, and the Senate will be acting very soon.

I might say, I am also pleased the House approached this matter in the proper way. That is, they brought it up in the House tax-writing committee, the Ways and Means Committee, where the bill was discussed. It was marked up in the committee and then went to the House floor. That is the preferable way of doing business.

In this case, there was an attempt for a bill to be filed at the desk and then brought up directly on the floor on this issue, not going through the Senate tax-writing committee, the Senate Finance Committee. I hope we go back to the usual course of business as a general rule where tax bills go through the Finance Committee before they are brought to the floor. I say that because the legislation will be much better. It will be thought through. There is a chance to correct mistakes. There is a chance to add on measures that should be added on or subtract out measures that should be subtracted out.

Having said that, obviously time is of the essence in this case, and the House Ways and Means Committee has acted; that is, the authorizing committee in the other body did act so we did have at least that assurance this has been looked at with some considerable examination.

I will be very pleased when the House bill comes over. We will be able to vote on it. That will probably be within the hour. As I said, I hope after we do that we can give also the same kind of thought to other Americans who are also serving in the zone who are also sacrificing to a great degree in serving our country.

I yield the remainder of our time.

(Pursuant to the order of April 14, 1999, the bill (S. 767) was returned to the Calendar.)

#### MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FITZGERALD). The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. ROTH. I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. ROTH, Mr. BIDEN and Mr. KENNEDY, pertaining to the introduction of S.J. Res. 19 are located in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

(The remarks of Mr. ROTH and Mr. GRAMS pertaining to the introduction of S. 815 are located in today's RECORD

under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.")

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.

#### KOSOVO POLICY

Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, it is my privilege to speak on the question of Kosovo and our military and political goals there. In working with my staff to put together some background and understand the history of that region, I came across an interesting fact, because I value history. What is it Winston Churchill once said? How do you know where you are going unless you know where you have been?

I find it fascinating, after 146 B.C., the Roman Republic was the world's only superpower—that sounds familiar—following the destruction of its long-time superpower rival, Carthage. This Roman triumph created a tremendous expansion of Roman territory, wealth, and influence and, not coincidentally, an expansion of Roman involvement in local conflicts far removed from Italy.

One such intervention involved the Northern African kingdom of Numidia, where Rome became entangled in a secession struggle in 112 B.C., with the Roman Senate declaring actual war against Jugurtha, the leading contender for the Numidian throne. What followed is fascinating. It is described in a book called the "Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists."

I think there are some lessons here for us, particularly as we view Kosovo today. Viewed from a modern perspective, North Africa in the age of Jugurtha was in many ways Rome's Vietnam. The Jugurthine War is the story of the failure of the Romans to find a strategy that would determine the appropriate level of force needed to maintain sound and stable foreign policy.

The Romans should have learned to operate according to the rules that Clausewitz later laid out in his book "On War": that war is always to be regarded as the pursuit of policy by other means and that strategy is the art of using exactly the appropriate amount of force to accomplish the ends of the policy. The Romans never had a clear policy in Numidia.

This is something we have to avoid in Kosovo. We need a clear policy.

Thus the Romans never had a rational strategy for winning the war.

Another mistake we have to avoid.

As a result, they poured a massive amount of military force into the region and accomplished worse than nothing.

Mr. President, we can't accomplish worse than nothing in Kosovo. We have to accomplish something of which we can be proud. The horrifying scenes unfolding in and around Kosovo today are indeed a sad recap of many of the worst images of our 20th century: Massive refugee flight to uncertain futures, civilian casualties, large numbers of destroyed homes and shops and commu-

nities, ethnic intolerance, and hostilities fanned by demagogic political leaders.

The hearts of Americans and people around the world have been truly touched by the incredible tragic plight of the Kosovar Albanians who have been the primary victims of the incredible, reprehensible, so-called ethnic cleansing policies of Milosevic.

This is also a difficult situation. There are no easy answers, and any choice the President makes and, indeed, any choice the Congress makes is fraught with danger. Part of this, I think, is the world in which we live, not a new world order but a new world disorder.

The post-cold-war order is one of disorder. The two administrations which have confronted the post-Soviet Union world, the Bush and Clinton administrations, have grappled mightily with the complexities of this new age in foreign places, much like the Roman Empire, foreign places like Iraq, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Haiti, and now Kosovo. Almost every step in these areas has been subjected to questioning and controversy before, during, and even after the operation in question.

The decision to authorize the use of airstrikes against Serbia was one of the most difficult decisions I have ever had to make. I have felt in the weeks since much like President Kennedy described himself. He said he was an optimist with no illusions. I am an optimist. I am an idealist. I want to take the high ground. I thought that NATO and America needed to act, and act then, and airstrikes was our best option. Maximum impact on Milosevic, minimum impact on us. But it was a tough decision to make, and I am under no illusion that this is going to automatically get us to where we want to go in terms of our policies in the Balkans.

May I say that we have a major humanitarian interest in providing effective relief for the refugees and preventing further atrocities against civilians by the Milosevic regime. We certainly have a strong interest in stopping the spread of this conflict to the surrounding countries in this historically unstable region.

I find it interesting that the century opened in 1914 with a Serb nationalist assassinating Archduke Ferdinand and that led to the guns of August in 1914. We have to make sure that the current Milosevic-misled nationalism does not lead to the guns of 1999.

Unfortunately, I think that no real military, or so far diplomatic, approach we have come up with can really fully guarantee our goals in the Balkans. Despite my concern about our long-term policy in Kosovo and the Balkans, the Senate was asked to vote at a point when NATO had already united in favor of airstrikes. American troops were poised to embark on their mission and the credibility of American commitments was on the line.

Under these circumstances, I felt that we must not send a signal of disunity to Milosevic, to our NATO allies, to the President, to our own people.

While these circumstances dictated my vote for airstrikes, by no means—and I have made this clear—by no means does this indicate my giving a green light for an open-ended, ill-defined, deeper commitment of American military force in Kosovo, especially the introduction of American ground troops.

Mr. President, I was on the ground in Vietnam 31 years ago. I don't want this generation to repeat that experience. We do not need an open-ended, ill-defined commitment of American ground forces in the Balkans. I hope and pray that we can avoid that.

I hope and expect that any such future expansion of military might there would be thoroughly discussed and debated in our country and within NATO before it is undertaken, not after the decision has been already made. I oppose American ground troops in Kosovo. I think this would represent further intervention in that civil war within internationally recognized borders, Yugoslavia. I think it would be in pursuit of objectives which are not vital to the United States or NATO and would do little, frankly, to secure the long-term interests that we do have in the Balkans—stability and economic prosperity.

The distinguished Senator from Kansas, Mr. ROBERTS, has often cited the following quotation from one of my personal heroes, Senator Richard Russell. It is an honor I cherish that I hold his seat in the Senate and his seat on the Senate Armed Services Committee. Senator Russell 30 years ago in this Chamber, while I was in Vietnam, said this:

While it is a sound policy to have limited objectives, we should not expose our men to unnecessary hazards of life and limb in pursuing them. As for me, my fellow Americans, I shall never knowingly support a policy of sending even a single American boy overseas to risk his life in combat unless the entire civilian population and wealth of our country—all that we have and all that we are—is to bear a commensurate responsibility in giving him the fullest support and protection of which we are capable.

Mr. President, it has been my honor to visit some of the troops and facilities in Georgia that are supporting our efforts in Kosovo and the Balkans and in western Europe, some of the troops in Fort Stewart, troops at Robins Air Force Base. I know what it means to be a troop out there committed on behalf of this country and to have this country divided. It is not fun. It is not what we want to repeat. And with air operations now ongoing, with Americans soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in harm's way, our thoughts must turn to them as they tackle a very complicated and very risky mission. Our prayers are with them, and we pray for their safe return in every way.

As with every American military deployment, there are risks. That is why

I have chosen to visit some of the places in Georgia that have sent young men and women into harm's way, including the 93rd Air Control Wing of JSTARS Aircraft out of Robins Air Force Base; the 19th Air Refueling Group of KC135R Aircraft—which participated, by the way, in the rescue of our downed stealth fighter pilot—also out of Robins; and the 94th Airlift Wing of the C-130 transports out of Dobbins Air Reserve Base, not to mention the numerous other Georgia citizens serving in our deployed forces in the Balkans.

My primary purpose today is to look beyond the military phase at our Balkans policy and ahead to the elements which I believe we must consider if we are to have a truly successful exit strategy. I said today in our hearings that there is one thing a Vietnam veteran does not like to hear and that is "no win." There is another thing and that is "no exit." Put those together and that becomes a tragedy: "no win, no exit." We can't have that situation in the Balkans. We need a successful exit strategy which produces a long-term, stable, and humane outcome, one which also will allow our service men and women to come home safely from the Balkans without having to return again. I believe we ought to have a full debate on our exit strategies now, and not just on exit strategies, but on what constitutes victory. I think we still have to nail that down. But certainly we ought to talk about not just how we get in and what we do there, but how do we get out.

Even while military operations are still underway, we must not repeat the mistakes the Romans made in the Jugurthine war, or the mistakes we made in the Vietnam war—pursuing both "no win" and "no exit" at the same time.

In spite of substantial disagreements about the appropriate ways to go about our goals in the Balkans, I think there is some consensus in this country and in NATO regarding our ultimate goals:

1. An end to atrocities in Kosovo.
2. Effective relief for refugees.
3. A negotiated political settlement, in terms of the status of Kosovo.
4. Stability throughout the Balkans, including Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro.

Another important goal, it seems to me, is an end to the U.S. and other NATO country force deployments in the Balkans, in other than a legitimate peacekeeping rather than warmaking role.

Any effective exit strategy must indicate how we can achieve these ends, including the costs for doing so and also the costs for not doing so. Our involvement in Bosnia has cost us \$10 billion already. I understand that the price tag, through October, for our involvement now in Kosovo will cost some \$8 billion. We owe it to both the people in the region, as well as to our own service men and women, to determine what price we are prepared to pay

in order to make their sacrifices in the military operations they are involved in worthwhile in the long run. Otherwise, we may actually "win the war," but "lose a peace" by failure to pursue the nonmilitary policies necessary to attain our key objectives.

I think it is important for me to quote one of my heroes, Walter Whitman, who said about the Vietnam experience that the battles we fight we may win, but the battles we fight can't win the war. One of the things I fear most about Kosovo and further military action in the Balkans is that we win those battles, but those battles can't help us bring about the ultimate goals we seek. I am afraid there is a massive disconnect there between the two, and I am afraid that is going to pull us into a deeper and more prolonged war.

In that spirit, I want to offer some preliminary ideas, some key elements that I believe must be part of an exit strategy.

First of all, we must develop a comprehensive, long-term plan for refugee relief and resettlement. I am not sure if I were a Kosovar Albanian that I would ever want to go back to that part of the world. I would certainly probably not want to go back as long as Milosevic was in power. It is one thing to announce the appropriate goal of the return of all the Kosovar refugees to their homes, but how many will really want to go back? Is it really possible to put Humpty-Dumpty back together again? Is it possible to put together Kosovo as it was before the war? It may not be possible. It is another thing to realize reality and put together a set of policies necessary to deal with the real life situation in which many—perhaps most—of the Kosovar Albanians exist today:

1. They don't have homes.
2. In many ways, they are dispossessed and don't have a country.
3. They don't have jobs.
4. They don't have functioning communities to return to.

While the European members of NATO and other nearby nations have a great stake in the refugee population resettlement, it is the greatest obligation we have here in the United States, too. We have a significant responsibility. I believe the administration and Congress must develop a substantial aid package now to demonstrate clearly that we are fully committed to successfully working on the refugee crisis. It may be years before that crisis is resolved. The sooner we get to work on it, the better.

Secondly, in terms of a successful exit strategy out of the Balkans, we must be prepared to address, as part of any lasting solution to the problems in Kosovo and the Balkans, the economic devastation which exists in much of the entire Balkan region, much of which has been brought about by Milosevic himself in making war on the Slovenians, the Croats, the Muslims, and now on the Kosovars. Much of this devastation has been at his

hands and under the barrel of his guns. This devastation is not something that can be overcome overnight. It is my view that there is little prospect for lasting reconciliation between the peoples and nations of the Balkans until there is some degree of economic recovery. People aren't going to return to homes that exist in communities that don't function. They are not going to return to places where there are no jobs, no schools, no education, and no hope. So much of the Balkans now is in that condition.

Given the depth of the problem, we are looking at a project which is almost certainly to be far more lengthy than the financially costly refugee problem. Again, Europe must take the lead, but the United States has to play a part as the international community leader, which it is. We have a stake in the stability of the Balkans, and this is one of the areas that we need to address. We need to begin now considering under which conditions we will offer economic reconstruction aid to the Balkans.

Third, in terms of a successful exit strategy, we have to begin laying the groundwork for an international conference to determine a mechanism for a final settlement not just of the Kosovo problem and allowing the will of the people in the Balkans to determine their fate, but we have to do that for Bosnia as well. I think the only way out of our dilemma in the Balkans is negotiating a settlement acceptable to as many parties as possible. It is the only outcome I can see that would help us achieve some lasting peace in the region.

Fourth, in terms of a successful exit strategy, all of these efforts that, as I mentioned, revolve around Kosovo have to be applied to Bosnia as well. American forces have been enforcing an uneasy peace in Bosnia since 1996. Many of those refugees displaced in the Bosnia war have not returned to their homes. The costs continue to mount to this country and NATO, and no clear end is in sight.

I find it fascinating that the great powers of Europe, after World War I, in 1918, help set up the Balkans, help structure it as it is today. As a matter of fact, in terms of Kosovo, the Russians helped prevail upon the great powers of Europe to take Kosovo away from Albania and give it to Serbia. It is now part of Serbia. I think we need an international conference to resolve some of these dilemmas that have resulted from a century-old set of solutions that may not any longer apply.

Fifth, for any successful exit strategy, and for any settlement or resettlement to stick, Serbia must be reconciled to its neighbors and to the NATO countries. Clearly, the chief source of the most immediate problems in the Balkans, the massive human rights violation in Kosovo, is the Serbian regime led by Milosevic. He stands condemned before history and humanity.

I am confident that he will ultimately be held accountable for his actions—not just by an international tribunal but by the civilized world. However, we must be very careful that, in painting Milosevic as the enemy, we not demonize the Serbian people. After all, Serbia is the only part of the former Yugoslavia which fought as our allies in both of the world wars of this century. We must make a concerted effort to reach out to the Serbians to make it clear that our quarrel is not with them; it is with Milosevic and his actions.

Sixth, as a vital part, a key part of an exit strategy, we must thank those who fought the war. We must redeem our pledges to the men and women in our Armed Forces who are, once again, being asked to put their lives on the line to implement American foreign policy. Our service men and women, and their families, are, once again, the ones paying the price for the policies we make here in Washington. They are on the point of the sphere. If we policymakers are going to continue to put them in harm's way, surely we can appropriately provide for the men and women and their families who depend on them.

This body passed overwhelmingly S. 4, a marvelous measure to increase pay and improve pension benefits under the G.I. bill. I was proud to be part of that effort, and we need to make sure that the effort passes the House and is signed into law.

It is interesting, as we find ourselves exiting the 20th century and going into the 21st with another situation in the Balkans. Hopefully, we can avoid the guns of 1999 and move towards a more peaceful resolution of our problems. Hopefully, we have learned some things through the years. But, interestingly enough, we have a new role going into the 21st century and will face very few self-imposed restraints on our actions. Therefore, perhaps more than at any time in our Nation's history, it is imperative that both Congress and the executive branch focus clearly on defining our national interest and developing policies to effectively and appropriately protect and promote those interests. Even with our current unparalleled power and influence, I think it would be wise to heed the words of President Kennedy in 1961. He said about us in this country:

And we must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent or omniscient, that we are only 6 percent of the world's population, that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 percent of mankind, that we cannot right every wrong or reverse every adversity, and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.

Mr. President, I was laying on a beach in Miami getting ready to go to basic training at Fort Benning in the summer of 1963 and heard a marvelous speech on my little transistor radio. I can remember the technology in those days. That was high tech in those days.

I remember that President Kennedy spoke at American University on June

10, 1963, in a marvelous address. And he said, "We don't want a Pax Americana." That is not what we want to look for as we enter the 21st century. We don't want a Pax Americana. We don't want America to keep the peace all over the world. It is not our role. It is not our job. And we have to realize that it is not necessarily an American solution to every problem in the world.

But the challenge for the post-cold war world for us is to learn from the Jugurthine War that, consistent with our national interests and our values, we "find a strategy that would determine the appropriate level of force needed to maintain sound and stable foreign policy."

The post-cold-war world of disorder makes the development of a bipartisan national security consensus especially relevant. We have often said, and really meant, I think, that politics must stop at the water's edge. But we need more now. I believe we need to redouble our efforts to open real dialog here within the Congress and with the administration and with the American people to discuss the fundamental role of America's power in the world as we begin the 21st century. Kosovo challenges us to define that policy now. For the dialog to be meaningful, we must be sure that policymakers, including Members of Congress, have timely and sufficient information to actually allow us to make informed decisions before we get so deeply committed in a military excursion that challenges American credibility.

I had a hand last year in working with the wonderful Senator OLYMPIA SNOWE and PAT ROBERTS in some efforts to enact in the last Congress and to seek to require the administration, the President whenever the President committed some 500 troops abroad, or asked for money for a contingency force to be sent somewhere in the world, this requirement that Senator SNOWE and I put together and Senator ROBERTS put together in the appropriations bill and in the authorization bill, requires the administration, when they do those kinds of things, when they make those kinds of commitments, to come before the Congress up front and early and explain why we are committing our forces abroad, what the military application is, and what the exit strategy is.

Unfortunately, I am afraid these amendments went by the wayside and we don't have the kind of information up front and early that we need. I will be working with Senator SNOWE and Senator ROBERTS to strengthen our legislation so that the Congress can get in, in terms of military commitment, on the take off as well as a potential crash landing.

Let me just say that we need to adhere to the basic dictum of Clausewitz that we must know in terms of military commitment, the last step we are going to take before we take the first step. If I had any one red-letter piece of advice to give our policymakers here in

Washington, that will be it. Let's make sure we fully understand the last step we are going to take before we take the first step. It is so easy to get into war; it is so difficult to get out.

There is, obviously, much more to be done in formulating an effective approach to defining the proper guidelines, objectives, and policies for American foreign policy in today's world. We must successfully resolve the debate about NATO's mission statement: Is it going to participate in more offensive operations, or is it going to continue to be a defensive alliance primarily? Are we going to admit more members? Is this a good idea, or a bad idea?

The members of NATO are coming to Washington in a few days. I think we ought to engage in that discussion with NATO, because we have to figure in the relationship with our friends and our allies, because those relationships affect our relationship with other countries.

Our relationship with Russia, for instance—Russia, for all of its troubles, is still the only nation possessing the means to really threaten our physical security. And China? What about China? China, I think, might pose perhaps the greatest policy challenge to us as we enter the 21st century.

Clearly, there is much work to do. But it all starts with the correct articulation of national interests—what is vital to our national interest and what is not, and particularly in terms of the commitment of American young men and women abroad.

For all the challenges and difficulties facing us today, I would like for us to consider the other words spoken by President Kennedy in that 1963 address, on June 10, at American University. He spoke during the height of the cold war. President Kennedy put it this way:

World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor; it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever. However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, the tide of time and events will often bring surprising changes in the relations between nations and neighbors. So let us persevere. Peace need not be impracticable and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly, by making it seem more manageable and less remote, we can help all peoples to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly toward it.

I yield the floor.

Mrs. LINCOLN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ROBERTS). The distinguished Senator from Arkansas is recognized.

Mrs. LINCOLN. I thank the Chair.

#### MORTGAGE DEDUCTIONS

Mrs. LINCOLN. Mr. President, on tax-filing day, it is customary for Senators to note the many difficulties that taxpayers have complying with a complex and unwieldy tax system. I plan to

highlight some problems with the system later today. But I do think it is important, however, to note that some aspects of our system have worked very well.

Since the Internal Revenue Code was enacted in 1913, the tax system has provided a deduction for mortgage interest. The mortgage interest deduction is one of the simplest, most widely available, and most widely understood of all the provisions in the Code.

What is important about the deduction is the support it provides for a goal that is of paramount importance to all Americans—Homeownership. Just five years ago, the rate of homeownership was declining in our country. Beginning in late 1997, however, the rate of homeownership began to climb, so that now, a record number of American families own their own homes. For the first time in our history, two-thirds of all households own their own homes. Where has the growth in homeownership been most evident? Every age group has expanded its ownership, and, even more importantly for the future of our country, the two categories of homeowners that have seen the greatest rates of growth are first-time homeowners and minorities. It is also notable that within 6 years of naturalization, foreign-born individuals achieve the same rate of homeownership as the nation at large. This is a great achievement that shows that the American Dream is alive and well.

When asked why they want to own their own homes, Americans in all parts of the country note that "Owning my own home is the American dream. That is what it all boils down to, that I own my own home." They do not buy a home to get tax breaks. They buy a home to attain a sense of community. Neighborhoods that have a high rate of homeownership have high rates of voting, participation in schools, and lower crime rates.

It seems that we all complain a great deal about the complexity of the tax system. I think that a great deal of this tax code ridicule is justified. The U.S. Tax Code now consumes more pages than eight Bibles. It is generally too complicated and unfair for most taxpayers. I too believe that the tax code must be streamlined but only while preserving important taxpayer deductions such as the home mortgage deduction. It is important to note that, as far as the tax code goes, one of the easiest steps in the computation process is the mortgage interest deduction. Unlike many more recently created tax breaks, the mortgage interest deduction presents no difficult formulas, calculations, or income limits for taxpayers who utilize the deduction. The lender simply provides the interest and property tax amounts to the homeowner on a Form 1098. The taxpayer then simply transfers these two numbers from the form on to their tax return.

Among the taxpayers who itemize their deductions, 28 million used the

mortgage interest deduction in 1995, the most recent year for which statistics were available. In that group, 71% had incomes below \$75,000, and 42% had incomes below \$50,000. Clearly, the mortgage interest deduction is a significant benefit for middle class taxpayers.

Homeownership is a cornerstone of American life. The tax code has always supported that goal and facilitated the great achievements we have made. The stability and simplicity of the tax policies supporting homeownership have played a crucial role in the progress we have made in keeping the American Dream alive.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### EXTENSION OF CERTAIN TAX BENEFITS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the clerk will report.

The legislative assistant read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 1376) to extend the tax benefits available with respect to services performed in a combat zone to services performed in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) and certain other areas, and for other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I rise in support of the military tax-filing fairness bill that passed the Senate earlier today. This is an important signal of support to send to our troops in the Balkans as they fight against the forces of ethnic cleansing, mass murder, and genocide. All Americans should be proud of the dedication and professionalism shown by our military personnel in the ongoing NATO operation.

While I am very pleased that we were able to pass this legislation, I am disappointed that I was unable to offer an amendment that would call on Secretary Cohen to do everything in his power to ensure that both parents in dual military couples are not deployed into a combat area.

As the number of United States personnel slated for the Balkans increases—and as there is an increased possibility of a Reserve call-up—I am concerned that situations may arise where children will have to watch both of their parents deployed in combat. It is difficult enough for children to watch one parent go off to war. It is unacceptable that they should have to see both of their parents put in harm's way.

I hope that we will have the opportunity to discuss this matter further