

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized to speak as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE KOSOVO QUAGMIRE

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it seems we are about to go to war with Yugoslavia. Our stated purpose is to stop the humanitarian disaster there caused by a civil war. If we do not act, we are told, innocent people will be killed, will be wounded, will be displaced from their homes. Indeed, over 2,000 have already been killed in the Kosovo civil war in just the last year. Many more have been uprooted. There are serious problems there. No one disputes that.

My question is, Where is the vital U.S. national interest?

The National Defense Council Foundation recently reported that there are at least 60 conflicts going on in the world involving humanitarian suffering of one kind or another. There are 30 wars being waged—civil wars, guerrilla wars, major terrorist campaigns. Many are driven by ethnic quarrels and religious disputes which have raged for decades, if not for centuries.

Just consider a partial list from recent years: 800,000 to 1 million people have been brutally murdered in Rwanda alone; tens of thousands killed in civil wars in Sudan, Algeria and Angola; thousands killed in civil war in Ethiopia; in January, 140 civilians killed by paramilitary squads in Colombia; including 27 worshipers slain during a village church service.

Why is there no outcry for these millions of people who are being brutally murdered in other places in the world, but we are all concerned about the humanitarian problems in Kosovo?

I have to say this, and I know it is very unpopular to say it, but I am going to quote a guy whose name is Roger Wilkins. He is a professor of history and American culture at George Mason University:

I think it is pretty clear. U.S. foreign policy is geared to the European-American sensibility which takes the lives of white people much more seriously than the lives of people who aren't white.

Let me read a couple paragraphs from an article in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune on January 31, 1999:

But no one mobilized on behalf of perhaps 500 people who were shot, hacked and burned to death in a village in eastern Congo, in central Africa, around the same time. No outrage was expressed on behalf of many other innocents who had the misfortune to be slain just off the world's stage over the past few weeks.

Why do 45 white Europeans rate an all-out response while several hundred black Africans are barely worth notice?

And this is all in that same time-frame.

Further quoting the Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune:

While U.S. officials struggled to provide an answer, analysts said the uneven U.S. responses to a spurt of violence in the past month illuminates not just an immoral or perhaps racist foreign policy, but one that fails on pragmatic and strategic grounds as well.

So now the President wants us to send the U.S. military into Kosovo, not to enforce a peace agreement—we do not have a peace agreement, as we were told 2 weeks ago—but to inject ourselves into the middle of an ongoing civil war, with no clearly defined military objective, no assurance of success, no exit strategy and great, great risk to our pilots and men and women in uniform.

We know that the Yugoslav leader, Mr. Milosevic, is a bad guy. No one disputes that. But are we absolutely sure that there are some good guys, too? Are there any good guys in the fight that stretches back over 500 years?

When I was in Kosovo recently, I was horrified as I was going through the main road—Kosovo is only 75 miles wide and 75 miles long, and there is one road going all the way through it. I was only able to see two dead people at the time. They turned them over and both of them were Serbs. They had been executed at pointblank range. And they were Serbs, not Kosovars, not Albanians. So the national interest here is not at all clear.

Let me quote Dr. Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. In an op-ed piece in the Washington Post on February 24, Kissinger said he was opposed to U.S. military involvement in Kosovo. He is not unaware of the humanitarian concerns that the President and others talk about. Here are just a few of the highlights of what he said:

The proposed deployment in Kosovo does not deal with any threat to American security as traditionally conceived.

Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was to Europe.

If Kosovo, why not East Africa or Central Asia?

We must take care not to stretch ourselves too thin in the face of far less ambiguous threats in the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

Each incremental deployment into the Balkans is bound to weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North Korea.

I think this is very, very significant, the last two points.

First of all, I have asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have asked the Chiefs, I have asked the CINCs, the commanders in chief, this question: If we have to send troops into Kosovo—keep in mind that people may lie to you and say this is going to be an airstrike. Anybody who knows anything about military strategy and warfare knows you can't do it all from the air. You have to ultimately send in ground troops. So we are talking about sending in ground troops. That is in a theater where the logistics support for

ground troops is handled out of the 21st TACOM in Germany. I was over in the 21st TACOM. Right now, they are at 110 percent capacity just supporting Bosnia. They don't have any more capacity. The commander in chief there said, if we send ground troops into Iraq or Kosovo, we are going to be 100 percent dependent upon Guard and Reserve to support those troops. And look what has happened to the Guard and Reserve now because of the decimation of our military through its budget, finding ourselves only half the size we were in 1991.

Right now, we don't have the capacity. We have to depend on Guard and Reserves, and in doing this we don't have the critical MOSs. You can't expect doctors in the Guard to be deployed for 270 days and maintain their practice, so we now have ourselves faced with a problem, a serious problem, and that is we cannot carry out the national military strategy, which is to be able to defend America on two regional fronts. We don't have the capacity to do it. If we could do it on nearly simultaneous fronts within 45 days between each conflict, then we go up from low-medium risk to a medium-high risk, which is translated in lives of Americans.

Going into Kosovo for an unlimited duration at who knows what cost, who knows the amount of risk, the risk will be higher.

I chair the readiness subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. President, and I can tell you right now that we are in the same situation we were in in the late 1970s with the hollow force. We can't afford to dilute our military strength anymore. And that is not even mentioning the immediate risk to our forces that they will face in Yugoslavia where the Serbs have sophisticated Russian-made air defense and thousands of well-trained and equipped troops motivated to fight and die for their country.

In recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, some of our top military leaders were very frank about what they expected for any U.S. military operation in Kosovo.

Air Force Chief of Staff General Ryan said, "There stands a very good chance that we will lose aircraft against Yugoslavian air defense."

Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Johnson, said, "We must be prepared to take losses."

Marine Commandant, General Krulak, said it will be "tremendously dangerous."

And then George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, said this is not Bosnia we are talking about, this is Kosovo where they are not tired, they are not worn out, and they are ready to fight and kill Americans.

So we are faced with that serious problem, Mr. President. We should not under any circumstances go into Kosovo. Our vital security interests are not at stake, where we don't have a clear military objective or an exit

strategy, or where our policy doesn't fit into any coherent broader foreign policy vision.

So let me go back to my opening statement. Since we have no national security risks at stake, there must be another reason for our involvement. It is not humanitarian because of the following:

800,000 to 1 million killed in ethnic strife in Rwanda;

tens of thousands killed in civil wars in Sudan, Algeria, and Angola;

thousands killed in civil war in Ethiopia;

in January, 140 civilians killed by paramilitary squads in Colombia, including 27 worshippers slain during a village church service.

Why is there no outcry for U.S. involvement in these obvious humanitarian situations?

"I think it's pretty clear," said Roger Wilkins, professor of history and American culture at George Mason University. "U.S. foreign policy is geared to the European-American sensibility which takes the lives of white people much more seriously than the lives of people who aren't white."

Anyone who supports our sending American troops into Kosovo must be aware this will come back and haunt them. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of Oregon). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, for the information of our colleagues, the majority leader will soon be coming over to make a unanimous consent request concerning the vote on a resolution dealing with Kosovo. I have been involved in the negotiations of the resolution. I might read it for my colleagues, for the information of my colleagues, and then I am going to state my opposition to it. But for the information of all of our colleagues, it is our hope and our expectation we would have a vote on this resolution in the not too distant future, possibly as early as 6 or 6:30 or 7 o'clock. So I wanted my colleagues to be aware of that.

Mr. President, this resolution authorizes the President of the United States to conduct military air operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro.

The resolution reads,

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America and Congress assembled, That the President of the United States is authorized to conduct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro.

It is very simple. It is very short. There are not a long list of

"whereases," not a lot of confusion. It says we authorize the President of the United States to conduct airstrikes against Serbia.

I oppose this resolution. I will take a couple of minutes to explain my opposition. I understand and I have great respect for many of our colleagues who are supportive. I have joined with colleagues who went to the White House on Friday and also earlier today to talk to the President and hear his side of the issue. He tried to make a very strong case for airstrikes and for military intervention. He didn't convince me. I respect his opinion. I just happen to disagree with him.

Time and time again I ask, If we are going to war, why are we going to war? Make no mistake, if we conduct airstrikes against Serbia, we are going to war. I don't think we should do that lightly.

I tell my colleagues, the resolution that we are voting on, in my opinion, is a very important resolution. It is probably one of the most important votes we will conduct, certainly this session of Congress. Maybe Members will look back over their Senate career and it may be one of the most important votes Members will cast in their Senate career.

I urge my colleagues to vote no on this resolution. That means I think that we are making a mistake by conducting a bombing campaign in Serbia. A bombing campaign will also lead to ground campaigns. A lot of people have the false assumption that if we have airstrikes, that is it. Many times there has been a tendency by this administration—and maybe previous administrations as well—that we can do things by air and that will do it.

We had an air campaign, we had military strikes in the air against Iraq in December—I believe December 18, 19, and 20. It was a significant military operation. Why? Because we wanted to get the arms control inspectors back into Iraq. We bombed them like crazy. Guess what. We don't have any arms control inspectors in Iraq today, so air didn't do it. Saddam Hussein is now able to build weapons of mass destruction. The air campaign didn't change his policies one iota.

What about in Serbia? The whole purpose of this—I will read from yesterday's New York Times, an interview with Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State,

Two days after President Clinton warned that the Serbs had gone beyond "the threshold" of violence in their southern province, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright said she was sending Mr. Holbrooke to present Mr. Milosevic with a "stark choice."

That choice, she said, was for him to agree to the settlement signed in Paris last week by the ethnic Albanians . . . or face NATO air strikes.

In other words, if the Serbs don't sign on to the agreement that was negotiated in France, they are going to face airstrikes. In other words, we are going to be attacking a foreign country because they refused to allow an inter-

national force to be stationed in their country. That is what the Paris agreement is.

Some of our colleagues say they will vote for airstrikes but they won't vote for ground forces. The Secretary of State says we are going to bomb them until they agree to sign up to a peace agreement, a peace agreement that calls for stationing 28,000 international troops into Kosovo.

I just disagree. I don't think you can bomb a country into submitting to a peace agreement. That is more than coercion, and I don't think you get real peace by coercing somebody. Maybe cajoling people, maybe a little leverage here and there, but to say we will bomb your country until you sign a peace agreement is probably very shortsighted and not real peace, and to station the 28,000 troops into hostile territory I think would be a very serious mistake.

I have heard the President's arguments. I haven't made the argument this is not in our national interest, but I will say there is—I started to say a civil war is going on in Kosovo, but it is not even to the point of a civil war. There is certainly an armed conflict. There is guerrilla warfare going on. There has been sniping going on. There have been people killed on both sides. I think that is unfortunate, but it has been happening. But this is not the only civil conflict that is going on around the world. Yet in this conflict, we will take sides. Maybe if you declare it is a civil war going on, a total civil war going on in Kosovo—why should we be taking sides? Should we be the air force for the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army? Should we be trying to help them fulfill their goals?

Their goal is not autonomy; their goal is independence. They were somewhat reluctant to sign on to the France so-called peace agreement because they didn't want autonomy; they wanted independence. They will never be satisfied until they have independence. The French peace accords say we will insert this peacekeeping force of 28,000 troops for 3 years, we will have autonomy at that time, and then we are somewhat silent on what happens at the end of 3 years. If anyone has talked to the KLA, they know that the KLA wants independence. Should we be intervening to the extent of taking that side?

Some of my colleagues say if Serbia is really massing and having military actions against the KLA, instead of us just bombing, why don't we just give them some support? Why don't we give them some munitions and help them defend themselves? It is similar to the argument many of us made in Bosnia: Instead of sending troops, we wanted to take the arms embargo off and allow them to defend themselves. Senator Dole stood on the floor many times and said let's allow them to defend themselves.

Some people made that same argument today, dealing with the Kosovars. The problem is, the peace agreement

that has been negotiated says we will disarm the KLA. I think the chances of that happening are slim, if non-existent. They will hide the arms. We will not be successful in disarming, nor do I really think that we should. We will be very much involved in a civil war. We are taking the side of the Kosovars. Many of the Kosovars are great people and I love them and some are very peace loving, but there are some people on the other side, on the KLA side, who have assassinated and murdered as well.

I have serious, serious reservations about getting involved in a civil war. I have very strong reservations about the ability to be able to bomb somebody to the peace table and making them agree to a peace agreement that they were not a signatory to.

I am reminded by some of our friends and colleagues that this is a continuation of President Bush's policy. As a matter of fact, in December of 1992 President Bush—and he was a lame duck President at the time—issued a very stern warning to Mr. Milosevic: If he made a military move in Kosovo, there would be significant and serious consequences. Mr. Milosevic rightfully respected President Bush, and he didn't make that move. I supported President Bush in making that statement. I think he was right in doing so.

However, there is a big difference between that statement and saying we will move militarily if he moves aggressively against the Kosovars. There is a big difference between that and saying we will bomb you until you agree to a peace agreement, and part of that peace agreement is stationing 28,000 troops in Kosovo. There is a big difference. I hope our colleagues will understand that difference. That is one of the reasons I am vigorously opposed to this resolution. I don't think you can bomb a sovereign nation into submission of a peace agreement.

Let me mention a couple of other reservations that I have. Somebody said, What about the credibility of NATO? NATO, for 50 years, has helped sustain peace and stability throughout Europe. It has been a great alliance. That is true. NATO has been a great alliance. It has been a defensive alliance. NATO has never taken military action against a non-NATO member when other NATO countries weren't threatened. Now we are breaking new ground and we are moving into areas which I believe greatly expand NATO's mission far beyond the defensive alliance that it was created under.

Another reservation I have: The Constitution says that Congress shall declare war; it doesn't say the President can initiate war. The President started at least consulting Congress on Friday. He also consulted with Congress today, Tuesday. We understand that war is imminent. I don't consider that consultation. I remember about 4 weeks ago when Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen briefed a few of us on the Paris negotiations,

or the negotiations in France. They basically said: We are trying to get both sides to sign; we think maybe the Kosovars will sign, but the Serbs and Mr. Milosevic are not inclined to. But if we can get the Kosovars to sign, we will bomb the Serbs until they do sign.

I left there thinking, you have to be kidding. That is their policy? I want peace. I want peace as much as President Clinton. I want peace as much as Secretary Albright, throughout Yugoslavia, but I don't think by initiating bombing we will bring about peace. I am afraid, instead of increasing stability, it might increase violence.

There might be adverse reactions that this administration hasn't thought about. Instead of bringing about stability, it may well be that the Serbian forces are going to move more aggressively. In the last 24 hours, it looks like that may be the case. So instead of convincing Mr. Milosevic to take the Serbs out of Kosovo, they may be moving in more aggressively. It looks as if that is happening now. Instead of dissuading him from oppression on the Kosovars, he may be more oppressive, more aggressive, and he may run more people away from their homes and burn more villages. Instead of bringing stability, it may be bringing instability, and it may be forcing, as a result of this bombing, Mr. Milosevic—instead of his response being to move back into greater Serbia and away from Kosovo, he may be more assertive and aggressive and he may want to strike out against the United States. If airplanes are flying, he might find that is unsuccessful. I hope he has no success against our pilots and our planes, but if he is not successful against our planes, what can he be successful against? Maybe the KLA, or maybe he would be more aggressive in striking out where he can have results on the ground.

So by initiating the bombing, instead of bringing stability, we may be bringing instability. We may be igniting a tinderbox that has been very, very explosive for a long time. I hope that doesn't happen, but I can easily see how it could happen. I have heard my colleague, Senator INHOFE, allude to the fact that former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger alluded to that.

I will read this one sentence: "The threatening escalation sketched by the President to Macedonia, Greece and Turkey are, in the long run, more likely to result from the emergence of a Kosovo State." Well, the President, in this so-called peace accord, is supporting autonomy for Kosovo. I have already stated that the Kosovo Liberation Army doesn't want autonomy, they want independence. If they are an independent state, many people see that usually aligned with Albania and may be including the Albanians in Macedonia. So you have a greater Albania which would be very destabilizing, certainly, toward the Greeks and maybe other European allies. So the peace accord says we don't want

independence for Kosovo, we just want autonomy.

Former Secretary of State Kissinger says maybe that makes it more dangerous and maybe violence would be escalated in that process. Instead of being a stabilizing factor, it may be an escalating factor. That is not just me saying that. That is Henry Kissinger and other people I respect a great deal saying that, also.

I am glad we are going to be voting on this resolution. We are going to have this vote—at least that is our expectation. I know the leader is going to propound a request before too long. It is important that we vote on this. It would be easy for this Senator, or any other Senator, to say we are never going to vote on this; we can stop this, and frankly, if you stop it long enough, maybe the President will be bombing and then you can say, hey, it doesn't make any difference, he already started bombing. I think that would be a mistake. We ought to have an up-or-down vote. Is this the right thing to do or not?

So I urge my colleagues to support the leader in his efforts to come to an agreement on a vote on this resolution. I, for one—I say "for one" because even though I am assistant majority leader, I have not asked one colleague to vote one way or another on this resolution. Some issues are too important to play partisan politics on. I am not playing partisan politics. I refuse to do so. These are tough votes.

I remember the vote we had on the Persian Gulf war in 1991, authorizing the use of force. We already had 550,000 troops stationed in the Persian Gulf ready to fulfill our obligations as outlined by President Bush to remove Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis from Kuwait. We had a good debate on the floor. It wasn't easy. It was a close debate and a close vote—52-47. I thought it was a good vote the way it turned out.

I am going to vote against this resolution because I think it is a mistake. Maybe I am wrong, and if bombing commences, I hope and pray that every single pilot will be returned safely, and that there will be peace and harmony and stability throughout Kosovo. But I am concerned that we are making a mistake. I don't believe you can bomb a country into submission and force them into a peace agreement that they determine is against their interest. I don't think you can bomb a country and say we are going to bomb you until you agree to have stationed 28,000 troops in your homeland. And this is Serbian homeland, and if you go back centuries, fighting has been going on in this country for centuries.

One other comment. Somebody said, "What about the atrocities?" I am concerned about the atrocities, but we have to look at what is in our national interest. There were 96 people killed in Borneo last weekend. In Turkey, something like 37,000 Kurds have lost their lives. They want independence. The

Kurds in Iraq want independence; they want their own homeland. What about in Sudan where there have been over a million lives lost? What about Burundi, where 200,000 lives have been lost. Or Rwanda, where 700,000 lives have been lost?

We have to be very careful. We had a Civil War in this country 130-some years ago, and 600,000 Americans lost their lives. I am glad we didn't have foreign powers intervene in our Civil War. I think that would have been a mistake. I am afraid that we are making a mistake by intervening in the war now going on in Kosovo. I hope this resolution that we are getting ready to vote on is not agreed to. I urge colleagues to vote no on the resolution.

I yield the floor.

Mr. GORTON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, the Senate is about to be presented with a resolution authorizing the President of the United States to intervene in a civil war in the Republic of Yugoslavia—one of many civil wars taking place around the world, in which one dominant group is repressing, killing, and displacing a minority group within their borders.

Mr. President, the cause of this civil war is Mr. Milosevic, the dictator of Serbia and of the Yugoslav Republic. But nowhere in any of the administration's stated goals justifying this intervention is included the removal of Mr. Milosevic from his position of power. The goal is neither a stated nor an unstated goal. Therefore, we are about to engage in a civil war in which we do not go after the cause of the war.

Just a few years ago, the last occasion on which we debated authorizing the President of the United States to engage the Armed Forces of our country far from the borders of the United States, in Iraq, after its invasion of Kuwait, we made the determination, and after successfully removing the symptom, the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, that we would not remove the cause—Saddam Hussein. As a consequence of not going after the cause, we have been involved in either a cold or a hot war with Iraq ever since, at great cost in money to the United States, and at a considerable cost to our support for that cause around the world.

Mr. President, once burned, twice shot. Why, having learned during the war and its aftermath with Iraq that if you are going to use your Armed Forces, you ought to go after the cause, are we failing to do that in this case? Here, as far as I can determine from what I hear from the administration, our goals are as follows:

We hope by the use of our Armed Forces to be permitted to send ground troops to Kosovo for a period of a minimum of 3 years to enforce a peace that neither side in this civil war wishes. We will be there to enforce an auton-

omy for the Kosovars. That is not their ultimate goal, that ultimate goal being independence.

Is there the slightest chance that this will be a peaceable, casualty-free, 3-year occupation, at the end of which, having settled all of the problems of the Kosovars, we will come home? That certainly has not happened in Bosnia, even after all sides were totally exhausted by a civil war.

Those goals of being allowed to occupy Kosovo and enforce an autonomy that neither side wants are not goals justifying or warranting our American military involvement. They are not goals involving the vital security interests of the United States. In fact, if simply stopping a slaughter is a primary goal—and I believe that it is—there are far greater slaughters taking place in Sudan, in several countries in Africa, and in a number of other places around the world in which there has been no request on the part of the administration to intervene. No, Mr. President. This is an intervention that is highly unwise, highly unlikely to be successful, and not worth the investment of our money and lives, if it is successful, with the intermediate goals that the administration uses to justify it.

Mr. President, this Senate Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, this Senate first step into getting into a situation, the consequences of which we simply cannot envisage, and getting into it perhaps with less justification than there was in Vietnam in the midst of a cold war, getting into it to involve ourselves in a civil war that for all practical purposes has already gone on for 600 years, is not—I repeat, not—going to be settled by the United States of America in its intervention in a period of 2 or 3 years antiseptically cost free and casualty free.

With my colleague from Oklahoma, I believe it more than appropriate that we should be debating this resolution here tonight. I believe it more than appropriate that we should vote yes or no on whether or not we agree with the President. That President has finally grudgingly sent us a letter not asking for our authorization but for our support. This is an authorization. It is an authorization that the Senate of the United States, in its wisdom, should reject out of hand. This is not a matter for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States. This is not a matter demanded by our national security. This is not a way that we would even settle the civil war taking place in Kosovo today.

I hope my colleagues will vote with me and will reject this resolution of authorization.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I get confused by this because I think the analyses, although clearly heartfelt and searching, are totally out of propor-

tion. This is Europe, not Asia. This is a place where we fought two world wars, where we got involved in the circumstances based upon the legitimate concern of the spread of communism. This is part of an industrialized world, not where we were in Vietnam. This is not a Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which was clearly open ended. This is closed ended. This is the circumstance. I find it fascinating—all these bad lessons we learned. What is the bad lesson we learned in Bosnia? We stopped bloodshed. We have 7,300 troops there. We have had as many as 365,000 troops in Europe to preserve stability and democracy in Europe for the past 54 years. We have 100,000 troops in Europe right now. We have 100,000 troops who sit there.

If, in fact, it is a bad idea, and it is an open-ended commitment to keep troops in Bosnia, to keep the peace with not a single American life having been lost, without the destabilization of the region, without Croatia and Serbia being at war, without a flood of refugees into Germany and into the rest of the area—if that is a bad idea—then we shouldn't even have anybody in all of Europe. This is about stability in Europe.

The idea of comparing this to Somalia—a life in Somalia is equally as valuable as a life in Kosovo. But the loss of a life in Somalia and the loss of a life in Kosovo have totally different consequences, in a Machiavellian sense, for the United States interests. If there is chaos in Europe, we have a problem. We are a European power. If, as a consequence of this, there is a flood of refugees into any of the surrounding—let's take Albania. Albania has a Greek population that is a minority population, where there is already a problem. If radicalized Albanian Kosovars are thrown out of Kosovo into Albania radicalizing that society—because, by the way, when they burn down your home, when they kill your mother, when they kneel your child on the ground and put a gun to the back of his head and blow it off, it tends to radicalize you. It tends to have that impact. We are talking about 400,000 to 800,000 refugees. What happens if, in fact, the flood of refugees goes rolling into Macedonia, where you have two-thirds of the population that is Slav, one-third Albanian? Just play out that little scenario for me. What happens in that region?

I will not take the time of the Senate to go through the litany of why this clearly is in our interest. But at least let's agree that this isn't anything like Vietnam in terms of our interests—like Africa, or like a whole lot of other places. We have an alliance called NATO. All 19 members of NATO are in agreement that this is necessary. All of Europe is united. All of Europe is united in that we have no choice but to deal with this genocidal maniac.

With regard to this notion of a peace agreement that this is designed—my friend from the State of Washington, I

respectfully suggest, misstated the objectives of the administration. The objectives of the administration are the objectives of the rest of Europe—all 19 other nations as well as the contact group, I might add—and the objectives are these: To stop the genocide, stop the ethnic cleansing, stop the routing, stop the elimination of entire villages in Kosovo, to have some guarantee that the civil rights, civil liberties, life and liberty of the people living in that region, 2 million people, are somewhat secure.

Why do we do that? Beyond the humanitarian reasons, why we do that is, we know what happens if it spins out of kilter. We know what the downside is if the entire area is engulfed in this chaos. We also know from experience what happened in Bosnia. When we acted, when we put ourselves on the line, when we demonstrated that we would not allow it to "happen" again, it worked.

My friends say it isn't working in Bosnia, because, if we move through, all of a sudden everything will fly apart.

That was the case in most of Europe for 30 years. If we removed the troops in Europe in 1954, or 1958, the concern was all of Germany would go. The concern was all of Europe would go. So we held out. We decided that democracy tends to bring stability. I, for the life of me, do not understand why you can just cut out an entire—I wish I had a map here—segment of Europe and say it can be in flames and chaos, and it has no impact on us; it will have no impact on the alliance; it will have no impact on our national security. That I do not understand.

I do agree that this is not an easy choice. I do agree that to know exactly what to do is debatable, legitimately debatable. But I do not agree that the purpose of the administration is, as was stated, to hope to be permitted to send ground troops.

The only reason why the proposal that was put forward by 19 NATO nations in Europe was put forward was not because we want to put in ground troops. It was because we wanted a commitment that the genocide and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo would stop. I remind everybody, by the way, in 1989 and 1990 their rights were taken away. Their autonomy was stripped. During that first 7-year period, there was a policy of nonviolence on the part of the Kosovars led by a doctor named Rugova. And what happened was what some of us predicted: By failing to stop any of the actions of Milosevic and the ultranationalists in Serbia, one thing was bound to happen. Maybe it is because I am Irish I understand it. I watched it. We watched it historically for 80 years in Ireland. That is, when peaceful means fail and people continue to be cleansed, denied their civil rights and their civil liberties, denied the ability to work, denied the ability to worship, denied the ability to speak their language, they become

radicalized. So all of a sudden Rugova found himself odd man out, as the KLA gained credibility and momentum, basically saying: You are not getting it done for us so we are going to use the violent means.

What do we think is going to happen if we walk away? The objective is to stop the oppression of men, women and children who are a minority in Serbia, but make up the majority in Kosovo; to say it will stop. The only way it will stop is one of two: Either Mr. Milosevic is denied the means to continue his oppression, or he comes to the table, agrees to stop it, and allows international forces in there to guarantee that he will stop it.

That is what this is about. You may not think that is a worthwhile goal. I understand that. I understand that. But this is not about the desire to send troops. It is about the desire to keep that part of the world from spinning out of control. I see two of my colleagues wish to speak so I will cease with the following comment.

Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield to me for just a question?

Mr. BIDEN. I sure will.

Mr. STEVENS. I am constrained to go back to the time when we had the Persian Gulf crisis and we had Iraq in Kuwait, threatening to go into Saudi Arabia. What is the difference between that situation, where it actually had taken place, and this threat the Senator is describing in Serbia and in Kosovo now?

Mr. BIDEN. There is a big difference. The difference is it is in the center of Europe, No. 1. No. 2, if Europe in fact becomes destabilized, we are deeply involved in matters far beyond what is existing now.

I acknowledge to my friend, though, what was at stake in the Middle East was oil, was economic security, and was a lot of other things at the time. So it is, in fact, a legitimate point to make that that was a critical vote. I voted against that involvement—I am sure the next point my friend was going to make. I voted against that involvement. I insisted, along with others, there be a resolution to authorize the use of force.

But the argument I would make is, although you can argue it made sense to do what we did, it is a different reason why we moved; a different reason why it occurred; a different reason why it was necessary. It seems to me, comparing what we did in the gulf, comparing that to what we do here either for purposes of justifying action here or not justifying action here, is an inappropriate analogy. It stands on its own. It either made sense or it didn't make sense. It turns out it made sense to move in the gulf and I argue it makes sense for us to take this action now in the Balkans.

So, if I can conclude so my friend from Kentucky, who has been seeking the floor, can get the floor, Senator NICKLES started off a few moments ago pointing out that seven of us, assigned

by the leadership, met to see whether we could work out a compromise resolution. Senator NICKLES pointed out that the resolution that we agreed to move with, assuming the procedural circumstances allowed it to be done, was one that was a straight-up authorization for the use of airpower in conjunction with NATO against Serbia and Mr. Milosevic. That was the language as to how to proceed that was agreed to.

Senator NICKLES indicated he would vote against that, notwithstanding the fact that he helped craft what the language would be. And that makes sense, by the way. He was trying to figure out what is the best, simplest, most straightforward way to get an up-or-down vote on what the President wants to do.

In the meantime, the President has sent us a letter asking for legislation to be able to do this. He has asked us whether or not we would support the use of airpower in conjunction with NATO. I think we should get, at the appropriate point, an up-or-down vote on that. I understand my friend from Alaska may have an amendment to that resolution, if it ever comes up freestanding, dealing with a prohibition of ground troops, but we should get to the business of dealing with that which we are getting at now. I hope through the leadership of the majority leader we can somehow clear the decks and get to a vote on the resolution.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield?

Mr. BIDEN. I will be happy to yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I worked with the Senator from Delaware and others you mentioned. You used the phrase, "we agreed to it." Yes, the group of six or seven did, but it was a recommendation to our respective leadership.

Mr. BIDEN. That is correct.

Mr. WARNER. I have, since that time, worked with Senator LOTT and we pretty well, I think, have this thing ready to be presented to the Senate. As you mentioned, our distinguished colleague from Alaska has possibly some thoughts on it that have not been completed yet—that are to be incorporated—but I want to be sure nothing has been agreed to. It is just a recommendation to the leadership. Our group did, I think, a very fine job in consolidating the thoughts of a number of us who have been working on this for several days. I am hopeful we can bring it up very shortly.

I know the Senator is looking for one Senator who was a part of that group to give his blessing to certain phraseology.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I appreciate the intervention by the Senator from Virginia. He is absolutely correct. Let me be even more precise. Seven of us agreed on the vehicle that we recommend to the leadership that we should be voting on. We agreed to that language. I came back with one of my

Democratic colleagues, Senator LEVIN, spoke with the minority leader, and indicated that this is what we had agreed to. He indicated he thought that was an appropriate vehicle, appropriate way to proceed and I might add, some of the Senators in the room, although they agreed to the language, I want to make clear, were not agreeing to the substance of the language. They agreed that this is an appropriate test vote. This is an appropriate vote to determine whether or not the Senate agrees or disagrees with the President. Several of them—one of them at least—said, "I will not vote for it"; two of them said, "I will not vote for it but I agree this is how we should decide the issue."

I understand that the majority leader has to make a judgment as to what vehicle we use, when we use it, how we will use it, but I hope we can get an up-or-down vote on some direct vote.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is correct. I think very shortly we will have a document to present to the Senate.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.

Mr. BUNNING addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BUNNING. I am more than happy to yield.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I would like to have some parameter on these discussions so that we might get back to the bill and finish it this evening. Could I inquire of the Senator from Kentucky how long he intends to speak?

Mr. BUNNING. Not very long, Mr. President.

Mr. STEVENS. More than 10 minutes?

Mr. BUNNING. No.

Mr. STEVENS. I see Senator BROWNBAC. Does he wish to speak on this subject?

Mr. BROWNBAC. Mr. President, I would like to speak on Kosovo about 7 minutes.

Mr. STEVENS. I see that Senator WARNER's hand is up.

Does the Senator intend to speak also?

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I intend to address the remarks of my two colleagues. I am a cosponsor, with Senator BIDEN, and I have some very definite statements to make.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, with due deference to my friend from Virginia, that matter is not pending before the Senate and the supplemental is. I wonder if the Senators would agree to some time limit so we can tell Members when we will get back to the bill.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we want to accommodate the distinguished chairman. It is important that this colloquy ensues. The distinguished Senator from Kentucky is in opposition to me. I presume my colleague likewise is in opposition to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that these Senators have 30 minutes to continue this discussion and at that time we return to the pending business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. BROWNBAC. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, could we establish a discussion order?

Mr. STEVENS. He has 10 minutes.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to have the opportunity to, on occasion, interject, have a colloquy with both of you, not to exceed 10 minutes.

Mr. BROWNBAC. I agree to 10 minutes, as will the Senator from Kentucky.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.

Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, this resolution which is about to come before the Senate will be something we should have voted on maybe 2 weeks ago. Unfortunately, we are voting on it under an extreme timeframe, and I think that is unfortunate for all of us.

If there are negotiations that have really gone on, it has been one-sided. The Serbs have never sat down and really negotiated in good faith with anyone. Only because they were asked to show up at the table, they showed up for a short time and left immediately. Now the debate has shifted and is not about peacekeeping, not about deploying peacekeepers anymore; it is about going to war with a foreign government. NATO, the United Nations, have never gone to war in a civil war situation. That is what we are about to do, and we have been consulted to the point of being told exactly what the President intends to do, whether or not—whether or not—we agree or disagree.

In 1991, President Bush came to the House and to the Senate and asked for specific resolutions to go to war to defend Kuwait against Iraqi invasion. It was a major vote to go to war in the House. It was a very narrow vote in the Senate. I think by five votes they voted to support President Bush.

I read on the Internet today what was supposed to be a private briefing that we all had at lunch by the Secretary of Defense and by the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That private personal briefing was totally on the Internet this afternoon.

Let me tell my colleagues what it said so everybody in the United States can understand exactly what is going to happen. There will be two different types of airstrikes. There will be a preliminary airstrike—and this is on the Internet; all you have to do is look it up—two kinds of airstrikes to force Belgrade into accepting NATO ground troops.

The first strike would be a demonstration strike by air- and sea-launched cruise missiles to soften up Milosevic to know that we are really serious about this. Then there would be a pause to give the Serbian leadership

a chance to realize that we are serious. If the Serbs do not comply, there would be a second wave of strikes that would be targeted to air defense and missile installations by the same type of military hardware. In fact, 55 percent, or a little less, of all of the airstrikes done will be 70 percent by U.S. hardware and, if we use aircraft, 54 percent of it exactly will be by U.S. aircraft.

This is in the middle of Europe. This is not at our borders in Mexico or Canada.

Mr. DOMENICI. May we have order, Mr. President?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will be in order.

Mr. BUNNING. The second wave would be to take down the missile defenses.

Let me give you a little background. In 1991, we had a briefing in the House of Representatives by Dick Cheney, who was Secretary of Defense, and by Colin Powell, who was the head of the Joint Chiefs. They both said the same thing: The worst thing we can do is to send ground troops into Bosnia and Kosovo or any of that area, because of the logistics, because of the terrain, because of the weather. One of the things that they also said was that airstrikes would be very questionable. The reason they were going to be questionable was that the sophistication of the missile defenses and of the air defenses of the Serbs was much better than many other places. The terrain is much more difficult.

What we are doing is wrong. What the President asked us to do at the 11th hour is wrong. We should not be going into an independent nation's civil war and imposing our will, no matter what the situation is.

Now, the Senator from Oklahoma brought up many other places we could be intervening that we could save more lives—many places in Africa. If we expend the same amount of dollars like we are going to expend in Kosovo, we could save many more lives. This attack is premeditated and the Congress is an afterthought. They want us to agree to it after they have already decided to go.

This is a great institution, the Senate. I have come to love it in a very short time. These debates should be before the fact, not after the administration has already made up their mind to bomb. The same is true about sending ground troops.

I want to ask President Clinton these questions: What vital American security interests are at stake? What is the long-term strategy for the region? Not only do we bomb one wave and a second wave, and a third request is to send in 4,000 additional men and women from the United States in ground troops. What is the long-term strategy for the region? How do we get in and how do we get out? How long will the troops be deployed? What is their mission?

What is the mission they are supposed to accomplish?

Will we be forced to deploy more ground troops if the 4,000 are not sufficient?

Will foreign commanders be commanding our troops under NATO?

What are the rules of engagement?

How will the mission be paid for?

What valuable dollars will be taken away from military readiness accounts to pay for this?

What is our exit strategy?

President Clinton, you have not answered these questions. You have not come before the Congress of the United States and asked for our help. I think it is essential that you do so before you send one American into harm's way when you have not proven the need to do it.

I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if I might use my 5 minutes and engage the Senator in a colloquy and then yield the floor.

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I have to preside at 6.

Mr. WARNER. At some point, we have to have some rebuttal to the strong arguments on this side. I yield to the Senator.

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Virginia very much. I am sorry to assert myself at this point, but I have to preside shortly.

Mr. President, I think the Senate and the American people, hopefully, heard a number of strong arguments questioning whether or not we should start this bombing campaign at this point in time.

Let me say categorically, I am concerned about the carnage that is taking place in Kosovo and in Europe and the number of people who are displaced that the newspapers put at 45,000, the number of people who have been killed, and the possibility of refugees in the surrounding area.

Let me also say that if our troops are engaged and are starting to bomb or are put there, I will support the troops. If they go to battle, I will support them. But this action at this point in time seems to me to be ill-advised. If the Senate has not been properly consulted, the American people have not been properly consulted and brought along, and we should back up and rethink what we are about to do in this area. We are making an act of war against a sovereign nation, with likely loss of U.S. life, and neither the Senate nor this Nation has been adequately consulted.

The Senator from Delaware previously spoke and talked about the objective is to stop oppression that is occurring. I am supportive of stopping oppression, but if we are looking at oppression, that occurs a number of places around the world.

If we want to stop oppression, I have a better suggestion. Let's engage in the Sudan, not with troops, not with bombing, but let's support the southern Sudanese. They have 4 million people displaced at the present time. Two million

have had a loss of life, and there you have a government in Khartoum that is supporting terrorism in the surrounding region in Uganda, Eritrea, and Congo, that is expanding, that is a militant fundamentalist regime that seeks to do us harm. There you have a vital strategic United States interest.

If we want to stop oppression, let's supply and support the southern Sudanese. If that is what the objective is, then let's do something there where we can help save more lives, help more people, and also a vital and strategic U.S. interest.

I do not see us doing that. The situation taking place in Europe is a sad situation, but one where I really question whether we should put forth the loss of U.S. lives which is contemplated at this point in time.

Perhaps this can be explained over some period of time. Perhaps the administration can engage the American public and the Congress to get that kind of support. But I cannot give that at this point in time on the basis of the information I have to date.

Plus, what is the plan? The Senator from Kentucky just asked a number of very simple and very basic questions. Here is a Member of the Senate asking these sorts of simple and basic questions, saying, "I don't know the answers to these things." Nor do I.

Have we been sufficiently brought along and engaged and had discussions on these items that we can have such basic questions and not even know the answers to them? We have been told there is going to be a bombing campaign, maybe several ways of bombing. What if Mr. Milosevic does not blink at that point in time and says, "OK, we are going to support some kind of autonomy in Kosovo"? What then? What is the plan at that point in time? Are we engaging ground troops not in a peacekeeping but aggressive fashion? I do not think people will support that.

After Kosovo, is it Montenegro next where we will be going in and supporting, supplying people who want a separatist movement, if that were to happen in that region of the former Yugoslavia? What next? And what is the full plan?

We just do not have the answers to these questions, and we are about to take an act against a sovereign nation that is likely to result in the loss of U.S. lives.

Now is the time to debate and discuss and to back up and slow down on this, have the administration engage the American public, engage the Congress in answering the simple questions that my colleagues have put forward. Now is the time to do that.

I ask the President, please, let's have that sort of discussion on those sorts of specifics with the American public before we move in to what I think could be a very ill-fated, ill-timed, and inappropriate action at this point in time by the United States.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.

It is my hope to engage, through some questioning, my colleagues. The distinguished Senator from Kentucky left. I did not want an impression left with the Senate that nothing has been done on the complicated issues of Kosovo as related to Bosnia, as related to the region.

The Armed Services Committee has had a series of hearings, a series of briefings. The distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee knows of an amendment that the bill contained last year by Senator ROBERTS which outlined considerable work in this area. So I believe the Senate has addressed this issue off and on for some time.

The Armed Services Committee last week, when we had all four of the Service Chiefs up, we asked each one specifically, regarding the risk of this operation, what opposition they were going to meet in terms of air defense alone, and they replied it was significant, it was multiples of two or three of what had been experienced in Bosnia, which is being experienced almost every day in Iraq. We have had a considerable deliberation, I think, in various areas of the Senate. This is, of course, the first action.

It is my hope that very shortly, with the concurrence of the two leaders, Mr. LOTT and Mr. DASCHLE, we can send to the desk a relatively short resolution which will provide Senators with a clear up-or-down vote. I will just read a draft. It as yet has not been finally approved. It is submitted by Mr. BIDEN, myself, Mr. WARNER, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. BYRD, and Mr. MCCONNELL. Those are the sponsors to date.

It reads:

Concurrent resolution—Authorizing the President of the United States to conduct military air operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Resolved by the Senate . . .

That the President of the United States is authorized to conduct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with our NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

That clarity was achieved by a group of six of us. The distinguished majority whip, Mr. NICKLES, sort of had the unofficial job of presiding over the group. He made it clear from the beginning his opposition to this, but, nevertheless, I think we succeeded in devising what the Senate desired, and hope will be concurred in, in terms of bringing it up for further debate of this resolution.

I yield the floor.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, are we under some time agreement?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BROWNBACK). The time agreements have expired.

Mr. DOMENICI. Thirty minutes has expired?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 30 minutes has expired.

Mr. DOMENICI. May I have 3 minutes? I ask unanimous consent that I have 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no time limit now. The Senator can speak as he wishes.

Mr. DOMENICI. Then I will speak to my heart's content.

Mr. STEVENS. No. No. No.

Mr. DOMENICI. I say to the Senator, you don't think that should be the case? Who knows. My heart's content may be only 3 or 4 minutes on this issue.

Mr. President, I believe under the guise of the Constitution, which gives the President, as Commander in Chief, some very, very strong powers over what he does, where he places, and what he asks our military to do, that we are beginning now, in this President's administration, to go down the slippery path that the President can engage our military almost anywhere, any time, so long as it pleases him and he decides it is in our national interest.

I say, shame on the President. If this is such an important matter, why could he not trust the Senate and the House to ask us whether we concur?

Let me say, Mr. President—not the President who occupies the Chair, but our President down on Pennsylvania Avenue—with your last budget, we will have spent \$12.3 billion in Bosnia—\$12.3 billion. There was not even enough money in the defense budget. At one point we had to declare it an emergency, after 3 years of being involved, to pay for it, because to pay for it would have stripped our military of other things that they desperately need to be our strong military force.

What are we up to? We are going to take up the budget on the floor, and I predict that if we authorize, or do not authorize the President, he is going to do it anyway. And there will be Senators from the other side of the aisle who will stand up and want to take money out of the Defense Department to spend on domestic programs. But they will vote here tonight to send our men and women off to this war and claim they will never go in there.

But let me tell you, this is a very, very unintelligible plan. You cannot rationally accept the President's reasoning unless you conclude that they do not want to tell you where it is going to end up. It does not take a lot of sense to say airstrike No. 1 may not work, airstrike No. 2 may not work. We have been told by military experts years ago that airstrikes would not work in this area of the world.

So what then happens? That is the extent of our plan? Who believes that? I ask those who believe in the great United States of America, with its President leading the way, who sent the bombers in, sent in the stealth fighters, sent in the Tomahawk missiles—and the big leader who has caused all the trouble is not dead yet and will not quit, what are we going to do?

I asked the question already of the leaders representing the President, and they say there is no plan. Wait a minute. No plan? Well, NATO may

have a plan, but America does not have a plan for the third phase, which is probably putting military men and women in harm's way.

What is NATO without America? They have just described, NATO without America in these airstrikes probably could not get the job done. The whole of NATO without us probably would not undertake it. So do you believe the third phase, which we do not want to talk about, is going to get done without America, if there is a third phase?

And will there be a third phase? I do not know. I have a hunch that phase 1, of airstrikes from a distance through Tomahawk missiles, and phase 2, with actual airplanes of one sort or another, may not work. I would think it would be fair for the President of the United States, since we have been at this issue for months—as it got worse they threatened and then pulled the threat—to ask the Senate, as George Bush did, and get concurrence. And if we did not concur, wouldn't it be a pretty good signal that we do not think it is right? What is wrong with that?

As I understand it, there will be an amendment, there will be a proposal, freestanding perhaps, asking that we concur with the President of the United States in airstrikes. I am not going to vote for it, because I do not think that is the end of it.

I ask one simple question: Is this not a declaration of war without asking us, who, under the Constitution, were given authority to declare war? Isn't it an invasion of a sovereign country by a military that is more than half American? I believe it is. You can make all kinds of rationalizations that it is not an invasion, but it is. Is it not a civil war? Yes, it is. Is it not a civil war of long lasting? It did not start last week.

These people have been at civil war for God knows how long. And they are going to be there after the airstrikes unless there is a large contingent of soldiers to keep the peace. Is that what we are going to do? Are we going to have soldiers in there under the third phase or the fourth phase? What if they just do not agree to a peace treaty after all these bombs? Do we walk away? I do not believe we will. From my standpoint, we never should have gone in.

So, Mr. President, I believe the President of the United States, once again, has waited so long that he has us right in a spot. He does it all the time. He has us in the spot that a terrible tragedy is going to occur unless we agree with him in the next 24 hours, or perhaps he even thinks unless you have already agreed with me today. But who knows, the Tomahawks may be flying tonight. At this point it is dark over there. And that is when they will start. Everybody knows that.

So I say to the President of the United States, since you like us to consider your prerogatives under the U.S. Constitution—and we do it all the time—why don't you consider ours?

Why don't you ask us? And why don't you wait until we give you an answer? That seems fair to me. What we are doing is not fair to the Congress. And if it isn't fair to us, it is not fair to our people.

I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator yield for a moment of colloquy here?

Mr. DOMENICI. Sure.

Mr. WARNER. A group of us met this morning with the President. We had a very thorough exchange of views. Senator BYRD raised the issue of the President asking the Senate. I followed Senator BYRD and repeated the question. And he said orally: "Yes, I do want the support of the Senate, indeed, the Congress." And he has now sent a letter to the leadership of the Congress.

Mr. DOMENICI. What does it say?

Mr. WARNER. I say to the Senator, I will be happy to read it.

DEAR MR. LEADER: I appreciate the opportunity to consult closely with the Congress regarding events in Kosovo.

The United States' national interests are clear and significant. The ongoing effort by President Milosevic to attack and repress the people of Kosovo could ignite a wider European war with dangerous consequences to the United States. This is a conflict with no natural boundaries. If it continues it will push refugees across borders and draw in neighboring countries.

NATO has authorized air strikes against the Former Yugoslavia to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to address the threat to peace and security in the Balkan region and Europe. Mr. Milosevic should not doubt our resolve. Therefore, without regard to our differing views on the Constitution about the use of force, I ask for your legislative support as we address the crisis in Kosovo.

We all can be proud of our armed forces as they stand ready to answer the call of duty in the Balkans.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON.

I say to my colleague, what is the consequence if we do nothing, if we do nothing, if we stand there? Here we are, the leader of NATO. Here we are, the leader of so many agreements throughout Europe that have provided for the greater security of Europe in the past, throughout the history of NATO.

What do we say to the men and women of the Armed Forces who will be in the airplanes, perhaps as early as tomorrow some time? I am not predicting the hour, but it could be. What do we say to them? That the people of the United States, through their elected Representatives, are not supportive?

I know the strong arguments against going in. And I respect my colleague. But I say to my colleague, it has not been spoken, with clarity, as to what the consequences are if we do nothing. I predict it would be an absolutely disastrous situation in that region, that it could grow in proportion far beyond the crisis of the moment, and that at that juncture, if military action were required, it would require greater military force than envisioned by the limited airstrike, limited in the sense that that component of our arsenal and that

of 18 other nations—this is a 19-nation operation—be required to stamp out a literal implosion of that whole Balkan region. I say to my good friend, I respect his views, but I think we also have to address what happens if we do nothing.

I recognize we are intruding on the time of the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee and others. I know of no more significant issue than to send our people into harm's way, which requires the debate of the Senate. I shall stand here at every opportunity I can to give my views on why I think it is essential that we approve the actions as recommended.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I don't believe Senator WARNER, with all the respect that we hold for him, should stand on the floor of the Senate and say that anyone who votes that we should not go in there will not be in support of the military people who happen to go in there because the President prevailed.

As a matter of fact, most of the Senators who have supported the military of the United States to the highest extent over the years will probably be voting against sending them in, but will be right there supporting them, and the Senator knows that and they should know that.

I do my share in my little role as a budgeteer to see that the military gets sufficient money, and I will do that again this year. I hope you all come down here when people want to take the money away from them. Just because I don't like what they are doing doesn't mean I don't love the military and the men and women out there doing it. We will support them, but we have a right to warn the American people and tell them what this is all about.

If you say, What is going to happen if we don't? I ask you, what happened in the other countries of the world that had revolutions where hundreds of thousands of people were killed and we didn't go in because it wasn't in our national interest?

I happen to think that is the case here. It is not in our national interest.

Mr. WARNER. If I could reply, nothing in the remarks by the Senator from Virginia in this moment or earlier today from this period infer that a Senator voting against this proposed resolution in its draft form in any way does not support the men and women of the Armed Forces.

I simply say at this hour when we are trying to debate this, it would seem to me that those who can come and support this resolution—it is clearly in support of what they are about to do; they are likely to go.

I am convinced that the President has a resolve with the other leaders of NATO to go forth with this military mission. It is important that debate here in the Senate take place. Every Senator will vote his or her conscience, and I know that there will be 100 votes in support of the troops if they are

called upon to take on this high risk together with their families.

Mr. REID addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRAPO). The Senator from Nevada.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have been waiting here for an hour. I was supposed to get the floor at 6:10.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, that is why I asked permission to get the floor. I am happy to yield to the Appropriations chairman. In fact, I will direct the question to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee.

I wanted to make an inquiry through the Chair to the manager of this bill and the chairman of the Appropriations Committee as to how we are coming on the supplemental emergency appropriations bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.

Mr. STEVENS. I think the Senator from New Mexico still has the floor.

Mr. DOMENICI. I will use only 1 minute.

Let me say, I had no reluctance to ask the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee to read the President's letter. Without having seen it, I know it would not contain words saying "and if you do not vote in support I will not send them in." It merely said, "I sure would like to have you joining me."

President Bush didn't do that. He said, "Concur or we don't have a war." There is a big difference.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield to my friend for a comment or question or whatever he wants, but I want to get back to this bill.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, directing a question through the Chair to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, could the Senator bring us up to date as to how we are doing on the underlying legislation; namely, the supplemental appropriations bill?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am delighted to do that. I hope to get involved in this statement about Kosovo sometime tonight, and I think it will be a late night. Everybody ought to be on notice. I am going to try to finish the supplemental bill tonight.

We have the managers' package coming and it is being brought to me. I hope the people are listening right now. I am prepared to outline that. We do have an amendment that is pending, the Murkowski amendment. I understand the Senator from Montana will make a motion to table that and that will require a vote. We also have an amendment that I have been requested by the leader to offer concerning the question of rule XVI. I understand that may be objected to. We will have to see how to handle that when it occurs. I do believe we will have to handle it tonight. I have the managers' package of about 10 amendments that have been cleared on both sides and are being analyzed from the point of view of the budget. It would be my hope we could proceed with that matter now.

Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator allow me to make a unanimous consent request?

Mr. STEVENS. Yes. I am not saying I might not object to it, though.

Mr. WARNER. I am trying to put a record together for the benefit of all Senators. I simply ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the letter that President Bush sent the Senate in 1991, so each Senator can compare them.

Mr. STEVENS. Reserving the right to object, so long as the Senator also has printed at the same time for the RECORD the joint resolution that was adopted by a vote of 52-47, following President Bush's letter.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. WARNER. I shall not object because I drew up the resolution, if the Senator will look at the first name on it.

There being no objection, the letter and joint resolution were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[Letter dated January 8, 1991 from President George Bush to Hon. Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives, requesting that the House of Representatives and the Senate adopt a resolution stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 678]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, January 8, 1991.

Hon. THOMAS S. FOLEY,
Speaker of the House,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by the UN Security Council on twelve separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.

Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have been most constructive if he could have presented the Iraqi government a Resolution passed by both houses of Congress supporting the UN position and in particular Security Council Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently stated my desire for such a Resolution. Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for peace and safeguard this country's vital interests.

I therefore request that the House of Representatives and the Senate adopt a Resolution stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to implement UN Security Council Resolution 678. Such action would send the clearest possible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw without condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything less would risk detracting from the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression.

Mr. Speaker, I am determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security. I ask Congress to join me in this task. I can think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the President

at this critical time. This truly is the last best chance for peace.

Sincerely,

GEORGE BUSH.

JOINT RESOLUTION

Whereas the Government of Iraq without provocation invaded and occupied the territory of Kuwait on August 2, 1990;

Whereas both the House of Representatives (in H.J. Res. 658 of the 101st Congress) and the Senate (in S. Con. Res. 147 of the 101st Congress) have condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and declared their support for international action to reverse Iraq's aggression;

Whereas, Iraq's conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and its demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to world peace;

Whereas the international community has demanded that Iraq withdraw unconditionally and immediately from Kuwait and that Kuwait's independence and legitimate government be restored;

Whereas the United Nations Security Council repeatedly affirmed the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

Whereas, in the absence of full compliance by Iraq with its resolutions, the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 678 has authorized member states of the United Nations to use all necessary means, after January 15, 1991, to uphold and implement all relevant Security Council resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area; and

Whereas Iraq has persisted in its illegal occupation of, and brutal aggression against Kuwait; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution".

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) AUTHORIZATION.—The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677.

(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS NECESSARY.—Before exercising the authority granted in subsection (a), the President shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that—

(1) the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council resolutions cited in subsection (a); and

(2) that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.

(c) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.—Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

SEC. 3. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

At least once every 60 days, the President shall submit to the Congress a summary on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in response to Iraq's aggression.

Approved January 14, 1991.

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.

Mr. REID. Will the chairman yield for a question?

Mr. STEVENS. I am happy to yield.

Mr. REID. I wonder if the chairman could attempt to get clearance from the two leaders—maybe one way to move this along is to vote on the underlying motion to table that will be made shortly.

Mr. STEVENS. I am pleased to do that, but we have to check with both sides to see about the timing. I hope the Senator will help me on that. I will check, also, to see if we can get an agreement as to when that should be.

At the present time, am I correct, Mr. President, the pending business is the Murkowski amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for a parliamentary inquiry.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Where in the line is the Hutchison amendment?

Mr. STEVENS. The Hutchison amendment was put aside. It is my understanding, I say to the Senator from Texas, it was put aside so we could proceed with the balance of the supplemental. It will be the last amendment to be considered. It could be called up by requesting the regular order by either the majority leader or myself.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. At some point following the Murkowski amendment, I would like the opportunity to address my amendment and set it aside.

Mr. STEVENS. Is my understanding correct that the amendment of the Senator from Texas is set aside?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is set aside, subject to being called back by the Senator from Texas or the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. STEVENS. Very well. Then the Senator has that right. It was not my understanding at the time, but I am prepared—I am not prepared to yield this floor until I can find out how we can get back to getting some votes and get these matters resolved and finish this bill tonight.

I know my colleague is seeking to be recognized. There was a Senator who was supposed to come over and make a motion to table the amendment of my colleague. As my colleague knows, I don't do that.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Will the floor manager yield for a question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from Alaska yield to the Senator from Alaska?

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, it would be my pleasure at this time to yield briefly to my colleague for a question.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. What I am attempting to do is accommodate the floor manager by advising him that we are certainly ready for a vote on a tabling motion, so that you can advise Members of the scheduled for the balance of the evening. Maybe we can get a time certain.

Mr. STEVENS. I say to my friend and colleague that we are checking out the time of 6:45. I hope that clears. It is my understanding that Senator REID will make the motion to table the amendment of the Senator from Alaska. I could at this time start with the process of reviewing some of these amendments in my manager's package.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I wonder if I could pretty much count on that. I would like to leave for about 20 minutes.

Mr. STEVENS. My friend can be assured that it won't happen before 6:45. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Nevada for the purpose of making a motion to table.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Montana, Senator BAUCUS, I move to table the Murkowski amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote occur at 6:45.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. 113 WITHDRAWN

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to vitiate Senate action on amendment No. 113 and ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have the manager's package that I mentioned, which includes 10 amendments. As I have said, we tried our best to clear these amendments throughout the Senate. I hope the Senate will agree to this package. It has been cleared on both sides.

First is an amendment by Senator HELMS to appropriate, with a corresponding rescission, funds for the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Second is an amendment by Senator GRASSLEY to appropriate, with a corresponding rescission, funds for regional applications programs, consistent with the direction and the report to accompany Public Law 105-277. Third is an amendment by myself to allow military technicians, while deployed, to receive per diem expenses. Fourth is an amendment by myself clarifying the intent of the fiscal year 1998 and 1999 Interior and related agency appropriations bills in relation to Pike's Peak Summit House. Fifth is an amendment by Senator GREGG in relation to an issue for renewal of fishing permits and fishing